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@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ relations:
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with: "[[Warren Commission]]"
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start: 1963-11-29
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end: 1964-09-24
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fn: 11
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fn: 12
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---
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Allen Welsh Dulles (April 7, 1893 - January 29, 1969) served as [[Director of Central Intelligence]] from February 26, 1953, to November 29, 1961 - the longest tenure of any DCI, the first civilian DCI, and the only brother of a sitting Secretary of State to hold the position. Dulles built the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] into the instrument of Cold War covert action that executed [[Operation AJAX]] in [[Iran]] (1953), [[Operation PBSUCCESS]] in [[Guatemala]] (1954), and the [[Bay of Pigs]] invasion of [[Cuba]] (1961). The Bay of Pigs disaster cost him his position - President [[John F. Kennedy]] forced his resignation, along with [[Richard Bissell]] and [[Charles P. Cabell|C.P. Cabell]] - and his subsequent appointment by President [[Lyndon B. Johnson]] to the [[Warren Commission]] investigating Kennedy's assassination placed him in the remarkable position of overseeing the investigation of the event that had ended both his patron's life and his own career.[^1]
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@ -68,13 +68,15 @@ Operation PBSUCCESS (June 1954): The CIA's overthrow of Guatemalan President [[J
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[[MKULTRA]]: Dulles authorized the CIA's human experimentation program in April 1953 under Technical Services Staff chief [[Sidney Gottlieb]]. The program used LSD and other substances on unconsenting subjects, including mental patients, prisoners, and unwitting CIA employees. Dulles's authorization memorandum noted concerns about Soviet brainwashing capabilities and framed the program as defensive research. The program's scope - eventually comprising 150 subprojects at 80 institutions - far exceeded what Dulles's authorization documents described.
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On August 26, 1960 Dulles cabled the Leopoldville station that the station officer was to be given "wider authority," including "even more aggressive action if it can remain covert," and wrote that "we realize that targets of opportunity may present themselves to you."[^8] The cable authorized up to $100,000 "to carry out any crash programs on which you do not have the opportunity to consult HQS," and assured the station officer that the message had been "seen and approved at competent level" in the State Department.[^8] The Church Committee documented the cable as one of a sequence that began with Tweedy's cable of August 18, 1960 and Bissell's of August 19.[^8]
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### MKULTRA: The Sandoz Panic and the Olson Death
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Dulles approved MKULTRA on April 13, 1953, ten days after Richard Helms proposed a program for the "covert use of biological and chemical materials," with an initial $300,000 exempt from normal financial controls and payable blindly on the signatures of Gottlieb and TSS chief [[Willis Gibbons]]. Acting in a climate of Cold War urgency, that same month Dulles approved a $240,000 payment after an intelligence report claimed [[Sandoz]] wanted to sell 10 kilograms of [[LSD]] on the open market; CIA officers flew to Switzerland with a black bag of cash only to learn Sandoz had produced barely 40 grams in fifteen years, the entire panic stemming from a military attaché who confused milligrams with kilograms. When [[Frank Olson]] died in November 1953 after Gottlieb dosed him with LSD at [[Deep Creek Lodge]], Dulles ordered Inspector General [[Lyman Kirkpatrick]] to investigate; the resulting reprimands were softened through six drafts and placed in no personnel file.[^8]
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Dulles approved MKULTRA on April 13, 1953, ten days after Richard Helms proposed a program for the "covert use of biological and chemical materials," with an initial $300,000 exempt from normal financial controls and payable blindly on the signatures of Gottlieb and TSS chief [[Willis Gibbons]]. Acting in a climate of Cold War urgency, that same month Dulles approved a $240,000 payment after an intelligence report claimed [[Sandoz]] wanted to sell 10 kilograms of [[LSD]] on the open market; CIA officers flew to Switzerland with a black bag of cash only to learn Sandoz had produced barely 40 grams in fifteen years, the entire panic stemming from a military attaché who confused milligrams with kilograms. When [[Frank Olson]] died in November 1953 after Gottlieb dosed him with LSD at [[Deep Creek Lodge]], Dulles ordered Inspector General [[Lyman Kirkpatrick]] to investigate; the resulting reprimands were softened through six drafts and placed in no personnel file.[^9]
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### Rockefeller's Special Group and the Human Ecology Front
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Under Eisenhower, Dulles reported all CIA covert operations, including MKULTRA, the coups, and assassination planning, to the NSC "[[Special Group]]" chaired by [[Nelson Rockefeller]], the structure formalized by NSC 5412/2 in December 1955 that gave the president plausible deniability; in a 1955 "Family Jewels" briefing Dulles described the full range of covert programs to Rockefeller's board. When MKULTRA needed a research hospital, Dulles sought Rockefeller's approval for a scheme to channel CIA money through private foundations to win matching federal grants for a wing at [[Georgetown University Hospital]]. The program's primary funding front, the [[Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology]], was organized at Dulles's initiative through [[Harold Wolff]], the Cornell neurologist who had treated Dulles's brain-damaged son; Dulles attended one of its first board meetings. His relationship with [[D. Ewen Cameron]] predated the funding: in November 1945, still with the OSS, Dulles had sent Cameron to Nuremberg to assess whether [[Rudolf Hess]] was fit to stand trial.[^9]
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Under Eisenhower, Dulles reported all CIA covert operations, including MKULTRA, the coups, and assassination planning, to the NSC "[[Special Group]]" chaired by [[Nelson Rockefeller]], the structure formalized by NSC 5412/2 in December 1955 that gave the president plausible deniability; in a 1955 "Family Jewels" briefing Dulles described the full range of covert programs to Rockefeller's board. When MKULTRA needed a research hospital, Dulles sought Rockefeller's approval for a scheme to channel CIA money through private foundations to win matching federal grants for a wing at [[Georgetown University Hospital]]. The program's primary funding front, the [[Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology]], was organized at Dulles's initiative through [[Harold Wolff]], the Cornell neurologist who had treated Dulles's brain-damaged son; Dulles attended one of its first board meetings. His relationship with [[D. Ewen Cameron]] predated the funding: in November 1945, still with the OSS, Dulles had sent Cameron to Nuremberg to assess whether [[Rudolf Hess]] was fit to stand trial.[^10]
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### Bay of Pigs and Forced Resignation
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@ -82,24 +84,26 @@ The Bay of Pigs invasion of April 17-19, 1961 was the catastrophic failure that
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Kennedy publicly accepted responsibility but was privately furious. He reportedly told aide [[Ted Sorensen]] that he wanted to "splinter the CIA into a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds" - a remark almost certainly apocryphal in its precise wording but consistent with his documented anger. The Taylor Commission's findings and the classified Kirkpatrick IG report both pointed to fundamental CIA failures in planning, execution, and judgment.
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Dulles submitted his resignation in September 1961; it was formally accepted November 29, 1961. He was replaced by [[John McCone]]. The CIA's own history states that a "humiliated President Kennedy did not wait for either report before cleaning house at CIA" and that he accepted resignations from Dulles and from Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell, who stayed at their posts until their successors were selected a few months later.[^10] Bissell and Cabell were also forced out. CIA veterans viewed their dismissal as Kennedy scapegoating the agency for a failure the [[White House]] had co-created by canceling the air strikes.[^1]
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Dulles submitted his resignation in September 1961; it was formally accepted November 29, 1961. He was replaced by [[John McCone]]. The CIA's own history states that a "humiliated President Kennedy did not wait for either report before cleaning house at CIA" and that he accepted resignations from Dulles and from Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell, who stayed at their posts until their successors were selected a few months later.[^11] Bissell and Cabell were also forced out. CIA veterans viewed their dismissal as Kennedy scapegoating the agency for a failure the [[White House]] had co-created by canceling the air strikes.[^1]
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### The Warren Commission
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On November 29, 1963 - exactly two years after Dulles's forced resignation - President Lyndon Johnson appointed the Warren Commission to investigate Kennedy's assassination. Among the seven commissioners Johnson named was Allen Dulles despite Kennedy’s firing of Dulles.[^11]
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On November 29, 1963 - exactly two years after Dulles's forced resignation - President Lyndon Johnson appointed the Warren Commission to investigate Kennedy's assassination. Among the seven commissioners Johnson named was Allen Dulles despite Kennedy’s firing of Dulles.[^12]
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The investigation was examining whether CIA-connected parties (specifically the anti-Castro exile networks and organized crime figures that Dulles had directly overseen) had any role in the assassination. He was now in a position to shape what evidence the Commission sought, what witnesses it called, and what conclusions it reached regarding the CIA programs he had run.
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Dulles was reportedly among the most active commissioners in shaping the investigation's scope. He briefed commissioners on CIA history and procedures. Book V of the Church Committee's final report states that, with the exception of Dulles, it is unlikely anyone on the Warren Commission knew of the CIA's assassination efforts, and that Dulles knew of the plots with underworld figures that had taken place during his tenure as Director of Central Intelligence.[^12] The Church Committee's 1975 interim report states that Dulles "did not inform the other members about the plots that had occurred during his term as DCI,"[^13] and also states that "it is not entirely certain that Dulles was ever made aware of the true nature of the underworld operation."[^14] The [[ZR/RIFLE]] assassination plotting program was, in the same period, not disclosed to the Commission at the agency level by [[Richard Helms]] as Deputy Director for Plans. Helms testified that Dulles "was sitting right there" in the Commission's deliberations and "knew about this," and that he did not know what Dulles had said to the Commission about the plots.[^15] The CIA's failure to disclose the assassination plots to the Warren Commission was documented by the Church Committee in 1975; Dulles's role as both a commissioner and the former DCI who had authorized the programs is the structural conflict of interest the Commission's composition created.
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Dulles was reportedly among the most active commissioners in shaping the investigation's scope. He briefed commissioners on CIA history and procedures. Book V of the Church Committee's final report states that, with the exception of Dulles, it is unlikely anyone on the Warren Commission knew of the CIA's assassination efforts, and that Dulles knew of the plots with underworld figures that had taken place during his tenure as Director of Central Intelligence.[^13] The Church Committee's 1975 interim report states that Dulles "did not inform the other members about the plots that had occurred during his term as DCI,"[^14] and also states that "it is not entirely certain that Dulles was ever made aware of the true nature of the underworld operation."[^15] The [[ZR/RIFLE]] assassination plotting program was, in the same period, not disclosed to the Commission at the agency level by [[Richard Helms]] as Deputy Director for Plans. Helms testified that Dulles "was sitting right there" in the Commission's deliberations and "knew about this," and that he did not know what Dulles had said to the Commission about the plots.[^16] The CIA's failure to disclose the assassination plots to the Warren Commission was documented by the Church Committee in 1975; Dulles's role as both a commissioner and the former DCI who had authorized the programs is the structural conflict of interest the Commission's composition created.
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Angleton testified that Dulles consulted him before agreeing to President Johnson's request that he serve, that the two were in frequent contact, and that they informally discussed the progress of the investigation and what further work the CIA could do.[^16] At the January 22, 1964 executive session, the Commission took up a report that [[Lee Harvey Oswald]] had been a paid FBI informant. Dulles asked whether the purpose of such a hire could have been to penetrate the [[Fair Play for Cuba Committee]]. He said that practically any American could obtain a passport good for anywhere, and that the Passport Bureau had no record of Oswald's defection. Near the end of the meeting, Dulles said: "I think this record ought to be destroyed."[^17] FBI Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]]'s files held an index card on Dulles that cross-referenced a November 29, 1963 memorandum.[^18]
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Angleton testified that Dulles consulted him before agreeing to President Johnson's request that he serve, that the two were in frequent contact, and that they informally discussed the progress of the investigation and what further work the CIA could do.[^17] At the January 22, 1964 executive session, the Commission took up a report that [[Lee Harvey Oswald]] had been a paid FBI informant. Dulles asked whether the purpose of such a hire could have been to penetrate the [[Fair Play for Cuba Committee]]. He said that practically any American could obtain a passport good for anywhere, and that the Passport Bureau had no record of Oswald's defection. Near the end of the meeting, Dulles said: "I think this record ought to be destroyed."[^18] FBI Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]]'s files held an index card on Dulles that cross-referenced a November 29, 1963 memorandum.[^19]
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The [[HSCA|House Select Committee on Assassinations]] (1979) found that the Warren Commission's failure to investigate adequately the possibility of a conspiracy was "attributable in part to the failure of the Commission to receive all the relevant information that was in the possession of other agencies and departments of the Government," and that the CIA "was deficient in its collection and sharing of information both prior to and subsequent to the assassination."[^19] The report does not name Dulles in those findings. It states that the committee did not ignore the possibility that certain CIA officials who knew that close scrutiny of United States-Cuban relations could have exposed the CIA-Mafia plots might have tried to keep the CIA's or the Warren Commission's inquiry from the question of Cuban complicity, and that it determined that only Deputy Director Helms was in a position to have both the knowledge and the power to accomplish such a cover-up and was satisfied, on the basis of its investigation, that it was "highly unlikely he in fact did so."[^20] It found that the details of the AMLASH plot and the CIA-Mafia plots should have been provided to the Warren Commission.[^21]
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The [[HSCA|House Select Committee on Assassinations]] (1979) found that the Warren Commission's failure to investigate adequately the possibility of a conspiracy was "attributable in part to the failure of the Commission to receive all the relevant information that was in the possession of other agencies and departments of the Government," and that the CIA "was deficient in its collection and sharing of information both prior to and subsequent to the assassination."[^20] The report does not name Dulles in those findings. It states that the committee did not ignore the possibility that certain CIA officials who knew that close scrutiny of United States-Cuban relations could have exposed the CIA-Mafia plots might have tried to keep the CIA's or the Warren Commission's inquiry from the question of Cuban complicity, and that it determined that only Deputy Director Helms was in a position to have both the knowledge and the power to accomplish such a cover-up and was satisfied, on the basis of its investigation, that it was "highly unlikely he in fact did so."[^21] It found that the details of the AMLASH plot and the CIA-Mafia plots should have been provided to the Warren Commission.[^22]
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### Death and Legacy
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Dulles spent his post-CIA years writing, lecturing, and defending the covert action programs he had built. His book *The Craft of Intelligence* (1963) was the first major public account of CIA operations by a former director. He died in Washington on January 29, 1969, of influenza complicated by pneumonia, eighteen months before the full extent of MKULTRA and the assassination plots became public.
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The 2022 report of the United Nations Eminent Person summarized the argument of Greg Poulgrain's 2020 book, *JFK vs. Allen Dulles: Battleground Indonesia*, which posits that Dulles formed a motive to remove [[Dag Hammarskjöld]] following a policy conflict over the United Nations' intended intervention in the dispute over the sovereignty of West New Guinea.[^23] The report recorded Poulgrain's proposition that the Operation Celeste documents, which refer to a plan to kill Hammarskjöld by causing his plane to crash, mention Dulles by name, stating: "UNO is becoming troublesome and it is felt that Hammarskjöld should be removed. Allen Dulles agrees and has promised full cooperation from his people."[^23] Poulgrain compared this with the Church Committee's account of Dulles expressing a "wish [to] give every possible support" to a plan to kill Lumumba.[^23] The report stated that it was not necessary at that stage to assess the probative value of Poulgrain's information, and that it underscored the importance of "proving or disproving the veracity of the Operation Celeste hypothesis and Dulles's alleged involvement (as relied on by Poulgrain)."[^24]
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### Footnotes
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[^1]: Kinzer, Stephen. *The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War.* Times Books, 2013 (covers both brothers, the Sullivan & Cromwell connections, and the covert action programs). Grose, Peter. *Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles.* Houghton Mifflin, 1994.
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@ -109,17 +113,20 @@ Dulles spent his post-CIA years writing, lecturing, and defending the covert act
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[^5]: Howard L. Bevis to Allen W. Dulles, February 7, 1958, CIA-RDP80B01676R003800020106-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80b01676r003800020106-4.
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[^6]: Hugh Wilford, The Mighty Wurlitzer (Harvard University Press, 2008), pp. 230-231.
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[^7]: Kornbluh, Peter, ed. *Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba.* New Press, 1998. Church Committee. "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders." Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975. Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy.* Random House, 1991. Chapter 4.
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[^8]: John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*. Times Books, 1979, Chapter 4; "Project MKULTRA, the CIA's Program of Research in Behavioral Modification," Joint Senate Hearing, August 3, 1977.
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[^9]: Gerard Colby and Charlotte Dennett, *Thy Will Be Done: The Conquest of the Amazon*. HarperCollins, 1995, Ch. 18; John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*. Times Books, 1979, Chapter 9.
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[^10]: Warner, Michael, "The CIA's Internal Probe of the Bay of Pigs Affair: Lessons Unlearned," *Studies in Intelligence*, Winter 1998-1999. https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/static/Internal-Probe-Bay-Pigs.pdf
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[^11]: Executive Order 11130, "Appointing a Commission To Report Upon the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy," November 29, 1963. The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-11130-appointing-commission-report-upon-the-assassination-president-john-f
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[^12]: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies*, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, pp. 67-68. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf
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[^13]: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report*, Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975, p. 269, note 1. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
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[^14]: *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, p. 267. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
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[^15]: Book V, p. 70 (Helms testimony of July 18, 1975). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf
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[^16]: Book V, p. 69 (note 134, Angleton testimony of February 6, 1976, pp. 31-34). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf
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[^17]: Warren Commission, executive session transcript, January 22, 1964, 5:30 to 7:00 p.m. https://aarclibrary.org/publib/jfk/wc/wcexec/pdf/WcEx0122.pdf
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[^18]: U.S. Assassination Records Review Board, memorandum by Ronald G. Haron, "Assassination Records Among the Files of J. Edgar Hoover (FBI-36)," January 8, 1998. https://documents3.theblackvault.com/documents/jfkfiles/NARA-Oct2017/ARRB/RHARON/HARON/FBIMEM.002.pdf
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[^19]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), summary Findings I.D.4 and I.D.5(b) (p. 4). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
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[^20]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report,* H. Rept. 95-1828, p. 128. https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
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[^21]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report,* H. Rept. 95-1828, pp. 112-116. https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
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[^8]: United States Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975, section on the Congo, quoting the CIA cables of August 18, August 19 and August 26, 1960. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf
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[^9]: John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*. Times Books, 1979, Chapter 4; "Project MKULTRA, the CIA's Program of Research in Behavioral Modification," Joint Senate Hearing, August 3, 1977.
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[^10]: Gerard Colby and Charlotte Dennett, *Thy Will Be Done: The Conquest of the Amazon*. HarperCollins, 1995, Ch. 18; John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*. Times Books, 1979, Chapter 9.
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[^11]: Warner, Michael, "The CIA's Internal Probe of the Bay of Pigs Affair: Lessons Unlearned," *Studies in Intelligence*, Winter 1998-1999. https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/static/Internal-Probe-Bay-Pigs.pdf
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[^12]: Executive Order 11130, "Appointing a Commission To Report Upon the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy," November 29, 1963. The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-11130-appointing-commission-report-upon-the-assassination-president-john-f
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[^13]: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies*, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, pp. 67-68. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf
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[^14]: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report*, Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975, p. 269, note 1. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
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[^15]: *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, p. 267. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
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[^16]: Book V, p. 70 (Helms testimony of July 18, 1975). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf
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[^17]: Book V, p. 69 (note 134, Angleton testimony of February 6, 1976, pp. 31-34). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf
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[^18]: Warren Commission, executive session transcript, January 22, 1964, 5:30 to 7:00 p.m. https://aarclibrary.org/publib/jfk/wc/wcexec/pdf/WcEx0122.pdf
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[^19]: U.S. Assassination Records Review Board, memorandum by Ronald G. Haron, "Assassination Records Among the Files of J. Edgar Hoover (FBI-36)," January 8, 1998. https://documents3.theblackvault.com/documents/jfkfiles/NARA-Oct2017/ARRB/RHARON/HARON/FBIMEM.002.pdf
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[^20]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), summary Findings I.D.4 and I.D.5(b) (p. 4). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
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[^21]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report,* H. Rept. 95-1828, p. 128. https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
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[^22]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report,* H. Rept. 95-1828, pp. 112-116. https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
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[^23]: A/76/892, report of the Eminent Person, August 25, 2022, paragraphs 241 to 244. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
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[^24]: A/76/892, paragraph 246. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
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### The Ilopango Connection
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DEA agent [[Celerino Castillo|Celerino Castillo III]], based in [[Guatemala City]], received reports that Amador "was intending to fly into Ilopango, pick up cocaine at Hangar No. 4, and take it to Miami." When Castillo's investigation escalated, the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] station in [[El Salvador]] sent a desperate message to [[Costa Rica]] Station advising the DEA not to make inquiries about anyone at Hangar No. 4. Amador's case illustrated how the CIA's Contra supply operation and the cocaine trade used the same facilities and infrastructure.[^2]
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DEA agent [[Celerino Castillo|Celerino Castillo III]], based in [[Guatemala City]], received reports that Amador "was intending to fly into Ilopango, pick up cocaine at Hangar No. 4, and take it to Miami." The DEA office in [[Costa Rica]] sent the cable of March 20, 1986 to the Guatemala office; the Justice Department Inspector General quotes it as reporting that a source said Amador "was intending to fly an aircraft from Costa Rica through El Salvador to Miami with cocaine." On April 25, 1986 the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] station in [[El Salvador]] replied to a Costa Rica station cable of April 23: "Based on that information, [El Salvador] Station would appreciate [Costa Rica] Station advising [DEA] not to make any inquiries to anyone re: hangar no. 4 at Ilopango since only legitimate [CIA] supported operations were conducted from this facility."[^2][^3] Amador's case illustrated how the CIA's Contra supply operation and the cocaine trade used the same facilities and infrastructure.[^2]
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### DEA and CIA Records
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The CIA's file on Amador begins in November 1984, when a station cable describes him as a pilot for the [[ARDE]] group and reports that he gave the station information about another ARDE pilot fired for suspected contraband smuggling. A July or August 1985 Costa Rica station cable reported that the other pilot had suggested Amador was a possible trafficker. On August 27, 1985, a DEA Costa Rica report said a source had heard Amador planned to fly two aircraft from Miami to Colombia. The DEA agent who later reviewed it said it was filed in a general air intelligence file, which indicated there was not enough specific information to open an investigation.[^3]
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On June 10, 1986, the El Salvador station reported that the regional DEA official had told an embassy officer that Amador was suspected of heavy involvement in narcotics smuggling, and that if Amador was connected to the CIA the DEA would leave him alone. On June 17, 1986, CIA headquarters replied that its records showed no CIA "association" with Amador. The Inspector General states that the regional official was likely Country Attache [[Robert Stia]] or Castillo.[^3]
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On June 23, 1986, Castillo's debriefing report on informant STG6 described Amador as a "Contra Freedom Fighter" based in Miami who used a Salvadoran military credential to land at Ilopango without a customs search, and it asked for NADDIS checks on Amador and the aircraft listed. The DEA's NADDIS database shows no case initiated against Amador, and the Inspector General found no later DEA or FBI file on him.[^3]
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### Footnotes
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[^1]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Ch. 15.
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[^2]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Ch. 15.
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[^3]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.2 (Carlos Amador: DEA cables of August 27, 1985 and March 20, 1986; CIA cables of July and August 1985, April 23, April 25, June 10 and June 17, 1986; Castillo's June 23, 1986 debriefing report; NADDIS check). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
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@ -3,43 +3,209 @@ title: Celerino Castillo
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aliases:
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- Celerino Castillo
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- Celerino Castillo III
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- Cellerino Castillo
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- Cele
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created: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
category: "Law Enforcement & Legal"
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- Person
|
||||
- LawEnforcement
|
||||
- DEA
|
||||
- ElSalvador
|
||||
- 1980s
|
||||
- Guatemala
|
||||
- Ilopango
|
||||
- ContraWar
|
||||
- CIAContraDrugs
|
||||
- DarkAllianceInvestigation
|
||||
summary: "DEA agent who discovered Contra drug trafficking operations at Ilopango Air Force Base in El Salvador and had his investigation repeatedly shut down by the CIA and State Department."
|
||||
- Powderburns
|
||||
- FirearmsConviction
|
||||
summary: "DEA agent whose reports of drug flights from Ilopango Air Base were closed, in his account, by CIA and Embassy pressure, and whose core claims the 1997 Justice Department Inspector General wrote were not substantiated."
|
||||
born: 1949-01-01
|
||||
location: "Edinburg, Texas"
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[DEA]]"
|
||||
start: 1979
|
||||
end: 1992
|
||||
role: "special agent in New York, Peru and the Guatemala City regional office; left in 1992 on disability retirement after a proposed removal"
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[DEA]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 1991-12
|
||||
end: 1992
|
||||
role: "proposed removal on six charges, including misappropriation of funds and the sale of firearms to an informant; resolved by disability retirement"
|
||||
fn: 21
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[Walter Grasheim]]"
|
||||
start: 1986-10-27
|
||||
end: 1986-11-21
|
||||
role: "DEA case on Grasheim opened by Castillo and closed by Country Attache Robert Stia"
|
||||
fn: 8
|
||||
- type: reported_to
|
||||
with: "[[Edwin Corr]]"
|
||||
start: 1986
|
||||
end: 1988
|
||||
role: "briefed the ambassador on the Grasheim investigation and on Ilopango drug allegations"
|
||||
fn: 11
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 1997-06
|
||||
role: "declined an interview on conditions he set; the Inspector General's chapter X reviewed his allegations"
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
- type: prosecuted
|
||||
with: "[[Department of Justice]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 2008-03
|
||||
end: 2012-07
|
||||
role: "charged in March 2008 in the Western District of Texas; pleaded guilty October 1, 2008 to two counts of a superseding information; sentenced October 22, 2008 to 37 months; Fifth Circuit affirmed in 2009; motion to vacate denied July 2012"
|
||||
fn: 29
|
||||
---
|
||||
[[DEA]] agent Celerino Castillo III was assigned to the DEA's regional office in [[Guatemala City]] in October 1985, covering both [[Guatemala]] and [[El Salvador]]. Two days into his new job, agent-in-charge Robert Stia warned him that the U.S. government was running a covert operation at [[Ilopango Airbase|Ilopango Air Force Base]] and Castillo should not interfere with it. At the time, El Salvador produced no drugs and had no major drug rings; the DEA had never opened an office in the country.[^1]
|
||||
[[DEA]] special agent Celerino Castillo III served with the agency from 1979 to 1992, in [[New York City]], in [[Peru]] and in the regional office in [[Guatemala City]], which covered [[El Salvador]]. From that office he reported that pilots flying [[Contras|Contra]] resupply aircraft out of [[Ilopango Airbase|Ilopango Air Force Base]] were trafficking cocaine to the United States, and he alleged that the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] and the U.S. Embassy shut his investigation down. He set out those allegations in the 1994 book *Powderburns: Cocaine, Contras & the Drug War*, co-written with [[Dave Harmon]], and in interviews and a 1996 protest at DEA headquarters. The [[Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General]] reviewed the allegations in 1997 and wrote that the core of them was not substantiated. The CIA Inspector General's 1998 report records CIA denials and records that bear on parts of his account. In 2008 he was charged in the Western District of Texas with conspiracy to sell firearms without a license and selling them without a license, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to 37 months, as set out below.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Through informants including a Cuban named [[Socrates Sofi-Perez]], Castillo discovered that [[Contras|Contra]] pilots based at Ilopango were brazenly flying drugs to the United States and money to [[Panama]], sometimes leaving kilos in plain view or arriving with boxloads of cash. When Castillo ran the pilots' names through DEA computers, nearly all came back as documented narcotics traffickers. Among the busiest was [[Francisco Guirola Beeche]], who was observed zooming in and out of Ilopango hauling drugs in and carrying cash to the Bahamas. His key informant, known as Murga, wrote flight plans for private planes on the civilian side of the base and could move freely on the military side.[^1]
|
||||
### Assignment to Guatemala City
|
||||
|
||||
### Hangar No. 4 and CIA Obstruction
|
||||
Castillo had been a police officer in [[Edinburg, Texas]] from 1973 to 1979, when he joined the DEA as a special agent. His first posting was New York City, where he remained until 1984, when he was sent to Peru.[^1] DEA records confirm that in October 1985 he was transferred from Peru to the Guatemala City office, which covered [[Guatemala]], El Salvador, [[Belize]] and [[Honduras]], with Castillo responsible for El Salvador.[^1] Castillo told [[High Times]] that a supervisor who did not speak Spanish felt threatened by him and moved him to Central America without the promotion he had been promised. According to DEA Special Agent [[Russell Reina]], the transfer followed a photograph of Castillo posing in camouflage clothing with two machine guns that appeared on the front page of a Peruvian daily, which the DEA believed compromised his identity for undercover work.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
In March 1986, a cable from the [[Costa Rica|Costa Rican]] DEA office reported that pilot [[Carlos Amador]] intended to fly into Ilopango, pick up cocaine at Hangar No. 4, and transport it to [[Miami]]. The CIA had used Hangar No. 4 for covert Contra operations until turning it over to the [[National Security Council]] and [[Oliver North]]'s "Enterprise" in 1985. The adjoining Hangar No. 5 was still CIA-run. [[Alan Fiers]] acknowledged the CIA "had a capability and indeed a responsibility for reporting what had been happening at Ilopango." When Castillo began investigating, the CIA sent a cable asking the Costa Rica station to persuade the DEA to back off: "El Salvador Station would appreciate Costa Rica Station advising DEA not to make any inquiries into anyone re: Hangar No. 4 at Ilopango since only legitimate CIA supported operations were conducted from this facility."[^1]
|
||||
The Guatemala office had two agents, Reina and Castillo, under Country Attache [[Robert Stia]].[^2] Castillo's account, as set out in his book and in the reconstruction by [[Gary Webb]], is that Stia warned him two days after he arrived that the U.S. government was running a covert operation at Ilopango and that he should not interfere with it. Castillo also wrote that at the time El Salvador produced no drugs and the DEA had never opened an office there.[^3] The DEA opened an office in El Salvador in 1992, after Castillo had left the region.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
### Investigation Shut Down
|
||||
### Informants and the first Ilopango reports
|
||||
|
||||
U.S. Ambassador [[Edwin Corr]], to whom Castillo reported, sent a secret "back channel" cable to the [[State Department]] requesting an internal DEA review. The DEA informed Corr that Castillo's information was "totally inaccurate" and he was told to close his investigation. When Castillo continued investigating, Corr personally ordered him to "stop the witch hunt." Three years later, when Castillo opened a new investigation into drug trafficking at Hangar No. 5, the CIA refused to allow him on the base and assured him there was no drug activity. Castillo was subsequently investigated by the DEA for administrative violations and forced into disability retirement. The DEA later claimed under FOIA it had no reports from Castillo about drug trafficking at Ilopango - a claim the [[Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General|Justice Department Inspector General]] exposed as false.[^1]
|
||||
On March 20, 1986, the DEA office in [[Costa Rica]] cabled the Guatemala office that a source said [[Carlos Amador]] intended to fly an aircraft from Costa Rica through El Salvador to [[Miami]] with cocaine, possibly picking it up at "Hangar No. 4" in San Salvador. The Costa Rica office asked the Guatemala office to have the Salvadoran police investigate Amador and any persons or companies associated with Hangar No. 4. The Inspector General found no written response from the Guatemala office to that cable.[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
### Grasheim Raid and CIA Infiltration
|
||||
On June 23, 1986, Castillo filed a debriefing report on an informant designated STG6, who worked at the airport, listing alleged traffickers in El Salvador. The informant identified [[Walter Grasheim]] as the "head of smuggling operations at the Illopango [sic] Military International Airport" and said that "Grasheim owns and operates Hangar #4 at said airport." The report named thirteen other documented narcotics traffickers who used hangars four and five, and it was filed in a general "Air Intelligence" file.[^5] Castillo's book gives the Ilopango informant the name "Hugo Martinez," as the CIA report records.[^6] Webb's account names an informant known as "Murga," who wrote flight plans for private aircraft on the civilian side of the base.[^3] The Inspector General chapter identifies the informant only by the designation STG6. Webb wrote that Castillo's informant Murga "was indeed working for the CIA and had been for quite some time," citing the Inspector General's section on STG6.[^3][^5] Castillo's informants also included [[Socrates Sofi-Perez]], a Cuban whom Webb identifies as a [[Bay of Pigs]] veteran.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
Denied access to Ilopango, Castillo targeted weapons dealer [[Walter Grasheim|Walter "Wally" Grasheim]], whose home was raided on September 1, 1986. The raid uncovered automatic weapons, M-16s, hand grenades, C-4 explosives, and U.S. Embassy license plates and IDs. Grasheim claimed Castillo's informant was working for the CIA and had been used to divert attention from Ilopango. The Justice Department Inspector General confirmed the informant, Murga, was indeed a CIA asset, and the CIA demanded the DEA stop using him.[^1]
|
||||
Webb wrote that Murga told Castillo the Contra pilots were flying cocaine to the United States and money to [[Panama]], sometimes leaving with kilos in plain view or arriving with boxloads of cash, and that when Castillo ran the pilots' names through DEA computers nearly all returned as documented narcotics traffickers. One was [[Francisco Guirola Beeche]]; Webb quotes Castillo's memoir: "When I ran Guirola's name in the computer, it popped up in 11 DEA files, detailing his South America-to-United States cocaine, arms and money laundering." Webb wrote that Castillo and his informants watched Guirola move in and out of Ilopango hauling drugs in and carrying cash to the [[Bahamas]]. Webb also wrote that Castillo began sending reports on the pilots to DEA headquarters in January 1986 and received no replies.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
### Chretien's Role in Internal Investigation
|
||||
The Inspector General listed the DEA case and informant files that Castillo gave the DEA in October 1996. They include an "Air Intelligence" file (GFTF-86-9999) holding the March 20, 1986 cable on Amador, a Grasheim case file (TG-87-0003), a general aircraft file (GFTG-85-9999) and a file on the Pozo-Aparicio cocaine organization (TG-86-0001). The Inspector General reported that few of the files mention the Contras, and that most of the files it described make no mention of Contra or CIA involvement in drug trafficking.[^7]
|
||||
|
||||
After returning to Sacramento, [[Gary Webb|Webb]] phoned Castillo and told him about [[Craig Chretien|Chretien]]'s claim that there was no proof the Contras were involved in drugs. Castillo said Chretien had been one of the DEA officials sent to Guatemala to conduct the internal investigation of him. Castillo said Chretien ordered him to use the word "alleged" in his reports to Washington about Contra drug shipments from Ilopango. "They said, 'You cannot actually come out and say this shit is going on.' And I told them, 'I'm watching the fucking things fly out of here with my own eyes! Why would I have to say alleged?'" Castillo said of Chretien's denial: "Aw, bullshit. Of all people, he knows perfectly well what was going on. He was reading all my reports, looking for grammatical errors."[^2]
|
||||
### The Grasheim investigation
|
||||
|
||||
The earliest DEA reference to Grasheim that the Inspector General found was a March 10, 1986 cable from Panama. It reported that Grasheim and an Israeli national had flown into Panama from El Salvador and, when questioned, had claimed to be DEA agents. The cable also reported that the U.S. Customs Service in New York was investigating Grasheim for arms smuggling.[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
Castillo's case opening report of October 27, 1986 said that two informants had linked Grasheim to air smuggling of cocaine by subjects believed to be associated with the Contra movement. It said that Salvadoran armed forces Chief of Staff General Adolfo Blandon had limited the Salvadoran investigation "for security reasons." It also reported that on May 3, 1986 Grasheim had crash-landed an aircraft near Tamiami, Florida, identified himself as a "secret agent," and turned over a suitcase that the report said weighed about 60 pounds and contained cocaine.[^8] Grasheim's own account to the Inspector General is that a clog in his fuel line forced an emergency landing at Tamiami in 1987, that Customs had him proceed to the airport, and that no one searched his person, bags or plane.[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
On September 1, 1986, Salvadoran police searched Grasheim's residence. Castillo's report lists a small amount of marijuana, plastic explosives, cases of grenades, sniper equipment, silencers, anti-tank rockets, machine guns, pistols, night vision equipment, military radios and ammunition. Three vehicles were also seized, one with a license plate registered to the U.S. Embassy, which the Embassy denied belonged to it. Grasheim filed a sworn statement that the Salvadoran armed forces had named him a military advisor and given him the seized items, a claim the armed forces denied.[^8] Castillo later told the Office of Independent Counsel's 1991 interviewer that he had possessed Grasheim's identification cards, including a U.S. Embassy identification.[^10]
|
||||
|
||||
On October 30, 1986, Castillo and U.S. Customs agent Richard Rivera briefed Ambassador [[Edwin Corr]] on Grasheim. Corr told the Inspector General that he welcomed the investigation but asked that it be conducted discreetly, and that he had canceled U.S. government night vision contracts with Grasheim after the search. Corr said he later sent a secret "back channel" cable asking the [[State Department]] to have the DEA review Castillo's allegations. According to Corr, DEA headquarters replied that the Grasheim case would be closed for lack of evidence. The Inspector General could not find that cable or any DEA reply in DEA files, and the State Department could not find the back-channel cable either.[^11]
|
||||
|
||||
Corr told the Inspector General that after the back-channel cable Castillo's supervisors told him to close the Grasheim investigation, and that Castillo continued "to snoop around the airport and make allegations." Corr said he told Castillo that if he had evidence on Grasheim or anyone at Ilopango, Corr would support the investigation, and if he had none he would have to stop the "witch hunt."[^11] Webb's account has Corr telling Castillo to stop the "witch hunt," and reports that the DEA told Corr that Castillo's information was "totally inaccurate." Webb attributes to Corr, in his interview with Justice Department investigators, the statements that Castillo "Was a very professional and a good agent" and that the investigation had the potential to "destroy relationships with Salvadoran officials that had taken so long to build."[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
The DEA closed the case on November 21, 1986. The closing report, written by Stia, stated: "DEA has no further interest in Grasheim at this time and it is unlikely to develop further drug information about Grasheim directly." It added: "[t]he drug aspect of this portion of the investigation is concluded and therefore this particular file is closed." The DEA passed its information to Customs and the Internal Revenue Service, which were conducting their own investigation of Grasheim's exports of military equipment.[^12] Rivera told the Inspector General that Customs never developed enough evidence to charge Grasheim and eventually closed its own case.[^12]
|
||||
|
||||
### Carlos Amador and the hangar cables
|
||||
|
||||
The CIA's records on Amador begin in November 1984, when a cable describes him as a pilot for the [[ARDE]] group and reports that he had given the station information about another ARDE pilot fired for suspected contraband smuggling. A July or August 1985 Costa Rica station cable records that the other pilot had suggested Amador was a possible trafficker. The DEA office in Costa Rica had received an August 27, 1985 report that Amador planned to fly two aircraft from Miami to Colombia. The DEA official who reviewed that report later said it sat in a general air intelligence file, which indicated to him that there was not enough specific information to open an investigation.[^13]
|
||||
|
||||
After the March 20, 1986 DEA cable, the CIA's Costa Rica station wrote to the El Salvador station on April 23, 1986. On April 25 the El Salvador station replied that Amador had stopped flying for the Contras in early 1985 and had gone into private business. The reply said Hangar 4 at Ilopango was the location of Contra operations and that the station could assure that the only items moved on Amador's flights were military supplies. It then asked: "Based on that information, [El Salvador] Station would appreciate [Costa Rica] Station advising [DEA] not to make any inquiries to anyone re: hangar no. 4 at Ilopango since only legitimate [CIA] supported operations were conducted from this facility." The same cable noted that station air operations had moved from Hangar 4 into Hangar 5, which the station still occupied.[^13]
|
||||
|
||||
On June 10, 1986, the El Salvador station reported that an embassy officer, the local contact for the regional DEA official, had asked for any CIA information on Amador. According to that cable, the DEA official said that if Amador was connected to the CIA the DEA would leave him alone, and if not the DEA intended to go after him. The Inspector General judged that the regional official was likely either Robert Stia or Castillo.[^13] On June 17, 1986, CIA headquarters replied that its records showed no CIA "association" with Amador. Castillo's June 23, 1986 debriefing had described Amador as a "Contra Freedom Fighter" based in Miami who used a Salvadoran military credential to land at Ilopango without a customs search.[^5] The Inspector General found no DEA case initiated against Amador in its NADDIS database and no later DEA or FBI file on him.[^13]
|
||||
|
||||
### Hangars 4 and 5
|
||||
|
||||
The CIA Inspector General's report on the Contra story describes the hangars at Ilopango. In 1984 the CIA occupied a newly built warehouse and hangar, Hangar 5, and moved to it activities that had been conducted in the smaller Hangar 4. After the CIA moved out of Hangar 4, the [[NHAO]] and the "Private Benefactors" used it in 1985 and 1986 for Contra-related operations. The two hangars shared an aircraft parking area on a restricted part of the base controlled by the Salvadoran military.[^6] Webb wrote that CIA records show Hangar 4 was used for covert Contra operations "until it was turned over in 1985 to the National Security Council and Oliver North's illegal arms network, 'The Enterprise.'"[^3] The CIA Inspector General's account of the transfer names the NHAO and the Private Benefactors and does not name the [[National Security Council]] or [[Oliver North]].[^6] Webb quotes former CIA Central American Task Force chief [[Alan Fiers]] from his testimony in *United States v. George* on July 31, 1992: "We had a capability and indeed a responsibility for reporting what had been happening at Ilopango."[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
The same report identifies three main sources of drug trafficking allegations at Ilopango: a U.S. citizen, Castillo, and a CIA/DEA source known as STG6.[^6] [[Felix Rodriguez]], who went to El Salvador in 1985 to oversee a counterinsurgency program at Ilopango and who was known in the Contra supply operation as "Max Gomez," told the Inspector General that Hangar 4 was used by the Salvadoran military to store equipment and helicopters, that the CIA controlled Hangar 5, and that the sliding doors on both generally stood open. He said that he never saw or had reason to believe that drugs were carried by the Contra pilots, and that [[Juan Rafael Bustillo]] had asked Corr to place drug-sniffing dogs at the airfield after the DEA allegations.[^14] Rodriguez also said that he sent a mechanic named Carson back to the United States in 1986 after Carson said the Ilopango operation was "a money making project."[^14]
|
||||
|
||||
### Castillo's conversations with CIA officers
|
||||
|
||||
In the book, Castillo describes two conversations with CIA officers. In the first, on August 15, 1986, the San Salvador chief of station, whom he names as [[Jack McCavett]], denied any connection between the CIA and the Ilopango operation. Three days later, Castillo wrote, McCavett pulled $45,000 in cash from his desk drawer and told him to spend it on cars for an anti-narcotics group. In the second, Castillo says that [[Randy Kapasar]], a CIA agent in Guatemala, knew he was investigating the Contras and followed the reasoning of informant Socrates Sofi-Perez. In Castillo's account Kapasar said: "Cele, how do you think the Contras are gonna make money? They've got to run dope, that's the only way we can finance this operation."[^15]
|
||||
|
||||
The CIA Inspector General's report found CIA records showing that in mid-1986 the agency planned to spend $45,000 on three vehicles for the Government of El Salvador, and that the money was accounted for on August 18, 1986, "the same date Castillo alleged in Powderburns that he received $45,000 from a person he refers to as COS McCavett." The report added that "no information has been found to indicate that the transaction involved Castillo or DEA in any manner."[^15] The same report records an officer who met Castillo in Guatemala, and who worked with him on an unrelated project, recalling that Castillo discussed suspected narcotics trafficking at Ilopango without mentioning the Contras. That officer denied any knowledge of Contra drug trafficking and denied ever asking Castillo to back away from an investigation.[^16]
|
||||
|
||||
### The DEA's internal review
|
||||
|
||||
The Inspector General reports that in February 1987 [[Douglas Everett]], chief of program and policy in the DEA Intelligence Section, went to Central America to evaluate allegations linking Nicaraguan political organizations to the drug trade. After meeting DEA, State Department and military personnel and informants, Everett reported that he could find no evidence that the [[Sandinistas]] or the Contras as entities were involved in drug trafficking. He wrote that the Guatemala office had recently closed an El Salvador investigation involving Contra allegations, and that informants had reported drug activity in hangars four and five. The Guatemala office believed the informants had exaggerated, in part because people arriving at the airport sometimes ran to the military side carrying briefcases, which the informants assumed held cocaine. Everett suggested that any smuggling at Ilopango was probably the work of Francisco Guirola Beeche, and he predicted that the allegations would keep surfacing because arrested traffickers would claim CIA authorization.[^17]
|
||||
|
||||
The CIA Inspector General's report records that a DEA intelligence analyst who helped review Castillo's allegations told it that DEA found no information supporting the claims linking the Contras to drug trafficking, and that "all of the Contra allegations lacked substance."[^16]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Inspector General's 1997 review
|
||||
|
||||
Chapter X of the DOJ Inspector General's 1997 report on the CIA and the Contra cocaine controversy states that Castillo refused an interview unless it was taped and [[Maxine Waters]] was present. The Inspector General agreed to tape the interview and to let him bring a personal representative, but told him Waters should not take part in an investigation it was conducting, and Waters was unable to persuade him to meet. The report also records that the former DEA country attache for Costa Rica, the former CIA chiefs of station for Costa Rica and El Salvador, and others declined interviews; that Stia did not sit for a second interview; and that the former Salvadoran air force chief Juan Rafael Bustillo and informant STG6 could not be located.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
The Inspector General's conclusion, attributed to the Inspector General alone, is that "although some of his claims have a seed of truth behind them, the inferences he draws, and his core claims about CIA support for Contra drug trafficking, were not substantiated by our review." It also found "that there was intelligence, although not hard evidence, that some Contra resupply pilots were trafficking in drugs, and that Castillo made that information available to the DEA, as he states." It found that the CIA did ask the DEA to stop using STG6, and that "there is no evidence that the CIA made this request for any reason other than that it wanted to use the informant."[^18]
|
||||
|
||||
On the Ilopango operations, the Inspector General wrote that "it is clear that there were sensitive covert operations being conducted at Ilopango Airport," and that the CIA and the embassy were not anxious for the DEA to pursue its investigation there. It said it did not find proof that the CIA or the embassy wanted the DEA kept away because the agency was involved in drug trafficking, as opposed to wanting to protect covert operations.[^18]
|
||||
|
||||
The Inspector General also summarized the 1991 interview of Castillo by FBI Special Agent [[Michael Foster]] for the [[Office of Independent Counsel]] investigation of the [[Iran-Contra Affair]]. Castillo told Foster that he believed North and the resupply operation were running drugs to raise money for the Contras. He said Grasheim had told Corr that "If I go down, half your Mil Group will go down with me," and that Corr had responded "Let the chips fall where they may." Foster wrote that Castillo "makes general accusations, but when I try to pin him down, he can't provide specific information that would support his conclusions." Foster told the Inspector General that Castillo would proceed from his own limited knowledge to generalizations that people "had to have known" about drug involvement.[^10]
|
||||
|
||||
Other DEA and embassy personnel interviewed by the Inspector General described Castillo in similar terms. Stia said Castillo needed a lot of guidance and was quick to make judgments before conducting an adequate investigation. Reina said Castillo was quick to jump to conclusions and treated the leaders of foreign governments with disrespect. [[Janice Elmore]], the embassy's narcotics coordinator, said Castillo had often made allegations that later proved to be without merit. Delphin Von Briesen, who worked with informant STG6, said that Castillo's book "definitely embellished facts" about which Von Briesen had personal knowledge.[^19]
|
||||
|
||||
### The 1988 Bustillo meeting and Hangar 5
|
||||
|
||||
On December 14, 1988, Castillo met General Bustillo about Bustillo's suspicion that Salvadoran Air Force officers were using the base for drug trafficking. Castillo told Bustillo that the DEA had similar information but lacked hard evidence because it had not been able to work at Ilopango. Pressed for names, Castillo named the Air School director, [[Manfredo Koenigsberg]]. Bustillo passed the allegation to the defense minister, General [[Vides Casanova]], who confronted Koenigsberg. Koenigsberg denied the charges, and Bustillo could produce only rumors and Castillo's information. A January 3, 1989 embassy cable to the DEA said the embassy assumed the DEA "must have some concrete evidence" to support Castillo's remarks, and it noted that Castillo had given Bustillo the impression that the DEA was prepared to assign personnel to Ilopango.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
In February 1989 the CIA station sent the DEA information that the Panamanian Miguel Antonio Rodriguez was using Ilopango to repair his aircraft. Robert Stia later reported that Castillo and Group Supervisor [[Thomas deTriquet]] went to Ilopango to investigate and were told by a CIA officer that they could not enter the base for that purpose, and that the CIA had already supplied the tail numbers and names.[^4] Stia wrote that the San Salvador station "has taken a more active stance in providing drug information to DEA," but that the Guatemala office could not develop the most important information, which concerned Ilopango.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
DeTriquet told the Inspector General that he and Castillo went to Ilopango about an allegation that unidentified dealers moved cocaine through Hangar 5 using Contra-associated pilots. A Salvadoran security officer denied them access to Hangar 5, which deTriquet believed held CIA equipment, after they tried a ruse without identifying themselves as DEA agents. At the embassy the CIA chief of station assured them there was no drug activity associated with Hangar 5, and they dropped the matter.[^4] The Inspector General's account has a Salvadoran security officer and a CIA officer as the obstacles. Castillo's version has the CIA itself refusing him access.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
The CIA ended its use of STG6 in December 1987, when it asked the DEA to stop using him because he was a current CIA informant. The DEA reactivated STG6 in 1989. Stia said the CIA chief of station had asked him to relinquish STG6 and that Castillo never expressed displeasure about it. An April 13, 1989 Stia memorandum, however, describes a "valuable asset (CI) was denied" to the Guatemala office at Ilopango.[^20]
|
||||
|
||||
### Disciplinary action and disability retirement
|
||||
|
||||
In December 1991 the DEA moved to remove Castillo as a criminal investigator on six charges. The first was misappropriation of funds. A DEA source reported that Castillo had asked for $25,000 to give to special forces in Guatemala; the source said he gave Castillo the $25,000, and Castillo later said the source had given him only $10,000. The Office of Professional Responsibility found that Castillo had not followed the rules for processing money, had delayed reporting it for about five months, and had not fully advised his supervisor. The second charge concerned an attempt to sell a DEA radio to the same source for $15,000. The third was accepting a fully automatic MAC-10 machine gun from a confidential source and disregarding an order to get rid of it. The fourth concerned the sale of a .45 caliber pistol and a Mossberg 12-gauge shotgun to an informant for $3,000 and $5,000. The fifth was possessing two fully automatic weapons, an AR-15 and a MAC-10, contrary to DEA regulations. The sixth was a false statement about whether he knew the buyer of the pistol was an informant.[^21]
|
||||
|
||||
Castillo denied the charges, called them administrative, and said they were brought in retaliation for his investigations of alleged Contra and CIA drug trafficking. In 1992, in lieu of the removal the DEA had proposed, he accepted disability retirement for a stress-related disorder. The Inspector General wrote that it was beyond the scope of its review to determine the validity of the charges or whether his retaliation claims had merit.[^21]
|
||||
|
||||
### The 1996 protest and the congressional record
|
||||
|
||||
In October 1996 Castillo appeared at DEA headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia, with a list of cases that he said supported his allegation that the DEA had turned a deaf ear to investigations linking the CIA and the Contras to trafficking.[^7] [[Salon]] published a report by [[Dennis Bernstein]] and [[Robert Knight]] of Pacific News Service on October 8, 1996, which stated that Castillo, "flanked by civil rights activist [[Dick Gregory]] and the Rev. [[Joseph Lowery]] of the [[Southern Christian Leadership Conference]]," had staged a protest at DEA headquarters the week before, with the demand "an official investigation into the Reagan-Bush governments' clandestine Iran-Contra policy."[^22] The report states that Castillo said he tried on or about January 14, 1986 to alert Vice President [[George H. W. Bush]] at a U.S. embassy party in Guatemala that "something funny" was going on at Ilopango, and quotes him: "But he just shook my hand, smiled and walked away from me." It describes a February 14, 1989 memo from Castillo to his Guatemala-based supervisor on known traffickers using hangars at Ilopango controlled by the CIA and by North, and quotes a 1994 interview in which Castillo said: "There is no doubt that they were running large quantities of cocaine into the U.S. to support the Contras. We saw the cocaine and we saw boxes full of money." The report adds that Attorney General [[Janet Reno]] and CIA Director [[John Deutch]] had stated there was no evidence to support the allegations against the CIA.[^22]
|
||||
|
||||
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence held hearings titled "Allegations of a CIA Connection to Crack Cocaine Epidemic" on October 23 and November 26, 1996. [[Fred Hitz]] testified at the first session.[^23] The printed record of both sessions does not name Castillo. A statement in the record says the committee took testimony from a DEA agent after the agency closed its Honduras office and moved the agents to Guatemala, and that the agent "said it made no sense." The record does not name him.[^23]
|
||||
|
||||
On March 16, 1998, the CIA Inspector General told the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, in a statement on the California story, that "six former CIA employees and a former DEA agent refused our request to be interviewed." The statement does not name the agent. The DOJ Inspector General records that Castillo declined an interview on conditions he set.[^1][^24]
|
||||
|
||||
The 1988 Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee report, issued by the [[Kerry Committee]], does not name Castillo. It documents the flights of a C-47 transport. [[Adolfo Chamorro]] gave the subcommittee a list of the flights made by that aircraft to ferry arms from Ilopango to Costa Rica and to La Penca, and the report states that between October 18, 1984 and February 12, 1986 some 156,000 pounds of material were moved from Ilopango to airfields in Costa Rica, on 24 flights, eleven of them to La Penca.[^25] A subcommittee staff report chronology for October 14, 1986 states that [[Max Gomez]] (identified in brackets as Felix Rodriguez) was managing contra supply operations out of Ilopango after having allegedly been placed there by the National Security Council.[^26]
|
||||
|
||||
### Powderburns
|
||||
|
||||
*Powderburns: Cocaine, Contras & the Drug War* was published in 1994, under the Sundial imprint of [[Mosaic Press]], with Dave Harmon as co-author.[^27] The CIA report and the Inspector General's chapter X both quote its account of Castillo's conversations with CIA officers, and both treat those claims as Castillo's allegations.[^1][^6] The CIA report quotes the book's references to "McCavett" and "Hugo Martinez," and its Kapasar passage is drawn from the book.[^15] Webb's notes for his chapter 13 cite *Powderburns* pages 112 to 113 for Stia's warning and pages 126 to 127 for Sofi-Perez, and state that his text on Castillo draws on the book, on his own interviews with Castillo, and on Castillo's interviews with Independent Counsel investigators declassified by the National Archives in 1994.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
### Dark Alliance and the Chretien allegation
|
||||
|
||||
In his book [[Dark Alliance]], Webb wrote that after returning to [[Sacramento]] he phoned Castillo and told him about [[Craig Chretien]]'s claim that there was no proof the Contras were involved in drugs. Castillo said Chretien had been one of the DEA officials sent to Guatemala to conduct the internal investigation of him. He said Chretien ordered him to use the word "alleged" in his reports to Washington about Contra drug shipments from Ilopango. Webb quotes Castillo: "They said, 'You cannot actually come out and say this shit is going on.' And I told them, 'I'm watching the fucking things fly out of here with my own eyes! Why would I have to say alleged?'" Castillo said of Chretien's denial: "Aw, bullshit. Of all people, he knows perfectly well what was going on. He was reading all my reports, looking for grammatical errors."[^28]
|
||||
|
||||
Webb also wrote that in response to a Freedom of Information Act request the DEA claimed it had no reports from Castillo about drug trafficking at Ilopango, and that the Inspector General "had no trouble locating the agent's reports and quoted from them liberally." The Inspector General's chapter X, reviewing DEA files, located Castillo's June 23, 1986 debriefing report, his October 27, 1986 case opening report on Grasheim, his October 31, 1986 personal history report, and the Air Intelligence files.[^7][^8]
|
||||
|
||||
### Firearms conviction, 2008 and 2009
|
||||
|
||||
The docket of *United States v. Castillo*, No. 5:08-cr-00193 in the Western District of Texas, lists the defendant as Celerino Castillo, III. A sealed complaint was filed on March 5, 2008 (No. 5:08-mj-00160) and an arrest warrant was returned executed on March 6; Castillo made an initial appearance on March 7 before Magistrate Judge John W. Primomo, who set a $25,000 unsecured bond. An indictment on two counts was filed on April 2, 2008. He pleaded guilty before the magistrate judge on June 13, 2008. On October 1, 2008 he pleaded guilty before Judge W. Royal Furgeson Jr. to two counts of a superseding information, and the indictment was dismissed on the government's motion. The minute entry for the sentencing of October 22, 2008 records 37 months of imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently, with two years of supervised release. He filed a pro se notice of appeal on October 31, 2008, and judgment was entered on November 5.[^29]
|
||||
|
||||
The [[San Antonio Current]] reported in July 2009 that Celerino Castillo III, described as a Vietnam veteran and former DEA agent, was picked up at a San Antonio gun show in March 2008 and charged with conspiracy to sell guns without a license and selling guns without a license. The paper quoted him: "I did sell guns without a license because half of the gun shows do, but they wanted to actually come after me because of my history of fighting the government." It reported that he was ordered to report to the [[La Tuna Federal Correctional Institution|La Tuna federal prison]] on July 20 to serve a 22-month sentence received "late last year," and that at a July 10 hearing the judge denied his request to remain on bond during his appeal to the [[United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit|Fifth Circuit]]. It quoted Castillo: "I initiated the Iran/Contra investigation back in the '80s where we implicated our government in the drug trafficking. There were some bipartisan investigations that confirmed my allegations."[^30]
|
||||
|
||||
The docket records a July 10, 2009 status conference and an order of that date extending the surrender date to July 30, 2009. The Fifth Circuit (No. 08-51144) affirmed, and its mandate was entered on November 9, 2009; the docket also records a Supreme Court order denying certiorari, transmitted in March 2010. Castillo filed a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. section 2255 on October 7, 2010 (Civil Action SA-10-CV-818). Magistrate Judge Primomo recommended denial on February 2, 2011, and Chief Judge Fred Biery accepted the recommendation and closed the case on July 24, 2012.[^29]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 13: "The wrong kind of friends"
|
||||
[^2]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 25: "Things are moving all around us"
|
||||
[^1]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, "CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy," Chapter X: Celerino Castillo, introduction and sections A and B (December 1997). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p1.htm
|
||||
[^2]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 3, section F (interviews of DEA Guatemala personnel, including Reina, Holifield, Von Briesen and Elmore). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p3.htm
|
||||
[^3]: Gary Webb, *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion* (Seven Stories Press, 1998), chapter 13, "The wrong kind of friends," and the chapter notes. https://archive.org/details/dark-alliance-the-cia-the-contras-and-the-crack-cocaine-explosion-gary-webb-1998
|
||||
[^4]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 3, section E (Castillo's later interactions with Salvadoran personnel, the January 3, 1989 embassy cable, the Stia memorandum, and the deTriquet interview). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p3.htm
|
||||
[^5]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, sections C.1.a and C.2 (DEA cables and debriefing reports on Grasheim and Amador, including the March 20, 1986 Costa Rica cable and Castillo's June 23, 1986 debriefing report). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
|
||||
[^6]: CIA Office of Inspector General, *Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States*, Volume II, "The Contra Story" (1998), paragraphs 1023 and 1026 (hangars, three sources of allegations) and 1028 (Castillo's book and the "Hugo Martinez" name). https://archive.org/details/nps56-111612-04
|
||||
[^7]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 4, section I ("Castillo's Recent List of Relevant Files," including the October 1996 visit to DEA headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia, and DEA case and informant files) https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p4.htm
|
||||
[^8]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.1.a (DEA reports on Grasheim: the March 10, 1986 Panama cable, the June 23, 1986 debriefing, the October 27, 1986 case opening, the October 31, 1986 personal history report, the September 1, 1986 search, and the reports that followed). The Inspector General gives the case opening as October 27, 1986 in its file listing and as 1987 in one passage of part 2. https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
|
||||
[^9]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.1.b(6) (interview of Walter Grasheim). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
|
||||
[^10]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 4, section K (summary of the FBI report of Special Agent Michael Foster's 1991 interview of Castillo for the Office of Independent Counsel). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p4.htm
|
||||
[^11]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.1.b(2) (interview of Edwin Corr). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
|
||||
[^12]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.1.b(5) (interview of Richard Rivera) and section C.1.c (closing of the Grasheim case). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
|
||||
[^13]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.2 (Carlos Amador: CIA cables of April 23, April 25, June 10 and June 17, 1986; DEA cables of August 27, 1985 and March 20, 1986; NADDIS check). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
|
||||
[^14]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.1.b(1) (interview of Felix Rodriguez). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
|
||||
[^15]: CIA Office of Inspector General, Volume II (1998), paragraphs 1028 through 1031 (Castillo's account of conversations with the San Salvador chief of station and with Randy Kapasar, as quoted from *Powderburns*) and paragraph 1047 (CIA records of the $45,000 vehicle purchase, August 18, 1986). https://archive.org/details/nps56-111612-04
|
||||
[^16]: CIA Office of Inspector General, Volume II (1998), paragraphs 1063 (officer who met Castillo in Guatemala) and 1065 (DEA intelligence analyst). https://archive.org/details/nps56-111612-04
|
||||
[^17]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 3, section D (Douglas Everett's February 1987 review of allegations linking Nicaraguan political organizations to drug trafficking). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p3.htm
|
||||
[^18]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 4, section L (evaluation of Castillo's allegations). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p4.htm
|
||||
[^19]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.1.b(4) (interview of Robert Stia) and part 3, section F. https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p3.htm
|
||||
[^20]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 3, section H (informant STG6, CIA use and DEA reactivation, and the April 13, 1989 Stia memorandum). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p3.htm
|
||||
[^21]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 4, section J (allegation that the DEA retaliated against Castillo, December 1991 removal charges and 1992 disability retirement). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p4.htm
|
||||
[^22]: Dennis Bernstein and Robert Knight (Pacific News Service), report published by Salon, October 8, 1996. https://www.salon.com/1996/10/08/news_555/
|
||||
[^23]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Allegations of a CIA Connection to Crack Cocaine Epidemic*, hearings of October 23 and November 26, 1996, S. Hrg. 104-865. https://intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/hearings/allegationsofcia00unit.pdf
|
||||
[^24]: CIA Inspector General Frederick P. Hitz, statement before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "Volume I: The California Story," March 16, 1998. https://irp.fas.org/congress/1998_hr/980316-ps.htm
|
||||
[^25]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy*, S. Prt. 100-165 (printed December 1988), p. 51 (Chamorro flight list, C-47 flights from Ilopango).
|
||||
[^26]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy*, S. Prt. 100-165, chronology entry for October 14, 1986.
|
||||
[^27]: Celerino Castillo III and Dave Harmon, *Powderburns: Cocaine, Contras & the Drug War* (Sundial, Mosaic Press, 1994), catalogue record at Fairfield University Digital Commons. https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/petry-books/197
|
||||
[^28]: Gary Webb, *Dark Alliance* (1998), chapter 25, "Things are moving all around us."
|
||||
[^29]: Docket entries 1 to 100, *United States v. Castillo*, No. 5:08-cr-00193 (W.D. Tex., filed April 2, 2008; earlier magistrate No. 5:08-mj-00160), CourtListener RECAP archive. https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/4399978/united-states-v-castillo/
|
||||
[^30]: Alicia Ramirez, "DEA Agent Sentenced to 22 Months at La Tuna," *San Antonio Current*, July 15-21, 2009. https://www.sacurrent.com/news/dea-agent-sentenced-to-22-months-at-la-tuna-2377362/
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -14,9 +14,17 @@ Edwin Corr was the U.S. Ambassador to [[El Salvador]] who received [[Celerino Ca
|
|||
|
||||
### Shutting Down the Investigation
|
||||
|
||||
When Castillo reported his findings about [[Cocaine]] trafficking at Ilopango to Ambassador Corr, Corr sent a secret back channel cable to Washington. Rather than supporting Castillo's investigation, the response from Washington was to shut it down. The CIA station in El Salvador sent a message to [[Costa Rica]] Station advising the [[DEA]] not to make inquiries about Hangar No. 4 at Ilopango. Corr's role in the chain of suppression illustrated how the State Department participated in protecting the Contra supply operation from law enforcement scrutiny.[^2]
|
||||
Corr sent a secret back-channel cable asking the [[State Department]] to have the [[DEA]] review Castillo's allegations. Corr told the Justice Department Inspector General that DEA headquarters replied that the [[Walter Grasheim|Grasheim]] case would be closed for lack of evidence. The Inspector General could not find that cable or the reply in DEA files, and the State Department could not find the back-channel cable.[^2] On April 25, 1986 the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] station in El Salvador asked the [[Costa Rica]] station to advise the DEA not to make any inquiries to anyone about Hangar No. 4 at Ilopango.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
Corr told the Inspector General that he had canceled U.S. government night vision contracts with Grasheim after the Salvadoran police search of Grasheim's residence, and that he thought it best to sever all ties with him. He said that after the search Castillo continued to make allegations about Grasheim's possible involvement with Salvadoran officials and Contra rebels. He said that after his back-channel cable Castillo's supervisors told Castillo to close the Grasheim investigation, and that Castillo continued "to snoop around the airport and make allegations." Corr said he told Castillo that if Castillo had evidence on Grasheim or anyone at Ilopango he would support the investigation, but that if he had none Castillo would have to stop the "witch hunt." Corr told the Inspector General that he did not recall the CIA ever asking him to pressure the DEA to back away from an investigation, and that Castillo never suggested to him that the CIA was conspiring with the Contras to traffic drugs.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Gary Webb]] wrote that Corr told Castillo to stop the "witch hunt" and that the DEA told Corr Castillo's information was "totally inaccurate." Webb attributes to Corr, in his interview with Justice Department investigators, the statements that Castillo "Was a very professional and a good agent" and that the investigation had the potential to "destroy relationships with Salvadoran officials that had taken so long to build."[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Castillo told the 1991 FBI interviewer, Special Agent Michael Foster, that Grasheim had told Corr "If I go down, half your Mil Group will go down with me," and that Corr had responded "Let the chips fall where they may." Castillo's account is recorded in the Inspector General's summary of Foster's report.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Ch. 15.
|
||||
[^2]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Ch. 15.
|
||||
[^2]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.1.b(2) (interview of Edwin Corr) and section C.1.a (Castillo's November 5, 1986 status report). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
|
||||
[^3]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Ch. 15.
|
||||
[^4]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 4, section K (summary of the FBI report of the 1991 interview of Castillo for the Office of Independent Counsel). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p4.htm
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -22,6 +22,23 @@ category: "Military"
|
|||
summary: "Army lieutenant of the 902d Military Intelligence Group attached to Grill Flame in 1978 for his earlier research, who screened the first Army remote viewers and was acting project manager of Center Lane in 1983."
|
||||
born: 1947-01-01
|
||||
location: "Glendale, California"
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Monroe Institute]]"
|
||||
role: President
|
||||
start: 2006
|
||||
fn: 12
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[Monroe Institute]]"
|
||||
role: Research Director
|
||||
start: 1988
|
||||
fn: 12
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[Gondola Wish]]"
|
||||
role: Project officer
|
||||
start: 1978
|
||||
end: 1978
|
||||
fn: 3
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Frederick Holmes "Skip" Atwater (born 1947, Glendale, California) was the [[U.S. Army]] intelligence officer at [[Fort Meade]], Maryland, who proposed the formation of a military remote viewing unit in 1977, recruited its initial personnel, and served as its operations officer through the program's most active period until his retirement from the Army in 1987. His proposal directly initiated what became the [[Stargate Project]] series of programs - Gondola Wish, Grill Flame, Center Lane, [[Sun Streak]] - that constituted the military's remote viewing research and intelligence effort for nearly two decades.
|
||||
|
|
@ -56,12 +73,27 @@ Frederick H. Atwater, known as Skip, was a lieutenant in the Special Security De
|
|||
|
||||
He remained the unit's operations officer through Grill Flame and [[Center Lane]]. INSCOM's chronology records, under July 7, 1983, "CPT Frederick Atwater assumes duties as Acting Project Manager," and under August 15, 1983, that Lieutenant Colonel Brian Buzby assumed duties as project manager.[^1] Published accounts by participants credit him with recruiting the first six viewers, among them Joe McMoneagle and Mel Riley, and with the unit's training in [[Robert Monroe]]'s Hemi-Sync method, which the Center Lane briefing dates to the end of 1980. After retiring from the Army in 1988 he became research director of the Monroe Institute's laboratory and, in 2006, its president, and was a founder and president of the International Remote Viewing Association.[^5][^6][^7]
|
||||
|
||||
### Gateway Training and the Monroe Institute
|
||||
|
||||
On July 29, 1978, as project officer for Gondola Wish, Atwater attended a seminar by [[Charles Tart]] on out-of-body experiences; his memorandum of July 31, 1978 records that Tart referred attendees who asked where to learn more about out-of-body experience to the Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
Atwater attended the Institute's eight-day training seminar from September 20 to 28, 1980 to assess it for the INSCOM Grill Flame Project. His trip report of September 30, 1980 recommended that experienced remote viewers be scheduled for the Institute's seminars and records that Robert Monroe had signed a consultant security agreement and that contact with the Institute had been on a "shallow cover" basis.[^8] In a memorandum of March 12, 1982 as Ops/Training Officer he proposed the Institute's Discovery series as a screening tool and the Gateway program as the second phase of an enhanced relaxation and concentration program, followed by one-on-one sessions with Monroe, the use of the Monroe tapes during operational sessions and biomonitoring.[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
On October 5, 1983 Atwater, as Operations Officer, and Lieutenant Colonel [[Brian Buzby]] briefed the Secretary of the Army, [[John Marsh]], on Center Lane; on January 5, 1984 Buzby and "Mr. Fred Atwater" briefed Marsh on Monroe, the Institute and INSCOM involvement with it, and the Secretary asked a series of questions on RAPT, Center Lane and the Institute.[^10][^11]
|
||||
|
||||
The Center Lane Project's biographical glossary states that in September 1988 Atwater accepted the position of Research Director in the Bob Monroe Research Lab at the Institute and that in December 2006 he became its president. A 1997 paper in the Journal of Scientific Exploration lists his affiliation as The Monroe Institute, Faber, Virginia. Army papers of 1983 style him "CPT Fred Atwater" (October 12, 1983), "Mr. Atwater" (August 31, 1983) and "Mr. Fred Atwater" (January 6, 1984); a Center Lane access list gives "Frederick H. Atwater, Mr., ASD, Great Skill." Other accounts give his Army retirement as 1987 and as 1988.[^12]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, "List of Events from September 1977 to January 1986," CIA-RDP96-00788R001100020001-8 and the attachment to CIA-RDP96-00788R001500180001-7, cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R001500180001-7.pdf.
|
||||
[^2]: 902d Military Intelligence Group, memorandum for Chief, OPSEC Support Division, "GONDOLA WISH (U)," May 18, 1978, signed Frederick H. Atwater, 2LT, MI, CI Studies Section, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000160007-7, cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R002000160007-7.pdf.
|
||||
[^3]: 902d Military Intelligence Group, "Attendance at Scientific Seminar in Support of GONDOLA WISH (U)," July 31, 1978, signed Frederick H. Atwater, Project Officer, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000160013-0, cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R002000160013-0.pdf.
|
||||
[^4]: Memorandum for record, "Minutes of the Grill Flame Committee Meeting, 14 Feb 79," with the representatives roster as enclosure 1, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000130002-5, cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R002000130002-5.pdf.
|
||||
[^5]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, "INSCOM Project Grill Flame: Progress Report #1," February 21, 1979, with enclosures, CIA-RDP96-00788R001100070001-3. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^6]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, "List of Events from September 1977 to January 1986," CIA-RDP96-00788R001100020001-8. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection. US Army Intelligence and Security Command, "Briefing - Project Center Lane," c. 1984, CIA-RDP96-00789R002100180002-8. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^5]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, "INSCOM Project Grill Flame: Progress Report #1," February 21, 1979, with enclosures, CIA-RDP96-00788R001100070001-3..
|
||||
[^6]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, "List of Events from September 1977 to January 1986," CIA-RDP96-00788R001100020001-8.. US Army Intelligence and Security Command, "Briefing - Project Center Lane," c. 1984, CIA-RDP96-00789R002100180002-8..
|
||||
[^7]: Monroe Institute and International Remote Viewing Association biographical notices, and Atwater, F. Holmes. *Captain of My Ship, Master of My Soul.* Hampton Roads, 2001; McMoneagle, Joseph. *The Stargate Chronicles.* Hampton Roads, 2002.
|
||||
[^8]: Atwater, Frederick H., memorandum for the record, "Trip Report, 18-28 September 1980," September 30, 1980. CIA-RDP96-00788R001200060028-4, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^9]: Atwater, Frederick H., memorandum IAGPC-G, March 12, 1982. CIA-RDP96-00788R001200060027-5, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^10]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, memorandum of October 12, 1983. CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270014-1, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^11]: Security Support Detachment, USAINSCOM, memorandum of January 6, 1984. CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270003-3, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^12]: Center Lane Project, glossary entry "Fred Holmes Skip Atwater," centerlane-rv.org/glossary/skip-atwater; Atwater, F. Holmes, "Accessing Anomalous States of Consciousness with a Binaural Beat Technology," *Journal of Scientific Exploration* 11, no. 3 (1997): 263-274.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -14,22 +14,45 @@ tags:
|
|||
- SS
|
||||
- 1950s
|
||||
- 1960s
|
||||
summary: "Heinz Felfe was a former SS officer and KGB double agent who joined the CIA-funded Gehlen Organization in 1951, rose to chief of counterintelligence for the BND, and was exposed in November 1961 after a decade compromising CIA-BND joint operations."
|
||||
summary: "Former SS officer and KGB double agent who joined the CIA-funded Gehlen Organization in 1951, rose to chief of BND Soviet counterintelligence, and was exposed in November 1961."
|
||||
born: 1918-03-18
|
||||
died: 2008-05-08
|
||||
location: "East Germany"
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[Gehlen Organization]]"
|
||||
start: 1951-11
|
||||
end: 1956-04
|
||||
role: counterintelligence section officer
|
||||
fn: 2
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[Bundesnachrichtendienst]]"
|
||||
start: 1956-04
|
||||
end: 1961-11
|
||||
role: deputy chief and in practice chief of the Soviet counterintelligence section
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
- type: informant_for
|
||||
with: "[[Stasi]]"
|
||||
start: 1969
|
||||
role: full-time informal collaborator after the exchange
|
||||
fn: 4
|
||||
---
|
||||
Heinz Felfe was born March 18, 1918, in Dresden, Germany. He joined the [[SS]] and served as an officer in the Sicherheitsdienst (SD), the SS intelligence service, during World War II. After the war he was captured by British forces, held briefly, and released. He died May 8, 2008, in Germany.[^1]
|
||||
Heinz Felfe was born March 18, 1918, in Dresden, Germany. He joined the [[SS]] and served as an officer in the Sicherheitsdienst (SD), the SS intelligence service, during World War II. He finished the war as an Obersturmführer in the Waffen-SS and a British prisoner of war, interned at the Blauw Kappel interrogation center near Utrecht, which specialized in former German intelligence personnel.[^1] He returned to West Germany in November 1946 and from 1947 worked as an agent of a British military intelligence unit (Sixth Area Intelligence Office, BAOR), reporting on communist student groups at the University of Bonn and joining the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) under British instruction.[^1] The British decided in April 1950 to drop him, citing his attempts to sell information to other agencies and his contacts with former SS men, among them Helmut Proebsting and Hans Clemens.[^1] The CIA study gives his entry into an SS reserve unit as 1938; the historian Norman Goda gives 1936 for his entry into the SS and 1943 for his commission.[^1][^2] He died May 8, 2008, in Germany.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
### Soviet Recruitment
|
||||
|
||||
Following his release from British custody, Felfe was recruited by [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] intelligence (the [[MGB]], predecessor to the [[KGB]]) during the postwar occupation period. The precise circumstances and date of his recruitment were never publicly established in full detail. Soviet intelligence had specific interest in recruiting former SD personnel who possessed intelligence tradecraft and might be positioned to penetrate Western intelligence structures, and Felfe's SS background, rather than disqualifying him, made him an attractive candidate for exactly this purpose.[^1]
|
||||
Following his release from British custody, Felfe was recruited by [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] intelligence (the [[MGB]], predecessor to the [[KGB]]) during the postwar occupation period.[^3] According to the CIA study, the Soviet effort ran through Felfe's former SD colleague Hans Clemens. Clemens went to Dresden in February 1950, was recruited there by a Soviet officer, and then recruited Erwin Tiebel and Felfe in West Germany; Felfe, then working as a refugee interrogator, resisted the trip east for another year.[^1] Goda dates Felfe's full status as a Soviet agent, codenamed Paul, to September 1951 and his job in the Gehlen Organization's counterintelligence section to November 1951.[^2] The CIA study adds that Felfe may have been recruited earlier, during a 1948 trip east while working for the British, and that Goleniewski reached the same view.[^1] Soviet intelligence had specific interest in recruiting former SD personnel who possessed intelligence tradecraft and might be positioned to penetrate Western intelligence structures, and Felfe's SS background, rather than disqualifying him, made him an attractive candidate for exactly this purpose.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
### Entry into the Gehlen Organization
|
||||
|
||||
In 1951, Felfe was recruited into the [[Gehlen Organization]], the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]-funded intelligence network that [[Reinhard Gehlen]] had built at Pullach, Bavaria, from the remnants of his wartime intelligence apparatus. Felfe's SS and SD background was not disqualifying within the Gehlen Organization, which recruited extensively from former Wehrmacht and Nazi intelligence veterans. He entered the counterintelligence section and rose progressively through its ranks.[^1]
|
||||
In 1951, Felfe was recruited into the [[Gehlen Organization]], the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]-funded intelligence network that [[Reinhard Gehlen]] had built at Pullach, Bavaria, from the remnants of his wartime intelligence apparatus. Felfe's SS and SD background was not disqualifying within the Gehlen Organization, which recruited extensively from former Wehrmacht and Nazi intelligence veterans. He entered the counterintelligence section and rose progressively through its ranks.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
When the [[Bundesnachrichtendienst]] (BND) formally succeeded the Gehlen Organization in April 1956, Felfe transitioned into the new service's structure and continued his rise within the counterintelligence apparatus. He eventually became chief of Soviet counterintelligence within the BND - the section responsible for identifying and neutralizing Soviet penetration agents within West German intelligence.[^1]
|
||||
When the [[Bundesnachrichtendienst]] (BND) formally succeeded the Gehlen Organization in April 1956, Felfe transitioned into the new service's structure and continued his rise within the counterintelligence apparatus. He eventually became chief of Soviet counterintelligence within the BND - the section responsible for identifying and neutralizing Soviet penetration agents within West German intelligence.[^3] The CIA study describes him as an officer of the BND for ten years, six of them as deputy chief (in practice the real chief) of the section responsible among other things for countering Soviet espionage, having succeeded his superior Reile in late 1956 or early 1957.[^1] Goda states that he took charge of counterintelligence against the Soviets in 1955.[^2] Bodo Hechelhammer, the BND's chief historian, says he rose to head of counterintelligence against the Soviet Union, and ZDF calls him head of the section "Gegenspionage Sowjetunion."[^4][^5]
|
||||
|
||||
The Army's Counter Intelligence Corps noted in 1953 Felfe's role as leader of an "SD clique" in the Gehlen Organization, in 1954 that he was probably leaking to the Soviets, and in 1955 that suspicion of him and the clique was growing; the CIA suspected him by 1957, but he had the confidence of Reinhard Gehlen and personally briefed him on sensitive Soviet matters.[^2] From 1958 Felfe pressed the CIA for information on its Karlshorst penetration program. The CIA's record shows first official briefings to him in May 1958, February 1959 and July 1959, after which he became the BND headquarters supervisor of the joint program.[^1] The CIA's 1963 damage assessment estimated that roughly 15,000 individual items were blown or compromised.[^2] Hechelhammer states that the whole Soviet counterintelligence of the BND collapsed for years and had to be rebuilt.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
Wilhelm Harster, an SS lieutenant general who had been Felfe's superior, could not join the BND as a security risk but presented himself as a BND agent and recommended former SS contacts to the service; the CIA's file indicates he used Felfe to reach the BND.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### Decade of Penetration
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -37,26 +60,31 @@ Felfe operated as a KGB agent throughout his tenure in the Gehlen Organization a
|
|||
|
||||
The identities of Western agents operating in the Soviet bloc who had been compromised through BND channels; the existence and details of CIA-BND joint operations in [[East Germany]] and other Warsaw Pact countries; the organizational structure, personnel, and procedures of the BND itself; and material that allowed Soviet intelligence to anticipate Western counterintelligence activities.
|
||||
|
||||
The full extent of the damage was difficult to assess because Felfe had in his counterintelligence role the authority to handle cases involving suspected Soviet agents - a position from which he could protect Soviet sources, mislead investigations, and channel false information to American and [[West Germany|West German]] analysts.[^1]
|
||||
The full extent of the damage was difficult to assess because Felfe had in his counterintelligence role the authority to handle cases involving suspected Soviet agents - a position from which he could protect Soviet sources, mislead investigations, and channel false information to American and [[West Germany|West German]] analysts.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
### Exposure
|
||||
|
||||
Felfe was exposed in November 1961, following information provided to Western intelligence by a Soviet defector or through signals intelligence - the specific source of his exposure was officially described in general terms but not fully disclosed publicly. He was arrested along with two accomplices, Hans Clemens and Erwin Tiebel, who had also been working within the Gehlen/BND network.[^1]
|
||||
Felfe was exposed in November 1961. The CIA study states he was detected through a lead provided by a CIA-run penetration of the Polish Intelligence Service (UB) and names the defector Michal Goleniewski, a senior UB officer, as the officer who provided the lead.[^1] He was arrested along with two accomplices, Hans Clemens and Erwin Tiebel, who had also been working within the Gehlen/BND network.[^3] News of the arrests was generally known throughout the West German government by December 2, 1961, and appeared in the newspapers by December 12.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
The timing was significant: his exposure came only months after the construction of the [[Berlin Wall]] in August 1961, a period of heightened tension in which the extent of Soviet penetration of Western intelligence was a matter of acute concern.
|
||||
|
||||
### Trial and Conviction
|
||||
|
||||
Felfe was tried in West Germany on charges of treason and espionage. He was convicted in July 1963 and sentenced to fourteen years in prison. The trial established the factual record of his decade of KGB service and the scope of the material he had passed. His cooperation during trial and sentencing was limited.[^1]
|
||||
Felfe was tried in West Germany on charges of treason and espionage. He was convicted in July 1963 and sentenced to fourteen years in prison. The trial established the factual record of his decade of KGB service and the scope of the material he had passed. His cooperation during trial and sentencing was limited.[^3] Hans Clemens received nine years and Tiebel two years at hard labor.[^1] From prison Felfe re-established contact with the KGB through his mother in Dresden and corresponded with the Soviets; the Soviets several times tried to obtain his release in exchange for prisoners held in the East.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### Exchange and East Germany
|
||||
|
||||
In February 1969, Felfe was exchanged for a group of Western agents held by East Germany in a spy exchange negotiated between the two German states. He settled in East Germany, where he was received as a hero of socialist intelligence work. He later published a memoir, *Im Dienst des Gegners* (In the Service of the Enemy, 1986), presenting his account of his career as a double agent and his motivations. He taught at Humboldt University in East Berlin and remained in Germany after reunification, dying in 2008.[^1]
|
||||
In February 1969, Felfe was exchanged for a group of Western agents held by East Germany in a spy exchange negotiated between the two German states. Goda states that Felfe was released to East Germany in 1969 in exchange for three West German spies, and a BND archive photograph published with Hechelhammer's interview shows the exchange at the Herleshausen border crossing.[^2][^4] He settled in East Germany, where he was received as a hero of socialist intelligence work; Hechelhammer states that he became a full-time informal collaborator of the Stasi.[^4] He later published a memoir, *Im Dienst des Gegners* (In the Service of the Enemy, 1986), presenting his account of his career as a double agent and his motivations. He taught at Humboldt University in East Berlin and remained in Germany after reunification, dying in 2008.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
### Significance
|
||||
|
||||
Felfe's career was among the most damaging Cold War penetrations of a Western intelligence service. Its specific significance derived from his position in counterintelligence rather than in operational work - he did not merely report on operations but actively managed the processes that were supposed to protect them. The Felfe case reinforced American intelligence concerns about the security vulnerabilities of the BND stemming from its origins in the Nazi intelligence establishment, and contributed to a reassessment of the degree of access given to BND personnel in joint operations.[^1]
|
||||
Felfe's career was among the most damaging Cold War penetrations of a Western intelligence service. Its specific significance derived from his position in counterintelligence rather than in operational work - he did not merely report on operations but actively managed the processes that were supposed to protect them. The Felfe case reinforced American intelligence concerns about the security vulnerabilities of the BND stemming from its origins in the Nazi intelligence establishment, and contributed to a reassessment of the degree of access given to BND personnel in joint operations.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA.* Doubleday, 2007, pp. 33-56. Felfe, Heinz. *Im Dienst des Gegners: 10 Jahre Moskaus Mann im BND.* Rasch und Röhring, 1986 (Felfe's own account). Breitman, Richard, Norman J.W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, and Robert Wolfe. *U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis.* Cambridge University Press, 2005.
|
||||
[^1]: Central Intelligence Agency, "KGB Exploitation of Heinz Felfe: Successful KGB Penetration of a Western Intelligence Service," March 1969, document C02606328, released February 21, 2019. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/node/2071209
|
||||
[^2]: Goda, Norman J. W., "CIA Files Relating to Heinz Felfe, SS officer and KGB Spy," Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, 2008. https://fas.org/sgp/eprint/goda.pdf
|
||||
[^3]: Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA.* Doubleday, 2007, pp. 33-56. Felfe, Heinz. *Im Dienst des Gegners: 10 Jahre Moskaus Mann im BND.* Rasch und Röhring, 1986 (Felfe's own account). Breitman, Richard, Norman J.W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, and Robert Wolfe. *U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis.* Cambridge University Press, 2005.
|
||||
[^4]: Hechelhammer, Bodo, interview, "Spion Heinz Felfe: Für ihn lieferten die Sowjets kleinere Fische ans Messer," t-online, March 22, 2020. https://www.t-online.de/nachrichten/panorama/wissen/geschichte/id_87517540/spion-heinz-felfe-fuer-ihn-lieferten-die-sowjets-kleinere-fische-ans-messer-.html
|
||||
[^5]: ZDF, "BND-Affären: Von Hanning und Felfe bis Landesverrat an Russland," October 6, 2026. https://www.zdfheute.de/politik/deutschland/bnd-affaeren-spionage-hanning-skandale-100.html
|
||||
[^6]: Breitman, Richard, "Historical Analysis of 20 Name Files from CIA Records," Interagency Working Group, 2001 (entry on Wilhelm Harster). https://www.archives.gov/iwg/declassified-records/rg-263-cia-records/historical-analysis-by-breitman.pdf
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -29,11 +29,13 @@ When Lumumba, the Congo's first elected Prime Minister, sought [[Soviet Union|So
|
|||
|
||||
Devlin testified to the [[Church Committee]] in 1975 that he never used the materials and eventually disposed of them by throwing the poison into the [[Congo River]]. His testimony acknowledged he had understood the orders but claimed moral and practical objections to carrying them out.[^1] The committee's interim report calls the Leopoldville station officer "Hedgman." The scientist it calls "Joseph Scheider" testified on October 7 and 9, 1975 that he destroyed the viability of the biological material and disposed of it in the Congo River before leaving the Congo on October 5, 1960, and the station officer testified on August 21, 1975 that he locked the material in the bottom drawer of his safe and disposed of it months later; each recalled disposing of it in the Congo River, alone. The station officer's October 7, 1960 cable to [[Bronson Tweedy]] said that "certain items of continuing usefulness" had been left.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
The 2019 report of the United Nations Eminent Person described the CIA's presence in the Congo in 1961 as including air operations and activities that included planned assassinations. It recorded that Chief of Station Larry Devlin coordinated agents designated "WIROGUE" and "QJWIN," and attributed the planned assassinations to "the programme 'ZRRIFLE' and other programmes" rather than to Devlin by name.[^3] The report did not state whether Devlin knew of or approved the programmes it named.
|
||||
|
||||
### Lumumba's Death
|
||||
|
||||
Despite Devlin's claimed refusal of the assassination order, Lumumba was captured, transferred to Katanga, and killed on January 17, 1961, by Katangese forces under [[Moise Tshombe]] with Belgian officers present. The precise extent of CIA foreknowledge or facilitation of this transfer - as opposed to the separate biological assassination plan Devlin received - has not been fully resolved by the documentary record.
|
||||
|
||||
Devlin acknowledged to the Church Committee that the CIA was aware of Lumumba's transfer to Katanga and that this transfer made his survival unlikely. A 2001 Belgian parliamentary inquiry found Belgian government and intelligence officers directly involved in the killing. The question of whether CIA officers encouraged or facilitated the handover remained contested.[^3]
|
||||
Devlin acknowledged to the Church Committee that the CIA was aware of Lumumba's transfer to Katanga and that this transfer made his survival unlikely. A 2001 Belgian parliamentary inquiry found Belgian government and intelligence officers directly involved in the killing. The question of whether CIA officers encouraged or facilitated the handover remained contested.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
### Mobutu and the Congo's Political Future
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -51,4 +53,5 @@ In 2007, one year before his death, Devlin published *Chief of Station, Congo: F
|
|||
|
||||
[^1]: Devlin, Lawrence. *Chief of Station, Congo: Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone.* Public Affairs, 2007. Church Committee (U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities). *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders.* Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975.
|
||||
[^2]: Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report*, S. Rept. 94-465, November 20, 1975, pp. 24 to 31 (Scheider, October 7 and 9, 1975; Hedgman, August 21, 1975, pp. 48 to 49 and 84 to 85). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
|
||||
[^3]: Kalb, Madeleine G. *The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa from Eisenhower to Kennedy.* Macmillan, 1982. De Witte, Ludo. *The Assassination of Lumumba.* Verso, 2001.
|
||||
[^3]: A/73/973, report of the Eminent Person, September 12, 2019, paragraph 26. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^4]: Kalb, Madeleine G. *The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa from Eisenhower to Kennedy.* Macmillan, 1982. De Witte, Ludo. *The Assassination of Lumumba.* Verso, 2001.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ aliases:
|
|||
- Walter Grasheim
|
||||
- Wally Grasheim
|
||||
created: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
category: "Arms Dealers & Brokers"
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- Person
|
||||
|
|
@ -15,6 +15,14 @@ tags:
|
|||
- ContraWar
|
||||
- DarkAllianceInvestigation
|
||||
summary: "New York weapons dealer and U.S. military contractor raided by DEA agent Celerino Castillo, who was found with embassy plates, C-4 explosives, and a massive weapons cache."
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[Celerino Castillo]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 1986-10-27
|
||||
end: 1986-11-21
|
||||
role: "DEA case opened by Castillo and closed by Country Attache Robert Stia"
|
||||
fn: 4
|
||||
---
|
||||
Walter "Wally" Grasheim was a New York weapons dealer and U.S. military contractor based in [[San Salvador]], [[El Salvador]], who was raided by [[DEA]] agent [[Celerino Castillo]] on September 1, 1986. The raid uncovered a massive weapons cache, U.S. Embassy license plates and IDs, and evidence linking Grasheim to the Contra operation at [[Ilopango Airbase|Ilopango Air Force Base]].[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -24,7 +32,7 @@ The tall, bearded arms broker was the Salvadoran sales representative for the Li
|
|||
|
||||
### The Raid
|
||||
|
||||
Denied access to the military side of Ilopango, Castillo targeted Grasheim as an off-base target linked to the Ilopango operation. One of Castillo's informants told him Grasheim was intimately involved with the Contra drug operation at the base, and DEA computers turned up several references to Grasheim as a suspected drug trafficker. Salvadoran police working with Castillo raided Grasheim's elegant hillside home in San Salvador. A pound of marijuana was found, along with an extraordinary weapons cache: "Some of the rooms in the house had munitions and explosives piled to the ceiling, including automatic weapons, M-16's, hand grenades and C-4 [plastic explosives]." The raid also uncovered U.S. Embassy license plates, radios, and IDs in Grasheim's name.[^1]
|
||||
Denied access to the military side of Ilopango, Castillo targeted Grasheim as an off-base target linked to the Ilopango operation. One of Castillo's informants told him Grasheim was intimately involved with the Contra drug operation at the base, and DEA computers turned up several references to Grasheim as a suspected drug trafficker. Salvadoran police working with Castillo raided Grasheim's elegant hillside home in San Salvador. A pound of marijuana was found, along with an extraordinary weapons cache. [[Gary Webb]] quoted the raid's contents as including: "Some of the rooms in the house had munitions and explosives piled to the ceiling, including automatic weapons, M-16's, hand grenades and C-4 [plastic explosives]." The Inspector General's inventory of the September 1, 1986 search lists "machine guns" and "pistols" and does not list M-16s. The raid also uncovered U.S. Embassy license plates, radios, and IDs in Grasheim's name.[^1][^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### Grasheim's Claims
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -32,8 +40,29 @@ Grasheim strenuously denied involvement with either the Contras or drugs and bel
|
|||
|
||||
### CIA Infiltration of Castillo's Investigation
|
||||
|
||||
The [[Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General|Justice Department Inspector General]]'s report partially confirmed Grasheim's account. Castillo's informant Murga, who directed Castillo toward Grasheim by fingering him as "head of smuggling operations at Ilopango," was indeed a CIA asset and had been for some time. Soon after putting Castillo onto Grasheim, the CIA demanded Murga back. Castillo's boss Robert Stia "recalled being asked by the CIA station chief in El Salvador to relinquish the use of informant" Murga. "The Station Chief had explained that the CIA had established the informant before he had ever worked for the DEA" and wanted the DEA to stop using him because "he was currently a CIA informant." Stia complied but complained internally that the CIA had cost the DEA a valuable asset.[^1]
|
||||
The [[Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General|Justice Department Inspector General]]'s report partially confirmed Grasheim's account. Webb wrote that Castillo's informant Murga, who directed Castillo toward Grasheim by fingering him as "head of smuggling operations at Ilopango," "was indeed working for the CIA and had been for quite some time," and that soon after putting Castillo onto Grasheim the CIA demanded Murga back.[^1] The Inspector General's report designates the informant STG6 and records that the CIA asked the DEA in December 1987 to stop using STG6 because he was currently a CIA informant; the DEA reactivated him in 1989. [[Robert Stia]] recalled being asked "by the CIA Station Chief in El Salvador to relinquish use of informant STG6," and said "The Station Chief had explained that the CIA had established the informant before he had ever worked for the DEA." Stia complied but complained internally that the CIA had cost the DEA a valuable asset.[^3] The report does not confirm Grasheim's claim that the informant worked for the CIA against Castillo; it records that CIA records showed STG6 was a CIA informant and that the CIA and the DEA disagreed over his use.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
### Investigation Record, 1986
|
||||
|
||||
The DEA's case on Grasheim began with a March 10, 1986 cable from Panama, which reported that Grasheim and an Israeli national had flown in from El Salvador and, when questioned by Panamanian authorities, had claimed to be DEA agents. The cable also reported a U.S. Customs Service investigation of Grasheim in New York for arms smuggling.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
On May 3, 1986, according to Castillo's report, Grasheim crash-landed an aircraft six miles northwest of Tamiami airport in Florida while flying from Ilopango to Florida. At the scene he identified himself as a "secret agent" with the U.S. government and turned over a suitcase that Castillo's report says weighed about 60 pounds and contained cocaine. Castillo's report also says Grasheim did not clear Customs. Grasheim told the Inspector General that a clog in his fuel line forced an emergency landing in 1987, that Customs instructed him to proceed to the airport, that he left everything in the plane except a suitcase of business records and flight plans, and that no one searched his person, bags or plane.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
The case opening report, dated October 27, 1986 in the Inspector General's file listing, named the informants STG6 and STG13 and attributed to Grasheim the "air smuggling of cocaine by subjects who were believed to be associated with the Contra movement." Castillo's report said that Grasheim allegedly abused hangars four and five, which the CIA had provided to him. The Salvadoran police search of Grasheim's residence followed on September 1, 1986, and Grasheim filed a sworn statement on September 19, 1986 saying that the Salvadoran armed forces had named him a military advisor and given him the seized items. The armed forces denied that they had done so.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
On October 30, 1986, Castillo and Customs agent Richard Rivera briefed Ambassador [[Edwin Corr]]. Corr said he welcomed an investigation but asked that it be conducted discreetly. Corr told the Inspector General that he had canceled U.S. government night vision contracts with Grasheim after the search. Grasheim later came to the embassy and asked to see Corr, and his security staff turned him away.[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
The DEA closed the case on November 21, 1986. In the closing report, Country Attache Robert Stia wrote: "DEA has no further interest in Grasheim at this time and it is unlikely to develop further drug information about Grasheim directly." The report noted that Grasheim had questioned "DEA's right and authority to conduct an investigation into his activities." Stia wrote that the DEA's information was passed to Customs and the Internal Revenue Service, which were conducting their own investigation of Grasheim's exports of military supplies.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
Grasheim told the Inspector General that he was never charged with a crime or given a formal explanation for the search. He offered three explanations for why the DEA had targeted him: some of his activities were suspicious, the DEA might have been "led by the nose through the investigation by someone else" who wanted to divert attention from that person, or the investigation resulted from his "high profile" in El Salvador.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
Customs agent Rivera told the Inspector General that Customs never developed enough evidence to charge Grasheim with an offense, and that its case was closed. The Customs file the Inspector General obtained contained nothing on the CIA or the Contras.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 13: "The wrong kind of friends"
|
||||
[^2]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.1.b(6) (interview of Walter Grasheim) and section C.1.a (inventory of the September 1, 1986 search). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
|
||||
[^3]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 3, section H (informant STG6, CIA use and DEA reactivation). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p3.htm
|
||||
[^4]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.1.a (DEA reports on Grasheim, including the March 10, 1986 Panama cable, the October 27, 1986 case opening report and the September 19, 1986 sworn statement). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
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[^5]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.1.b(2) (interview of Edwin Corr). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
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[^6]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, sections C.1.c (closing of the Grasheim case) and C.1.b(5) (interview of Richard Rivera). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
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@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ died: 1996-04-27
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location: "Saint Paul, Minnesota"
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---
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William Egan Colby (January 4, 1920 - April 27, 1996) served as Director of Central Intelligence from September 1973 to January 1976 under Presidents Nixon and Ford. His tenure was defined by his decision to cooperate with congressional investigations into CIA domestic surveillance activities, a choice that made him deeply unpopular within the agency's leadership and among figures like [[James Jesus Angleton]] and [[Richard Helms]].[^1]
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William Egan Colby (January 4, 1920 - April 27, 1996) served as Director of Central Intelligence from September 4, 1973 to January 30, 1976 (after [[Vernon Walters]] served as acting director from July 2, 1973) under Presidents Nixon and Ford. His tenure was defined by his decision to cooperate with congressional investigations into CIA domestic surveillance activities, a choice that made him deeply unpopular within the agency's leadership and among figures like [[James Jesus Angleton]] and [[Richard Helms]].[^1][^2]
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### Vietnam Service
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@ -32,17 +32,17 @@ Colby served as CIA station chief in Saigon during the [[Vietnam War]] and from
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### Angleton Firing and Operation CHAOS
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In December 1974, Seymour Hersh approached Colby with material for a forthcoming New York Times article on the CIA's domestic surveillance activities under [[Operation CHAOS]] (MHCHAOS). On December 17, 1974 - five days before Hersh's article appeared on December 22 - Colby dismissed Angleton, who had headed the Counterintelligence Staff that ran CHAOS under director [[Richard Ober]]. Angleton had served as the CIA's chief of counterintelligence for 21 years.[^1][^2]
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In December 1974, Seymour Hersh approached Colby with material for a forthcoming New York Times article on the CIA's domestic surveillance activities under [[Operation CHAOS]] (MHCHAOS). On December 17, 1974 - five days before Hersh's article appeared on December 22 - Colby dismissed Angleton, who had headed the Counterintelligence Staff that ran CHAOS under director [[Richard Ober]]. Angleton had served as the CIA's chief of counterintelligence for 21 years.[^1][^3]
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Colby's cooperation with the subsequent [[Church Committee]] investigation of CHAOS and other "Family Jewels" programs (a compilation of potentially illegal CIA activities assembled by Colby's predecessor [[James Schlesinger]] in 1973) was deeply controversial within the CIA. Critics including former DCI Helms accused him of betraying the agency; defenders argued he prevented far more damaging forced exposure.[^1]
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### Israel and Nuclear Weapons
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Colby held a documented assessment of Israeli nuclear capability. He shared the assumption that Israel had a small number of nuclear weapons by 1973 and believed they would be used "only in an extreme situation." His analysis was tested during the October 1973 Yom Kippur War when Israeli military performance initially deteriorated. He believed that in the event of a potential Israeli military collapse, Israel might use its nuclear weapons.[^3]
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Colby held a documented assessment of Israeli nuclear capability. He shared the assumption that Israel had a small number of nuclear weapons by 1973 and believed they would be used "only in an extreme situation." His analysis was tested during the October 1973 Yom Kippur War when Israeli military performance initially deteriorated. He believed that in the event of a potential Israeli military collapse, Israel might use its nuclear weapons.[^4]
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### Legacy and the Contra War
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Colby's tenure established institutional patterns in deniable covert operations that carried into the Contra war era through his protégé [[William Nelson]], who subsequently served as the CIA's Deputy Director of Operations - the head of all covert operations worldwide - before moving to [[Fluor Corporation]]. Methods developed under Colby's leadership for managing deniable operations became standard practice in the later Contra-era programs.[^4]
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Colby's tenure established institutional patterns in deniable covert operations that carried into the Contra war era through his protégé [[William Nelson]], who subsequently served as the CIA's Deputy Director of Operations - the head of all covert operations worldwide - before moving to [[Fluor Corporation]]. Methods developed under Colby's leadership for managing deniable operations became standard practice in the later Contra-era programs.[^5]
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### Death
|
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|
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|
@ -50,12 +50,13 @@ On April 27, 1996, Colby disappeared from his weekend home in Rock Point, Maryla
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|
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### Israel
|
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|
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William E. Colby served as the Director of the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] from 1973 to 1976. He shared the assumption that [[Israel]] had a few nuclear weapons and that if there was a collapse during the 1973 [[Yom Kippur War]], there was a possibility that Israel would use them. Colby believed that nuclear weapons would be used "only in an extreme situation."[^5]
|
||||
William E. Colby served as the Director of the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] from 1973 to 1976. He shared the assumption that [[Israel]] had a few nuclear weapons and that if there was a collapse during the 1973 [[Yom Kippur War]], there was a possibility that Israel would use them. Colby believed that nuclear weapons would be used "only in an extreme situation."[^6]
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|
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### Footnotes
|
||||
|
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[^1]: Powers, Thomas. *The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA*. Knopf, 1979. Hersh, Seymour M. "Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U.S. Against Antiwar Forces." New York Times, December 22, 1974.
|
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[^2]: Church Committee, S. Rept. 94-755, April 26, 1976.
|
||||
[^3]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 17.
|
||||
[^4]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion*. Seven Stories Press, 1998. Ch. 9.
|
||||
[^5]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 17.
|
||||
[^2]: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVIII, part 2, front matter, "Persons" (Walters: "Acting Director of Central Intelligence, July 2, 1973-September 4, 1973"; Colby: "Director of Central Intelligence, September 4, 1973-January 30, 1976"; Schlesinger: "Director of Central Intelligence, February 2-July 2, 1973"). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v38p2/persons
|
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[^3]: Church Committee, S. Rept. 94-755, April 26, 1976.
|
||||
[^4]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 17.
|
||||
[^5]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion*. Seven Stories Press, 1998. Ch. 9.
|
||||
[^6]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 17.
|
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