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@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ relations:
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with: "[[Warren Commission]]"
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start: 1963-11-29
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end: 1964-09-24
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fn: 11
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fn: 12
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---
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Allen Welsh Dulles (April 7, 1893 - January 29, 1969) served as [[Director of Central Intelligence]] from February 26, 1953, to November 29, 1961 - the longest tenure of any DCI, the first civilian DCI, and the only brother of a sitting Secretary of State to hold the position. Dulles built the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] into the instrument of Cold War covert action that executed [[Operation AJAX]] in [[Iran]] (1953), [[Operation PBSUCCESS]] in [[Guatemala]] (1954), and the [[Bay of Pigs]] invasion of [[Cuba]] (1961). The Bay of Pigs disaster cost him his position - President [[John F. Kennedy]] forced his resignation, along with [[Richard Bissell]] and [[Charles P. Cabell|C.P. Cabell]] - and his subsequent appointment by President [[Lyndon B. Johnson]] to the [[Warren Commission]] investigating Kennedy's assassination placed him in the remarkable position of overseeing the investigation of the event that had ended both his patron's life and his own career.[^1]
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@ -68,13 +68,15 @@ Operation PBSUCCESS (June 1954): The CIA's overthrow of Guatemalan President [[J
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[[MKULTRA]]: Dulles authorized the CIA's human experimentation program in April 1953 under Technical Services Staff chief [[Sidney Gottlieb]]. The program used LSD and other substances on unconsenting subjects, including mental patients, prisoners, and unwitting CIA employees. Dulles's authorization memorandum noted concerns about Soviet brainwashing capabilities and framed the program as defensive research. The program's scope - eventually comprising 150 subprojects at 80 institutions - far exceeded what Dulles's authorization documents described.
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On August 26, 1960 Dulles cabled the Leopoldville station that the station officer was to be given "wider authority," including "even more aggressive action if it can remain covert," and wrote that "we realize that targets of opportunity may present themselves to you."[^8] The cable authorized up to $100,000 "to carry out any crash programs on which you do not have the opportunity to consult HQS," and assured the station officer that the message had been "seen and approved at competent level" in the State Department.[^8] The Church Committee documented the cable as one of a sequence that began with Tweedy's cable of August 18, 1960 and Bissell's of August 19.[^8]
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### MKULTRA: The Sandoz Panic and the Olson Death
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Dulles approved MKULTRA on April 13, 1953, ten days after Richard Helms proposed a program for the "covert use of biological and chemical materials," with an initial $300,000 exempt from normal financial controls and payable blindly on the signatures of Gottlieb and TSS chief [[Willis Gibbons]]. Acting in a climate of Cold War urgency, that same month Dulles approved a $240,000 payment after an intelligence report claimed [[Sandoz]] wanted to sell 10 kilograms of [[LSD]] on the open market; CIA officers flew to Switzerland with a black bag of cash only to learn Sandoz had produced barely 40 grams in fifteen years, the entire panic stemming from a military attaché who confused milligrams with kilograms. When [[Frank Olson]] died in November 1953 after Gottlieb dosed him with LSD at [[Deep Creek Lodge]], Dulles ordered Inspector General [[Lyman Kirkpatrick]] to investigate; the resulting reprimands were softened through six drafts and placed in no personnel file.[^8]
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Dulles approved MKULTRA on April 13, 1953, ten days after Richard Helms proposed a program for the "covert use of biological and chemical materials," with an initial $300,000 exempt from normal financial controls and payable blindly on the signatures of Gottlieb and TSS chief [[Willis Gibbons]]. Acting in a climate of Cold War urgency, that same month Dulles approved a $240,000 payment after an intelligence report claimed [[Sandoz]] wanted to sell 10 kilograms of [[LSD]] on the open market; CIA officers flew to Switzerland with a black bag of cash only to learn Sandoz had produced barely 40 grams in fifteen years, the entire panic stemming from a military attaché who confused milligrams with kilograms. When [[Frank Olson]] died in November 1953 after Gottlieb dosed him with LSD at [[Deep Creek Lodge]], Dulles ordered Inspector General [[Lyman Kirkpatrick]] to investigate; the resulting reprimands were softened through six drafts and placed in no personnel file.[^9]
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### Rockefeller's Special Group and the Human Ecology Front
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Under Eisenhower, Dulles reported all CIA covert operations, including MKULTRA, the coups, and assassination planning, to the NSC "[[Special Group]]" chaired by [[Nelson Rockefeller]], the structure formalized by NSC 5412/2 in December 1955 that gave the president plausible deniability; in a 1955 "Family Jewels" briefing Dulles described the full range of covert programs to Rockefeller's board. When MKULTRA needed a research hospital, Dulles sought Rockefeller's approval for a scheme to channel CIA money through private foundations to win matching federal grants for a wing at [[Georgetown University Hospital]]. The program's primary funding front, the [[Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology]], was organized at Dulles's initiative through [[Harold Wolff]], the Cornell neurologist who had treated Dulles's brain-damaged son; Dulles attended one of its first board meetings. His relationship with [[D. Ewen Cameron]] predated the funding: in November 1945, still with the OSS, Dulles had sent Cameron to Nuremberg to assess whether [[Rudolf Hess]] was fit to stand trial.[^9]
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Under Eisenhower, Dulles reported all CIA covert operations, including MKULTRA, the coups, and assassination planning, to the NSC "[[Special Group]]" chaired by [[Nelson Rockefeller]], the structure formalized by NSC 5412/2 in December 1955 that gave the president plausible deniability; in a 1955 "Family Jewels" briefing Dulles described the full range of covert programs to Rockefeller's board. When MKULTRA needed a research hospital, Dulles sought Rockefeller's approval for a scheme to channel CIA money through private foundations to win matching federal grants for a wing at [[Georgetown University Hospital]]. The program's primary funding front, the [[Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology]], was organized at Dulles's initiative through [[Harold Wolff]], the Cornell neurologist who had treated Dulles's brain-damaged son; Dulles attended one of its first board meetings. His relationship with [[D. Ewen Cameron]] predated the funding: in November 1945, still with the OSS, Dulles had sent Cameron to Nuremberg to assess whether [[Rudolf Hess]] was fit to stand trial.[^10]
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### Bay of Pigs and Forced Resignation
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@ -82,24 +84,26 @@ The Bay of Pigs invasion of April 17-19, 1961 was the catastrophic failure that
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Kennedy publicly accepted responsibility but was privately furious. He reportedly told aide [[Ted Sorensen]] that he wanted to "splinter the CIA into a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds" - a remark almost certainly apocryphal in its precise wording but consistent with his documented anger. The Taylor Commission's findings and the classified Kirkpatrick IG report both pointed to fundamental CIA failures in planning, execution, and judgment.
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Dulles submitted his resignation in September 1961; it was formally accepted November 29, 1961. He was replaced by [[John McCone]]. The CIA's own history states that a "humiliated President Kennedy did not wait for either report before cleaning house at CIA" and that he accepted resignations from Dulles and from Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell, who stayed at their posts until their successors were selected a few months later.[^10] Bissell and Cabell were also forced out. CIA veterans viewed their dismissal as Kennedy scapegoating the agency for a failure the [[White House]] had co-created by canceling the air strikes.[^1]
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Dulles submitted his resignation in September 1961; it was formally accepted November 29, 1961. He was replaced by [[John McCone]]. The CIA's own history states that a "humiliated President Kennedy did not wait for either report before cleaning house at CIA" and that he accepted resignations from Dulles and from Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell, who stayed at their posts until their successors were selected a few months later.[^11] Bissell and Cabell were also forced out. CIA veterans viewed their dismissal as Kennedy scapegoating the agency for a failure the [[White House]] had co-created by canceling the air strikes.[^1]
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### The Warren Commission
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On November 29, 1963 - exactly two years after Dulles's forced resignation - President Lyndon Johnson appointed the Warren Commission to investigate Kennedy's assassination. Among the seven commissioners Johnson named was Allen Dulles despite Kennedy’s firing of Dulles.[^11]
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On November 29, 1963 - exactly two years after Dulles's forced resignation - President Lyndon Johnson appointed the Warren Commission to investigate Kennedy's assassination. Among the seven commissioners Johnson named was Allen Dulles despite Kennedy’s firing of Dulles.[^12]
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The investigation was examining whether CIA-connected parties (specifically the anti-Castro exile networks and organized crime figures that Dulles had directly overseen) had any role in the assassination. He was now in a position to shape what evidence the Commission sought, what witnesses it called, and what conclusions it reached regarding the CIA programs he had run.
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Dulles was reportedly among the most active commissioners in shaping the investigation's scope. He briefed commissioners on CIA history and procedures. Book V of the Church Committee's final report states that, with the exception of Dulles, it is unlikely anyone on the Warren Commission knew of the CIA's assassination efforts, and that Dulles knew of the plots with underworld figures that had taken place during his tenure as Director of Central Intelligence.[^12] The Church Committee's 1975 interim report states that Dulles "did not inform the other members about the plots that had occurred during his term as DCI,"[^13] and also states that "it is not entirely certain that Dulles was ever made aware of the true nature of the underworld operation."[^14] The [[ZR/RIFLE]] assassination plotting program was, in the same period, not disclosed to the Commission at the agency level by [[Richard Helms]] as Deputy Director for Plans. Helms testified that Dulles "was sitting right there" in the Commission's deliberations and "knew about this," and that he did not know what Dulles had said to the Commission about the plots.[^15] The CIA's failure to disclose the assassination plots to the Warren Commission was documented by the Church Committee in 1975; Dulles's role as both a commissioner and the former DCI who had authorized the programs is the structural conflict of interest the Commission's composition created.
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Dulles was reportedly among the most active commissioners in shaping the investigation's scope. He briefed commissioners on CIA history and procedures. Book V of the Church Committee's final report states that, with the exception of Dulles, it is unlikely anyone on the Warren Commission knew of the CIA's assassination efforts, and that Dulles knew of the plots with underworld figures that had taken place during his tenure as Director of Central Intelligence.[^13] The Church Committee's 1975 interim report states that Dulles "did not inform the other members about the plots that had occurred during his term as DCI,"[^14] and also states that "it is not entirely certain that Dulles was ever made aware of the true nature of the underworld operation."[^15] The [[ZR/RIFLE]] assassination plotting program was, in the same period, not disclosed to the Commission at the agency level by [[Richard Helms]] as Deputy Director for Plans. Helms testified that Dulles "was sitting right there" in the Commission's deliberations and "knew about this," and that he did not know what Dulles had said to the Commission about the plots.[^16] The CIA's failure to disclose the assassination plots to the Warren Commission was documented by the Church Committee in 1975; Dulles's role as both a commissioner and the former DCI who had authorized the programs is the structural conflict of interest the Commission's composition created.
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Angleton testified that Dulles consulted him before agreeing to President Johnson's request that he serve, that the two were in frequent contact, and that they informally discussed the progress of the investigation and what further work the CIA could do.[^16] At the January 22, 1964 executive session, the Commission took up a report that [[Lee Harvey Oswald]] had been a paid FBI informant. Dulles asked whether the purpose of such a hire could have been to penetrate the [[Fair Play for Cuba Committee]]. He said that practically any American could obtain a passport good for anywhere, and that the Passport Bureau had no record of Oswald's defection. Near the end of the meeting, Dulles said: "I think this record ought to be destroyed."[^17] FBI Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]]'s files held an index card on Dulles that cross-referenced a November 29, 1963 memorandum.[^18]
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Angleton testified that Dulles consulted him before agreeing to President Johnson's request that he serve, that the two were in frequent contact, and that they informally discussed the progress of the investigation and what further work the CIA could do.[^17] At the January 22, 1964 executive session, the Commission took up a report that [[Lee Harvey Oswald]] had been a paid FBI informant. Dulles asked whether the purpose of such a hire could have been to penetrate the [[Fair Play for Cuba Committee]]. He said that practically any American could obtain a passport good for anywhere, and that the Passport Bureau had no record of Oswald's defection. Near the end of the meeting, Dulles said: "I think this record ought to be destroyed."[^18] FBI Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]]'s files held an index card on Dulles that cross-referenced a November 29, 1963 memorandum.[^19]
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The [[HSCA|House Select Committee on Assassinations]] (1979) found that the Warren Commission's failure to investigate adequately the possibility of a conspiracy was "attributable in part to the failure of the Commission to receive all the relevant information that was in the possession of other agencies and departments of the Government," and that the CIA "was deficient in its collection and sharing of information both prior to and subsequent to the assassination."[^19] The report does not name Dulles in those findings. It states that the committee did not ignore the possibility that certain CIA officials who knew that close scrutiny of United States-Cuban relations could have exposed the CIA-Mafia plots might have tried to keep the CIA's or the Warren Commission's inquiry from the question of Cuban complicity, and that it determined that only Deputy Director Helms was in a position to have both the knowledge and the power to accomplish such a cover-up and was satisfied, on the basis of its investigation, that it was "highly unlikely he in fact did so."[^20] It found that the details of the AMLASH plot and the CIA-Mafia plots should have been provided to the Warren Commission.[^21]
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The [[HSCA|House Select Committee on Assassinations]] (1979) found that the Warren Commission's failure to investigate adequately the possibility of a conspiracy was "attributable in part to the failure of the Commission to receive all the relevant information that was in the possession of other agencies and departments of the Government," and that the CIA "was deficient in its collection and sharing of information both prior to and subsequent to the assassination."[^20] The report does not name Dulles in those findings. It states that the committee did not ignore the possibility that certain CIA officials who knew that close scrutiny of United States-Cuban relations could have exposed the CIA-Mafia plots might have tried to keep the CIA's or the Warren Commission's inquiry from the question of Cuban complicity, and that it determined that only Deputy Director Helms was in a position to have both the knowledge and the power to accomplish such a cover-up and was satisfied, on the basis of its investigation, that it was "highly unlikely he in fact did so."[^21] It found that the details of the AMLASH plot and the CIA-Mafia plots should have been provided to the Warren Commission.[^22]
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### Death and Legacy
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Dulles spent his post-CIA years writing, lecturing, and defending the covert action programs he had built. His book *The Craft of Intelligence* (1963) was the first major public account of CIA operations by a former director. He died in Washington on January 29, 1969, of influenza complicated by pneumonia, eighteen months before the full extent of MKULTRA and the assassination plots became public.
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The 2022 report of the United Nations Eminent Person summarized the argument of Greg Poulgrain's 2020 book, *JFK vs. Allen Dulles: Battleground Indonesia*, which posits that Dulles formed a motive to remove [[Dag Hammarskjöld]] following a policy conflict over the United Nations' intended intervention in the dispute over the sovereignty of West New Guinea.[^23] The report recorded Poulgrain's proposition that the Operation Celeste documents, which refer to a plan to kill Hammarskjöld by causing his plane to crash, mention Dulles by name, stating: "UNO is becoming troublesome and it is felt that Hammarskjöld should be removed. Allen Dulles agrees and has promised full cooperation from his people."[^23] Poulgrain compared this with the Church Committee's account of Dulles expressing a "wish [to] give every possible support" to a plan to kill Lumumba.[^23] The report stated that it was not necessary at that stage to assess the probative value of Poulgrain's information, and that it underscored the importance of "proving or disproving the veracity of the Operation Celeste hypothesis and Dulles's alleged involvement (as relied on by Poulgrain)."[^24]
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### Footnotes
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[^1]: Kinzer, Stephen. *The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War.* Times Books, 2013 (covers both brothers, the Sullivan & Cromwell connections, and the covert action programs). Grose, Peter. *Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles.* Houghton Mifflin, 1994.
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@ -109,17 +113,20 @@ Dulles spent his post-CIA years writing, lecturing, and defending the covert act
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[^5]: Howard L. Bevis to Allen W. Dulles, February 7, 1958, CIA-RDP80B01676R003800020106-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80b01676r003800020106-4.
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[^6]: Hugh Wilford, The Mighty Wurlitzer (Harvard University Press, 2008), pp. 230-231.
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[^7]: Kornbluh, Peter, ed. *Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba.* New Press, 1998. Church Committee. "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders." Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975. Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy.* Random House, 1991. Chapter 4.
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[^8]: John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*. Times Books, 1979, Chapter 4; "Project MKULTRA, the CIA's Program of Research in Behavioral Modification," Joint Senate Hearing, August 3, 1977.
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[^9]: Gerard Colby and Charlotte Dennett, *Thy Will Be Done: The Conquest of the Amazon*. HarperCollins, 1995, Ch. 18; John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*. Times Books, 1979, Chapter 9.
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[^10]: Warner, Michael, "The CIA's Internal Probe of the Bay of Pigs Affair: Lessons Unlearned," *Studies in Intelligence*, Winter 1998-1999. https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/static/Internal-Probe-Bay-Pigs.pdf
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[^11]: Executive Order 11130, "Appointing a Commission To Report Upon the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy," November 29, 1963. The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-11130-appointing-commission-report-upon-the-assassination-president-john-f
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[^12]: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies*, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, pp. 67-68. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf
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[^13]: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report*, Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975, p. 269, note 1. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
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[^14]: *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, p. 267. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
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[^15]: Book V, p. 70 (Helms testimony of July 18, 1975). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf
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[^16]: Book V, p. 69 (note 134, Angleton testimony of February 6, 1976, pp. 31-34). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf
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[^17]: Warren Commission, executive session transcript, January 22, 1964, 5:30 to 7:00 p.m. https://aarclibrary.org/publib/jfk/wc/wcexec/pdf/WcEx0122.pdf
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[^18]: U.S. Assassination Records Review Board, memorandum by Ronald G. Haron, "Assassination Records Among the Files of J. Edgar Hoover (FBI-36)," January 8, 1998. https://documents3.theblackvault.com/documents/jfkfiles/NARA-Oct2017/ARRB/RHARON/HARON/FBIMEM.002.pdf
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[^19]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), summary Findings I.D.4 and I.D.5(b) (p. 4). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
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[^20]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report,* H. Rept. 95-1828, p. 128. https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
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[^21]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report,* H. Rept. 95-1828, pp. 112-116. https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
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[^8]: United States Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975, section on the Congo, quoting the CIA cables of August 18, August 19 and August 26, 1960. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf
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[^9]: John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*. Times Books, 1979, Chapter 4; "Project MKULTRA, the CIA's Program of Research in Behavioral Modification," Joint Senate Hearing, August 3, 1977.
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[^10]: Gerard Colby and Charlotte Dennett, *Thy Will Be Done: The Conquest of the Amazon*. HarperCollins, 1995, Ch. 18; John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*. Times Books, 1979, Chapter 9.
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[^11]: Warner, Michael, "The CIA's Internal Probe of the Bay of Pigs Affair: Lessons Unlearned," *Studies in Intelligence*, Winter 1998-1999. https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/static/Internal-Probe-Bay-Pigs.pdf
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[^12]: Executive Order 11130, "Appointing a Commission To Report Upon the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy," November 29, 1963. The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-11130-appointing-commission-report-upon-the-assassination-president-john-f
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[^13]: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies*, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, pp. 67-68. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf
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[^14]: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report*, Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975, p. 269, note 1. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
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[^15]: *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, p. 267. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
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[^16]: Book V, p. 70 (Helms testimony of July 18, 1975). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf
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[^17]: Book V, p. 69 (note 134, Angleton testimony of February 6, 1976, pp. 31-34). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf
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[^18]: Warren Commission, executive session transcript, January 22, 1964, 5:30 to 7:00 p.m. https://aarclibrary.org/publib/jfk/wc/wcexec/pdf/WcEx0122.pdf
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[^19]: U.S. Assassination Records Review Board, memorandum by Ronald G. Haron, "Assassination Records Among the Files of J. Edgar Hoover (FBI-36)," January 8, 1998. https://documents3.theblackvault.com/documents/jfkfiles/NARA-Oct2017/ARRB/RHARON/HARON/FBIMEM.002.pdf
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[^20]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), summary Findings I.D.4 and I.D.5(b) (p. 4). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
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[^21]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report,* H. Rept. 95-1828, p. 128. https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
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[^22]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report,* H. Rept. 95-1828, pp. 112-116. https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
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[^23]: A/76/892, report of the Eminent Person, August 25, 2022, paragraphs 241 to 244. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
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[^24]: A/76/892, paragraph 246. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
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### The Ilopango Connection
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DEA agent [[Celerino Castillo|Celerino Castillo III]], based in [[Guatemala City]], received reports that Amador "was intending to fly into Ilopango, pick up cocaine at Hangar No. 4, and take it to Miami." When Castillo's investigation escalated, the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] station in [[El Salvador]] sent a desperate message to [[Costa Rica]] Station advising the DEA not to make inquiries about anyone at Hangar No. 4. Amador's case illustrated how the CIA's Contra supply operation and the cocaine trade used the same facilities and infrastructure.[^2]
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DEA agent [[Celerino Castillo|Celerino Castillo III]], based in [[Guatemala City]], received reports that Amador "was intending to fly into Ilopango, pick up cocaine at Hangar No. 4, and take it to Miami." The DEA office in [[Costa Rica]] sent the cable of March 20, 1986 to the Guatemala office; the Justice Department Inspector General quotes it as reporting that a source said Amador "was intending to fly an aircraft from Costa Rica through El Salvador to Miami with cocaine." On April 25, 1986 the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] station in [[El Salvador]] replied to a Costa Rica station cable of April 23: "Based on that information, [El Salvador] Station would appreciate [Costa Rica] Station advising [DEA] not to make any inquiries to anyone re: hangar no. 4 at Ilopango since only legitimate [CIA] supported operations were conducted from this facility."[^2][^3] Amador's case illustrated how the CIA's Contra supply operation and the cocaine trade used the same facilities and infrastructure.[^2]
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### DEA and CIA Records
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The CIA's file on Amador begins in November 1984, when a station cable describes him as a pilot for the [[ARDE]] group and reports that he gave the station information about another ARDE pilot fired for suspected contraband smuggling. A July or August 1985 Costa Rica station cable reported that the other pilot had suggested Amador was a possible trafficker. On August 27, 1985, a DEA Costa Rica report said a source had heard Amador planned to fly two aircraft from Miami to Colombia. The DEA agent who later reviewed it said it was filed in a general air intelligence file, which indicated there was not enough specific information to open an investigation.[^3]
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On June 10, 1986, the El Salvador station reported that the regional DEA official had told an embassy officer that Amador was suspected of heavy involvement in narcotics smuggling, and that if Amador was connected to the CIA the DEA would leave him alone. On June 17, 1986, CIA headquarters replied that its records showed no CIA "association" with Amador. The Inspector General states that the regional official was likely Country Attache [[Robert Stia]] or Castillo.[^3]
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On June 23, 1986, Castillo's debriefing report on informant STG6 described Amador as a "Contra Freedom Fighter" based in Miami who used a Salvadoran military credential to land at Ilopango without a customs search, and it asked for NADDIS checks on Amador and the aircraft listed. The DEA's NADDIS database shows no case initiated against Amador, and the Inspector General found no later DEA or FBI file on him.[^3]
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### Footnotes
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[^1]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Ch. 15.
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[^2]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Ch. 15.
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[^3]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.2 (Carlos Amador: DEA cables of August 27, 1985 and March 20, 1986; CIA cables of July and August 1985, April 23, April 25, June 10 and June 17, 1986; Castillo's June 23, 1986 debriefing report; NADDIS check). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
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@ -3,43 +3,209 @@ title: Celerino Castillo
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aliases:
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- Celerino Castillo
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- Celerino Castillo III
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- Cellerino Castillo
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- Cele
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created: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
category: "Law Enforcement & Legal"
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- Person
|
||||
- LawEnforcement
|
||||
- DEA
|
||||
- ElSalvador
|
||||
- 1980s
|
||||
- Guatemala
|
||||
- Ilopango
|
||||
- ContraWar
|
||||
- CIAContraDrugs
|
||||
- DarkAllianceInvestigation
|
||||
summary: "DEA agent who discovered Contra drug trafficking operations at Ilopango Air Force Base in El Salvador and had his investigation repeatedly shut down by the CIA and State Department."
|
||||
- Powderburns
|
||||
- FirearmsConviction
|
||||
summary: "DEA agent whose reports of drug flights from Ilopango Air Base were closed, in his account, by CIA and Embassy pressure, and whose core claims the 1997 Justice Department Inspector General wrote were not substantiated."
|
||||
born: 1949-01-01
|
||||
location: "Edinburg, Texas"
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[DEA]]"
|
||||
start: 1979
|
||||
end: 1992
|
||||
role: "special agent in New York, Peru and the Guatemala City regional office; left in 1992 on disability retirement after a proposed removal"
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[DEA]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 1991-12
|
||||
end: 1992
|
||||
role: "proposed removal on six charges, including misappropriation of funds and the sale of firearms to an informant; resolved by disability retirement"
|
||||
fn: 21
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[Walter Grasheim]]"
|
||||
start: 1986-10-27
|
||||
end: 1986-11-21
|
||||
role: "DEA case on Grasheim opened by Castillo and closed by Country Attache Robert Stia"
|
||||
fn: 8
|
||||
- type: reported_to
|
||||
with: "[[Edwin Corr]]"
|
||||
start: 1986
|
||||
end: 1988
|
||||
role: "briefed the ambassador on the Grasheim investigation and on Ilopango drug allegations"
|
||||
fn: 11
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 1997-06
|
||||
role: "declined an interview on conditions he set; the Inspector General's chapter X reviewed his allegations"
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
- type: prosecuted
|
||||
with: "[[Department of Justice]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 2008-03
|
||||
end: 2012-07
|
||||
role: "charged in March 2008 in the Western District of Texas; pleaded guilty October 1, 2008 to two counts of a superseding information; sentenced October 22, 2008 to 37 months; Fifth Circuit affirmed in 2009; motion to vacate denied July 2012"
|
||||
fn: 29
|
||||
---
|
||||
[[DEA]] agent Celerino Castillo III was assigned to the DEA's regional office in [[Guatemala City]] in October 1985, covering both [[Guatemala]] and [[El Salvador]]. Two days into his new job, agent-in-charge Robert Stia warned him that the U.S. government was running a covert operation at [[Ilopango Airbase|Ilopango Air Force Base]] and Castillo should not interfere with it. At the time, El Salvador produced no drugs and had no major drug rings; the DEA had never opened an office in the country.[^1]
|
||||
[[DEA]] special agent Celerino Castillo III served with the agency from 1979 to 1992, in [[New York City]], in [[Peru]] and in the regional office in [[Guatemala City]], which covered [[El Salvador]]. From that office he reported that pilots flying [[Contras|Contra]] resupply aircraft out of [[Ilopango Airbase|Ilopango Air Force Base]] were trafficking cocaine to the United States, and he alleged that the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] and the U.S. Embassy shut his investigation down. He set out those allegations in the 1994 book *Powderburns: Cocaine, Contras & the Drug War*, co-written with [[Dave Harmon]], and in interviews and a 1996 protest at DEA headquarters. The [[Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General]] reviewed the allegations in 1997 and wrote that the core of them was not substantiated. The CIA Inspector General's 1998 report records CIA denials and records that bear on parts of his account. In 2008 he was charged in the Western District of Texas with conspiracy to sell firearms without a license and selling them without a license, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to 37 months, as set out below.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Through informants including a Cuban named [[Socrates Sofi-Perez]], Castillo discovered that [[Contras|Contra]] pilots based at Ilopango were brazenly flying drugs to the United States and money to [[Panama]], sometimes leaving kilos in plain view or arriving with boxloads of cash. When Castillo ran the pilots' names through DEA computers, nearly all came back as documented narcotics traffickers. Among the busiest was [[Francisco Guirola Beeche]], who was observed zooming in and out of Ilopango hauling drugs in and carrying cash to the Bahamas. His key informant, known as Murga, wrote flight plans for private planes on the civilian side of the base and could move freely on the military side.[^1]
|
||||
### Assignment to Guatemala City
|
||||
|
||||
### Hangar No. 4 and CIA Obstruction
|
||||
Castillo had been a police officer in [[Edinburg, Texas]] from 1973 to 1979, when he joined the DEA as a special agent. His first posting was New York City, where he remained until 1984, when he was sent to Peru.[^1] DEA records confirm that in October 1985 he was transferred from Peru to the Guatemala City office, which covered [[Guatemala]], El Salvador, [[Belize]] and [[Honduras]], with Castillo responsible for El Salvador.[^1] Castillo told [[High Times]] that a supervisor who did not speak Spanish felt threatened by him and moved him to Central America without the promotion he had been promised. According to DEA Special Agent [[Russell Reina]], the transfer followed a photograph of Castillo posing in camouflage clothing with two machine guns that appeared on the front page of a Peruvian daily, which the DEA believed compromised his identity for undercover work.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
In March 1986, a cable from the [[Costa Rica|Costa Rican]] DEA office reported that pilot [[Carlos Amador]] intended to fly into Ilopango, pick up cocaine at Hangar No. 4, and transport it to [[Miami]]. The CIA had used Hangar No. 4 for covert Contra operations until turning it over to the [[National Security Council]] and [[Oliver North]]'s "Enterprise" in 1985. The adjoining Hangar No. 5 was still CIA-run. [[Alan Fiers]] acknowledged the CIA "had a capability and indeed a responsibility for reporting what had been happening at Ilopango." When Castillo began investigating, the CIA sent a cable asking the Costa Rica station to persuade the DEA to back off: "El Salvador Station would appreciate Costa Rica Station advising DEA not to make any inquiries into anyone re: Hangar No. 4 at Ilopango since only legitimate CIA supported operations were conducted from this facility."[^1]
|
||||
The Guatemala office had two agents, Reina and Castillo, under Country Attache [[Robert Stia]].[^2] Castillo's account, as set out in his book and in the reconstruction by [[Gary Webb]], is that Stia warned him two days after he arrived that the U.S. government was running a covert operation at Ilopango and that he should not interfere with it. Castillo also wrote that at the time El Salvador produced no drugs and the DEA had never opened an office there.[^3] The DEA opened an office in El Salvador in 1992, after Castillo had left the region.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
### Investigation Shut Down
|
||||
### Informants and the first Ilopango reports
|
||||
|
||||
U.S. Ambassador [[Edwin Corr]], to whom Castillo reported, sent a secret "back channel" cable to the [[State Department]] requesting an internal DEA review. The DEA informed Corr that Castillo's information was "totally inaccurate" and he was told to close his investigation. When Castillo continued investigating, Corr personally ordered him to "stop the witch hunt." Three years later, when Castillo opened a new investigation into drug trafficking at Hangar No. 5, the CIA refused to allow him on the base and assured him there was no drug activity. Castillo was subsequently investigated by the DEA for administrative violations and forced into disability retirement. The DEA later claimed under FOIA it had no reports from Castillo about drug trafficking at Ilopango - a claim the [[Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General|Justice Department Inspector General]] exposed as false.[^1]
|
||||
On March 20, 1986, the DEA office in [[Costa Rica]] cabled the Guatemala office that a source said [[Carlos Amador]] intended to fly an aircraft from Costa Rica through El Salvador to [[Miami]] with cocaine, possibly picking it up at "Hangar No. 4" in San Salvador. The Costa Rica office asked the Guatemala office to have the Salvadoran police investigate Amador and any persons or companies associated with Hangar No. 4. The Inspector General found no written response from the Guatemala office to that cable.[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
### Grasheim Raid and CIA Infiltration
|
||||
On June 23, 1986, Castillo filed a debriefing report on an informant designated STG6, who worked at the airport, listing alleged traffickers in El Salvador. The informant identified [[Walter Grasheim]] as the "head of smuggling operations at the Illopango [sic] Military International Airport" and said that "Grasheim owns and operates Hangar #4 at said airport." The report named thirteen other documented narcotics traffickers who used hangars four and five, and it was filed in a general "Air Intelligence" file.[^5] Castillo's book gives the Ilopango informant the name "Hugo Martinez," as the CIA report records.[^6] Webb's account names an informant known as "Murga," who wrote flight plans for private aircraft on the civilian side of the base.[^3] The Inspector General chapter identifies the informant only by the designation STG6. Webb wrote that Castillo's informant Murga "was indeed working for the CIA and had been for quite some time," citing the Inspector General's section on STG6.[^3][^5] Castillo's informants also included [[Socrates Sofi-Perez]], a Cuban whom Webb identifies as a [[Bay of Pigs]] veteran.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
Denied access to Ilopango, Castillo targeted weapons dealer [[Walter Grasheim|Walter "Wally" Grasheim]], whose home was raided on September 1, 1986. The raid uncovered automatic weapons, M-16s, hand grenades, C-4 explosives, and U.S. Embassy license plates and IDs. Grasheim claimed Castillo's informant was working for the CIA and had been used to divert attention from Ilopango. The Justice Department Inspector General confirmed the informant, Murga, was indeed a CIA asset, and the CIA demanded the DEA stop using him.[^1]
|
||||
Webb wrote that Murga told Castillo the Contra pilots were flying cocaine to the United States and money to [[Panama]], sometimes leaving with kilos in plain view or arriving with boxloads of cash, and that when Castillo ran the pilots' names through DEA computers nearly all returned as documented narcotics traffickers. One was [[Francisco Guirola Beeche]]; Webb quotes Castillo's memoir: "When I ran Guirola's name in the computer, it popped up in 11 DEA files, detailing his South America-to-United States cocaine, arms and money laundering." Webb wrote that Castillo and his informants watched Guirola move in and out of Ilopango hauling drugs in and carrying cash to the [[Bahamas]]. Webb also wrote that Castillo began sending reports on the pilots to DEA headquarters in January 1986 and received no replies.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
### Chretien's Role in Internal Investigation
|
||||
The Inspector General listed the DEA case and informant files that Castillo gave the DEA in October 1996. They include an "Air Intelligence" file (GFTF-86-9999) holding the March 20, 1986 cable on Amador, a Grasheim case file (TG-87-0003), a general aircraft file (GFTG-85-9999) and a file on the Pozo-Aparicio cocaine organization (TG-86-0001). The Inspector General reported that few of the files mention the Contras, and that most of the files it described make no mention of Contra or CIA involvement in drug trafficking.[^7]
|
||||
|
||||
After returning to Sacramento, [[Gary Webb|Webb]] phoned Castillo and told him about [[Craig Chretien|Chretien]]'s claim that there was no proof the Contras were involved in drugs. Castillo said Chretien had been one of the DEA officials sent to Guatemala to conduct the internal investigation of him. Castillo said Chretien ordered him to use the word "alleged" in his reports to Washington about Contra drug shipments from Ilopango. "They said, 'You cannot actually come out and say this shit is going on.' And I told them, 'I'm watching the fucking things fly out of here with my own eyes! Why would I have to say alleged?'" Castillo said of Chretien's denial: "Aw, bullshit. Of all people, he knows perfectly well what was going on. He was reading all my reports, looking for grammatical errors."[^2]
|
||||
### The Grasheim investigation
|
||||
|
||||
The earliest DEA reference to Grasheim that the Inspector General found was a March 10, 1986 cable from Panama. It reported that Grasheim and an Israeli national had flown into Panama from El Salvador and, when questioned, had claimed to be DEA agents. The cable also reported that the U.S. Customs Service in New York was investigating Grasheim for arms smuggling.[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
Castillo's case opening report of October 27, 1986 said that two informants had linked Grasheim to air smuggling of cocaine by subjects believed to be associated with the Contra movement. It said that Salvadoran armed forces Chief of Staff General Adolfo Blandon had limited the Salvadoran investigation "for security reasons." It also reported that on May 3, 1986 Grasheim had crash-landed an aircraft near Tamiami, Florida, identified himself as a "secret agent," and turned over a suitcase that the report said weighed about 60 pounds and contained cocaine.[^8] Grasheim's own account to the Inspector General is that a clog in his fuel line forced an emergency landing at Tamiami in 1987, that Customs had him proceed to the airport, and that no one searched his person, bags or plane.[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
On September 1, 1986, Salvadoran police searched Grasheim's residence. Castillo's report lists a small amount of marijuana, plastic explosives, cases of grenades, sniper equipment, silencers, anti-tank rockets, machine guns, pistols, night vision equipment, military radios and ammunition. Three vehicles were also seized, one with a license plate registered to the U.S. Embassy, which the Embassy denied belonged to it. Grasheim filed a sworn statement that the Salvadoran armed forces had named him a military advisor and given him the seized items, a claim the armed forces denied.[^8] Castillo later told the Office of Independent Counsel's 1991 interviewer that he had possessed Grasheim's identification cards, including a U.S. Embassy identification.[^10]
|
||||
|
||||
On October 30, 1986, Castillo and U.S. Customs agent Richard Rivera briefed Ambassador [[Edwin Corr]] on Grasheim. Corr told the Inspector General that he welcomed the investigation but asked that it be conducted discreetly, and that he had canceled U.S. government night vision contracts with Grasheim after the search. Corr said he later sent a secret "back channel" cable asking the [[State Department]] to have the DEA review Castillo's allegations. According to Corr, DEA headquarters replied that the Grasheim case would be closed for lack of evidence. The Inspector General could not find that cable or any DEA reply in DEA files, and the State Department could not find the back-channel cable either.[^11]
|
||||
|
||||
Corr told the Inspector General that after the back-channel cable Castillo's supervisors told him to close the Grasheim investigation, and that Castillo continued "to snoop around the airport and make allegations." Corr said he told Castillo that if he had evidence on Grasheim or anyone at Ilopango, Corr would support the investigation, and if he had none he would have to stop the "witch hunt."[^11] Webb's account has Corr telling Castillo to stop the "witch hunt," and reports that the DEA told Corr that Castillo's information was "totally inaccurate." Webb attributes to Corr, in his interview with Justice Department investigators, the statements that Castillo "Was a very professional and a good agent" and that the investigation had the potential to "destroy relationships with Salvadoran officials that had taken so long to build."[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
The DEA closed the case on November 21, 1986. The closing report, written by Stia, stated: "DEA has no further interest in Grasheim at this time and it is unlikely to develop further drug information about Grasheim directly." It added: "[t]he drug aspect of this portion of the investigation is concluded and therefore this particular file is closed." The DEA passed its information to Customs and the Internal Revenue Service, which were conducting their own investigation of Grasheim's exports of military equipment.[^12] Rivera told the Inspector General that Customs never developed enough evidence to charge Grasheim and eventually closed its own case.[^12]
|
||||
|
||||
### Carlos Amador and the hangar cables
|
||||
|
||||
The CIA's records on Amador begin in November 1984, when a cable describes him as a pilot for the [[ARDE]] group and reports that he had given the station information about another ARDE pilot fired for suspected contraband smuggling. A July or August 1985 Costa Rica station cable records that the other pilot had suggested Amador was a possible trafficker. The DEA office in Costa Rica had received an August 27, 1985 report that Amador planned to fly two aircraft from Miami to Colombia. The DEA official who reviewed that report later said it sat in a general air intelligence file, which indicated to him that there was not enough specific information to open an investigation.[^13]
|
||||
|
||||
After the March 20, 1986 DEA cable, the CIA's Costa Rica station wrote to the El Salvador station on April 23, 1986. On April 25 the El Salvador station replied that Amador had stopped flying for the Contras in early 1985 and had gone into private business. The reply said Hangar 4 at Ilopango was the location of Contra operations and that the station could assure that the only items moved on Amador's flights were military supplies. It then asked: "Based on that information, [El Salvador] Station would appreciate [Costa Rica] Station advising [DEA] not to make any inquiries to anyone re: hangar no. 4 at Ilopango since only legitimate [CIA] supported operations were conducted from this facility." The same cable noted that station air operations had moved from Hangar 4 into Hangar 5, which the station still occupied.[^13]
|
||||
|
||||
On June 10, 1986, the El Salvador station reported that an embassy officer, the local contact for the regional DEA official, had asked for any CIA information on Amador. According to that cable, the DEA official said that if Amador was connected to the CIA the DEA would leave him alone, and if not the DEA intended to go after him. The Inspector General judged that the regional official was likely either Robert Stia or Castillo.[^13] On June 17, 1986, CIA headquarters replied that its records showed no CIA "association" with Amador. Castillo's June 23, 1986 debriefing had described Amador as a "Contra Freedom Fighter" based in Miami who used a Salvadoran military credential to land at Ilopango without a customs search.[^5] The Inspector General found no DEA case initiated against Amador in its NADDIS database and no later DEA or FBI file on him.[^13]
|
||||
|
||||
### Hangars 4 and 5
|
||||
|
||||
The CIA Inspector General's report on the Contra story describes the hangars at Ilopango. In 1984 the CIA occupied a newly built warehouse and hangar, Hangar 5, and moved to it activities that had been conducted in the smaller Hangar 4. After the CIA moved out of Hangar 4, the [[NHAO]] and the "Private Benefactors" used it in 1985 and 1986 for Contra-related operations. The two hangars shared an aircraft parking area on a restricted part of the base controlled by the Salvadoran military.[^6] Webb wrote that CIA records show Hangar 4 was used for covert Contra operations "until it was turned over in 1985 to the National Security Council and Oliver North's illegal arms network, 'The Enterprise.'"[^3] The CIA Inspector General's account of the transfer names the NHAO and the Private Benefactors and does not name the [[National Security Council]] or [[Oliver North]].[^6] Webb quotes former CIA Central American Task Force chief [[Alan Fiers]] from his testimony in *United States v. George* on July 31, 1992: "We had a capability and indeed a responsibility for reporting what had been happening at Ilopango."[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
The same report identifies three main sources of drug trafficking allegations at Ilopango: a U.S. citizen, Castillo, and a CIA/DEA source known as STG6.[^6] [[Felix Rodriguez]], who went to El Salvador in 1985 to oversee a counterinsurgency program at Ilopango and who was known in the Contra supply operation as "Max Gomez," told the Inspector General that Hangar 4 was used by the Salvadoran military to store equipment and helicopters, that the CIA controlled Hangar 5, and that the sliding doors on both generally stood open. He said that he never saw or had reason to believe that drugs were carried by the Contra pilots, and that [[Juan Rafael Bustillo]] had asked Corr to place drug-sniffing dogs at the airfield after the DEA allegations.[^14] Rodriguez also said that he sent a mechanic named Carson back to the United States in 1986 after Carson said the Ilopango operation was "a money making project."[^14]
|
||||
|
||||
### Castillo's conversations with CIA officers
|
||||
|
||||
In the book, Castillo describes two conversations with CIA officers. In the first, on August 15, 1986, the San Salvador chief of station, whom he names as [[Jack McCavett]], denied any connection between the CIA and the Ilopango operation. Three days later, Castillo wrote, McCavett pulled $45,000 in cash from his desk drawer and told him to spend it on cars for an anti-narcotics group. In the second, Castillo says that [[Randy Kapasar]], a CIA agent in Guatemala, knew he was investigating the Contras and followed the reasoning of informant Socrates Sofi-Perez. In Castillo's account Kapasar said: "Cele, how do you think the Contras are gonna make money? They've got to run dope, that's the only way we can finance this operation."[^15]
|
||||
|
||||
The CIA Inspector General's report found CIA records showing that in mid-1986 the agency planned to spend $45,000 on three vehicles for the Government of El Salvador, and that the money was accounted for on August 18, 1986, "the same date Castillo alleged in Powderburns that he received $45,000 from a person he refers to as COS McCavett." The report added that "no information has been found to indicate that the transaction involved Castillo or DEA in any manner."[^15] The same report records an officer who met Castillo in Guatemala, and who worked with him on an unrelated project, recalling that Castillo discussed suspected narcotics trafficking at Ilopango without mentioning the Contras. That officer denied any knowledge of Contra drug trafficking and denied ever asking Castillo to back away from an investigation.[^16]
|
||||
|
||||
### The DEA's internal review
|
||||
|
||||
The Inspector General reports that in February 1987 [[Douglas Everett]], chief of program and policy in the DEA Intelligence Section, went to Central America to evaluate allegations linking Nicaraguan political organizations to the drug trade. After meeting DEA, State Department and military personnel and informants, Everett reported that he could find no evidence that the [[Sandinistas]] or the Contras as entities were involved in drug trafficking. He wrote that the Guatemala office had recently closed an El Salvador investigation involving Contra allegations, and that informants had reported drug activity in hangars four and five. The Guatemala office believed the informants had exaggerated, in part because people arriving at the airport sometimes ran to the military side carrying briefcases, which the informants assumed held cocaine. Everett suggested that any smuggling at Ilopango was probably the work of Francisco Guirola Beeche, and he predicted that the allegations would keep surfacing because arrested traffickers would claim CIA authorization.[^17]
|
||||
|
||||
The CIA Inspector General's report records that a DEA intelligence analyst who helped review Castillo's allegations told it that DEA found no information supporting the claims linking the Contras to drug trafficking, and that "all of the Contra allegations lacked substance."[^16]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Inspector General's 1997 review
|
||||
|
||||
Chapter X of the DOJ Inspector General's 1997 report on the CIA and the Contra cocaine controversy states that Castillo refused an interview unless it was taped and [[Maxine Waters]] was present. The Inspector General agreed to tape the interview and to let him bring a personal representative, but told him Waters should not take part in an investigation it was conducting, and Waters was unable to persuade him to meet. The report also records that the former DEA country attache for Costa Rica, the former CIA chiefs of station for Costa Rica and El Salvador, and others declined interviews; that Stia did not sit for a second interview; and that the former Salvadoran air force chief Juan Rafael Bustillo and informant STG6 could not be located.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
The Inspector General's conclusion, attributed to the Inspector General alone, is that "although some of his claims have a seed of truth behind them, the inferences he draws, and his core claims about CIA support for Contra drug trafficking, were not substantiated by our review." It also found "that there was intelligence, although not hard evidence, that some Contra resupply pilots were trafficking in drugs, and that Castillo made that information available to the DEA, as he states." It found that the CIA did ask the DEA to stop using STG6, and that "there is no evidence that the CIA made this request for any reason other than that it wanted to use the informant."[^18]
|
||||
|
||||
On the Ilopango operations, the Inspector General wrote that "it is clear that there were sensitive covert operations being conducted at Ilopango Airport," and that the CIA and the embassy were not anxious for the DEA to pursue its investigation there. It said it did not find proof that the CIA or the embassy wanted the DEA kept away because the agency was involved in drug trafficking, as opposed to wanting to protect covert operations.[^18]
|
||||
|
||||
The Inspector General also summarized the 1991 interview of Castillo by FBI Special Agent [[Michael Foster]] for the [[Office of Independent Counsel]] investigation of the [[Iran-Contra Affair]]. Castillo told Foster that he believed North and the resupply operation were running drugs to raise money for the Contras. He said Grasheim had told Corr that "If I go down, half your Mil Group will go down with me," and that Corr had responded "Let the chips fall where they may." Foster wrote that Castillo "makes general accusations, but when I try to pin him down, he can't provide specific information that would support his conclusions." Foster told the Inspector General that Castillo would proceed from his own limited knowledge to generalizations that people "had to have known" about drug involvement.[^10]
|
||||
|
||||
Other DEA and embassy personnel interviewed by the Inspector General described Castillo in similar terms. Stia said Castillo needed a lot of guidance and was quick to make judgments before conducting an adequate investigation. Reina said Castillo was quick to jump to conclusions and treated the leaders of foreign governments with disrespect. [[Janice Elmore]], the embassy's narcotics coordinator, said Castillo had often made allegations that later proved to be without merit. Delphin Von Briesen, who worked with informant STG6, said that Castillo's book "definitely embellished facts" about which Von Briesen had personal knowledge.[^19]
|
||||
|
||||
### The 1988 Bustillo meeting and Hangar 5
|
||||
|
||||
On December 14, 1988, Castillo met General Bustillo about Bustillo's suspicion that Salvadoran Air Force officers were using the base for drug trafficking. Castillo told Bustillo that the DEA had similar information but lacked hard evidence because it had not been able to work at Ilopango. Pressed for names, Castillo named the Air School director, [[Manfredo Koenigsberg]]. Bustillo passed the allegation to the defense minister, General [[Vides Casanova]], who confronted Koenigsberg. Koenigsberg denied the charges, and Bustillo could produce only rumors and Castillo's information. A January 3, 1989 embassy cable to the DEA said the embassy assumed the DEA "must have some concrete evidence" to support Castillo's remarks, and it noted that Castillo had given Bustillo the impression that the DEA was prepared to assign personnel to Ilopango.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
In February 1989 the CIA station sent the DEA information that the Panamanian Miguel Antonio Rodriguez was using Ilopango to repair his aircraft. Robert Stia later reported that Castillo and Group Supervisor [[Thomas deTriquet]] went to Ilopango to investigate and were told by a CIA officer that they could not enter the base for that purpose, and that the CIA had already supplied the tail numbers and names.[^4] Stia wrote that the San Salvador station "has taken a more active stance in providing drug information to DEA," but that the Guatemala office could not develop the most important information, which concerned Ilopango.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
DeTriquet told the Inspector General that he and Castillo went to Ilopango about an allegation that unidentified dealers moved cocaine through Hangar 5 using Contra-associated pilots. A Salvadoran security officer denied them access to Hangar 5, which deTriquet believed held CIA equipment, after they tried a ruse without identifying themselves as DEA agents. At the embassy the CIA chief of station assured them there was no drug activity associated with Hangar 5, and they dropped the matter.[^4] The Inspector General's account has a Salvadoran security officer and a CIA officer as the obstacles. Castillo's version has the CIA itself refusing him access.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
The CIA ended its use of STG6 in December 1987, when it asked the DEA to stop using him because he was a current CIA informant. The DEA reactivated STG6 in 1989. Stia said the CIA chief of station had asked him to relinquish STG6 and that Castillo never expressed displeasure about it. An April 13, 1989 Stia memorandum, however, describes a "valuable asset (CI) was denied" to the Guatemala office at Ilopango.[^20]
|
||||
|
||||
### Disciplinary action and disability retirement
|
||||
|
||||
In December 1991 the DEA moved to remove Castillo as a criminal investigator on six charges. The first was misappropriation of funds. A DEA source reported that Castillo had asked for $25,000 to give to special forces in Guatemala; the source said he gave Castillo the $25,000, and Castillo later said the source had given him only $10,000. The Office of Professional Responsibility found that Castillo had not followed the rules for processing money, had delayed reporting it for about five months, and had not fully advised his supervisor. The second charge concerned an attempt to sell a DEA radio to the same source for $15,000. The third was accepting a fully automatic MAC-10 machine gun from a confidential source and disregarding an order to get rid of it. The fourth concerned the sale of a .45 caliber pistol and a Mossberg 12-gauge shotgun to an informant for $3,000 and $5,000. The fifth was possessing two fully automatic weapons, an AR-15 and a MAC-10, contrary to DEA regulations. The sixth was a false statement about whether he knew the buyer of the pistol was an informant.[^21]
|
||||
|
||||
Castillo denied the charges, called them administrative, and said they were brought in retaliation for his investigations of alleged Contra and CIA drug trafficking. In 1992, in lieu of the removal the DEA had proposed, he accepted disability retirement for a stress-related disorder. The Inspector General wrote that it was beyond the scope of its review to determine the validity of the charges or whether his retaliation claims had merit.[^21]
|
||||
|
||||
### The 1996 protest and the congressional record
|
||||
|
||||
In October 1996 Castillo appeared at DEA headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia, with a list of cases that he said supported his allegation that the DEA had turned a deaf ear to investigations linking the CIA and the Contras to trafficking.[^7] [[Salon]] published a report by [[Dennis Bernstein]] and [[Robert Knight]] of Pacific News Service on October 8, 1996, which stated that Castillo, "flanked by civil rights activist [[Dick Gregory]] and the Rev. [[Joseph Lowery]] of the [[Southern Christian Leadership Conference]]," had staged a protest at DEA headquarters the week before, with the demand "an official investigation into the Reagan-Bush governments' clandestine Iran-Contra policy."[^22] The report states that Castillo said he tried on or about January 14, 1986 to alert Vice President [[George H. W. Bush]] at a U.S. embassy party in Guatemala that "something funny" was going on at Ilopango, and quotes him: "But he just shook my hand, smiled and walked away from me." It describes a February 14, 1989 memo from Castillo to his Guatemala-based supervisor on known traffickers using hangars at Ilopango controlled by the CIA and by North, and quotes a 1994 interview in which Castillo said: "There is no doubt that they were running large quantities of cocaine into the U.S. to support the Contras. We saw the cocaine and we saw boxes full of money." The report adds that Attorney General [[Janet Reno]] and CIA Director [[John Deutch]] had stated there was no evidence to support the allegations against the CIA.[^22]
|
||||
|
||||
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence held hearings titled "Allegations of a CIA Connection to Crack Cocaine Epidemic" on October 23 and November 26, 1996. [[Fred Hitz]] testified at the first session.[^23] The printed record of both sessions does not name Castillo. A statement in the record says the committee took testimony from a DEA agent after the agency closed its Honduras office and moved the agents to Guatemala, and that the agent "said it made no sense." The record does not name him.[^23]
|
||||
|
||||
On March 16, 1998, the CIA Inspector General told the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, in a statement on the California story, that "six former CIA employees and a former DEA agent refused our request to be interviewed." The statement does not name the agent. The DOJ Inspector General records that Castillo declined an interview on conditions he set.[^1][^24]
|
||||
|
||||
The 1988 Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee report, issued by the [[Kerry Committee]], does not name Castillo. It documents the flights of a C-47 transport. [[Adolfo Chamorro]] gave the subcommittee a list of the flights made by that aircraft to ferry arms from Ilopango to Costa Rica and to La Penca, and the report states that between October 18, 1984 and February 12, 1986 some 156,000 pounds of material were moved from Ilopango to airfields in Costa Rica, on 24 flights, eleven of them to La Penca.[^25] A subcommittee staff report chronology for October 14, 1986 states that [[Max Gomez]] (identified in brackets as Felix Rodriguez) was managing contra supply operations out of Ilopango after having allegedly been placed there by the National Security Council.[^26]
|
||||
|
||||
### Powderburns
|
||||
|
||||
*Powderburns: Cocaine, Contras & the Drug War* was published in 1994, under the Sundial imprint of [[Mosaic Press]], with Dave Harmon as co-author.[^27] The CIA report and the Inspector General's chapter X both quote its account of Castillo's conversations with CIA officers, and both treat those claims as Castillo's allegations.[^1][^6] The CIA report quotes the book's references to "McCavett" and "Hugo Martinez," and its Kapasar passage is drawn from the book.[^15] Webb's notes for his chapter 13 cite *Powderburns* pages 112 to 113 for Stia's warning and pages 126 to 127 for Sofi-Perez, and state that his text on Castillo draws on the book, on his own interviews with Castillo, and on Castillo's interviews with Independent Counsel investigators declassified by the National Archives in 1994.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
### Dark Alliance and the Chretien allegation
|
||||
|
||||
In his book [[Dark Alliance]], Webb wrote that after returning to [[Sacramento]] he phoned Castillo and told him about [[Craig Chretien]]'s claim that there was no proof the Contras were involved in drugs. Castillo said Chretien had been one of the DEA officials sent to Guatemala to conduct the internal investigation of him. He said Chretien ordered him to use the word "alleged" in his reports to Washington about Contra drug shipments from Ilopango. Webb quotes Castillo: "They said, 'You cannot actually come out and say this shit is going on.' And I told them, 'I'm watching the fucking things fly out of here with my own eyes! Why would I have to say alleged?'" Castillo said of Chretien's denial: "Aw, bullshit. Of all people, he knows perfectly well what was going on. He was reading all my reports, looking for grammatical errors."[^28]
|
||||
|
||||
Webb also wrote that in response to a Freedom of Information Act request the DEA claimed it had no reports from Castillo about drug trafficking at Ilopango, and that the Inspector General "had no trouble locating the agent's reports and quoted from them liberally." The Inspector General's chapter X, reviewing DEA files, located Castillo's June 23, 1986 debriefing report, his October 27, 1986 case opening report on Grasheim, his October 31, 1986 personal history report, and the Air Intelligence files.[^7][^8]
|
||||
|
||||
### Firearms conviction, 2008 and 2009
|
||||
|
||||
The docket of *United States v. Castillo*, No. 5:08-cr-00193 in the Western District of Texas, lists the defendant as Celerino Castillo, III. A sealed complaint was filed on March 5, 2008 (No. 5:08-mj-00160) and an arrest warrant was returned executed on March 6; Castillo made an initial appearance on March 7 before Magistrate Judge John W. Primomo, who set a $25,000 unsecured bond. An indictment on two counts was filed on April 2, 2008. He pleaded guilty before the magistrate judge on June 13, 2008. On October 1, 2008 he pleaded guilty before Judge W. Royal Furgeson Jr. to two counts of a superseding information, and the indictment was dismissed on the government's motion. The minute entry for the sentencing of October 22, 2008 records 37 months of imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently, with two years of supervised release. He filed a pro se notice of appeal on October 31, 2008, and judgment was entered on November 5.[^29]
|
||||
|
||||
The [[San Antonio Current]] reported in July 2009 that Celerino Castillo III, described as a Vietnam veteran and former DEA agent, was picked up at a San Antonio gun show in March 2008 and charged with conspiracy to sell guns without a license and selling guns without a license. The paper quoted him: "I did sell guns without a license because half of the gun shows do, but they wanted to actually come after me because of my history of fighting the government." It reported that he was ordered to report to the [[La Tuna Federal Correctional Institution|La Tuna federal prison]] on July 20 to serve a 22-month sentence received "late last year," and that at a July 10 hearing the judge denied his request to remain on bond during his appeal to the [[United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit|Fifth Circuit]]. It quoted Castillo: "I initiated the Iran/Contra investigation back in the '80s where we implicated our government in the drug trafficking. There were some bipartisan investigations that confirmed my allegations."[^30]
|
||||
|
||||
The docket records a July 10, 2009 status conference and an order of that date extending the surrender date to July 30, 2009. The Fifth Circuit (No. 08-51144) affirmed, and its mandate was entered on November 9, 2009; the docket also records a Supreme Court order denying certiorari, transmitted in March 2010. Castillo filed a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. section 2255 on October 7, 2010 (Civil Action SA-10-CV-818). Magistrate Judge Primomo recommended denial on February 2, 2011, and Chief Judge Fred Biery accepted the recommendation and closed the case on July 24, 2012.[^29]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 13: "The wrong kind of friends"
|
||||
[^2]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 25: "Things are moving all around us"
|
||||
[^1]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, "CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy," Chapter X: Celerino Castillo, introduction and sections A and B (December 1997). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p1.htm
|
||||
[^2]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 3, section F (interviews of DEA Guatemala personnel, including Reina, Holifield, Von Briesen and Elmore). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p3.htm
|
||||
[^3]: Gary Webb, *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion* (Seven Stories Press, 1998), chapter 13, "The wrong kind of friends," and the chapter notes. https://archive.org/details/dark-alliance-the-cia-the-contras-and-the-crack-cocaine-explosion-gary-webb-1998
|
||||
[^4]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 3, section E (Castillo's later interactions with Salvadoran personnel, the January 3, 1989 embassy cable, the Stia memorandum, and the deTriquet interview). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p3.htm
|
||||
[^5]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, sections C.1.a and C.2 (DEA cables and debriefing reports on Grasheim and Amador, including the March 20, 1986 Costa Rica cable and Castillo's June 23, 1986 debriefing report). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
|
||||
[^6]: CIA Office of Inspector General, *Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States*, Volume II, "The Contra Story" (1998), paragraphs 1023 and 1026 (hangars, three sources of allegations) and 1028 (Castillo's book and the "Hugo Martinez" name). https://archive.org/details/nps56-111612-04
|
||||
[^7]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 4, section I ("Castillo's Recent List of Relevant Files," including the October 1996 visit to DEA headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia, and DEA case and informant files) https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p4.htm
|
||||
[^8]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.1.a (DEA reports on Grasheim: the March 10, 1986 Panama cable, the June 23, 1986 debriefing, the October 27, 1986 case opening, the October 31, 1986 personal history report, the September 1, 1986 search, and the reports that followed). The Inspector General gives the case opening as October 27, 1986 in its file listing and as 1987 in one passage of part 2. https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
|
||||
[^9]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.1.b(6) (interview of Walter Grasheim). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
|
||||
[^10]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 4, section K (summary of the FBI report of Special Agent Michael Foster's 1991 interview of Castillo for the Office of Independent Counsel). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p4.htm
|
||||
[^11]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.1.b(2) (interview of Edwin Corr). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
|
||||
[^12]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.1.b(5) (interview of Richard Rivera) and section C.1.c (closing of the Grasheim case). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
|
||||
[^13]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.2 (Carlos Amador: CIA cables of April 23, April 25, June 10 and June 17, 1986; DEA cables of August 27, 1985 and March 20, 1986; NADDIS check). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
|
||||
[^14]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.1.b(1) (interview of Felix Rodriguez). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
|
||||
[^15]: CIA Office of Inspector General, Volume II (1998), paragraphs 1028 through 1031 (Castillo's account of conversations with the San Salvador chief of station and with Randy Kapasar, as quoted from *Powderburns*) and paragraph 1047 (CIA records of the $45,000 vehicle purchase, August 18, 1986). https://archive.org/details/nps56-111612-04
|
||||
[^16]: CIA Office of Inspector General, Volume II (1998), paragraphs 1063 (officer who met Castillo in Guatemala) and 1065 (DEA intelligence analyst). https://archive.org/details/nps56-111612-04
|
||||
[^17]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 3, section D (Douglas Everett's February 1987 review of allegations linking Nicaraguan political organizations to drug trafficking). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p3.htm
|
||||
[^18]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 4, section L (evaluation of Castillo's allegations). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p4.htm
|
||||
[^19]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.1.b(4) (interview of Robert Stia) and part 3, section F. https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p3.htm
|
||||
[^20]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 3, section H (informant STG6, CIA use and DEA reactivation, and the April 13, 1989 Stia memorandum). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p3.htm
|
||||
[^21]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 4, section J (allegation that the DEA retaliated against Castillo, December 1991 removal charges and 1992 disability retirement). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p4.htm
|
||||
[^22]: Dennis Bernstein and Robert Knight (Pacific News Service), report published by Salon, October 8, 1996. https://www.salon.com/1996/10/08/news_555/
|
||||
[^23]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Allegations of a CIA Connection to Crack Cocaine Epidemic*, hearings of October 23 and November 26, 1996, S. Hrg. 104-865. https://intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/hearings/allegationsofcia00unit.pdf
|
||||
[^24]: CIA Inspector General Frederick P. Hitz, statement before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "Volume I: The California Story," March 16, 1998. https://irp.fas.org/congress/1998_hr/980316-ps.htm
|
||||
[^25]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy*, S. Prt. 100-165 (printed December 1988), p. 51 (Chamorro flight list, C-47 flights from Ilopango).
|
||||
[^26]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy*, S. Prt. 100-165, chronology entry for October 14, 1986.
|
||||
[^27]: Celerino Castillo III and Dave Harmon, *Powderburns: Cocaine, Contras & the Drug War* (Sundial, Mosaic Press, 1994), catalogue record at Fairfield University Digital Commons. https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/petry-books/197
|
||||
[^28]: Gary Webb, *Dark Alliance* (1998), chapter 25, "Things are moving all around us."
|
||||
[^29]: Docket entries 1 to 100, *United States v. Castillo*, No. 5:08-cr-00193 (W.D. Tex., filed April 2, 2008; earlier magistrate No. 5:08-mj-00160), CourtListener RECAP archive. https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/4399978/united-states-v-castillo/
|
||||
[^30]: Alicia Ramirez, "DEA Agent Sentenced to 22 Months at La Tuna," *San Antonio Current*, July 15-21, 2009. https://www.sacurrent.com/news/dea-agent-sentenced-to-22-months-at-la-tuna-2377362/
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -14,9 +14,17 @@ Edwin Corr was the U.S. Ambassador to [[El Salvador]] who received [[Celerino Ca
|
|||
|
||||
### Shutting Down the Investigation
|
||||
|
||||
When Castillo reported his findings about [[Cocaine]] trafficking at Ilopango to Ambassador Corr, Corr sent a secret back channel cable to Washington. Rather than supporting Castillo's investigation, the response from Washington was to shut it down. The CIA station in El Salvador sent a message to [[Costa Rica]] Station advising the [[DEA]] not to make inquiries about Hangar No. 4 at Ilopango. Corr's role in the chain of suppression illustrated how the State Department participated in protecting the Contra supply operation from law enforcement scrutiny.[^2]
|
||||
Corr sent a secret back-channel cable asking the [[State Department]] to have the [[DEA]] review Castillo's allegations. Corr told the Justice Department Inspector General that DEA headquarters replied that the [[Walter Grasheim|Grasheim]] case would be closed for lack of evidence. The Inspector General could not find that cable or the reply in DEA files, and the State Department could not find the back-channel cable.[^2] On April 25, 1986 the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] station in El Salvador asked the [[Costa Rica]] station to advise the DEA not to make any inquiries to anyone about Hangar No. 4 at Ilopango.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
Corr told the Inspector General that he had canceled U.S. government night vision contracts with Grasheim after the Salvadoran police search of Grasheim's residence, and that he thought it best to sever all ties with him. He said that after the search Castillo continued to make allegations about Grasheim's possible involvement with Salvadoran officials and Contra rebels. He said that after his back-channel cable Castillo's supervisors told Castillo to close the Grasheim investigation, and that Castillo continued "to snoop around the airport and make allegations." Corr said he told Castillo that if Castillo had evidence on Grasheim or anyone at Ilopango he would support the investigation, but that if he had none Castillo would have to stop the "witch hunt." Corr told the Inspector General that he did not recall the CIA ever asking him to pressure the DEA to back away from an investigation, and that Castillo never suggested to him that the CIA was conspiring with the Contras to traffic drugs.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Gary Webb]] wrote that Corr told Castillo to stop the "witch hunt" and that the DEA told Corr Castillo's information was "totally inaccurate." Webb attributes to Corr, in his interview with Justice Department investigators, the statements that Castillo "Was a very professional and a good agent" and that the investigation had the potential to "destroy relationships with Salvadoran officials that had taken so long to build."[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Castillo told the 1991 FBI interviewer, Special Agent Michael Foster, that Grasheim had told Corr "If I go down, half your Mil Group will go down with me," and that Corr had responded "Let the chips fall where they may." Castillo's account is recorded in the Inspector General's summary of Foster's report.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Ch. 15.
|
||||
[^2]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Ch. 15.
|
||||
[^2]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.1.b(2) (interview of Edwin Corr) and section C.1.a (Castillo's November 5, 1986 status report). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
|
||||
[^3]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Ch. 15.
|
||||
[^4]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 4, section K (summary of the FBI report of the 1991 interview of Castillo for the Office of Independent Counsel). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p4.htm
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -22,6 +22,23 @@ category: "Military"
|
|||
summary: "Army lieutenant of the 902d Military Intelligence Group attached to Grill Flame in 1978 for his earlier research, who screened the first Army remote viewers and was acting project manager of Center Lane in 1983."
|
||||
born: 1947-01-01
|
||||
location: "Glendale, California"
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Monroe Institute]]"
|
||||
role: President
|
||||
start: 2006
|
||||
fn: 12
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[Monroe Institute]]"
|
||||
role: Research Director
|
||||
start: 1988
|
||||
fn: 12
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[Gondola Wish]]"
|
||||
role: Project officer
|
||||
start: 1978
|
||||
end: 1978
|
||||
fn: 3
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Frederick Holmes "Skip" Atwater (born 1947, Glendale, California) was the [[U.S. Army]] intelligence officer at [[Fort Meade]], Maryland, who proposed the formation of a military remote viewing unit in 1977, recruited its initial personnel, and served as its operations officer through the program's most active period until his retirement from the Army in 1987. His proposal directly initiated what became the [[Stargate Project]] series of programs - Gondola Wish, Grill Flame, Center Lane, [[Sun Streak]] - that constituted the military's remote viewing research and intelligence effort for nearly two decades.
|
||||
|
|
@ -56,12 +73,27 @@ Frederick H. Atwater, known as Skip, was a lieutenant in the Special Security De
|
|||
|
||||
He remained the unit's operations officer through Grill Flame and [[Center Lane]]. INSCOM's chronology records, under July 7, 1983, "CPT Frederick Atwater assumes duties as Acting Project Manager," and under August 15, 1983, that Lieutenant Colonel Brian Buzby assumed duties as project manager.[^1] Published accounts by participants credit him with recruiting the first six viewers, among them Joe McMoneagle and Mel Riley, and with the unit's training in [[Robert Monroe]]'s Hemi-Sync method, which the Center Lane briefing dates to the end of 1980. After retiring from the Army in 1988 he became research director of the Monroe Institute's laboratory and, in 2006, its president, and was a founder and president of the International Remote Viewing Association.[^5][^6][^7]
|
||||
|
||||
### Gateway Training and the Monroe Institute
|
||||
|
||||
On July 29, 1978, as project officer for Gondola Wish, Atwater attended a seminar by [[Charles Tart]] on out-of-body experiences; his memorandum of July 31, 1978 records that Tart referred attendees who asked where to learn more about out-of-body experience to the Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
Atwater attended the Institute's eight-day training seminar from September 20 to 28, 1980 to assess it for the INSCOM Grill Flame Project. His trip report of September 30, 1980 recommended that experienced remote viewers be scheduled for the Institute's seminars and records that Robert Monroe had signed a consultant security agreement and that contact with the Institute had been on a "shallow cover" basis.[^8] In a memorandum of March 12, 1982 as Ops/Training Officer he proposed the Institute's Discovery series as a screening tool and the Gateway program as the second phase of an enhanced relaxation and concentration program, followed by one-on-one sessions with Monroe, the use of the Monroe tapes during operational sessions and biomonitoring.[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
On October 5, 1983 Atwater, as Operations Officer, and Lieutenant Colonel [[Brian Buzby]] briefed the Secretary of the Army, [[John Marsh]], on Center Lane; on January 5, 1984 Buzby and "Mr. Fred Atwater" briefed Marsh on Monroe, the Institute and INSCOM involvement with it, and the Secretary asked a series of questions on RAPT, Center Lane and the Institute.[^10][^11]
|
||||
|
||||
The Center Lane Project's biographical glossary states that in September 1988 Atwater accepted the position of Research Director in the Bob Monroe Research Lab at the Institute and that in December 2006 he became its president. A 1997 paper in the Journal of Scientific Exploration lists his affiliation as The Monroe Institute, Faber, Virginia. Army papers of 1983 style him "CPT Fred Atwater" (October 12, 1983), "Mr. Atwater" (August 31, 1983) and "Mr. Fred Atwater" (January 6, 1984); a Center Lane access list gives "Frederick H. Atwater, Mr., ASD, Great Skill." Other accounts give his Army retirement as 1987 and as 1988.[^12]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, "List of Events from September 1977 to January 1986," CIA-RDP96-00788R001100020001-8 and the attachment to CIA-RDP96-00788R001500180001-7, cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R001500180001-7.pdf.
|
||||
[^2]: 902d Military Intelligence Group, memorandum for Chief, OPSEC Support Division, "GONDOLA WISH (U)," May 18, 1978, signed Frederick H. Atwater, 2LT, MI, CI Studies Section, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000160007-7, cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R002000160007-7.pdf.
|
||||
[^3]: 902d Military Intelligence Group, "Attendance at Scientific Seminar in Support of GONDOLA WISH (U)," July 31, 1978, signed Frederick H. Atwater, Project Officer, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000160013-0, cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R002000160013-0.pdf.
|
||||
[^4]: Memorandum for record, "Minutes of the Grill Flame Committee Meeting, 14 Feb 79," with the representatives roster as enclosure 1, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000130002-5, cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R002000130002-5.pdf.
|
||||
[^5]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, "INSCOM Project Grill Flame: Progress Report #1," February 21, 1979, with enclosures, CIA-RDP96-00788R001100070001-3. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^6]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, "List of Events from September 1977 to January 1986," CIA-RDP96-00788R001100020001-8. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection. US Army Intelligence and Security Command, "Briefing - Project Center Lane," c. 1984, CIA-RDP96-00789R002100180002-8. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^5]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, "INSCOM Project Grill Flame: Progress Report #1," February 21, 1979, with enclosures, CIA-RDP96-00788R001100070001-3..
|
||||
[^6]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, "List of Events from September 1977 to January 1986," CIA-RDP96-00788R001100020001-8.. US Army Intelligence and Security Command, "Briefing - Project Center Lane," c. 1984, CIA-RDP96-00789R002100180002-8..
|
||||
[^7]: Monroe Institute and International Remote Viewing Association biographical notices, and Atwater, F. Holmes. *Captain of My Ship, Master of My Soul.* Hampton Roads, 2001; McMoneagle, Joseph. *The Stargate Chronicles.* Hampton Roads, 2002.
|
||||
[^8]: Atwater, Frederick H., memorandum for the record, "Trip Report, 18-28 September 1980," September 30, 1980. CIA-RDP96-00788R001200060028-4, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^9]: Atwater, Frederick H., memorandum IAGPC-G, March 12, 1982. CIA-RDP96-00788R001200060027-5, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^10]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, memorandum of October 12, 1983. CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270014-1, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^11]: Security Support Detachment, USAINSCOM, memorandum of January 6, 1984. CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270003-3, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^12]: Center Lane Project, glossary entry "Fred Holmes Skip Atwater," centerlane-rv.org/glossary/skip-atwater; Atwater, F. Holmes, "Accessing Anomalous States of Consciousness with a Binaural Beat Technology," *Journal of Scientific Exploration* 11, no. 3 (1997): 263-274.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -14,22 +14,45 @@ tags:
|
|||
- SS
|
||||
- 1950s
|
||||
- 1960s
|
||||
summary: "Heinz Felfe was a former SS officer and KGB double agent who joined the CIA-funded Gehlen Organization in 1951, rose to chief of counterintelligence for the BND, and was exposed in November 1961 after a decade compromising CIA-BND joint operations."
|
||||
summary: "Former SS officer and KGB double agent who joined the CIA-funded Gehlen Organization in 1951, rose to chief of BND Soviet counterintelligence, and was exposed in November 1961."
|
||||
born: 1918-03-18
|
||||
died: 2008-05-08
|
||||
location: "East Germany"
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[Gehlen Organization]]"
|
||||
start: 1951-11
|
||||
end: 1956-04
|
||||
role: counterintelligence section officer
|
||||
fn: 2
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[Bundesnachrichtendienst]]"
|
||||
start: 1956-04
|
||||
end: 1961-11
|
||||
role: deputy chief and in practice chief of the Soviet counterintelligence section
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
- type: informant_for
|
||||
with: "[[Stasi]]"
|
||||
start: 1969
|
||||
role: full-time informal collaborator after the exchange
|
||||
fn: 4
|
||||
---
|
||||
Heinz Felfe was born March 18, 1918, in Dresden, Germany. He joined the [[SS]] and served as an officer in the Sicherheitsdienst (SD), the SS intelligence service, during World War II. After the war he was captured by British forces, held briefly, and released. He died May 8, 2008, in Germany.[^1]
|
||||
Heinz Felfe was born March 18, 1918, in Dresden, Germany. He joined the [[SS]] and served as an officer in the Sicherheitsdienst (SD), the SS intelligence service, during World War II. He finished the war as an Obersturmführer in the Waffen-SS and a British prisoner of war, interned at the Blauw Kappel interrogation center near Utrecht, which specialized in former German intelligence personnel.[^1] He returned to West Germany in November 1946 and from 1947 worked as an agent of a British military intelligence unit (Sixth Area Intelligence Office, BAOR), reporting on communist student groups at the University of Bonn and joining the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) under British instruction.[^1] The British decided in April 1950 to drop him, citing his attempts to sell information to other agencies and his contacts with former SS men, among them Helmut Proebsting and Hans Clemens.[^1] The CIA study gives his entry into an SS reserve unit as 1938; the historian Norman Goda gives 1936 for his entry into the SS and 1943 for his commission.[^1][^2] He died May 8, 2008, in Germany.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
### Soviet Recruitment
|
||||
|
||||
Following his release from British custody, Felfe was recruited by [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] intelligence (the [[MGB]], predecessor to the [[KGB]]) during the postwar occupation period. The precise circumstances and date of his recruitment were never publicly established in full detail. Soviet intelligence had specific interest in recruiting former SD personnel who possessed intelligence tradecraft and might be positioned to penetrate Western intelligence structures, and Felfe's SS background, rather than disqualifying him, made him an attractive candidate for exactly this purpose.[^1]
|
||||
Following his release from British custody, Felfe was recruited by [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] intelligence (the [[MGB]], predecessor to the [[KGB]]) during the postwar occupation period.[^3] According to the CIA study, the Soviet effort ran through Felfe's former SD colleague Hans Clemens. Clemens went to Dresden in February 1950, was recruited there by a Soviet officer, and then recruited Erwin Tiebel and Felfe in West Germany; Felfe, then working as a refugee interrogator, resisted the trip east for another year.[^1] Goda dates Felfe's full status as a Soviet agent, codenamed Paul, to September 1951 and his job in the Gehlen Organization's counterintelligence section to November 1951.[^2] The CIA study adds that Felfe may have been recruited earlier, during a 1948 trip east while working for the British, and that Goleniewski reached the same view.[^1] Soviet intelligence had specific interest in recruiting former SD personnel who possessed intelligence tradecraft and might be positioned to penetrate Western intelligence structures, and Felfe's SS background, rather than disqualifying him, made him an attractive candidate for exactly this purpose.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
### Entry into the Gehlen Organization
|
||||
|
||||
In 1951, Felfe was recruited into the [[Gehlen Organization]], the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]-funded intelligence network that [[Reinhard Gehlen]] had built at Pullach, Bavaria, from the remnants of his wartime intelligence apparatus. Felfe's SS and SD background was not disqualifying within the Gehlen Organization, which recruited extensively from former Wehrmacht and Nazi intelligence veterans. He entered the counterintelligence section and rose progressively through its ranks.[^1]
|
||||
In 1951, Felfe was recruited into the [[Gehlen Organization]], the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]-funded intelligence network that [[Reinhard Gehlen]] had built at Pullach, Bavaria, from the remnants of his wartime intelligence apparatus. Felfe's SS and SD background was not disqualifying within the Gehlen Organization, which recruited extensively from former Wehrmacht and Nazi intelligence veterans. He entered the counterintelligence section and rose progressively through its ranks.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
When the [[Bundesnachrichtendienst]] (BND) formally succeeded the Gehlen Organization in April 1956, Felfe transitioned into the new service's structure and continued his rise within the counterintelligence apparatus. He eventually became chief of Soviet counterintelligence within the BND - the section responsible for identifying and neutralizing Soviet penetration agents within West German intelligence.[^1]
|
||||
When the [[Bundesnachrichtendienst]] (BND) formally succeeded the Gehlen Organization in April 1956, Felfe transitioned into the new service's structure and continued his rise within the counterintelligence apparatus. He eventually became chief of Soviet counterintelligence within the BND - the section responsible for identifying and neutralizing Soviet penetration agents within West German intelligence.[^3] The CIA study describes him as an officer of the BND for ten years, six of them as deputy chief (in practice the real chief) of the section responsible among other things for countering Soviet espionage, having succeeded his superior Reile in late 1956 or early 1957.[^1] Goda states that he took charge of counterintelligence against the Soviets in 1955.[^2] Bodo Hechelhammer, the BND's chief historian, says he rose to head of counterintelligence against the Soviet Union, and ZDF calls him head of the section "Gegenspionage Sowjetunion."[^4][^5]
|
||||
|
||||
The Army's Counter Intelligence Corps noted in 1953 Felfe's role as leader of an "SD clique" in the Gehlen Organization, in 1954 that he was probably leaking to the Soviets, and in 1955 that suspicion of him and the clique was growing; the CIA suspected him by 1957, but he had the confidence of Reinhard Gehlen and personally briefed him on sensitive Soviet matters.[^2] From 1958 Felfe pressed the CIA for information on its Karlshorst penetration program. The CIA's record shows first official briefings to him in May 1958, February 1959 and July 1959, after which he became the BND headquarters supervisor of the joint program.[^1] The CIA's 1963 damage assessment estimated that roughly 15,000 individual items were blown or compromised.[^2] Hechelhammer states that the whole Soviet counterintelligence of the BND collapsed for years and had to be rebuilt.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
Wilhelm Harster, an SS lieutenant general who had been Felfe's superior, could not join the BND as a security risk but presented himself as a BND agent and recommended former SS contacts to the service; the CIA's file indicates he used Felfe to reach the BND.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### Decade of Penetration
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -37,26 +60,31 @@ Felfe operated as a KGB agent throughout his tenure in the Gehlen Organization a
|
|||
|
||||
The identities of Western agents operating in the Soviet bloc who had been compromised through BND channels; the existence and details of CIA-BND joint operations in [[East Germany]] and other Warsaw Pact countries; the organizational structure, personnel, and procedures of the BND itself; and material that allowed Soviet intelligence to anticipate Western counterintelligence activities.
|
||||
|
||||
The full extent of the damage was difficult to assess because Felfe had in his counterintelligence role the authority to handle cases involving suspected Soviet agents - a position from which he could protect Soviet sources, mislead investigations, and channel false information to American and [[West Germany|West German]] analysts.[^1]
|
||||
The full extent of the damage was difficult to assess because Felfe had in his counterintelligence role the authority to handle cases involving suspected Soviet agents - a position from which he could protect Soviet sources, mislead investigations, and channel false information to American and [[West Germany|West German]] analysts.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
### Exposure
|
||||
|
||||
Felfe was exposed in November 1961, following information provided to Western intelligence by a Soviet defector or through signals intelligence - the specific source of his exposure was officially described in general terms but not fully disclosed publicly. He was arrested along with two accomplices, Hans Clemens and Erwin Tiebel, who had also been working within the Gehlen/BND network.[^1]
|
||||
Felfe was exposed in November 1961. The CIA study states he was detected through a lead provided by a CIA-run penetration of the Polish Intelligence Service (UB) and names the defector Michal Goleniewski, a senior UB officer, as the officer who provided the lead.[^1] He was arrested along with two accomplices, Hans Clemens and Erwin Tiebel, who had also been working within the Gehlen/BND network.[^3] News of the arrests was generally known throughout the West German government by December 2, 1961, and appeared in the newspapers by December 12.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
The timing was significant: his exposure came only months after the construction of the [[Berlin Wall]] in August 1961, a period of heightened tension in which the extent of Soviet penetration of Western intelligence was a matter of acute concern.
|
||||
|
||||
### Trial and Conviction
|
||||
|
||||
Felfe was tried in West Germany on charges of treason and espionage. He was convicted in July 1963 and sentenced to fourteen years in prison. The trial established the factual record of his decade of KGB service and the scope of the material he had passed. His cooperation during trial and sentencing was limited.[^1]
|
||||
Felfe was tried in West Germany on charges of treason and espionage. He was convicted in July 1963 and sentenced to fourteen years in prison. The trial established the factual record of his decade of KGB service and the scope of the material he had passed. His cooperation during trial and sentencing was limited.[^3] Hans Clemens received nine years and Tiebel two years at hard labor.[^1] From prison Felfe re-established contact with the KGB through his mother in Dresden and corresponded with the Soviets; the Soviets several times tried to obtain his release in exchange for prisoners held in the East.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### Exchange and East Germany
|
||||
|
||||
In February 1969, Felfe was exchanged for a group of Western agents held by East Germany in a spy exchange negotiated between the two German states. He settled in East Germany, where he was received as a hero of socialist intelligence work. He later published a memoir, *Im Dienst des Gegners* (In the Service of the Enemy, 1986), presenting his account of his career as a double agent and his motivations. He taught at Humboldt University in East Berlin and remained in Germany after reunification, dying in 2008.[^1]
|
||||
In February 1969, Felfe was exchanged for a group of Western agents held by East Germany in a spy exchange negotiated between the two German states. Goda states that Felfe was released to East Germany in 1969 in exchange for three West German spies, and a BND archive photograph published with Hechelhammer's interview shows the exchange at the Herleshausen border crossing.[^2][^4] He settled in East Germany, where he was received as a hero of socialist intelligence work; Hechelhammer states that he became a full-time informal collaborator of the Stasi.[^4] He later published a memoir, *Im Dienst des Gegners* (In the Service of the Enemy, 1986), presenting his account of his career as a double agent and his motivations. He taught at Humboldt University in East Berlin and remained in Germany after reunification, dying in 2008.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
### Significance
|
||||
|
||||
Felfe's career was among the most damaging Cold War penetrations of a Western intelligence service. Its specific significance derived from his position in counterintelligence rather than in operational work - he did not merely report on operations but actively managed the processes that were supposed to protect them. The Felfe case reinforced American intelligence concerns about the security vulnerabilities of the BND stemming from its origins in the Nazi intelligence establishment, and contributed to a reassessment of the degree of access given to BND personnel in joint operations.[^1]
|
||||
Felfe's career was among the most damaging Cold War penetrations of a Western intelligence service. Its specific significance derived from his position in counterintelligence rather than in operational work - he did not merely report on operations but actively managed the processes that were supposed to protect them. The Felfe case reinforced American intelligence concerns about the security vulnerabilities of the BND stemming from its origins in the Nazi intelligence establishment, and contributed to a reassessment of the degree of access given to BND personnel in joint operations.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA.* Doubleday, 2007, pp. 33-56. Felfe, Heinz. *Im Dienst des Gegners: 10 Jahre Moskaus Mann im BND.* Rasch und Röhring, 1986 (Felfe's own account). Breitman, Richard, Norman J.W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, and Robert Wolfe. *U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis.* Cambridge University Press, 2005.
|
||||
[^1]: Central Intelligence Agency, "KGB Exploitation of Heinz Felfe: Successful KGB Penetration of a Western Intelligence Service," March 1969, document C02606328, released February 21, 2019. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/node/2071209
|
||||
[^2]: Goda, Norman J. W., "CIA Files Relating to Heinz Felfe, SS officer and KGB Spy," Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, 2008. https://fas.org/sgp/eprint/goda.pdf
|
||||
[^3]: Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA.* Doubleday, 2007, pp. 33-56. Felfe, Heinz. *Im Dienst des Gegners: 10 Jahre Moskaus Mann im BND.* Rasch und Röhring, 1986 (Felfe's own account). Breitman, Richard, Norman J.W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, and Robert Wolfe. *U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis.* Cambridge University Press, 2005.
|
||||
[^4]: Hechelhammer, Bodo, interview, "Spion Heinz Felfe: Für ihn lieferten die Sowjets kleinere Fische ans Messer," t-online, March 22, 2020. https://www.t-online.de/nachrichten/panorama/wissen/geschichte/id_87517540/spion-heinz-felfe-fuer-ihn-lieferten-die-sowjets-kleinere-fische-ans-messer-.html
|
||||
[^5]: ZDF, "BND-Affären: Von Hanning und Felfe bis Landesverrat an Russland," October 6, 2026. https://www.zdfheute.de/politik/deutschland/bnd-affaeren-spionage-hanning-skandale-100.html
|
||||
[^6]: Breitman, Richard, "Historical Analysis of 20 Name Files from CIA Records," Interagency Working Group, 2001 (entry on Wilhelm Harster). https://www.archives.gov/iwg/declassified-records/rg-263-cia-records/historical-analysis-by-breitman.pdf
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -29,11 +29,13 @@ When Lumumba, the Congo's first elected Prime Minister, sought [[Soviet Union|So
|
|||
|
||||
Devlin testified to the [[Church Committee]] in 1975 that he never used the materials and eventually disposed of them by throwing the poison into the [[Congo River]]. His testimony acknowledged he had understood the orders but claimed moral and practical objections to carrying them out.[^1] The committee's interim report calls the Leopoldville station officer "Hedgman." The scientist it calls "Joseph Scheider" testified on October 7 and 9, 1975 that he destroyed the viability of the biological material and disposed of it in the Congo River before leaving the Congo on October 5, 1960, and the station officer testified on August 21, 1975 that he locked the material in the bottom drawer of his safe and disposed of it months later; each recalled disposing of it in the Congo River, alone. The station officer's October 7, 1960 cable to [[Bronson Tweedy]] said that "certain items of continuing usefulness" had been left.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
The 2019 report of the United Nations Eminent Person described the CIA's presence in the Congo in 1961 as including air operations and activities that included planned assassinations. It recorded that Chief of Station Larry Devlin coordinated agents designated "WIROGUE" and "QJWIN," and attributed the planned assassinations to "the programme 'ZRRIFLE' and other programmes" rather than to Devlin by name.[^3] The report did not state whether Devlin knew of or approved the programmes it named.
|
||||
|
||||
### Lumumba's Death
|
||||
|
||||
Despite Devlin's claimed refusal of the assassination order, Lumumba was captured, transferred to Katanga, and killed on January 17, 1961, by Katangese forces under [[Moise Tshombe]] with Belgian officers present. The precise extent of CIA foreknowledge or facilitation of this transfer - as opposed to the separate biological assassination plan Devlin received - has not been fully resolved by the documentary record.
|
||||
|
||||
Devlin acknowledged to the Church Committee that the CIA was aware of Lumumba's transfer to Katanga and that this transfer made his survival unlikely. A 2001 Belgian parliamentary inquiry found Belgian government and intelligence officers directly involved in the killing. The question of whether CIA officers encouraged or facilitated the handover remained contested.[^3]
|
||||
Devlin acknowledged to the Church Committee that the CIA was aware of Lumumba's transfer to Katanga and that this transfer made his survival unlikely. A 2001 Belgian parliamentary inquiry found Belgian government and intelligence officers directly involved in the killing. The question of whether CIA officers encouraged or facilitated the handover remained contested.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
### Mobutu and the Congo's Political Future
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -51,4 +53,5 @@ In 2007, one year before his death, Devlin published *Chief of Station, Congo: F
|
|||
|
||||
[^1]: Devlin, Lawrence. *Chief of Station, Congo: Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone.* Public Affairs, 2007. Church Committee (U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities). *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders.* Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975.
|
||||
[^2]: Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report*, S. Rept. 94-465, November 20, 1975, pp. 24 to 31 (Scheider, October 7 and 9, 1975; Hedgman, August 21, 1975, pp. 48 to 49 and 84 to 85). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
|
||||
[^3]: Kalb, Madeleine G. *The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa from Eisenhower to Kennedy.* Macmillan, 1982. De Witte, Ludo. *The Assassination of Lumumba.* Verso, 2001.
|
||||
[^3]: A/73/973, report of the Eminent Person, September 12, 2019, paragraph 26. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^4]: Kalb, Madeleine G. *The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa from Eisenhower to Kennedy.* Macmillan, 1982. De Witte, Ludo. *The Assassination of Lumumba.* Verso, 2001.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ aliases:
|
|||
- Walter Grasheim
|
||||
- Wally Grasheim
|
||||
created: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
category: "Arms Dealers & Brokers"
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- Person
|
||||
|
|
@ -15,6 +15,14 @@ tags:
|
|||
- ContraWar
|
||||
- DarkAllianceInvestigation
|
||||
summary: "New York weapons dealer and U.S. military contractor raided by DEA agent Celerino Castillo, who was found with embassy plates, C-4 explosives, and a massive weapons cache."
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[Celerino Castillo]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 1986-10-27
|
||||
end: 1986-11-21
|
||||
role: "DEA case opened by Castillo and closed by Country Attache Robert Stia"
|
||||
fn: 4
|
||||
---
|
||||
Walter "Wally" Grasheim was a New York weapons dealer and U.S. military contractor based in [[San Salvador]], [[El Salvador]], who was raided by [[DEA]] agent [[Celerino Castillo]] on September 1, 1986. The raid uncovered a massive weapons cache, U.S. Embassy license plates and IDs, and evidence linking Grasheim to the Contra operation at [[Ilopango Airbase|Ilopango Air Force Base]].[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -24,7 +32,7 @@ The tall, bearded arms broker was the Salvadoran sales representative for the Li
|
|||
|
||||
### The Raid
|
||||
|
||||
Denied access to the military side of Ilopango, Castillo targeted Grasheim as an off-base target linked to the Ilopango operation. One of Castillo's informants told him Grasheim was intimately involved with the Contra drug operation at the base, and DEA computers turned up several references to Grasheim as a suspected drug trafficker. Salvadoran police working with Castillo raided Grasheim's elegant hillside home in San Salvador. A pound of marijuana was found, along with an extraordinary weapons cache: "Some of the rooms in the house had munitions and explosives piled to the ceiling, including automatic weapons, M-16's, hand grenades and C-4 [plastic explosives]." The raid also uncovered U.S. Embassy license plates, radios, and IDs in Grasheim's name.[^1]
|
||||
Denied access to the military side of Ilopango, Castillo targeted Grasheim as an off-base target linked to the Ilopango operation. One of Castillo's informants told him Grasheim was intimately involved with the Contra drug operation at the base, and DEA computers turned up several references to Grasheim as a suspected drug trafficker. Salvadoran police working with Castillo raided Grasheim's elegant hillside home in San Salvador. A pound of marijuana was found, along with an extraordinary weapons cache. [[Gary Webb]] quoted the raid's contents as including: "Some of the rooms in the house had munitions and explosives piled to the ceiling, including automatic weapons, M-16's, hand grenades and C-4 [plastic explosives]." The Inspector General's inventory of the September 1, 1986 search lists "machine guns" and "pistols" and does not list M-16s. The raid also uncovered U.S. Embassy license plates, radios, and IDs in Grasheim's name.[^1][^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### Grasheim's Claims
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -32,8 +40,29 @@ Grasheim strenuously denied involvement with either the Contras or drugs and bel
|
|||
|
||||
### CIA Infiltration of Castillo's Investigation
|
||||
|
||||
The [[Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General|Justice Department Inspector General]]'s report partially confirmed Grasheim's account. Castillo's informant Murga, who directed Castillo toward Grasheim by fingering him as "head of smuggling operations at Ilopango," was indeed a CIA asset and had been for some time. Soon after putting Castillo onto Grasheim, the CIA demanded Murga back. Castillo's boss Robert Stia "recalled being asked by the CIA station chief in El Salvador to relinquish the use of informant" Murga. "The Station Chief had explained that the CIA had established the informant before he had ever worked for the DEA" and wanted the DEA to stop using him because "he was currently a CIA informant." Stia complied but complained internally that the CIA had cost the DEA a valuable asset.[^1]
|
||||
The [[Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General|Justice Department Inspector General]]'s report partially confirmed Grasheim's account. Webb wrote that Castillo's informant Murga, who directed Castillo toward Grasheim by fingering him as "head of smuggling operations at Ilopango," "was indeed working for the CIA and had been for quite some time," and that soon after putting Castillo onto Grasheim the CIA demanded Murga back.[^1] The Inspector General's report designates the informant STG6 and records that the CIA asked the DEA in December 1987 to stop using STG6 because he was currently a CIA informant; the DEA reactivated him in 1989. [[Robert Stia]] recalled being asked "by the CIA Station Chief in El Salvador to relinquish use of informant STG6," and said "The Station Chief had explained that the CIA had established the informant before he had ever worked for the DEA." Stia complied but complained internally that the CIA had cost the DEA a valuable asset.[^3] The report does not confirm Grasheim's claim that the informant worked for the CIA against Castillo; it records that CIA records showed STG6 was a CIA informant and that the CIA and the DEA disagreed over his use.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
### Investigation Record, 1986
|
||||
|
||||
The DEA's case on Grasheim began with a March 10, 1986 cable from Panama, which reported that Grasheim and an Israeli national had flown in from El Salvador and, when questioned by Panamanian authorities, had claimed to be DEA agents. The cable also reported a U.S. Customs Service investigation of Grasheim in New York for arms smuggling.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
On May 3, 1986, according to Castillo's report, Grasheim crash-landed an aircraft six miles northwest of Tamiami airport in Florida while flying from Ilopango to Florida. At the scene he identified himself as a "secret agent" with the U.S. government and turned over a suitcase that Castillo's report says weighed about 60 pounds and contained cocaine. Castillo's report also says Grasheim did not clear Customs. Grasheim told the Inspector General that a clog in his fuel line forced an emergency landing in 1987, that Customs instructed him to proceed to the airport, that he left everything in the plane except a suitcase of business records and flight plans, and that no one searched his person, bags or plane.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
The case opening report, dated October 27, 1986 in the Inspector General's file listing, named the informants STG6 and STG13 and attributed to Grasheim the "air smuggling of cocaine by subjects who were believed to be associated with the Contra movement." Castillo's report said that Grasheim allegedly abused hangars four and five, which the CIA had provided to him. The Salvadoran police search of Grasheim's residence followed on September 1, 1986, and Grasheim filed a sworn statement on September 19, 1986 saying that the Salvadoran armed forces had named him a military advisor and given him the seized items. The armed forces denied that they had done so.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
On October 30, 1986, Castillo and Customs agent Richard Rivera briefed Ambassador [[Edwin Corr]]. Corr said he welcomed an investigation but asked that it be conducted discreetly. Corr told the Inspector General that he had canceled U.S. government night vision contracts with Grasheim after the search. Grasheim later came to the embassy and asked to see Corr, and his security staff turned him away.[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
The DEA closed the case on November 21, 1986. In the closing report, Country Attache Robert Stia wrote: "DEA has no further interest in Grasheim at this time and it is unlikely to develop further drug information about Grasheim directly." The report noted that Grasheim had questioned "DEA's right and authority to conduct an investigation into his activities." Stia wrote that the DEA's information was passed to Customs and the Internal Revenue Service, which were conducting their own investigation of Grasheim's exports of military supplies.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
Grasheim told the Inspector General that he was never charged with a crime or given a formal explanation for the search. He offered three explanations for why the DEA had targeted him: some of his activities were suspicious, the DEA might have been "led by the nose through the investigation by someone else" who wanted to divert attention from that person, or the investigation resulted from his "high profile" in El Salvador.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
Customs agent Rivera told the Inspector General that Customs never developed enough evidence to charge Grasheim with an offense, and that its case was closed. The Customs file the Inspector General obtained contained nothing on the CIA or the Contras.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 13: "The wrong kind of friends"
|
||||
[^2]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.1.b(6) (interview of Walter Grasheim) and section C.1.a (inventory of the September 1, 1986 search). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
|
||||
[^3]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 3, section H (informant STG6, CIA use and DEA reactivation). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p3.htm
|
||||
[^4]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.1.a (DEA reports on Grasheim, including the March 10, 1986 Panama cable, the October 27, 1986 case opening report and the September 19, 1986 sworn statement). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
|
||||
[^5]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.1.b(2) (interview of Edwin Corr). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
|
||||
[^6]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, sections C.1.c (closing of the Grasheim case) and C.1.b(5) (interview of Richard Rivera). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ died: 1996-04-27
|
|||
location: "Saint Paul, Minnesota"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
William Egan Colby (January 4, 1920 - April 27, 1996) served as Director of Central Intelligence from September 1973 to January 1976 under Presidents Nixon and Ford. His tenure was defined by his decision to cooperate with congressional investigations into CIA domestic surveillance activities, a choice that made him deeply unpopular within the agency's leadership and among figures like [[James Jesus Angleton]] and [[Richard Helms]].[^1]
|
||||
William Egan Colby (January 4, 1920 - April 27, 1996) served as Director of Central Intelligence from September 4, 1973 to January 30, 1976 (after [[Vernon Walters]] served as acting director from July 2, 1973) under Presidents Nixon and Ford. His tenure was defined by his decision to cooperate with congressional investigations into CIA domestic surveillance activities, a choice that made him deeply unpopular within the agency's leadership and among figures like [[James Jesus Angleton]] and [[Richard Helms]].[^1][^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### Vietnam Service
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -32,17 +32,17 @@ Colby served as CIA station chief in Saigon during the [[Vietnam War]] and from
|
|||
|
||||
### Angleton Firing and Operation CHAOS
|
||||
|
||||
In December 1974, Seymour Hersh approached Colby with material for a forthcoming New York Times article on the CIA's domestic surveillance activities under [[Operation CHAOS]] (MHCHAOS). On December 17, 1974 - five days before Hersh's article appeared on December 22 - Colby dismissed Angleton, who had headed the Counterintelligence Staff that ran CHAOS under director [[Richard Ober]]. Angleton had served as the CIA's chief of counterintelligence for 21 years.[^1][^2]
|
||||
In December 1974, Seymour Hersh approached Colby with material for a forthcoming New York Times article on the CIA's domestic surveillance activities under [[Operation CHAOS]] (MHCHAOS). On December 17, 1974 - five days before Hersh's article appeared on December 22 - Colby dismissed Angleton, who had headed the Counterintelligence Staff that ran CHAOS under director [[Richard Ober]]. Angleton had served as the CIA's chief of counterintelligence for 21 years.[^1][^3]
|
||||
|
||||
Colby's cooperation with the subsequent [[Church Committee]] investigation of CHAOS and other "Family Jewels" programs (a compilation of potentially illegal CIA activities assembled by Colby's predecessor [[James Schlesinger]] in 1973) was deeply controversial within the CIA. Critics including former DCI Helms accused him of betraying the agency; defenders argued he prevented far more damaging forced exposure.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### Israel and Nuclear Weapons
|
||||
|
||||
Colby held a documented assessment of Israeli nuclear capability. He shared the assumption that Israel had a small number of nuclear weapons by 1973 and believed they would be used "only in an extreme situation." His analysis was tested during the October 1973 Yom Kippur War when Israeli military performance initially deteriorated. He believed that in the event of a potential Israeli military collapse, Israel might use its nuclear weapons.[^3]
|
||||
Colby held a documented assessment of Israeli nuclear capability. He shared the assumption that Israel had a small number of nuclear weapons by 1973 and believed they would be used "only in an extreme situation." His analysis was tested during the October 1973 Yom Kippur War when Israeli military performance initially deteriorated. He believed that in the event of a potential Israeli military collapse, Israel might use its nuclear weapons.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
### Legacy and the Contra War
|
||||
|
||||
Colby's tenure established institutional patterns in deniable covert operations that carried into the Contra war era through his protégé [[William Nelson]], who subsequently served as the CIA's Deputy Director of Operations - the head of all covert operations worldwide - before moving to [[Fluor Corporation]]. Methods developed under Colby's leadership for managing deniable operations became standard practice in the later Contra-era programs.[^4]
|
||||
Colby's tenure established institutional patterns in deniable covert operations that carried into the Contra war era through his protégé [[William Nelson]], who subsequently served as the CIA's Deputy Director of Operations - the head of all covert operations worldwide - before moving to [[Fluor Corporation]]. Methods developed under Colby's leadership for managing deniable operations became standard practice in the later Contra-era programs.[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
### Death
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -50,12 +50,13 @@ On April 27, 1996, Colby disappeared from his weekend home in Rock Point, Maryla
|
|||
|
||||
### Israel
|
||||
|
||||
William E. Colby served as the Director of the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] from 1973 to 1976. He shared the assumption that [[Israel]] had a few nuclear weapons and that if there was a collapse during the 1973 [[Yom Kippur War]], there was a possibility that Israel would use them. Colby believed that nuclear weapons would be used "only in an extreme situation."[^5]
|
||||
William E. Colby served as the Director of the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] from 1973 to 1976. He shared the assumption that [[Israel]] had a few nuclear weapons and that if there was a collapse during the 1973 [[Yom Kippur War]], there was a possibility that Israel would use them. Colby believed that nuclear weapons would be used "only in an extreme situation."[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Powers, Thomas. *The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA*. Knopf, 1979. Hersh, Seymour M. "Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U.S. Against Antiwar Forces." New York Times, December 22, 1974.
|
||||
[^2]: Church Committee, S. Rept. 94-755, April 26, 1976.
|
||||
[^3]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 17.
|
||||
[^4]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion*. Seven Stories Press, 1998. Ch. 9.
|
||||
[^5]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 17.
|
||||
[^2]: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVIII, part 2, front matter, "Persons" (Walters: "Acting Director of Central Intelligence, July 2, 1973-September 4, 1973"; Colby: "Director of Central Intelligence, September 4, 1973-January 30, 1976"; Schlesinger: "Director of Central Intelligence, February 2-July 2, 1973"). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v38p2/persons
|
||||
[^3]: Church Committee, S. Rept. 94-755, April 26, 1976.
|
||||
[^4]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 17.
|
||||
[^5]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion*. Seven Stories Press, 1998. Ch. 9.
|
||||
[^6]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 17.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
356
10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Dag Hammarskjöld.md
Normal file
356
10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Dag Hammarskjöld.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,356 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
aliases:
|
||||
- Dag Hammarskjold
|
||||
- Hammarskjöld
|
||||
- Dag Hjalmar Agne Carl Hammarskjöld
|
||||
category: "Intelligence & Government"
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- Person
|
||||
- DagHammarskjold
|
||||
- UnitedNations
|
||||
- SecretaryGeneral
|
||||
- Congo
|
||||
- Katanga
|
||||
- UnionMiniere
|
||||
- Ndola
|
||||
- PlaneCrash
|
||||
- NSA
|
||||
- CryptoAG
|
||||
- CX52
|
||||
- OperationCeleste
|
||||
- SAIMR
|
||||
- ColdWar
|
||||
- Sweden
|
||||
summary: "Dag Hammarskjöld, second Secretary-General of the United Nations, died when flight SE-BDY crashed near Ndola on the night of September 17 and 18, 1961, and the General Assembly has kept the inquiry open since 2014."
|
||||
born: 1905-07-29
|
||||
died: 1961-09-18
|
||||
location: "Ndola, Northern Rhodesia"
|
||||
created: 2026-10-12
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[United Nations]]"
|
||||
start: 1953-04
|
||||
end: 1961-09-18
|
||||
role: "Secretary-General of the United Nations"
|
||||
fn: 5
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Bank of Sweden]]"
|
||||
start: 1941
|
||||
end: 1948
|
||||
role: "head of the Bank of Sweden"
|
||||
fn: 4
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[Swedish Ministry of Finance]]"
|
||||
start: 1936
|
||||
end: 1945
|
||||
role: "undersecretary"
|
||||
fn: 4
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs]]"
|
||||
start: 1946
|
||||
end: 1953
|
||||
role: "financial adviser from 1946, deputy foreign minister from 1951"
|
||||
fn: 4
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[Suez Crisis]]"
|
||||
start: 1956-10
|
||||
end: 1956-11
|
||||
role: "commissioned the United Nations Emergency Force"
|
||||
fn: 7
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[Rishikesh Shaha]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 1961-12
|
||||
end: 1962-04
|
||||
role: "chair of the United Nations Commission of Investigation into the death"
|
||||
fn: 37
|
||||
- type: subject_of
|
||||
with: "[[Hammarskjöld Commission]]"
|
||||
start: 2012-07
|
||||
end: 2013-09-09
|
||||
role: "commission of jurists whose report was made public in 2013"
|
||||
fn: 40
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[Stephen Sedley]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 2012-07
|
||||
end: 2013-09-09
|
||||
role: "chair of the commission of jurists"
|
||||
fn: 40
|
||||
- type: subject_of
|
||||
with: "[[Independent Panel of Experts]]"
|
||||
start: 2015-03
|
||||
end: 2015-06-12
|
||||
role: "examined new information on the crash and assessed its probative value"
|
||||
fn: 62
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[Mohamed Chande Othman]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 2015-03
|
||||
role: "head of the Independent Panel of Experts in 2015, then Eminent Person reporting in 2017, 2019, 2022 and 2024"
|
||||
fn: 62
|
||||
- type: subject_of
|
||||
with: "[[Operation Celeste]]"
|
||||
start: 1961-09
|
||||
role: "alleged sabotage plot named in documents on South African Institute for Maritime Research letterhead, surfaced by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1998"
|
||||
fn: 75
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Dag Hjalmar Agne Carl Hammarskjöld (July 29, 1905 to September 18, 1961) was a Swedish economist and diplomat who served as the second Secretary-General of the [[United Nations]] from 1953 until his death.[^1] He was one of sixteen people aboard the Swedish [[Transair]] DC-6 known as the Albertina, flight SE-BDY, which crashed near [[Ndola]] in [[Northern Rhodesia]] on the night of September 17 and 18, 1961.[^2] The Rhodesian and United Nations inquiries of 1961 and 1962 did not fix the cause, and the General Assembly has kept the investigation open since 2014.
|
||||
|
||||
### Swedish career
|
||||
|
||||
Hammarskjöld was the youngest of four sons of [[Hjalmar Hammarskjöld]], who had been prime minister of [[Sweden]], a member of the [[Permanent Court of Arbitration|Hague Tribunal]], governor of Uppland, and chairman of the board of the [[Nobel Foundation]].[^3] He took degrees at [[Uppsala University]] in the humanities in 1925, in economics in 1928 and in law in 1930, and a doctorate in economics in 1934. He taught economics at [[Stockholm University]] in 1933. He was secretary of a governmental commission on unemployment from 1930 to 1934, and secretary of the [[Bank of Sweden]] from 1935. He was undersecretary in the [[Swedish Ministry of Finance]] from 1936 to 1945 and head of the Bank of Sweden from 1941 to 1948. The Nobel biography says he has been credited with coining the term "planned economy."[^4] From 1946 he was financial adviser to the [[Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs]], took an official post there in 1949, became deputy foreign minister with cabinet rank in 1951, and represented Sweden at the United Nations in 1949 and again from 1951 to 1953.
|
||||
|
||||
### Secretary-General, 1953 to 1961
|
||||
|
||||
The General Assembly elected him Secretary-General in 1953 for a five-year term, with fifty-seven votes out of sixty, and reelected him in 1957. The Nobel biography says that he called his method "preventive diplomacy," that in 1954 and 1955 he personally negotiated the release of American soldiers captured by the Chinese in the [[Korean War]], and that he sought more independence and effectiveness for the post itself.[^5] In 1958 he proposed to the Assembly a solution to the crises in [[Lebanon]] and [[Jordan]]. In 1959 he sent a personal representative to Southeast Asia when [[Cambodia]] and [[Thailand]] broke off diplomatic relations, and another to [[Laos]].[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### Suez and the emergency force
|
||||
|
||||
During the [[Suez Crisis]] of 1956 he exercised what the Nobel biography describes as his own personal diplomacy with the nations involved. Under the United Nations mandate he commissioned the [[United Nations Emergency Force]], "the first ever mobilized by an international organization."[^7] General Assembly resolution 1001 (ES-I) of November 5, 1956 established a United Nations Command for the force, appointed the Chief of Staff of the [[United Nations Truce Supervision Organization]] as its chief, and created an advisory committee whose chairman was the Secretary-General.[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
### Katanga and the mining interests
|
||||
|
||||
On July 14, 1960 the Security Council authorized the Secretary-General to provide the Government of the Republic of the Congo with the military assistance it had asked for.[^9] On August 9, 1960 the Council reaffirmed that the United Nations Force in the Congo "will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise."[^10]
|
||||
|
||||
On July 11, 1960 the Katangan politician [[Moise Tshombe]] declared the province independent, with the overt support of the Belgian military command. The Commission of Jurists wrote that Katanga contained the majority of the Congo's known mineral resources, "the world's richest uranium and four fifths of the West's cobalt supply," mined principally by a Belgian company, the [[Union Minière du Haut Katanga]]. The company immediately recognized the secessionist government in [[Elisabethville]] and began paying it royalties, so that Tshombe's regime "was well funded," and "so long as Katanga remained independent of the Congo, there was no risk that the assets of Union Minière would be expropriated."[^11]
|
||||
|
||||
The Commission recorded that Union Minière had close relations with the British company [[Tanganyika Concessions]], whose chairman, Captain Charles Waterhouse, was also a director of Union Minière, and that Tanganyika Concessions had links with [[Anglo American]], the [[Rhodesian Selection Trust]] and the [[British South Africa Company]]. The prime minister of the Rhodesian Federation, [[Roy Welensky]], wrote on April 21, 1961 in a secret message to the British foreign secretary, [[Lord Home]], that "Tshombe is a very good friend of the Federation." The High Commissioner in Salisbury, [[Lord Alport]], sent London a dispatch a week after the crash blaming the United Nations' "complete failure to understand the conditions in Central Africa."[^12] The Commission wrote that there was evidence of a cleft in policy between the United States administration, which supported the United Nations, and the [[Central Intelligence Agency]], which "may have been providing materiel to Katanga," and concluded that Belgium, the British and American security services, the Rhodesian Federation with its British supporters, and South Africa "had reasons not to welcome the prospect of a reunited and independent Congo which it was the UN's policy and Dag Hammarskjöld's mission to bring about."[^13]
|
||||
|
||||
On February 21, 1961 the Security Council resolved that measures be taken for the withdrawal of all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, "and mercenaries."[^14] The Commission wrote that some 500 foreign mercenaries were attached to the Katangan army by the start of 1961, at about £4,000 a year plus keep, that the principal paymasters were likely Belgium and South Africa, and that commercial sources were also possible.[^15]
|
||||
|
||||
Political command of the United Nations operation was exercised by the Irish diplomat [[Conor Cruise O'Brien]], whose priority was to force Tshombe to expel the mercenaries and to acknowledge the authority of the Congolese government. Tshombe's refusal prompted [[Operation Rumpunch]], which on August 28, 1961 captured a number of strategic points in Elisabethville; Britain, Belgium and France then intervened diplomatically and took responsibility for deporting the mercenaries captured, while at least 100 remained unaccounted for. [[Operation Morthor]] followed on September 13, 1961, designed to seize key buildings in Elisabethville and facilitate the arrest of Tshombe and four of his ministers. Katanga's resources included at least one and possibly several [[Fouga Magister]] jet trainers armed with two machine guns, with mercenaries to fly them, one of which had on several occasions harassed United Nations transport planes on the ground.[^16]
|
||||
|
||||
### Lumumba
|
||||
|
||||
The [[Church Committee]] documented the American side of the [[Patrice Lumumba]] affair from CIA cables. On August 18, 1960 [[Bronson Tweedy]], chief of the Africa Division of the agency's clandestine services, replied that he was seeking State Department approval for an operation based on "your and our belief Lumumba must be removed if possible." On August 19 [[Richard Bissell]], director of the agency's covert operations branch, signed a follow-up cable to Leopoldville reading "You are authorized proceed with operation."[^17]
|
||||
|
||||
On August 26 [[Allen Dulles]] cabled that "targets of opportunity may present themselves to you," and authorized up to $100,000 "to carry out any crash programs on which you do not have the opportunity to consult HQS."[^18] The Committee wrote that Lumumba "was killed by Congolese rivals. It does not appear from the evidence that the United States was in any way involved in the killing."[^19] It also wrote that the evidence was "strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the plot to assassinate Lumumba was authorized by President Eisenhower."[^20] The Commission of Jurists wrote that Lumumba and two other Congolese politicians were kidnapped by the troops of [[Joseph Mobutu]] in January 1961, "allegedly with the connivance of the Belgian, British and US security services," and taken to Katanga, where they were tortured and murdered.[^13] On February 21, 1961 the Security Council, having "learnt with deep regret" of the announced killing, decided that "an immediate and impartial investigation be held."[^14]
|
||||
|
||||
### The journey to Ndola
|
||||
|
||||
The Commission wrote that Hammarskjöld and his team arrived in [[Léopoldville]] from New York on September 13, 1961, to discuss an aid programme with the Congolese government, on the day that Morthor was launched without his knowledge or approval. An attempt by the British consulate in Elisabethville to broker ceasefire talks between Tshombe and O'Brien had stalled over O'Brien's requirement that Tshombe first recognize the unity of the Congo. On September 16 Hammarskjöld proposed that he and Tshombe meet in Rhodesia, and the arrangements were passed through the British consul in Katanga, [[Denzil Dunnett]]; Ndola was settled on as the venue. On September 17 the [[Secret Intelligence Service]] officer [[Neil Ritchie]], first secretary at the High Commission in Salisbury, flew with two small aircraft to collect Tshombe and Dunnett at Kipushi, where he found them with Henry Fortemps, the assistant director general of Union Minière in Elisabethville.[^21]
|
||||
|
||||
The Albertina, chartered from Transair and assigned to the United Nations Force Commander, took off from Ndjili airport at 1751. Radio silence was maintained, the pilot filed a flight plan naming Luluabourg as his destination, and the aircraft flew a circuitous route to avoid interception by Katangan fighters. The Secretary-General had asked other states for air cover; Ethiopia had agreed to provide jet fighters, but the British government had not granted clearance to overfly British East African territory, which the Commission attributed to the want in London of any sense of urgency and not to more, finding no convincing evidence that the failure was deliberate. [[Lord Lansdowne]], the British Under-Secretary of State, landed at Ndola at about 2230, flying ahead of the United Nations party at the Secretary-General's suggestion. The Commission recorded that among those at the airport by midnight were Alport, Dunnett and a considerable number of journalists, and that according to the memoir of the South African mercenary commander [[Jerry Puren]], he and two other mercenaries were also at the airport and two more were in the town, a presence the Commission said had never been explained save by Puren as a coincidence.[^22] The last recorded exchange with Ndola air traffic control came at 0010 hours, when the aircraft reported "Your lights in sight, overhead Ndola, descending, confirm QNH" and, after the controller's reply, confirmed "Roger 1021." No further communication is recorded.[^23]
|
||||
|
||||
The Foreign Relations of the United States editorial note records that the plane "crashed as it approached Ndola that evening," and that all aboard were killed. On September 18 [[Dean Rusk]], then in New York for the General Assembly session, called on Executive Assistant [[Andrew Cordier]] and Under Secretary-General [[Ralph Bunche]]. According to the memorandum of the conversation, Bunche "emphasized the depradations [sic] of a single jet fighter," and Rusk assured the group that "the United States could not stand idly by and let U.N. planes be interfered with on their missions."[^24]
|
||||
|
||||
### The wreck and the survivor
|
||||
|
||||
The official Rhodesian account was that the wreckage was found at about 1500 hours on September 18, some fifteen hours after the aircraft failed to land. The 2022 report of the Eminent Person wrote that information from multiple sources established that it was discovered earlier, and that numerous sources refer to unidentified persons at the crash site before its official discovery.[^25] One person aboard, a United Nations security sergeant, survived the impact and died in hospital some days later. The 2024 report wrote that the Rhodesian inquiries prematurely dismissed his statements, and that some statements he may have made before he died were not put before them.[^26] The 2022 report recorded that the Ndola air traffic controller destroyed his original notes of the final communications, that no tapes were made of the control tower's interactions, and that later information cast further doubt on the completeness of his account.[^27]
|
||||
|
||||
### Intelligence and military presence at Ndola
|
||||
|
||||
The 2019 report of the Eminent Person, [[Mohamed Chande Othman]], recorded that Ritchie, Dunnett and Alport, together with others, made arrangements in September 1961 for the Ndola meeting with Tshombe. British diplomatic, intelligence and commercial personnel used the facilities of the Union Minière and other channels to communicate with each other and with Belgian and Katangan authorities, and the report recorded that the United States appeared to have been aware of some of these interactions. It recorded that the intercepts of United Nations communications were discussed at a high level by Alport, by the United States Consul in Elisabethville, [[William C. Canup]], and by Welensky.[^28] The 2022 report wrote that Ritchie flew a Union Minière engineer to [[Kitwe]] in Northern Rhodesia in September 1961, where the engineer worked with a British commercial figure who referred to himself as British intelligence, to support the transmission of messages between the governments of Katanga, Northern Rhodesia and the United Kingdom, and that on the night of the crash Ritchie and these two men stayed at the same location. After the crash the engineer and Ritchie travelled to Katanga with the aim of taking the Secretary-General's documents, recovered from the crash site, to Dunnett. Ritchie wrote a secret report for the Commonwealth Relations Office in London, and the United Kingdom has not disclosed records of MI5 or MI6 personnel.[^29]
|
||||
|
||||
The Commission recorded the account of [[David Doyle]], a former CIA officer who had been in charge of the agency's Elisabethville base until April 1961. Doyle wrote in a memoir that on a night visit to the airport, not long after the killing of Lumumba, he found a US-registered Stratocruiser whose civilian crew were unloading three Fouga Magister jet trainers, armed, for Katanga, which he wrote was "in direct violation" of US policy. In June 2013 Doyle told [[Charles Southall]] that after he had been posted to [[Burundi]], Tweedy "came out after and wanted to know if I had any idea what had happened." The Commission wrote that if Tweedy had to ask Doyle such a question, the possibility of direct CIA involvement in interfering with the Albertina's flight, as distinct from giving logistical support to Katanga, "begins to recede." The Commission also recorded that, according to Puren's memoir, one or more Katangan De Havilland Dove aircraft had been adapted to drop bombs of a kind manufactured by Union Minière.[^30]
|
||||
|
||||
The 2019 report recorded that [[Larry Devlin]], chief of station in Léopoldville, coordinated agents designated "WIROGUE" and "QJWIN," and that the agency's activities in the Congo included planned assassinations, such as those under the programme "ZRRIFLE."[^31] The 2022 report recorded that the CIA employed the mercenary [[Mike Hoare]] in the 1960s, "though likely some years after the crash," that Hoare, who had been in the service of Katanga in 1961, stated that the crash was not an accident, and that Senator [[Frank Church]] "is said to have claimed" that the United States held significant undisclosed information relating to the crash. It recorded West German and CIA records suggesting West German operations in the Congo involving an agent of the [[Bundesnachrichtendienst]] (BND), and a telegram of December 16, 1961 from the United Kingdom representative in Salisbury reporting that "certain Federal agencies were deeply implicated in military traffic between Northern Rhodesia and Katanga" and that the Ndola representative of the Federal Intelligence and Security Bureau regularly "briefed and debriefed" Katangan pilots.[^32] The same report found that the Katangan air force, [[Avikat]], had multiple serving pilots, that its aircraft included a Fouga Magister, a Dornier DO-28 and several De Havilland Doves, and that armaments for its operations appear to have included weapons made locally with the involvement of Union Minière.[^33]
|
||||
|
||||
The Commission recorded that two USAF aircraft stood on the tarmac at Ndola that night, one from Pretoria and one from Léopoldville, and quoted a British witness who said that "Those planes we understood had high powered communication equipment." A Rhodesian squadron leader, Mussell, was reported to have told the UN inquiry that "American Dakotas were sitting on the airfield with their engines running." The United States air attaché in Pretoria, [[Don Gaylor]], was according to his memoirs ordered by the Pentagon to Ndola to meet the Secretary-General.[^34] The 2024 report recorded that two Dakota aircraft had arrived at Ndola by September 16, one under the command of Commander [[Don Ely]], the naval attaché for air in Pretoria, and one under Gaylor, the air force attaché for air in Pretoria, and that a third was flown from Elisabethville on the morning of September 18 by Colonel [[Benjamin Matlick]], United States air attaché in Léopoldville. It stated that there was "a reasonable evidentiary basis to consider that these or other aircraft ... may have overheard or relayed communications from or about flight SE-BDY." Gaylor referred to his "unique intelligence operations" and reports to the Pentagon, was in the Ndola control tower on the night of the crash, and according to his accounts was among the first to locate the wreckage the next day; no reports of his activities on September 18 have been disclosed.[^35]
|
||||
|
||||
### The 1961 and 1962 inquiries
|
||||
|
||||
The Rhodesian Federal Department of Civil Aviation set up an air accident investigation two days after the crash. Its Board of Investigation, which sat in private, concluded that the approach had been normal and correct except that the aircraft was about 1,700 feet lower than it should have been. It found that the evidence did not allow a "specific" or "definitive" cause, and while pilot error was a possibility it was unable to rule out a "wilful act of some person or persons unknown which might have forced the aircraft to descend or collide with the trees." A Rhodesian Commission of Inquiry chaired by the Chief Justice, [[John Clayden|Sir John Clayden]], reported in February 1962 that "the aircraft was allowed by the pilots to descend too low, so that it struck the trees and was brought to the ground."[^36]
|
||||
|
||||
A United Nations Commission of Investigation, chaired by [[Rishikesh Shaha]], reported in April 1962 that it had found no evidence of sabotage or attack, but that these possibilities could not be excluded. It could not exclude material failure or human failure either. The bibliography of the Commission of Jurists dates the report, document A/5069, to April 24, 1962.[^37] The Foreign Relations editorial note dates a report of the Commission of Investigation to March 8, 1962.[^38] On October 26, 1962 the General Assembly adopted resolution 1759 (XVII), which requested the Secretary-General to inform it of "any new evidence which may come to his attention."[^39]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Hammarskjöld Commission, 2013
|
||||
|
||||
In July 2012 an enabling committee chaired by [[Lord Lea of Crondall]], which included the former Commonwealth Secretary-General [[Emeka Anyaoku]] and the Archbishop Emeritus of the Church of Sweden, [[K. G. Hammar]], set up a commission of jurists chaired by Sir [[Stephen Sedley]]. Its members were [[Hans Corell]], [[Richard Goldstone]] and [[Wilhelmina Thomassen]]. The commission's report was made public on September 9, 2013. The Secretary-General transmitted it to the General Assembly as document A/68/800 on March 21, 2014, stating that he had "the duty to inform you that new evidence has come to my attention."[^40]
|
||||
|
||||
The commission did not determine the cause of the crash. Its essential purpose was to consider whether the evidence pointing to a wilful act merited fuller consideration. It noted that the work of [[Susan Williams]], whose 2011 book *Who Killed Hammarskjöld?* was the principal published account of the case, "marshalled a striking quantity of evidential material."[^41]
|
||||
|
||||
The commission rejected the theory of an infiltrated seventeenth passenger who hijacked the aircraft, on the ground that only sixteen identified people were found at the site.[^42] It recorded the allegation of Soviet responsibility made in the August 1978 issue of *Penthouse*, which quoted a purported CIA report to President Kennedy that "the explosive device aboard the aircraft was of standard KGB incendiary design," and wrote that there was no evidence from any source known to it to support the claim, while noting that it would be of value to know on what evidence the CIA report, assuming it was accurately quoted, was based.[^43] The Associated Press had reported on June 3, 1978 that the magazine's account rested on unnamed CIA sources and a six-month investigation by the reporters Joe Trento and Dave Roman.[^44]
|
||||
|
||||
The commission wrote that "There is persuasive evidence that the aircraft was subjected to some form of attack or threat as it circled to land at Ndola." It did not consider the sabotage claim "capable of verification," and added that this "is not the same thing as saying that it is untrue." It did not recommend that the sabotage evidence be further investigated by the United Nations for the present, and wrote that the United Nations "would be justified in reopening its 1961-2 inquiry for the initial purpose of confirming or refuting, from intercept records, the evidence indicating that the descent of the Secretary-General's plane was brought about by some form of attack or threat." It added that such records "appear, on the evidence currently available, to be held, if anywhere, in the United States."[^45]
|
||||
|
||||
### The National Security Agency and the intercept records
|
||||
|
||||
On the intercepts, the commission wrote that "both from the specific evidence of a physical US presence at Ndola airport with radio monitoring equipment, and from the broader evidence of the US National Security Agency's worldwide monitoring activities in and about 1961, it is highly likely that the entirety of the local and regional Ndola radio traffic on the night of 17-18 September 1961 was tracked and recorded by the NSA, and possibly also by the CIA." It added that any cockpit narrative or tower dialogue should in the ordinary course have been monitored, recorded, logged and archived by the [[National Security Agency]], and that authenticated recordings would furnish "potentially conclusive evidence of what happened to the DC6."[^46]
|
||||
|
||||
The [[National Security Archive]] at [[George Washington University]] submitted Freedom of Information Act requests on the commission's behalf for any recording or transcription of radio traffic intercepted by the NSA at its Cyprus station or any other station on the night of September 17 and 18, 1961 appearing to relate to one aircraft firing upon another, and for any radio message intercepted between 2130 GMT on September 17 and 0030 GMT on September 18 concerning the landing or approach of an aircraft at Ndola. The NSA's initial response indicated that two of three documents "responsive" to the request appeared to be exempt from disclosure by reason of "top secret" classification, and that the third was not held by the NSA. On July 19, 2013 the National Security Archive's public service coordinator wrote to the commission, relaying the view of the Archive's CIA specialist, [[John Prados]], that NSA intercepts "have always been highly guarded by declassifiers," and an appeal against the continuing classification was lodged.[^47]
|
||||
|
||||
The Independent Panel of Experts recorded in 2015 that the NSA advised that two files in its possession were "responsive" to the request, and that they could not be released because doing so "could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security." The Swedish newspaper [[SvD Nyheter]] reported on November 21, 2014 that the United States had given Swedish foreign minister [[Carl Bildt]] access to the two files, and quoted him as saying that the information in them was "trivial and unimportant." In response to the Panel's own request, one member of the Panel, of Australian nationality, was afforded full access to the two files under the bilateral security information-sharing arrangements between the United States and Australia; she assessed that they would not help establish the cause of the crash and contained no information on the interception of communications about an attack on SE-BDY. In a letter of June 9, 2015 the United States told the Panel that its search of NSA and CIA records had not found documents matching the materials the Panel had described.[^48]
|
||||
|
||||
### Southall and the Cyprus listening post
|
||||
|
||||
Charles Southall was a former United States Navy commander who, according to the commission, had been in September 1961 at the NSA's naval communications facility in Cyprus, which maintained a listening post near [[Nicosia]], where his task was to read and if necessary decrypt intercepted messages. He described a recording played back over a loudspeaker shortly after midnight on the night of the crash. In the commission's rendering of his account, a single male voice, described as "cool and professional," said: "I see a transport plane coming low. All the lights are on. I'm going down to make a run on it. Yes, it's the Transair DC6. It's the plane." The sound of cannon-fire followed, and then a more animated voice: "I've hit it. There are flames. It's going down. It's crashing." The commission recorded that Southall was positive the traffic was consistent only with a deliberate shooting down, while noting that on its face the narrative he recounted "is not inconsistent with an accidental shooting-down."[^49]
|
||||
|
||||
The Independent Panel of 2015 quoted the passage with the wording "I'm going to go down to make a run on it." Southall told the Panel that his communications watch officer, or another officer present, had told him that a Belgian pilot known as the "Lone Ranger," flying a Fouga Magister used by Katangese forces, made the transmission and that the pilot "must be waiting for Hammarskjöld's plane."[^50] The Panel recorded that an analyst at the State Department, [[Karen Engstrom]], contacted Southall on December 8, 1992 in connection with a request from Sweden for assistance with its own investigation, which was headed by the Swedish diplomat [[Bengt Rösiö]].[^51]
|
||||
|
||||
The United States confirmed to the Panel in 2015 that Southall was an active member of the Navy at the time, without saying where he was stationed. Southall declined an interview with the Panel for health reasons. The Panel described his account as "solitary witness information," because no colleague present had corroborated it. In correspondence of July 28, 1993, a colleague who was then a diplomat was reported to have told a journalist that he had "no special memory of" an incident that night.[^52] The 2019 report recorded that the United States confirmed he joined the Navy in 1955, was released from active duty in 1969 and retired as a commander from the Naval Reserve in 1978, and gave no information on whether he worked in support of NSA.[^53] The 2022 report wrote that it had not been disputed that he held a specialization as a "processing and reporting" officer assigned at a naval communications facility near Nicosia in 1961, and that he consistently attempted to convey the information to officials between 1967 and 2013.[^54]
|
||||
|
||||
The 2019 report recorded that a Swedish assistant air attaché in [[Rabat]] reported in 1967 that Southall had heard a radio message from a Belgian mercenary, and that [[Edelstam]], deputy director at the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, replied that "nobody had ever claimed that the plane was shot down from the ground." In the early 1980s Southall met the Scandinavian academic [[Sten Thore]] and told him about the crash. Thore's letter of October 21, 1992 to Rösiö stated that Southall "declares categorically that all the circumstances were known in detail within the CIA." The Panel had assessed Southall's information about an attack as having moderate probative value in 2015, and the 2019 report wrote that the new information received that year "is consistent with and supports his previous statements."[^55]
|
||||
|
||||
### Paul Abram
|
||||
|
||||
The Panel also received an account from [[Paul Abram]], a former United States Air Force security services officer, who was attached to an NSA listening post in [[Iraklion]] on [[Crete]], Greece. He said that on the night of the crash he heard a voice say "Here comes the plane ... the plane is well lit," and that a second voice, which he judged to be non-American, then said "the Americans just shot down a UN plane." He said the transmissions were followed by a significant increase in "radio chatter." He assessed from the high frequency network that the aircraft had been shot down by ground fire. Abram first provided the additional information when he contacted the Hammarskjöld Commission in 2014, after it had concluded its work.[^56] The Panel was given a discharge record describing him as a "voice intercept procedure specialist" and "interpreter," and assessed that his claim to have performed special duties appeared to be valid. It could not confirm that he had been posted to Iraklion at the time.[^57] The 2017 report recorded that the United States confirmed his service record only in July 2017, along with information that disputed his location at the time he reported hearing the intercept.[^58]
|
||||
|
||||
In 2019 the Eminent Person assessed Abram's claims as of strong probative value regarding the proposition that the United States was monitoring radio traffic and of moderate probative value insofar as they related to an attack on SE-BDY, and assessed the claims of both men as of strong probative value that the United States was monitoring radio traffic and that relevant transcripts were highly likely to have been created. The 2022 report retained that assessment.[^54]
|
||||
|
||||
The reports give different accounts of the two men's deaths. The 2017 report records that Southall died in 2015, and the 2019 report that the Eminent Person was informed in 2017 that he had died since the Panel completed its work.[^53][^58] The reports of 2019, 2022 and 2024 state that both men had passed away as of 2018.[^59] The 2022 report states in one paragraph that the Eminent Person was informed in 2020, after the 2019 report, that Abram had died, and in another that he was advised in 2019; the 2024 report states that he was informed after the 2019 report was published.[^60] The 2024 report wrote that the failure of the United States to take up the opportunity to contradict Southall and Abram "tends to have the effect of supporting those claims."[^59]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Independent Panel of Experts, 2015
|
||||
|
||||
General Assembly resolution 69/246, adopted December 29, 2014, requested the Secretary-General to appoint an independent panel of experts to examine new information and assess its probative value.[^61] The Secretary-General appointed on March 16, 2015 Mohamed Chande Othman, then Chief Justice of [[Tanzania]], as head of the Panel, with [[Kerryn Macaulay]] of Australia as an aviation safety expert and [[Henrik Larsen]] of Denmark as a ballistics expert. The Panel worked from March 30 to June 12, 2015, and the Secretary-General transmitted its report on July 2, 2015.[^62]
|
||||
|
||||
The Panel assigned moderate probative value to nine new eyewitness accounts that more than one aircraft was in the air, to the claims of two persons who heard or read alleged intercepts, to new information on the air capability of Katangan forces, to the possibility that communications sent from Hammarskjöld's CX-52 cryptographic machine were intercepted, to crew fatigue, and to new information that called into question the time of discovery of the wreck. It found that "claims made by mercenaries, or their interlocutors, and other agents that they shot or otherwise forced down SE-BDY in an aerial attack" lacked credibility, and wrote that the new information "may also provide an appreciable lead in pursuing the truth of the probable cause or causes of the air crash and tragic deaths."[^62]
|
||||
|
||||
### The CX-52 and Crypto AG
|
||||
|
||||
Hammarskjöld's party used CX-52 cryptographic machines, which were produced by the Swiss company [[Crypto AG]]. The 2017 report recorded a claim made to the Panel by a brother-in-law of [[Boris Hagelin]], the founder of Crypto AG, that the NSA had covertly monitored communications sent from the CX-52 by way of a "backdoor" in the encryption, and had shared the intelligence with the CIA, [[Government Communications Headquarters]] and possibly other services. The claimant said that Hagelin's memoirs carried full details but were scheduled for publication no earlier than 2033, fifty years after Hagelin's death. The Panel assessed the claim as having moderate probative value.[^63] The report also recorded that Lord Alport "peculiarly ... refused to return to the UN representatives coding machines and books which the Federal authorities had recovered from the wreck," according to a United States dispatch from Lusaka transmitted from Salisbury on September 27, 1961.[^64] The 2022 report recorded that United Nations officials were suspicious when the CX-52 machines were not immediately returned after the crash, despite the entreaty of ONUC Colonel Björn Egge.[^65]
|
||||
|
||||
The 2019 report stated that communications sent from the CX-52 "appear to have been intercepted by British and United States signals and intelligence agencies as a result of a secret interception and decryption setting that those agencies held that enabled them to intercept surreptitiously."[^66]
|
||||
|
||||
In 2020 the Eminent Person was given new information on reporting by SRF (Swiss television), the [[Washington Post]] and ZDF (German television) on the involvement of the CIA, the NSA and the BND in an operation designed to let the United States and West Germany secretly read encrypted communications in devices made by Crypto AG, which were said to have been sold to the United Nations and to governments. The 2022 report recorded that this reporting was "stated to be based on a 96-page account completed in 2004 by the CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence and an oral history compiled by German intelligence officials in 2008," and that it alleged a joint operation of the CIA and the BND known in the CIA first as "Thesaurus" and later as "Rubicon."[^67] In 2017 the United States had advised the Eminent Person that it "ha[d] no comments on this item," and in the 2022 mandate the United Kingdom and the United States, invited to comment, gave no comment or clarification.[^68] The Eminent Person wrote: "I consider it to be established that communications sent from Hammarskjöld's CX-52 cryptographic machines were covertly intercepted by or shared with specific Member States. I assess it to be of strong probative value that those Member States were monitoring the Secretary-General's confidential communications." He also considered it highly likely that records of those communications were created but have not been disclosed.[^67] The claim that the CIA or NSA monitored United Nations communications under the names "Thesaurus" and "Rubicon" "has not been refuted by the Member States concerned."[^69]
|
||||
|
||||
The Swiss parliamentary Control Delegation reported on November 2, 2020 on a history of the operation prepared by American services after 2000 with representatives of the German intelligence service, titled MINERVA. It describes how the American services used Crypto AG, which had manufactured encryption devices in Switzerland from the 1950s, in agreement with its Swedish owner, and records that in 1970 the company passed into the joint ownership of American services and the German service, that the German side withdrew at the end of 1993, and that the account closes in 1995.[^70] The 2024 report stated that the United States and West Germany "appear to have had covert and direct 'backdoor' access" to messages sent with the CX-52, and recorded that Germany's sole clarification, received in 2024, was that German archives did not reveal any indication that West German intelligence agencies had access to Hammarskjöld's communications before the crash.[^71]
|
||||
|
||||
### The 2017 and 2019 reports
|
||||
|
||||
Othman's first report as Eminent Person, under resolution 71/260, was transmitted by the Secretary-General, [[António Guterres]], on September 5, 2017. The report recorded that it was "almost certain" that Hammarskjöld and the members of the party with him were not assassinated after landing. It considered it "plausible that an external attack or threat was a cause of the crash," and stated that "it is not possible at present to conclude whether sabotage was a cause of the crash." The transmittal letter said that the burden had "now shifted to Member States" to show that they had reviewed their records and archives, including those that remain classified.[^72]
|
||||
|
||||
The 2017 report dealt with an unauthenticated claim by a Belgian pilot, "Beukels," made to [[Claude de Kemoularia]] in 1967 that Beukels had shot down or otherwise forced SE-BDY to crash. The report found that De Kemoularia's agendas appeared to verify his meeting with "Beukels" and other mercenaries that year, but that the identity of "Beukels" could not be verified.[^73] The 2019 report, transmitted on September 12, 2019, wrote that de Kemoularia's notes of a June 16, 1993 meeting with the former mercenary [[Bob Denard]] do not mention Beukels. It recorded that the military archives of Belgium did not contain any reference to a pilot named Beukels, and concluded that the new information "goes to disproving this hypothesis," while noting that "it may still be that parts of the story are true, while others are false."[^74]
|
||||
|
||||
The 2019 report stated that "it appears established that British and Northern Rhodesian officials attempted to influence the findings of those inquiries to conclude that the crash was the result of pilot error, rather than any type of external interference."[^66] It also recorded that the two United States personnel who claimed to have overheard a transmission about an attack had both passed away by 2018, and that the United States had not responded to their claims substantively.
|
||||
|
||||
### Operation Celeste and the SAIMR
|
||||
|
||||
In July 1998 the South African [[National Intelligence Agency]] passed to the [[Truth and Reconciliation Commission]] (TRC) a file concerning the 1993 assassination of the leader of the South African Communist Party, [[Chris Hani]]. The TRC's researcher found in it about a dozen documents, on the letterhead of the [[South African Institute for Maritime Research]] (SAIMR), relating not to Hani but to an operation codenamed Celeste. The TRC's chairman, [[Desmond Tutu]], released copies of eight of them at the commission's final press conference in August 1998, and the originals were passed to the Minister of Justice, [[Dullah Omar]], who died in 2004 without making further comment. Attempts by Susan Williams and others to examine the originals failed, and a search made by the Ministry at the request of Justice Goldstone on behalf of the commission was unsuccessful. The Commission of Jurists noted that the assassination of Hani was not the work of the National Intelligence Agency.[^75]
|
||||
|
||||
The Commission of Jurists reproduced the documents' text. An order dated September 14, 1961 states that a DC-6 in Transair livery is parked at Léopoldville to be used for transport of "subject," and that "our technician has orders to plant 6 lbs TNT in the wheelbay with contact detonator to activate as wheels are retracted on taking off." An undated typescript, evidently relating to early September 1961, purports to record the decisions following a meeting between "M.I.5, Special Ops. Executive, and SAIMR": "UNO is becoming troublesome and it is felt that Hammarskjöld should be removed. Allen Dulles [head of the CIA] agrees and has promised full cooperation from his people." It adds: "If McKeown and O'Brien can be dealt with simultaneously it would be useful but not if it could compromise the main operation." The last document, headed "Operation Celeste 18.9.61," reads in part: "1. Device failed on take-off. ... 3. Device activated [........] prior to landing. 4. As advised O'Brien and McKeown were not aboard. 5. Mission accomplished: satisfactory," and is marked as from "Congo Red."[^76] The Commission wrote that there was nothing on the face of the documents that could be confidently shown to be false, and nothing in them that could not have been known to, or invented by, a forger, and that "by themselves neither the SAIMR documents nor their contents can be treated as trustworthy."[^77]
|
||||
|
||||
The 2017 report recorded that the Panel had found the Operation Celeste documents lacked probative value. Their authenticity could not be established, their chain of possession was uncertain, and it had not been confirmed that the institute existed in 1961. The Panel wrote to South Africa on June 23, 2015 to request that it search for and share any records relating to the documents, and had not heard back from South Africa when it completed its work. South Africa wrote to the United Nations on July 1, 2016 that a "revelation made during the Republic of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) hearings in the 1990s" had pointed to the possible involvement of the institute in Hammarskjöld's death.[^78]
|
||||
|
||||
The 2019 report accepted that the institute "appears to have existed in South Africa in the 1980s and 1990s," and wrote that it could not confirm whether it existed in 1961.[^79] A former South African soldier told the Independent Appointee in 2019 that he had joined the institute around 1990 after answering a newspaper advertisement. At a recruitment meeting in Johannesburg the recruits were introduced to two individuals, one of whom was [[Keith Maxwell]], known as "the Commodore." The recruits were shown photographs of an operation that Maxwell said had taken place in the Congo in 1960.[^80]
|
||||
|
||||
The 2019 report recorded a handwritten version of Maxwell's memoirs, obtained through a film team. Its extract "Johannesburg 1961" describes a meeting at which an "Acting Commodore Wagman" tells officers that three men are to be "removed," and a technician who plants explosive material in the Transair DC-6, the device of which fails to harm the aircraft. The report noted internal inconsistencies, including a letter dated "12 July 1960" that refers to Fouga jets that were not delivered to Katanga until months later. Several sources in the film team claimed that some of the Operation Celeste documents were in Maxwell's handwriting. The report's author wrote that this was an untrained analysis, and that if the handwriting was Maxwell's the documents could also have been forged. In a 1998 statement reported by the [[BBC]], the British [[Foreign and Commonwealth Office]] answered allegations of British involvement with the words: "intelligence agents of the United Kingdom do not go around bumping people off. At this time during the Cold War, Soviet misinformation was quite rampant so [the letters] may have been put out by them."[^81]
|
||||
|
||||
The 2022 report recorded that South Africa's renewed search of its archives produced no originals: "despite a thorough and diligent search the original documents could not be located." It recorded that the address and telephone number on the SAIMR letterhead did not match the Johannesburg directory listings for 1960 and 1961, and wrote that this "may be another flag suggesting that the documents are not authentic." It also recorded that a former mercenary who had been in Ndola on the night of the crash told a journalist that he had never heard of the institute.[^82]
|
||||
|
||||
The 2022 report summarized the argument of [[Greg Poulgrain]]'s 2020 book, *JFK vs. Allen Dulles: Battleground Indonesia*, which posits that Dulles formed a motive to remove Hammarskjöld because of a policy conflict over the dispute concerning the sovereignty of West New Guinea, and that the Operation Celeste documents show Dulles's involvement. Poulgrain compared the documents' wording with the Church Committee's account of Dulles expressing a "wish [to] give every possible support" to the plan against Lumumba. The report recorded that Conor Cruise O'Brien and [[George Ivan Smith]], who had both been senior United Nations officials in the Congo in 1961, had expressed to Poulgrain their view that Hammarskjöld had been intentionally killed. The Eminent Person wrote that the information focused on a motive and did not require an assessment of probative value at that stage, and that it underscored the importance of "proving or disproving the veracity of the Operation Celeste hypothesis and Dulles's alleged involvement."[^83]
|
||||
|
||||
### The 2022 and 2024 reports
|
||||
|
||||
Othman was reappointed Eminent Person in March 2020 under resolution 74/248, and the General Assembly extended his mandate in December 2020. His report of August 25, 2022 (A/76/892) stated that "it remains plausible that an external attack or threat was a cause of the crash." It found no evidence of mechanical failure or of an incorrect altimeter setting, that crew fatigue may have affected the co-pilot and flight engineer, that pilot error could not be excluded, and that it would be unsound to rule out an external attack "in circumstances where it is clear that not all relevant evidence has been disclosed." It recorded that the United Kingdom, the United States and Northern Rhodesia intercepted and received interceptions of confidential United Nations communications throughout 1961 without the knowledge or consent of the United Nations, and that encrypted communications sent by Hammarskjöld using the CX-52 "appear to have been intercepted and read by Member States' signals and intelligence agencies."[^84]
|
||||
|
||||
The report of September 9, 2024 (A/78/1006) repeated the findings on the Dakota aircraft and the NSA, and recorded that "almost all new information provided between 2020 and 2024 has originated from individual researchers and non-State entities." It stated that "I respectfully consider that the burden of proof assigned to key Member States remains to be discharged," that the non-cooperation of Member States "may be seen to be approaching intentional obstruction of the full truth of the circumstances and events," and that it was almost certain that further relevant information exists, including radio or other communications.[^85]
|
||||
|
||||
### Responses of the Member States
|
||||
|
||||
In April and May 2017 the Eminent Person asked eight Member States identified as most likely to hold relevant information: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States. Responses came from Belgium, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States.[^86]
|
||||
|
||||
Germany appointed Thomas Fitschen as its Independent Appointee in 2018; he confirmed that Germany had given him full access to all files and archives, including those of the BND and of the intelligence service of the former German Democratic Republic.[^87] South Africa appointed Mxolisi Nkosi as a focal point in 2019. In 2021 its Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Grace Naledi Mandisa Pandor, advised that "no documents relating to the death of former UNSG Hammarskjöld" had been found, and the Eminent Person stated that he had requested searches for the transfer of personnel and equipment from South Africa to Katanga, South African mercenaries and intelligence personnel who served in Katanga, and links between Katangan, Belgian and South African entities. By 2024 he had received no new information or specific responses from South Africa and considered that there were grounds to believe that further undisclosed information existed in its archives.[^88]
|
||||
|
||||
The United Kingdom stated in November 2018 that it did not intend to appoint an independent appointee because all information of direct value had already been made available. In June 2019 it appointed Graham Hand, who stated that all responsive documents had been provided. The Independent Appointee of Zimbabwe noted that, before Zimbabwe's independence, Rhodesian authorities under the direction of British colonial authorities had "meticulously removed almost every record or archive associated with the Dag Hammarskjöld Crash." In 2022 the United Kingdom responded without addressing the specific requests or listing the archives searched. In April 2024 Phil Dixon of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office wrote that "our firm assessment (independently confirmed by Mr. Hand) remains that all information of value to the Inquiry has already been provided to the Inquiry itself or has been released to The National Archives at Kew and is available to the public there." The Eminent Person considered that there were grounds to believe that further undisclosed information existed in British archives.[^89]
|
||||
|
||||
In April 2019 the United States Independent Appointee stated that searches had been comprehensive and included intelligence, security and defence archives, and sent a single document. In November 2021 the Independent Appointee, David McFarland, stated that the Director of National Intelligence, Avril Haines, had tasked the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency to search contemporary and archival records, that the only result of the search coordinated by the CIA was two issues of the "President's Intelligence Checklist" dated September 18 and 19, 1961, and that "no holdings reviewed then, or acquired since, mention the crash or Hammarskjöld's death," notwithstanding searches by the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the NSA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Eminent Person's requests for information at a more granular level, and for a list of the archives searched and the search terms applied, were not answered. In March 2024 McFarland wrote: "I am not aware of any additional information pertaining to the specific questions in your request, but will reconfirm with relevant agencies." The Eminent Person considered that there were grounds to believe that further undisclosed information existed in United States archives.[^90]
|
||||
|
||||
No response had been received from the Republic of the Congo, to requests for airport and air force records from Brazzaville in September 1961, or from Ethiopia, to requests for records relating to a Swedish instructor with the Ethiopian Air Force who reported overhearing a short-wave radio conversation at about midnight on the night of the crash in which flight controllers, one of them at Ndola airport, expressed surprise that one plane was being followed by another. Italy confirmed it had commenced enquiries.[^91] The Eminent Person has had unrestricted access to all United Nations archives; all files of the United Nations Operation in the Congo are public except twenty-three that remain "strictly confidential."[^92]
|
||||
|
||||
### General Assembly resolutions
|
||||
|
||||
Resolution 1759 (XVII) of 1962 is the basis of the reopened inquiry. Resolution 69/246 (December 29, 2014) recalled it, acknowledged the commission's report, and requested the Panel. Resolution 70/11 (November 19, 2015) asked the Secretary-General to pursue the Panel's pending requests for information and to explore the feasibility of a central archival holding for records of the death.[^93] Resolution 71/260 (December 23, 2016) requested an eminent person, and called on Member States to ensure that records "that remain classified, more than 50 years after the fact, are declassified or otherwise made available for review."[^94] Resolution 72/252 (December 24, 2017) requested the Secretary-General to reappoint the Eminent Person, asked Member States to appoint independent, high-ranking officials to review their intelligence, security and defence archives, and asked the United Nations to review its own specific records and archives for possible declassification.[^95] Resolutions 74/248 (December 27, 2019) and 77/252 (December 30, 2022) reappointed him again.[^96][^97]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Nobel Foundation, "Dag Hammarskjöld: Biographical," Nobel Peace Prize 1961. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1961/hammarskjold/biographical/
|
||||
[^2]: A/68/800, report of the Commission of Jurists on the Inquiry into the Death of Dag Hammarskjöld, transmitted by the note of the Secretary-General of March 21, 2014, paragraph 1.1 (sixteen people aboard). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^3]: Nobel Foundation, "Dag Hammarskjöld: Biographical," family background, degrees from Uppsala University and teaching at Stockholm University in 1933. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1961/hammarskjold/biographical/
|
||||
[^4]: Nobel Foundation, "Dag Hammarskjöld: Biographical," account of the Bank of Sweden, Ministry of Finance and Foreign Ministry appointments, the "planned economy" attribution, and the 1949 and 1951 to 1953 United Nations delegations. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1961/hammarskjold/biographical/
|
||||
[^5]: Nobel Foundation, "Dag Hammarskjöld: Biographical," election in 1953 with fifty-seven votes out of sixty, reelection in 1957, the 1954 to 1955 prisoner releases, "preventive diplomacy," and the post's independence. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1961/hammarskjold/biographical/
|
||||
[^6]: Nobel Foundation, "Dag Hammarskjöld: Biographical," account of the 1958 Lebanon and Jordan proposal and the 1959 representatives to Southeast Asia and Laos. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1961/hammarskjold/biographical/
|
||||
[^7]: Nobel Foundation, "Dag Hammarskjöld: Biographical," Suez Canal crisis of 1956, personal diplomacy, and the United Nations Emergency Force "the first ever mobilized by an international organization." https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1961/hammarskjold/biographical/
|
||||
[^8]: United Nations General Assembly, resolution 1001 (ES-I), November 5, 1956, operative paragraphs 1 to 2 and the advisory committee paragraph. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2FRES%2F1001%20%28ES-I%29&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^9]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 143 (1960), July 14, 1960, paragraph 2. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F143%20%281960%29&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^10]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 146 (1960), August 9, 1960, paragraph 4. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F146%20%281960%29&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^11]: A/68/800, paragraphs 3.2 and 3.3 (the declaration of July 11, 1960 with Belgian military support; the mineral resources of Katanga; Union Minière recognition and royalties). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^12]: A/68/800, paragraphs 3.5 to 3.7 (the Rhodesian Federation, Welensky's message of April 21, 1961 to Lord Home, Union Minière and Tanganyika Concessions, Lord Alport's dispatch). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^13]: A/68/800, paragraphs 3.4, 3.9 and 3.10 (the January 1961 transfer of Lumumba; the divide between the United States administration and the CIA; the states and enterprises with a stake in the secession). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^14]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 161 (1961), February 21, 1961, preamble and paragraphs 1 to 4. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F161%20%281961%29&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^15]: A/68/800, paragraph 10.10 (some 500 foreign mercenaries attached to the Katangan army; the likely paymasters). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^16]: A/68/800, paragraphs 4.1 to 4.4 (resolution 161 and ONUC; the aircraft and mercenaries available to Katanga; Operations Rumpunch and Morthor). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^17]: United States Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975, section on the Congo, quoting CIA cables of August 18 and 19, 1960. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf
|
||||
[^18]: Church Committee, Senate Report No. 94-465, section on the Congo, quoting the cable of August 26, 1960. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf
|
||||
[^19]: Church Committee, Senate Report No. 94-465, interim summary on the Congo. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf
|
||||
[^20]: Church Committee, Senate Report No. 94-465, section on the level at which the plot was authorized. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf
|
||||
[^21]: A/68/800, paragraphs 5.1 to 5.3 (arrival in Léopoldville on September 13, 1961; the proposal of September 16; Dunnett; Ritchie, Fortemps and the journey to Ndola). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^22]: A/68/800, paragraphs 5.4 to 5.9 and 6.1 to 6.2 (departure from Ndjili at 1751; Lansdowne; those present at Ndola airport; Puren's memoir; Ethiopian jets; the flight plan and route). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^23]: A/76/892, report of the Eminent Person, August 25, 2022, paragraph 127 (the last recorded exchange with Ndola at 0010 hours). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^24]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, volume XX, Congo Crisis, document 116, editorial note on the Secretary-General's death and the memorandum of the conversation of September 18, 1961 as summarized there. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d116
|
||||
[^25]: A/76/892, paragraphs 39 and 47 (unidentified persons at the crash site before its official discovery; the wreckage found earlier than the official account of about 1500 hours on September 18). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^26]: A/78/1006, report of the Eminent Person, September 9, 2024, paragraphs 39 and 40 (the sole survivor's death in hospital; his statements prematurely dismissed by the Rhodesian inquiries). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F78%2F1006&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^27]: A/76/892, paragraphs 45 and 371 (the Ndola air traffic controller's destroyed notes and the absence of tapes). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^28]: A/73/973, report of the Eminent Person, September 12, 2019, paragraph 25 (British arrangements for the Ndola meeting) and paragraph 16 (the intercepts discussed at a high level, including by Lord Alport, the United States Consul in Elisabethville and Sir Roy Welensky). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^29]: A/76/892, paragraphs 33 and 41 (Ritchie, Loeb and Hunt; the Ritchie report; the post-crash journey to Katanga with the Secretary-General's documents). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^30]: A/68/800, paragraphs 13.17 to 13.19 (Doyle's memoir, the Stratocruiser and the Fouga Magisters; the remark attributed to Tweedy; the Dove aircraft and Union Minière bombs). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^31]: A/73/973, paragraph 26 (CIA stations in Léopoldville and Elisabethville; Chief of Station Larry Devlin; "WIROGUE," "QJWIN," and "ZRRIFLE"). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^32]: A/76/892, paragraphs 42 to 44 and 135 (CIA presence; Mike Hoare; Senator Church; West German operations; Northern Rhodesian intelligence; the telegram of December 16, 1961). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^33]: A/76/892, paragraphs 34 to 38 (the Katangan air force; arms made locally with the involvement of Union Minière; the pilots and mercenaries). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^34]: A/68/800, paragraphs 13.20 to 13.22 (two USAF aircraft at Ndola; the evidence of a British witness and of Squadron Leader Mussell; Gaylor's functions). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^35]: A/78/1006, paragraphs 47 to 49 (Dakota aircraft at Ndola; Ely, Gaylor and Matlick; Gaylor's "unique intelligence operations"). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F78%2F1006&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^36]: A/68/800, paragraphs 9.1 to 9.4, summarizing the report of the Board of Investigation of the Rhodesian Federal Department of Civil Aviation, the report of the Rhodesian Commission of Inquiry chaired by Sir John Clayden (February 1962) and the report of the United Nations Commission of Investigation. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^37]: A/68/800, bibliography (United Nations Commission of Investigation chaired by Rishikesh Shaha, report of April 24, 1962, document A/5069). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^38]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, volume XX, document 116, editorial note (a report of the United Nations Commission of Investigation dated March 8, 1962, citing A/5069 and Add.1). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d116
|
||||
[^39]: United Nations General Assembly, resolution 1759 (XVII), October 26, 1962, paragraph 3. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2FRES%2F1759%20%28XVII%29&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^40]: A/68/800, note of the Secretary-General of March 21, 2014, paragraphs 1 to 3 (the enabling committee of July 2012; the membership of the commission; publication on September 9, 2013). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^41]: A/68/800, paragraphs 1.3 to 1.5 and 9.2 (the work of Susan Williams and the purpose of the report). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^42]: A/68/800, paragraph 10.5 (the hijacking hypothesis). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^43]: A/68/800, paragraphs 10.7 and 10.8 (the Penthouse allegation of August 1978 and the Commission's assessment). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^44]: The Washington Post, "Hammarskjold Said Murdered," Associated Press, June 3, 1978, page A-9 (copy in the CIA Records Search Tool, CIA-RDP81M00980R000600080076-5). https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp81m00980r000600080076-5
|
||||
[^45]: A/68/800, paragraphs 15.4 to 15.6 and 15.14 to 15.16 (the Commission's conclusions and recommendation). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^46]: A/68/800, paragraphs 15.7 to 15.10 (the NSA's monitoring of Ndola radio traffic and the value of archived recordings). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^47]: A/68/800, paragraphs 15.11 and 15.12 (the Freedom of Information Act requests; the NSA's response; the letter of July 19, 2013 from the National Security Archive; the appeal). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^48]: A/70/132, report of the Independent Panel of Experts, letter of the Secretary-General dated July 2, 2015, paragraphs 81 to 83 (the NSA's response to the Freedom of Information Act request; the SvD Nyheter report of November 21, 2014; the examination of the two files by a Panel member; the United States letter of June 9, 2015). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F70%2F132&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^49]: A/68/800, paragraphs 13.23 to 13.28 (Southall's position at the Cyprus listening post, the recording, and his view of its meaning). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^50]: A/70/132, paragraphs 72 and 73 (Southall's statements of 2009 to 2013; the "Lone Ranger"). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F70%2F132&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^51]: A/70/132, paragraph 75 (Engstrom's contact of December 8, 1992; the Swedish investigation headed by Bengt Rösiö). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F70%2F132&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^52]: A/70/132, paragraphs 80, 84 and 86 (Southall's inability to be interviewed; the 2015 United States confirmation of his Navy service; "solitary witness information"; the correspondence of July 28, 1993). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F70%2F132&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^53]: A/73/973, paragraphs 102 and 103 (United States confirmation of Southall's Navy service and retirement; his death reported in 2017). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^54]: A/76/892, paragraphs 367 to 370 (the assessments of Southall's and Abram's claims; the United States confirmation of Southall's position; "processing and reporting" officer). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^55]: A/73/973, paragraphs 109 to 112 (the 1967 Swedish report from Rabat; Edelstam's reply; Thore's letter of October 21, 1992; the assessments). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^56]: A/70/132, paragraphs 76 to 79 (Abram's account of the Iraklion listening post and the transmissions; his 2013 book; his contact with the Commission in 2014). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F70%2F132&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^57]: A/70/132, paragraph 85 (discharge record; the Panel's assessment; the unconfirmed posting). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F70%2F132&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^58]: A/71/1042, report of the Eminent Person, September 5, 2017, paragraph 7 (Southall's death in 2015; the July 2017 confirmation of Abram's record and the dispute over his location). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F71%2F1042&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^59]: A/78/1006, paragraph 50 (both men "passed away" as of 2018; "tends to have the effect of supporting those claims"). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F78%2F1006&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^60]: A/76/892, paragraphs 102 to 104 and 368 (the 2019 assessment of the claims of Abram; the notice of his death given as 2020 and as 2019); A/78/1006, paragraph 93 (the notice after the publication of the 2019 report). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^61]: United Nations General Assembly, resolution 69/246, adopted December 29, 2014, preamble and operative paragraphs 1 to 3. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2FRES%2F69%2F246&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^62]: A/70/132, introduction (the appointment of March 16, 2015; the composition of the Panel; work from March 30 to June 12, 2015; the letters of June 11 and July 2, 2015), paragraph 2 (moderate probative value; the claims of mercenaries) and paragraph 261 (the "appreciable lead"). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F70%2F132&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^63]: A/71/1042, paragraphs 27 and 121 (the claim of the brother-in-law of the founder of Crypto AG; the CX-52 "backdoor"; Hagelin's memoirs and the 2033 date; moderate probative value). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F71%2F1042&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^64]: A/71/1042, paragraph 123 (the Lusaka dispatch transmitted from Salisbury on September 27, 1961). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F71%2F1042&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^65]: A/76/892, paragraph 132 (the CX-52 machines not returned to the United Nations after the crash; ONUC Colonel Egge; the dispatch quoting Lord Alport). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^66]: A/73/973, paragraphs 8 and 15 to 19 (the shortcomings of the early inquiries; the CX-52 interception; the two United States personnel). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^67]: A/76/892, paragraphs 129 to 134 (the SRF, Washington Post and ZDF reporting; the 96-page CIA account of 2004; the BND oral history of 2008; the finding on the CX-52 interception). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^68]: A/76/892, paragraph 130 (the United States response of 2017, "no comments on this item"). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^69]: A/76/892, paragraphs 29 and 30 (interception of United Nations communications; the CX-52; "Thesaurus" and "Rubicon"). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^70]: Geschäftsprüfungsdelegation der Eidgenössischen Räte, "Fall Crypto AG," Bericht vom 2. November 2020, Bundesblatt 2020, sections "Das Wichtigste in Kürze" and 2.1.1 (the MINERVA report). https://www.parlament.ch/centers/documents/de/bericht-gpdel-2020-11-10-d.pdf
|
||||
[^71]: A/78/1006, paragraphs 45 and 46 (backdoor access by the United States and West Germany; "Thesaurus" and "Rubicon"; the German clarification of 2024). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F78%2F1006&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^72]: A/71/1042, summary of findings and transmittal letter, September 5, 2017. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F71%2F1042&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^73]: A/71/1042, paragraph 13 (the "Beukels" claim and De Kemoularia's records). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F71%2F1042&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^74]: A/73/973, paragraphs 141 and 153 to 161 (de Kemoularia's notes of the June 16, 1993 meeting with Bob Denard; Belgian military archives; the assessment). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^75]: A/68/800, paragraphs 12.32, 12.33 and 12.37 (the National Intelligence Agency file of July 1998 concerning the 1993 assassination of Chris Hani; the SAIMR; the press conference of August 1998; the originals passed to the Minister of Justice). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^76]: A/68/800, paragraphs 12.34 to 12.36 (the text of the documents). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^77]: A/68/800, paragraphs 12.38 to 12.41 (the Commission's assessment of the documents). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^78]: A/71/1042, paragraphs 100 to 102 (the Operation Celeste documents; the Panel's letter of June 23, 2015 to South Africa; South Africa's letter of July 1, 2016). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F71%2F1042&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^79]: A/73/973, paragraph 29 (the SAIMR in the 1980s and 1990s; existence in 1961 unconfirmed). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^80]: A/73/973, paragraphs 260 to 266 (the SAIMR recruitment meeting; "the Commodore"). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^81]: A/73/973, paragraphs 274 to 280 (Maxwell memoir extracts, "Johannesburg 1961," the letter of "12 July 1960," the handwriting analysis, and the BBC article of August 20, 1998 on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office statement). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^82]: A/76/892, paragraphs 233 to 240 (South Africa's renewed search; the letterhead; the former mercenary's statement). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^83]: A/76/892, paragraphs 241 to 248 (Poulgrain's 2020 book; the views of O'Brien and Smith; the Church Committee comparison; the Eminent Person's assessment). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^84]: A/76/892, introduction and transmittal (reappointment in March 2020; extension in December 2020), and paragraphs 21 to 32 (key findings of 2022). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^85]: A/78/1006, summary page and paragraphs 74 to 78 (the burden of proof; "approaching intentional obstruction"; the origin of new information). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F78%2F1006&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^86]: A/71/1042, paragraphs 4 to 6 (the eight Member States asked in April and May 2017; the five that responded). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F71%2F1042&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^87]: A/78/1006, paragraphs 44 to 46 and 57 to 59 (requests to Member States in 2020 and 2023; Germany's appointee and access to BND and Staatssicherheitsdienst files). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F78%2F1006&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^88]: A/78/1006, paragraphs 60 to 64 (South Africa). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F78%2F1006&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^89]: A/78/1006, paragraphs 65 to 72 (the United Kingdom, including the Zimbabwean Independent Appointee's remark on the removal of Rhodesian records). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F78%2F1006&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^90]: A/78/1006, paragraphs 73 to 78 (the United States). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F78%2F1006&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^91]: A/78/1006, paragraphs 49 to 56 (the Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia and Italy). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F78%2F1006&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^92]: A/78/1006, paragraph 79 (United Nations archives). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F78%2F1006&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^93]: United Nations General Assembly, resolution 70/11, November 19, 2015, operative paragraphs 1 and 2. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2FRES%2F70%2F11&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^94]: United Nations General Assembly, resolution 71/260, December 23, 2016, operative paragraphs 1 to 3. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2FRES%2F71%2F260&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^95]: United Nations General Assembly, resolution 72/252, December 24, 2017, operative paragraph 1 (reappointment), the paragraph on independent officials reviewing intelligence, security and defence archives, and the paragraph on the United Nations' own records. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2FRES%2F72%2F252&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^96]: United Nations General Assembly, resolution 74/248, December 27, 2019. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2FRES%2F74%2F248&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^97]: United Nations General Assembly, resolution 77/252, December 30, 2022. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2FRES%2F77%2F252&l=en&t=pdf
|
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|
|
@ -61,12 +61,20 @@ His Legion of Merit citation of 1984, as quoted by [[Edwin May]], read that he "
|
|||
|
||||
McMoneagle retired from the Army in 1984 with the rank of Chief Warrant Officer. His Legion of Merit citation referenced his contributions to intelligence collection through unconventional means. After retirement, he continued as a civilian consultant to the STAR GATE program - operating under DIA oversight through the [[Sun Streak]] and STAR GATE code names - until its declassification in 1995.
|
||||
|
||||
He married Nancy Lea Honeychurch, the sister of Robert Monroe, the founder of the Monroe Institute in Faber, Virginia. The Monroe Institute had developed methods for inducing altered states of consciousness using binaural audio technology and had trained some STARGATE viewers in out-of-body techniques. McMoneagle became associated with the institute after his retirement.
|
||||
He married Nancy Lea, the stepdaughter of Robert Monroe, the founder of the Monroe Institute in Faber, Virginia.[^4] The Monroe Institute had developed methods for inducing altered states of consciousness using binaural audio technology and had trained some STARGATE viewers in out-of-body techniques. McMoneagle became associated with the institute after his retirement.
|
||||
|
||||
A memorandum of March 29, 1984 records that the Center Lane office awarded a personal services contract to [[Robert Monroe]] in July 1983 to examine his Hemi-Sync technology in the collection process, that its objectives were extended to train the source in Hemi-Sync "in anticipation of his continued participation in CL as a private consultant after his retirement," and that the project manager was "aware that Mr. McMoneagle will retire soon after completion of the training."[^5] The Center Lane chronology records the start of one-on-one training with Monroe between October 31 and November 4, 1983 and "MIAS Advanced Training completed" on July 13, 1984.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
His wife [[Nancy McMoneagle]] was director of the Monroe Institute from 1983 to 1991 and president and executive director from 2014 until she retired on March 4, 2019; the Institute's Forms 990 list her as executive director and then president for tax years 2016 to 2018 at reportable compensation of $88,426, $93,017 and $96,985.[^4][^7]
|
||||
|
||||
He published two books describing his work and his theoretical framework: *Mind Trek: Exploring Consciousness, Time, and Space Through Remote Viewing* (Hampton Roads, 1993) and *Remote Viewing Secrets: A Handbook* (Hampton Roads, 2000). He has continued to participate in publicly available remote viewing demonstrations and research.
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Grill Flame volunteer security agreements, consent statements, and counseling statements for Joseph W. McMoneagle (February 8, 1979; October 26, 1979; February 19, 1980), Melvin C. Riley (February 8, 1979), and Robert C. Cowart (June 3 and October 2, 1981), and "Requirement for Access to DIA Sun Streak Project (Brian Buzby)," May 10, 1985, CIA-RDP96-00789R0021001500xx series. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^2]: Jachim, Robert J., memorandum "Briefing for MG A.N. Stubblebine III," October 8, 1982, CIA-RDP96-00788R001700220022-7; Buzby, Brian, memoranda "CENTER LANE Briefing for CG, USAINSCOM," August 29, 1983 (CIA-RDP96-00788R001700220011-9), "Meeting With MG Stubblebine on 30 November 1983," December 6, 1983 (CIA-RDP96-00788R001700220010-0), and "Meeting with MG Stubblebine on 6 January 1984," January 17, 1984 (CIA-RDP96-00788R001700220009-2); letter of the ACSI to Stubblebine, "CENTER LANE," April 1983 (CIA-RDP96-00788R001700220002-9). Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^3]: May, Edwin C. "The American Institutes for Research Review of the Department of Defense's STAR GATE Program: A Commentary," *Journal of Parapsychology,* vol. 60, no. 1, March 1996, pp. 3-23. "Psychic Spies: Cold War Whimsy or Secret Weapon?," ABC News *Nightline,* November 28, 1995, Radio TV Reports transcript for the CIA Public Affairs Staff, CIA-RDP99-01448R000402140001-7, read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room.
|
||||
[^1]: Grill Flame volunteer security agreements, consent statements, and counseling statements for Joseph W. McMoneagle (February 8, 1979; October 26, 1979; February 19, 1980), Melvin C. Riley (February 8, 1979), and Robert C. Cowart (June 3 and October 2, 1981), and "Requirement for Access to DIA Sun Streak Project (Brian Buzby)," May 10, 1985, CIA-RDP96-00789R0021001500 series.
|
||||
[^2]: Jachim, Robert J., memorandum "Briefing for MG A.N. Stubblebine III," October 8, 1982, CIA-RDP96-00788R001700220022-7; Buzby, Brian, memoranda "CENTER LANE Briefing for CG, USAINSCOM," August 29, 1983 (CIA-RDP96-00788R001700220011-9), "Meeting With MG Stubblebine on 30 November 1983," December 6, 1983 (CIA-RDP96-00788R001700220010-0), and "Meeting with MG Stubblebine on 6 January 1984," January 17, 1984 (CIA-RDP96-00788R001700220009-2); letter of the ACSI to Stubblebine, "CENTER LANE," April 1983 (CIA-RDP96-00788R001700220002-9)..
|
||||
[^3]: May, Edwin C. "The American Institutes for Research Review of the Department of Defense's STAR GATE Program: A Commentary," *Journal of Parapsychology,* vol. 60, no. 1, March 1996, pp. 3-23. "Psychic Spies: Cold War Whimsy or Secret Weapon?," ABC News *Nightline,* November 28, 1995, Radio TV Reports transcript for the CIA Public Affairs Staff, CIA-RDP99-01448R000402140001-7.
|
||||
[^4]: The Monroe Institute, "From the Director's Chair: March 2019, Nancy's Farewell." https://monroeinstitute.org/blogs/blog/director-s-chair-march-2019-nancys-farewell
|
||||
[^5]: Security Support Detachment, USAINSCOM, memorandum for record "Continuation of MIAS Advanced Training (U)," March 29, 1984. CIA-RDP96-00788R001700210002-0, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^6]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, *Center Lane Information Papers for Director, Defense Intelligence Agency*, March 7, 1985. CIA-RDP96-00788R000400060001-2, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^7]: Internal Revenue Service, Forms 990 of The Monroe Institute, tax years 2016, 2017 and 2018, Part VII, object IDs 201721239349301212, 201832569349300913 and 201920829349300002.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Kenneth A. Kress was a physicist in the CIA's [[CIA Office of Technical Service|
|
|||
|
||||
### SCANATE
|
||||
|
||||
The office had spent 874 dollars on a few days' work in August 1972 and 2,500 more before it "funded a $50,000 expanded effort in parapsychology" on October 1, 1972. Kress carried the project through the review of April and May 1973, when [[William Colby]] sent it to the Executive Management Committee and the matter went to the director, [[James Schlesinger]]; \"I was soon told not to increase the scope of the project,\" and into the joint program with the Office of Research and Development that began on February 1, 1974. He wrote that at one point "I began to have serious feelings of being involved with a fraud," and had the agency's computer office re-analyze the SRI random-number machine, finding "no evidence of nonrandomness." In July 1974 he designed the test of Pat Price against [[Semipalatinsk]], choosing "the tall crane and the four structures resembling oil well derricks" as the checks, and concluded that "as proof of remote viewing, the data are at best inconclusive." When the program was reviewed in 1975 he was "judged to be a positively biased advocate of paranormal functioning" and removed from evaluation; the research support was dropped as "not productive or even competent."[^2]
|
||||
The office had spent 874 dollars on a few days' work in August 1972 and 2,500 more before it "funded a $50,000 expanded effort in parapsychology" on October 1, 1972. Kress carried the project through the review of April and May 1973, when [[William Colby]] sent it to the Executive Management Committee and the matter went to the director, [[James Schlesinger]]; "I was soon told not to increase the scope of the project and not to anticipate any follow-on in this area," and into the joint program with the Office of Research and Development that began on February 1, 1974. He wrote that at one point "I began to have serious feelings of being involved with a fraud," and had the agency's computer office re-analyze the SRI random-number machine, finding "no evidence of nonrandomness." In July 1974 he designed the test of Pat Price against [[Semipalatinsk]], choosing "the tall crane and the four structures resembling oil well derricks" as the checks, and concluded that "as proof of remote viewing, the data are at best inconclusive." When the program was reviewed in 1975 he was "judged to be a positively biased advocate of paranormal functioning" and removed from evaluation; the research support was dropped as "not productive or even competent."[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Article
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -39,17 +39,17 @@ Hunt Oil found the Alif field near [[Marib]] in 1984, the first oil discovered i
|
|||
|
||||
Hunt joined the Halliburton board in 1998, when [[Dick Cheney]] was chief executive, and went at once onto its compensation committee, which that year gave Cheney a bonus of 1.1 million dollars and restricted stock worth 1.5 million on a salary of 1.18 million. He joined the board of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas the same year. He was a [[Bush Pioneers|Pioneer]] fundraiser for George W. Bush, who made him finance chairman of the Republican National Committee in May 2000. His son [[Hunter Hunt|Hunter L. Hunt]] took leave from the company to work on the campaign's energy policy group.[^2][^9]
|
||||
|
||||
On October 5, 2001, the [[White House]] announced Hunt's appointment to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board under General [[Brent Scowcroft]]. The other members included [[Jim Barksdale]], [[Robert Addison Day]], [[Stephen Friedman]], [[Alfred Lerner]], [[Rita Hauser]], Admiral [[David Jeremiah]], [[Arnold Kanter]], [[James C. Langdon Jr.]], [[Pete Wilson]], and [[Philip Zelikow]]. Scowcroft was removed after criticizing the [[Iraq]] war. On October 27, 2005, the White House reappointed Hunt for a term beginning December 20 under Friedman, with [[Donald Evans]], [[Arthur B. Culvahouse]], [[William O. DeWitt Jr.]], and [[Lee Hamilton]]. In the same years two Hunt Oil executives became ambassadors. [[Jeanne L. Phillips]], a senior vice president and a fundraiser for the Bush campaign and inaugural, was ambassador to the [[Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development|OECD]] from August 2001 to June 2003 and returned to the company. Oberwetter was sworn in as ambassador to [[Saudi Arabia]] on January 8, 2004.[^2][^3][^10]
|
||||
On October 5, 2001, the [[White House]] announced Hunt's appointment to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board under General [[Brent Scowcroft]]. The other members included [[Jim Barksdale]], [[Robert Addison Day]], [[Stephen Friedman]], [[Alfred Lerner]], [[Rita Hauser]], Admiral [[David Jeremiah]], [[Arnold Kanter]], [[James C. Langdon Jr.]], [[Pete Wilson]], and [[Philip Zelikow]]. [[Robert Bryce]] wrote in *Salon* on November 17, 2005 that George W. Bush had dismissed Scowcroft from the chairmanship about a year earlier because of his public criticism of the decision to invade [[Iraq]].[^2] [[Steve Clemons]] wrote on October 27, 2005 that Scowcroft was not asked to return to the board when his term expired at the end of 2004 and that he reportedly told a gathering just after the New Year: "I just got fired."[^10] On October 27, 2005, the White House reappointed Hunt for a term beginning December 20 under Friedman, with [[Donald Evans]], [[Arthur B. Culvahouse]], [[William O. DeWitt Jr.]], and [[Lee Hamilton]]. In the same years two Hunt Oil executives became ambassadors. [[Jeanne L. Phillips]], a senior vice president and a fundraiser for the Bush campaign and inaugural, was ambassador to the [[Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development|OECD]] from August 2001 to June 2003 and returned to the company. Oberwetter was sworn in as ambassador to [[Saudi Arabia]] on January 8, 2004.[^2][^3][^11]
|
||||
|
||||
### Kurdistan
|
||||
|
||||
On September 8, 2007, Hunt Oil and the [[Kurdistan Regional Government]] announced a production-sharing contract for a block in the Dohuk area, signed under a regional oil law that the Kurdish parliament had passed a month earlier and that the government in [[Baghdad]] did not recognize. The Bush administration's policy was that no contracts should be signed before a national oil law. Three days before the signing, Hunt Oil's regional manager, [[David McDonald (Hunt Oil)|David McDonald]], told the head of the [[State Department]]'s reconstruction team in [[Erbil]] that the company was interested in the Shekhan and Akra districts of northern [[Nineveh Governorate|Nineveh]], territory disputed between Erbil and Baghdad. "This is a significant opportunity that outweighs the legal ambiguity," he said, and of the geology: "It's like shooting fish in a barrel." The embassy's cable reporting the contract went to Washington on September 12. Ray Hunt said he was pleased to be "actively participating in the establishment of the petroleum industry in the [[Kurdistan Region|Kurdistan Region of Iraq]]." President Bush said: "I know nothing about the deal."[^11][^12]
|
||||
On September 8, 2007, Hunt Oil and the [[Kurdistan Regional Government]] announced a production-sharing contract for a block in the Dohuk area, signed under a regional oil law that the Kurdish parliament had passed a month earlier and that the government in [[Baghdad]] did not recognize. The Bush administration's policy was that no contracts should be signed before a national oil law. Three days before the signing, Hunt Oil's regional manager, [[David McDonald (Hunt Oil)|David McDonald]], told the head of the [[State Department]]'s reconstruction team in [[Erbil]] that the company was interested in the Shekhan and Akra districts of northern [[Nineveh Governorate|Nineveh]], territory disputed between Erbil and Baghdad. "This is a significant opportunity that outweighs the legal ambiguity," he said, and of the geology: "It's like shooting fish in a barrel." The embassy's cable reporting the contract went to Washington on September 12. Ray Hunt said he was pleased to be "actively participating in the establishment of the petroleum industry in the [[Kurdistan Region|Kurdistan Region of Iraq]]." President Bush said: "I know nothing about the deal."[^12][^13]
|
||||
|
||||
On July 2, 2008, Representative [[Henry Waxman]], chairman of the [[House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform]], released company and government documents and wrote to [[United States Secretary of State|Secretary of State]] [[Condoleezza Rice]] that "contrary to the denials of Administration officials, advisors to the President and officials in the State and Commerce Departments knew about Hunt Oil's interest in the Kurdish region months before the contract was executed." Hunt Oil officials had met the State Department team in Erbil on June 12, 2007. Hunt had written to the intelligence board on July 12 and August 30, 2007, describing his contacts with the Kurds. An internal Hunt Oil message quoted in the letter read: "This is really good for us ... I find it a huge compliment that he is tipping us off about this ... This is a lucky break."[^12]
|
||||
On July 2, 2008, Representative [[Henry Waxman]], chairman of the [[House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform]], released company and government documents and wrote to [[United States Secretary of State|Secretary of State]] [[Condoleezza Rice]] that "contrary to the denials of Administration officials, advisors to the President and officials in the State and Commerce Departments knew about Hunt Oil's interest in the Kurdish region months before the contract was executed." Hunt Oil officials had met the State Department team in Erbil on June 12, 2007. Hunt had written to the intelligence board on July 12 and August 30, 2007, describing his contacts with the Kurds. An internal Hunt Oil message quoted in the letter read: "This is really good for us ... I find it a huge compliment that he is tipping us off about this ... This is a lucky break."[^13]
|
||||
|
||||
### Sharyland
|
||||
|
||||
Hunter Hunt founded [[Sharyland Utilities]] in 1999, the first new regulated electric utility in the [[United States]] in three decades. Under the Competitive Renewable Energy Zone program that the [[Texas Legislature]] created in 2005, Sharyland was awarded about 300 miles of transmission lines in the Panhandle. In 2010 the family placed the lines in a real estate investment trust, [[InfraREIT]], which leased them back to the utility. In 2016 Sharyland's average residential delivery charge was 90.39 dollars a month against 38.59 dollars at [[Oncor]]. Oncor and [[Sempra Energy]] bought the assets in 2019 in transactions worth about 1.3 billion dollars.[^13]
|
||||
Hunter Hunt founded [[Sharyland Utilities]] in 1999, the first new regulated electric utility in the [[United States]] in three decades. Under the Competitive Renewable Energy Zone program that the [[Texas Legislature]] created in 2005, Sharyland was awarded about 300 miles of transmission lines in the Panhandle. In 2010 the family placed the lines in a real estate investment trust, [[InfraREIT]], which leased them back to the utility. In 2016 Sharyland's average residential delivery charge was 90.39 dollars a month against 38.59 dollars at [[Oncor]]. Oncor and [[Sempra Energy]] bought the assets in 2019 in transactions worth about 1.3 billion dollars.[^14]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -62,7 +62,8 @@ Hunter Hunt founded [[Sharyland Utilities]] in 1999, the first new regulated ele
|
|||
[^7]: "Vice President George Bush, completing a 10-day trip aimed...," *United Press International,* April 12, 1986. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1986/04/12/Vice-President-George-Bush-completing-a-10-day-trip-aimed/5692513666000/
|
||||
[^8]: "Hunt Oil & ExxonMobil File for Arbitration on Yemen Field," *Rigzone,* 2005.
|
||||
[^9]: Halliburton Company, Schedule 14A proxy statement, 2004, Securities and Exchange Commission.
|
||||
[^10]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, "Jeanne L. Phillips," Department History.; "Ambassador focuses on U.S.-Saudi cooperation," *NBC News.* https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna8293255
|
||||
[^11]: U.S. Embassy Baghdad, "Hunt Oil Signs Agreement with KRG under KRG Oil Law," cable 07BAGHDAD3071, September 12, 2007. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07BAGHDAD3071_a.html
|
||||
[^12]: Waxman, Henry A., letter to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, July 2, 2008, as reported in "Bush Officials Condoned Regional Iraqi Oil Deal," *The Washington Post,* July 3, 2008, and "U.S. officials condoned Kurdish oil deal," *NBC News.* https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna25506968
|
||||
[^13]: *The Texas Tribune,* 2016 reporting on Sharyland Utilities delivery rates; "Texas regulators seal Oncor's nearly $1.3 billion power line deal with Hunt family," *The Dallas Morning News,* May 9, 2019.
|
||||
[^10]: Clemons, Steve. "Stephen Friedman Named to Chair President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," *The Washington Note,* October 27, 2005. https://washingtonnote.com/stephen_friedma/
|
||||
[^11]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, "Jeanne L. Phillips," Department History.; "Ambassador focuses on U.S.-Saudi cooperation," *NBC News.* https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna8293255
|
||||
[^12]: U.S. Embassy Baghdad, "Hunt Oil Signs Agreement with KRG under KRG Oil Law," cable 07BAGHDAD3071, September 12, 2007. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07BAGHDAD3071_a.html
|
||||
[^13]: Waxman, Henry A., letter to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, July 2, 2008, as reported in "Bush Officials Condoned Regional Iraqi Oil Deal," *The Washington Post,* July 3, 2008, and "U.S. officials condoned Kurdish oil deal," *NBC News.* https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna25506968
|
||||
[^14]: *The Texas Tribune,* 2016 reporting on Sharyland Utilities delivery rates; "Texas regulators seal Oncor's nearly $1.3 billion power line deal with Hunt family," *The Dallas Morning News,* May 9, 2019.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -10,14 +10,59 @@ summary: "American businessman who founded The Monroe Institute, known for Hemi-
|
|||
born: 1915-10-30
|
||||
died: 1995-03-17
|
||||
location: "Lexington, Kentucky, USA"
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: founded
|
||||
with: "[[Monroe Institute]]"
|
||||
start: 1971
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Monroe Institute]]"
|
||||
role: Executive Director
|
||||
start: 1978
|
||||
fn: 7
|
||||
- type: contractor_to
|
||||
with: "[[United States Army Intelligence and Security Command]]"
|
||||
start: 1980
|
||||
end: 1984
|
||||
role: Hemi-Sync training for remote viewers
|
||||
fn: 8
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[Gondola Wish]]"
|
||||
start: 1978
|
||||
end: 1978
|
||||
fn: 7
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[Center Lane]]"
|
||||
start: 1983
|
||||
end: 1984
|
||||
fn: 9
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
[[Robert Monroe]] was an American businessman and explorer of human consciousness. He is known for his extensive personal experiences with out-of-body experiences (OBEs) and for founding [[Monroe Institute|The Monroe Institute]], a non-profit organization dedicated to the exploration of human consciousness through various techniques, including Hemi-Sync audio technology. While not directly involved in the [[Stargate Project|Stargate Project]], his work and institute became a post-military career path for figures like [[Frederick Atwater|Skip Atwater]], who became president of the Institute.[^1]
|
||||
[[Robert Monroe]] was an American businessman and explorer of human consciousness. He is known for his extensive personal experiences with out-of-body experiences (OBEs) and for founding [[Monroe Institute|The Monroe Institute]], a non-profit organization dedicated to the exploration of human consciousness through various techniques, including Hemi-Sync audio technology.[^1] While not directly involved in the [[Stargate Project|Stargate Project]], his work and institute became a post-military career path for figures like [[Frederick Atwater|Skip Atwater]], who became president of the Institute.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
An INSCOM information paper of January 5, 1984, gave his particulars: "Born on 30 Oct 1915, in [[Wabash, Indiana]], Robert A. Monroe received a BA degree from [[Ohio State University]] in 1937," was "the author of the book *Journeys Out of the Body,* published in 1971," and "has a DoD SECRET security clearance based on a NAC completed on 18 January 1980." The Army's association with his institute dated from 1978, and by 1984 its Hemi-Sync process was in use in the [[Center Lane]] unit's training and collection missions.[^2]
|
||||
An INSCOM information paper of January 5, 1984, gave his particulars: "Born on 30 Oct 1915, in [[Wabash, Indiana]], Robert A. Monroe received a BA degree from [[Ohio State University]] in 1937," was "the author of the book *Journeys Out of the Body,* published in 1971," and "has a DoD SECRET security clearance based on a NAC completed on 18 January 1980." The Army's association with his institute dated from 1978, and by 1984 its Hemi-Sync process was in use in the [[Center Lane]] unit's training and collection missions.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
Monroe created and produced some four hundred radio and television network programs and became owner and operator of a radio network and cable television system in Virginia.[^4] The psychologist [[Charles Tart]] met him in the fall of 1965 at the [[University of Virginia]] Medical School and recorded him in eight late-night EEG sessions between December 1965 and August 1966, and in a two-hour session at the [[University of California, Davis]] in 1968; Tart wrote that the results left "only weak evidence that Monroe was actually 'out'" on the occasion in which he named the laboratory technician's location, and Tart wrote the introduction to Monroe's *Journeys Out of the Body*, dated January 10, 1971.[^5][^6]
|
||||
|
||||
A 902d Military Intelligence Group assessment of August 25, 1978 records that Monroe, interviewed at the Institute on April 6, 1978, received a security indoctrination on May 3, 1978 and agreed to train three military intelligence personnel for a fee of $2,000.[^7] In a trip report of September 30, 1980, Frederick Atwater wrote that Monroe held a SECRET clearance, "has signed a consultant security agreement" and had been dealt with on a "shallow cover" basis, with no other Institute personnel aware of the agreement.[^8] The Center Lane chronology records a contract signed with Monroe on July 19, 1983 for one-on-one training of a Center Lane operative, and the fiscal year 1983 budget lists $24.4K for a consultant services agreement with him.[^9] On October 5, 1983 and January 5, 1984 the Secretary of the Army, [[John Marsh]], was briefed on Monroe and the Institute.[^10]
|
||||
|
||||
A patent granted on May 20, 1975, US 3,884,218, "Method of inducing and maintaining various stages of sleep in the human being," names Monroe as inventor and Monroe Industries Inc. as original assignee. A later patent, US 5,356,368, names him as inventor and [[Interstate Industries]] as original assignee, filed March 1, 1991 and granted October 18, 1994.[^11][^12]
|
||||
|
||||
The INSCOM information paper of January 5, 1984 gives his birthplace as Wabash, Indiana; the Society for Psychical Research's Psi Encyclopedia gives Lexington, Kentucky.[^3][^13]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Schnabel, Jim. *Remote Viewers*. Dell, 1997.
|
||||
[^2]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, information paper "The Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences," ITAGPA-F-SD, January 5, 1984, CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270004-2. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^1]: Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences, *The Gateway Program*, promotional text. CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270006-0, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^2]: Schnabel, Jim. *Remote Viewers*. Dell, 1997.
|
||||
[^3]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, information paper "The Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences," ITAGPA-F-SD, January 5, 1984, CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270004-2..
|
||||
[^4]: Monroe, Robert A., *Journeys Out of the Body*, updated edition (Main Street Books, Doubleday), author note. https://archive.org/details/journeys_out_body
|
||||
[^5]: Tart, Charles T., "Six Studies of Out-of-Body Experiences," *Journal of Near-Death Studies* 17, no. 2 (1998): 73-99, pp. 83-90. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc799368/
|
||||
[^6]: Monroe, Robert A., *Journeys Out of the Body*, Tart introduction dated Davis, California, January 10, 1971. https://archive.org/details/journeys_out_body
|
||||
[^7]: 902d Military Intelligence Group, GONDOLA WISH assessment report, August 25, 1978. CIA-RDP96-00788R002000160001-3, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^8]: Atwater, Frederick H., memorandum for the record, "Trip Report, 18-28 September 1980," September 30, 1980. CIA-RDP96-00788R001200060028-4, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^9]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, *Center Lane Information Papers for Director, Defense Intelligence Agency*, March 7, 1985. CIA-RDP96-00788R000400060001-2, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^10]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, memoranda of October 12, 1983 (CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270014-1) and January 6, 1984 (CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270003-3), CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^11]: US Patent 3,884,218, granted May 20, 1975. https://patents.google.com/patent/US3884218A
|
||||
[^12]: US Patent 5,356,368, granted October 18, 1994. https://patents.google.com/patent/US5356368A
|
||||
[^13]: Wehrstein, KM, "Robert Monroe," Psi Encyclopedia, Society for Psychical Research. https://psi-encyclopedia.spr.ac.uk/articles/robert-monroe
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -3,31 +3,260 @@ category: "Intelligence & Government"
|
|||
tags:
|
||||
- Person
|
||||
- BrentScowcroft
|
||||
- KissingerAssociates
|
||||
- NationalSecurityCouncil
|
||||
- KissingerAssociates
|
||||
- BNLScandal
|
||||
- Iraq
|
||||
- Iraqgate
|
||||
- GeorgeHWBush
|
||||
summary: "Vice chairman of Kissinger Associates, where he advised Banca Nazionale del Lavoro for fees, who as national security adviser kept agricultural credits flowing to Iraq in 1990 while his staff resisted measures singling Iraq out."
|
||||
- GeraldFord
|
||||
- TowerCommission
|
||||
- ScowcroftCommission
|
||||
- PresidentsForeignIntelligenceAdvisoryBoard
|
||||
- GulfWar
|
||||
- NSD26
|
||||
- AspenStrategyGroup
|
||||
- TheScowcroftGroup
|
||||
aliases:
|
||||
- Brent Scowcroft
|
||||
- Scowcroft
|
||||
- Gen. Brent Scowcroft
|
||||
- General Scowcroft
|
||||
- Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft
|
||||
summary: "Retired Air Force lieutenant general, national security adviser to Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush, chairman of the 1983 Commission on Strategic Forces and of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 2001 to 2005."
|
||||
location: "Washington, D.C."
|
||||
created: 2026-09-21
|
||||
updated: 2026-09-21
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: appointed
|
||||
with: "[[Richard Nixon]]"
|
||||
start: "1971"
|
||||
end: "1973"
|
||||
role: "military aide to the President"
|
||||
fn: 5
|
||||
- type: reported_to
|
||||
with: "[[Henry A. Kissinger]]"
|
||||
start: "1973"
|
||||
end: "1975"
|
||||
role: "deputy assistant to the President for national security affairs"
|
||||
fn: 5
|
||||
- type: appointed
|
||||
with: "[[Gerald R. Ford]]"
|
||||
start: "1975"
|
||||
end: "1977"
|
||||
role: "Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs"
|
||||
fn: 10
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[Yom Kippur War]]"
|
||||
start: "1973"
|
||||
end: "1973"
|
||||
role: "attended the October 24 or 25, 1973 meeting at which DEFCON III was set"
|
||||
fn: 7
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[Kissinger Associates]]"
|
||||
start: "1982"
|
||||
end: "1989"
|
||||
role: "vice chairman; headed the firm's Washington office"
|
||||
fn: 14
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Scowcroft Commission]]"
|
||||
start: "1983"
|
||||
end: "1983"
|
||||
role: "chairman of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces"
|
||||
fn: 21
|
||||
- type: director_of
|
||||
with: "[[Council on Foreign Relations]]"
|
||||
start: "1984"
|
||||
end: "1986"
|
||||
role: "director, term expiring 1986, and member of the Nominating and Membership committees"
|
||||
fn: 25
|
||||
- type: member_of
|
||||
with: "[[Tower Commission]]"
|
||||
start: "1987"
|
||||
end: "1987"
|
||||
role: "member of the President's Special Review Board"
|
||||
fn: 26
|
||||
- type: contractor_to
|
||||
with: "[[Banca Nazionale del Lavoro]]"
|
||||
start: "1986"
|
||||
end: "1989"
|
||||
role: "adviser to bank management through Kissinger Associates; briefed the bank's board three times, as reported by Gonzalez"
|
||||
fn: 19
|
||||
- type: appointed
|
||||
with: "[[George H.W. Bush]]"
|
||||
start: "1989"
|
||||
end: "1993"
|
||||
role: "Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs"
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[Frederick Lacey]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: "1992"
|
||||
end: "1992"
|
||||
role: "special counsel's review of the BNL matter, which examined his contacts with BNL management"
|
||||
fn: 15
|
||||
- type: founded
|
||||
with: "[[The Scowcroft Group]]"
|
||||
start: "1994"
|
||||
role: "founder of the international business advisory firm"
|
||||
fn: 4
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board]]"
|
||||
start: "2001"
|
||||
end: "2005"
|
||||
role: "chairman"
|
||||
fn: 49
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[Aspen Strategy Group]]"
|
||||
start: "2016"
|
||||
end: "2016"
|
||||
role: "named by Tom Pritzker as one of three people who run the group"
|
||||
fn: 55
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Brent Scowcroft, a retired [[United States Air Force|Air Force]] lieutenant general, was vice chairman of [[Kissinger Associates]] until January 1989, when he became national security adviser to President [[George H.W. Bush]].[^1]
|
||||
Brent Scowcroft (March 19, 1925 to August 6, 2020) was a retired [[United States Air Force|Air Force]] lieutenant general who served as national security adviser to President [[Gerald R. Ford]] from 1975 to 1977 and to President [[George H.W. Bush]] from 1989 to 1993.[^1][^2] He chaired the President's Commission on Strategic Forces in 1983, was a member of the [[Tower Commission]] in 1987, was vice chairman of [[Kissinger Associates]] until January 1989, founded [[The Scowcroft Group]] in 1994 and chaired the [[President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board]] from 2001 to 2005.[^3][^4]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Bank
|
||||
### Air Force and the Nixon White House
|
||||
|
||||
"BNL was a client of Mr. Scowcroft's while he was the vice-chairman of Kissinger Associates," Representative [[Henry B. Gonzalez]] told the House on April 28, 1992. "Mr. Scowcroft regularly provided advice to BNL's management and received hefty fees in return." At a meeting in [[New York City|New York]] in 1987 he, [[Henry A. Kissinger|Henry Kissinger]], [[Lawrence Eagleburger]], and [[Alan Stoga]] advised officers of the [[Banca Nazionale del Lavoro]], and he and Stoga took them to lunch. The special counsel [[Frederick Lacey]] found that the two men "came into contact with BNL management" and saw nothing to suggest they knew of the lending to [[Iraq]] by the bank's [[Atlanta]] branch.[^1][^2]
|
||||
[[Henry B. Gonzalez]], the chairman of the [[House Banking Committee]], told the House on April 28, 1992 that early in his career Scowcroft served one year as air attaché at the [[United States Embassy in Belgrade]] in [[Yugoslavia]].[^5] After earning a Ph.D. and working in academia from 1962 to 1968, he held a succession of national security posts in the [[Department of Defense]].[^5] In 1971 President [[Richard Nixon]] appointed him military aide to the President, and in 1973 [[Henry A. Kissinger|Kissinger]] chose him as deputy assistant to the President for national security affairs.[^5] The Scowcroft Group's biography of him describes a twenty-nine-year military career that began with graduation from [[United States Military Academy|West Point]] and ended at the rank of lieutenant general after service as Deputy National Security Advisor.[^3] [[R. W. Apple Jr.]], who wrote the introduction to the Tower Commission report, described him as "a retired Air Force general who served several Republican presidents as a key foreign-policy adviser."[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### The White House
|
||||
### Deputy to Kissinger, 1973 to 1975
|
||||
|
||||
[[Bryan Siebert]] of the [[United States Department of Energy|Energy Department]] "had been waging a lonely and unsuccessful battle to get [[James Baker]] and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft to do something about the steady flow of U.S. exports that were materially assisting Iraq's nuclear weapons program." [[Matrix Churchill]] "was not discussed at the cabinet meeting, even though the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] had reported its activities to both the [[White House]] and the [[State Department]] in November 1989." Scowcroft's aides "objected to any measures 'that singled out Iraq.'" On May 18, 1990, he telephoned Secretary of Agriculture [[Clayton Yeutter]] and asked him "not to put out any press release today saying we are terminating the program" of [[Commodity Credit Corporation Iraq Program|credit guarantees]]. "We would be shooting ourselves in the foot," his staff said of cancelling the second 500 million dollars. Iraq invaded [[Kuwait]] on August 2.[^3]
|
||||
A memorandum for the record that Admiral [[Thomas H. Moorer]] prepared on October 26, 1973 reproduces Kissinger's record of schedule for a meeting in Washington on the night of October 24 to 25, 1973 (10:30 p.m. to 3:30 a.m.), which lists the attendees as Kissinger, [[James R. Schlesinger]], [[William Colby]], Moorer, Scowcroft, [[Alexander Haig]] and [[Jonathan Howe]]. The memorandum lists among the actions taken that day the setting of [[DEFCON]] III, during the [[Yom Kippur War]].[^7] Kissinger later recalled that immediately after the alert was set he instructed Scowcroft to call [[Anatoly Dobrynin]] to tell him to desist from all action until there was a U.S. reply, "and to warn him that any unilateral actions by the Soviet Union would have the most serious consequences."[^7] The Foreign Relations of the United States editors note that [[Ray Cline|Cline]] called the meeting a "curious little rump NSC meeting" in the Winter 1974 to 1975 issue of [[Foreign Policy]].[^7] Gonzalez told the House that Scowcroft often took charge of the [[National Security Council]] while Kissinger was fulfilling his duties as Secretary of State.[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
Lawyers of his staff under [[C. Nicholas Rostow|Nicholas Rostow]] met with those of other agencies to coordinate replies to congressional requests for documents on Iraq. Gonzalez called them "the Rostow gang." His investigator was told by Rostow that "it would be a cold day in hell before Congress got NSD 26."[^3]
|
||||
### National security adviser to Ford, 1975 to 1977
|
||||
|
||||
On May 27, 1975 Ford met in the [[White House Cabinet Room|Cabinet Room]] with Schlesinger, Colby, [[Donald Rumsfeld]], [[Robert Ingersoll]] and Scowcroft, who is listed in the memorandum of conversation as Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, about a [[New York Times]] article by [[Seymour Hersh]] on American submarine intercept missions in Soviet waters. Ford said: "Somehow someone must be made an example of." Scowcroft said: "The real problem is not the press. The real problem is the people who are leaking the material to the press. They are the ones we have to go after."[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
At a news conference on November 3, 1975, Ford announced that "Brent Scowcroft, who has been serving ably for 3 years as Deputy Assistant at the White House, will move up to Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs" when Kissinger relinquished that post to devote his full time to being Secretary of State.[^10] The report of the Tower Commission summarizes that "Under President Ford, Lt Gen Brent Scowcroft became National Security Advisor, with Henry Kissinger remaining as Secretary of State."[^11]
|
||||
|
||||
In April 1976 Scowcroft briefed Vice President [[Nelson Rockefeller]] before an April 20 courtesy call on [[Anastasio Somoza]] at the Nicaraguan Ambassador's residence in Washington, covering Nicaraguan affairs and U.S.-Nicaraguan relations.[^12] Gonzalez told the House that Scowcroft resigned the post during the [[Jimmy Carter|Carter]] administration but stayed active as a member of the President's general advisory committee on arms control.[^13]
|
||||
|
||||
### Kissinger Associates and the BNL account, 1982 to 1989
|
||||
|
||||
In 1982 Scowcroft joined Kissinger in setting up Kissinger Associates, according to Gonzalez, who said Scowcroft served as vice chairman and head of the firm's Washington, D.C. office until he became national security adviser in January 1989.[^14] The firm's biography of him states that in that capacity he advised and assisted US and foreign corporate leaders on global joint venture opportunities, strategic planning and risk assessment.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Frederick Lacey]], who was appointed as special counsel in the [[BNL Scandal|Banca Nazionale del Lavoro]] investigation, wrote that Scowcroft had served as vice president of Kissinger Associates and had headed its Washington, D.C. office before joining the Bush administration as national security adviser in January 1989.[^15] Lacey's report states: "It is clear that, while at Kissinger Associates, Scowcroft and Eagleburger came into contact with BNL management. I have seen nothing, however, to suggest that they knew of BNL-Atlanta's wrongful loans to Iraq or influenced the prosecution of this matter."[^15] The passage refers to [[Lawrence Eagleburger]], who had been president of the firm and became deputy secretary of state.
|
||||
|
||||
Gonzalez told the House that Kissinger, Scowcroft and Eagleburger "maintain that they were unaware of the BNL loans to [[Iraq]]. I offer no definitive proof that they were aware of the BNL loans."[^16] He reported that Scowcroft worked on the account of [[Banca Nazionale del Lavoro|BNL]] at Kissinger Associates, met BNL management on numerous occasions, and briefed the bank's board on international political and economic developments on three occasions between 1986 and 1989, and that when the president of BNL traveled to the United States for the annual International Monetary Fund conference he met Kissinger and Scowcroft in [[New York City|New York]].[^17] Gonzalez reported that a former head of BNL's American operations said he attended a 1987 meeting in New York with [[Alan Stoga]], the head of BNL's Rome headquarters, Kissinger, Scowcroft and Eagleburger, convened to give BNL advice on doing business in several countries including India, and that Stoga and Scowcroft took the BNL officers to lunch afterward.[^18] Gonzalez said: "BNL was a client of Mr. Scowcroft's while he was the vice-chairman of Kissinger Associates. Mr. Scowcroft regularly provided advice to BNL's management and received hefty fees in return."[^19]
|
||||
|
||||
Luigi Sardelli, BNL's regional manager in the United States, gave the Banking Committee written answers in 1993 in which he stated that in February 1989 Dr. Pedde, BNL's managing director, asked him to contact Stoga, that he understood the bank was looking for space in Washington and that, because Scowcroft had just been appointed to the Bush White House, his mission may have been to find out whether a room would be available at Kissinger Associates in Washington for a BNL officer. Sardelli wrote that he did not recall posing the question to Stoga, and that he never discussed any loan to Iraq with Kissinger Associates.[^20]
|
||||
|
||||
### Scowcroft Commission, 1983
|
||||
|
||||
On January 3, 1983 President [[Ronald Reagan]] announced the establishment of a bipartisan Commission on Strategic Forces (the [[Scowcroft Commission]]) to review the strategic modernization program, with particular focus on the land-based intercontinental ballistic missile system and its basing alternatives, and named "The Honorable Brent Scowcroft, former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to serve as Chairman." The other members were [[Thomas C. Reed]] as vice chairman, [[Nicholas Brady]], [[Harold Brown]], [[William Clements]], [[John Deutch]], Alexander M. Haig Jr., [[Richard Helms]], [[John Lyons]] of the [[AFL-CIO]], Vice Admiral Levering Smith and [[James Woolsey]].[^21] The statement notes that Reagan signed the establishing executive order the same day in the Cabinet Room with Scowcroft, several commission members, Secretary of State [[George P. Shultz]] and Secretary of Defense [[Caspar Weinberger]] present.[^21] Executive Order 12400 set the commission at no more than fifteen members, directed it to report by February 18, 1983, provided that information supplied to or developed by it would not, to the extent permitted by law, be available for public inspection, and assigned its administrative support to the Secretary of Defense.[^22]
|
||||
|
||||
On April 19, 1983 Reagan, acknowledging "Brent Scowcroft, the Commission's Chairman," announced that the commission had unanimously arrived at its recommendations and that he would send them to Congress with his endorsement; he said the commission had held dozens of formal meetings and talked to over 200 technical experts.[^23] On April 9, 1984 Reagan issued a statement on the commission's final report, saying that it reiterated the original recommendations, namely an arms control structure with incentives for stability at reduced levels, deployment of 100 [[MX missile|MX missiles]] and development of a small single-warhead ICBM, and that it recommended extreme caution in proceeding to engineering development of an active strategic defense system.[^24]
|
||||
|
||||
### Council on Foreign Relations, 1984 to 1986
|
||||
|
||||
The annual report of the [[Council on Foreign Relations]] for July 1, 1984 to June 30, 1985 lists Scowcroft among the directors with terms expiring in 1986, alongside Harold Brown, [[Lane Kirkland]], [[Juanita Kreps]] and [[Robert Scalapino]]. He is listed on the Membership Committee chaired by [[Theodore Hesburgh]] and on the five-member board Nominating Committee with [[Nicholas Katzenbach]], [[Philip Geyelin]], [[William D. Rogers]] and [[Marina Whitman]]. The report records a Council session of former national security advisers, chaired jointly by [[Winston Lord]] and Eagleburger, at which [[Zbigniew Brzezinski]], [[Walt Rostow]] and Scowcroft spoke, and a Council book, Michael Krepon's *Strategic Stalemate*, with parallel prefaces by Scowcroft and [[Paul Warnke]].[^25]
|
||||
|
||||
### Tower Commission, 1987
|
||||
|
||||
Scowcroft was one of the members of the President's Special Review Board, chaired by [[John Tower]], with [[Edmund Muskie]] as the other member.[^26] The board examined the [[Iran-Contra affair]] and the role of the National Security Council in it. Apple's introduction reports that Scowcroft considered the lack of written records "appalling" and added: "It may be that some went into the shredder, but we can't prove it."[^26]
|
||||
|
||||
### National Security Directive 26, October 2, 1989
|
||||
|
||||
National Security Directive 26, "U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf," is dated October 2, 1989 and was addressed to the Vice President, the Secretaries of State, the Treasury, Defense and Energy, the Attorney General, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the directors of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the United States Information Agency. Its section on Iraq reads in part: "Normal relations between the United States and Iraq would serve our longer-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East. The United States Government should propose economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior and to increase our influence with Iraq." It continues that "any illegal use of chemical and/or biological weapons will lead to economic and political sanctions" and that "Any breach by Iraq of IAEA safeguards in its nuclear program will result in a similar response." A further paragraph states: "We should pursue, and seek to facilitate, opportunities for U.S. firms to participate in the reconstruction of the Iraqi economy, particularly in the energy area," and that the United States should consider sales of non-lethal military assistance, training courses and medical exchanges to Iraq's defense establishment on a case by case basis.[^27]
|
||||
|
||||
Gonzalez told the House that after the BNL offices in [[Atlanta]] were raided in August 1989, the White House and the National Security Council acted to protect the [[Commodity Credit Corporation Iraq Program|credit guarantee program for Iraq]] that the [[Commodity Credit Corporation]] ran. He said that State Department officials, including Secretary [[James A. Baker III|Baker]], "repeatedly referred to NSD-26 which stated that 'the President wished to improve relations with Iraq'" as the justification for pressing other agencies to approve the program.[^28] State Department talking points for the November 8, 1989 meeting of the National Advisory Council deputies, which Gonzalez reproduced, read: "In NSD-26, the President mandated that we seek to improve and expand our relationship with Iraq."[^29]
|
||||
|
||||
Gonzalez stated that under Scowcroft's direction the NSC staff was heavily involved in winning approval of the one billion dollar program for fiscal 1990 in late 1989, and that Scowcroft himself was directly involved in trying to win the release of the second 500 million dollar installment, which was delayed because of the BNL scandal.[^30] A State Department memorandum of March 5, 1990, which Gonzalez quoted, states: "National Security Council staff [NSCS] contacted the USDA March 2 to inquire about the delay after the Iraqi Ambassador complained to General Scowcroft."[^31] Gonzalez said the [[United States Department of Agriculture|Department of Agriculture]] sent a background memorandum to Scowcroft in preparation for the NSC meeting in May 1990 stating that "it cannot be overemphasized that any constraint on CCC credit guarantees must not be based on a foreign policy rationale," and said the program was suspended at that meeting. He also quoted a May 25, 1990 Treasury Department memorandum summarizing a meeting of Agriculture, Treasury and State officials: "The NSC prevailed on Agriculture to say only that their investigation showed the improprieties may have occurred and remained silent on the suspension."[^32]
|
||||
|
||||
On May 18, 1992 Gonzalez named Scowcroft, [[C. Boyden Gray]], [[John Schmitz]], [[Richard Haass]], [[Clayton Yeutter]] and others as White House and NSC staff involved in the decision and in the administrative review of the BNL scandal, said that "many White House and NSC staff were involved" and asked why neither Scowcroft nor Eagleburger had recused himself, and said: "So the White House and NSC, armed with National Security Directive 26, sprang into action in order to save the CCC Program for Iraq."[^33] The same Record pages print his letter of October 1, 1991 asking Scowcroft for the President's report on exports of nuclear, biological, chemical and ballistic missile technology to Iraq, Scowcroft's reply of November 1, 1991 offering a copy of the report "as a courtesy," Gonzalez's letter of April 29, 1992 asking Scowcroft for all NSC information on [[Carlos Cardoen]] and [[Gerald Bull]], and his letter of the same date to Bush asking that Scowcroft and the other named staff be made available for interview.[^34]
|
||||
|
||||
Gonzalez described an interagency group of lawyers chaired by [[C. Nicholas Rostow]], the NSC's legal adviser, which met in April 1991 and which he called the "Rostow gang." He said the group "gave the White House a direct hand in regulating the flow of information to the Congress, thus limiting oversight of Iraq policy."[^35] In a May 2, 1991 letter to Bush, Gonzalez detailed his concerns about the links among BNL, Kissinger, Scowcroft and Eagleburger.[^36]
|
||||
|
||||
The report of the independent counsel Lacey, printed in the Banking Committee record, quotes a February 8, 1991 memorandum from Rostow to Scowcroft at the National Security Council on the BNL indictment, which names [[Robert Mueller]] and states: "I have informed Robert Mueller ... of your reluctance to seek an indictment of Iraqi government officials whom we are unlikely to take into custody."[^37]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Alan Friedman]] wrote that [[Bryan Siebert]] of the [[United States Department of Energy|Energy Department]] "had been waging a lonely and unsuccessful battle to get James Baker and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft to do something about the steady flow of U.S. exports that were materially assisting Iraq's nuclear weapons program." Friedman wrote that on May 18, 1990 Scowcroft telephoned Secretary of Agriculture Yeutter and asked him "not to put out any press release today saying we are terminating the program" of credit guarantees, and that Scowcroft's aides "objected to any measures 'that singled out Iraq.'" Friedman quoted Scowcroft's staff as saying of cancelling the second 500 million dollars: "We would be shooting ourselves in the foot." Friedman wrote that [[Matrix Churchill]] "was not discussed at the cabinet meeting, even though the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] had reported its activities to both the [[White House]] and the [[State Department]] in November 1989." According to Friedman, Rostow told Gonzalez's investigator that "it would be a cold day in hell before Congress got NSD 26."[^38]
|
||||
|
||||
### Beijing after Tiananmen, 1989
|
||||
|
||||
On July 2, 1989 Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger met [[Deng Xiaoping]] and Premier [[Li Peng]] in the [[Great Hall of the People]] in [[Beijing]]. The memorandum of conversation records Deng saying that the turmoil in China had begun shortly after Bush took office, that the United States was too deeply involved in it, that U.S. foreign policy had cornered China, and that the aim of what he called the counter-revolutionary rebellion had been to overthrow the People's Republic. Deng said that the person who tied the knot should be the one to untie it, and that his hope was that the United States would do so.[^39]
|
||||
|
||||
Scowcroft and Eagleburger returned to Beijing in December 1989. At a banquet on December 9 Qian toasted the health of Scowcroft, Eagleburger and Lilley and the resumption and development of normal Sino-U.S. relations. On December 10 Scowcroft, Eagleburger, Ambassador [[James R. Lilley]], [[Chase Untermeyer]] and the National Security Council's Asian affairs director [[Douglas Paal]] attended a working luncheon with Foreign Minister [[Qian Qichen]] at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse, and Scowcroft met Li Peng from 8:45 to 9:40 a.m., with a meeting with the General Secretary scheduled for 9:45. Li Peng asked Scowcroft whether the United States considered the Cold War ended after the Malta meeting.[^40]
|
||||
|
||||
### Gulf War decisions, 1990
|
||||
|
||||
On July 28, 1990, in a telephone call from [[Kennebunkport, Maine|Kennebunkport]], Maine, Bush told King [[Hussein of Jordan|Hussein]], who was about to travel to Baghdad, that he had "just had lunch with Barbara, my daughter, and Brent Scowcroft," that there were problems with Iraq's behavior he would rather not discuss on that line, and that the United States had tried to send signals to [[Saddam Hussein]] with a congressional delegation. The King asked Bush to tell Scowcroft hello.[^41] On August 2, 1990, aboard [[Air Force One]] en route to [[Aspen, Colorado|Aspen]], Colorado, Bush told King Hussein and President [[Hosni Mubarak]] that the United States was "very surprised at this outrageous invasion."[^42] On August 3 Bush told Prime Minister [[Margaret Thatcher]] by telephone that "Brent will be talking with Woerner" ([[Manfred Wörner]]) and that "Brent is here and will get in touch"; Thatcher thanked him for "all the kind things you said at Aspen," and Bush replied: "I told Brent to keep you informed."[^43]
|
||||
|
||||
On August 2, 1990 Iraqi tanks sped the 80 miles to Kuwait City to begin the occupation of [[Kuwait]].[^44] [[James P. Pfiffner]] wrote that on August 3, 1990, at a White House meeting, Scowcroft made the argument that the invasion was something the United States could not leave unanswered.[^44] Pfiffner quoted a White House official as saying: "it was Brent's presentation at one of the meetings on August 3, that Friday after the invasion, that made clear what the stakes were, crystallized people's thinking and galvanized support for a very strong response." Pfiffner's note attributes the quotation to an article by [[Andrew Rosenthal]] in the New York Times of February 21, 1991.[^45] In late September 1990 [[Colin Powell]] went to the White House with [[Richard Cheney]] to meet with Bush and Scowcroft, for what Pfiffner described as the most formal presentation of the sanctions option to the president.[^46]
|
||||
|
||||
### Essay against an attack on Iraq, August 2002
|
||||
|
||||
On August 15, 2002 Scowcroft published an essay in the [[Wall Street Journal]] under the headline "Don't Attack Saddam."[^47][^48] A news report of the essay quotes him as writing that if the United States "were seen to be turning our backs" on the Israeli-Palestinian dispute "in order to go after Iraq, there would be an explosion of outrage against us."[^47] The same report quotes him as writing: "There is a virtual consensus in the world against an attack on Iraq at this time. So long as that sentiment persists, it would require the U.S. to pursue a virtual go-it-alone strategy against Iraq, making any military operations correspondingly more difficult and expensive."[^47]
|
||||
|
||||
### President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 2001 to 2005
|
||||
|
||||
On October 5, 2001 the White House announced that President [[George W. Bush]] intended to appoint "Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft who will serve as Chairman" of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, for a term of two years, together with Cresencio Arcos, [[Jim Barksdale]], Robert Addison Day, [[Stephen Friedman]], [[Alfred Lerner]], [[Ray Hunt|Ray Lee Hunt]], [[Rita Hauser]], [[David E. Jeremiah]], [[Arnold Kanter]], [[James C. Langdon Jr.]], [[Elisabeth Pate-Cornell]], [[John Streicker]], [[Pete Wilson]] and [[Philip Zelikow]].[^49]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Steve Clemons]] wrote on October 27, 2005 that Scowcroft was not asked by the President to return to the board when his term expired at the end of 2004, that most had assumed he would continue as chairman, and that at a gathering at the home of Brzezinski just after the New Year Scowcroft reportedly said: "I just got fired." Clemons wrote that on January 6 Scowcroft spoke with Brzezinski at the [[New America Foundation]].[^50] [[Jeffrey Goldberg]] published "Breaking Ranks: What Turned Brent Scowcroft Against the Bush Administration?" in The New Yorker of October 31, 2005, in which Scowcroft described his objections to the administration's Iraq policy; Goldberg's article also drew on an interview with George H.W. Bush.[^51] [[Robert Bryce]] wrote in Salon on November 17, 2005 that Bush had dismissed Scowcroft from the chairmanship about a year earlier because of his criticism of the decision to invade Iraq.[^52]
|
||||
|
||||
On October 27, 2005 the White House announced that Stephen Friedman would be appointed to the board for a term beginning on December 20, 2005, and that he would be designated its chairman upon appointment. The announcement also named Hunt, [[Donald Evans]], [[Arthur B. Culvahouse]], [[William O. DeWitt Jr.]], [[Lee Hamilton]] and others as members.[^53]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Scowcroft Group
|
||||
|
||||
The Scowcroft Group states that it was founded in 1994 by Scowcroft and is an international business advisory firm that has served US and multinational firms in a variety of sectors.[^4] Its services include geopolitical risk, sanctions and export controls, energy and resource security and scenario planning, and it lists partnerships with Fulcrum Macro Advisors, Vriens & Partners and McLarty Associates.[^54]
|
||||
|
||||
### Aspen Strategy Group roster, 2016
|
||||
|
||||
On August 8, 2016 [[Tom Pritzker]] wrote to [[Jeffrey Epstein]] that he had just finished a presentation on leadership to the "grand pooh baahs of Aspen Strategy Group." Epstein asked "who attends," and Pritzker replied: "You have to be a bit of a wonk to know some of the names, but Nye, Scowcroft and [[Nicholas Burns|Nick Burns]] run it (Scowcroft being replaced by [[Condoleezza Rice|Condi]])." The message lists members including [[David Petraeus]], [[Madeleine Albright]], [[Stephen Hadley]], [[Jake Sullivan]], [[William Burns|Bill Burns]] and [[John Sawers]] (MI6).[^55]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Gonzalez, Henry B. "Kissinger Associates, Scowcroft, Eagleburger, Stoga, Iraq, and BNL," *Congressional Record,* House, April 28, 1992, pp. H2694-H2701.
|
||||
[^2]: Lacey, Frederick B. "The Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Investigation: Report of the Independent Counsel," reproduced in House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Serial No. 103-95, pp. 514-15.
|
||||
[^3]: Friedman, Alan. *Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq*. Bantam, 1993, pp. 153-156, 162, 192, 216, 221.
|
||||
[^1]: Brookings Institution, "Remembering Brent Scowcroft: A True National Security Maverick," which states that he served two presidents, Gerald Ford and George H. W. Bush, after a career in the United States Air Force. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/remembering-brent-scowcroft-a-true-national-security-maverick
|
||||
[^2]: Atlantic Council, "The Passing of Brent Scowcroft: March 19, 1925 - August 6, 2020," press release. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/press-releases/the-passing-of-brent-scowcroft-march-19-1925-august-6-2020/
|
||||
[^3]: The Scowcroft Group, "General Scowcroft" (national security adviser to both Presidents Ford and Bush; vice chairman of Kissinger Associates 1982 to 1989; twenty-nine-year military career; the President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control, the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, the President's Special Review Board; chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board). https://www.scowcroft.com/generalscowcroft
|
||||
[^4]: The Scowcroft Group, "Our Firm" ("Founded in 1994 by General Brent Scowcroft"). https://www.scowcroft.com/ourfirm
|
||||
[^5]: Gonzalez, Henry B. "Kissinger Associates, Scowcroft, Eagleburger, Stoga, Iraq, and BNL," *Congressional Record,* House, April 28, 1992, p. H2695 (Belgrade air attache, academia 1962 to 1968, Department of Defense posts, 1971 military aide, 1973 deputy to Kissinger). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm
|
||||
[^6]: *The Tower Commission Report: The Full Text of the President's Special Review Board* (1987), introduction by R. W. Apple Jr. https://archive.org/details/towercommission00unit
|
||||
[^7]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, Document 269, memorandum for the record by Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, October 26, 1973, Washington, October 24/25, 1973, with editorial notes citing Cline, "Policy Without Intelligence," *Foreign Policy*, no. 17 (Winter 1974-1975), p. 128. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25/d269
|
||||
[^8]: Gonzalez, *Congressional Record*, April 28, 1992, p. H2695 (Scowcroft often took charge of the National Security Council while Kissinger was Secretary of State; succeeded Kissinger as national security adviser in 1975). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm
|
||||
[^9]: Memorandum of conversation, May 27, 1975, Ford, Schlesinger, Colby, Rumsfeld, Ingersoll and Scowcroft. National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 12, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. The memorandum is partly declassified. https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1553088.pdf
|
||||
[^10]: "The President's News Conference," November 3, 1975, statement on personnel changes in the administration. The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-60
|
||||
[^11]: *The Tower Commission Report* (1987), the report's historical summary of the National Security Advisor's role under President Ford. https://archive.org/details/towercommission00unit
|
||||
[^12]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. E-11, part 1, Document 263, memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to Vice President Rockefeller, "Call on Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza, Tuesday, April 20, 1976," Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Latin American Affairs Staff Files, Box 14. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p1/d263
|
||||
[^13]: Gonzalez, *Congressional Record*, April 28, 1992, p. H2695 (resigned the post during the Carter administration; member of the President's general advisory committee on arms control). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm
|
||||
[^14]: Gonzalez, *Congressional Record*, April 28, 1992, p. H2695 (joined Kissinger in setting up Kissinger Associates in 1982; vice chairman and head of the Washington office until January 1989). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm
|
||||
[^15]: Lacey, Frederick B. "The Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Investigation: Report of the Independent Counsel," reproduced in U.S. House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, *Testimony of Former Employees of the BNL*, Serial No. 103-95 (1994), pp. 514-515. https://archive.org/details/testimonyofforme1994unit
|
||||
[^16]: Gonzalez, *Congressional Record*, April 28, 1992, p. H2694 (quoting the denials of Kissinger, Scowcroft and Eagleburger and the statement "I offer no definitive proof that they were aware of the BNL loans"). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm
|
||||
[^17]: Gonzalez, *Congressional Record*, April 28, 1992, p. H2696 (BNL account, three board briefings between 1986 and 1989, and the BNL president's meeting with Kissinger and Scowcroft in New York). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm
|
||||
[^18]: Gonzalez, *Congressional Record*, April 28, 1992, p. H2698 (1987 New York meeting as reported by Gonzalez from a former head of BNL's American operations; lunch taken by Stoga and Scowcroft). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm
|
||||
[^19]: Gonzalez, *Congressional Record*, April 28, 1992, p. H2699 (quoted sentences on BNL's client relationship and "hefty fees"). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm
|
||||
[^20]: Luigi Sardelli, written responses to Chairman Gonzalez's questions, in U.S. House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, *Testimony of Former Employees of the BNL*, Serial No. 103-95 (1994), p. 164. https://archive.org/details/testimonyofforme1994unit
|
||||
[^21]: Ronald Reagan, "Statement Announcing the Establishment and Membership of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, and Designation of Chairman and Vice Chairman," January 3, 1983, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/statement-announcing-establishment-and-membership-presidents-commission-strategic
|
||||
[^22]: Executive Order 12400, "President's Commission on Strategic Forces," January 3, 1983, sections 1 to 4, *Federal Register*, vol. 48, no. 3 (January 5, 1983), pp. 381-382. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1983-01-05/pdf/FR-1983-01-05.pdf
|
||||
[^23]: Ronald Reagan, "Remarks Endorsing the Recommendations in the Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces," April 19, 1983, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/41983a
|
||||
[^24]: Ronald Reagan, "Statement on the Final Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces," April 9, 1984, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/statement-final-report-presidents-commission-strategic-forces
|
||||
[^25]: Council on Foreign Relations, Annual Report, July 1, 1984 to June 30, 1985 (New York, 1985): Officers and Directors; Membership Committee; Nominating Committee; former National Security Advisers session; Krepon, *Strategic Stalemate*. CIA CREST copy, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00806r000100210066-5
|
||||
[^26]: *The Tower Commission Report* (1987), title page (John Tower, chairman; Edmund Muskie and Brent Scowcroft, members) and Apple introduction. https://archive.org/details/towercommission00unit
|
||||
[^27]: National Security Directive 26, "U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf," October 2, 1989, signed by George Bush, sections "Arms Sales," "Iraq" and "Iran," declassified, George H.W. Bush Presidential Library. https://web.archive.org/web/2022/https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/nsd/nsd26.pdf
|
||||
[^28]: Gonzalez, Henry B. Remarks on Commodity Credit Corporation credits for Iraq and NSD-26, *Congressional Record*, House, March 2, 1992, p. H863. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920302g.htm
|
||||
[^29]: *Congressional Record*, House, March 2, 1992, p. H867, State Department "Talking Points for NAC Deputies Meeting, November 8, 1989," reproduced in Gonzalez's remarks. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920302g.htm
|
||||
[^30]: Gonzalez, *Congressional Record*, April 28, 1992, pp. H2696-H2697 (late 1989 $1 billion allocation and NSC direction; second $500 million installment). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm
|
||||
[^31]: Gonzalez, *Congressional Record*, April 28, 1992, p. H2697, quoting a State Department memorandum of March 5, 1990. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm
|
||||
[^32]: Gonzalez, Henry B. Remarks on the USDA review and the NSC, *Congressional Record*, House, March 16, 1992, p. H1278 (USDA background memorandum to Scowcroft before the May 1990 NSC meeting; Treasury Department memorandum of May 25, 1990). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920316g.htm
|
||||
[^33]: Gonzalez, Henry B. Special order on BNL, *Congressional Record*, House, May 18, 1992, pp. H3367-H3368 (list of White House and NSC staff; recusal question; "So the White House and NSC, armed with National Security Directive 26, sprang into action"). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920518g.htm
|
||||
[^34]: Gonzalez, *Congressional Record*, May 18, 1992, pp. H3373-H3374 (letters of October 1, 1991, November 1, 1991 and April 29, 1992). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920518g.htm
|
||||
[^35]: Gonzalez, Henry B. Remarks on the NSC legal group, *Congressional Record*, House, March 16, 1992, pp. H1274-H1275 (Rostow meeting in April 1991; "Rostow gang"). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920316g.htm
|
||||
[^36]: Gonzalez, *Congressional Record*, May 18, 1992, p. H3367 (letter to President Bush of May 2, 1991). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920518g.htm
|
||||
[^37]: Lacey, "The Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Investigation: Report of the Independent Counsel," in Serial No. 103-95, p. 598 (memorandum from Nicholas Rostow to Brent Scowcroft, February 8, 1991, Lacey Ex.). https://archive.org/details/testimonyofforme1994unit
|
||||
[^38]: Friedman, Alan. *Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq* (Bantam, 1993), pp. 153-156, 162, 192, 216, 221.
|
||||
[^39]: Memorandum of conversation, LTG Brent Scowcroft, Deng Xiaoping et al., Great Hall of the People, July 2, 1989, George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, in "U.S. Government Documents Following Tiananmen Square Crackdown" (compilation pp. 19-32), published by ChinaFile. https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6184537/U-S-Government-Documents-Following-Tiananmen.pdf
|
||||
[^40]: Toast of Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, December 9, 1989; memorandum of conversation, working luncheon, Diaoyutai State Guesthouse, December 10, 1989; memorandum of conversation, Premier Li Peng and General Scowcroft, December 10, 1989, Beijing, George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, in the same compilation. https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6184537/U-S-Government-Documents-Following-Tiananmen.pdf
|
||||
[^41]: Memorandum of telephone conversation, Bush and King Hussein of Jordan, July 28, 1990, Kennebunkport, George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, Memcons and Telcons. https://web.archive.org/web/20221024145017/https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1990-07-28--Hussein%20I.pdf
|
||||
[^42]: Memorandum of telephone conversation, Bush, King Hussein and President Mubarak, August 2, 1990, aboard Air Force One, George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, Memcons and Telcons. https://web.archive.org/web/20221024145017/https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1990-08-02--Hussein%20I.pdf
|
||||
[^43]: Memorandum of conversation, telephone call to Prime Minister Thatcher, August 3, 1990, Oval Office, 3:03 to 3:10 p.m., George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, Memcons and Telcons. https://web.archive.org/web/20221024145017/https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1990-08-03--Thatcher.pdf
|
||||
[^44]: Pfiffner, James P. "Presidential Policy-Making and the Gulf War," chapter 1 in Marcia Lynn Whicker, James P. Pfiffner and Raymond A. Moore, eds., *The Presidency and the Persian Gulf War* (Praeger, 1993), section "The Decision to Commit U.S. Troops."
|
||||
[^45]: Pfiffner, "Presidential Policy-Making and the Gulf War," note 4, citing Andrew Rosenthal, "Scowcroft and Gates: A Team Rivals Baker," *New York Times*, February 21, 1991, p. A14.
|
||||
[^46]: Pfiffner, "Presidential Policy-Making and the Gulf War," chapter 1 (late September 1990 meeting of Powell, Cheney, Bush and Scowcroft).
|
||||
[^47]: "Top Republicans Break With Bush on Iraq Strategy," news report of August 16, 2002 quoting Scowcroft's essay in the *Wall Street Journal*, reproduced on the World Systems Network list. https://wsarch.ucr.edu/wsnmail/2002/msg00949.html
|
||||
[^48]: "Brent Scowcroft is Wrong: We Must Attack Saddam," Middle East Forum, August 20, 2002, identifying the essay as "Don't Attack Saddam" in the *Wall Street Journal* "on Thursday." https://www.meforum.org/brent-scowcroft-is-wrong-we-must-attack-saddam
|
||||
[^49]: White House, "Personnel Announcement," October 5, 2001, members of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, including "Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft who will serve as Chairman." https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011005-8.html
|
||||
[^50]: Clemons, Steve. "Stephen Friedman Named to Chair President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," The Washington Note, October 27, 2005. https://washingtonnote.com/stephen_friedma/
|
||||
[^51]: Goldberg, Jeffrey. "Breaking Ranks: What Turned Brent Scowcroft Against the Bush Administration?," *The New Yorker*, October 31, 2005, as excerpted in Clemons, Steve. "Brent Scowcroft 'Breaks Ranks' with George W. Bush in Major New Yorker Article," The Washington Note, October 23, 2005. https://washingtonnote.com/brent_scowcroft_2/
|
||||
[^52]: Bryce, Robert. "Top-secret cronies," *Salon*, November 17, 2005. https://www.salon.com/2005/11/17/pfiab/
|
||||
[^53]: White House, "Personnel Announcement," October 27, 2005, members of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Stephen Friedman designated chairman, term beginning December 20, 2005. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051027-7.html
|
||||
[^54]: The Scowcroft Group, "What We Offer" and "Our Firm" (partnerships). https://www.scowcroft.com/whatwedo
|
||||
[^55]: U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Library, EFTA01783338, DataSet 10, email exchange between Tom Pritzker and Jeffrey Epstein, August 8, 2016. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2010/EFTA01783338.pdf
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -2,17 +2,36 @@
|
|||
category: "Intelligence & Government"
|
||||
aliases:
|
||||
- "James Schlesinger"
|
||||
- "James A. Schlesinger"
|
||||
- "James Rodney Schlesinger"
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- Person
|
||||
- CIA
|
||||
- Nuclear
|
||||
- DepartmentOfDefense
|
||||
- DepartmentOfEnergy
|
||||
- FamilyJewels
|
||||
summary: "Economist who chaired the Atomic Energy Commission, directed the CIA in 1973 and ordered the Family Jewels compilation, and served as Secretary of Defense and the first Secretary of Energy."
|
||||
- RAND
|
||||
- Watergate
|
||||
- Stargate
|
||||
- AbuGhraib
|
||||
summary: "Economist and RAND strategist who chaired the Atomic Energy Commission, directed the CIA in 1973 and ordered the Family Jewels compilation, then served as Secretary of Defense and the first Secretary of Energy."
|
||||
born: 1929-02-15
|
||||
died: 2014-03-27
|
||||
location: "New York City, New York"
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[RAND Corporation]]"
|
||||
role: "senior staff member, later Director of Strategic Studies"
|
||||
start: 1963
|
||||
end: 1969
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[Bureau of the Budget]]"
|
||||
role: "assistant director"
|
||||
start: 1969
|
||||
end: 1971
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Atomic Energy Commission]]"
|
||||
role: "chairman"
|
||||
|
|
@ -24,39 +43,164 @@ relations:
|
|||
role: "Director of Central Intelligence"
|
||||
start: 1973-02-02
|
||||
end: 1973-07-02
|
||||
fn: 2
|
||||
fn: 3
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[CIA Family Jewels]]"
|
||||
role: "ordered the compilation by memorandum of May 9, 1973"
|
||||
start: 1973-05-09
|
||||
end: 1973-09
|
||||
fn: 11
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Department of Defense]]"
|
||||
role: "Secretary of Defense"
|
||||
start: 1973-07
|
||||
end: 1975-11
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
start: 1973-07-02
|
||||
end: 1975-11-19
|
||||
fn: 3
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Department of Energy]]"
|
||||
role: "first Secretary of Energy"
|
||||
start: 1977-08-06
|
||||
end: 1979-08-23
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
fn: 2
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[Lehman Brothers]]"
|
||||
role: "senior adviser"
|
||||
start: 1979
|
||||
fn: 4
|
||||
- type: director_of
|
||||
with: "[[MITRE Corporation]]"
|
||||
role: "chairman of the board"
|
||||
fn: 38
|
||||
- type: member_of
|
||||
with: "[[Defense Policy Board]]"
|
||||
role: "member"
|
||||
fn: 38
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations]]"
|
||||
role: "chairman"
|
||||
start: 2004-05-12
|
||||
end: 2004-08-24
|
||||
fn: 29
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management]]"
|
||||
role: "chairman"
|
||||
start: 2008-09
|
||||
end: 2008-12
|
||||
fn: 36
|
||||
created: 2025-08-05
|
||||
updated: 2026-09-22
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
James R. Schlesinger was born in New York City on February 15, 1929, and took a doctorate at Harvard in 1956. He chaired the [[Atomic Energy Commission]] from 1971 to 1973, directed the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] in 1973, was Secretary of Defense from 1973 to 1975, and after serving as an assistant to President [[Jimmy Carter]] was confirmed on August 4, 1977, as the first Secretary of Energy, holding the office from August 6, 1977, to August 23, 1979.[^1]
|
||||
James Rodney Schlesinger (February 15, 1929 to March 27, 2014) was an economist and nuclear strategist who chaired the [[Atomic Energy Commission]] from 1971 to 1973, directed the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] from February 2 to July 2, 1973, served as [[Department of Defense|Secretary of Defense]] from July 2, 1973, to November 19, 1975, and was the first [[Department of Energy|Secretary of Energy]], from August 6, 1977, to August 23, 1979.[^1][^2][^3]
|
||||
|
||||
### Academic work and RAND
|
||||
|
||||
Schlesinger was born in New York City. He took his bachelor's, master's and doctoral degrees at [[Harvard University]] (1950, 1952 and 1956), taught economics at the [[University of Virginia]] from 1956 to 1963, and was a consultant to the [[Federal Reserve Board]] and to the [[RAND Corporation]] during part of that period. He was academic consultant in economics to the [[Naval War College]] in 1957, and his lectures there were published in 1960 as *The Political Economy of National Security*.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
From 1963 to 1969 he was a senior staff member at RAND in Santa Monica, California, and later its director of strategic studies, where he worked on strategic analysis "with particular reference to nuclear weaponry."[^1][^4]
|
||||
|
||||
### Budget Bureau and Atomic Energy Commission
|
||||
|
||||
In 1969 [[Richard Nixon]] appointed him assistant director of the [[Bureau of the Budget]]. He later became assistant director of the [[Office of Management and Budget]] and served as acting director during the transition between the two agencies. His responsibilities included national security and international programs, the Budget Bureau's place on the [[Environmental Quality Council]] and the [[National Space Council]], and its representation on several [[National Security Council]] committees.[^1][^4]
|
||||
|
||||
He chaired the Atomic Energy Commission from 1971 to 1973 and headed the United States delegation to the sixteenth General Conference of the [[International Atomic Energy Agency]].[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### Director of Central Intelligence
|
||||
|
||||
Schlesinger was Director of Central Intelligence from February 2 to July 2, 1973. On May 9, 1973, he signed a memorandum, drafted by [[William Colby]], ordering senior officers to report any current or past activities "which might be construed to be outside the legislative charter of this Agency"; the replies became the 693-page compilation known as the [[CIA Family Jewels|Family Jewels]], which passed to Colby when he succeeded Schlesinger.[^2][^3] In the same weeks the question of the agency's parapsychology research at [[SRI International|SRI]] reached him; [[Kenneth A. Kress]] wrote that he "was soon told not to increase the scope of the project. The project was too sensitive and potentially embarrassing. It should be tabled."[^4] Testifying about [[Watergate]], [[James McCord]] said his lawyer, Gerald Alch, had proposed a defense under which the agency would supply a recall-to-duty record and that "the new Director, Dr. Schlesinger, 'would go along with it'"; Alch denied it.[^5]
|
||||
[[Richard Helms]] resigned as Director of Central Intelligence on February 2, 1973, the day Schlesinger was sworn in. The President had appointed Schlesinger on December 21, 1972, and the Senate confirmed him on January 23, 1973.[^5] Schlesinger served until July 2, 1973, when he became Secretary of Defense. Lieutenant General [[Vernon A. Walters]], the deputy director, was acting director from July 2 to September 4, 1973, when [[William Colby]] (deputy director for operations from March 2 to August 24, 1973) became director.[^3] Colby later estimated, in his memoirs, that under Schlesinger's purge about 7 percent of the agency's staff were "fired or were forced to resign or retired."[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
The historian [[David S. Robarge]], writing in [[Studies in Intelligence]], listed Schlesinger among six directors he classed as "manager-reformer outsiders," and recorded that at 43 he was the youngest of the directors he surveyed.[^7] Robarge wrote that when directors tried to "clean house" (Schlesinger and [[Stansfield Turner]]), the result was "administrative disarray and low morale," and that Schlesinger and Turner "facilitated the departure of hundreds of clandestine services veterans."[^7] Robarge also recorded that Schlesinger told veteran [[John McMahon]] and his superior, [[Carl Duckett]], that he had just appointed McMahon to head the [[Office of Technical Service]]. When Duckett suggested that McMahon start on the first of the month, Schlesinger answered, "How about at 10:00?"[^7]
|
||||
|
||||
The [[House Committee on Armed Services]] special subcommittee on intelligence opened its inquiry into the agency's role in the [[Watergate]] scandal and the [[Daniel Ellsberg|Ellsberg]] matter on May 11, 1973, and issued its report on October 23, 1973.[^8] The report states that in February 1973 "Mr. Dean" called Schlesinger to ask whether the CIA could recover from the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] the file material the agency had given the Justice Department about its contact with [[Howard Hunt|E. Howard Hunt]], and that "This was not done."[^8] The report described a view of the agency's assistance to Hunt as "the better view, although charitable," which it said was "probably expressed by" Schlesinger, and gave the words: "The Agency was insufficiently cautious in the initiation of assistance to Hunt."[^9] The report also recorded the account given by [[James McCord]] of a meeting with his lawyer, [[Gerald Alch]], at which Alch proposed a CIA defense in which McCord's records would be doctored to show a recall to duty, and that "the new Director, Dr. Schlesinger, 'would go along with it.'" The report records that Alch disputed McCord's version "in the strongest of terms."[^10]
|
||||
|
||||
On May 9, 1973, Schlesinger signed a memorandum, drafted by deputy director for operations William Colby, calling on senior officers to report any current or past activities "which might be construed to be outside the legislative charter of this Agency."[^11] Schlesinger issued the directive after learning that Hunt and James McCord, both veteran CIA officers, had received cooperation from the agency as they carried out "dirty tricks" for President Nixon.[^11] The replies were compiled into a 693-page file, the [[CIA Family Jewels|Family Jewels]], which passed to Colby when he succeeded Schlesinger. The file was declassified in June 2007.[^12]
|
||||
|
||||
On January 3, 1975, Colby briefed [[Gerald R. Ford]] on the file, describing the compilation as the agency's "skeletons," including surveillance of student radicals, illegal wiretaps, assassination plots, and the confinement of a Soviet defector for three years.[^13] On February 20, 1975, Cabinet and sub-cabinet officials led by [[Henry A. Kissinger]], with Schlesinger and Colby present, discussed ways to protect information sought by the [[Church Committee]] and the House [[Pike Committee]] investigations.[^14]
|
||||
|
||||
The agency's contract for parapsychology research at [[SRI International]] reached Schlesinger in the spring of 1973. A new contract continuing and expanding the work went from the Office of Technical Service and the [[Office of Research and Development]] to Colby in April 1973 and was referred to the [[Executive Management Committee]]. [[Kenneth A. Kress]], the project officer, wrote in his 1977 study for Studies in Intelligence that an approval memorandum was written "for the signature of the DCI, then Dr. James Schlesinger," that Colby "took the memorandum to the DCI a few days later," and that he was "soon told not to increase the scope of the project and not to anticipate any follow-on in this area. The project was too sensitive and potentially embarrassing. It should be tabled."[^15] Kress added that the Office of Technical Service was then being investigated for involvement in Watergate and that in May 1973 the DCI had issued his memorandum asking employees to report improper activities.[^15] An Office of Technical Service memorandum for the record of November 17, 1977, prepared for a briefing of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, gives the same chronology: in March 1973 a third subject, [[Pat Price]], "is discovered with an apparent ability for 'remote viewing,'" and in May 1973 "The contract is finally sent to the DCI (Schlesinger) who decides to allow the existing contract to be completed without a follow-on." The memorandum continues that an informal SRI experiment with a scientist of the Office of Scientific Intelligence uncovered classified information about a military site and convinced "the new DCI (Colby) to renew work on ESP."[^16]
|
||||
|
||||
### Secretary of Defense
|
||||
|
||||
During the [[Yom Kippur War]] of 1973, [[Henry A. Kissinger]] told Schlesinger that his goal was to "let [[Israel]] come out ahead, but bleed." Schlesinger noted that Israel's ammunition consumption had been gauged for a seven-day war, and concluded from Kissinger's sudden push for resupply that Israeli use of a nuclear weapon was not out of the question.[^6] After the *[[Glomar Explorer]]* operation leaked in March 1975, Schlesinger recommended at the [[White House]] acknowledging the "bare facts"; President [[Gerald R. Ford]] took Colby's advice instead.[^7] In November 1975 Ford removed both Colby and Schlesinger in the same announcement.[^3]
|
||||
Schlesinger moved from the agency to the [[Pentagon]] as Secretary of Defense on July 2, 1973, after about five months as director.[^3][^4]
|
||||
|
||||
During the [[Yom Kippur War]] of 1973, [[Seymour Hersh]] wrote in *[[The Samson Option]]* (1991) that Kissinger made no secret of his strategy, telling Schlesinger that his goal was to "let [[Israel]] come out ahead, but bleed."[^17] In the same book Hersh quoted Schlesinger, whom he interviewed on April 25, 1989: "Israel's [ammunition] consumption rate was gauged for a seven-day war," but "Kissinger just turned around totally. He got a little hysterical" in urging an immediate and massive resupply, and "Henry seemed to be more concerned than I was over the possibility of a nuclear exchange" in the Middle East. Schlesinger added: "From where we sat, there was an assumption that Israel had a few nukes and that if there was a collapse, there was a possibility that Israel would use them." Hersh wrote that Colby, then director of the CIA, shared the assumption: "We were afraid Israel might go for broke."[^18]
|
||||
|
||||
The claim that Schlesinger told the military not to act on White House orders, particularly on nuclear matters, in the last days of the Nixon presidency rests on an account that [[Stanley I. Kutler]] traced to an unnamed "senior Pentagon official." As Kutler summarized it, Schlesinger asked General [[George S. Brown]], Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to monitor all orders from any source to military units, because Nixon or his aides might reach units outside Pentagon channels, and the account says Schlesinger supposedly prepared plans to deploy troops in Washington if there were anything but a peaceful succession.[^19] In an essay in [[The American Interest]] of January 12, 2018, [[Larry Diamond]] wrote that Schlesinger "reportedly told the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff not to follow any presidential orders to the military without checking with Schlesinger first," and quoted the historian [[Gil Troy]] calling the act "the most patriotic act of treason in American history."[^20] Kutler wrote in the [[History News Network]] in 2014 that, "as far as can be determined, such information emanated from Schlesinger himself," and that there are "no corroborating documents." He described a message from Brown on August 8, 1974, advising increased vigilance to commanders, and two messages on August 9, 1974, sent over Schlesinger's name, one of which conveyed the remarks of the new president, Ford. Kutler called both August 9 messages "boilerplate," and quoted [[Thomas H. Moorer]], a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, calling Schlesinger's communiqué "ridiculous."[^19] Haig, Nixon's chief of staff, later told senators, in Kutler's quotation, "There were no tanks. No troops were drawn up."[^19]
|
||||
|
||||
The National Security Council met four times on the seizure of the [[SS Mayaguez]] by Cambodian forces, and the minutes list Schlesinger as a principal at each meeting. On May 12, 1975 (12:05 to 12:50 p.m.), he told Gerald R. Ford the options: "We can have a passive stance or we can be active. We can do such things as seizing Cambodian assets. We can assemble forces. We could seize a small island as a hostage. We might also consider a blockade," and when [[Donald Rumsfeld]] asked "Isn't this piracy?" he answered "Yes."[^21] On May 13 he described the force options (Marines and helicopters at Utapao, and the carrier [[USS Coral Sea]]) and the minutes record an exchange with Vice President [[Nelson Rockefeller]] over where the ship was.[^22] On May 14, after General [[David C. Jones]] recommended landing on the island and on the ship, Schlesinger asked "How about a local ultimatum?" and Kissinger answered that the action should not depend on one.[^23] At the meeting of May 15, 1975 (4:02 to 4:20 p.m.), held after the recovery, Schlesinger corrected the number of aircraft used ("Not the 81 that had been on the carrier") and Ford asked him for "a full factual report giving a summary and chronology of what happened."[^24]
|
||||
|
||||
On May 27, 1975, Ford met with Schlesinger, Colby, Donald Rumsfeld, [[Robert Ingersoll]] and [[Brent Scowcroft]] about a Seymour Hersh article on American submarines operating off Soviet waters. The memorandum of conversation records Ford saying, "Somehow someone must be made an example of." Schlesinger called the disclosure "a flagrant violation" of the law, said he had spoken to the Attorney General the month before, and stated that "There is some indication that Hersh has files of signals intelligence material." He then asked, "How about a search warrant to get them?"[^25]
|
||||
|
||||
On March 19, 1975, the day front-page stories revealed that [[Howard Hughes]]'s *[[Glomar Explorer]]* had recovered part of a sunken Soviet submarine in an operation led by the CIA, Ford met in the Cabinet Room of the [[White House]] with Schlesinger, Colby, [[Philip Buchen]], [[John O. Marsh Jr.]], Rumsfeld and Scowcroft (11:20 a.m. to 12:25 p.m.). Schlesinger called the operation "a major American accomplishment" and "a marvel, technically, and with maintaining secrecy," and advised: "If we don't confirm the mission details, acknowledge the bare facts. It has been confirmed privately by Colby. There is no plausible denial story, so 'no comment' will be taken as a confirmation. If we move now we can take the high ground, if not we will be pilloried." He offered to make the statement himself. Colby answered, "I go back to the U-2. I think we should not put the Soviet Union under such pressure to respond." The volume editors record that no statement by Schlesinger or Ford was found and that the press reported the administration refused to comment.[^26] President Ford took Colby's advice instead.[^27]
|
||||
|
||||
On November 3, 1975, Ford announced that he intended to nominate Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense, and thanked Schlesinger "for his able service" as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Director of the CIA, and Secretary of Defense. Asked why Schlesinger and Colby did not fit on the new team, Ford answered, "I think any President has to have the opportunity to put together his own team." Asked about reports of conflict between Schlesinger and Kissinger over détente, he said, "There were no basic differences."[^28]
|
||||
|
||||
### Secretary of Energy
|
||||
|
||||
[[Jimmy Carter]] appointed Schlesinger his special adviser on energy in January 1977.[^4] He was confirmed as the first Secretary of Energy on August 4, 1977, and served from August 6, 1977, to August 23, 1979.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### Later career
|
||||
|
||||
After leaving the Energy Department he became senior adviser to [[Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb]] in New York.[^4] He served on the [[President's Commission on Strategic Forces]] from 1982 to 1983, was vice chairman of the [[President's Blue Ribbon Task Group on Nuclear Weapons Program Management]] from 1984 to 1985, was a member of the [[U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century]] from 1998 to 2001, and sat on the [[Panel to Assess the Reliability, Safety, and Security of the U.S. Nuclear Stockpile]] from 1999 to 2003.[^4] He co-chaired a [[Defense Science Board]] task force on the future of the [[Global Positioning System]].[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
### Independent Panel on DoD detention operations (2004)
|
||||
|
||||
The Secretary of Defense chartered the [[Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations]] on May 12, 2004, to review Department of Defense investigations into detention operations and to advise on their causes and corrective measures.[^29] Schlesinger chaired the panel, whose members were [[Harold Brown]], [[Tillie Fowler]] and [[Charles Horner]], with [[James A. Blackwell Jr.]] as executive director. The report is dated August 24, 2004, and is addressed to Rumsfeld.[^29]
|
||||
|
||||
The panel found that "the most egregious instances of detainee abuse were caused by the aberrant behavior of a limited number of soldiers and the predilections of the non-commissioned officers on the night shift of Tier 1 at Abu Ghraib," and that commanding officers and staffs "at various levels failed in their duties," adding that "Military and civilian leaders at the Department of Defense share this burden of responsibility" (p. 43). It stated that "the weak and ineffectual leadership of the Commanding General of the 800th MP Brigade and the Commanding Officer of the 205th MI Brigade allowed the abuses at [[Abu Ghraib]]," and found no evidence that organizations above those two brigades "were directly involved in the incidents at Abu Ghraib" (p. 43).[^30]
|
||||
|
||||
On policy, the report recounts the Secretary of Defense decision of December 2, 2002, authorizing "as a matter of policy" Category I and II techniques and one Category III technique, rescinded after concern from the Navy General Counsel, and states that the legal resources of the Services' judge advocates and general counsels "were not utilized to their fullest potential" (pp. 35-36). It found that "pressure for additional intelligence and the more aggressive methods sanctioned by the Secretary of Defense memorandum resulted in stronger interrogation techniques" (p. 36), and that "Some individuals seized the opportunity provided by this environment to give vent to latent sadistic urges" while others "found themselves in uncharted ethical ground, with frequently changing guidance from above" (p. 29).[^31] Among the leaders who could have adjusted the detention plan after July 2003 it listed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and "the Office of the Secretary of Defense," and wrote, "In most cases these were errors of omission, but they were errors that should not go unnoted" (p. 47).[^32]
|
||||
|
||||
On the CIA, the panel wrote: "CIA personnel conducted interrogations in DoD detention facilities... at Abu Ghraib the CIA was allowed to conduct its interrogations separately. No memorandum of understanding existed on interrogations operations between the CIA and CJTF-7, and the CIA was allowed to operate under different rules." It added, "We are aware of the issue of unregistered detainees, but the Panel did not have sufficient access to CIA information to make any determinations in this regard" (p. 70), and recommended that "Clearer guidelines for the interaction of CIA with the Department of Defense in detention and interrogation operations must be defined" (p. 91).[^33]
|
||||
|
||||
On contractors, it stated: "Contractors were a particular problem at Abu Ghraib. The Army Inspector General found that 35 percent of the contractors employed did not receive formal training in military interrogation techniques, policy, or doctrine" (p. 69).[^34] On ghost detainees: "Secretary Rumsfeld publicly declared he directed one detainee be held secretly at the request of the Director of Central Intelligence" (p. 87).[^35]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### Nuclear weapons management task forces (2008)
|
||||
|
||||
In June 2008 Secretary of Defense [[Robert Gates]] appointed the Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, a subcommittee of the [[Defense Policy Board]], with Schlesinger as chairman and [[Michael P. C. Carns]], [[J. D. Crouch II]], [[Jacques S. Gansler]], [[Edmund P. Giambastiani Jr.]], [[John J. Hamre]], [[Franklin C. Miller]] and [[Christopher A. Williams]] as members and James Blackwell as executive director, after the 2006 misshipment of intercontinental ballistic missile components to Taiwan and the 2007 unauthorized transfer of nuclear weapons from [[Minot Air Force Base]] to [[Barksdale Air Force Base]]. Its Phase I report, transmitted to Gates on September 12, 2008, found "an unambiguous, dramatic, and unacceptable decline in the Air Force's commitment to perform the nuclear mission" and that "Air Force leaders failed in their leadership responsibilities to shift priorities and adjust policies and resources in ways needed to maintain robust nuclear stewardship, resulting in the inattention that led to the Minot-Barksdale and Taiwan incidents" (Executive Summary, pp. 1-3). It listed five trends, including that "no one Command in the Air Force had 'ownership' of the nuclear mission," and made 33 recommendations.[^36] The Phase II report of December 2008 found that "the lack of interest in and attention to the nuclear mission and nuclear deterrence... go well beyond the Air Force," "widespread fragmentation, dispersal of responsibility, and weakening of authorities" in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and "a distressing degree of inattention to the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence among many senior DoD military and civilian leaders" (Executive Summary, pp. iii-v). It recommended an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Deterrence.[^37]
|
||||
|
||||
### Boards and advisory posts
|
||||
|
||||
Schlesinger was chairman of the board of [[MITRE Corporation]], a member of the Defense Policy Board and of the [[International Security Advisory Board]], and a counselor and trustee of the [[Center for Strategic and International Studies]]. He chaired the [[National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing Advisory Board]] from 2007 until his death on March 27, 2014, while serving his fourth term as chairman.[^38]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Legacy Management, "Secretaries of Energy." https://www.energy.gov/lm/secretaries-energy
|
||||
[^2]: Blanton, Thomas, ed. "The CIA's Family Jewels," National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 222, June 21, 2007, with Schlesinger's memorandum of May 9, 1973. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/index.htm
|
||||
[^3]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Family Jewels," CIA FOIA Reading Room, released 2007; Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA.* Doubleday, 2007, pp. 316-327.
|
||||
[^4]: Kress, Kenneth A. "Parapsychology in Intelligence: A Personal Review and Conclusions." *Studies in Intelligence,* vol. 21, no. 4, winter 1977, declassified.
|
||||
[^5]: House Committee on Armed Services, Special Subcommittee on Intelligence, report on the inquiry into the alleged involvement of the CIA in the Watergate and Ellsberg matters, October 23, 1973.
|
||||
[^6]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy.* Random House, 1991, ch. 17.
|
||||
[^7]: Burr, William, ed. "Project Azorian: The CIA's Declassified History of the Glomar Explorer." National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 305, February 12, 2010.
|
||||
[^1]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Biography, James R. Schlesinger," reading room document CIA-RDP75B00380R000400150017-8, copy at https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75b00380r000400150017-8
|
||||
[^2]: U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Legacy Management, "Secretaries of Energy," entry for James Schlesinger (confirmed August 4, 1977; term of office August 6, 1977 to August 23, 1979). https://www.energy.gov/lm/secretaries-energy
|
||||
[^3]: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVIII, part 2, front matter, "Persons" (Schlesinger: "Director of Central Intelligence, February 2-July 2, 1973; Secretary of Defense, July 2, 1973-November 19, 1975"; Walters: "Acting Director of Central Intelligence, July 2, 1973-September 4, 1973"; Colby: "Director of Central Intelligence, September 4, 1973-January 30, 1976"). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v38p2/persons
|
||||
[^4]: Miller Center, University of Virginia, "James R. Schlesinger (1973-1974)," https://millercenter.org/node/1002; and "James R. Schlesinger (1977-1979)," https://millercenter.org/node/1152
|
||||
[^5]: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. II, Document 284, editorial note (Schlesinger "sworn in on February 2, the same day that Helms resigned"). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v02/d284
|
||||
[^6]: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVIII, part 2, Document 2, editorial note quoting William Colby's memoirs on the staff reduction under Schlesinger. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v38p2/d2
|
||||
[^7]: David S. Robarge, survey of the Directors of Central Intelligence, 1946 to 2005, Studies in Intelligence, vol. 49, no. 3, CIA reading room document C05460742, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-16290853
|
||||
[^8]: House Committee on Armed Services, Special Subcommittee on Intelligence, "Inquiry into the Alleged Involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Watergate and Ellsberg Matters," report, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., October 23, 1973 (HASC No. 93-25), passage on the February 1973 call from Mr. Dean. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80b01495r000500030007-0
|
||||
[^9]: Same report, passage on the assistance to Hunt and Schlesinger's view of it.
|
||||
[^10]: Same report, passage on McCord's account of the meeting with Gerald Alch and Alch's denial.
|
||||
[^11]: National Security Archive, "The CIA's Family Jewels," Electronic Briefing Book No. 222, June 21, 2007, with the memorandum of May 9, 1973. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/index.htm
|
||||
[^12]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Family Jewels," compilation of 693 pages, declassified June 2007, full text PDF as posted by the National Security Archive. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/family_jewels_full_ocr.pdf
|
||||
[^13]: National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 222, Document 2, "Colby Briefs President Ford on the Family Jewels," memorandum of conversation, January 3, 1975, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/index.htm
|
||||
[^14]: National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 222, Document 4, "Investigations Continue," memorandum of conversation, "Investigations of Allegations of CIA Domestic Activities," February 20, 1975, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/index.htm
|
||||
[^15]: Kenneth A. Kress, "Parapsychology in Intelligence: A Personal Review and Conclusions," Studies in Intelligence, vol. 21, no. 4, winter 1977, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200030040-0. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00791r000200030040-0
|
||||
[^16]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Technical Service, Memorandum for the Record, OTS/BAB Memo #287-77, "Briefing for House Permanent Select Committee re OTS Involvement in ESP Research," November 17, 1977, CIA-RDP96-00787R000500170001-0. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00787r000500170001-0
|
||||
[^17]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Random House, 1991), p. 227. https://archive.org/details/Sampson_Option
|
||||
[^18]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, p. 230 (index entry "Schlesinger, James R., 227, 230"); the author's notes date the Schlesinger interview April 25, 1989, in Washington, and the Colby interview January 10, 1991.
|
||||
[^19]: Stanley I. Kutler, "The Fast One James Schlesinger Pulled on the Media," *History News Network*, April 2, 2014, summarizing an account attributed to an unnamed "senior Pentagon official." https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/155168
|
||||
[^20]: Larry Diamond, "Our Year of Living Dangerously," *The American Interest*, January 12, 2018, quoting Gil Troy. https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/01/12/year-living-dangerously
|
||||
[^21]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. X, Document 285, Minutes of National Security Council Meeting, May 12, 1975, 12:05 to 12:50 p.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d285
|
||||
[^22]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. X, Document 291, Minutes of National Security Council Meeting, May 13, 1975, 10:22 to 11:17 a.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d291
|
||||
[^23]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. X, Document 298, Minutes of National Security Council Meeting, May 14, 1975, 3:52 to 5:42 p.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d298
|
||||
[^24]: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. X, Document 301, "Minutes of National Security Council Meeting," May 15, 1975, 4:02 to 4:20 p.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d301
|
||||
[^25]: Memorandum of conversation, May 27, 1975, Ford, Schlesinger, Colby, Rumsfeld, Ingersoll and Scowcroft, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 12, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1553088.pdf (declassified in part)
|
||||
[^26]: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXV, Document 197, Memorandum of Conversation, "MATADOR Meeting," Washington, March 19, 1975, 11:20 a.m., with editorial notes citing Jack Nelson, "Administration Won't Talk About Sub Raised by CIA," Los Angeles Times, March 20, 1975, pp. A1, A14-A16. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v35/d197
|
||||
[^27]: Burr, William, ed. "Project Azorian: The CIA's Declassified History of the Glomar Explorer." National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 305, February 12, 2010. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB305/index.htm
|
||||
[^28]: Gerald R. Ford, "The President's News Conference," November 3, 1975, The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-60
|
||||
[^29]: Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, *Final Report*, August 2004, DTIC ADA428743, copy at https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA428743; cover letter of August 24, 2004, and Introduction ("Charter and Methodology"), p. 21.
|
||||
[^30]: Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, *Final Report*, August 2004, DTIC ADA428743, copy at https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA428743; "Command Responsibilities," pp. 43-47.
|
||||
[^31]: Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, *Final Report*, August 2004, DTIC ADA428743, copy at https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA428743; chapter on the Secretary of Defense policy decisions of December 2, 2002 and April 16, 2003, pp. 35-36, and "The Changing Threat," p. 29.
|
||||
[^32]: Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, *Final Report*, August 2004, DTIC ADA428743, copy at https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA428743; "Failure of the Combatant Command to Adjust the Plan," p. 47.
|
||||
[^33]: Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, *Final Report*, August 2004, DTIC ADA428743, copy at https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA428743; "Role of CIA," p. 70, and recommendation 8, p. 91.
|
||||
[^34]: Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, *Final Report*, August 2004, DTIC ADA428743, copy at https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA428743; "Use of Contractors as Interrogators," p. 69.
|
||||
[^35]: Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, *Final Report*, August 2004, DTIC ADA428743, copy at https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA428743; "The Role of the ICRC," p. 87.
|
||||
[^36]: Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, *Phase I: The Air Force's Nuclear Mission*, transmittal letter of September 12, 2008, Executive Summary pp. 1-4 and recommendations, DTIC ADA486299; the figure of 33 recommendations is stated in the Phase II Executive Summary, p. iii. https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA486299
|
||||
[^37]: Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, *Phase II: Review of the DoD Nuclear Mission*, December 2008, Executive Summary pp. iii-v, DTIC ADA492647. https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA492647
|
||||
[^38]: Global Positioning System, "James Schlesinger," advisory board member biography, archive.gps.gov (Advisory Board Chair, 2007 to 2014; death on March 27, 2014). https://archive.gps.gov/governance/advisory/members/schlesinger/
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -13,7 +13,12 @@ born: 1937-04-29
|
|||
died: 2025-03-05
|
||||
location: "Davis, California"
|
||||
created: 2026-09-22
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: director_of
|
||||
with: "[[Monroe Institute]]"
|
||||
role: Board of Advisors (emeritus)
|
||||
fn: 8
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Charles T. Tart was born in Morrisville, [[Pennsylvania]], on April 29, 1937, "but grew up mostly in [[New Jersey]]," a teenage radio engineer who entered the engineering program at [[Massachusetts Institute of Technology|MIT]] and, "after several personal experiences" of drugs "that produced altered states of consciousness" and after reading [[J. B. Rhine]], "transferred from MIT to [[Duke University]] in order to meet and be mentored by Rhine." He took his doctorate in psychology at the University of North Carolina in 1963 on "post-hypnotic suggestions to influence dreaming," did post-doctoral work with [[Ernest Hilgard]] at [[Stanford University]], and served 28 years on the psychology faculty of the [[University of California, Davis]], holding concurrently a senior research fellowship at the [[Institute of Noetic Sciences]], the Bigelow Chair of Consciousness Studies at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, a visiting professorship at the California Institute of Integral Studies, and a post as "a consultant on government funded parapsychological research at the [[Stanford Research Institute]]." His *Altered States of Consciousness* appeared in 1969 and *Transpersonal Psychologies* in 1975; he was president of the Parapsychological Association. He died on March 5, 2025.[^1]
|
||||
|
|
@ -24,8 +29,22 @@ A report entered as Plaintiff's Exhibit 7 in Puharich v. Brenner lists a Charles
|
|||
|
||||
With Whitson, Bogart and [[John Palmer]] he published "Preliminary experiments in group 'remote viewing'" in the Proceedings of the IEEE in 1976. When [[David Marks]] and [[Richard Kammann]] argued in Nature in 1978 that cues in the transcripts explained the [[Pat Price]] series, [[Hal Puthoff]] and [[Russell Targ]] turned the nine transcripts over to "an independent research psychologist," Tart, "for rejudging on the basis of the criteria implied by the Marks-Kammann criticism." By his own account he first tested two candidate judges on transcripts from "another successful remote-viewing series," disqualifying the one who scored at chance, "edited them to delete all references that could conceivably give any indication as to the order of the experiments," and had the judge, [[Phyllis Matson]], rate each transcript at each site; "for seven of the nine target sites the highest correspondence rating was given to the correct transcript." "I would hypothesize that Marks and Kammann were unable to obtain significant results in their reanalysis of the subset of the Price series because their judges either lacked the necessary discriminative skills and/or were not sufficiently motivated to use them effectively." The Army's [[Grill Flame Scientific Evaluation Committee]] met "Mr. Targ/Dr. Puthoff/Dr. Tart" at SRI on July 24 and 25, 1979.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
### Out-of-Body Studies with Robert Monroe
|
||||
|
||||
Tart met [[Robert Monroe]] in the fall of 1965, when he took a research position at the [[University of Virginia]] Medical School. He wrote that Monroe came in for eight late-night sessions at the hospital's EEG laboratory from December 1965 to August 1966; the introduction Tart wrote for Monroe's *Journeys Out of the Body* dates the series to September 1965 through August 1966. In a session in which Monroe reported leaving his body, the technician's location in the corridor with a man later identified as her husband matched his account; Tart wrote in 1998 that this left "only weak evidence that Monroe was actually 'out'." After moving to the University of California, Davis, Tart and his wife concentrated one evening on guiding Monroe to their home at a random time, 11 P.M. Pacific, and Monroe reported being pulled from his body within a minute of the start; Tart wrote that the timing matched and the description of the home was poor. On a visit in 1968 Monroe had two brief experiences in Tart's sleep laboratory, monitored by EEG, eye movements and plethysmograph.[^4][^5] Tart's introduction to the book is dated Davis, California, January 10, 1971.[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
An Army assessment of August 25, 1978 recorded that Tart "has conducted investigations of Monroe under laboratory conditions and is convinced of the validity of Monroe's experience" and "recently recommended that anyone wanting to learn about OOBE should contact MIAS."[^6] [[Frederick Atwater]], then project officer for [[Gondola Wish]], attended Tart's seminar on July 29, 1978, held while Tart was on leave from Davis as a consultant to Stanford Research Institute; Atwater's memorandum records that Tart told attendees the Soviets were far ahead in parapsychology, that US Government sponsored research was almost zero, that he had approached US Government officials on several occasions "but was discouraged," and that he referred them to the [[Monroe Institute]] of Applied Sciences.[^7]
|
||||
|
||||
A biographical note to a December 16, 2009 interview calls Tart an emeritus member of the Monroe Institute's board of advisors, and the Institute's 2015 Professional Seminar carried a Skype question-and-answer with Tart on his friendship and collaboration with Monroe.[^8][^9]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Schwartz, Stephan A. "Charles T. Tart Obituary, 29 April 1937 - 5 March 2025." Institut Metapsychique International, April 2025. https://www.metapsychique.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Tart-VO.pdf The obituary gives his age at death as 86, which its own dates do not support.
|
||||
[^2]: Plaintiff's Exhibit 7, Transcript of Record, Appendix, Puharich v. Brenner, No. 22286 (D.C. Cir.), section 8.80. https://archive.org/details/dc_circ_1968_22286_henry_k_puharich_v_edward_j_brenner
|
||||
[^3]: Puthoff, H. E., and Russell Targ, "Information Transmission in Remote Viewing Experiments: II," and Tart, Charles T., "Reanalysis of SRI Remote Viewing Experiments," January 1979, CIA-RDP96-00787R000200090017-5. *Report by the Grill Flame Scientific Evaluation Committee,* December 1979, CIA-RDP96-00788R001300120001-5; Stoner, William L., memorandum of conversation, January 14, 1980, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200230017-7; Jachim, Robert J., "Information Briefing for Senator Clairborne Pell," October 6, 1982, CIA-RDP96-00788R001100320001-5. Snyder, Harry L., and Arlene G. Snyder. *Summary and Critical Evaluation of Research in Remote Viewing,* Report RV-79-1, June 1, 1979, part 2, CIA-RDP96-00787R000100260003-2.
|
||||
[^4]: Tart, Charles T., "Six Studies of Out-of-Body Experiences," *Journal of Near-Death Studies* 17, no. 2 (1998): 73-99, pp. 83-90. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc799368/
|
||||
[^5]: Monroe, Robert A., *Journeys Out of the Body*, updated edition (Doubleday), Tart introduction dated January 10, 1971. https://archive.org/details/journeys_out_body
|
||||
[^6]: 902d Military Intelligence Group, GONDOLA WISH assessment report, August 25, 1978. CIA-RDP96-00788R002000160001-3, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^7]: 902d Military Intelligence Group, memorandum of July 31, 1978. CIA-RDP96-00788R002000160013-0, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^8]: Multidisciplinary Association for Psychedelic Studies, "Exploring the Near-Death Experience: An Interview with Charles Tart, Ph.D." https://maps.org/news/bulletin/exploring-the-near-death-experience-an-interview-with-charles-tart-ph-d/
|
||||
[^9]: The Monroe Institute, "2015 Professional Seminar: Charles Tart Remembers Robert Monroe." https://archive.org/details/2015-charles-tart
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
aliases:
|
||||
- Donald John Trump
|
||||
- Donald J. Trump
|
||||
- Trump
|
||||
category: "Political Figure"
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- KeyFigure
|
||||
|
|
@ -14,71 +16,250 @@ tags:
|
|||
- LeonardLeo
|
||||
- DarkMoney
|
||||
- FederalistSociety
|
||||
summary: "Donald Trump is the 45th and 47th President of the United States, whose administrations placed figures from the Peter Thiel, Leonard Leo and Jared Kushner networks in federal power and oversaw the Epstein file releases."
|
||||
- JeffreyEpstein
|
||||
- EpsteinFilesTransparencyAct
|
||||
- SupremeCourt
|
||||
- RussiaInvestigation
|
||||
- UAP
|
||||
- RoyCohn
|
||||
- CambridgeAnalytica
|
||||
summary: "45th and 47th President of the United States, defended by Roy Cohn in the 1973 housing suit, whose administrations appointed Thiel, Leo and Kushner network figures and who signed the Epstein Files Act."
|
||||
born: 1946-06-14
|
||||
location: "Queens, New York City (born)"
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: appointed
|
||||
with: "[[Neil Gorsuch]]"
|
||||
start: 2017-04-10
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
- type: appointed
|
||||
with: "[[Brett Kavanaugh]]"
|
||||
start: 2018-10-06
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
- type: appointed
|
||||
with: "[[Amy Coney Barrett]]"
|
||||
start: 2020-10-26
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
- type: appointed
|
||||
with: "[[Alexander Acosta]]"
|
||||
start: 2017-04-27
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
- type: appointed
|
||||
with: "[[Pam Bondi]]"
|
||||
start: 2025-02-04
|
||||
end: 2026-04-02
|
||||
fn: 34
|
||||
- type: appointed
|
||||
with: "[[Todd Blanche]]"
|
||||
start: 2026-04-02
|
||||
role: acting Attorney General
|
||||
fn: 34
|
||||
- type: appointed
|
||||
with: "[[Howard Lutnick]]"
|
||||
start: 2025-02
|
||||
fn: 34
|
||||
- type: appointed
|
||||
with: "[[David Sacks]]"
|
||||
start: 2024-12
|
||||
fn: 33
|
||||
- type: appointed
|
||||
with: "[[Jay Clayton]]"
|
||||
start: 2026-10-04
|
||||
role: White House AI czar
|
||||
fn: 33
|
||||
- type: represented
|
||||
with: "[[Todd Blanche]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 2023
|
||||
fn: 34
|
||||
- type: represented
|
||||
with: "[[Roy Cohn]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 1973
|
||||
role: defense counsel in United States v. Fred C. Trump, et al., No. 73 C 1529 (E.D.N.Y.)
|
||||
fn: 6
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[Robert Mueller]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 2017-05-17
|
||||
end: 2019-03-22
|
||||
fn: 21
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[Steve Bannon]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 2016-08
|
||||
role: campaign chief executive
|
||||
fn: 14
|
||||
- type: relative_of
|
||||
with: "[[Jared Kushner]]"
|
||||
role: son-in-law
|
||||
fn: 28
|
||||
- type: spouse_of
|
||||
with: "[[Melania Trump]]"
|
||||
fn: 36
|
||||
created: 2026-06-18
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Donald Trump (born June 14, 1946) is the 45th and 47th [[President of the United States]], serving 2017-2021 and 2025-present. His two administrations functioned as the political vehicle through which the [[Peter Thiel|Peter Thiel]] commercial network ([[Palantir Technologies|Palantir]] contracting expansion, [[Clearview AI]] seed funding, [[Founders Fund]] defense portfolio), the [[Leonard Leo|Leonard Leo]] judicial-selection network (the [[Neil Gorsuch|Gorsuch]], [[Brett Kavanaugh|Kavanaugh]], [[Amy Coney Barrett|Barrett]] Supreme Court confirmations), and the [[Jared Kushner|Jared Kushner]] [[Middle East]] network ([[Abraham Accords|Abraham Accords]], U.S.-[[Saudi Arabia|Saudi Arabia]] arms sales, the documented [[Mohammed bin Salman|MBS]] WhatsApp channel) exercised documented federal power. Thiel spoke at the 2016 [[Republican National Convention|Republican National Convention]] endorsing Trump, served on the transition executive committee, and placed associates including [[Kevin Harrington|Kevin Harrington]] on the [[National Security Council|National Security Council]].[^1][^2][^3]
|
||||
Donald Trump (born June 14, 1946) is the 45th and 47th [[President of the United States]], serving from 2017 to 2021 and from 2025. His administrations appointed figures from the [[Peter Thiel|Peter Thiel]] commercial network, the [[Leonard Leo|Leonard Leo]] judicial-selection network and the [[Jared Kushner|Jared Kushner]] [[Middle East|Middle East]] network to federal office and contracts, and the second administration signed the [[Epstein Files Transparency Act|Epstein Files Transparency Act]] into law on November 19, 2025.[^1][^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### The 2016 Thiel Endorsement and the Transition
|
||||
### New York and the Trump Organization
|
||||
|
||||
Thiel endorsed Trump at the July 2016 Republican National Convention in [[Cleveland|Cleveland]], the first openly gay speaker at a Republican convention in sixteen years, and donated over one million dollars to Trump-supporting super PACs alongside the [[Mercer family|Mercer family]], the Republican donors who funded [[Breitbart|Breitbart]] and the [[Cambridge Analytica|Cambridge Analytica]] data operation. After the November 2016 election, Trump placed Thiel on the transition team's executive committee. Thiel used the position to place Harrington as Senior Director for Strategic Planning on the National Security Council and a Thiel aide as White House Deputy Chief Technology Officer. *Politico* reported that companies Thiel backed, especially Palantir, stood to benefit from the transition role.[^1][^2][^4]
|
||||
Trump was born in [[Queens, New York|Queens]], the son of the real estate developer [[Fred Trump|Fred C. Trump]], and became the chief executive of the [[Trump Organization|Trump Organization]] in New York. He later held casino and resort interests in [[Atlantic City, New Jersey|Atlantic City]]. He bought the [[Mar-a-Lago|Mar-a-Lago]] estate in [[Palm Beach, Florida|Palm Beach]] in 1985.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
The Mercer family connection was the other documented channel of the 2016 operation. [[Robert Mercer|Robert Mercer]] and his daughter [[Rebekah Mercer|Rebekah Mercer]] funded Breitbart News (where [[Steve Bannon|Steve Bannon]] served as executive chairman before becoming the Trump campaign CEO in August 2016), Cambridge Analytica (the data-targeting firm that deployed psychographic profiling of voters using Facebook data acquired through the [[ Aleksandr Kogan | Aleksandr Kogan / Joseph Chancellor ]] academic-researcher channel), and the [[Government Accountability Institute|Government Accountability Institute]] (the research nonprofit that produced *Clinton Cash*). The Mercer-Breitbart-Cambridge Analytica infrastructure was the documented digital-and-media backbone of the 2016 campaign, and the convergence with the Thiel commercial network (Palantir, Founders Fund) through the shared Trump support produced the documented 2016 alignment of the [[Silicon Valley]] billionaire network with the Republican political operation.[^4][^5]
|
||||
In the 1980s [[Alan Greenberg|Alan Greenberg]] of [[Bear Stearns|Bear Stearns]] was among the advisers who helped Trump accumulate 9.6 percent of [[Bally Entertainment|Bally Entertainment]] in an unsuccessful 1986 takeover attempt. Trump said in 2006 that he had placed his children's accounts with Greenberg.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Palantir Contracting Expansion
|
||||
### The Housing Suit and Roy Cohn
|
||||
|
||||
The first Trump administration produced the documented expansion of Palantir's government contracting. The [[U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement|ICE]] contracts (FALCON, ICM, ImmigrationOS, ELITE) expanded through the administration's immigration-enforcement escalation. The [[Customs and Border Protection|CBP]] and [[Department of Defense|DoD]] contracts grew alongside the border-enforcement and defense-spending increases. The [[In-Q-Tel|In-Q-Tel]]-seeded relationship between Palantir and the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] deepened as Palantir's Gotham platform became the standard data-fusion tool across multiple agencies. Thiel chaired Palantir throughout, while simultaneously placing associates in the NSC and running the [[Dialog]] convening network whose government-side attendees included the congressional oversight and military-command principals responsible for the agencies Palantir serves.[^3][^6]
|
||||
On October 15, 1973 the United States sued Fred C. Trump, Donald Trump and Trump Management, Inc. in the [[United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York|Eastern District of New York]] under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, Civil Action No. 73 C 1529, before Judge [[Edward R. Neaher|Edward R. Neaher]].[^5][^6] The complaint covered 39 buildings with more than 14,000 apartments and drew on reports from black and white testers sent by the Open Housing Center of the [[New York Urban League|New York Urban League]]; the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] interviewed company employees, former employees and applicants in the investigation that preceded the suit.[^7]
|
||||
|
||||
The second administration (2025-present) has extended the contracting expansion. ICE awarded Palantir the 30 million dollar [[ImmigrationOS|ImmigrationOS]] contract for the administration's mass-deportation operations. Palantir signed the January 2024 strategic partnership with the [[Israeli Ministry of Defense|Israeli Ministry of Defense]] for "war-related missions" in the [[Gaza war|Gaza war]], placing the [[Palantir Gotham|Gotham]] "AI-powered kill chain" platform in an active combat zone. The [[Anduril Industries|Anduril]] [[Sentry Tower|Sentry Tower]] deployment expanded to over 350 towers covering 30 percent of the southern border under a 363 million dollar CBP contract. The documented combination of Palantir (case management and targeting), Anduril (autonomous detection), and Clearview (facial identification) across the deportation and border-enforcement pipelines constitutes the commercial operation of the [[Thiel Influence Network|Thiel network]] against the documented target populations.[^3][^6][^7]
|
||||
The defendants retained [[Roy Cohn|Roy M. Cohn]] of the firm Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley. Cohn had been admitted to the New York bar in 1948 and in 1952 appeared among the counsel for the United States on the Second Circuit appeal in [[United States v. Rosenberg|United States v. Rosenberg]]; the Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse summary of the Trump case describes him as a former aide to Senator [[Joseph McCarthy|Joseph McCarthy]].[^7][^8] The docket shows that on December 12, 1973 the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint and filed a counterclaim, that the government moved on January 8, 1974 to dismiss the counterclaim, and that both motions were argued before Neaher on January 25, 1974. The docket records the government's response to affidavits of Donald Trump and Roy Cohn, a government motion for sanctions returnable in May 1974, and a notice to take Donald Trump's deposition.[^5] The counterclaim sought 100 million dollars from the government for defamation, and it failed.[^7][^9]
|
||||
|
||||
[[David Marcus|David Marcus]], identified as Cohn's cousin, said in the 2024 [[PBS Frontline|FRONTLINE]] film The Choice 2024 that when Cohn met Trump he told him, "You might be guilty; it doesn't matter. Go after the Justice Department. Don't ever admit guilt." Ken Auletta of The New Yorker said in the same film that Trump was "totally taken" by Cohn's advice to "fight it" and "just deny everything and fight."[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
The case ended in a consent order entered June 10, 1975. It recites that the order was entered "without adjudication of the merit and without any admission as to the existence or absence of liability," that "Defendants vigorously deny said allegations," and that Trump Management's execution of it was "in no way an admission" of a violation. It dismissed the complaint against Fred Trump and Donald Trump personally, with prejudice. It permanently enjoined the company from refusing to rent or sell, discriminating in terms, and representing that a dwelling was unavailable when it was available, directed the principal officers to "thoroughly acquaint themselves personally on a detailed basis" with the Fair Housing Act, and required a two-year affirmative program that began with written notice to the Open Housing Center of the New York Urban League. Cohn signed for the defendants and Frank E. Schwelb, Chief of the Housing Section of the Civil Rights Division, for the United States.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
On June 23, 1986 the Appellate Division, First Department, in Matter of Cohn, 118 A.D.2d 15, sustained four charges brought by the Departmental Disciplinary Committee in the fall of 1982 and disbarred Cohn effective immediately, in a per curiam opinion joined by Justices Sandler, Fein, Lynch, Rosenberger and Ellerin. Cohn's counsel were [[Michael Mukasey|Michael B. Mukasey]] and [[Harold R. Tyler Jr.|Harold R. Tyler, Jr.]] The charges concerned a 100,000-dollar loan from a client in 1966 that remained unpaid until 1984; the violation of an escrow order in a Securities and Exchange Commission fraud action involving two yachts; a December 6, 1975 codicil to the will of [[Lewis Rosenstiel|Lewis S. Rosenstiel]], signed in a Miami hospital room weeks before his death and naming Cohn as an additional executor and trustee; and a false answer on Cohn's July 28, 1982 application to the District of Columbia Bar. The court wrote that "for an attorney practicing for nearly 40 years in this State, such misconduct is inexcusable" and that the evidence on each charge left "no recourse but to order disbarment."[^10] The FBI's online Vault carries a 748-page file titled Roy Cohn, Part 01 of 01.[^11]
|
||||
|
||||
### The 2016 Campaign and the Thiel Network
|
||||
|
||||
Peter Thiel, a [[Silicon Valley|Silicon Valley]] investor, endorsed Trump at the July 2016 [[Republican National Convention|Republican National Convention]] in [[Cleveland|Cleveland]], as the first openly gay speaker at a Republican convention in sixteen years. Federal Election Commission schedule A records list Thiel's itemized individual contributions for the 2015 to 2016 cycle, including two contributions of 1,000,000 dollars each to committees named Fighting for Ohio Fund (August 10, 2016) and Make America Number 1 (October 26, 2016), a 250,000-dollar contribution to Trump Victory (October 6, 2016), and a 2,700-dollar contribution to Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. (October 6, 2016). A 2,000,000-dollar contribution dated August 25, 2015 went to a committee named Conservative, Authentic, Responsive Leadership for You and for America.[^12]
|
||||
|
||||
After the November 2016 election Trump placed Thiel on the transition team's executive committee. Thiel used the position to place [[Kevin Harrington|Kevin Harrington]] as Senior Director for Strategic Planning on the [[National Security Council|National Security Council]] and a Thiel aide as White House Deputy Chief Technology Officer. The [[The Guardian|Guardian]] and [[Politico|Politico]] reported in November and December 2016 that companies Thiel backed, especially [[Palantir Technologies|Palantir]], stood to benefit from the transition role.[^13]
|
||||
|
||||
The [[Robert Mercer|Robert Mercer]] and [[Rebekah Mercer|Rebekah Mercer]] family funded [[Breitbart News|Breitbart News]], where [[Steve Bannon|Steve Bannon]] served as executive chairman before becoming Trump's campaign chief executive in August 2016. The Mercer Family Foundation also gave 7,460,000 dollars to the [[Government Accountability Institute|Government Accountability Institute]] in tax years 2013 to 2017; Bannon was the institute's chairman and Rebekah Mercer a director in its 2012 return, and the institute produced the book [[Clinton Cash|Clinton Cash]]. The family also funded [[Cambridge Analytica|Cambridge Analytica]], which obtained Facebook user data through an academic researcher, [[Aleksandr Kogan|Aleksandr Kogan]], and used psychographic profiling in the campaign.[^14]
|
||||
|
||||
The [[Federal Trade Commission|Federal Trade Commission]] issued an administrative complaint against Cambridge Analytica on July 24, 2019. The Commission's opinion and final order of November 25, 2019 (Docket No. 9383) granted complaint counsel's unopposed motion for summary decision, found that the company harvested profile data from approximately 250,000 to 270,000 U.S. app users and from 50 to 65 million of their Facebook friends, and ordered it to delete or destroy the covered information and to stop misrepresenting its privacy practices and its Privacy Shield participation; the company had filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in May 2018.[^15] The United Kingdom Information Commissioner's final letter to Parliament, dated October 2, 2020, stated that the Commissioner "did not find any additional evidence of Russian involvement" in the material on the SCL Elections and Cambridge Analytica servers, and that earlier details of reported Russia-located activity had been referred to the National Crime Agency.[^16] The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reported that Cambridge Analytica developers helped ingest the campaign's polling data into a visualization tool that [[Brad Parscale|Brad Parscale]] carried on an iPad.[^17]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Russia Investigation
|
||||
|
||||
The Special Counsel's report on Russian interference in the 2016 election, Volume I, stated that candidate Trump signed a letter of intent for [[Trump Tower Moscow|Trump Tower Moscow]] by November 2015, and that Trump Organization executive [[Michael Cohen|Michael Cohen]] pursued the project through at least June 2016, including by considering travel to Russia by Cohen and candidate Trump. The report places the letter of intent between approximately October 13 and November 2, 2015, signed by Trump for the Trump Organization.[^18][^19]
|
||||
|
||||
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, in Volume 5 of its report on Russian active measures (2020), stated that Trump authorized Cohen in September 2015 to pursue the deal through [[Felix Sater|Felix Sater]], a longtime business associate of Trump. The committee found that Sater had senior-level ties to Russian businessmen and former officials, though it stated that he almost certainly inflated some of his claims.[^20]
|
||||
|
||||
The Special Counsel's Volume II addressed obstruction. Its introduction, its executive summary and its conclusion each state: "while this report does not conclude that the President committed a crime, it also does not exonerate him." The report adds that "if we had confidence after a thorough investigation of the facts that the President clearly did not commit obstruction of justice, we would so state," and that "we are unable to reach that judgment."[^21]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Supreme Court and the Leo Network
|
||||
|
||||
Trump's three Supreme Court appointments (Gorsuch 2017, Kavanaugh 2018, Barrett 2020) were selected and shepherded through the Leonard Leo / [[Federalist Society|Federalist Society]] pipeline. Leo advised Trump on all three selections and the [[Judicial Crisis Network|Judicial Crisis Network]] (now the [[Concord Fund|Concord Fund]]) dark-money operation funded the confirmation campaigns. The conservative supermajority produced by the confirmations has been the structural outcome that shapes U.S. law on reproductive rights, gun regulation, campaign finance, and executive power. The Leo operation and the Thiel operation overlap through the shared [[Teneo Network|Teneo Network]] institutional terrain and the shared 501(c)(4) dark-money infrastructure.[^8]
|
||||
Trump nominated [[Neil Gorsuch|Neil Gorsuch]], [[Brett Kavanaugh|Brett Kavanaugh]] and [[Amy Coney Barrett|Amy Coney Barrett]] to the [[Supreme Court of the United States|Supreme Court]]. The Senate confirmed Gorsuch on April 7, 2017 by 54 to 45, Kavanaugh on October 6, 2018 by 50 to 48, and Barrett on October 26, 2020 by 52 to 48.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
The Kavanaugh confirmation (2018) was the most contested of the three and drew the documented engagement of the Thiel-aligned political infrastructure. The confirmation followed a sexual-assault allegation against Kavanaugh and the [[Senate Judiciary Committee]] hearings, and the conservative dark-money operation that funded the confirmation campaign (the JCN / Concord Fund network) spent millions on advertising and grassroots mobilization. Leo personally managed the confirmation strategy. The Kavanaugh confirmation solidified the conservative supermajority that produced the 2022 [[Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization|Dobbs]] decision overturning [[Roe v. Wade|Roe v. Wade]].[^8]
|
||||
Leonard Leo, the longtime executive vice president of the [[Federalist Society|Federalist Society]], advised Trump on all three selections, according to [[ProPublica|ProPublica]], which reported on Leo's role in March 2023.[^22] The [[Judicial Crisis Network|Judicial Crisis Network]], later renamed the [[Concord Fund|Concord Fund]], funded campaigns for the confirmations. Leo managed the Kavanaugh confirmation strategy, and the Judicial Crisis Network and Concord Fund network spent millions of dollars on advertising and grassroots mobilization.[^22] The Kavanaugh confirmation followed a sexual assault allegation against Kavanaugh, and the [[Senate Judiciary Committee|Senate Judiciary Committee]] held hearings on it. The Court's 2022 decision in [[Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization|Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization]] overturned [[Roe v. Wade|Roe v. Wade]]. The conservative majority that followed the three confirmations has decided cases on abortion, gun regulation, campaign finance and executive power.
|
||||
|
||||
The Leo and Thiel operations share the [[Teneo Network|Teneo Network]] institutional terrain and the 501(c)(4) dark-money structure described on the Leo page.[^22]
|
||||
|
||||
### Palantir and the Immigration Contracts
|
||||
|
||||
Palantir expanded its federal contracting during the first administration. Thiel chaired Palantir throughout, placed associates on the National Security Council, and ran the [[Dialog|Dialog]] convening network, a membership list of which was reported by WIRED in June 2026.[^23] The cluster is known as the [[Thiel Influence Network|Thiel network]]. Its [[U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement|ICE]] contracts include the FALCON database, awarded under contract HSCETC15C00001 (May 28, 2015 to May 27, 2018, about 39.3 million dollars) and continued under contract 70CTD019C00000001 (November 28, 2018 to May 27, 2022, about 37.8 million dollars), and the Investigative Case Management system, awarded as order 70CTD022FR0000170 (September 26, 2022 to September 25, 2027, about 170.8 million dollars). Palantir's ICE work also included a contract known as ELITE. [[In-Q-Tel|In-Q-Tel]] had seeded Palantir's relationship with the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]], and Palantir's Gotham platform became a standard data-fusion tool across multiple agencies.[^24]
|
||||
|
||||
On April 11, 2025 ICE modified order 70CTD022FR0000170 by about 29.9 million dollars; the USAspending record describes the modification as adding licenses, configuration and engineering services to deploy "new targeting and enforcement prioritization, self-deportation tracking, and immigration lifecycle process capabilities." ICE described a system called [[ImmigrationOS|ImmigrationOS]] in connection with this work, to track immigrants for deportation. In May and June 2026 ICE placed two further Palantir orders, 70CTD026FC0000012 (about 86.3 million dollars, enforcement removal operations modernization for the Enforcement Case Management System) and 70CTD026FC0000018 (about 45.8 million dollars, Homeland Security Investigations system modernization).[^25]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Anduril Industries|Anduril]] holds contracts from [[Customs and Border Protection|CBP]] for [[Sentry Tower|Sentry Tower]] surveillance towers along the southern border, including a 363 million dollar award for extended-range towers; the deployment expanded to over 350 towers covering 30 percent of the southern border. [[Clearview AI|Clearview AI]], seeded by [[Founders Fund|Founders Fund]], supplies facial identification to CBP.[^26] The Palantir partnership with the [[Israeli Ministry of Defense|Israeli Ministry of Defense]] for "war-related missions" during the [[Gaza war|Gaza war]] was announced in January 2024, during the Biden administration, and is not an action of the second Trump administration. Palantir markets its [[Palantir Gotham|Gotham]] platform as an "AI-powered kill chain."[^27]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Kushner Middle East Policy
|
||||
|
||||
Kushner, Trump's son-in-law and senior advisor, handled the Middle East portfolio that produced the Abraham Accords (2020 normalization agreements between [[Israel|Israel]] and the [[United Arab Emirates|UAE]], [[Bahrain|Bahrain]], [[Sudan|Sudan]], and [[Morocco|Morocco]]). The accords broke with the prior U.S. framework that had conditioned normalization on Israeli-Palestinian progress, and Kushner led the negotiation alongside the administration's recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the [[Golan Heights|Golan Heights]] and the relocation of the U.S. embassy to [[Jerusalem|Jerusalem]].[^9]
|
||||
Jared Kushner, Trump's son-in-law, led Middle East policy in the first administration. It produced the 2020 [[Abraham Accords|Abraham Accords]] normalization agreements between [[Israel|Israel]] and the [[United Arab Emirates|UAE]], [[Bahrain|Bahrain]], [[Sudan|Sudan]] and [[Morocco|Morocco]]. The administration recognized Israeli sovereignty over the [[Golan Heights|Golan Heights]] and moved the U.S. embassy to [[Jerusalem|Jerusalem]]. The accords departed from the earlier U.S. framework that had conditioned normalization on Israeli-Palestinian progress.[^28]
|
||||
|
||||
The U.S.-Saudi Arabia arms sales proceeded over congressional opposition, with the administration invoking emergency authority to bypass the congressional review process. The arms sales ran through the period of the [[Jamal Khashoggi|Khashoggi]] murder (October 2018), after which the CIA assessed with high confidence that MBS had ordered the assassination. Kushner maintained his relationship with MBS after the murder and maintained the WhatsApp channel the CIA assessed as compromised.[^9]
|
||||
The administration approved U.S.-[[Saudi Arabia|Saudi Arabia]] arms sales over congressional opposition, using emergency authority to bypass congressional review. The sales went forward after the October 2018 murder of [[Jamal Khashoggi|Jamal Khashoggi]]. The CIA was reported to have assessed with high confidence that [[Mohammed bin Salman|Mohammed bin Salman]] had ordered the killing, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's assessment dated February 11, 2021, declassified on February 25 and released on February 26, 2021, stated: "We assess that Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman approved an operation in Istanbul, Turkey to capture or kill Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi."[^29] Kushner maintained his relationship with the crown prince after the murder and kept up the WhatsApp channel that the CIA assessed as compromised; he used WhatsApp to communicate with the crown prince during his government service.[^28] The Guardian reported in January 2020 that [[Jeff Bezos|Jeff Bezos]]'s phone had been hacked in May 2018 through a file sent from the crown prince's WhatsApp account.[^28]
|
||||
|
||||
After the administration ended, the [[Public Investment Fund|Saudi sovereign wealth fund]] committed 2 billion dollars to Kushner's [[Affinity Partners|Affinity Partners]] fund despite the fund's own due-diligence panel rejecting the deal as "unsatisfactory in all aspects." The Kushner-MBS channel, the [[NSO Group|NSO Group]] Pegasus surveillance of Khashoggi's associates, and the Abraham Accords together constitute the documented Middle East policy outcome.[^9]
|
||||
After the first administration ended, the [[Public Investment Fund|Saudi sovereign wealth fund]] committed 2 billion dollars to Kushner's [[Affinity Partners|Affinity Partners]]. The [[NSO Group|NSO Group]] Pegasus spyware was used against associates of Khashoggi, according to leaked data reported in July 2021. The House Committee on Oversight opened a probe of the investment in June 2022. Its letter stated that the fund's screening panel had rated the firm's due diligence unsatisfactory before the fund's board approved the investment.[^30]
|
||||
|
||||
### The 2024 Campaign and the Second Administration
|
||||
### DOGE and the Second Administration
|
||||
|
||||
Thiel funded the 2022 [[JD Vance|JD Vance]] Senate campaign (approximately fifteen million dollars) and the [[Blake Masters|Blake Masters]] campaign (approximately fifteen million dollars), and brokered Vance's selection as Trump's 2024 vice-presidential running mate. The Vance selection compressed a three-and-a-half-year path from private citizen to Vice President on a single-donor financial base.[^1][^3]
|
||||
Executive Order 14158 established the [[Department of Government Efficiency|Department of Government Efficiency]] (DOGE), led by [[Elon Musk|Elon Musk]], on January 20, 2025.[^31] An April 2025 whistleblower disclosure stated that DOGE personnel had taken sensitive data from the [[National Labor Relations Board|National Labor Relations Board]] in what the whistleblower described as an [[NLRB Data Exfiltration|NLRB data exfiltration]] and that a login attempt to NLRB systems came from a Russian IP address, as reported by [[NPR|NPR]] and [[Nextgov|Nextgov/FCW]].[^32]
|
||||
|
||||
The [[Heritage Foundation|Heritage Foundation]]'s [[Project 2025|Project 2025]] produced the personnel pipeline for the second administration. [[ProPublica|ProPublica]] reported that [[Paul Dans|Paul Dans]], the Project 2025 director, created a personnel database of over 10,000 vetted candidates ("a conservative LinkedIn") to staff a second Trump term. [[NBC News|NBC News]] reported that several prominent Project 2025 authors secured executive-branch roles. [[Center for American Progress|CAP]] documented that 80 percent of Project 2025's authors were former Trump administration officials or close advisors, and 140 people who worked for Trump contributed to the project. Trump publicly disavowed Project 2025 during the campaign but the personnel overlap is documented.[^1][^5]
|
||||
Thiel funded the 2022 Senate campaigns of [[JD Vance|JD Vance]] in Ohio and [[Blake Masters|Blake Masters]] in Arizona, at approximately fifteen million dollars each, and brokered Vance's selection as Trump's 2024 vice-presidential running mate.[^13]
|
||||
|
||||
The second Trump administration (2025-present) has produced the documented expansion of Palantir's ICE contracting (the 30 million dollar ImmigrationOS contract), the Palantir-Israel strategic partnership for "war-related missions" in the Gaza war, and the [[Department of Government Efficiency|DOGE]] access to federal systems. [[David Sacks|David Sacks]], the PayPal Mafia COO, received the White House AI and cryptocurrency czar appointment. The DOGE, led by [[Elon Musk|Musk]], produced the documented [[NLRB Data Exfiltration|NLRB data exfiltration]] with Russian IP login attempts and the documented exfiltration of union-organizing records.[^1][^3][^10]
|
||||
[[David Sacks|David Sacks]], a former chief operating officer of [[PayPal|PayPal]] and a member of the [[PayPal Mafia|PayPal Mafia]], was named in December 2024 as White House AI and cryptocurrency czar. NPR reported in October 2026 that Sacks had stepped down from the role earlier that year and become co-chair of the [[President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology|President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology]], and that on October 4, 2026 Trump named Director of National Intelligence [[Jay Clayton|Jay Clayton]] as AI czar to lead a White House "Super Intelligence Force."[^33] [[Project 2025|Project 2025]], the [[Heritage Foundation|Heritage Foundation]] policy project, was run by [[Paul Dans|Paul Dans]], who according to ProPublica built a personnel database of more than 10,000 vetted candidates for a second Trump term. [[NBC News|NBC News]] reported that several prominent Project 2025 authors secured executive-branch roles. The [[Center for American Progress|Center for American Progress]] reported that 80 percent of the project's authors had been former Trump administration officials or close advisers, and that 140 people who worked for Trump contributed to the project. Trump publicly disavowed Project 2025 during the 2024 campaign.[^33]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Howard Lutnick|Howard Lutnick]], the [[Cantor Fitzgerald|Cantor Fitzgerald]] CEO whose Epstein emails are documented in the 2026 file releases, received the [[Secretary of Commerce|Secretary of Commerce]] appointment. [[Pam Bondi|Pam Bondi]] received the [[Attorney General|Attorney General]] appointment and was confirmed on February 4, 2025; a year later she co-signed the February 2026 report to Congress under the [[Epstein Files Transparency Act]] that listed some 300 names of officials and public figures referenced in the [[Jeffrey Epstein|Epstein]] files, among them [[Elvis Presley|Elvis]], [[Princess Diana|Princess Diana]], and [[Kurt Cobain|Kurt Cobain]]. [[Todd Blanche|Todd Blanche]], the deputy attorney general who announced the 3.5 million page Epstein-files publication, was previously Trump's personal defense attorney in the Manhattan criminal case. The second-administration personnel pattern places documented Epstein-network contacts (Lutnick) and Epstein-files oversight figures (Bondi, Blanche) in the executive branch.[^1]
|
||||
[[Howard Lutnick|Howard Lutnick]], chief executive of [[Cantor Fitzgerald|Cantor Fitzgerald]], became [[Secretary of Commerce|Secretary of Commerce]] in February 2025. Lutnick's emails with Epstein appear in the 2026 file releases. [[Pam Bondi|Pam Bondi]] was confirmed as [[Attorney General|Attorney General]] on February 4, 2025, and Trump announced her departure on April 2, 2026, naming [[Todd Blanche|Todd Blanche]] acting attorney general. Blanche, whose office announced on January 30, 2026 the publication of more than 3 million additional pages and a total of nearly 3.5 million, had been Trump's personal criminal defense lawyer in the Manhattan case, and the Senate confirmed him as Attorney General on August 8, 2026 by 50 to 49.[^34][^35]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Epstein Relationship
|
||||
|
||||
Trump and Epstein socialized from the late 1980s through 2004, mostly in [[Palm Beach, Florida|Palm Beach]] and New York. Archival [[NBC]] footage from 1992 shows the two men together at [[Mar-a-Lago]] watching dancers, with [[Ghislaine Maxwell]] present, and photographs place Trump, [[Melania Trump]], Epstein, and Maxwell together in the period. In a 2002 [[New York Magazine]] profile Trump said of Epstein, "I've known Jeff for fifteen years. Terrific guy," adding that "he likes beautiful women as much as I do, and many of them are on the younger side." Epstein's address books listed multiple Trump telephone numbers, and Trump's name appears roughly seven times in the flight logs of Epstein's aircraft (the [[Lolita Express]]) on domestic legs, with no log entry placing Trump on [[Little St. James]].[^11]
|
||||
Trump and [[Jeffrey Epstein|Jeffrey Epstein]] socialized from the late 1980s through 2004, mostly in Palm Beach and New York. Archival [[NBC|NBC]] footage from 1992 shows the two men together at Mar-a-Lago watching dancers, with [[Ghislaine Maxwell|Ghislaine Maxwell]] present. A photograph taken at Mar-a-Lago on February 12, 2000 shows Trump, [[Melania Trump|Melania Knauss]], Epstein and Maxwell together.[^36]
|
||||
|
||||
The relationship broke in 2004 over a Palm Beach property. In November 2004 Trump outbid Epstein for the oceanfront mansion [[Maison de l'Amitie]], paying 41.35 million dollars, and the bankruptcy trustee for the estate described the two men lobbying him and disparaging each other's finances. Trump later said he had a falling out with Epstein "a long time ago" and had thrown him out of Mar-a-Lago as "persona non grata" for poaching club staff. Little public record of contact survives after 2004. [[Maria Farmer]], who reported Epstein to the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] in 1996, said she had also flagged a 1990s encounter involving Trump, an account that remains an uncorroborated allegation. No allegation of criminal wrongdoing by Trump in connection with Epstein has been established in any court or official finding.[^12]
|
||||
In an October 28, 2002 profile by Landon Thomas Jr. in New York magazine, Trump, speaking by speakerphone, said: "I've known Jeff for fifteen years. Terrific guy. He's a lot of fun to be with. It is even said that he likes beautiful women as much as I do, and many of them are on the younger side."[^37] On July 9, 2019, asked about Epstein at the White House, Trump said: "I had a falling out with him a long time ago. I don't think I've spoken to him for 15 years." He added: "I was not a fan of his. That I can tell you."[^38]
|
||||
|
||||
The relationship returned as a political liability across 2025. As president, Trump presided over the Justice Department that handled the file releases; he denied authoring the 2003 "birthday book" letter that the [[Wall Street Journal]] reported bore his signature and a drawing of a nude woman, dismissed the report as fake, and filed a multibillion-dollar defamation suit against the paper. After months of pressure from members of his own coalition demanding disclosure, Trump signed the Epstein Files Transparency Act in November 2025. The staged releases, the missing "client list" that Bondi had promised, and the unexplained redactions kept the Trump-Epstein history in continuous national coverage through the end of 2025.[^13]
|
||||
Epstein's address books listed multiple Trump telephone numbers. Former Epstein pilot [[Larry Visoski|Larry Visoski]] testified on November 29 and 30, 2021 that he had flown Trump on Epstein's aircraft, the [[Lolita Express|Lolita Express]], "more than once, I believe." Trump's name appears in the flight logs of the aircraft on domestic legs, roughly seven times by one count. No flight log entry places Trump on [[Little St. James|Little St. James]].[^39]
|
||||
|
||||
The relationship broke in 2004 over a Palm Beach property. In November 2004 Trump bought the oceanfront mansion [[Maison de l'Amitie|Maison de l'Amitie]] for 41.35 million dollars. The bankruptcy trustee, Joseph Luzinski, described the two men bidding as "two very large Palm Beach egos going at it."[^40] Speaking at his Turnberry course in Scotland on July 28, 2025, Trump said of Epstein: "He stole people that worked for me. I said, 'Don't ever do that again.' He did it again, and I threw him out of the place, persona non grata."[^41]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Maria Farmer]], who reported Epstein to the FBI in 1996, later said that she had also flagged a 1990s encounter involving Trump; the account remains an uncorroborated allegation. Trump has denied wrongdoing in connection with Epstein.[^42]
|
||||
|
||||
Trump's name also appears in the 2003 "birthday book" assembled for Epstein's fiftieth birthday. The [[Wall Street Journal|Wall Street Journal]] reported in July 2025 that a letter in the book bore Trump's signature and a drawing of a nude woman. Trump denied authoring the letter, called the report fake, and filed a multibillion-dollar defamation suit against the paper.[^43] The staged releases, the missing "client list" that Bondi had promised, and the redactions kept the Trump-Epstein history in national coverage through the end of 2025.
|
||||
|
||||
### The Epstein Files Transparency Act
|
||||
|
||||
The House passed the Epstein Files Transparency Act (H.R. 4405) on November 18, 2025, and Trump signed it on November 19, 2025 as Public Law 119-38. The statute required the Attorney General to release the unclassified records of the [[Department of Justice|Department of Justice]] and the FBI within thirty days, and allowed withholding of material that would jeopardize an active federal investigation.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
On November 14, 2025 Trump asked the Justice Department to investigate Epstein's dealings with [[Bill Clinton|Bill Clinton]], [[Larry Summers|Larry Summers]], [[Reid Hoffman|Reid Hoffman]] and [[JPMorgan Chase|JPMorgan Chase]]. Attorney General Bondi assigned the investigation to Jay Clayton that day.[^44]
|
||||
|
||||
On February 14, 2026 the Justice Department sent the Senate and House Judiciary Committees a letter under section 3 of the Act, on the letterhead of the Office of the Deputy Attorney General and signed by Attorney General Pamela J. Bondi and Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche. It listed all categories of records released and withheld, a summary of redactions, and a list of "all government officials and politically exposed persons" named or referenced in the released materials. The letter states that the term "politically exposed persons" was not defined in the Act, that names appear in the files "in a wide variety of contexts," and that "some individuals had extensive direct email contact with Epstein or Maxwell while other individuals are mentioned only in a portion of a document (including press reporting) that on its face is unrelated to the Epstein and Maxwell matters." The alphabetical list runs to about 300 names, from Alexander Acosta to Mark Zuckerberg, and includes Donald Trump, Ivanka Trump, Melania Trump, JD Vance, Jared Kushner, Howard Lutnick, Steve Bannon, Elon Musk, Peter Thiel, Leonard Leo, Elvis Presley, Princess Diana and Kurt Cobain.[^45] [[Ro Khanna|Ro Khanna]] described the list as "purposefully muddying the waters on who was a predator and who was mentioned in an email."[^45]
|
||||
|
||||
### The January 2026 Release Allegations
|
||||
|
||||
The Justice Department's January 30, 2026 release of [[Epstein Files|Epstein files]] included FBI interview memoranda from 2019 in which a woman told investigators that she had been sexually assaulted by Epstein and by Trump in the 1980s, when she said she was a teenager. The Justice Department stated that the files contain false and unverified claims. Trump has denied the allegations.[^35]
|
||||
|
||||
### Unidentified Aerial Phenomena
|
||||
|
||||
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Public Law 116-260, which Trump signed on December 27, 2020, contained the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 as Division W. Division W has no provision in its text on unidentified aerial phenomena. Its section 3 provides that the explanatory statement printed in the Congressional Record by the chairmen of the House and Senate intelligence committees "shall have the same effect with respect to the implementation of this division as if it were a joint explanatory statement of a committee of conference."[^46] That explanatory statement, Part II, "incorporates by reference, and the Executive Branch shall comply with, all direction contained in the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report to accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (S. Rept. 116-233)."[^47] Senate Report 116-233, filed June 17, 2020 by [[Marco Rubio|Marco Rubio]] for the committee, contains a section titled "Advanced Aerial Threats." It states the committee's concern that "there is no unified, comprehensive process within the Federal Government for collecting and analyzing intelligence on unidentified aerial phenomena" and directs the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, to submit within 180 days of enactment an unclassified report, with a classified annex permitted, that includes an analysis of data held by the [[Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force|Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force]] at the [[Office of Naval Intelligence|Office of Naval Intelligence]] and by the FBI, an interagency collection process with a named accountable official, an assessment of foreign-adversary attribution, and recommendations.[^48]
|
||||
|
||||
The statute that created the permanent office is a different law. The James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, Public Law 117-81, approved December 27, 2021 by President [[Joe Biden|Joe Biden]], contains section 1683, which directed the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, to establish an office to address unidentified aerial phenomena within 180 days of enactment.[^49]
|
||||
|
||||
On February 19, 2026 Trump wrote on Truth Social that, "based on the tremendous interest shown," he would be directing Defense Secretary [[Pete Hegseth|Pete Hegseth]] and other agencies "to begin the process of identifying and releasing Government files related to alien and extraterrestrial life, unidentified aerial phenomena (UAP), and unidentified flying objects (UFOs), and any and all other information connected to these highly complex, but extremely interesting and important, matters." The post followed his statement to a reporter that [[Barack Obama|Barack Obama]] had given classified information when Obama said in a podcast interview that aliens were "real."[^50] On May 8, 2026 the Department of Defense began posting the files at war.gov/UFO, with more than 160 files covering more than 400 incidents, and said additional files would follow "on a rolling basis."[^51]
|
||||
|
||||
On July 11, 2026 [[The Harvard Crimson|The Harvard Crimson]] reported that [[Avi Loeb|Avi Loeb]] said he had served on the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology under Trump. The paper also reported that a representative of the [[Office of the Director of National Intelligence|Office of the Director of National Intelligence]] visited Loeb to request a group that Loeb formed as the [[UAP Science Advisory Council|UAP Science Advisory Council]], "in support of President Trump's directive on UAP transparency."[^52] In August 2026 [[Ross Coulthart|Ross Coulthart]] wrote on NewsNation that unnamed White House sources told him Trump "has personally authorized" a government program using the methods of the [[Sky Watcher|Skywatcher]] organization. Coulthart attributed each statement to unnamed sources.[^53]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: For Thiel's 2016 endorsement, the RNC speech, and the transition team role, see the contemporaneous press (*Guardian*, *Politico*, *ABC News*) and the Peter Thiel page.
|
||||
[^2]: "Peter Thiel goes 'big league', joining Trump's presidential transition team." *The Guardian,* November 11, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/nov/11/peter-thiel-joins-donald-trump-transition-team ; "Thiel could gain from Trump transition." *Politico,* December 2016. https://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/peter-thiel-trump-transition-benefits-232233
|
||||
[^3]: Cameron, Dell, and Yulia Almazova. "Leak Exposes Members of Peter Thiel's Secretive 'Dialog' Society." *WIRED,* June 16, 2026. https://www.wired.com/story/leak-exposes-members-of-peter-thiels-secretive-dialog-society/
|
||||
[^4]: "Who Is Kevin Harrington, the Peter Thiel Associate Who Just Joined the National Security Council Staff?" *Gizmodo,* February 2017. https://gizmodo.com/who-is-kevin-harrington-the-peter-thiel-associate-who-1791925769 ; "Disrupting the White House: Peter Thiel's Influence is Shaping the National Security Council." *Just Security,* 2017. https://www.justsecurity.org/37466/disrupting-white-house-peter-thiels-influence-shaping-national-security-council/
|
||||
[^5]: For the Mercer-Breitbart-Cambridge Analytica infrastructure, see the contemporaneous press coverage of the 2016 campaign digital operation and the Cambridge Analytica documentation. For the Government Accountability Institute and *Clinton Cash*, see the published record. For Project 2025: "Paul Dans, the Man Behind Project 2025's Most Radical Plans." *ProPublica.* https://www.propublica.org/article/project-2025-trump-campaign-heritage-foundation-paul-dans ; "The key Project 2025 authors now staffing the Trump administration." *NBC News.* https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/trump-administration/key-project-2025-authors-now-staffing-trump-administration-rcna195107
|
||||
[^6]: "ICE to Use ImmigrationOS by Palantir, a New AI System, to Track Immigrants' Movements." *American Immigration Council,* April 2025. https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/blog/ice-immigrationos-palantir-ai-track-immigrants/ ; "ICE enlists Palantir to develop all-seeing 'ImmigrationOS' eye to speed up deportations." *The Register,* April 21, 2025. https://www.theregister.com/2025/04/21/ice_enlists_palantir_to_develop/
|
||||
[^7]: "Anduril Wins $363 Million CBP Contract to Deploy Over 200 Extended Range AI Surveillance Towers." *The Defense News,* 2025. https://www.thedefensenews.com/Anduril-Wins-363-Million-CBP-Contract-to-Deploy-Over-200-Extended-Range-AI-Surveillance-Towers/ ; "CBP to strengthen 'tactical targeting,' 'counter-network analysis' with Clearview AI." *FedScoop,* 2026. https://fedscoop.com/dhs-cbp-contract-biometric-facial-recognition-ai/
|
||||
[^8]: "We Don't Talk About Leonard: The Man Behind the Right's Supreme Court Supermajority." *ProPublica,* March 2023. https://www.propublica.org/article/we-dont-talk-about-leonard-leo-supreme-court-supermajority
|
||||
[^9]: "Chairwoman Maloney Launches Probe of Saudi Government's $2 Billion Investment in Affinity Partners." House Committee on Oversight, June 2, 2022, citing the PIF screening panel that rated the firm's due diligence "unsatisfactory in all aspects" before MBS overruled it. https://oversightdemocrats.house.gov/news/press-releases/chairwoman-maloney-launches-probe-of-saudi-government-s-2-billion-investment-in
|
||||
[^10]: "Whistleblower details how DOGE may have taken sensitive NLRB data." *NPR,* April 15, 2025. https://www.npr.org/2025/04/15/nx-s1-5355896/doge-nlrb-elon-musk-spacex-security ; "User with Russian IP address tried to log into NLRB systems following DOGE access, whistleblower says." *Nextgov/FCW,* April 2025. https://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2025/04/user-russian-ip-address-tried-log-nlrb-systems-following-doge-access-whistleblower-says/404574/
|
||||
[^11]: "Trump called Epstein a 'terrific guy' who enjoyed 'younger' women before denying relationship with him." *Washington Post,* July 8, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-called-epstein-a-terrific-guy-before-denying-relationship-with-him/2019/07/08/a01e0f00-a1be-11e9-bd56-eac6bb02d01d_story.html ; "Trump and Epstein: A Timeline of Their Relationship." *Time,* 2025. https://time.com/7333365/trump-epstein-relationship-timeline/
|
||||
[^12]: "What we know about the Trump-Epstein falling out." *PolitiFact,* July 31, 2025. https://www.politifact.com/article/2025/jul/31/what-we-know-about-the-trump-epstein-falling-out/ ; "President Donald Trump explains why he kicked Jeffrey Epstein out of Mar-a-Lago." *Fox News,* 2025. https://www.foxnews.com/us/jeffrey-epstein-thrown-out-mar-a-lago-hiring-help-trump
|
||||
[^13]: "Birthday letter to Epstein bore Trump's signature, drawing of naked woman, Wall Street Journal reports." *CNN,* July 17, 2025. https://www.cnn.com/2025/07/17/politics/epstein-birthday-letter-trump ; U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Files Transparency Act disclosures. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/doj-disclosures
|
||||
[^1]: Senate roll call votes. 115th Congress, 1st Session, vote 111 (Nomination of Neil M. Gorsuch, April 7, 2017, 54 to 45). https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1151/vote_115_1_00111.xml ; vote 116 (Nomination of R. Alexander Acosta as Secretary of Labor, April 27, 2017, 60 to 38). https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1151/vote_115_1_00116.xml ; 115th Congress, 2nd Session, vote 223 (Nomination of Brett M. Kavanaugh, October 6, 2018, 50 to 48). https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1152/vote_115_2_00223.xml ; 116th Congress, 2nd Session, vote 224 (Nomination of Amy Coney Barrett, October 26, 2020, 52 to 48). https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1162/vote_116_2_00224.xml
|
||||
[^2]: Epstein Files Transparency Act, Pub. L. No. 119-38, sections 1 to 3, 139 Stat. 656 to 658 (approved November 19, 2025; House passage November 18, Senate passage November 19). https://www.congress.gov/119/plaws/publ38/PLAW-119publ38.pdf
|
||||
[^3]: "Trump did open Mar-a-Lago to blacks and Jews, but in a business move, not a crusade." *PolitiFact,* February 11, 2020 (purchase in 1985). https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2020/feb/11/viral-image/trump-did-open-mar-lago-blacks-and-jews-business-m/ ; "President Donald J. Trump," The White House (Wharton School; real estate development in New York City). https://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/donald-j-trump/
|
||||
[^4]: "Alan 'Ace' Greenberg, who remade Bear Stearns, dies at 86." *Bloomberg News,* via *Portland Press Herald,* July 25, 2014. https://www.pressherald.com/2014/07/25/alan-ace-greenberg-who-remade-bear-stearns-dies-at-86/
|
||||
[^5]: United States v. Fred C. Trump, Donald Trump and Trump Management, Inc., No. 73 C 1529 (E.D.N.Y.), civil docket (complaint filed October 15, 1973; motion to dismiss and counterclaim filed December 12, 1973; motion to dismiss counterclaim January 8, 1974; argument January 25, 1974; entries on affidavits of Donald Trump and Roy Cohn, plaintiff's motion for sanctions and notice of deposition of Donald Trump). Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, document 82945. https://clearinghouse-umich-production.s3.amazonaws.com/media/doc/82945.pdf
|
||||
[^6]: United States v. Fred C. Trump, Donald Trump and Trump Management, Inc., Consent Order, No. 73 C 1529 (E.D.N.Y. June 10, 1975) (Neaher, J.), parts I to IV and signature page (Roy M. Cohn, Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley, for defendants; Frank E. Schwelb, Chief, Housing Section, Civil Rights Division, for plaintiff). Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, document 83283. https://clearinghouse-umich-production.s3.amazonaws.com/media/doc/83283.pdf ; Order to Show Cause, June 10, 1975, document 83277. https://clearinghouse-umich-production.s3.amazonaws.com/media/doc/83277.pdf
|
||||
[^7]: "United States v. Fred C. Trump, Donald Trump, and Trump Management, Inc.," case summary, Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, University of Michigan Law School (39 buildings, more than 14,000 apartments; tester evidence; retention of Roy Cohn; counterclaim of 100 million dollars for defamation dismissed by Judge Neaher; FBI investigation records released in 2017). https://clearinghouse.net/case/15342/
|
||||
[^8]: United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. Feb. 25, 1952) (counsel: Myles J. Lane, with Roy M. Cohn of counsel, for the United States). https://static.case.law/f2d/195/cases/0583-01.json
|
||||
[^9]: "How Donald Trump and Roy Cohn fought the race discrimination lawsuit," excerpt from *The Choice 2024: Harris vs. Trump,* PBS FRONTLINE, September 24, 2024 (David Marcus; Ken Auletta). https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/donald-trump-roy-cohn-race-discrimination-lawsuit-fight-documentary-excerpt
|
||||
[^10]: Matter of Cohn, 118 A.D.2d 15, 503 N.Y.S.2d 759 (1st Dep't June 23, 1986) (per curiam) (charges I to IV; disbarment). https://static.case.law/ad2d/118/cases/0015-01.json ; https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6021889/in-re-cohn/
|
||||
[^11]: "Roy Cohn," Part 01 of 01, FBI Records: The Vault, 748 pages. https://vault.fbi.gov/roy-cohn (archived January 18, 2021: https://web.archive.org/web/20210118074105/https://vault.fbi.gov/roy-cohn)
|
||||
[^12]: Federal Election Commission, Schedule A itemized individual contributions, contributor name THIEL, PETER, two-year transaction period 2016 (retrieved October 12, 2026 through the FEC API). Entries cited: Fighting for Ohio Fund, August 10, 2016, 1,000,000; Make America Number 1, October 26, 2016, 1,000,000; Trump Victory, October 6, 2016, 250,000; Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., October 6, 2016, 2,700; Conservative, Authentic, Responsive Leadership for You and for America, August 25, 2015, 2,000,000. https://api.open.fec.gov/v1/schedules/schedule_a/
|
||||
[^13]: "Peter Thiel goes 'big league', joining Trump's presidential transition team." *The Guardian,* November 11, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/nov/11/peter-thiel-joins-donald-trump-transition-team ; "Thiel could gain from Trump transition." *Politico,* December 2016. https://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/peter-thiel-trump-transition-benefits-232233 ; "Who Is Kevin Harrington, the Peter Thiel Associate Who Just Joined the National Security Council Staff?" *Gizmodo,* February 2017. https://gizmodo.com/who-is-kevin-harrington-the-peter-thiel-associate-who-1791925769
|
||||
[^14]: Jim Zarroli, "Billionaire Investor Robert Mercer To Step Down From Firm, Selling Stake In Breitbart." *NPR,* November 2, 2017. https://www.kpbs.org/news/2017/nov/02/billionaire-investor-robert-mercer-steps-down ; Government Accountability Institute (EIN 45-4681912), Form 990 for 2012, Part VII (Bannon, chairman; Rebekah Mercer, director). https://990s.foundationcenter.org/990_pdf_archive/454/454681912/454681912_201212_990.pdf ; Mercer Family Foundation (EIN 20-1982204), grants to the Government Accountability Institute, tax years 2013 to 2017, ProPublica Nonprofit Explorer. https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/201982204 ; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Volume 5, pp. 664 to 667 (SCL, Cambridge Analytica and the Mercer family). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
|
||||
[^15]: Federal Trade Commission, In the Matter of Cambridge Analytica, LLC, Docket No. 9383: Complaint (July 24, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/182_3107_cambridge_analytica_administrative_complaint_7-24-19.pdf ; Opinion of the Commission and Final Order (issued November 25, 2019; announced December 6, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/d09389_comm_final_opinionpublic.pdf and https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/d09389_comm_final_orderpublic.pdf ; press release, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2019/12/ftc-issues-opinion-order-against-cambridge-analytica-deceiving-consumers-about-collection-facebook
|
||||
[^16]: Information Commissioner's Office, letter from Elizabeth Denham to Julian Knight MP, Chair, Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee, "ICO investigation into use of personal information and political influence," October 2, 2020 (ref. ICO/O/ED/L/RTL/0181), paragraph 9. https://ico.org.uk/media2/migrated/2618383/20201002_ico-o-ed-l-rtl-0181_to-julian-knight-mp.pdf
|
||||
[^17]: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities, notes 447 and 448 (Parscale testimony on the polling data visualization tool and Cambridge Analytica developers). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
|
||||
[^18]: Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller III, Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election, Volume I, Executive Summary, p. 5 (March 2019). https://www.justice.gov/archives/sco/file/1373816/dl
|
||||
[^19]: Mueller Report, Volume I, section IV.A.1.c.i, "Trump Signs the Letter of Intent on behalf of the Trump Organization," p. 70 (letter of intent completed between approximately October 13 and November 2, 2015). https://www.justice.gov/archives/sco/file/1373816/dl
|
||||
[^20]: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities, Executive Summary, "Trump Tower Moscow," p. ix (116th Congress). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
|
||||
[^21]: Mueller Report, Volume II, Introduction, p. 2; Executive Summary, p. 8; and section IV, Conclusion, p. 182 (the same two sentences appear in each). https://www.justice.gov/archives/sco/file/1373816/dl
|
||||
[^22]: "We Don't Talk About Leonard: The Man Behind the Right's Supreme Court Supermajority." *ProPublica,* March 2023. https://www.propublica.org/article/we-dont-talk-about-leonard-leo-supreme-court-supermajority
|
||||
[^23]: "Leak exposes members of Peter Thiel's secretive Dialog society." *WIRED,* June 16, 2026. https://www.wired.com/story/leak-exposes-members-of-peter-thiels-secretive-dialog-society/ ; "CBP to strengthen 'tactical targeting,' 'counter-network analysis' with Clearview AI." *FedScoop,* 2026. https://fedscoop.com/dhs-cbp-contract-biometric-facial-recognition-ai/
|
||||
[^24]: USAspending.gov award records, recipient Palantir Technologies Inc., awarding sub-agency U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (retrieved October 12, 2026 through the USAspending API): HSCETC15C00001, "FALCON operations and maintenance (O&M), system enhancement," 39,340,900.82 dollars, May 28, 2015 to May 27, 2018 (CONT_AWD_HSCETC15C00001_7012_-NONE-_-NONE-); 70CTD019C00000001, "FALCON O&M support services," 37,839,725.17 dollars, November 28, 2018 to May 27, 2022 (CONT_AWD_70CTD019C00000001_7012_-NONE-_-NONE-); 70CTD022FR0000170, "Investigative Case Management (ICM) operations and maintenance support services and custom enhancements," 170,765,322.37 dollars, September 26, 2022 to September 25, 2027 (CONT_AWD_70CTD022FR0000170_7012_GS35F0086U_4730). https://www.usaspending.gov/award/CONT_AWD_70CTD022FR0000170_7012_GS35F0086U_4730 ; EPIC v. ICE FOIA litigation on ICE-Palantir databases. https://epic.org/documents/epic-v-ice-palantir-databases/
|
||||
[^25]: USAspending.gov transaction record, award 70CTD022FR0000170, action date April 11, 2025, 29,898,236 dollars (retrieved through the USAspending API); awards 70CTD026FC0000012 (start May 5, 2026, 86,271,599.30 dollars; CONT_AWD_70CTD026FC0000012_7012_70RTAC26A00000001_7001) and 70CTD026FC0000018 (start June 26, 2026, 45,848,616.80 dollars; CONT_AWD_70CTD026FC0000018_7012_70RTAC26A00000001_7001). https://api.usaspending.gov/api/v2/search/spending_by_award/ ; "ICE to Use ImmigrationOS by Palantir, a New AI System, to Track Immigrants' Movements." *American Immigration Council,* April 2025. https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/blog/ice-immigrationos-palantir-ai-track-immigrants/
|
||||
[^26]: "Anduril Wins $363M CBP Contract for XR Sentry Towers." *Tectonic Defense.* https://www.tectonic-defense.com/anduril-wins-363m-cbp-contract-for-xr-sentry-towers/ ; "Anduril Surveillance Towers," U.S. Customs and Border Protection FOIA record. https://www.cbp.gov/document/foia-record/anduril-surveillance-towers ; "CBP to strengthen 'tactical targeting,' 'counter-network analysis' with Clearview AI." *FedScoop,* 2026. https://fedscoop.com/dhs-cbp-contract-biometric-facial-recognition-ai/
|
||||
[^27]: "Palantir, Israel Agree Strategic Partnership for Battle Tech." *Bloomberg,* January 12, 2024. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-12/palantir-israel-agree-to-strategic-partnership
|
||||
[^28]: "Jared Kushner, Mohammed bin Salman, and the Making of the Trump-Saudi Alliance." *The Intercept,* March 21, 2018. https://theintercept.com/2018/03/21/jared-kushner-saudi-crown-prince-mohammed-bin-salman/ ; "Jared Kushner used WhatsApp to message foreign contacts in White House." *ABC News.* https://abcnews.com/Politics/jared-kushner-whatsapp-foreign-contacts-lawyer-tells-congress/story?id=61843329 ; "Amazon boss Jeff Bezos's phone 'hacked by Saudi crown prince.'" *The Guardian,* January 21, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/jan/21/amazon-boss-jeff-bezoss-phone-hacked-by-saudi-crown-prince
|
||||
[^29]: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *Assessing the Saudi Government's Role in the Killing of Jamal Khashoggi,* February 11, 2021 (declassified by the Director of National Intelligence on February 25, 2021 and released February 26, 2021), Executive Summary. https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/Assessment-Saudi-Gov-Role-in-JK-Death-20210226v2.pdf
|
||||
[^30]: "Chairwoman Maloney Launches Probe of Saudi Government's $2 Billion Investment in Affinity Partners." House Committee on Oversight, June 2, 2022. https://oversightdemocrats.house.gov/news/press-releases/chairwoman-maloney-launches-probe-of-saudi-government-s-2-billion-investment-in ; Wyden investigation of Affinity Partners, U.S. Senate Committee on Finance. https://www.finance.senate.gov/chairmans-news/wyden-investigation-of-kushner-firm-continues-new-letter-outlines-affinity-partners-fee-structure-lack-of-return-to-investors-ques ; "NSO spyware used to target family of Jamal Khashoggi, leaked data shows." *The Guardian,* July 18, 2021. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/18/nso-spyware-used-to-target-family-of-jamal-khashoggi-leaked-data-shows-saudis-pegasus
|
||||
[^31]: Executive Order 14158, "Establishing and Implementing the President's 'Department of Government Efficiency'" (signed January 20, 2025). *Federal Register.* https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/29/2025-02005/establishing-and-implementing-the-presidents-department-of-government-efficiency
|
||||
[^32]: "Whistleblower details how DOGE may have taken sensitive NLRB data." *NPR,* April 15, 2025. https://www.npr.org/2025/04/15/nx-s1-5355896/doge-nlrb-elon-musk-spacex-security ; "User with Russian IP address tried to log into NLRB systems following DOGE access, whistleblower says." *Nextgov/FCW,* April 2025. https://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2025/04/user-russian-ip-address-tried-log-nlrb-systems-following-doge-access-whistleblower-says/404574/
|
||||
[^33]: Statement by President-elect Donald J. Trump Announcing the Appointment of David O. Sacks as "White House A.I. & Crypto Czar," December 5, 2024, The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-president-elect-donald-j-trump-announcing-the-appointment-david-o-sacks-white ; Chandelis Duster, "Trump names national intelligence chief Jay Clayton as new AI czar." *NPR,* October 4, 2026. https://www.npr.org/2026/10/04/nx-s1-5990781/jay-clayton-ai-czar-trump ; "Paul Dans, the Man Behind Project 2025's Most Radical Plans." *ProPublica.* https://www.propublica.org/article/project-2025-trump-campaign-heritage-foundation-paul-dans ; "The key Project 2025 authors now staffing the Trump administration." *NBC News.* https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/trump-administration/key-project-2025-authors-now-staffing-trump-administration-rcna195107
|
||||
[^34]: "Trump fires Pam Bondi as attorney general, installs Todd Blanche as acting AG." *CBS News,* April 2, 2026. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-pam-bondi-attorney-general/ ; U.S. Senate, Roll Call Votes 119th Congress, 2nd Session, Nos. 229 (cloture) and 230 (confirmation), Todd Blanche to be Attorney General, August 8, 2026. https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1192/vote_119_2_00230.htm ; "Senate votes to confirm Todd Blanche as attorney general." *NPR,* August 8, 2026. https://www.npr.org/2026/08/08/g-s1-137631/senate-confirms-todd-blanche-attorney-general ; Ruetenik, Daniel, and Graham Kates. "Lutnick and Epstein were in business together, Epstein files show." *CBS News,* updated February 7, 2026. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/howard-lutnick-jeffrey-epstein-in-business-together/ ; "Howard Lutnick," U.S. Department of Commerce. https://www.commerce.gov/about/leadership/howard-lutnick
|
||||
[^35]: "Epstein files live updates: Trump DOJ releases millions more pages of records." *NBC News,* January 30, 2026. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/justice-department/live-blog/epstein-files-trump-doj-release-live-updates-rcna256639 ; "DOJ releases FBI memos detailing woman's allegation against Trump in Epstein probe." *The Wire,* 2026. https://ticklethewire.com/doj-releases-fbi-memos-detailing-womans-allegation-against-trump-in-epstein-probe/
|
||||
[^36]: "Trump and Epstein: A Timeline of Their Relationship." *Time,* 2025 (1992 NBC footage; photograph of February 12, 2000). https://time.com/7333365/trump-epstein-relationship-timeline/
|
||||
[^37]: Landon Thomas Jr., "Jeffrey Epstein: International Moneyman of Mystery." *New York,* October 28, 2002. https://nymag.com/nymetro/news/people/n_7912/ (archived May 21, 2011: https://web.archive.org/web/20110521191003/http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/people/n_7912/)
|
||||
[^38]: "Trump defends embattled Acosta, says he had a 'falling out' with Jeffrey Epstein 'a long time ago.'" *NBC News,* July 9, 2019. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-defends-embattled-acosta-says-he-had-falling-out-jeffrey-n1027861
|
||||
[^39]: Lauren del Valle and Eric Levenson, "Jeffrey Epstein's former pilot testifies Bill Clinton, Donald Trump, Prince Andrew flew aboard Epstein's private plane," *CNN,* November 30, 2021. https://abc17news.com/news/national-world/cnn-national/2021/11/30/prosecution-links-ghislaine-maxwell-to-jeffrey-epstein-while-defense-says-she-is-being-blamed-for-his-actions/ ; "Trump called Epstein a 'terrific guy' who enjoyed 'younger' women before denying relationship with him." *Washington Post,* July 8, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-called-epstein-a-terrific-guy-before-denying-relationship-with-him/2019/07/08/a01e0f00-a1be-11e9-bd56-eac6bb02d01d_story.html
|
||||
[^40]: "Trump and Epstein: A Timeline of Their Relationship." *Time,* 2025 (2004 Maison de l'Amitie bidding; trustee Joseph Luzinski quoted by the Washington Post). https://time.com/7333365/trump-epstein-relationship-timeline/
|
||||
[^41]: "What we know about the Trump-Epstein falling out." *PolitiFact,* July 31, 2025. https://www.politifact.com/article/2025/jul/31/what-we-know-about-the-trump-epstein-falling-out/ ; "President Donald Trump explains why he kicked Jeffrey Epstein out of Mar-a-Lago." *Fox News,* 2025. https://www.foxnews.com/us/jeffrey-epstein-thrown-out-mar-a-lago-hiring-help-trump
|
||||
[^42]: "Maria Farmer and Marsh Law Firm's Persistent Advocacy Vindicated as FBI Releases Farmer's 1996 Report on Jeffrey Epstein." *Marsh Law Firm,* December 23, 2025 (the 1996 FBI report). https://www.jamesmarshlaw.com/persistent-advocacy-vindicated/ ; Trump's denial: "What we know about the Trump-Epstein falling out." *PolitiFact,* July 31, 2025. https://www.politifact.com/article/2025/jul/31/what-we-know-about-the-trump-epstein-falling-out/
|
||||
[^43]: "Birthday letter to Epstein bore Trump's signature, drawing of naked woman, Wall Street Journal reports." *CNN,* July 17, 2025. https://www.cnn.com/2025/07/17/politics/epstein-birthday-letter-trump
|
||||
[^44]: "Bondi taps acting U.S. Attorney Jay Clayton to probe Democrats' ties to Epstein." *The Washington Times,* November 14, 2025. https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2025/nov/14/bondi-taps-acting-us-attorney-jay-clayton-probe-democrats-ties/ ; Epstein Files Transparency Act, Pub. L. No. 119-38.
|
||||
[^45]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, letter to Chairman Grassley, Ranking Member Durbin, Chairman Jordan and Ranking Member Raskin, "Re: Epstein Files Transparency Act, Section 3 Report to Congress," February 14, 2026, pages 1 to 6 (signed Pamela J. Bondi, United States Attorney General, and Todd Blanche, Deputy United States Attorney General). https://www.justice.gov/opa/media/1434856/dl ; coverage in "Justice Department lists hundreds of prominent people named in Epstein files in letter to Congress." *CNN,* February 15, 2026. https://kvia.com/politics/cnn-us-politics/2026/02/15/justice-department-lists-hundreds-of-prominent-people-named-in-epstein-files-in-letter-to-congress/
|
||||
[^46]: Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260, approved December 27, 2020, 134 Stat. 1182; Division W, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, section 3 ("Explanatory statement"), 134 Stat. 2362 to 2363. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-116publ260/pdf/PLAW-116publ260.pdf
|
||||
[^47]: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Division W, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021), Part II, Select Unclassified Congressional Direction, December 21, 2020. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-iaa-fy21-jes-final-2-12-15-20.pdf
|
||||
[^48]: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, S. Rept. 116-233 (to accompany S. 3905), June 17, 2020, "Advanced Aerial Threats," pp. 11 to 12. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CRPT-116srpt233/pdf/CRPT-116srpt233.pdf
|
||||
[^49]: James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-81, section 1683, "Establishment of office, organizational structure, and authorities to address unidentified aerial phenomena" (approved December 27, 2021). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-117publ81/pdf/PLAW-117publ81.pdf
|
||||
[^50]: "Trump says he's directing the Pentagon to release files related to UFOs and aliens." *NBC News,* February 19, 2026 (quoting Trump's Truth Social post). https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/trump-administration/trump-says-directing-pentagon-release-files-related-ufos-aliens-rcna259833
|
||||
[^51]: "Pentagon releases declassified UFO files including videos and photos held by the government for decades." *NBC News,* May 8, 2026. https://www.nbcnews.com/science/ufos-and-anomalous-phenomena/ufo-uap-files-pentagon-release-trump-rcna344204
|
||||
[^52]: Neil H. Shah, Theresa F. Bartelme and Risha Sinha, "Inside Avi Loeb's New UAP Council, Built From His Harvard Orbit." *The Harvard Crimson,* July 11, 2026. https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2026/7/11/avi-loeb-uap-council/
|
||||
[^53]: Ross Coulthart, "Is the Trump administration running a covert UFO program?," NewsNation Reality Check, about August 2026. https://www.newsnationnow.com/podcasts-newsnation/reality-check/trump-administration-covert-ufo-program/amp/
|
||||
|
|
|
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|
|
@ -53,31 +53,31 @@ After the coup succeeded on April 1, 1964, Walters helped facilitate the early U
|
|||
|
||||
### CIA Deputy Director and Watergate
|
||||
|
||||
President Nixon appointed Walters Deputy Director of Central Intelligence on May 2, 1972, promoting him to Lieutenant General at the same time. Walters served as Acting Director of Central Intelligence from July 2 to September 4, 1973, during [[James Schlesinger]]'s transition period.
|
||||
President Nixon appointed Walters Deputy Director of Central Intelligence on May 2, 1972, promoting him to Lieutenant General at the same time. Walters served as Acting Director of Central Intelligence from July 2 to September 4, 1973, between [[James Schlesinger]]'s departure for the Department of Defense and [[William Colby]]'s appointment as director.[^14]
|
||||
|
||||
Walters's appointment placed him at the CIA at the precise moment the [[Watergate]] scandal was breaking. On June 23, 1972, six days after the Watergate break-in, Nixon directed chief of staff [[H.R. Haldeman]] to instruct CIA Director [[Richard Helms]] and Walters to tell acting FBI Director [[L. Patrick Gray]] to stay out of the Watergate investigation on grounds of national security. Helms and Walters were called to a White House meeting with Haldeman and [[John Ehrlichman]] on June 23, where Haldeman relayed the instruction: "Stay the hell out of this." This conversation, captured on White House audio tape, became the "smoking gun" tape that destroyed Nixon's presidency when it became public on August 5, 1974.[^14]
|
||||
Walters's appointment placed him at the CIA at the precise moment the [[Watergate]] scandal was breaking. On June 23, 1972, six days after the Watergate break-in, Nixon directed chief of staff [[H.R. Haldeman]] to instruct CIA Director [[Richard Helms]] and Walters to tell acting FBI Director [[L. Patrick Gray]] to stay out of the Watergate investigation on grounds of national security. Helms and Walters were called to a White House meeting with Haldeman and [[John Ehrlichman]] on June 23, where Haldeman relayed the instruction: "Stay the hell out of this." This conversation, captured on White House audio tape, became the "smoking gun" tape that destroyed Nixon's presidency when it became public on August 5, 1974.[^15]
|
||||
|
||||
Walters did meet with Gray and initially asked him to go slow on the Mexican money-laundering connection, but when Gray demanded a written declaration that a CIA operation in Mexico could be compromised by further investigation, Walters replied that he could not supply this "because it would not be true." He delivered a three-page memo, marked Secret, that did not in fact ask the FBI to halt its interviews.[^15]
|
||||
Walters did meet with Gray and initially asked him to go slow on the Mexican money-laundering connection, but when Gray demanded a written declaration that a CIA operation in Mexico could be compromised by further investigation, Walters replied that he could not supply this "because it would not be true." He delivered a three-page memo, marked Secret, that did not in fact ask the FBI to halt its interviews.[^16]
|
||||
|
||||
Subsequently, counsel [[John Dean]] approached Walters asking the CIA to provide funds as hush money for the Watergate burglars. Walters refused. A memorandum from Director Helms to Walters, dated June 28, 1972, addressed the Watergate affair and became significant in later congressional investigations. Walters met again with Gray on July 12, 1972, to discuss CIA assistance previously provided to retired CIA officer [[E. Howard Hunt]] of the White House "Plumbers" unit. Walters documented the approaches made to him in a series of memoranda that were subsequently presented as evidence before the [[Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities]].[^16]
|
||||
Subsequently, counsel [[John Dean]] approached Walters asking the CIA to provide funds as hush money for the Watergate burglars. Walters refused. A memorandum from Director Helms to Walters, dated June 28, 1972, addressed the Watergate affair and became significant in later congressional investigations. Walters met again with Gray on July 12, 1972, to discuss CIA assistance previously provided to retired CIA officer [[E. Howard Hunt]] of the White House "Plumbers" unit. Walters documented the approaches made to him in a series of memoranda that were subsequently presented as evidence before the [[Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities]].[^17]
|
||||
|
||||
Walters later stated he had "flatly refused" to involve the CIA and had informed "the highest levels of the executive branch" that further pressure would result in his immediate resignation.
|
||||
|
||||
### Chile and the DINA Connection
|
||||
|
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As DDCI, Walters was not limited to the Watergate crisis. In mid-February 1974, he secretly traveled to [[Santiago]], [[Chile]] to meet with [[General Augusto Pinochet]] following the September 1973 coup. In a cable classified Secret and addressed personally to [[Henry Kissinger]], dated February 14, 1974, Walters reported conveying "greetings from the President and Secretary" and "friendship and support and our wish to be helpful in a discreet way." Pinochet accepted the CIA's offer of assistance and specifically requested support for his newly established secret police service, [[DINA]], and its director, [[Colonel Manuel Contreras]], described as "his key man." Walters reported telling Pinochet: "I told him we would be glad to have Contreras or anyone else come up to see us to see what we could do to be of assistance to them."[^17]
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As DDCI, Walters was not limited to the Watergate crisis. In mid-February 1974, he secretly traveled to [[Santiago]], [[Chile]] to meet with [[General Augusto Pinochet]] following the September 1973 coup. In a cable classified Secret and addressed personally to [[Henry Kissinger]], dated February 14, 1974, Walters reported conveying "greetings from the President and Secretary" and "friendship and support and our wish to be helpful in a discreet way." Pinochet accepted the CIA's offer of assistance and specifically requested support for his newly established secret police service, [[DINA]], and its director, [[Colonel Manuel Contreras]], described as "his key man." Walters reported telling Pinochet: "I told him we would be glad to have Contreras or anyone else come up to see us to see what we could do to be of assistance to them."[^18]
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Three weeks after the Walters-Pinochet meeting, Contreras traveled to [[CIA]] headquarters at [[Langley]] for briefings on intelligence service organization. Contreras met with Walters twice in Washington, in 1974 and 1975, during the period when Walters was second-in-command at the Agency. In mid-1975, the CIA briefly placed Contreras on its payroll as a paid asset. DINA subsequently became the primary instrument of the Pinochet regime's repression, responsible for torture centers, extrajudicial executions, forced disappearances, and international terrorism including the [[Letelier assassination]] in Washington in 1976.[^18]
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Three weeks after the Walters-Pinochet meeting, Contreras traveled to [[CIA]] headquarters at [[Langley]] for briefings on intelligence service organization. Contreras met with Walters twice in Washington, in 1974 and 1975, during the period when Walters was second-in-command at the Agency. In mid-1975, the CIA briefly placed Contreras on its payroll as a paid asset. DINA subsequently became the primary instrument of the Pinochet regime's repression, responsible for torture centers, extrajudicial executions, forced disappearances, and international terrorism including the [[Letelier assassination]] in Washington in 1976.[^19]
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On Saturday, July 5, 1975, Walters met Contreras secretly at a CIA office at [[Fort Myer]]. He reported that Contreras asked how Chile might obtain American arms despite the congressional ban: "Wonder if there is any way they could get it indirectly via [[Spain]], [[Brazil]], or the Republic of Korea." They lunched at Langley on August 25. Ambassador [[David Popper]] had advised that publicity "could be counterproductive" but that "it would be worthwhile if General Walters could give Contreras a little time." Walters told the FBI in 1979 that "part of his function as deputy director of the CIA was to coordinate and conduct foreign liaison," and that he had received Contreras in that capacity. Contreras said from prison in 1999 that Walters had proposed placing CIA officers inside DINA and hiring five retired senators as lobbyists for Chile at two million dollars a year.[^19]
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On Saturday, July 5, 1975, Walters met Contreras secretly at a CIA office at [[Fort Myer]]. He reported that Contreras asked how Chile might obtain American arms despite the congressional ban: "Wonder if there is any way they could get it indirectly via [[Spain]], [[Brazil]], or the Republic of Korea." They lunched at Langley on August 25. Ambassador [[David Popper]] had advised that publicity "could be counterproductive" but that "it would be worthwhile if General Walters could give Contreras a little time." Walters told the FBI in 1979 that "part of his function as deputy director of the CIA was to coordinate and conduct foreign liaison," and that he had received Contreras in that capacity. Contreras said from prison in 1999 that Walters had proposed placing CIA officers inside DINA and hiring five retired senators as lobbyists for Chile at two million dollars a year.[^20]
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In June 1976 Walters went to [[Paraguay]] to remove the CIA station chief, who had deceived Ambassador [[George Landau]], and to ask the government of General [[Alfredo Stroessner]] not to kill a Paraguayan agent of the CIA who had been arrested and tortured. He was received by Stroessner's aide [[Conrado Pappalardo]] and left in the last week of June with the agent still in prison. In July Pappalardo asked Landau for American visas in false Paraguayan passports for two Chilean officers, saying that they were to contact Walters in Washington. Landau told Walters that the request appeared to be "the quid pro quo that Paraguay was demanding in exchange for sparing the CIA agent's life," issued the visas, and sent photographs of the passports to Walters through the State Department's "Roger Channel" on July 28. Walters was on leave in [[Florida]] before retirement, and the cable went to Director [[George H.W. Bush|George Bush]]. On August 4 Walters replied that he had made no arrangement with Pappalardo, that he and Bush "had agreed that the agency wanted nothing to do with the DINA matter," and that the request was "highly irregular" and "a strange way of doing business." Two DINA captains using the same false names reached Washington on August 22 and had the Chilean embassy telephone Walters's office at Langley. The CIA did not tell the prosecutor of the [[Orlando Letelier|Letelier]] murder, [[Eugene Propper]], of any of this when it began sending him files that fall.[^20]
|
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In June 1976 Walters went to [[Paraguay]] to remove the CIA station chief, who had deceived Ambassador [[George Landau]], and to ask the government of General [[Alfredo Stroessner]] not to kill a Paraguayan agent of the CIA who had been arrested and tortured. He was received by Stroessner's aide [[Conrado Pappalardo]] and left in the last week of June with the agent still in prison. In July Pappalardo asked Landau for American visas in false Paraguayan passports for two Chilean officers, saying that they were to contact Walters in Washington. Landau told Walters that the request appeared to be "the quid pro quo that Paraguay was demanding in exchange for sparing the CIA agent's life," issued the visas, and sent photographs of the passports to Walters through the State Department's "Roger Channel" on July 28. Walters was on leave in [[Florida]] before retirement, and the cable went to Director [[George H.W. Bush|George Bush]]. On August 4 Walters replied that he had made no arrangement with Pappalardo, that he and Bush "had agreed that the agency wanted nothing to do with the DINA matter," and that the request was "highly irregular" and "a strange way of doing business." Two DINA captains using the same false names reached Washington on August 22 and had the Chilean embassy telephone Walters's office at Langley. The CIA did not tell the prosecutor of the [[Orlando Letelier|Letelier]] murder, [[Eugene Propper]], of any of this when it began sending him files that fall.[^21]
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One of the two, Captain René Riveros Valderrama, gave a sworn statement in Santiago on March 22, 1978, to the Chilean court investigating Contreras and Espinoza. He and Captain Rolando Mosqueira Jarpa had left for Washington on August 21, 1976, on official passports in the names Juan Williams Rose and Alejandro Romeral Jara, prepared by DINA's passport section, on a mission given them by Contreras "to make contact with the North American General Don Vernon Walters in order to receive certain information relating to the names of certain persons." They could not reach him: he was handing over his post and on leave, and "finally a CIA secretary whom we could not identify told us that General Walters no longer worked at that intelligence agency." They then called on a Chilean general Mosqueira knew, giving their real names and ranks but not their errand, and when every approach failed telephoned Espinoza, DINA's chief of operations, who authorized them to return.[^21]
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One of the two, Captain René Riveros Valderrama, gave a sworn statement in Santiago on March 22, 1978, to the Chilean court investigating Contreras and Espinoza. He and Captain Rolando Mosqueira Jarpa had left for Washington on August 21, 1976, on official passports in the names Juan Williams Rose and Alejandro Romeral Jara, prepared by DINA's passport section, on a mission given them by Contreras "to make contact with the North American General Don Vernon Walters in order to receive certain information relating to the names of certain persons." They could not reach him: he was handing over his post and on leave, and "finally a CIA secretary whom we could not identify told us that General Walters no longer worked at that intelligence agency." They then called on a Chilean general Mosqueira knew, giving their real names and ranks but not their errand, and when every approach failed telephoned Espinoza, DINA's chief of operations, who authorized them to return.[^22]
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Contreras told the Chilean military prosecutor on March 22, 1978, that "around June or early July 1976, CIA Chile informed me that the Deputy Director of the CIA, General Vernon Walters, needed a contact in the US to give us a list of lobbyists and people who could cooperate with Chile before the US Senate and also for the UN's forthcoming session that year." Espinoza testified on April 24 that Contreras ordered him to designate an agent for the mission with a companion fluent in English; he chose Fernández Larios, and "the name of the second man was suggested by then-Major [[Raúl Iturriaga Neumann|Iturriaga]], under the name Andrés Wilson," who "turned out to be the same person I had known since November or December 1974 as [[Michael Townley]]." Fernández Larios said he was told "once in the US I had to speak with a CIA chief named Vernon Walters, because he was going to give me a list of people sympathetic to Chile for purposes of presenting the Chilean position before the United Nations." The second pair, Captains [[René Riveros]] and [[Rolando Mosqueira]], could not find him; General [[Nilo Floody]] of the Chilean military mission, who had known Walters since 1974, had his secretary telephone Walters's office and was told "that he was out of town, that he no longer belonged to the CIA, and that upon his return he would presumably rejoin the Army." The FBI interviewed Walters on June 14, 1978, at the Chilean prosecutor's request. "When told that several DINA officials were claiming that their trip to the US in August of 1976 was to see him, the General laughed and dismissed the idea as being ludicrous on its face, saying it was impossible since he had retired during the previous month." He said his trip to Paraguay "had been completely unrelated to the Letelier assassination," that "at no time had he discussed with any Paraguayan officials the issuance of false passports," that his only contact with Contreras had been the 1975 visit, and he "offered to take a polygraph examination." Propper added: "I have been advised by the CIA that General Vernon Walters retired from the CIA on July 2, 1976. He was no longer there at the time either mission to the United States by DINA personnel took place."[^22]
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Contreras told the Chilean military prosecutor on March 22, 1978, that "around June or early July 1976, CIA Chile informed me that the Deputy Director of the CIA, General Vernon Walters, needed a contact in the US to give us a list of lobbyists and people who could cooperate with Chile before the US Senate and also for the UN's forthcoming session that year." Espinoza testified on April 24 that Contreras ordered him to designate an agent for the mission with a companion fluent in English; he chose Fernández Larios, and "the name of the second man was suggested by then-Major [[Raúl Iturriaga Neumann|Iturriaga]], under the name Andrés Wilson," who "turned out to be the same person I had known since November or December 1974 as [[Michael Townley]]." Fernández Larios said he was told "once in the US I had to speak with a CIA chief named Vernon Walters, because he was going to give me a list of people sympathetic to Chile for purposes of presenting the Chilean position before the United Nations." The second pair, Captains [[René Riveros]] and [[Rolando Mosqueira]], could not find him; General [[Nilo Floody]] of the Chilean military mission, who had known Walters since 1974, had his secretary telephone Walters's office and was told "that he was out of town, that he no longer belonged to the CIA, and that upon his return he would presumably rejoin the Army." The FBI interviewed Walters on June 14, 1978, at the Chilean prosecutor's request. "When told that several DINA officials were claiming that their trip to the US in August of 1976 was to see him, the General laughed and dismissed the idea as being ludicrous on its face, saying it was impossible since he had retired during the previous month." He said his trip to Paraguay "had been completely unrelated to the Letelier assassination," that "at no time had he discussed with any Paraguayan officials the issuance of false passports," that his only contact with Contreras had been the 1975 visit, and he "offered to take a polygraph examination." Propper added: "I have been advised by the CIA that General Vernon Walters retired from the CIA on July 2, 1976. He was no longer there at the time either mission to the United States by DINA personnel took place."[^23]
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As ambassador at large for President [[Ronald Reagan]], Walters visited Pinochet in February 1981. "We spoke as old friends," he reported. "He offered full support and said he would do anything we wanted to help us in the Salvadoran situation." He told a congressional committee that the Letelier bombing had been "a mistake," like [[Napoleon]]'s execution of the Duke of Enghien: "You can't rub their noses in it forever."[^19]
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As ambassador at large for President [[Ronald Reagan]], Walters visited Pinochet in February 1981. "We spoke as old friends," he reported. "He offered full support and said he would do anything we wanted to help us in the Salvadoran situation." He told a congressional committee that the Letelier bombing had been "a mistake," like [[Napoleon]]'s execution of the Duke of Enghien: "You can't rub their noses in it forever."[^20]
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### Later Career
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@ -100,12 +100,13 @@ Under President Ronald Reagan, Walters served as Ambassador-at-Large from 1981 t
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[^11]: FRUS 1964-68, Vol. XXXI, Document 198: Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Brazil, March 31, 1964, formally assigning the code name "Brother Sam."
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[^12]: Colby and Dennett, Ch. 29.
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[^13]: De Oliveira, *Attaché Extraordinaire*; State Department Biographic Register, 1965-1967 Brazil posting.
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[^14]: White House audio tape, June 23, 1972 (Nixon Presidential Library, Conversation No. 741-002), published as the "smoking gun" tape August 5, 1974. Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, Final Report, June 1974.
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[^15]: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, Final Report, June 1974; Walters, *Silent Missions*, pp. 603-606.
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[^16]: CIA FOIA, Memorandum for Deputy Director Walters from Richard Helms, June 28, 1972, Watergate Affair (CIA-RDP75B00380R000100110051-7); Judicial Watch, "CIA Inspector General's Watergate History Report" (declassified 2014), citing Walters-Gray meeting of July 12, 1972.
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[^17]: National Security Archive, CIA Cable, "Personal to Dr. Henry A. Kissinger [from CIA Deputy Director Vernon Walters on Secret Meeting with Pinochet]," Secret, February 14, 1974 (Document 5 in NSAEBB series on DINA).
|
||||
[^18]: National Security Archive, "The Pinochet Regime Declassified: DINA," June 2024; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Staff Report on Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973," December 18, 1975 (released by Church Committee); Contreras CIA payroll: CIA Inspector General report on DINA relationship, released 2023.
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[^19]: Kornbluh, Peter. *The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability*. New Press, 2003, pp. 213-215, 409-410, and note 34 at p. 522.
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[^20]: Dinges, John, and Saul Landau. *Assassination on Embassy Row*. McGraw-Hill, 1980, pp. 200-201, 242-243, 309-311, 383-384.
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[^21]: Corte Suprema de Justicia de Chile, proceso contra Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda y Pedro Espinoza Bravo, ministro instructor Adolfo Bañados, tomo 1, declaración de René Miguel Riveros Valderrama, Santiago, March 22, 1978, scan at latinamericanstudies.org, Causa-Contreras-Espinoza-1991.pdf. Quotations translated from the Spanish
|
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[^22]: Fiscalía Militar Ad-Hoc, Santiago, causa 192-78 (fiscal Héctor Orozco), as reproduced in *Proceso contra Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda y Pedro Espinoza Bravo,* ministro instructor Adolfo Bañados, tomo 1, scan at https://www.latinamericanstudies.org/MNC/Causa-Contreras-Espinoza-1991.pdf. Quotations translated from the Spanish, declaraciones of Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda (March 22, 1978), Armando Fernández Larios (March 22, 1978), and Pedro Espinoza Bravo (April 24, 1978); Fiscalía Militar Ad-Hoc, Santiago, causa 192-78, as reproduced in *Proceso contra Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda y Pedro Espinoza Bravo,* tomo 2, scan at https://www.latinamericanstudies.org/MNC/Causa-Contreras-Espinoza-1991-2.pdf. Quotations translated from the Spanish, memorandum of Eugene M. Propper and E. Lawrence Barcella, June 22, 1978, with the FBI report of the interview of June 14, 1978, and addendum of June 9, 1978.
|
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[^14]: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVIII, part 2, front matter, "Persons" (Walters: "Acting Director of Central Intelligence, July 2, 1973-September 4, 1973"; Colby: "Director of Central Intelligence, September 4, 1973-January 30, 1976"; Schlesinger: "Director of Central Intelligence, February 2-July 2, 1973"). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v38p2/persons
|
||||
[^15]: White House audio tape, June 23, 1972 (Nixon Presidential Library, Conversation No. 741-002), published as the "smoking gun" tape August 5, 1974. Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, Final Report, June 1974.
|
||||
[^16]: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, Final Report, June 1974; Walters, *Silent Missions*, pp. 603-606.
|
||||
[^17]: CIA FOIA, Memorandum for Deputy Director Walters from Richard Helms, June 28, 1972, Watergate Affair (CIA-RDP75B00380R000100110051-7); Judicial Watch, "CIA Inspector General's Watergate History Report" (declassified 2014), citing Walters-Gray meeting of July 12, 1972.
|
||||
[^18]: National Security Archive, CIA Cable, "Personal to Dr. Henry A. Kissinger [from CIA Deputy Director Vernon Walters on Secret Meeting with Pinochet]," Secret, February 14, 1974 (Document 5 in NSAEBB series on DINA).
|
||||
[^19]: National Security Archive, "The Pinochet Regime Declassified: DINA," June 2024; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Staff Report on Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973," December 18, 1975 (released by Church Committee); Contreras CIA payroll: CIA Inspector General report on DINA relationship, released 2023.
|
||||
[^20]: Kornbluh, Peter. *The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability*. New Press, 2003, pp. 213-215, 409-410, and note 34 at p. 522.
|
||||
[^21]: Dinges, John, and Saul Landau. *Assassination on Embassy Row*. McGraw-Hill, 1980, pp. 200-201, 242-243, 309-311, 383-384.
|
||||
[^22]: Corte Suprema de Justicia de Chile, proceso contra Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda y Pedro Espinoza Bravo, ministro instructor Adolfo Bañados, tomo 1, declaración de René Miguel Riveros Valderrama, Santiago, March 22, 1978, scan at latinamericanstudies.org, Causa-Contreras-Espinoza-1991.pdf. Quotations translated from the Spanish
|
||||
[^23]: Fiscalía Militar Ad-Hoc, Santiago, causa 192-78 (fiscal Héctor Orozco), as reproduced in *Proceso contra Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda y Pedro Espinoza Bravo,* ministro instructor Adolfo Bañados, tomo 1, scan at https://www.latinamericanstudies.org/MNC/Causa-Contreras-Espinoza-1991.pdf. Quotations translated from the Spanish, declaraciones of Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda (March 22, 1978), Armando Fernández Larios (March 22, 1978), and Pedro Espinoza Bravo (April 24, 1978); Fiscalía Militar Ad-Hoc, Santiago, causa 192-78, as reproduced in *Proceso contra Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda y Pedro Espinoza Bravo,* tomo 2, scan at https://www.latinamericanstudies.org/MNC/Causa-Contreras-Espinoza-1991-2.pdf. Quotations translated from the Spanish, memorandum of Eugene M. Propper and E. Lawrence Barcella, June 22, 1978, with the FBI report of the interview of June 14, 1978, and addendum of June 9, 1978.
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