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10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Brent Scowcroft.md
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@ -3,31 +3,260 @@ category: "Intelligence & Government"
tags:
- Person
- BrentScowcroft
- KissingerAssociates
- NationalSecurityCouncil
- KissingerAssociates
- BNLScandal
- Iraq
- Iraqgate
- GeorgeHWBush
summary: "Vice chairman of Kissinger Associates, where he advised Banca Nazionale del Lavoro for fees, who as national security adviser kept agricultural credits flowing to Iraq in 1990 while his staff resisted measures singling Iraq out."
- GeraldFord
- TowerCommission
- ScowcroftCommission
- PresidentsForeignIntelligenceAdvisoryBoard
- GulfWar
- NSD26
- AspenStrategyGroup
- TheScowcroftGroup
aliases:
- Brent Scowcroft
- Scowcroft
- Gen. Brent Scowcroft
- General Scowcroft
- Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft
summary: "Retired Air Force lieutenant general, national security adviser to Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush, chairman of the 1983 Commission on Strategic Forces and of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 2001 to 2005."
location: "Washington, D.C."
created: 2026-09-21
updated: 2026-09-21
updated: 2026-10-12
relations:
- type: appointed
with: "[[Richard Nixon]]"
start: "1971"
end: "1973"
role: "military aide to the President"
fn: 5
- type: reported_to
with: "[[Henry A. Kissinger]]"
start: "1973"
end: "1975"
role: "deputy assistant to the President for national security affairs"
fn: 5
- type: appointed
with: "[[Gerald R. Ford]]"
start: "1975"
end: "1977"
role: "Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs"
fn: 10
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Yom Kippur War]]"
start: "1973"
end: "1973"
role: "attended the October 24 or 25, 1973 meeting at which DEFCON III was set"
fn: 7
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Kissinger Associates]]"
start: "1982"
end: "1989"
role: "vice chairman; headed the firm's Washington office"
fn: 14
- type: head_of
with: "[[Scowcroft Commission]]"
start: "1983"
end: "1983"
role: "chairman of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces"
fn: 21
- type: director_of
with: "[[Council on Foreign Relations]]"
start: "1984"
end: "1986"
role: "director, term expiring 1986, and member of the Nominating and Membership committees"
fn: 25
- type: member_of
with: "[[Tower Commission]]"
start: "1987"
end: "1987"
role: "member of the President's Special Review Board"
fn: 26
- type: contractor_to
with: "[[Banca Nazionale del Lavoro]]"
start: "1986"
end: "1989"
role: "adviser to bank management through Kissinger Associates; briefed the bank's board three times, as reported by Gonzalez"
fn: 19
- type: appointed
with: "[[George H.W. Bush]]"
start: "1989"
end: "1993"
role: "Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs"
fn: 1
- type: investigated
with: "[[Frederick Lacey]]"
reverse: true
start: "1992"
end: "1992"
role: "special counsel's review of the BNL matter, which examined his contacts with BNL management"
fn: 15
- type: founded
with: "[[The Scowcroft Group]]"
start: "1994"
role: "founder of the international business advisory firm"
fn: 4
- type: head_of
with: "[[President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board]]"
start: "2001"
end: "2005"
role: "chairman"
fn: 49
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Aspen Strategy Group]]"
start: "2016"
end: "2016"
role: "named by Tom Pritzker as one of three people who run the group"
fn: 55
---
Brent Scowcroft, a retired [[United States Air Force|Air Force]] lieutenant general, was vice chairman of [[Kissinger Associates]] until January 1989, when he became national security adviser to President [[George H.W. Bush]].[^1]
Brent Scowcroft (March 19, 1925 to August 6, 2020) was a retired [[United States Air Force|Air Force]] lieutenant general who served as national security adviser to President [[Gerald R. Ford]] from 1975 to 1977 and to President [[George H.W. Bush]] from 1989 to 1993.[^1][^2] He chaired the President's Commission on Strategic Forces in 1983, was a member of the [[Tower Commission]] in 1987, was vice chairman of [[Kissinger Associates]] until January 1989, founded [[The Scowcroft Group]] in 1994 and chaired the [[President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board]] from 2001 to 2005.[^3][^4]
### The Bank
### Air Force and the Nixon White House
"BNL was a client of Mr. Scowcroft's while he was the vice-chairman of Kissinger Associates," Representative [[Henry B. Gonzalez]] told the House on April 28, 1992. "Mr. Scowcroft regularly provided advice to BNL's management and received hefty fees in return." At a meeting in [[New York City|New York]] in 1987 he, [[Henry A. Kissinger|Henry Kissinger]], [[Lawrence Eagleburger]], and [[Alan Stoga]] advised officers of the [[Banca Nazionale del Lavoro]], and he and Stoga took them to lunch. The special counsel [[Frederick Lacey]] found that the two men "came into contact with BNL management" and saw nothing to suggest they knew of the lending to [[Iraq]] by the bank's [[Atlanta]] branch.[^1][^2]
[[Henry B. Gonzalez]], the chairman of the [[House Banking Committee]], told the House on April 28, 1992 that early in his career Scowcroft served one year as air attaché at the [[United States Embassy in Belgrade]] in [[Yugoslavia]].[^5] After earning a Ph.D. and working in academia from 1962 to 1968, he held a succession of national security posts in the [[Department of Defense]].[^5] In 1971 President [[Richard Nixon]] appointed him military aide to the President, and in 1973 [[Henry A. Kissinger|Kissinger]] chose him as deputy assistant to the President for national security affairs.[^5] The Scowcroft Group's biography of him describes a twenty-nine-year military career that began with graduation from [[United States Military Academy|West Point]] and ended at the rank of lieutenant general after service as Deputy National Security Advisor.[^3] [[R. W. Apple Jr.]], who wrote the introduction to the Tower Commission report, described him as "a retired Air Force general who served several Republican presidents as a key foreign-policy adviser."[^6]
### The White House
### Deputy to Kissinger, 1973 to 1975
[[Bryan Siebert]] of the [[United States Department of Energy|Energy Department]] "had been waging a lonely and unsuccessful battle to get [[James Baker]] and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft to do something about the steady flow of U.S. exports that were materially assisting Iraq's nuclear weapons program." [[Matrix Churchill]] "was not discussed at the cabinet meeting, even though the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] had reported its activities to both the [[White House]] and the [[State Department]] in November 1989." Scowcroft's aides "objected to any measures 'that singled out Iraq.'" On May 18, 1990, he telephoned Secretary of Agriculture [[Clayton Yeutter]] and asked him "not to put out any press release today saying we are terminating the program" of [[Commodity Credit Corporation Iraq Program|credit guarantees]]. "We would be shooting ourselves in the foot," his staff said of cancelling the second 500 million dollars. Iraq invaded [[Kuwait]] on August 2.[^3]
A memorandum for the record that Admiral [[Thomas H. Moorer]] prepared on October 26, 1973 reproduces Kissinger's record of schedule for a meeting in Washington on the night of October 24 to 25, 1973 (10:30 p.m. to 3:30 a.m.), which lists the attendees as Kissinger, [[James R. Schlesinger]], [[William Colby]], Moorer, Scowcroft, [[Alexander Haig]] and [[Jonathan Howe]]. The memorandum lists among the actions taken that day the setting of [[DEFCON]] III, during the [[Yom Kippur War]].[^7] Kissinger later recalled that immediately after the alert was set he instructed Scowcroft to call [[Anatoly Dobrynin]] to tell him to desist from all action until there was a U.S. reply, "and to warn him that any unilateral actions by the Soviet Union would have the most serious consequences."[^7] The Foreign Relations of the United States editors note that [[Ray Cline|Cline]] called the meeting a "curious little rump NSC meeting" in the Winter 1974 to 1975 issue of [[Foreign Policy]].[^7] Gonzalez told the House that Scowcroft often took charge of the [[National Security Council]] while Kissinger was fulfilling his duties as Secretary of State.[^8]
Lawyers of his staff under [[C. Nicholas Rostow|Nicholas Rostow]] met with those of other agencies to coordinate replies to congressional requests for documents on Iraq. Gonzalez called them "the Rostow gang." His investigator was told by Rostow that "it would be a cold day in hell before Congress got NSD 26."[^3]
### National security adviser to Ford, 1975 to 1977
On May 27, 1975 Ford met in the [[White House Cabinet Room|Cabinet Room]] with Schlesinger, Colby, [[Donald Rumsfeld]], [[Robert Ingersoll]] and Scowcroft, who is listed in the memorandum of conversation as Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, about a [[New York Times]] article by [[Seymour Hersh]] on American submarine intercept missions in Soviet waters. Ford said: "Somehow someone must be made an example of." Scowcroft said: "The real problem is not the press. The real problem is the people who are leaking the material to the press. They are the ones we have to go after."[^9]
At a news conference on November 3, 1975, Ford announced that "Brent Scowcroft, who has been serving ably for 3 years as Deputy Assistant at the White House, will move up to Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs" when Kissinger relinquished that post to devote his full time to being Secretary of State.[^10] The report of the Tower Commission summarizes that "Under President Ford, Lt Gen Brent Scowcroft became National Security Advisor, with Henry Kissinger remaining as Secretary of State."[^11]
In April 1976 Scowcroft briefed Vice President [[Nelson Rockefeller]] before an April 20 courtesy call on [[Anastasio Somoza]] at the Nicaraguan Ambassador's residence in Washington, covering Nicaraguan affairs and U.S.-Nicaraguan relations.[^12] Gonzalez told the House that Scowcroft resigned the post during the [[Jimmy Carter|Carter]] administration but stayed active as a member of the President's general advisory committee on arms control.[^13]
### Kissinger Associates and the BNL account, 1982 to 1989
In 1982 Scowcroft joined Kissinger in setting up Kissinger Associates, according to Gonzalez, who said Scowcroft served as vice chairman and head of the firm's Washington, D.C. office until he became national security adviser in January 1989.[^14] The firm's biography of him states that in that capacity he advised and assisted US and foreign corporate leaders on global joint venture opportunities, strategic planning and risk assessment.[^3]
[[Frederick Lacey]], who was appointed as special counsel in the [[BNL Scandal|Banca Nazionale del Lavoro]] investigation, wrote that Scowcroft had served as vice president of Kissinger Associates and had headed its Washington, D.C. office before joining the Bush administration as national security adviser in January 1989.[^15] Lacey's report states: "It is clear that, while at Kissinger Associates, Scowcroft and Eagleburger came into contact with BNL management. I have seen nothing, however, to suggest that they knew of BNL-Atlanta's wrongful loans to Iraq or influenced the prosecution of this matter."[^15] The passage refers to [[Lawrence Eagleburger]], who had been president of the firm and became deputy secretary of state.
Gonzalez told the House that Kissinger, Scowcroft and Eagleburger "maintain that they were unaware of the BNL loans to [[Iraq]]. I offer no definitive proof that they were aware of the BNL loans."[^16] He reported that Scowcroft worked on the account of [[Banca Nazionale del Lavoro|BNL]] at Kissinger Associates, met BNL management on numerous occasions, and briefed the bank's board on international political and economic developments on three occasions between 1986 and 1989, and that when the president of BNL traveled to the United States for the annual International Monetary Fund conference he met Kissinger and Scowcroft in [[New York City|New York]].[^17] Gonzalez reported that a former head of BNL's American operations said he attended a 1987 meeting in New York with [[Alan Stoga]], the head of BNL's Rome headquarters, Kissinger, Scowcroft and Eagleburger, convened to give BNL advice on doing business in several countries including India, and that Stoga and Scowcroft took the BNL officers to lunch afterward.[^18] Gonzalez said: "BNL was a client of Mr. Scowcroft's while he was the vice-chairman of Kissinger Associates. Mr. Scowcroft regularly provided advice to BNL's management and received hefty fees in return."[^19]
Luigi Sardelli, BNL's regional manager in the United States, gave the Banking Committee written answers in 1993 in which he stated that in February 1989 Dr. Pedde, BNL's managing director, asked him to contact Stoga, that he understood the bank was looking for space in Washington and that, because Scowcroft had just been appointed to the Bush White House, his mission may have been to find out whether a room would be available at Kissinger Associates in Washington for a BNL officer. Sardelli wrote that he did not recall posing the question to Stoga, and that he never discussed any loan to Iraq with Kissinger Associates.[^20]
### Scowcroft Commission, 1983
On January 3, 1983 President [[Ronald Reagan]] announced the establishment of a bipartisan Commission on Strategic Forces (the [[Scowcroft Commission]]) to review the strategic modernization program, with particular focus on the land-based intercontinental ballistic missile system and its basing alternatives, and named "The Honorable Brent Scowcroft, former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to serve as Chairman." The other members were [[Thomas C. Reed]] as vice chairman, [[Nicholas Brady]], [[Harold Brown]], [[William Clements]], [[John Deutch]], Alexander M. Haig Jr., [[Richard Helms]], [[John Lyons]] of the [[AFL-CIO]], Vice Admiral Levering Smith and [[James Woolsey]].[^21] The statement notes that Reagan signed the establishing executive order the same day in the Cabinet Room with Scowcroft, several commission members, Secretary of State [[George P. Shultz]] and Secretary of Defense [[Caspar Weinberger]] present.[^21] Executive Order 12400 set the commission at no more than fifteen members, directed it to report by February 18, 1983, provided that information supplied to or developed by it would not, to the extent permitted by law, be available for public inspection, and assigned its administrative support to the Secretary of Defense.[^22]
On April 19, 1983 Reagan, acknowledging "Brent Scowcroft, the Commission's Chairman," announced that the commission had unanimously arrived at its recommendations and that he would send them to Congress with his endorsement; he said the commission had held dozens of formal meetings and talked to over 200 technical experts.[^23] On April 9, 1984 Reagan issued a statement on the commission's final report, saying that it reiterated the original recommendations, namely an arms control structure with incentives for stability at reduced levels, deployment of 100 [[MX missile|MX missiles]] and development of a small single-warhead ICBM, and that it recommended extreme caution in proceeding to engineering development of an active strategic defense system.[^24]
### Council on Foreign Relations, 1984 to 1986
The annual report of the [[Council on Foreign Relations]] for July 1, 1984 to June 30, 1985 lists Scowcroft among the directors with terms expiring in 1986, alongside Harold Brown, [[Lane Kirkland]], [[Juanita Kreps]] and [[Robert Scalapino]]. He is listed on the Membership Committee chaired by [[Theodore Hesburgh]] and on the five-member board Nominating Committee with [[Nicholas Katzenbach]], [[Philip Geyelin]], [[William D. Rogers]] and [[Marina Whitman]]. The report records a Council session of former national security advisers, chaired jointly by [[Winston Lord]] and Eagleburger, at which [[Zbigniew Brzezinski]], [[Walt Rostow]] and Scowcroft spoke, and a Council book, Michael Krepon's *Strategic Stalemate*, with parallel prefaces by Scowcroft and [[Paul Warnke]].[^25]
### Tower Commission, 1987
Scowcroft was one of the members of the President's Special Review Board, chaired by [[John Tower]], with [[Edmund Muskie]] as the other member.[^26] The board examined the [[Iran-Contra affair]] and the role of the National Security Council in it. Apple's introduction reports that Scowcroft considered the lack of written records "appalling" and added: "It may be that some went into the shredder, but we can't prove it."[^26]
### National Security Directive 26, October 2, 1989
National Security Directive 26, "U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf," is dated October 2, 1989 and was addressed to the Vice President, the Secretaries of State, the Treasury, Defense and Energy, the Attorney General, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the directors of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the United States Information Agency. Its section on Iraq reads in part: "Normal relations between the United States and Iraq would serve our longer-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East. The United States Government should propose economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior and to increase our influence with Iraq." It continues that "any illegal use of chemical and/or biological weapons will lead to economic and political sanctions" and that "Any breach by Iraq of IAEA safeguards in its nuclear program will result in a similar response." A further paragraph states: "We should pursue, and seek to facilitate, opportunities for U.S. firms to participate in the reconstruction of the Iraqi economy, particularly in the energy area," and that the United States should consider sales of non-lethal military assistance, training courses and medical exchanges to Iraq's defense establishment on a case by case basis.[^27]
Gonzalez told the House that after the BNL offices in [[Atlanta]] were raided in August 1989, the White House and the National Security Council acted to protect the [[Commodity Credit Corporation Iraq Program|credit guarantee program for Iraq]] that the [[Commodity Credit Corporation]] ran. He said that State Department officials, including Secretary [[James A. Baker III|Baker]], "repeatedly referred to NSD-26 which stated that 'the President wished to improve relations with Iraq'" as the justification for pressing other agencies to approve the program.[^28] State Department talking points for the November 8, 1989 meeting of the National Advisory Council deputies, which Gonzalez reproduced, read: "In NSD-26, the President mandated that we seek to improve and expand our relationship with Iraq."[^29]
Gonzalez stated that under Scowcroft's direction the NSC staff was heavily involved in winning approval of the one billion dollar program for fiscal 1990 in late 1989, and that Scowcroft himself was directly involved in trying to win the release of the second 500 million dollar installment, which was delayed because of the BNL scandal.[^30] A State Department memorandum of March 5, 1990, which Gonzalez quoted, states: "National Security Council staff [NSCS] contacted the USDA March 2 to inquire about the delay after the Iraqi Ambassador complained to General Scowcroft."[^31] Gonzalez said the [[United States Department of Agriculture|Department of Agriculture]] sent a background memorandum to Scowcroft in preparation for the NSC meeting in May 1990 stating that "it cannot be overemphasized that any constraint on CCC credit guarantees must not be based on a foreign policy rationale," and said the program was suspended at that meeting. He also quoted a May 25, 1990 Treasury Department memorandum summarizing a meeting of Agriculture, Treasury and State officials: "The NSC prevailed on Agriculture to say only that their investigation showed the improprieties may have occurred and remained silent on the suspension."[^32]
On May 18, 1992 Gonzalez named Scowcroft, [[C. Boyden Gray]], [[John Schmitz]], [[Richard Haass]], [[Clayton Yeutter]] and others as White House and NSC staff involved in the decision and in the administrative review of the BNL scandal, said that "many White House and NSC staff were involved" and asked why neither Scowcroft nor Eagleburger had recused himself, and said: "So the White House and NSC, armed with National Security Directive 26, sprang into action in order to save the CCC Program for Iraq."[^33] The same Record pages print his letter of October 1, 1991 asking Scowcroft for the President's report on exports of nuclear, biological, chemical and ballistic missile technology to Iraq, Scowcroft's reply of November 1, 1991 offering a copy of the report "as a courtesy," Gonzalez's letter of April 29, 1992 asking Scowcroft for all NSC information on [[Carlos Cardoen]] and [[Gerald Bull]], and his letter of the same date to Bush asking that Scowcroft and the other named staff be made available for interview.[^34]
Gonzalez described an interagency group of lawyers chaired by [[C. Nicholas Rostow]], the NSC's legal adviser, which met in April 1991 and which he called the "Rostow gang." He said the group "gave the White House a direct hand in regulating the flow of information to the Congress, thus limiting oversight of Iraq policy."[^35] In a May 2, 1991 letter to Bush, Gonzalez detailed his concerns about the links among BNL, Kissinger, Scowcroft and Eagleburger.[^36]
The report of the independent counsel Lacey, printed in the Banking Committee record, quotes a February 8, 1991 memorandum from Rostow to Scowcroft at the National Security Council on the BNL indictment, which names [[Robert Mueller]] and states: "I have informed Robert Mueller ... of your reluctance to seek an indictment of Iraqi government officials whom we are unlikely to take into custody."[^37]
[[Alan Friedman]] wrote that [[Bryan Siebert]] of the [[United States Department of Energy|Energy Department]] "had been waging a lonely and unsuccessful battle to get James Baker and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft to do something about the steady flow of U.S. exports that were materially assisting Iraq's nuclear weapons program." Friedman wrote that on May 18, 1990 Scowcroft telephoned Secretary of Agriculture Yeutter and asked him "not to put out any press release today saying we are terminating the program" of credit guarantees, and that Scowcroft's aides "objected to any measures 'that singled out Iraq.'" Friedman quoted Scowcroft's staff as saying of cancelling the second 500 million dollars: "We would be shooting ourselves in the foot." Friedman wrote that [[Matrix Churchill]] "was not discussed at the cabinet meeting, even though the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] had reported its activities to both the [[White House]] and the [[State Department]] in November 1989." According to Friedman, Rostow told Gonzalez's investigator that "it would be a cold day in hell before Congress got NSD 26."[^38]
### Beijing after Tiananmen, 1989
On July 2, 1989 Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger met [[Deng Xiaoping]] and Premier [[Li Peng]] in the [[Great Hall of the People]] in [[Beijing]]. The memorandum of conversation records Deng saying that the turmoil in China had begun shortly after Bush took office, that the United States was too deeply involved in it, that U.S. foreign policy had cornered China, and that the aim of what he called the counter-revolutionary rebellion had been to overthrow the People's Republic. Deng said that the person who tied the knot should be the one to untie it, and that his hope was that the United States would do so.[^39]
Scowcroft and Eagleburger returned to Beijing in December 1989. At a banquet on December 9 Qian toasted the health of Scowcroft, Eagleburger and Lilley and the resumption and development of normal Sino-U.S. relations. On December 10 Scowcroft, Eagleburger, Ambassador [[James R. Lilley]], [[Chase Untermeyer]] and the National Security Council's Asian affairs director [[Douglas Paal]] attended a working luncheon with Foreign Minister [[Qian Qichen]] at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse, and Scowcroft met Li Peng from 8:45 to 9:40 a.m., with a meeting with the General Secretary scheduled for 9:45. Li Peng asked Scowcroft whether the United States considered the Cold War ended after the Malta meeting.[^40]
### Gulf War decisions, 1990
On July 28, 1990, in a telephone call from [[Kennebunkport, Maine|Kennebunkport]], Maine, Bush told King [[Hussein of Jordan|Hussein]], who was about to travel to Baghdad, that he had "just had lunch with Barbara, my daughter, and Brent Scowcroft," that there were problems with Iraq's behavior he would rather not discuss on that line, and that the United States had tried to send signals to [[Saddam Hussein]] with a congressional delegation. The King asked Bush to tell Scowcroft hello.[^41] On August 2, 1990, aboard [[Air Force One]] en route to [[Aspen, Colorado|Aspen]], Colorado, Bush told King Hussein and President [[Hosni Mubarak]] that the United States was "very surprised at this outrageous invasion."[^42] On August 3 Bush told Prime Minister [[Margaret Thatcher]] by telephone that "Brent will be talking with Woerner" ([[Manfred Wörner]]) and that "Brent is here and will get in touch"; Thatcher thanked him for "all the kind things you said at Aspen," and Bush replied: "I told Brent to keep you informed."[^43]
On August 2, 1990 Iraqi tanks sped the 80 miles to Kuwait City to begin the occupation of [[Kuwait]].[^44] [[James P. Pfiffner]] wrote that on August 3, 1990, at a White House meeting, Scowcroft made the argument that the invasion was something the United States could not leave unanswered.[^44] Pfiffner quoted a White House official as saying: "it was Brent's presentation at one of the meetings on August 3, that Friday after the invasion, that made clear what the stakes were, crystallized people's thinking and galvanized support for a very strong response." Pfiffner's note attributes the quotation to an article by [[Andrew Rosenthal]] in the New York Times of February 21, 1991.[^45] In late September 1990 [[Colin Powell]] went to the White House with [[Richard Cheney]] to meet with Bush and Scowcroft, for what Pfiffner described as the most formal presentation of the sanctions option to the president.[^46]
### Essay against an attack on Iraq, August 2002
On August 15, 2002 Scowcroft published an essay in the [[Wall Street Journal]] under the headline "Don't Attack Saddam."[^47][^48] A news report of the essay quotes him as writing that if the United States "were seen to be turning our backs" on the Israeli-Palestinian dispute "in order to go after Iraq, there would be an explosion of outrage against us."[^47] The same report quotes him as writing: "There is a virtual consensus in the world against an attack on Iraq at this time. So long as that sentiment persists, it would require the U.S. to pursue a virtual go-it-alone strategy against Iraq, making any military operations correspondingly more difficult and expensive."[^47]
### President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 2001 to 2005
On October 5, 2001 the White House announced that President [[George W. Bush]] intended to appoint "Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft who will serve as Chairman" of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, for a term of two years, together with Cresencio Arcos, [[Jim Barksdale]], Robert Addison Day, [[Stephen Friedman]], [[Alfred Lerner]], [[Ray Hunt|Ray Lee Hunt]], [[Rita Hauser]], [[David E. Jeremiah]], [[Arnold Kanter]], [[James C. Langdon Jr.]], [[Elisabeth Pate-Cornell]], [[John Streicker]], [[Pete Wilson]] and [[Philip Zelikow]].[^49]
[[Steve Clemons]] wrote on October 27, 2005 that Scowcroft was not asked by the President to return to the board when his term expired at the end of 2004, that most had assumed he would continue as chairman, and that at a gathering at the home of Brzezinski just after the New Year Scowcroft reportedly said: "I just got fired." Clemons wrote that on January 6 Scowcroft spoke with Brzezinski at the [[New America Foundation]].[^50] [[Jeffrey Goldberg]] published "Breaking Ranks: What Turned Brent Scowcroft Against the Bush Administration?" in The New Yorker of October 31, 2005, in which Scowcroft described his objections to the administration's Iraq policy; Goldberg's article also drew on an interview with George H.W. Bush.[^51] [[Robert Bryce]] wrote in Salon on November 17, 2005 that Bush had dismissed Scowcroft from the chairmanship about a year earlier because of his criticism of the decision to invade Iraq.[^52]
On October 27, 2005 the White House announced that Stephen Friedman would be appointed to the board for a term beginning on December 20, 2005, and that he would be designated its chairman upon appointment. The announcement also named Hunt, [[Donald Evans]], [[Arthur B. Culvahouse]], [[William O. DeWitt Jr.]], [[Lee Hamilton]] and others as members.[^53]
### The Scowcroft Group
The Scowcroft Group states that it was founded in 1994 by Scowcroft and is an international business advisory firm that has served US and multinational firms in a variety of sectors.[^4] Its services include geopolitical risk, sanctions and export controls, energy and resource security and scenario planning, and it lists partnerships with Fulcrum Macro Advisors, Vriens & Partners and McLarty Associates.[^54]
### Aspen Strategy Group roster, 2016
On August 8, 2016 [[Tom Pritzker]] wrote to [[Jeffrey Epstein]] that he had just finished a presentation on leadership to the "grand pooh baahs of Aspen Strategy Group." Epstein asked "who attends," and Pritzker replied: "You have to be a bit of a wonk to know some of the names, but Nye, Scowcroft and [[Nicholas Burns|Nick Burns]] run it (Scowcroft being replaced by [[Condoleezza Rice|Condi]])." The message lists members including [[David Petraeus]], [[Madeleine Albright]], [[Stephen Hadley]], [[Jake Sullivan]], [[William Burns|Bill Burns]] and [[John Sawers]] (MI6).[^55]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Gonzalez, Henry B. "Kissinger Associates, Scowcroft, Eagleburger, Stoga, Iraq, and BNL," *Congressional Record,* House, April 28, 1992, pp. H2694-H2701.
[^2]: Lacey, Frederick B. "The Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Investigation: Report of the Independent Counsel," reproduced in House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Serial No. 103-95, pp. 514-15.
[^3]: Friedman, Alan. *Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq*. Bantam, 1993, pp. 153-156, 162, 192, 216, 221.
[^1]: Brookings Institution, "Remembering Brent Scowcroft: A True National Security Maverick," which states that he served two presidents, Gerald Ford and George H. W. Bush, after a career in the United States Air Force. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/remembering-brent-scowcroft-a-true-national-security-maverick
[^2]: Atlantic Council, "The Passing of Brent Scowcroft: March 19, 1925 - August 6, 2020," press release. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/press-releases/the-passing-of-brent-scowcroft-march-19-1925-august-6-2020/
[^3]: The Scowcroft Group, "General Scowcroft" (national security adviser to both Presidents Ford and Bush; vice chairman of Kissinger Associates 1982 to 1989; twenty-nine-year military career; the President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control, the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, the President's Special Review Board; chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board). https://www.scowcroft.com/generalscowcroft
[^4]: The Scowcroft Group, "Our Firm" ("Founded in 1994 by General Brent Scowcroft"). https://www.scowcroft.com/ourfirm
[^5]: Gonzalez, Henry B. "Kissinger Associates, Scowcroft, Eagleburger, Stoga, Iraq, and BNL," *Congressional Record,* House, April 28, 1992, p. H2695 (Belgrade air attache, academia 1962 to 1968, Department of Defense posts, 1971 military aide, 1973 deputy to Kissinger). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm
[^6]: *The Tower Commission Report: The Full Text of the President's Special Review Board* (1987), introduction by R. W. Apple Jr. https://archive.org/details/towercommission00unit
[^7]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, Document 269, memorandum for the record by Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, October 26, 1973, Washington, October 24/25, 1973, with editorial notes citing Cline, "Policy Without Intelligence," *Foreign Policy*, no. 17 (Winter 1974-1975), p. 128. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25/d269
[^8]: Gonzalez, *Congressional Record*, April 28, 1992, p. H2695 (Scowcroft often took charge of the National Security Council while Kissinger was Secretary of State; succeeded Kissinger as national security adviser in 1975). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm
[^9]: Memorandum of conversation, May 27, 1975, Ford, Schlesinger, Colby, Rumsfeld, Ingersoll and Scowcroft. National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 12, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. The memorandum is partly declassified. https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1553088.pdf
[^10]: "The President's News Conference," November 3, 1975, statement on personnel changes in the administration. The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-60
[^11]: *The Tower Commission Report* (1987), the report's historical summary of the National Security Advisor's role under President Ford. https://archive.org/details/towercommission00unit
[^12]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. E-11, part 1, Document 263, memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to Vice President Rockefeller, "Call on Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza, Tuesday, April 20, 1976," Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Latin American Affairs Staff Files, Box 14. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p1/d263
[^13]: Gonzalez, *Congressional Record*, April 28, 1992, p. H2695 (resigned the post during the Carter administration; member of the President's general advisory committee on arms control). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm
[^14]: Gonzalez, *Congressional Record*, April 28, 1992, p. H2695 (joined Kissinger in setting up Kissinger Associates in 1982; vice chairman and head of the Washington office until January 1989). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm
[^15]: Lacey, Frederick B. "The Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Investigation: Report of the Independent Counsel," reproduced in U.S. House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, *Testimony of Former Employees of the BNL*, Serial No. 103-95 (1994), pp. 514-515. https://archive.org/details/testimonyofforme1994unit
[^16]: Gonzalez, *Congressional Record*, April 28, 1992, p. H2694 (quoting the denials of Kissinger, Scowcroft and Eagleburger and the statement "I offer no definitive proof that they were aware of the BNL loans"). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm
[^17]: Gonzalez, *Congressional Record*, April 28, 1992, p. H2696 (BNL account, three board briefings between 1986 and 1989, and the BNL president's meeting with Kissinger and Scowcroft in New York). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm
[^18]: Gonzalez, *Congressional Record*, April 28, 1992, p. H2698 (1987 New York meeting as reported by Gonzalez from a former head of BNL's American operations; lunch taken by Stoga and Scowcroft). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm
[^19]: Gonzalez, *Congressional Record*, April 28, 1992, p. H2699 (quoted sentences on BNL's client relationship and "hefty fees"). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm
[^20]: Luigi Sardelli, written responses to Chairman Gonzalez's questions, in U.S. House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, *Testimony of Former Employees of the BNL*, Serial No. 103-95 (1994), p. 164. https://archive.org/details/testimonyofforme1994unit
[^21]: Ronald Reagan, "Statement Announcing the Establishment and Membership of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, and Designation of Chairman and Vice Chairman," January 3, 1983, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/statement-announcing-establishment-and-membership-presidents-commission-strategic
[^22]: Executive Order 12400, "President's Commission on Strategic Forces," January 3, 1983, sections 1 to 4, *Federal Register*, vol. 48, no. 3 (January 5, 1983), pp. 381-382. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1983-01-05/pdf/FR-1983-01-05.pdf
[^23]: Ronald Reagan, "Remarks Endorsing the Recommendations in the Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces," April 19, 1983, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/41983a
[^24]: Ronald Reagan, "Statement on the Final Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces," April 9, 1984, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/statement-final-report-presidents-commission-strategic-forces
[^25]: Council on Foreign Relations, Annual Report, July 1, 1984 to June 30, 1985 (New York, 1985): Officers and Directors; Membership Committee; Nominating Committee; former National Security Advisers session; Krepon, *Strategic Stalemate*. CIA CREST copy, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00806r000100210066-5
[^26]: *The Tower Commission Report* (1987), title page (John Tower, chairman; Edmund Muskie and Brent Scowcroft, members) and Apple introduction. https://archive.org/details/towercommission00unit
[^27]: National Security Directive 26, "U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf," October 2, 1989, signed by George Bush, sections "Arms Sales," "Iraq" and "Iran," declassified, George H.W. Bush Presidential Library. https://web.archive.org/web/2022/https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/nsd/nsd26.pdf
[^28]: Gonzalez, Henry B. Remarks on Commodity Credit Corporation credits for Iraq and NSD-26, *Congressional Record*, House, March 2, 1992, p. H863. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920302g.htm
[^29]: *Congressional Record*, House, March 2, 1992, p. H867, State Department "Talking Points for NAC Deputies Meeting, November 8, 1989," reproduced in Gonzalez's remarks. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920302g.htm
[^30]: Gonzalez, *Congressional Record*, April 28, 1992, pp. H2696-H2697 (late 1989 $1 billion allocation and NSC direction; second $500 million installment). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm
[^31]: Gonzalez, *Congressional Record*, April 28, 1992, p. H2697, quoting a State Department memorandum of March 5, 1990. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm
[^32]: Gonzalez, Henry B. Remarks on the USDA review and the NSC, *Congressional Record*, House, March 16, 1992, p. H1278 (USDA background memorandum to Scowcroft before the May 1990 NSC meeting; Treasury Department memorandum of May 25, 1990). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920316g.htm
[^33]: Gonzalez, Henry B. Special order on BNL, *Congressional Record*, House, May 18, 1992, pp. H3367-H3368 (list of White House and NSC staff; recusal question; "So the White House and NSC, armed with National Security Directive 26, sprang into action"). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920518g.htm
[^34]: Gonzalez, *Congressional Record*, May 18, 1992, pp. H3373-H3374 (letters of October 1, 1991, November 1, 1991 and April 29, 1992). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920518g.htm
[^35]: Gonzalez, Henry B. Remarks on the NSC legal group, *Congressional Record*, House, March 16, 1992, pp. H1274-H1275 (Rostow meeting in April 1991; "Rostow gang"). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920316g.htm
[^36]: Gonzalez, *Congressional Record*, May 18, 1992, p. H3367 (letter to President Bush of May 2, 1991). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920518g.htm
[^37]: Lacey, "The Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Investigation: Report of the Independent Counsel," in Serial No. 103-95, p. 598 (memorandum from Nicholas Rostow to Brent Scowcroft, February 8, 1991, Lacey Ex.). https://archive.org/details/testimonyofforme1994unit
[^38]: Friedman, Alan. *Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq* (Bantam, 1993), pp. 153-156, 162, 192, 216, 221.
[^39]: Memorandum of conversation, LTG Brent Scowcroft, Deng Xiaoping et al., Great Hall of the People, July 2, 1989, George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, in "U.S. Government Documents Following Tiananmen Square Crackdown" (compilation pp. 19-32), published by ChinaFile. https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6184537/U-S-Government-Documents-Following-Tiananmen.pdf
[^40]: Toast of Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, December 9, 1989; memorandum of conversation, working luncheon, Diaoyutai State Guesthouse, December 10, 1989; memorandum of conversation, Premier Li Peng and General Scowcroft, December 10, 1989, Beijing, George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, in the same compilation. https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6184537/U-S-Government-Documents-Following-Tiananmen.pdf
[^41]: Memorandum of telephone conversation, Bush and King Hussein of Jordan, July 28, 1990, Kennebunkport, George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, Memcons and Telcons. https://web.archive.org/web/20221024145017/https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1990-07-28--Hussein%20I.pdf
[^42]: Memorandum of telephone conversation, Bush, King Hussein and President Mubarak, August 2, 1990, aboard Air Force One, George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, Memcons and Telcons. https://web.archive.org/web/20221024145017/https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1990-08-02--Hussein%20I.pdf
[^43]: Memorandum of conversation, telephone call to Prime Minister Thatcher, August 3, 1990, Oval Office, 3:03 to 3:10 p.m., George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, Memcons and Telcons. https://web.archive.org/web/20221024145017/https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1990-08-03--Thatcher.pdf
[^44]: Pfiffner, James P. "Presidential Policy-Making and the Gulf War," chapter 1 in Marcia Lynn Whicker, James P. Pfiffner and Raymond A. Moore, eds., *The Presidency and the Persian Gulf War* (Praeger, 1993), section "The Decision to Commit U.S. Troops."
[^45]: Pfiffner, "Presidential Policy-Making and the Gulf War," note 4, citing Andrew Rosenthal, "Scowcroft and Gates: A Team Rivals Baker," *New York Times*, February 21, 1991, p. A14.
[^46]: Pfiffner, "Presidential Policy-Making and the Gulf War," chapter 1 (late September 1990 meeting of Powell, Cheney, Bush and Scowcroft).
[^47]: "Top Republicans Break With Bush on Iraq Strategy," news report of August 16, 2002 quoting Scowcroft's essay in the *Wall Street Journal*, reproduced on the World Systems Network list. https://wsarch.ucr.edu/wsnmail/2002/msg00949.html
[^48]: "Brent Scowcroft is Wrong: We Must Attack Saddam," Middle East Forum, August 20, 2002, identifying the essay as "Don't Attack Saddam" in the *Wall Street Journal* "on Thursday." https://www.meforum.org/brent-scowcroft-is-wrong-we-must-attack-saddam
[^49]: White House, "Personnel Announcement," October 5, 2001, members of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, including "Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft who will serve as Chairman." https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011005-8.html
[^50]: Clemons, Steve. "Stephen Friedman Named to Chair President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," The Washington Note, October 27, 2005. https://washingtonnote.com/stephen_friedma/
[^51]: Goldberg, Jeffrey. "Breaking Ranks: What Turned Brent Scowcroft Against the Bush Administration?," *The New Yorker*, October 31, 2005, as excerpted in Clemons, Steve. "Brent Scowcroft 'Breaks Ranks' with George W. Bush in Major New Yorker Article," The Washington Note, October 23, 2005. https://washingtonnote.com/brent_scowcroft_2/
[^52]: Bryce, Robert. "Top-secret cronies," *Salon*, November 17, 2005. https://www.salon.com/2005/11/17/pfiab/
[^53]: White House, "Personnel Announcement," October 27, 2005, members of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Stephen Friedman designated chairman, term beginning December 20, 2005. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051027-7.html
[^54]: The Scowcroft Group, "What We Offer" and "Our Firm" (partnerships). https://www.scowcroft.com/whatwedo
[^55]: U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Library, EFTA01783338, DataSet 10, email exchange between Tom Pritzker and Jeffrey Epstein, August 8, 2016. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2010/EFTA01783338.pdf

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10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/James R. Schlesinger.md
View file

@ -2,17 +2,36 @@
category: "Intelligence & Government"
aliases:
- "James Schlesinger"
- "James A. Schlesinger"
- "James Rodney Schlesinger"
tags:
- Person
- CIA
- Nuclear
- DepartmentOfDefense
- DepartmentOfEnergy
- FamilyJewels
summary: "Economist who chaired the Atomic Energy Commission, directed the CIA in 1973 and ordered the Family Jewels compilation, and served as Secretary of Defense and the first Secretary of Energy."
- RAND
- Watergate
- Stargate
- AbuGhraib
summary: "Economist and RAND strategist who chaired the Atomic Energy Commission, directed the CIA in 1973 and ordered the Family Jewels compilation, then served as Secretary of Defense and the first Secretary of Energy."
born: 1929-02-15
died: 2014-03-27
location: "New York City, New York"
relations:
- type: employed_by
with: "[[RAND Corporation]]"
role: "senior staff member, later Director of Strategic Studies"
start: 1963
end: 1969
fn: 1
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Bureau of the Budget]]"
role: "assistant director"
start: 1969
end: 1971
fn: 1
- type: head_of
with: "[[Atomic Energy Commission]]"
role: "chairman"
@ -24,39 +43,164 @@ relations:
role: "Director of Central Intelligence"
start: 1973-02-02
end: 1973-07-02
fn: 2
fn: 3
- type: participant_in
with: "[[CIA Family Jewels]]"
role: "ordered the compilation by memorandum of May 9, 1973"
start: 1973-05-09
end: 1973-09
fn: 11
- type: head_of
with: "[[Department of Defense]]"
role: "Secretary of Defense"
start: 1973-07
end: 1975-11
fn: 1
start: 1973-07-02
end: 1975-11-19
fn: 3
- type: head_of
with: "[[Department of Energy]]"
role: "first Secretary of Energy"
start: 1977-08-06
end: 1979-08-23
fn: 1
fn: 2
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Lehman Brothers]]"
role: "senior adviser"
start: 1979
fn: 4
- type: director_of
with: "[[MITRE Corporation]]"
role: "chairman of the board"
fn: 38
- type: member_of
with: "[[Defense Policy Board]]"
role: "member"
fn: 38
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations]]"
role: "chairman"
start: 2004-05-12
end: 2004-08-24
fn: 29
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management]]"
role: "chairman"
start: 2008-09
end: 2008-12
fn: 36
created: 2025-08-05
updated: 2026-09-22
updated: 2026-10-12
---
James R. Schlesinger was born in New York City on February 15, 1929, and took a doctorate at Harvard in 1956. He chaired the [[Atomic Energy Commission]] from 1971 to 1973, directed the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] in 1973, was Secretary of Defense from 1973 to 1975, and after serving as an assistant to President [[Jimmy Carter]] was confirmed on August 4, 1977, as the first Secretary of Energy, holding the office from August 6, 1977, to August 23, 1979.[^1]
James Rodney Schlesinger (February 15, 1929 to March 27, 2014) was an economist and nuclear strategist who chaired the [[Atomic Energy Commission]] from 1971 to 1973, directed the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] from February 2 to July 2, 1973, served as [[Department of Defense|Secretary of Defense]] from July 2, 1973, to November 19, 1975, and was the first [[Department of Energy|Secretary of Energy]], from August 6, 1977, to August 23, 1979.[^1][^2][^3]
### Academic work and RAND
Schlesinger was born in New York City. He took his bachelor's, master's and doctoral degrees at [[Harvard University]] (1950, 1952 and 1956), taught economics at the [[University of Virginia]] from 1956 to 1963, and was a consultant to the [[Federal Reserve Board]] and to the [[RAND Corporation]] during part of that period. He was academic consultant in economics to the [[Naval War College]] in 1957, and his lectures there were published in 1960 as *The Political Economy of National Security*.[^1]
From 1963 to 1969 he was a senior staff member at RAND in Santa Monica, California, and later its director of strategic studies, where he worked on strategic analysis "with particular reference to nuclear weaponry."[^1][^4]
### Budget Bureau and Atomic Energy Commission
In 1969 [[Richard Nixon]] appointed him assistant director of the [[Bureau of the Budget]]. He later became assistant director of the [[Office of Management and Budget]] and served as acting director during the transition between the two agencies. His responsibilities included national security and international programs, the Budget Bureau's place on the [[Environmental Quality Council]] and the [[National Space Council]], and its representation on several [[National Security Council]] committees.[^1][^4]
He chaired the Atomic Energy Commission from 1971 to 1973 and headed the United States delegation to the sixteenth General Conference of the [[International Atomic Energy Agency]].[^1]
### Director of Central Intelligence
Schlesinger was Director of Central Intelligence from February 2 to July 2, 1973. On May 9, 1973, he signed a memorandum, drafted by [[William Colby]], ordering senior officers to report any current or past activities "which might be construed to be outside the legislative charter of this Agency"; the replies became the 693-page compilation known as the [[CIA Family Jewels|Family Jewels]], which passed to Colby when he succeeded Schlesinger.[^2][^3] In the same weeks the question of the agency's parapsychology research at [[SRI International|SRI]] reached him; [[Kenneth A. Kress]] wrote that he "was soon told not to increase the scope of the project. The project was too sensitive and potentially embarrassing. It should be tabled."[^4] Testifying about [[Watergate]], [[James McCord]] said his lawyer, Gerald Alch, had proposed a defense under which the agency would supply a recall-to-duty record and that "the new Director, Dr. Schlesinger, 'would go along with it'"; Alch denied it.[^5]
[[Richard Helms]] resigned as Director of Central Intelligence on February 2, 1973, the day Schlesinger was sworn in. The President had appointed Schlesinger on December 21, 1972, and the Senate confirmed him on January 23, 1973.[^5] Schlesinger served until July 2, 1973, when he became Secretary of Defense. Lieutenant General [[Vernon A. Walters]], the deputy director, was acting director from July 2 to September 4, 1973, when [[William Colby]] (deputy director for operations from March 2 to August 24, 1973) became director.[^3] Colby later estimated, in his memoirs, that under Schlesinger's purge about 7 percent of the agency's staff were "fired or were forced to resign or retired."[^6]
The historian [[David S. Robarge]], writing in [[Studies in Intelligence]], listed Schlesinger among six directors he classed as "manager-reformer outsiders," and recorded that at 43 he was the youngest of the directors he surveyed.[^7] Robarge wrote that when directors tried to "clean house" (Schlesinger and [[Stansfield Turner]]), the result was "administrative disarray and low morale," and that Schlesinger and Turner "facilitated the departure of hundreds of clandestine services veterans."[^7] Robarge also recorded that Schlesinger told veteran [[John McMahon]] and his superior, [[Carl Duckett]], that he had just appointed McMahon to head the [[Office of Technical Service]]. When Duckett suggested that McMahon start on the first of the month, Schlesinger answered, "How about at 10:00?"[^7]
The [[House Committee on Armed Services]] special subcommittee on intelligence opened its inquiry into the agency's role in the [[Watergate]] scandal and the [[Daniel Ellsberg|Ellsberg]] matter on May 11, 1973, and issued its report on October 23, 1973.[^8] The report states that in February 1973 "Mr. Dean" called Schlesinger to ask whether the CIA could recover from the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] the file material the agency had given the Justice Department about its contact with [[Howard Hunt|E. Howard Hunt]], and that "This was not done."[^8] The report described a view of the agency's assistance to Hunt as "the better view, although charitable," which it said was "probably expressed by" Schlesinger, and gave the words: "The Agency was insufficiently cautious in the initiation of assistance to Hunt."[^9] The report also recorded the account given by [[James McCord]] of a meeting with his lawyer, [[Gerald Alch]], at which Alch proposed a CIA defense in which McCord's records would be doctored to show a recall to duty, and that "the new Director, Dr. Schlesinger, 'would go along with it.'" The report records that Alch disputed McCord's version "in the strongest of terms."[^10]
On May 9, 1973, Schlesinger signed a memorandum, drafted by deputy director for operations William Colby, calling on senior officers to report any current or past activities "which might be construed to be outside the legislative charter of this Agency."[^11] Schlesinger issued the directive after learning that Hunt and James McCord, both veteran CIA officers, had received cooperation from the agency as they carried out "dirty tricks" for President Nixon.[^11] The replies were compiled into a 693-page file, the [[CIA Family Jewels|Family Jewels]], which passed to Colby when he succeeded Schlesinger. The file was declassified in June 2007.[^12]
On January 3, 1975, Colby briefed [[Gerald R. Ford]] on the file, describing the compilation as the agency's "skeletons," including surveillance of student radicals, illegal wiretaps, assassination plots, and the confinement of a Soviet defector for three years.[^13] On February 20, 1975, Cabinet and sub-cabinet officials led by [[Henry A. Kissinger]], with Schlesinger and Colby present, discussed ways to protect information sought by the [[Church Committee]] and the House [[Pike Committee]] investigations.[^14]
The agency's contract for parapsychology research at [[SRI International]] reached Schlesinger in the spring of 1973. A new contract continuing and expanding the work went from the Office of Technical Service and the [[Office of Research and Development]] to Colby in April 1973 and was referred to the [[Executive Management Committee]]. [[Kenneth A. Kress]], the project officer, wrote in his 1977 study for Studies in Intelligence that an approval memorandum was written "for the signature of the DCI, then Dr. James Schlesinger," that Colby "took the memorandum to the DCI a few days later," and that he was "soon told not to increase the scope of the project and not to anticipate any follow-on in this area. The project was too sensitive and potentially embarrassing. It should be tabled."[^15] Kress added that the Office of Technical Service was then being investigated for involvement in Watergate and that in May 1973 the DCI had issued his memorandum asking employees to report improper activities.[^15] An Office of Technical Service memorandum for the record of November 17, 1977, prepared for a briefing of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, gives the same chronology: in March 1973 a third subject, [[Pat Price]], "is discovered with an apparent ability for 'remote viewing,'" and in May 1973 "The contract is finally sent to the DCI (Schlesinger) who decides to allow the existing contract to be completed without a follow-on." The memorandum continues that an informal SRI experiment with a scientist of the Office of Scientific Intelligence uncovered classified information about a military site and convinced "the new DCI (Colby) to renew work on ESP."[^16]
### Secretary of Defense
During the [[Yom Kippur War]] of 1973, [[Henry A. Kissinger]] told Schlesinger that his goal was to "let [[Israel]] come out ahead, but bleed." Schlesinger noted that Israel's ammunition consumption had been gauged for a seven-day war, and concluded from Kissinger's sudden push for resupply that Israeli use of a nuclear weapon was not out of the question.[^6] After the *[[Glomar Explorer]]* operation leaked in March 1975, Schlesinger recommended at the [[White House]] acknowledging the "bare facts"; President [[Gerald R. Ford]] took Colby's advice instead.[^7] In November 1975 Ford removed both Colby and Schlesinger in the same announcement.[^3]
Schlesinger moved from the agency to the [[Pentagon]] as Secretary of Defense on July 2, 1973, after about five months as director.[^3][^4]
During the [[Yom Kippur War]] of 1973, [[Seymour Hersh]] wrote in *[[The Samson Option]]* (1991) that Kissinger made no secret of his strategy, telling Schlesinger that his goal was to "let [[Israel]] come out ahead, but bleed."[^17] In the same book Hersh quoted Schlesinger, whom he interviewed on April 25, 1989: "Israel's [ammunition] consumption rate was gauged for a seven-day war," but "Kissinger just turned around totally. He got a little hysterical" in urging an immediate and massive resupply, and "Henry seemed to be more concerned than I was over the possibility of a nuclear exchange" in the Middle East. Schlesinger added: "From where we sat, there was an assumption that Israel had a few nukes and that if there was a collapse, there was a possibility that Israel would use them." Hersh wrote that Colby, then director of the CIA, shared the assumption: "We were afraid Israel might go for broke."[^18]
The claim that Schlesinger told the military not to act on White House orders, particularly on nuclear matters, in the last days of the Nixon presidency rests on an account that [[Stanley I. Kutler]] traced to an unnamed "senior Pentagon official." As Kutler summarized it, Schlesinger asked General [[George S. Brown]], Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to monitor all orders from any source to military units, because Nixon or his aides might reach units outside Pentagon channels, and the account says Schlesinger supposedly prepared plans to deploy troops in Washington if there were anything but a peaceful succession.[^19] In an essay in [[The American Interest]] of January 12, 2018, [[Larry Diamond]] wrote that Schlesinger "reportedly told the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff not to follow any presidential orders to the military without checking with Schlesinger first," and quoted the historian [[Gil Troy]] calling the act "the most patriotic act of treason in American history."[^20] Kutler wrote in the [[History News Network]] in 2014 that, "as far as can be determined, such information emanated from Schlesinger himself," and that there are "no corroborating documents." He described a message from Brown on August 8, 1974, advising increased vigilance to commanders, and two messages on August 9, 1974, sent over Schlesinger's name, one of which conveyed the remarks of the new president, Ford. Kutler called both August 9 messages "boilerplate," and quoted [[Thomas H. Moorer]], a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, calling Schlesinger's communiqué "ridiculous."[^19] Haig, Nixon's chief of staff, later told senators, in Kutler's quotation, "There were no tanks. No troops were drawn up."[^19]
The National Security Council met four times on the seizure of the [[SS Mayaguez]] by Cambodian forces, and the minutes list Schlesinger as a principal at each meeting. On May 12, 1975 (12:05 to 12:50 p.m.), he told Gerald R. Ford the options: "We can have a passive stance or we can be active. We can do such things as seizing Cambodian assets. We can assemble forces. We could seize a small island as a hostage. We might also consider a blockade," and when [[Donald Rumsfeld]] asked "Isn't this piracy?" he answered "Yes."[^21] On May 13 he described the force options (Marines and helicopters at Utapao, and the carrier [[USS Coral Sea]]) and the minutes record an exchange with Vice President [[Nelson Rockefeller]] over where the ship was.[^22] On May 14, after General [[David C. Jones]] recommended landing on the island and on the ship, Schlesinger asked "How about a local ultimatum?" and Kissinger answered that the action should not depend on one.[^23] At the meeting of May 15, 1975 (4:02 to 4:20 p.m.), held after the recovery, Schlesinger corrected the number of aircraft used ("Not the 81 that had been on the carrier") and Ford asked him for "a full factual report giving a summary and chronology of what happened."[^24]
On May 27, 1975, Ford met with Schlesinger, Colby, Donald Rumsfeld, [[Robert Ingersoll]] and [[Brent Scowcroft]] about a Seymour Hersh article on American submarines operating off Soviet waters. The memorandum of conversation records Ford saying, "Somehow someone must be made an example of." Schlesinger called the disclosure "a flagrant violation" of the law, said he had spoken to the Attorney General the month before, and stated that "There is some indication that Hersh has files of signals intelligence material." He then asked, "How about a search warrant to get them?"[^25]
On March 19, 1975, the day front-page stories revealed that [[Howard Hughes]]'s *[[Glomar Explorer]]* had recovered part of a sunken Soviet submarine in an operation led by the CIA, Ford met in the Cabinet Room of the [[White House]] with Schlesinger, Colby, [[Philip Buchen]], [[John O. Marsh Jr.]], Rumsfeld and Scowcroft (11:20 a.m. to 12:25 p.m.). Schlesinger called the operation "a major American accomplishment" and "a marvel, technically, and with maintaining secrecy," and advised: "If we don't confirm the mission details, acknowledge the bare facts. It has been confirmed privately by Colby. There is no plausible denial story, so 'no comment' will be taken as a confirmation. If we move now we can take the high ground, if not we will be pilloried." He offered to make the statement himself. Colby answered, "I go back to the U-2. I think we should not put the Soviet Union under such pressure to respond." The volume editors record that no statement by Schlesinger or Ford was found and that the press reported the administration refused to comment.[^26] President Ford took Colby's advice instead.[^27]
On November 3, 1975, Ford announced that he intended to nominate Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense, and thanked Schlesinger "for his able service" as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Director of the CIA, and Secretary of Defense. Asked why Schlesinger and Colby did not fit on the new team, Ford answered, "I think any President has to have the opportunity to put together his own team." Asked about reports of conflict between Schlesinger and Kissinger over détente, he said, "There were no basic differences."[^28]
### Secretary of Energy
[[Jimmy Carter]] appointed Schlesinger his special adviser on energy in January 1977.[^4] He was confirmed as the first Secretary of Energy on August 4, 1977, and served from August 6, 1977, to August 23, 1979.[^2]
### Later career
After leaving the Energy Department he became senior adviser to [[Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb]] in New York.[^4] He served on the [[President's Commission on Strategic Forces]] from 1982 to 1983, was vice chairman of the [[President's Blue Ribbon Task Group on Nuclear Weapons Program Management]] from 1984 to 1985, was a member of the [[U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century]] from 1998 to 2001, and sat on the [[Panel to Assess the Reliability, Safety, and Security of the U.S. Nuclear Stockpile]] from 1999 to 2003.[^4] He co-chaired a [[Defense Science Board]] task force on the future of the [[Global Positioning System]].[^4]
### Independent Panel on DoD detention operations (2004)
The Secretary of Defense chartered the [[Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations]] on May 12, 2004, to review Department of Defense investigations into detention operations and to advise on their causes and corrective measures.[^29] Schlesinger chaired the panel, whose members were [[Harold Brown]], [[Tillie Fowler]] and [[Charles Horner]], with [[James A. Blackwell Jr.]] as executive director. The report is dated August 24, 2004, and is addressed to Rumsfeld.[^29]
The panel found that "the most egregious instances of detainee abuse were caused by the aberrant behavior of a limited number of soldiers and the predilections of the non-commissioned officers on the night shift of Tier 1 at Abu Ghraib," and that commanding officers and staffs "at various levels failed in their duties," adding that "Military and civilian leaders at the Department of Defense share this burden of responsibility" (p. 43). It stated that "the weak and ineffectual leadership of the Commanding General of the 800th MP Brigade and the Commanding Officer of the 205th MI Brigade allowed the abuses at [[Abu Ghraib]]," and found no evidence that organizations above those two brigades "were directly involved in the incidents at Abu Ghraib" (p. 43).[^30]
On policy, the report recounts the Secretary of Defense decision of December 2, 2002, authorizing "as a matter of policy" Category I and II techniques and one Category III technique, rescinded after concern from the Navy General Counsel, and states that the legal resources of the Services' judge advocates and general counsels "were not utilized to their fullest potential" (pp. 35-36). It found that "pressure for additional intelligence and the more aggressive methods sanctioned by the Secretary of Defense memorandum resulted in stronger interrogation techniques" (p. 36), and that "Some individuals seized the opportunity provided by this environment to give vent to latent sadistic urges" while others "found themselves in uncharted ethical ground, with frequently changing guidance from above" (p. 29).[^31] Among the leaders who could have adjusted the detention plan after July 2003 it listed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and "the Office of the Secretary of Defense," and wrote, "In most cases these were errors of omission, but they were errors that should not go unnoted" (p. 47).[^32]
On the CIA, the panel wrote: "CIA personnel conducted interrogations in DoD detention facilities... at Abu Ghraib the CIA was allowed to conduct its interrogations separately. No memorandum of understanding existed on interrogations operations between the CIA and CJTF-7, and the CIA was allowed to operate under different rules." It added, "We are aware of the issue of unregistered detainees, but the Panel did not have sufficient access to CIA information to make any determinations in this regard" (p. 70), and recommended that "Clearer guidelines for the interaction of CIA with the Department of Defense in detention and interrogation operations must be defined" (p. 91).[^33]
On contractors, it stated: "Contractors were a particular problem at Abu Ghraib. The Army Inspector General found that 35 percent of the contractors employed did not receive formal training in military interrogation techniques, policy, or doctrine" (p. 69).[^34] On ghost detainees: "Secretary Rumsfeld publicly declared he directed one detainee be held secretly at the request of the Director of Central Intelligence" (p. 87).[^35]
### Nuclear weapons management task forces (2008)
In June 2008 Secretary of Defense [[Robert Gates]] appointed the Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, a subcommittee of the [[Defense Policy Board]], with Schlesinger as chairman and [[Michael P. C. Carns]], [[J. D. Crouch II]], [[Jacques S. Gansler]], [[Edmund P. Giambastiani Jr.]], [[John J. Hamre]], [[Franklin C. Miller]] and [[Christopher A. Williams]] as members and James Blackwell as executive director, after the 2006 misshipment of intercontinental ballistic missile components to Taiwan and the 2007 unauthorized transfer of nuclear weapons from [[Minot Air Force Base]] to [[Barksdale Air Force Base]]. Its Phase I report, transmitted to Gates on September 12, 2008, found "an unambiguous, dramatic, and unacceptable decline in the Air Force's commitment to perform the nuclear mission" and that "Air Force leaders failed in their leadership responsibilities to shift priorities and adjust policies and resources in ways needed to maintain robust nuclear stewardship, resulting in the inattention that led to the Minot-Barksdale and Taiwan incidents" (Executive Summary, pp. 1-3). It listed five trends, including that "no one Command in the Air Force had 'ownership' of the nuclear mission," and made 33 recommendations.[^36] The Phase II report of December 2008 found that "the lack of interest in and attention to the nuclear mission and nuclear deterrence... go well beyond the Air Force," "widespread fragmentation, dispersal of responsibility, and weakening of authorities" in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and "a distressing degree of inattention to the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence among many senior DoD military and civilian leaders" (Executive Summary, pp. iii-v). It recommended an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Deterrence.[^37]
### Boards and advisory posts
Schlesinger was chairman of the board of [[MITRE Corporation]], a member of the Defense Policy Board and of the [[International Security Advisory Board]], and a counselor and trustee of the [[Center for Strategic and International Studies]]. He chaired the [[National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing Advisory Board]] from 2007 until his death on March 27, 2014, while serving his fourth term as chairman.[^38]
### Footnotes
[^1]: U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Legacy Management, "Secretaries of Energy." https://www.energy.gov/lm/secretaries-energy
[^2]: Blanton, Thomas, ed. "The CIA's Family Jewels," National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 222, June 21, 2007, with Schlesinger's memorandum of May 9, 1973. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/index.htm
[^3]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Family Jewels," CIA FOIA Reading Room, released 2007; Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA.* Doubleday, 2007, pp. 316-327.
[^4]: Kress, Kenneth A. "Parapsychology in Intelligence: A Personal Review and Conclusions." *Studies in Intelligence,* vol. 21, no. 4, winter 1977, declassified.
[^5]: House Committee on Armed Services, Special Subcommittee on Intelligence, report on the inquiry into the alleged involvement of the CIA in the Watergate and Ellsberg matters, October 23, 1973.
[^6]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy.* Random House, 1991, ch. 17.
[^7]: Burr, William, ed. "Project Azorian: The CIA's Declassified History of the Glomar Explorer." National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 305, February 12, 2010.
[^1]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Biography, James R. Schlesinger," reading room document CIA-RDP75B00380R000400150017-8, copy at https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75b00380r000400150017-8
[^2]: U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Legacy Management, "Secretaries of Energy," entry for James Schlesinger (confirmed August 4, 1977; term of office August 6, 1977 to August 23, 1979). https://www.energy.gov/lm/secretaries-energy
[^3]: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVIII, part 2, front matter, "Persons" (Schlesinger: "Director of Central Intelligence, February 2-July 2, 1973; Secretary of Defense, July 2, 1973-November 19, 1975"; Walters: "Acting Director of Central Intelligence, July 2, 1973-September 4, 1973"; Colby: "Director of Central Intelligence, September 4, 1973-January 30, 1976"). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v38p2/persons
[^4]: Miller Center, University of Virginia, "James R. Schlesinger (1973-1974)," https://millercenter.org/node/1002; and "James R. Schlesinger (1977-1979)," https://millercenter.org/node/1152
[^5]: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. II, Document 284, editorial note (Schlesinger "sworn in on February 2, the same day that Helms resigned"). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v02/d284
[^6]: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVIII, part 2, Document 2, editorial note quoting William Colby's memoirs on the staff reduction under Schlesinger. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v38p2/d2
[^7]: David S. Robarge, survey of the Directors of Central Intelligence, 1946 to 2005, Studies in Intelligence, vol. 49, no. 3, CIA reading room document C05460742, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-16290853
[^8]: House Committee on Armed Services, Special Subcommittee on Intelligence, "Inquiry into the Alleged Involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Watergate and Ellsberg Matters," report, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., October 23, 1973 (HASC No. 93-25), passage on the February 1973 call from Mr. Dean. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80b01495r000500030007-0
[^9]: Same report, passage on the assistance to Hunt and Schlesinger's view of it.
[^10]: Same report, passage on McCord's account of the meeting with Gerald Alch and Alch's denial.
[^11]: National Security Archive, "The CIA's Family Jewels," Electronic Briefing Book No. 222, June 21, 2007, with the memorandum of May 9, 1973. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/index.htm
[^12]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Family Jewels," compilation of 693 pages, declassified June 2007, full text PDF as posted by the National Security Archive. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/family_jewels_full_ocr.pdf
[^13]: National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 222, Document 2, "Colby Briefs President Ford on the Family Jewels," memorandum of conversation, January 3, 1975, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/index.htm
[^14]: National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 222, Document 4, "Investigations Continue," memorandum of conversation, "Investigations of Allegations of CIA Domestic Activities," February 20, 1975, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/index.htm
[^15]: Kenneth A. Kress, "Parapsychology in Intelligence: A Personal Review and Conclusions," Studies in Intelligence, vol. 21, no. 4, winter 1977, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200030040-0. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00791r000200030040-0
[^16]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Technical Service, Memorandum for the Record, OTS/BAB Memo #287-77, "Briefing for House Permanent Select Committee re OTS Involvement in ESP Research," November 17, 1977, CIA-RDP96-00787R000500170001-0. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00787r000500170001-0
[^17]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Random House, 1991), p. 227. https://archive.org/details/Sampson_Option
[^18]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, p. 230 (index entry "Schlesinger, James R., 227, 230"); the author's notes date the Schlesinger interview April 25, 1989, in Washington, and the Colby interview January 10, 1991.
[^19]: Stanley I. Kutler, "The Fast One James Schlesinger Pulled on the Media," *History News Network*, April 2, 2014, summarizing an account attributed to an unnamed "senior Pentagon official." https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/155168
[^20]: Larry Diamond, "Our Year of Living Dangerously," *The American Interest*, January 12, 2018, quoting Gil Troy. https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/01/12/year-living-dangerously
[^21]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. X, Document 285, Minutes of National Security Council Meeting, May 12, 1975, 12:05 to 12:50 p.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d285
[^22]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. X, Document 291, Minutes of National Security Council Meeting, May 13, 1975, 10:22 to 11:17 a.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d291
[^23]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. X, Document 298, Minutes of National Security Council Meeting, May 14, 1975, 3:52 to 5:42 p.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d298
[^24]: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. X, Document 301, "Minutes of National Security Council Meeting," May 15, 1975, 4:02 to 4:20 p.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d301
[^25]: Memorandum of conversation, May 27, 1975, Ford, Schlesinger, Colby, Rumsfeld, Ingersoll and Scowcroft, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 12, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1553088.pdf (declassified in part)
[^26]: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXV, Document 197, Memorandum of Conversation, "MATADOR Meeting," Washington, March 19, 1975, 11:20 a.m., with editorial notes citing Jack Nelson, "Administration Won't Talk About Sub Raised by CIA," Los Angeles Times, March 20, 1975, pp. A1, A14-A16. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v35/d197
[^27]: Burr, William, ed. "Project Azorian: The CIA's Declassified History of the Glomar Explorer." National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 305, February 12, 2010. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB305/index.htm
[^28]: Gerald R. Ford, "The President's News Conference," November 3, 1975, The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-60
[^29]: Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, *Final Report*, August 2004, DTIC ADA428743, copy at https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA428743; cover letter of August 24, 2004, and Introduction ("Charter and Methodology"), p. 21.
[^30]: Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, *Final Report*, August 2004, DTIC ADA428743, copy at https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA428743; "Command Responsibilities," pp. 43-47.
[^31]: Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, *Final Report*, August 2004, DTIC ADA428743, copy at https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA428743; chapter on the Secretary of Defense policy decisions of December 2, 2002 and April 16, 2003, pp. 35-36, and "The Changing Threat," p. 29.
[^32]: Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, *Final Report*, August 2004, DTIC ADA428743, copy at https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA428743; "Failure of the Combatant Command to Adjust the Plan," p. 47.
[^33]: Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, *Final Report*, August 2004, DTIC ADA428743, copy at https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA428743; "Role of CIA," p. 70, and recommendation 8, p. 91.
[^34]: Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, *Final Report*, August 2004, DTIC ADA428743, copy at https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA428743; "Use of Contractors as Interrogators," p. 69.
[^35]: Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, *Final Report*, August 2004, DTIC ADA428743, copy at https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA428743; "The Role of the ICRC," p. 87.
[^36]: Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, *Phase I: The Air Force's Nuclear Mission*, transmittal letter of September 12, 2008, Executive Summary pp. 1-4 and recommendations, DTIC ADA486299; the figure of 33 recommendations is stated in the Phase II Executive Summary, p. iii. https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA486299
[^37]: Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, *Phase II: Review of the DoD Nuclear Mission*, December 2008, Executive Summary pp. iii-v, DTIC ADA492647. https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA492647
[^38]: Global Positioning System, "James Schlesinger," advisory board member biography, archive.gps.gov (Advisory Board Chair, 2007 to 2014; death on March 27, 2014). https://archive.gps.gov/governance/advisory/members/schlesinger/