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---
---
created: 2026-05-15
updated: 2026-05-15
updated: 2026-10-12
title: Bundesnachrichtendienst
aliases:
- BND
- Federal Intelligence Service
- Bundesnachrichtendienst
- Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND)
- German Federal Intelligence Service
tags:
- Organization
- Intelligence
- Germany
- ColdWar
- GehlenOrganization
- NaziPersonnel
- CryptoAG
- NSASurveillance
- Curveball
- Eikonal
- Merex
- ArmsTrade
category: "Foreign Government"
summary: "The Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) is Germany's federal foreign intelligence service, established April 1, 1956 by absorbing the CIA-funded Gehlen Organization under founder Reinhard Gehlen, and defined throughout the Cold War by the Heinz Felfe penetration scandal and its structural inheritance of former Nazi intelligence personnel."
summary: "The Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) is Germany's foreign intelligence service, formed in 1956 from the CIA-sponsored Gehlen Organization, and in October 2026 its former president August Hanning was arrested on warrants requested by the Federal Prosecutor."
start: 1956-04-01
location: "Pullach, Bavaria (original HQ); Berlin (from 2019)"
relations:
- type: head_of
with: Reinhard Gehlen
start: 1956-04-01
end: 1968
role: President
fn: 7
- type: head_of
with: Gerhard Wessel
start: 1968
role: President
fn: 12
- type: head_of
with: August Hanning
start: 1998-12-17
end: 2005-11-30
role: President
fn: 46
- type: employed_by
with: Heinz Felfe
reverse: true
start: 1951
end: 1961-11
role: counterintelligence officer
fn: 14
- type: funded
with: Central Intelligence Agency
reverse: true
start: 1946
end: 1956-04-01
role: sponsor of the Gehlen Organization
fn: 4
- type: owned
with: Crypto AG
start: 1970
end: 1993
role: joint owner with the CIA
fn: 38
- type: partner_of
with: NSA
start: 2002
role: Eikonal and Bad Aibling cooperation
fn: 41
- type: informant_for
with: Curveball
reverse: true
start: 2000
role: source whose reporting the BND supplied to the United States
fn: 36
- type: informant_for
with: Klaus Barbie
reverse: true
start: 1966-05
end: 1966-12
role: source in Bolivia, codename Adler
fn: 23
- type: informant_for
with: Gerhard Mertins
reverse: true
start: 1956
role: source codenamed Uranus, director of the arms firm Merex
fn: 25
- type: employed_by
with: Franz Rademacher
reverse: true
start: 1961
role: paid source, former German Foreign Office deportation specialist, based in Syria
fn: 21
- type: partner_of
with: Stepan Bandera
start: 1956-03
role: BND support for Ukrainian nationalist operations, including a trained team sent in July 1959
fn: 27
---
The Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND; Federal Intelligence Service) is the foreign intelligence service of the [[Germany|Federal Republic of Germany]]. It collects foreign intelligence, conducts signals intelligence (SIGINT), and coordinates counterintelligence activities in support of German national security and foreign policy. The BND is the direct institutional successor to the [[Gehlen Organization]], the private intelligence network that [[Reinhard Gehlen]] operated under CIA sponsorship from 1946 until West German sovereignty was restored.[^1]
The Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND; Federal Intelligence Service) is the foreign intelligence service of the [[Germany|Federal Republic of Germany]]. It collects foreign intelligence, conducts signals intelligence (SIGINT) and maintains liaison with the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] and the [[NSA]]. The service descends from the [[Gehlen Organization]], the network that [[Reinhard Gehlen]] ran under [[United States Army|U.S. Army]] and then CIA sponsorship from 1946 until West German sovereignty was restored, and it was formally established on April 1, 1956.[^1]
### Origins: The Gehlen Organization
### Origins under the Army and the CIA
The BND's predecessor was created through a bargain struck between Gehlen and American intelligence in May 1945. Gehlen had headed the Wehrmacht's Fremde Heere Ost (Foreign Armies East) intelligence section - the German military's primary intelligence service for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. As Germany collapsed, Gehlen had his staff microfilm their entire Soviet intelligence archive and bury it in the Bavarian mountains, then surrendered to American forces with the explicit offer to place this irreplaceable anti-Soviet intelligence in American hands.
The Gehlen group was first run under an American arrangement codenamed [[Operation RUSTY]]. Gehlen had headed the Wehrmacht's [[Fremde Heere Ost]] (Foreign Armies East) directorate, which covered the Soviet Union and the Eastern Front. His memoir describes microfilming the [[Wehrmacht]]'s files on the Soviet Union, burying them in the mountains and surrendering to American forces with the microfilm.[^2] A statement by his deputy [[Gerhard Wessel]] recorded in the CIA's history places the decision in spring 1944: Gehlen resolved then to salvage the directorate's files and records "for the West," and after [[Adolf Hitler]] relieved him on April 9, 1945, he moved the files, already photostated and microfilmed, by army truck to three sites in southern Germany, near the Wilder Kaiser, Marquartstein and Schliersee. Wessel succeeded him as chief of the directorate.[^3]
The U.S. Army, and subsequently the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]], accepted the arrangement. Gehlen and his former Wehrmacht and Abwehr staff were moved to a compound at Pullach, south of Munich, where they continued to operate under CIA oversight as the "Gehlen Organization" or simply "the Org." The CIA funded the operation, reviewed its product, and used it as the primary source of intelligence on the Soviet military from 1946 onward.[^1]
Between 1945 and 1949 the U.S. Army handled the organization and funded its intelligence collection, and the Army wanted the CIA and its predecessors to take over responsibility for it.[^4] Lieutenant General [[Lucius D. Clay]], the U.S. military governor, opposed CIA involvement in RUSTY, and his retirement in the spring of 1949 cleared the way for the Agency to assume control in July of that year. [[James H. Critchfield]]'s December 1948 report for Director of Central Intelligence [[Roscoe Hillenkoetter]] was decisive in persuading CIA officials to take responsibility for the Organization.[^5]
When West Germany (the Federal Republic) regained sovereignty under the 1955 Paris Agreements, the Org was transferred from CIA control to the new West German federal government. On April 1, 1956, it became the Bundesnachrichtendienst. Gehlen was named its first president, a position he held until 1968.[^1]
The Army's [[Counter Intelligence Corps]] arrested several Germans in 1946 who said they worked for American intelligence. The [[Strategic Services Unit]] representative who investigated the arrests reported that "some of the agents employed were [[SS]] personnel with known Nazi records and, in most cases, undesirable people."[^6] In August 1948 the acting chief of the CIA's [[Karlsruhe]] Operations Base wrote about RUSTY's recruiting methods "with great disgust." A former Wehrmacht officer named Baun had built his own network inside RUSTY, and the Americans and Gehlen removed him during 1947. In late 1947 RUSTY moved from [[Oberursel]] to its own compound at [[Pullach]], a village near [[Munich]], and Col. Willard K. Liebel replaced Col. Deane as operations officer.[^6]
### Cold War Operations
The CIA assumed responsibility for the Organization from the Army in 1949 and held it in what the CIA called "trusteeship" until 1956. Critchfield was the Agency's representative at Pullach from June 1949 until 1956.[^7] The CIA's 1945 to 1949 history describes the group as a "double edged sword" that "boosted the [[Warsaw Pact]]'s propaganda efforts" and that "suffered devastating penetrations by the [[KGB]]," as shown by the [[Heinz Felfe]] and [[Hans Clemens]] cases.[^8] The [[National Security Archive]] posted the history in February 2005 in a briefing book that notes Gehlen employed numerous former Nazis and known war criminals.[^9]
The BND's Cold War role was shaped by Germany's unique geographic position as the primary front line between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. [[Berlin]], divided between Western and Soviet occupation zones, was the central arena of East-West intelligence operations. The BND ran agent networks inside [[German Democratic Republic|East Germany]], monitored [[Stasi]] and [[KGB]] activities, and served as the CIA's primary liaison for operations targeting the Soviet Bloc.[^1]
The CIA acknowledged an intelligence relationship with Gehlen for the first time in an October 2000 court filing in the Freedom of Information Act case Oglesby v. Army. The [[Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act]] processing that followed released the Army's 2,100-page Gehlen file and nearly 2,100 further pages from CIA files, together with files on many of Gehlen's personnel and agents.[^10]
The BND suffered a structural vulnerability: the widespread use of former Nazi intelligence and SS personnel among its founding staff, many of whom had wartime connections to Soviet intelligence services through the complex loyalties of the war years.[^1]
### Founding in 1956 and the succession to Gehlen
### The Heinz Felfe Penetration
Under the 1955 [[Paris Agreements]], West Germany regained sovereignty and the Organization passed to the new federal government. On April 1, 1956 it became the Bundesnachrichtendienst, with Gehlen as its first president. He held the post until 1968.[^7] The Pullach compound, the personnel roster and the operational assets went with it, and the CIA-BND liaison replaced the CIA-Organization relationship.[^1]
The most damaging intelligence failure in BND history was the case of Heinz Felfe, a senior officer who served as head of the BND's Soviet counterintelligence section while simultaneously working as a KGB double agent.
A CIA field report distributed on December 20, 1967 relayed an account from a "qualified American observer" of a conversation with a West German official named [[Horst Ehmke|Ehmke]]. According to the account, the [[Social Democratic Party of Germany|Social Democratic Party]] (SPD) had decided to back Lieutenant General Gerhard Wessel as Gehlen's successor and wanted the vice presidency in return. The Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union had proposed Ambassador Swidbert Schnippenkoetter for the presidency. The SPD candidates for vice president were [[Guenther Nollau]], vice president of the [[Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz|BfV]], and Guenther Redding, president of the Hamburg office for the protection of the constitution.[^11] Wessel was the BND president by December 1969, when the service's telex on the security review of [[Günter Guillaume]] was sent.[^12]
Felfe had served in the SS Security Service (SD) during World War II. After the war he was briefly interned by the British before being released. He was recruited by Soviet intelligence in the late 1940s before joining the Gehlen Organization in 1951. Over the following decade Felfe rose to lead the counterintelligence section responsible for detecting Soviet penetrations - the precise position that gave him access to nearly all of the BND's anti-Soviet agent networks and methods.
The BND's Cold War work was shaped by Germany's position as the front line between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The service ran agent networks inside [[German Democratic Republic|East Germany]], monitored [[Stasi]] and KGB activities, and served as the CIA's primary liaison for operations against the Soviet Bloc. [[Berlin]], divided between Western and Soviet occupation zones, was the central arena of these operations.[^13] After the uprisings in East Germany in the summer of 1953 the Soviets and East Germans moved against the Organization: in late November 1953 the Communists announced the roll-up of West German agent networks in the East, three cases led to the exposure of hundreds of other assets, and by the end of that year more than 200 Organization agents had fled to West Germany to avoid arrest.[^7]
When Felfe was arrested on November 6, 1961, the extent of the damage became clear: he had provided the KGB with the identities of approximately one hundred Western agents operating inside the Soviet Bloc, many of whom had been arrested or killed. His 1963 trial resulted in conviction; he was sentenced to fourteen years. In 1969, Felfe was exchanged for Western agents held by the Soviet Union.
### Former SS and SD personnel
The Felfe case directly implicated Gehlen's policy of recruiting former Nazi intelligence and SS personnel regardless of wartime loyalty complications. The KGB had specifically exploited the wartime records of potential recruits to identify those who could be approached.[^1]
The Organization's counterintelligence base at Karlsruhe, designated GV"L" in the CIA's study of the Felfe case, was heavily staffed by former [[Sicherheitsdienst|SD]] and SS personnel who had to conceal their backgrounds to keep their jobs. The base developed an informal association of former SS and SD men for mutual protection and career advancement, and that group was susceptible to blackmail and to appeals based on revenge and vindication.[^14]
### The Gunter Guillaume Affair
The Soviets exploited the Organization's employment of former SS officers, and after the Felfe and Clemens scandals "it is believed that over 200 BND officers resigned or were dismissed in the 1960s because they had concealed their wartime pasts."[^7] The Pullach operations base played no role in vetting the Organization's staff, because Gehlen refused to give the true names of his staff and agents.[^7] The KGB exploited the wartime records of potential recruits to identify those who could be approached.[^13]
The BND's most politically significant Cold War case involved not its own personnel but a Stasi agent operating inside the West German government. [[Gunter Guillaume]] was an East German citizen who had emigrated to [[West Germany]] in 1956, established himself as a Social Democratic Party (SPD) activist, and risen to become a personal aide to Chancellor [[Willy Brandt]]. Guillaume was an officer of the [[Stasi|HVA]] - the Stasi's foreign intelligence directorate headed by [[Markus Wolf]].
The historians of the U.S. Interagency Working Group on the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act described nine of fourteen second-tier CIA name files as involving individuals who had contact with the Gehlen Organization. Their case summaries record the following:[^15]
BND suspicions about Guillaume developed from the late 1960s, but the sensitivity of disclosing that a spy had reached the Chancellor's office complicated the investigation. Guillaume was arrested on April 24, 1974; he confessed within days. Brandt resigned as Chancellor on May 7, 1974, partly because of the security failure. The affair was among the most damaging East German intelligence operations of the Cold War.[^2]
- [[Emil Augsburg]], an SD major and department director at the Wannsee Institute who had been wanted by Poland for war crimes, was used by the CIC in 1947 and 1948 and then taken on by the Organization. By 1953 the Organization viewed him as a "shining star" of counterespionage. Gehlen insisted in 1954 that he work outside Pullach because of his RSHA past, and he was dismissed in 1966 after the BND concluded in late 1965 that he could be a double agent.
- [[Franz Goering]], an aide to Walter Schellenberg in the RSHA foreign intelligence branch, was a BND official in 1959 when a former colleague who was a Soviet agent took intelligence records from his home in Hamburg and left a note inviting him to defect.
- [[Wilhelm Harster]], an SS lieutenant general and Security Police commander in the Netherlands and Italy, whose file notes implication in the murder of 104,000 Jews, could not join the BND as a security risk but presented himself to others as a BND agent and recommended former SS contacts to the service. He had been Heinz Felfe's superior, and the file indicates he used Felfe to reach the BND.
- [[Wilhelm Krichbaum]], former head of the Wehrmacht Secret Field Police and a district chief in the Organization, did not tell the Organization or the CIA of his contacts with two Viennese brothers-in-law who ran a literary agency in the Soviet sector of Vienna that the file describes as an espionage front. A 1963 document apparently from the BND concluded he had worked for the Soviets since 1950.
- [[Franz Six]], an Einsatzkommando officer sentenced at Nuremberg, was reported to have joined the Organization in the mid-1950s. In 1963 the East German media charged that Gehlen had recently transferred a number of former SS and SD officials, among them Six, Augsburg and Goering, to camouflaged positions to reduce criticism that he was using war criminals.
- [[Friedrich Panzinger]], a former Gestapo colonel, was released from Soviet prison in 1956 with a secret mission to penetrate the BND, reported the mission to the West German authorities and was used by them as a double agent. He killed himself in a cell in 1959 before a possible Bavarian war-crimes arrest, and West German intelligence reviews afterwards could not determine whether he had ever been loyal to the West.
- [[Hans Sommer]], a Gestapo official in Norway and France, was recruited for counterespionage in early 1950 and dropped in 1953. [[Wilfried Krallert]] was picked up in 1952. There are indications that [[Horst Kopkow]] surfaced as an Organization official. [[Guido Zimmer]] contacted Gehlen in December 1948.
### Post-Cold War and Modern Era
The same historians concluded that in settling on men such as Augsburg the CIC, the CIA and the Gehlen Organization made the West more vulnerable to Soviet espionage.[^15]
German reunification in October 1990 produced an enormous intelligence windfall: the Stasi archives, including the ROSENHOLZ files containing the identities of East German and Soviet agents throughout the West. The files took years to analyze and generated prosecutions, diplomatic incidents, and revelations about the extent of Eastern Bloc penetration of Western institutions.
The BND's own Independent Historians' Commission (Unabhängige Historikerkommission, UHK) was established by contract in February 2011. A parliamentary question of May 2022 describes its research focus as the BND's handling of the Nazi past, both its own personnel "Altlasten" and the early Federal Republic's handling of the subject, and states that fourteen studies had been published by then.[^16] The commission's first volume, by Christoph Rass, drew on a random sample of 3,650 life histories from the personnel files of the just under 12,000 staff who worked for the BND at Pullach until 1968 or for the Organization until 1956, and counted formal "markers" of National Socialist ties (NSDAP and other organizations, and service in the Reich's police, Waffen-SS and RSHA).[^17] The historian [[Dominik Rigoll]] summarized the first four volumes in 2016: Nowack's study of security reviews in the 1960s recorded the removal of 68 persons, who were treated as security risks because they could be blackmailed, and Sälter's volume described the Organization's revival of the Nazi image of the "Red Orchestra" resistance as a fifth column.[^17] In October 2022 a report attributed to Sälter's volume on Nazi continuities stated that up to 20 percent of the personnel in the Organization's early years "demonstrably had blood on their hands," that more than 30 of them had taken part in mass shootings with Einsatzgruppen, and that the recruitment of accomplices in the Holocaust and in war crimes had been a system until the 1960s.[^18]
[[Edward Snowden]]'s 2013 disclosures revealed that the BND had cooperated extensively with the [[NSA]] in mass surveillance operations targeting European communications. The BND Act was reformed in 2016 and 2021 following Federal Constitutional Court rulings that the agency's surveillance activities required more explicit statutory authorization.
The most recent study cited in the 2022 parliamentary question is [[Klaus-Dietmar Henke]], "Geheime Dienste. Die politische Inlandsspionage des BND in der Ära Adenauer," which the question describes as covering BND surveillance of the SPD carried out on the instruction of [[Konrad Adenauer]].[^16] A volume by Agilolf Keßelring on the Organization and the defense of West Germany from 1949 to 1953 documents, in a reviewer's summary, a secret emergency plan to gather veterans of the old Wehrmacht elite divisions, and of the Waffen-SS, behind the Rhine in case of a Soviet attack. The Wehrmacht colonel Albert Schnez had begun preparing such an army cadre in 1949 without the knowledge of the federal government; connections between the Schnez organization and Gehlen existed from the summer of 1951, and Gehlen evidently made the project a matter for his personal attention. About 3,000 men were recorded on index cards and lists, and the plan provided for a force of 40,000 in three divisions.[^19]
The BND's headquarters were transferred from Pullach to a new purpose-built complex in Berlin, completed in 2019.[^2]
### The BND and Alois Brunner
Members of [[Die Linke]] asked in May 2022 whether the redactions in the Henke volume concealed BND knowledge of the whereabouts of [[Alois Brunner]], whom the question described as a 1938 staff member of the Vienna office for Jewish emigration and deputy to [[Adolf Eichmann]]. The same question asked whether the BND had a "nachrichtendienstliche Verbindung" to the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem, citing [[Willi Winkler]], who wrote in the [[Süddeutsche Zeitung]] on April 20, 2022 that a lawyer may have been that link and that a journalist may have been an informant placed near the trial.[^16] In June 2022 the government answered the Brunner question with "Ja, dies kann ausgeschlossen werden" ("Yes, this can be ruled out") and referred back to earlier answers on the trial.[^20]
CIA files released under the Disclosure Act and described by the historians Richard Breitman and Norman Goda record several BND contacts around Brunner's circle in the Middle East. In 1959 a high BND official codenamed Winterstein conceded to the CIA that the BND had a loose relationship with [[Wilhelm Beisner]], a former SD officer who was in Cairo trading arms, and most of the CIA's information on his Egyptian activities originated with the Gehlen Organization. Mail to Beisner's Munich apartment was intercepted by an intelligence agency and copied to the CIA; the BND said it was a French operation and the CIA thought the BND itself might have done it. From a handwritten reply in that mail the CIA concluded, by comparing handwriting, that a correspondent in Damascus signing as Rischer was Brunner, then an adviser to Syrian intelligence. In March 1961 a BND official codenamed Glueckrath told a CIA officer in Munich that Brunner had attended meetings of an "Egyptian SS group" in late 1960 and January 1961 with [[Fritz Katzmann]] and the Nazi propagandist [[Johannes von Leers]], where Brunner claimed to hold a list of Jews who had collaborated, to be used for blackmail. The former German Foreign Office deportation specialist [[Franz Rademacher]], who had fled to Syria, was put on the payroll of the West German secret service in 1961 or early 1962; the CIA knew of his BND status and had no direct contact with him. Brunner survived an assassination attempt and, in the historians' account, remained in Syria and apparently died there in 1992.[^21]
### Klaus Barbie, Merex and the arms trade
In 1966 the BND recruited [[Klaus Barbie]], the former Gestapo chief of Lyon then living in La Paz as Klaus Altmann, as a source codenamed Adler.[^22] The historian [[Peter Hammerschmidt]] wrote in 2012 that the Amt used Barbie between May and December 1966, shielded him from prosecution and paid him 5,300 marks in total; he reported on left-wing forces in Bolivia, and the BND ended the connection after he declined to travel to Germany for training.[^23][^24] A few weeks after the recruitment Barbie became the Bolivian representative of the arms firm Merex.[^25]
Merex was run by [[Gerhard Mertins]], a former SS man who in Hammerschmidt's account had worked for the BND under the codename Uranus since 1956. The firm sold surplus [[Bundeswehr]] weapons and equipment abroad on the BND's behalf, above all in the Middle East. Hammerschmidt reported in June 2011, from files of German and American intelligence services, that a Merex representative acting as a double agent of the BND and CIA toured Latin America in July 1966, and that during the tour the former Luftwaffe pilot [[Hans-Ulrich Rudel]] introduced him to Friedrich Schwend, a former RSHA counterfeiter of British banknotes, and to the former SS officer Willem Sassen, who became a representative in Argentina two days after the first contact with the Merex representative; that Schwend, Barbie and Rudel had founded a firm named La Estrella in the early 1960s that employed former SS officers; that [[Otto Skorzeny]] was drawn into the Merex business; and that Merex and Barbie handled the delivery of four Transall C-160 aircraft from the West German defense ministry to Bolivia and Peru in March 1968. The CIA files, in Hammerschmidt's description, record that the BND was "very interested" in the representative's contacts with Rudel and other Germans in Latin America, which he called a clear sign that the Barbie recruitment was "only the tip of the iceberg" of BND collaboration with Nazi criminals.[^25] Marti wrote in 2025 that Barbie, as Merex's Bolivian representative from 1966, also arranged the delivery of Austrian tanks used in the 1980 coup, and that the Germans had made no effort to inquire about his identity.[^24]
The Federal Chancellery gave an official account of the BND's arms-trade contacts in February 1979 in a reply to the Higher Regional Court of Cologne in a civil suit involving [[Karl Carstens]]. The Chancellery stated that in the 1960s the BND maintained connections to arms trading firms, among them Merex AG and its dependent companies Deutsche Merex GmbH and Wehrexport GmbH, and a firm dependent on Dobbertin & Co. The purpose was stated as reconnaissance of the international arms trade. The BND went beyond observation: to move the firms to provide information it advised them on initiating and conducting deals, named them to the defense ministry as buyers for surplus Bundeswehr material and occasionally acted as intermediary by passing sales requests from the ministry or from foreign interested parties to the firms. From 1965 to September 1969 the Merex companies exported arms to various states on a larger scale, in numerous cases having obtained the required export approvals by naming incorrect recipient countries or, in some cases, by use of forged end-user certificates. A criminal case against Mertins and others ended in acquittal on November 26, 1975. The Chancellery stated that the BND had evidently known of the transactions in all essential phases, and that a senior BND official was released from service for five years from May 1, 1969 to steer the reconnaissance activity and took the post of deputy chairman of the management at the Dobbertin company. The same file records that Wessel told a dpa bureau chief on December 15, 1978 that the BND had never itself traded in arms and that its task was to find out where weapons were flowing.[^26]
The CIA's records also show the BND's relations with the Ukrainian nationalist leader [[Stepan Bandera]]. After a brief sponsorship by Italian military intelligence in early 1956, Bandera offered the BND his lines into Ukraine in March 1956 in return for money and weapons. The CIA warned the West Germans against any operational relationship, saying all alleged Bandera assets in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Ukraine were non-existent or ineffective. In April 1959 Gehlen's adviser Heinz Danko Herre, Bandera's contact in the BND, supported a mission, and a team trained and funded by the BND crossed from Czechoslovakia in late July.[^27]
### Heinz Felfe
Heinz Felfe was born in [[Dresden]] in 1918. According to the CIA study he was inducted into an SS reserve unit in 1938, and from then on his schooling, legal training and police career were guided by the SS; the historian Goda gives 1936 for his entry into the SS and 1943 for his commission.[^14][^28] In 1943 he joined the foreign intelligence section of the [[Reich Main Security Office]] (RSHA), serving first in its Swiss section and then in the Netherlands. He finished the war as an Obersturmführer in the [[Waffen-SS]] and was taken prisoner by the British.[^14] The British held him at an interrogation center near Utrecht that specialized in former German intelligence personnel. After his release he worked from 1947 for a British military intelligence unit in Bonn, assigned to report on communist student groups, and joined the [[Communist Party of Germany|Communist Party]] (KPD).[^14]
The British decided in April 1950 to drop Felfe, after he had tried to sell information to several agencies and two news services and had revealed himself as a British agent to his own contacts. Their files, received by the BND in 1961 and by the CIA in 1962, recorded that they told him his contacts with former SS personnel, named as [[Helmut Proebsting]] and Hans Clemens, could no longer be tolerated.[^14] Clemens was a former colleague from the RSHA foreign intelligence arm. The KGB recruited Clemens first, in Dresden in February 1950, and then, through Clemens, Felfe and a third Dresdener, [[Erwin Tiebel]].[^14] Goda dates Felfe's full status as a Soviet agent, codenamed Paul, to September 1951.[^28] After leaving the British Felfe worked for the North Rhine-Westphalia state security office and then as a refugee interrogator at the Ministry for All-German Affairs, and he was recruited into the Gehlen Organization in 1951.[^14] The CIA study records that British files showed he had told his case officer in early 1950 that he intended to offer Clemens to the North Rhine-Westphalia state security office.[^14]
Felfe was a BND officer for ten years, six of them as deputy chief of the section responsible for countering Soviet espionage, and the CIA study describes the post as in practice the real chief of the section. He was a dedicated Soviet agent throughout.[^14] Goda states that he took charge of counterintelligence against the Soviets in 1955, and Hechelhammer, the BND's chief historian, describes him as having risen to head of counterintelligence against the Soviet Union.[^28][^29] The Army's Counter Intelligence Corps had noted in 1953 his role as leader of an "SD clique" in the Organization, and in 1955 that suspicion of him and the clique was growing; the CIA suspected him by 1957, while he had Gehlen's confidence and personally briefed him on Soviet matters.[^28] The CIA's record shows that the first official briefings on the agency's Karlshorst penetration program were given to him in May 1958, February 1959 and July 1959, and that he became the BND headquarters supervisor of the joint Karlshorst program.[^14] Felfe was detected through a lead from a CIA-run penetration of the Polish intelligence service (UB), identified in the study as the defector Michal Goleniewski, and he was arrested on November 6, 1961, with Clemens and Tiebel.[^14][^30] Felfe is credited with the compromise of approximately one hundred Western agents operating in the Soviet Bloc, many of whom were arrested or killed.[^13] The CIA's 1963 damage assessment, as summarized by Goda, estimated that about 15,000 individual items were blown or compromised.[^28]
Felfe was tried in July 1963 and sentenced to fourteen years. Clemens received nine years and Tiebel two years at hard labor.[^14] From prison Felfe kept up contact with the KGB, and the Soviets tried to obtain his release in exchange for prisoners held in the East.[^14] In 1969 he was released to East Germany in exchange for three West German spies, and a BND archive photograph shows the exchange at the Herleshausen border crossing.[^28][^29] Hechelhammer states that he later worked for the Stasi as a full-time informal collaborator.[^29] He published a memoir, *Im Dienst des Gegners* (1986).[^31]
### The Günter Guillaume affair
The BND's most politically significant Cold War case involved not its own personnel but a Stasi agent operating inside the West German government. Günter Guillaume was an East German citizen who had emigrated to [[West Germany]] in 1956, established himself as a Social Democratic Party (SPD) activist and risen to become a personal aide to Chancellor [[Willy Brandt]]. Guillaume was an officer of the [[Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung|HVA]], the Stasi's foreign intelligence directorate headed by [[Markus Wolf]].[^32]
The BND had a card entry dating from April 1954 that recorded that Guillaume was reported to have travelled the Federal Republic for the East Berlin publisher [[Volk und Wissen]], to make contacts with publishers, printers and persons and then infiltrate them from the east. The Bundestag's Second Inquiry Committee reproduced a BND telex received on December 17, 1969 that reported the entry and noted that its truth could no longer be checked.[^33] The BND also held information that Volk und Wissen served as a legal residency for [[Ministry for State Security]] members.[^33]
BND suspicions about Guillaume developed from the late 1960s, but the sensitivity of disclosing that a spy had reached the Chancellor's office complicated the investigation. Guillaume was arrested on April 24, 1974, and confessed within days. Brandt resigned as Chancellor on May 7, 1974, partly because of the security failure. The affair was among the most damaging East German intelligence operations of the Cold War.[^32]
Markus Wolf wrote that the HVA penetrated the BND, the Federal Chancellery, the Foreign Ministry and both major West German parties, and that the full scope became clear only after reunification.[^34]
### Reunification and the Stasi files
The backup copy of the microfilmed index cards and statistical sheets of the Stasi's foreign intelligence directorate (Hauptverwaltung A) carries the name Rosenholz, assigned by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. The Stasi Records Agency received the data sets concerning German nationals from the CIA by March 2003; data on foreigners were not handed over. The 280,000 person records cover the whole period of the directorate's activity to January 1988, with 54 percent concerning citizens of the Federal Republic, 38 percent citizens of the GDR and 8 percent unassigned. The copies were handed to the German authorities between 1999 and 2003 on 381 CDs.[^35] The files took years to analyze and generated prosecutions, diplomatic incidents and revelations about the extent of Eastern Bloc penetration of Western institutions.
### Curveball and the Iraq assessments
The CIA's own memorandum on its contact with the BND's source codenamed [[Curveball]] states that the BND provided the vast majority of Curveball's reporting to the United States government, and that U.S. intelligence agencies had no direct access to him until mid-March 2004, when the BND allowed CIA officers to debrief him. The memorandum judges him unreliable because he fabricated his claimed access to a mobile biological weapons production project.[^36]
The [[Robb-Silberman Commission]] described Curveball as an Iraqi chemical engineer who came to the Intelligence Community's attention through a "foreign liaison service." The commission wrote that the service debriefed him and shared the results with the United States but would not give American officers direct access. Between January 2000 and September 2001 the [[Defense Intelligence Agency]]'s Defense HUMINT Service disseminated almost 100 of his reports on mobile biological weapons facilities. The commission wrote that "virtually all" of the Intelligence Community's information on those facilities came from a source "who was a fabricator."[^37] The CIA memorandum names the BND as the service.[^36]
### Crypto AG and Operation Rubicon
The Swiss parliamentary Control Delegation (Geschäftsprüfungsdelegation, GPDel) reviewed an American history of the operation, titled MINERVA, which describes how American intelligence services used the Swiss manufacturer [[Crypto AG]] for their own purposes in agreement with its Swedish owner. According to the GPDel's summary of that history, in 1970 the company passed into joint ownership of American services and the German intelligence service. German participation ended in late 1993, and the account closes in 1995. The GPDel also found that the Swiss [[Strategic Intelligence Service]] had reliable information from autumn 1993 that American and German services owned the firm, and that the Swiss service set out to break the encryption of the firm's weaker export devices.[^38]
The Washington Post reported in February 2020 that the company had been owned and run by the CIA in partnership with the BND for most of its history. In the Post's audio report the reporter [[Greg Miller]] said "By 1970, the CIA and the BND own this company," after buying it from its founder.[^39] The Post's coverage of the operation names Thesaurus and Rubicon.[^39]
### Bad Aibling and the NSA
The BND's [[Bad Aibling Station]] was built on a U.S. military site. According to the Bundestag's NSA inquiry, the American Army operated the station from 1952 to 2004, collecting satellite traffic from crisis regions. Former BND president [[August Hanning]] testified that the station was not run by the NSA and described it as a relic of the occupation period.[^40] Closure planned for 2002 was postponed after the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the NSA collected satellite traffic from the station until 2004. In April 2004 the U.S. Army gave up the station, and the [[Joint SIGINT Activity]] took over its essential technical facilities, including the antenna field. Hanning testified that the arrangement placed Bad Aibling under German sovereignty, with American access to its results provided through the BND.[^40]
### Operation Eikonal
Operation [[Eikonal]] was a BND collection point on a fibre-optic cable near Frankfurt am Main, run with the NSA in the Joint SIGINT Activity from 2004 to 2008. Its internal codename was GRANAT. Witnesses said it rested on a Memorandum of Agreement of 2002. The former BND department head [[Reinhardt Breitfelder]] testified that cooperation at Bad Aibling had been extended from satellite collection to a cable project for foreign-to-foreign traffic, with the results to be shared.[^41] A witness also said that cable collection in Frankfurt was discussed at a BND leadership conference in March 2002, and that Breitfelder sketched the plan in a paper.[^41]
The Süddeutsche Zeitung reported in June 2014 that the BND had collected data at a Frankfurt data node for years and passed raw data to the NSA, that the arrangement was halted in 2007 over its political sensitivity, and that the NSA had protested. The committee's report cites that reporting.[^41]
### NSA selectors
In late 2005 or early 2006 BND staff at Bad Aibling found NSA selectors (telephone numbers and other communication identifiers) targeting the European companies [[EADS]] and [[Eurocopter]], with numbers located outside Germany. On January 25, 2006 the station confirmed that the selectors were no longer used for collection, and the BND stopped using 74 numbers, 52 for EADS and 22 for Eurocopter.[^42] Former BND president [[Gerhard Schindler]] described the finding as the start of a third filter stage, for selectors that violated "deutsche Interessen."[^42]
According to the committee's report, in August 2013 a special review of the NSA selector stock found a large number of unlawful selectors concerning European government bodies. The Bad Aibling staff member who ran the search deleted about 12,000 features on the instruction of the station head. The report lists at least nine persons in the BND who knew of the review and its findings before March 2015, and states that the president and the Chancellery were reportedly informed only in March 2015.[^43] The report's section on the period is headed as the concealment of the NSA selector findings in the 2013 election year. Schindler was the BND president at the time of the 2013 review.[^43]
### Surveillance law and reform
The Bundestag's NSA inquiry followed the 2013 disclosures of [[Edward Snowden]], which the report describes as the source of public knowledge of the BND's role in mass surveillance.[^43] The 2016 reform of the BND Act, passed by the grand coalition, put strategic foreign-to-foreign surveillance into statute. The [[Federal Constitutional Court]] ruled on May 19, 2020 (1 BvR 2835/17) that this surveillance was unconstitutional as then regulated, that Article 10 of the [[Basic Law]] protects foreigners abroad, and that an independent oversight body was required. The legislature had until the end of 2021 to rewrite the rules.[^44] The federal cabinet approved a new bill on December 16, 2020.[^44]
### Later espionage cases and Berlin headquarters
In 2014 a BND employee, Markus R., was exposed as a source for the CIA; between 2008 and 2014 he passed on more than 200 documents, received at least 80,000 euros and was sentenced in March 2016 to eight years. In the case of the BND employee Carsten L. the Federal Prosecutor charged him with obtaining nine internal documents in September and October 2022 for the businessman Arthur E., who allegedly passed information to the Russian service FSB; both are charged with especially serious treason in a trial that began in December 2023.[^30] The BND was headquartered at Pullach until its new complex in Berlin was opened. Chancellor [[Angela Merkel]] opened the new headquarters on February 8, 2019, and called the move a milestone in the development of the German foreign intelligence service.[^45]
### Former president arrested in 2026
On October 6, 2026 the Federal Prosecutor (Bundesanwaltschaft) had August Hanning and his former office head arrested by officers of the [[Bundeskriminalamt]] in the district of Bad Tölz-Wolfratshausen in Bavaria and in the district of Steinfurt in North Rhine-Westphalia, on warrants issued by the investigating judge of the [[Federal Court of Justice]]. Searches of the suspects' premises began there and in Berlin the same day. The release states a strong suspicion against Hanning of unlawful espionage (landesverräterische Ausspähung, section 96 paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code), gathering state secrets (section 96 paragraph 2), attempted treason (section 94 paragraph 1 with section 22) and intelligence agent activity (section 99 paragraph 1 number 1). The office head is charged with aiding attempted treason and unlawful espionage (sections 94, 96 and 27).[^46]
The release gives the following facts as the warrants' allegation. Hanning was BND president from December 1998 to the end of November 2005, and the office head served as his office head, followed him as a seconded assistant when he was state secretary in the Federal Ministry of the Interior from December 2005 to November 2009, and from March 2012 to March 2026 served as office head for several later BND presidents. Probably in spring 2010 the two agreed that the office head would continuously obtain valuable BND findings for Hanning for payment, which Hanning could exploit commercially in his private consulting work. Until June 2022, by the state of the investigation, the office head supplied nearly 2,000 documents, many classified, intended only for internal BND use for briefing and preparing the agency's leadership, in particular for the intelligence situation meeting held at the Federal Chancellery. In one case Hanning used classified findings so supplied to prepare an analysis for an employee of a foreign intelligence security apparatus; whether the product reached the addressee could not be established. Hanning was also in intensive exchange with a member of another state intelligence service, whom he supplied over several years with political information, in part based on material from the office head.[^46]
The proceeding rests on finds from a search of Hanning's premises that the Hamburg public prosecutor carried out in September 2025 in an investigation concerning [[Christina Block]] and others; the matter was submitted to the Bundesanwaltschaft in early May 2026 for takeover. The investigation is conducted with the BND and the Bundeskriminalamt.[^46] A second release of October 7, 2026 states that both men were presented to the investigating judge on October 6 and 7 and that the arrest warrants were put into effect.[^47] Both men are presumed innocent. beck-aktuell reported the same charges and allegations on the day of the arrests, and ZDF reported that Hanning denies involvement in the Block case and that, as of the arrest day, nothing pointed to a political motive; ZDF described Hanning as well connected and as having run several security firms. The current BND president [[Martin Jäger]] stated that the BND had opened extensive internal investigations early, which hardened the suspicion.[^48][^49] In November 2005, while he was BND president, Hanning apologized to a journalist after BND staff had surveilled journalists to find leaks, a matter later examined by parliament.[^50]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Murphy, David E., Sergei A. Kondrashev, and George Bailey. *Battleground Berlin: CIA vs KGB in the Cold War.* Yale University Press, 1997. Andrew, Christopher, and Vasili Mitrokhin. *The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West.* Allen Lane, 1999.
[^2]: Andrew, Christopher, and Oleg Gordievsky. *KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev.* HarperCollins, 1990. Gehlen, Reinhard. *The Service: The Memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen.* World, 1972.
[^1]: Central Intelligence Agency, *Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1949-56*, Vol. 1 (Kevin C. Ruffner, ed.), foreword, declassified 2007, https://archive.org/details/CIAAndTheOriginsOfTheBND1949-1956 (the Agency held the Gehlen Organization in trusteeship until 1956, when the West German government established its own national intelligence structure).
[^2]: Gehlen, Reinhard. *The Service: The Memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen.* World, 1972 (microfilm, burial of the files, surrender).
[^3]: Central Intelligence Agency, *Forging an Intelligence Partnership*, 1945-49, Vol. 1, document appendix, "Statement of Gerhard Wessel on Development of the German Organization" (undated): spring 1944 decision, the relief of Gehlen on April 9, 1945, the removal of microfilmed files to three sites, Wessel's succession at Fremde Heere Ost. Same URL as note 3.
[^4]: Central Intelligence Agency, *Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1945-49*, Vol. 1, Ruffner, ed., declassified 2002 under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, https://archive.org/details/CIAAndTheOriginsOfTheBND1945-1949 (the U.S. Army handled the Gehlen Organization and funded its intelligence collection, 1945 to 1949).
[^5]: Central Intelligence Agency, *Forging an Intelligence Partnership*, 1945-49, Vol. 1, photograph captions (Clay's opposition and retirement in spring 1949; Critchfield's December 1948 report; the Agency assuming control in July 1949). Same URL as note 3.
[^6]: Central Intelligence Agency, *Forging an Intelligence Partnership*, 1945-49, Vol. 1, passages on the 1946 CIC arrests, the Strategic Services Unit investigation, the August 1948 Karlsruhe memorandum, the removal of Baun during 1947, and the late 1947 move to Pullach with Liebel replacing Deane. Same URL as note 3.
[^7]: Central Intelligence Agency, *Forging an Intelligence Partnership*, 1949-56, Vol. 1, Part I and foreword, declassified 2007 (trusteeship from 1949 to 1956; James H. Critchfield at Pullach from June 1949; the 1953 roll-ups and more than 200 agents fleeing; the statement that over 200 BND officers left in the 1960s; the Pullach base's role in vetting). Same URL as note 1.
[^8]: Central Intelligence Agency, *Forging an Intelligence Partnership*, 1945-49, Vol. 1, Introduction (the "double edged sword" passage). Same URL as note 3.
[^9]: National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 146, "The CIA and Nazi War Criminals," posted February 4, 2005, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB146/
[^10]: Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, *Final Report to Congress*, April 2007, Figure 12, "The Gehlen files," and the chapter on the CIA, https://www.archives.gov/files/iwg/reports/final-report-2007.pdf (Oglesby v. Army filing of October 2000; the 2,100-page Army file; Naftali, "Reinhard Gehlen and the United States," in Breitman et al., *U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis*, 2004).
[^11]: Central Intelligence Agency, field report "SPD Views on Succession to Gehlen Presidency and Vice Presidency," distributed December 20, 1967, document C07005044, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-07005044
[^12]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 7/3246, "Bericht und Antrag des 2. Untersuchungsausschusses," February 19, 1975, security review section (BND telex of the president, December 23, 1969), https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/07/032/0703246.pdf
[^13]: Murphy, David E., Sergei A. Kondrashev, and George Bailey. *Battleground Berlin: CIA vs KGB in the Cold War.* Yale University Press, 1997 (Cold War operations, KGB use of recruits' wartime records, the Felfe agent count).
[^14]: Central Intelligence Agency, "KGB Exploitation of Heinz Felfe: Successful KGB Penetration of a Western Intelligence Service," March 1969, document C02606328, released February 21, 2019, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/node/2071209 (printed pages 12 to 23 and the summary: the SD and SS background, the Utrecht internment, the British employment, the April 1950 dismissal, the 1961 and 1962 file transfers, the GV"L" base, the recruitment through Clemens, the Karlshorst briefings, the Polish UB lead, the November 1961 arrest and the July 1963 sentences).
[^15]: Breitman, Richard, "Historical Analysis of 20 Name Files from CIA Records," Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, 2001, https://www.archives.gov/iwg/declassified-records/rg-263-cia-records/historical-analysis-by-breitman.pdf (entries on Augsburg, Goering, Harster, Krichbaum, Six, Panzinger, Sommer, Krallert, Kopkow, Zimmer and the conclusion).
[^16]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 20/1963, Kleine Anfrage of Die Linke, May 24, 2022, https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/20/019/2001963.pdf (UHK contract of February 2011, fourteen studies, research focus on the Nazi past, the Henke volume, questions 7 to 10, and the citation of Willi Winkler in the Süddeutsche Zeitung, April 20, 2022). Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 19/26519, Kleine Anfrage on the UHK, February 9, 2021, https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/19/265/1926519.pdf
[^17]: Rigoll, Dominik, "Nazi-Verstrickungen beim Geheimdienst: Die braunen Wurzeln des BND," *die tageszeitung*, December 9, 2016, https://taz.de/Nazi-Verstrickungen-beim-Geheimdienst/!5363325/ (Rass's sample of 3,650 life histories from the roughly 12,000 staff to 1968; Nowack's 68 exclusions; Sälter's volume on the "Red Orchestra"; the 1953 roll-up of 93 informants).
[^18]: dts Nachrichtenagentur, "Über 30 BND-Mitarbeiter bei Kriegsverbrechen im Zweiten Weltkrieg," October 7, 2022, reporting Hessischer Rundfunk on Gerhard Sälter, *NS-Kontinuitäten im BND* (Ch. Links, 2022), https://regionalheute.de/ueber-30-bnd-mitarbeiter-bei-kriegsverbrechen-im-zweiten-weltkrieg-1665142867/
[^19]: Weise, Niels, review of Agilolf Keßelring, *Die Organisation Gehlen und die Verteidigung Westdeutschlands* (UHK Studien 3, 2014), and of the UHK conference volume, *sehepunkte* 16 (2016), no. 2, https://www.sehepunkte.de/2016/02/26494.html
[^20]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 20/2192, answer of the federal government, June 7, 2022, https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/20/021/2002192.pdf (answer to question 10, "Ja, dies kann ausgeschlossen werden," and the reference back to the answers to questions 2 to 2b for questions 7 to 9).
[^21]: Breitman, Richard, and Norman J. W. Goda, *Hitler's Shadow: Nazi War Criminals, U.S. Intelligence, and the Cold War*, National Archives, 2010, "Nazis and the Middle East," pp. 22 to 30, https://www.archives.gov/files/iwg/reports/hitlers-shadow.pdf (Beisner and the BND, Winterstein, the intercepted mail, Rischer identified as Brunner, Glueckrath's March 1961 account, Rademacher's BND payroll, Brunner's death in Syria).
[^22]: Bundesarchiv, file B 206/1983, 1966 to 1968, "Klaus Altmann als Quelle des BND (Deckname Adler)," catalogued in the Deutsche Digitale Bibliothek, https://www.deutsche-digitale-bibliothek.de/item/KN44LFOZYQMNMMVTPNQMIFALRTYMBJDK
[^23]: Hammerschmidt, Peter, "Die Geheimakte Klaus Barbie," *die tageszeitung*, January 31, 2012, https://taz.de/Ein-Altnazi-und-die-deutschen-Geheimdienste/!5101916/ (codename Adler, May to December 1966, 5,300 marks); Bundesarchiv, file B 206/1983, "Klaus Altmann als Quelle des BND (Deckname Adler)."
[^24]: Marti, Werner J., "The second life of Klaus Barbie," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, July 2, 2025, https://www.nzz.ch/english/the-second-life-of-klaus-barbie-a-nazi-war-criminals-rise-in-bolivia-ld.1891151
[^25]: Gessler, Philipp, "Alt-Nazis beim Bundesnachrichtendienst: Code-Name Uranus," *die tageszeitung*, June 19, 2011, https://taz.de/Alt-Nazis-beim-Bundesnachrichtendienst/!5118343/ (Hammerschmidt's presentation to the International Intelligence History Association; Merex, Uranus, Rudel, Schwend, Sassen, La Estrella, Skorzeny, the Transall delivery of March 1968).
[^26]: Der Chef des Bundeskanzleramtes, official information to the 6th Civil Senate of the Oberlandesgericht Köln, Rechtsstreit Prof. Carstens ./. Metzger, 6 U 164/78, February 1979, https://fragdenstaat.de/dokumente/3844/ (BND connections to arms trade firms, the Merex companies, the 1965 to 1969 exports, the acquittal of November 26, 1975, the BND officer at Dobbertin, and Wessel's statement of December 15, 1978).
[^27]: Breitman and Goda, *Hitler's Shadow*, 2010, chapter on collaborators, pp. 82 to 84 (Bandera, the BND, Herre, the July 1959 mission), https://www.archives.gov/files/iwg/reports/hitlers-shadow.pdf
[^28]: Goda, Norman J. W., "CIA Files Relating to Heinz Felfe, SS officer and KGB Spy," Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, 2008, https://fas.org/sgp/eprint/goda.pdf (the 1969 release in exchange for three West German spies; the 15,000 items; the "SD clique"; Felfe's entry to the SS and to the Organization).
[^29]: Hechelhammer, Bodo, interview, "Spion Heinz Felfe: Für ihn lieferten die Sowjets kleinere Fische ans Messer," *t-online*, March 22, 2020, https://www.t-online.de/nachrichten/panorama/wissen/geschichte/id_87517540/spion-heinz-felfe-fuer-ihn-lieferten-die-sowjets-kleinere-fische-ans-messer-.html (head of Soviet counterintelligence; the exchange at Herleshausen, photograph from the BND archive; the work for the Stasi).
[^30]: ZDF, "BND-Affären: Von Hanning und Felfe bis Landesverrat an Russland," October 6, 2026, https://www.zdfheute.de/politik/deutschland/bnd-affaeren-spionage-hanning-skandale-100.html (Markus R. and the CIA; the case of Carsten L. and Arthur E.; the 2005 surveillance of journalists; the 1961 arrest, the 1963 sentence and the 1969 exchange of Felfe).
[^31]: Felfe, Heinz. *Im Dienst des Gegners: 10 Jahre Moskaus Mann im BND.* Rasch und Röhring, 1986.
[^32]: Andrew, Christopher, and Oleg Gordievsky. *KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev.* HarperCollins, 1990 (Guillaume's emigration and career, the BND suspicions, the April 24, 1974 arrest, the May 7, 1974 resignation).
[^33]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 7/3246, security review section (the BND card entry of April 1954 and its statement that the entry's truth could no longer be checked; the BND telex of December 17, 1969; the BND information on Volk und Wissen as a residency for MfS members), https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/07/032/0703246.pdf
[^34]: Wolf, Markus. *Spionagechef im geheimen Krieg* (memoir).
[^35]: Bundesarchiv, MfS-Lexikon, "Rosenholz," https://www.bundesarchiv.de/im-archiv-recherchieren/stasi-unterlagen-einsehen/hinweise-zum-mfs/mfs-lexikon/detail/rosenholz/ (name given by the BfV; transfer by March 2003; 280,000 person records and the 54, 38 and 8 percent split; 381 CDs, 1999 to 2003).
[^36]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum "Results of Our CIA Contact with BND Source 'Curveball,'" ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-039, document 1, declassified November 21, 2017, https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2013-039-doc01.pdf
[^37]: Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, *Report to the President*, March 31, 2005, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-WMD/pdf/GPO-WMD.pdf (the Iraq biological weapons section: the "foreign liaison service" passage, the Defense HUMINT Service count and the "virtually all" sentence).
[^38]: Geschäftsprüfungsdelegation der Eidgenössischen Räte, Bericht zur Crypto AG, press release of November 10, 2020, https://www.parlament.ch/centers/documents/de/bericht-gpdel-2020-11-10-d.pdf (sections 2.1.1 on the MINERVA history and 4.1.1 on the Swiss service's information from autumn 1993).
[^39]: Greg Miller and Martine Powers, *The Washington Post*, audio report on the CIA's Crypto AG operation, February 11, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/world/national-security/cia-crypto-encryption-machines-espionage/ (archived at https://perma.cc/52JY-BEW4).
[^40]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 18/12850, Abschlussbericht des 1. Untersuchungsausschusses der 18. Wahlperiode, June 23, 2017, pp. 761 to 763 (Bad Aibling history; testimony of August Hanning, BND president from December 17, 1998 to November 30, 2005), https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/18/128/1812850.pdf
[^41]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 18/12850, June 23, 2017, pp. 887 to 888 and the Eikonal chapter (Memorandum of Agreement of 2002; the GRANAT designation; testimony of Reinhardt Breitfelder and Harald Fechner on the March 2002 conference; the Süddeutsche Zeitung reports of June 26, 2014 and October 4, 2014).
[^42]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 18/12850, June 23, 2017, p. 805 (the EADS and Eurocopter selectors, the January 25, 2006 confirmation, the 74 numbers, and the testimony of Gerhard Schindler on the third filter stage).
[^43]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 18/12850, June 23, 2017, p. 1538 (the August 2013 review, the nine persons who knew of it before March 2015, the reported March 2015 notification, and the section heading on concealment in the 2013 election year) and the report's introduction on the Snowden disclosures.
[^44]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 19/25483, Kleine Anfrage of Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, December 21, 2020, citing Bundesverfassungsgericht, judgment of May 19, 2020, 1 BvR 2835/17 (the 2016 BND Act reform, the court's requirements, the end-2021 deadline, and the cabinet bill of December 16, 2020), https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/19/254/1925483.pdf
[^45]: Bundesregierung, speech by Chancellor Angela Merkel at the opening ceremony of the new BND headquarters in Berlin, February 8, 2019, https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/rede-von-bundeskanzlerin-merkel-bei-der-eroeffnungsfeier-der-neuen-zentrale-des-bundesnachrichtendienstes-am-8-februar-2019-in-berlin-1578762
[^46]: Der Generalbundesanwalt beim Bundesgerichtshof, Pressemitteilung Nr. 66, "Festnahmen wegen mutmaßlicher landesverräterischer Ausspähung, Auskundschaften von Staatsgeheimnissen, versuchten Landesverrats und Spionage," October 6, 2026, https://www.generalbundesanwalt.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2026/Pressemitteilung-vom-06-10-2026.html
[^47]: Der Generalbundesanwalt beim Bundesgerichtshof, press release "Haftbefehle wegen mutmaßlicher landesverräterischer Ausspähung u. a. in Vollzug gesetzt," October 7, 2026, https://www.generalbundesanwalt.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2026/Pressemitteilung-vom-07-10-2026-2.html
[^48]: beck-aktuell, "Ex-BND-Präsident August Hanning festgenommen," October 6, 2026, https://www.beck-aktuell.de/heute-im-recht/rechtsgeschehen/ex-bnd-praesidenten-august-hanning-festgenommen-2026-10-06
[^49]: ZDF, "Ex-BND-Chef August Hanning wegen Spionageverdachts festgenommen," October 6, 2026, https://www.zdfheute.de/politik/deutschland/august-hanning-ex-bnd-chef-spionage-100.html
[^50]: ZDF, October 6, 2026 (note 44), on the November 2005 apology.

28
20 - ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/INTERNATIONAL/Gehlen Organization.md
View file

@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ tags:
- Soviet
- 1940s
- 1950s
summary: "The Gehlen Organization was a CIA-funded intelligence network in West Germany from 1946 to 1956, built by Reinhard Gehlen from his Wehrmacht Eastern Front directorate to provide U.S. coverage of the Soviet bloc, before being reconstituted as the Bundesnachrichtendienst in April 1956."
summary: "CIA-funded intelligence network in West Germany from 1946 to 1956, built by Reinhard Gehlen from his Wehrmacht Eastern Front directorate, reconstituted as the Bundesnachrichtendienst in April 1956."
start: 1946-07-01
end: 1956-04-01
location: "Pullach, Bavaria, West Germany"
@ -26,10 +26,12 @@ The Gehlen Organization (Organisation Gehlen), commonly called "the Org," was a
### Origins: The Gehlen Deal
In April-May 1945, anticipating German defeat, Gehlen had the files of Fremde Heere Ost microfilmed and the film containers buried in the Austrian Alps. He surrendered to U.S. Army forces on May 22, 1945, and immediately proposed a bargain to his American captors: his organization, its accumulated records on the Soviet military and political structure, and its agent networks in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, in exchange for American protection, funding, and operational support.
In April-May 1945, anticipating German defeat, Gehlen had the files of Fremde Heere Ost microfilmed and the film containers buried in the Austrian Alps, as Gehlen's memoir states. The CIA history's statement by Gehlen's deputy Gerhard Wessel records that after Hitler relieved Gehlen on April 9, 1945 the microfilmed Fremde Heere Ost files were moved by army truck and dispersed in three places in southern Germany: near the Wilder Kaiser, near Marquartstein and near Schliersee.[^2] He surrendered to U.S. Army forces on May 22, 1945, and immediately proposed a bargain to his American captors: his organization, its accumulated records on the Soviet military and political structure, and its agent networks in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, in exchange for American protection, funding, and operational support.
The offer was accepted by the Strategic Services Unit, successor to the Office of Strategic Services, and Gehlen was transported to the United States in August 1945 for debriefing at Fort Hunt, Virginia. He returned to Germany in 1946 to begin operations under American supervision. The CIA, formally established in 1947, inherited the arrangement from its predecessor organizations and took over direct management of the Gehlen network.[^1]
The arrangement with the U.S. Army was codenamed Operation RUSTY. Between 1945 and 1949 the Army handled the Organization and funded its intelligence collection.[^3] In late 1947 RUSTY moved from Oberursel to its own compound at Pullach, a village near Munich, and Col. Willard K. Liebel replaced Col. Deane as operations officer.[^3] In 1946 the Army's Counter Intelligence Corps arrested several Germans who said they worked for American intelligence; the Strategic Services Unit representative who investigated found "some of the agents employed were SS personnel with known Nazi records and, in most cases, undesirable people."[^3] The CIA's acting chief at the Karlsruhe Operations Base wrote in an August 1948 memorandum that he viewed RUSTY's recruiting methods "with great disgust."[^3] Lieutenant General Lucius D. Clay opposed CIA involvement, and his retirement in the spring of 1949 cleared the way for the Agency to assume control in July of that year; James H. Critchfield's December 1948 report was decisive in persuading CIA officials to take responsibility.[^2]
The "Gehlen deal" gave the United States what no other arrangement could provide at that moment: an existing intelligence network with deep files on the Soviet military and security apparatus, agents in place across Eastern Europe, and operational experience in the specific geographical and political environment where American intelligence was most blind. The cost - accepting an organization staffed substantially by former Wehrmacht and Nazi intelligence personnel and directed by a general who had served Hitler - was accepted as the price of operational capability during the emerging Cold War.[^1]
### Operations at Pullach
@ -44,13 +46,19 @@ The organization ran agent networks in [[East Germany]] and across the Soviet bl
The extent of former SS and Nazi party personnel within the Org was a persistent controversy that official accounts understated during the Cold War. The CIA accepted the personnel inheritance as a practical necessity: Gehlen's network was composed of the people who had relevant experience, and rebuilding from scratch would have taken years during which the United States would have lacked the coverage that German intelligence veterans could provide.
Academic research, culminating in the German government's Unabhängige Historikerkommission (Independent Historians' Commission, the Scholz Commission) report of 2013 and subsequent publications, documented the extent of former SS membership and Nazi party affiliation among Org personnel. The commission found that approximately 10 percent of Org employees had been SS members (a substantially higher proportion than in the West German government generally), and that individuals with wartime records involving repression operations had served in sensitive positions.[^2]
Academic research, including the work of the Bundesnachrichtendienst's Unabhängige Historikerkommission (Independent Historians' Commission, established by contract in February 2011, with volumes appearing from 2016),[^4] documented the extent of former SS membership and Nazi party affiliation among Org personnel. Breitman and his co-authors report that approximately 10 percent of Org employees had been SS members (a substantially higher proportion than in the West German government generally), and that individuals with wartime records involving repression operations had served in sensitive positions.[^5]
The first Historians' Commission volume, by Christoph Rass, rests on a random sample of 3,650 life histories from the roughly 12,000 staff to 1968 and counts "NS markers"; Nowack's study of security reviews counted 68 persons removed in the 1960s, and Sälter's volume was reported in 2022 as finding that up to 20 percent of the early personnel had taken part in crimes and more than 30 in Einsatzgruppen shootings.[^6][^7]
### Former SS and SD Staff in the CIA's Name Files
The CIA acknowledged an intelligence relationship with Gehlen for the first time in an October 2000 court filing in Oglesby v. Army; the Disclosure Act processing released the Army's 2,100-page Gehlen file and nearly 2,100 further pages from CIA files.[^8] The Interagency Working Group historians found that nine of fourteen second-tier CIA name files involved individuals who had contact with the Organization.[^9] Emil Augsburg, an SD major and Wannsee Institute department director, was taken on by 1953 and regarded as a "shining star" of counterintelligence; Gehlen required him in 1954 to work outside Pullach, and he was dismissed in 1966.[^9] Wilhelm Krichbaum, former head of the Wehrmacht Secret Field Police, was a district chief in the Organization; a 1963 document apparently from the BND concluded he had worked for the Soviets since 1950.[^9] Hans Sommer, a Gestapo official, was recruited for counterespionage in early 1950 and dropped in 1953; Wilfried Krallert was picked up in 1952; Franz Six was reported to have joined in the mid-1950s.[^9] In 1963 the East German media charged that Gehlen had transferred a number of former SS and SD officials, among them Six, Augsburg and Franz Goering, to camouflaged positions.[^9] Friedrich Panzinger, released from Soviet custody in 1956 with a mission to penetrate the BND, reported it and was used as a double agent until his suicide in 1959.[^9]
The CIA's own records, as disclosed through Freedom of Information Act releases, documented awareness of the Nazi personnel inheritance. Agency officials weighed the operational value of Gehlen's network against the security and political risks of employing former Nazis, consistently prioritizing operational continuity. The arrangement created long-term political vulnerabilities when the personnel roster became more widely known.[^1]
### Soviet Penetration
The Org was penetrated by Soviet intelligence from its early years. The most serious known penetration was [[Heinz Felfe]], who joined the Org in 1951 and rose to become chief of counterintelligence. Felfe was a former SS officer who had been recruited by Soviet intelligence and operated as a KGB agent within the Org and its successor the BND for approximately a decade before being exposed in November 1961. His position in counterintelligence gave him access to the operations, agent identities, and procedures that he was tasked with protecting - a near-ideal placement for a Soviet penetration agent.[^1]
The Org was penetrated by Soviet intelligence from its early years. The most serious known penetration was [[Heinz Felfe]], who joined the Org in 1951 and rose to become chief of counterintelligence (the CIA study describes him as deputy chief of the section, in practice its real chief). Felfe was a former SS officer who had been recruited by Soviet intelligence and operated as a KGB agent within the Org and its successor the BND for approximately a decade before being exposed in November 1961. His position in counterintelligence gave him access to the operations, agent identities, and procedures that he was tasked with protecting - a near-ideal placement for a Soviet penetration agent.[^1]
Additional penetrations were identified over the years, and the extent of Soviet knowledge of Org operations has never been fully assessed. The KGB had specific and well-founded interest in penetrating the Gehlen network given both its CIA connection and its operational focus on the Soviet bloc.[^1]
@ -58,7 +66,17 @@ Additional penetrations were identified over the years, and the extent of Soviet
When West Germany recovered sovereignty in 1955 and joined [[NATO]], negotiations transferred the Gehlen Organization from American to West German government control. The BND was formally established on April 1, 1956, with Gehlen as its first president. The BND retained the Pullach compound, its personnel roster, and its operational assets. The CIA-BND liaison relationship that replaced the CIA-Org relationship maintained close cooperation on Soviet bloc intelligence through the remainder of the Cold War.[^1]
The CIA held the Organization in what its own history calls "trusteeship" from 1949 to 1956, and Critchfield was the Agency's representative at Pullach from June 1949 until 1956.[^10] After the East German uprising of 1953 the Communists announced in late November the roll-up of West German agent networks in the East; three cases led to the exposure of hundreds of other assets, and by the end of that year more than 200 Organization agents had fled to West Germany.[^10] The CIA history states that after the Felfe and Clemens scandals "it is believed that over 200 BND officers resigned or were dismissed in the 1960s because they had concealed their wartime pasts."[^10]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA.* Doubleday, 2007, pp. 33-56. Gehlen, Reinhard. *Der Dienst: Erinnerungen 1942-1971.* v. Hase & Koehler, 1971 (Gehlen's memoir). Trento, Joseph. *The Secret History of the CIA.* Forum, 2001.
[^2]: Breitman, Richard, Norman J.W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, and Robert Wolfe. *U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis.* Cambridge University Press, 2005. Goschler, Constantin, and Michael Wala. *"Keine neue Gestapo": Das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz und die NS-Vergangenheit.* Rowohlt, 2015.
[^2]: Central Intelligence Agency, *Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1945-49*, Vol. 1, document appendix, "Statement of Gerhard Wessel on Development of the German Organization," and photograph captions. https://archive.org/details/CIAAndTheOriginsOfTheBND1945-1949
[^3]: Central Intelligence Agency, *Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1945-49*, Vol. 1, chapters on Operation RUSTY (CIC arrests of 1946, the August 1948 memorandum, the move to Pullach). https://archive.org/details/CIAAndTheOriginsOfTheBND1945-1949
[^4]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 20/1963, Kleine Anfrage of Die Linke, May 24, 2022. https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/20/019/2001963.pdf
[^5]: Breitman, Richard, Norman J.W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, and Robert Wolfe. *U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis.* Cambridge University Press, 2005. Goschler, Constantin, and Michael Wala. *"Keine neue Gestapo": Das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz und die NS-Vergangenheit.* Rowohlt, 2015.
[^6]: Rigoll, Dominik, "Nazi-Verstrickungen beim Geheimdienst: Die braunen Wurzeln des BND," *die tageszeitung*, December 9, 2016. https://taz.de/Nazi-Verstrickungen-beim-Geheimdienst/!5363325/
[^7]: dts Nachrichtenagentur, "Über 30 BND-Mitarbeiter bei Kriegsverbrechen im Zweiten Weltkrieg," October 7, 2022. https://regionalheute.de/ueber-30-bnd-mitarbeiter-bei-kriegsverbrechen-im-zweiten-weltkrieg-1665142867/
[^8]: Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, *Final Report to Congress*, April 2007, Figure 12. https://www.archives.gov/files/iwg/reports/final-report-2007.pdf
[^9]: Breitman, Richard, "Historical Analysis of 20 Name Files from CIA Records," Interagency Working Group, 2001. https://www.archives.gov/iwg/declassified-records/rg-263-cia-records/historical-analysis-by-breitman.pdf
[^10]: Central Intelligence Agency, *Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1949-56*, Vol. 1, declassified 2007. https://archive.org/details/CIAAndTheOriginsOfTheBND1949-1956

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20 - ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/USA/Central Intelligence Agency.md
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@ -28,19 +28,19 @@ relations:
with: "[[Psychological Strategy Board]]"
role: "Member agency; the Director of Central Intelligence chaired meeting M-8"
start: 1952-01-10
fn: 43
fn: 44
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Max Millikan]]"
reverse: true
role: "Assistant Director, Research and Reports (1951); Special Consultant (1952)"
start: 1951-01
end: 1952-03
fn: 44
fn: 45
- type: funded
with: "[[Center for International Studies]]"
role: "agency money reported to have set up the center in 1951; $300,000 reported in 1967"
start: 1951
fn: 51
fn: 52
---
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is a primary intelligence-gathering organization of the United States government. In the context of psychic research, the CIA played a significant, albeit often covert, role in funding and overseeing programs aimed at exploring and utilizing psychic phenomena for intelligence purposes.[^1]
@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ In early 1982, CIA director William J. Casey and Attorney General [[William Fren
### Ilopango Obstruction
When [[DEA]] agent [[Celerino Castillo]] began investigating Contra drug trafficking at Ilopango, the CIA intervened directly. In April 1986 the El Salvador station sent a cable asking the Costa Rica station to persuade the DEA to back off: "El Salvador Station would appreciate Costa Rica Station advising DEA not to make any inquiries into anyone re: Hangar No. 4 at Ilopango since only legitimate CIA supported operations were conducted from this facility."[^29]
When [[DEA]] agent [[Celerino Castillo]] began investigating Contra drug trafficking at Ilopango, the CIA intervened directly.[^29] On April 25, 1986 the El Salvador station replied to a Costa Rica station cable of April 23 about Carlos Amador. The reply asked: "Based on that information, [El Salvador] Station would appreciate [Costa Rica] Station advising [DEA] not to make any inquiries to anyone re: hangar no. 4 at Ilopango since only legitimate [CIA] supported operations were conducted from this facility." The same cable stated that station air operations had moved from Hangar 4 into Hangar 5, which the station still occupied.[^30]
### Inspector General Investigation
@ -144,37 +144,37 @@ Multiple CIA officials were indicted during the Iran-Contra investigation. Clarr
### Interrogation videotapes and the 2004 to 2006 directorship
[[Porter Goss]], a former House intelligence chairman, was confirmed by the Senate 77 to 17 on September 22, 2004, was sworn in at the White House on September 24, 2004, and announced his resignation on May 5, 2006.[^30] His executive director, [[Kyle Foggo]], the agency's No. 3 official, resigned in May 2006 while the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] was examining whether he had improperly helped the defense contractor [[Brent Wilkes]] obtain large CIA contracts.[^31] Foggo pleaded guilty in 2008 to one count of defrauding the government and was sentenced on February 26, 2009 to 37 months.[^32]
[[Porter Goss]], a former House intelligence chairman, was confirmed by the Senate 77 to 17 on September 22, 2004, was sworn in at the White House on September 24, 2004, and announced his resignation on May 5, 2006.[^31] His executive director, [[Kyle Foggo]], the agency's No. 3 official, resigned in May 2006 while the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] was examining whether he had improperly helped the defense contractor [[Brent Wilkes]] obtain large CIA contracts.[^32] Foggo pleaded guilty in 2008 to one count of defrauding the government and was sentenced on February 26, 2009 to 37 months.[^33]
The [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]]'s 2014 study of the detention and interrogation program records that the CIA destroyed videotapes of the interrogations of [[Abu Zubaydah]] and [[Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri]] on November 9, 2005, the day after the Senate's November 8 vote against an amendment to establish an independent commission on detainee treatment.[^33] In an October 31, 2005 email, the CIA attorney [[John Rizzo]] wrote that he needed "to be the skunk at the party again."[^33]
The [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]]'s 2014 study of the detention and interrogation program records that the CIA destroyed videotapes of the interrogations of [[Abu Zubaydah]] and [[Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri]] on November 9, 2005, the day after the Senate's November 8 vote against an amendment to establish an independent commission on detainee treatment.[^34] In an October 31, 2005 email, the CIA attorney [[John Rizzo]] wrote that he needed "to be the skunk at the party again."[^34]
Emails released by the [[United States Department of Justice|Justice Department]] in April 2010, under a Freedom of Information Act request by the [[American Civil Liberties Union]], state that in November 2005 [[Jose A. Rodriguez Jr.|Jose Rodriguez]] told Goss and others he "felt it was extremely important to destroy the tapes and that if there was any heat, he would take it," and that Goss "laughed and said he'd be the one to take the heat." The same email states: "PG, however, agreed with the decision." NBC News reported that the email is an after-the-fact summary that does not prove Goss approved the destruction, that current and former intelligence officials have said he did not and was angry to find out, and that Rodriguez's lawyer disputed that.[^34] On November 9, 2010, the Justice Department said special prosecutor [[John Durham]] would not bring criminal charges over the destruction.[^35]
Emails released by the [[United States Department of Justice|Justice Department]] in April 2010, under a Freedom of Information Act request by the [[American Civil Liberties Union]], state that in November 2005 [[Jose A. Rodriguez Jr.|Jose Rodriguez]] told Goss and others he "felt it was extremely important to destroy the tapes and that if there was any heat, he would take it," and that Goss "laughed and said he'd be the one to take the heat." The same email states: "PG, however, agreed with the decision." NBC News reported that the email is an after-the-fact summary that does not prove Goss approved the destruction, that current and former intelligence officials have said he did not and was angry to find out, and that Rodriguez's lawyer disputed that.[^35] On November 9, 2010, the Justice Department said special prosecutor [[John Durham]] would not bring criminal charges over the destruction.[^36]
### Foreign Broadcast Information Service
The [[Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service]] became a unit of the agency in 1947. The [[War Department]] had sponsored the service from January 2, 1946, and the [[Director of Central Intelligence]] assumed control of it on July 31, 1946, before the [[National Security Act of 1947]] replaced the [[Central Intelligence Group]] with the agency.[^36] The administrative history of the service's record group lists the successor as "Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Intelligence Agency, 1947-."[^37] The service's 1969 history says it came to the agency "almost mature, trained and disciplined, and ready to plunge immediately into the tasks outlined for it."[^38]
The [[Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service]] became a unit of the agency in 1947. The [[War Department]] had sponsored the service from January 2, 1946, and the [[Director of Central Intelligence]] assumed control of it on July 31, 1946, before the [[National Security Act of 1947]] replaced the [[Central Intelligence Group]] with the agency.[^37] The administrative history of the service's record group lists the successor as "Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Intelligence Agency, 1947-."[^38] The service's 1969 history says it came to the agency "almost mature, trained and disciplined, and ready to plunge immediately into the tasks outlined for it."[^39]
Within the agency the service sat under the [[Assistant Director for Operations]]. In January 1947 the Assistant Director presented a propaganda analysis program to the PRC, approving the proposed program but excluding "interpretative analysis" from its scope, and the requested staff was twelve at $61,000 a year. [[Lawrence K. White]] was announced as deputy chief of the service on January 9, 1947.[^39]
Within the agency the service sat under the [[Assistant Director for Operations]]. In January 1947 the Assistant Director presented a propaganda analysis program to the PRC, approving the proposed program but excluding "interpretative analysis" from its scope, and the requested staff was twelve at $61,000 a year. [[Lawrence K. White]] was announced as deputy chief of the service on January 9, 1947.[^40]
The service's functions were folded into the [[Open Source Center]] in November 2005. The release announcing the center said the Director of the CIA would administer it on behalf of the DNI.[^40]
The service's functions were folded into the [[Open Source Center]] in November 2005. The release announcing the center said the Director of the CIA would administer it on behalf of the DNI.[^41]
### Psychological warfare liaison, 1946 to 1952
In July 1946 the Central Intelligence Group's Central Planning Staff closed out its liaison with the Security Advisory Board of the [[Office of War Information]]. The memorandum designated a liaison officer to the Director, charged him with recommending when appropriate whether the board should be placed under the [[National Intelligence Authority]], and recorded that no further action by the Security Branch was required. The board was being replaced by a new Security Advisory Board under the [[State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee]].[^41]
In July 1946 the Central Intelligence Group's Central Planning Staff closed out its liaison with the Security Advisory Board of the [[Office of War Information]]. The memorandum designated a liaison officer to the Director, charged him with recommending when appropriate whether the board should be placed under the [[National Intelligence Authority]], and recorded that no further action by the Security Branch was required. The board was being replaced by a new Security Advisory Board under the [[State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee]].[^42]
In July 1947 the Assistant Director of the Office of Research and Evaluation complained to the chief of the Group's Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff that the arrangement for the Group's seat on the coordinating committee's subcommittee for psychological warfare was "not operable." The principal member came from the [[Office of Special Operations]] and the alternate from the Office of Research and Evaluation, and the memorandum was addressed to the Executive Director.[^42]
In July 1947 the Assistant Director of the Office of Research and Evaluation complained to the chief of the Group's Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff that the arrangement for the Group's seat on the coordinating committee's subcommittee for psychological warfare was "not operable." The principal member came from the [[Office of Special Operations]] and the alternate from the Office of Research and Evaluation, and the memorandum was addressed to the Executive Director.[^43]
On January 10, 1952 the eighth meeting of the [[Psychological Strategy Board]] was chaired by [[Walter Bedell Smith]], the Director of Central Intelligence. Its members were the Deputy Secretary of Defense, William C. Foster, and the Under Secretary of State, James E. Webb. [[Edward W. Barrett]], Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, attended as a participant from the Department of State.[^43]
On January 10, 1952 the eighth meeting of the [[Psychological Strategy Board]] was chaired by [[Walter Bedell Smith]], the Director of Central Intelligence. Its members were the Deputy Secretary of Defense, William C. Foster, and the Under Secretary of State, James E. Webb. [[Edward W. Barrett]], Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, attended as a participant from the Department of State.[^44]
In a letter stamped January 30, 1951, [[Max Millikan]] wrote that he had "gone on leave from MIT to head up the Office of Research and Reports in this Agency."[^44] On October 29, 1951 he wrote to a prospective recruit that for "the last nine or ten months" he had been "trying to put together for General Smith an organization to do economic research."[^45] A memorandum of conversation dated January 22, 1951 lists "Dr. Max Millikan, Central Intelligence Agency" among the participants in a discussion with State Department officers of psychological intelligence, and records his concern that splitting that work among several organizations would produce the shortcomings of decentralization.[^46] A memorandum of March 6, 1951, addressed to the intelligence chiefs of the State Department, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, was issued "For the Director of Central Intelligence" over Millikan's typed name as Assistant Director, Research and Reports.[^47] A letter he signed as Assistant Director on November 26, 1951 says that "Walt Rostow at the Center for International Studies has sought my assistance in finding him someone to help out with some research."[^48] A letter of March 3, 1952 addresses him as Special Consultant, Central Intelligence Agency.[^49] In an interview note of March 5, 1952 titled "Origin of PSB," a CIA historian recorded that Millikan "participated in a 'contract study,' State and MIT," which the note identifies as the "Troy Project," and that its study "had considerable to do with the creation of the PSB."[^50]
In a letter stamped January 30, 1951, [[Max Millikan]] wrote that he had "gone on leave from MIT to head up the Office of Research and Reports in this Agency."[^45] On October 29, 1951 he wrote to a prospective recruit that for "the last nine or ten months" he had been "trying to put together for General Smith an organization to do economic research."[^46] A memorandum of conversation dated January 22, 1951 lists "Dr. Max Millikan, Central Intelligence Agency" among the participants in a discussion with State Department officers of psychological intelligence, and records his concern that splitting that work among several organizations would produce the shortcomings of decentralization.[^47] A memorandum of March 6, 1951, addressed to the intelligence chiefs of the State Department, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, was issued "For the Director of Central Intelligence" over Millikan's typed name as Assistant Director, Research and Reports.[^48] A letter he signed as Assistant Director on November 26, 1951 says that "Walt Rostow at the Center for International Studies has sought my assistance in finding him someone to help out with some research."[^49] A letter of March 3, 1952 addresses him as Special Consultant, Central Intelligence Agency.[^50] In an interview note of March 5, 1952 titled "Origin of PSB," a CIA historian recorded that Millikan "participated in a 'contract study,' State and MIT," which the note identifies as the "Troy Project," and that its study "had considerable to do with the creation of the PSB."[^51]
The agency's financing of the [[Center for International Studies]] at MIT is recorded in several places. [[Patrick Oster]] reported in the Washington Post of September 11, 1977 that the agency "secretly financed a research project at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in order to gain data on how to turn Russian scientists into CIA agents," as part of "Project MK-ULTRA," with a foundation as a "front," and that the researcher was affiliated with MIT's Center for International Studies, "which was set up in 1951 with CIA money and had as its first director Max F. Millikan, a former assistant director of the agency."[^51] Time reported on February 24, 1967 "directly and without masquerade" "$300,000 to finance M.I.T.'s topflight Center for International Studies," and that MIT then "terminated the contract 'for practical, not moral reasons.'"[^52] [[Andreas Lowenfeld]], of the State Department's Office of Legal Adviser, testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee's Internal Security Subcommittee, said of the center in 1951 and 1952: "they had some kind of contract with the CIA," and, asked whether he knew it was a CIA operation, "I was never formally told, but it became apparent."[^53]
The agency's financing of the [[Center for International Studies]] at MIT is recorded in several places. [[Patrick Oster]] reported in the Washington Post of September 11, 1977 that the agency "secretly financed a research project at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in order to gain data on how to turn Russian scientists into CIA agents," as part of "Project MK-ULTRA," with a foundation as a "front," and that the researcher was affiliated with MIT's Center for International Studies, "which was set up in 1951 with CIA money and had as its first director Max F. Millikan, a former assistant director of the agency."[^52] Time reported on February 24, 1967 "directly and without masquerade" "$300,000 to finance M.I.T.'s topflight Center for International Studies," and that MIT then "terminated the contract 'for practical, not moral reasons.'"[^53] [[Andreas Lowenfeld]], of the State Department's Office of Legal Adviser, testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee's Internal Security Subcommittee, said of the center in 1951 and 1952: "they had some kind of contract with the CIA," and, asked whether he knew it was a CIA operation, "I was never formally told, but it became apparent."[^54]
The third progress report on NSC 59/1 records that the CIA had been assigned a continuing study of balloons as propaganda carriers and "instructed to stockpile one thousand large-sized propaganda balloons of the best type presently available."[^54] The [[Project Troy]] report had placed balloon work inside political warfare, stating that "The balloon problem is a part of political warfare. It cannot be handled by a separate balloon shop."[^55]
The third progress report on NSC 59/1 records that the CIA had been assigned a continuing study of balloons as propaganda carriers and "instructed to stockpile one thousand large-sized propaganda balloons of the best type presently available."[^55] The [[Project Troy]] report had placed balloon work inside political warfare, stating that "The balloon problem is a part of political warfare. It cannot be handled by a separate balloon shop."[^56]
In February 1961 [[Allen Dulles|Allen W. Dulles]] wrote to Millikan, then director of the center, that he was "very deeply interested in the proposal in your letter of January 23," and expected to attend at least part of the meetings of May 18 to 21, 1961, at which the center would review its first ten years.[^56]
In February 1961 [[Allen Dulles|Allen W. Dulles]] wrote to Millikan, then director of the center, that he was "very deeply interested in the proposal in your letter of January 23," and expected to attend at least part of the meetings of May 18 to 21, 1961, at which the center would review its first ten years.[^57]
A CIA document titled "Principles Governing Budgetary Relationships Between CENIS and CIA" describes an annual contract under which research projects were "mutually agreed upon case by case" between the agency and the Center for International Studies, within an annual authorization of $500,000. The document is undated.[^57] A CIA list of recipients of Office of Research and Reports unclassified studies names Max Millikan, [[Walt Rostow]], [[Wilfred Malenbaum]], [[Everett Hagen]], [[Evsey Domar]] and [[Thomas Schelling]], each listed under the Center for International Studies.[^58] A CIA memorandum dated February 16, 1959, forwarding a [[National Review]] Bulletin item, carries the item's text stating that [[Richard Bissell]] and [[Robert Amory]] "lean ideologically on CIA's outriding auxiliary at MIT, the Center for International Studies," and that they have been influenced by the theories of "W. W. Rostow, director of the Center."[^59] The MIT President's report for 1962 to 1963 refers to "Max F. Millikan, Director of the Center for International Studies."[^60] A CIA Office of Legislative Counsel journal entry of March 3, 1967 records that "the Agency has Senator Fulbright's letter concerning a Center for International Studies, MIT, and is preparing a response."[^61]
A CIA document titled "Principles Governing Budgetary Relationships Between CENIS and CIA" describes an annual contract under which research projects were "mutually agreed upon case by case" between the agency and the Center for International Studies, within an annual authorization of $500,000. The document is undated.[^58] A CIA list of recipients of Office of Research and Reports unclassified studies names Max Millikan, [[Walt Rostow]], [[Wilfred Malenbaum]], [[Everett Hagen]], [[Evsey Domar]] and [[Thomas Schelling]], each listed under the Center for International Studies.[^59] A CIA memorandum dated February 16, 1959, forwarding a [[National Review]] Bulletin item, carries the item's text stating that [[Richard Bissell]] and [[Robert Amory]] "lean ideologically on CIA's outriding auxiliary at MIT, the Center for International Studies," and that they have been influenced by the theories of "W. W. Rostow, director of the Center."[^60] The MIT President's report for 1962 to 1963 refers to "Max F. Millikan, Director of the Center for International Studies."[^61] A CIA Office of Legislative Counsel journal entry of March 3, 1967 records that "the Agency has Senator Fulbright's letter concerning a Center for International Studies, MIT, and is preparing a response."[^62]
### Footnotes
@ -207,35 +207,36 @@ A CIA document titled "Principles Governing Budgetary Relationships Between CENI
[^27]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom"
[^28]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue: "The damage that has been done"
[^29]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 13: "The wrong kind of friends"
[^30]: Congressional Record, Senate, September 22, 2004, Rollcall Vote No. 187 (yeas 77, nays 17). https://irp.fas.org/congress/2004_cr/goss092204.html ; "Porter Goss Sworn in As New CIA Director," PBS NewsHour, September 24, 2004 (sworn in by Andrew Card in the Oval Office). https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/government_programs-july-dec04-cia_09-24 ; Norris, "Goss Is Latest to Leave Bush Administration," NPR transcript, May 5, 2006. https://www.npr.org/transcripts/5387220
[^31]: JURIST, "FBI probes CIA defense contracts after top official resigns," May 2006 (FBI probe of Foggo's possible help to ADCS). https://www.jurist.org/news/2006/05/fbi-probes-cia-defense-contracts-after ; Paul Blumenthal, "MSNBC: Foggo Gone," Sunlight Foundation, May 8, 2006 (resignation reported Monday). https://sunlightfoundation.com/2006/05/08/msnbc-foggo-gone/
[^32]: NBC News, "Ex-CIA executive gets 37 months in prison," February 26, 2009 (one count of fraud, 27 counts dropped, Judge James Cacheris, 37 months as requested). https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna29413971 ; Associated Press, "CIA officer gets jail time for fraud," Philadelphia Inquirer, February 27, 2009. https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/nation_world/20090227_CIA_officer_gets_jail_time_for_fraud.html
[^33]: Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program, S. Rept. 113-288 (December 2014), executive summary and findings, sections on the 2005 videotapes ("The CIA destroyed the CIA interrogation videotapes the following day"; Rizzo's October 31, 2005 email). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CRPT-113srpt288.pdf
[^34]: NBC News, "Ex-CIA chief agreed with tape destruction," April 2010 (e-mails released by the Justice Department under an ACLU FOIA request; "PG, however, agreed with the decision"; the disputed account). https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna36589750
[^35]: JURIST, "No charges to be filed in CIA videotape destruction case: DOJ," November 2010 (spokesman Matthew Miller on Durham's decision; Durham appointed 2008 by Attorney General Michael Mukasey). https://www.jurist.org/news/2010/11/no-charges-to-be-filed-in-cia-videotape-destruction-case/
[^36]: Joseph E. Roop, "Foreign Broadcast Information Service. History. Part I: 1941-1947" (Central Intelligence Agency, approved for release April 1969), pp. 279, 299-300 and 303. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
[^37]: National Archives and Records Administration, Guide to Federal Records, Record Group 262, administrative history. https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/262.html.
[^38]: Roop, Part I, p. 2. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
[^39]: Roop, Part II (CIA Directorate of Intelligence, August 1970), pp. 2 and 151-152. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06741690.
[^40]: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "ODNI Announces Establishment of Open Source Center," News Release No. 6-05, November 8, 2005. https://irp.fas.org/news/2005/11/odni110805.html.
[^41]: Central Intelligence Group, Central Planning Staff, memorandum "Liquidation of Security Advisory Board, OWI (C.I.G. Liaison with New Security Advisory Board under SWNCC)," July 22, 1946. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP78-04007A000300040024-9. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-04007a000300040024-9
[^42]: Central Intelligence Group, Chief, ICAPS, to the Executive Director, memorandum "CIG Membership on SWNCC Subcommittee for Psychological Warfare," July 21, 1947. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP84-00022R000400100046-0. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp84-00022r000400100046-0
[^43]: Central Intelligence Agency, Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB M-8), January 10, 1952, membership and other participants. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP80-01065A000500100033-6. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-01065a000500100033-6
[^44]: Max F. Millikan, letter stamped January 30, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003100150032-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003100150032-1
[^45]: Max F. Millikan, letter of October 29, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP79-01157A000200020002-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp79-01157a000200020002-2
[^46]: CIA, memorandum of conversation, "Psychological Intelligence," January 22, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003500180026-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003500180026-1
[^47]: CIA, "Report of Intelligence Project Initiations, February 1951," memorandum of March 6, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP60-00213A000200030008-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp60-00213a000200030008-3
[^48]: Max F. Millikan, letter of November 26, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003000200096-6. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003000200096-6
[^49]: Stuart A. Rice, Assistant Director for Statistical Standards, Bureau of the Budget, letter to Max F. Millikan, March 3, 1952, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00662R000300120004-5. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00662r000300120004-5
[^50]: A. B. Darling, note of interview with Max Millikan, "Origin of PSB," March 5, 1952, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP83-00036R000400050039-0. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83-00036r000400050039-0
[^51]: Patrick Oster, "CIA Envisioned Soviet Scientists as U.S. Agents," Chicago Sun-Times, reprinted in the Washington Post, September 11, 1977, p. A-9, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP88-01315R000400460003-8. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp88-01315r000400460003-8
[^52]: Time, February 24, 1967, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP84-00161R000400210135-8. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp84-00161r000400210135-8
[^53]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Internal Security Subcommittee, extracts from hearings (Part 3) on State Department security and passport regulations, testimony of Andreas F. Lowenfeld, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00149R000400560007-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00149r000400560007-3
[^54]: FRUS, The Intelligence Community, 1950-1955, Document 57 (third progress report on NSC 59/1), paragraph 12. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d57
[^55]: CIA reading room document CIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8, excerpt of the Project Troy report to the Secretary of State, February 1, 1951 (balloon chapter). https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8
[^56]: Allen W. Dulles, letter to Max F. Millikan, February 27, 1961, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80B01676R003500160028-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80b01676r003500160028-9
[^57]: CIA, "Principles Governing Budgetary Relationships Between CENIS and CIA" (undated; released 2000), CIA reading room document CIA-RDP67-00059A000200090016-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp67-00059a000200090016-2
[^58]: CIA, "Recipients for ORR Unclassified Studies" (undated list), CIA reading room document CIA-RDP63-00314R000100180007-7. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp63-00314r000100180007-7
[^59]: CIA memorandum from the Assistant to the Director, February 16, 1959, forwarding a National Review Bulletin item, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00001R000100260064-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00001r000100260064-9
[^60]: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, President's Report Issue for the year ending July 1, 1963, p. 165, MIT Libraries, DSpace. https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/160055
[^61]: CIA Office of Legislative Counsel, journal entry, "Friday, 3 March 1967," CIA reading room document CIA-RDP69B00369R000200020044-4. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp69b00369r000200020044-4
[^30]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.2 (Carlos Amador: CIA cables of April 23 and April 25, 1986). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
[^31]: Congressional Record, Senate, September 22, 2004, Rollcall Vote No. 187 (yeas 77, nays 17). https://irp.fas.org/congress/2004_cr/goss092204.html ; "Porter Goss Sworn in As New CIA Director," PBS NewsHour, September 24, 2004 (sworn in by Andrew Card in the Oval Office). https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/government_programs-july-dec04-cia_09-24 ; Norris, "Goss Is Latest to Leave Bush Administration," NPR transcript, May 5, 2006. https://www.npr.org/transcripts/5387220
[^32]: JURIST, "FBI probes CIA defense contracts after top official resigns," May 2006 (FBI probe of Foggo's possible help to ADCS). https://www.jurist.org/news/2006/05/fbi-probes-cia-defense-contracts-after ; Paul Blumenthal, "MSNBC: Foggo Gone," Sunlight Foundation, May 8, 2006 (resignation reported Monday). https://sunlightfoundation.com/2006/05/08/msnbc-foggo-gone/
[^33]: NBC News, "Ex-CIA executive gets 37 months in prison," February 26, 2009 (one count of fraud, 27 counts dropped, Judge James Cacheris, 37 months as requested). https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna29413971 ; Associated Press, "CIA officer gets jail time for fraud," Philadelphia Inquirer, February 27, 2009. https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/nation_world/20090227_CIA_officer_gets_jail_time_for_fraud.html
[^34]: Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program, S. Rept. 113-288 (December 2014), executive summary and findings, sections on the 2005 videotapes ("The CIA destroyed the CIA interrogation videotapes the following day"; Rizzo's October 31, 2005 email). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CRPT-113srpt288.pdf
[^35]: NBC News, "Ex-CIA chief agreed with tape destruction," April 2010 (e-mails released by the Justice Department under an ACLU FOIA request; "PG, however, agreed with the decision"; the disputed account). https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna36589750
[^36]: JURIST, "No charges to be filed in CIA videotape destruction case: DOJ," November 2010 (spokesman Matthew Miller on Durham's decision; Durham appointed 2008 by Attorney General Michael Mukasey). https://www.jurist.org/news/2010/11/no-charges-to-be-filed-in-cia-videotape-destruction-case/
[^37]: Joseph E. Roop, "Foreign Broadcast Information Service. History. Part I: 1941-1947" (Central Intelligence Agency, approved for release April 1969), pp. 279, 299-300 and 303. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
[^38]: National Archives and Records Administration, Guide to Federal Records, Record Group 262, administrative history. https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/262.html.
[^39]: Roop, Part I, p. 2. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
[^40]: Roop, Part II (CIA Directorate of Intelligence, August 1970), pp. 2 and 151-152. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06741690.
[^41]: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "ODNI Announces Establishment of Open Source Center," News Release No. 6-05, November 8, 2005. https://irp.fas.org/news/2005/11/odni110805.html.
[^42]: Central Intelligence Group, Central Planning Staff, memorandum "Liquidation of Security Advisory Board, OWI (C.I.G. Liaison with New Security Advisory Board under SWNCC)," July 22, 1946. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP78-04007A000300040024-9. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-04007a000300040024-9
[^43]: Central Intelligence Group, Chief, ICAPS, to the Executive Director, memorandum "CIG Membership on SWNCC Subcommittee for Psychological Warfare," July 21, 1947. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP84-00022R000400100046-0. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp84-00022r000400100046-0
[^44]: Central Intelligence Agency, Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB M-8), January 10, 1952, membership and other participants. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP80-01065A000500100033-6. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-01065a000500100033-6
[^45]: Max F. Millikan, letter stamped January 30, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003100150032-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003100150032-1
[^46]: Max F. Millikan, letter of October 29, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP79-01157A000200020002-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp79-01157a000200020002-2
[^47]: CIA, memorandum of conversation, "Psychological Intelligence," January 22, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003500180026-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003500180026-1
[^48]: CIA, "Report of Intelligence Project Initiations, February 1951," memorandum of March 6, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP60-00213A000200030008-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp60-00213a000200030008-3
[^49]: Max F. Millikan, letter of November 26, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003000200096-6. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003000200096-6
[^50]: Stuart A. Rice, Assistant Director for Statistical Standards, Bureau of the Budget, letter to Max F. Millikan, March 3, 1952, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00662R000300120004-5. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00662r000300120004-5
[^51]: A. B. Darling, note of interview with Max Millikan, "Origin of PSB," March 5, 1952, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP83-00036R000400050039-0. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83-00036r000400050039-0
[^52]: Patrick Oster, "CIA Envisioned Soviet Scientists as U.S. Agents," Chicago Sun-Times, reprinted in the Washington Post, September 11, 1977, p. A-9, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP88-01315R000400460003-8. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp88-01315r000400460003-8
[^53]: Time, February 24, 1967, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP84-00161R000400210135-8. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp84-00161r000400210135-8
[^54]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Internal Security Subcommittee, extracts from hearings (Part 3) on State Department security and passport regulations, testimony of Andreas F. Lowenfeld, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00149R000400560007-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00149r000400560007-3
[^55]: FRUS, The Intelligence Community, 1950-1955, Document 57 (third progress report on NSC 59/1), paragraph 12. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d57
[^56]: CIA reading room document CIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8, excerpt of the Project Troy report to the Secretary of State, February 1, 1951 (balloon chapter). https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8
[^57]: Allen W. Dulles, letter to Max F. Millikan, February 27, 1961, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80B01676R003500160028-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80b01676r003500160028-9
[^58]: CIA, "Principles Governing Budgetary Relationships Between CENIS and CIA" (undated; released 2000), CIA reading room document CIA-RDP67-00059A000200090016-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp67-00059a000200090016-2
[^59]: CIA, "Recipients for ORR Unclassified Studies" (undated list), CIA reading room document CIA-RDP63-00314R000100180007-7. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp63-00314r000100180007-7
[^60]: CIA memorandum from the Assistant to the Director, February 16, 1959, forwarding a National Review Bulletin item, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00001R000100260064-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00001r000100260064-9
[^61]: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, President's Report Issue for the year ending July 1, 1963, p. 165, MIT Libraries, DSpace. https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/160055
[^62]: CIA Office of Legislative Counsel, journal entry, "Friday, 3 March 1967," CIA reading room document CIA-RDP69B00369R000200020044-4. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp69b00369r000200020044-4

35
20 - ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/USA/NSA.md
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@ -110,11 +110,21 @@ The NSA released transcripts of intercepts made after the June 8, 1967, attack o
### United Nations headquarters, Security Council delegations and Ndola
In September 1961, according to a commission of jurists reporting to the [[United Nations]] General Assembly in 2014, Charles Southall was stationed at the NSA naval communications facility near Nicosia, Cyprus, and recalled a recording played back shortly after midnight on the night of the crash that killed [[Dag Hammarskjöld]]. The Commission wrote that "from the broader evidence of the US National Security Agency's worldwide monitoring activities in and about 1961, it is highly likely that the entirety of the local and regional Ndola radio traffic on the night of 17-18 September 1961 was tracked and recorded by the NSA, and possibly also by the CIA."[^25] The Eminent Person reporting in 2019 recorded that two United States personnel confirmed as working for or in support of NSA activities said they overheard a transmission or recording of an attack on the aircraft, that both had died by 2018, and that the United States had not responded substantively to requests for clarification made since 2015.[^26]
According to a commission of jurists reporting to the [[United Nations]] General Assembly in 2014, Charles Southall recalled a recording played back shortly after midnight in September 1961, at the naval communications facility near Nicosia, Cyprus, on the night of the crash that killed [[Dag Hammarskjöld]]. The Eminent Person wrote in 2022: "It has not been disputed that he held a specialization as a "processing and reporting" officer who was assigned at a naval communications facility near Nicosia in 1961."[^25] The Commission wrote that "from the broader evidence of the US National Security Agency's worldwide monitoring activities in and about 1961, it is highly likely that the entirety of the local and regional Ndola radio traffic on the night of 17-18 September 1961 was tracked and recorded by the NSA, and possibly also by the CIA."[^26] The Eminent Person reporting in 2019 recorded that two United States personnel confirmed as working for or in support of NSA activities said they overheard a transmission or recording of an attack on the aircraft, that both had died by 2018, and that the United States had not responded substantively to requests for clarification made since 2015.[^27]
A January 31, 2003 email from [[Frank Koza]], chief of staff of the Regional Targets section of the NSA, to [[GCHQ]] asked for a "surge effort to revive/create efforts against UNSC members Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Bulgaria and Guinea." [[The Observer]] published the memo on March 2, 2003.[^27] [[Katharine Gun]], who worked at GCHQ, was charged under section 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1989; on February 25, 2004 the Crown offered no evidence.[^28]
The 2015 Independent Panel recorded that the United States, in its response of June 9, 2015, confirmed that Charles Southall was an active member of the United States Navy at the time, without saying where he was stationed or in what capacity he served.[^28] The 2019 report recorded that the United States confirmed that he joined the Navy in 1955, was released from active duty in 1969, and retired as a commander from the Naval Reserve in 1978, and that the United States gave no information on whether he worked in support of NSA activities.[^29]
In August 2013 [[Der Spiegel]] reported, on the basis of documents obtained by Edward Snowden, that NSA experts had cracked the codes of the United Nations video conferencing system in the summer of 2012, and that the number of decoded communications rose from 12 to 458 within three weeks. The same documents reportedly showed collection against the [[International Atomic Energy Agency]] and an NSA bugging program, called Special Collection Service, in more than 80 embassies and consulates.[^29]
The 2022 and 2024 reports described Southall and Paul Abram as two United States personnel who had provided information tending to confirm that they were working for or in support of NSA activities on the night of September 17 and 18, 1961, when they overheard or read a transmission concerning an attack on flight SE-BDY.[^30] Both reports recorded that the two men had passed away as of 2018.[^30] The 2024 report wrote that the failure of the United States to take up the opportunity to contradict their claims "tends to have the effect of supporting those claims."[^31]
The Panel recorded that Abram, a former United States Air Force security services officer, had said he was attached to an NSA listening post at Iraklion, Greece. It assessed that his claim to have performed special duties at the time appeared to be valid, on the basis of a discharge record describing him as a "voice intercept procedure specialist," but could not confirm that he was posted to Iraklion at the time.[^32] The 2017 report recorded that the United States confirmed his service record only in July 2017, with information that disputed his location at the time he reported hearing the intercept.[^33]
The National Security Archive at George Washington University filed Freedom of Information Act requests on behalf of the 2013 Commission of Jurists for any NSA recording or transcript of radio traffic on the night of September 17 and 18, 1961 appearing to relate to one aircraft firing upon another, and for any message intercepted concerning the approach of an aircraft to Ndola.[^34] The NSA's initial response indicated that two of three responsive documents appeared exempt by reason of "top secret" classification, and that the third was not held by the NSA; an appeal was lodged.[^34] The agency told the commission that releasing the two files "could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security."[^35] The Swedish newspaper SvD Nyheter reported on November 21, 2014 that the United States had given the Swedish foreign minister, Carl Bildt, access to the two files, quoting him as saying that the information was "trivial and unimportant." In 2015 one member of the Independent Panel, of Australian nationality, was given full access to the two files and assessed that they contained no information on the interception of communications about an attack on SE-BDY.[^35] On June 9, 2015 the United States told the Panel that its search of NSA and CIA records had not found documents matching the materials requested.[^35]
The 2024 report described Dakota aircraft at Ndola equipped to intercept, transmit and receive communications over long distances, and wrote that there was "a reasonable evidentiary basis" to consider that these aircraft "may have overheard or relayed communications from or about flight SE-BDY."[^31]
A January 31, 2003 email from [[Frank Koza]], chief of staff of the Regional Targets section of the NSA, to [[GCHQ]] asked for a "surge effort to revive/create efforts against UNSC members Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Bulgaria and Guinea." [[The Observer]] published the memo on March 2, 2003.[^36] [[Katharine Gun]], who worked at GCHQ, was charged under section 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1989; on February 25, 2004 the Crown offered no evidence.[^37]
In August 2013 [[Der Spiegel]] reported, on the basis of documents obtained by Edward Snowden, that NSA experts had cracked the codes of the United Nations video conferencing system in the summer of 2012, and that the number of decoded communications rose from 12 to 458 within three weeks. The same documents reportedly showed collection against the [[International Atomic Energy Agency]] and an NSA bugging program, called Special Collection Service, in more than 80 embassies and consulates.[^38]
### Footnotes
@ -142,8 +152,17 @@ In August 2013 [[Der Spiegel]] reported, on the basis of documents obtained by E
[^22]: National Security Agency, "U.S.S. Liberty," release page (Wayback Machine 2007 capture). http://web.archive.org/web/2007/http://www.nsa.gov/liberty
[^23]: David C. Walsh, "Former NSA Officials Agree," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, June 2003. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2003/june/former-nsa-officials-agree
[^24]: "New revelations in attack on American spy ship," *Chicago Tribune*, October 2, 2007. https://www.chicagotribune.com/2007/10/02/new-revelations-in-attack-on-american-spy-ship/
[^25]: Commission of Jurists on the Inquiry into the Death of Dag Hammarskjöld, United Nations General Assembly document A/68/800, 2014, paragraphs 13.23 to 13.28 and 15.7. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
[^26]: Report of the Eminent Person, United Nations General Assembly document A/73/973, September 12, 2019, paragraph 19. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
[^27]: Bright, Martin, Ed Vulliamy and Peter Beaumont. "Revealed: US dirty tricks to win vote on Iraq war," *The Observer,* March 2, 2003. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/02/usa.iraq ; McGovern, Ray. "When Truth Tried to Stop War," *Consortium News,* January 31, 2013. https://consortiumnews.com/2013/01/31/when-truth-tried-to-stop-war/
[^28]: House of Commons, "Katharine Gun," HC Deb 26 February 2004, vol. 418, cc. 427-40. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/2004/feb/26/katharine-gun
[^29]: Al Jazeera, "Report: US bugged UN headquarters," August 25, 2013, reporting the Der Spiegel account. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/8/25/report-us-bugged-un-headquarters ; CBC News, "NSA spied on UN, leaked files show," August 2013. https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/nsa-spied-on-un-leaked-files-show-1.1306194
[^25]: A/76/892, paragraph 370. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
[^26]: Commission of Jurists on the Inquiry into the Death of Dag Hammarskjöld, United Nations General Assembly document A/68/800, 2014, paragraphs 13.23 to 13.28 and 15.7. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
[^27]: Report of the Eminent Person, United Nations General Assembly document A/73/973, September 12, 2019, paragraph 19. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
[^28]: A/70/132, report of the Independent Panel of Experts, paragraph 84 (the United States response of June 9, 2015). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F70%2F132&l=en&t=pdf
[^29]: A/73/973, report of the Eminent Person, September 12, 2019, paragraph 102. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
[^30]: A/76/892, report of the Eminent Person, August 25, 2022, paragraph 32; A/78/1006, report of the Eminent Person, September 9, 2024, paragraph 50. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
[^31]: A/78/1006, paragraphs 47 to 50. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F78%2F1006&l=en&t=pdf
[^32]: A/70/132, paragraphs 76, 77 and 85. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F70%2F132&l=en&t=pdf
[^33]: A/71/1042, report of the Eminent Person, September 5, 2017, paragraph 7. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F71%2F1042&l=en&t=pdf
[^34]: A/68/800, paragraphs 15.11 and 15.12. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
[^35]: A/70/132, paragraphs 81 to 83. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F70%2F132&l=en&t=pdf
[^36]: Bright, Martin, Ed Vulliamy and Peter Beaumont. "Revealed: US dirty tricks to win vote on Iraq war," *The Observer,* March 2, 2003. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/02/usa.iraq ; McGovern, Ray. "When Truth Tried to Stop War," *Consortium News,* January 31, 2013. https://consortiumnews.com/2013/01/31/when-truth-tried-to-stop-war/
[^37]: House of Commons, "Katharine Gun," HC Deb 26 February 2004, vol. 418, cc. 427-40. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/2004/feb/26/katharine-gun
[^38]: Al Jazeera, "Report: US bugged UN headquarters," August 25, 2013, reporting the Der Spiegel account. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/8/25/report-us-bugged-un-headquarters ; CBC News, "NSA spied on UN, leaked files show," August 2013. https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/nsa-spied-on-un-leaked-files-show-1.1306194

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20 - ORGANIZATIONS/INTERNATIONAL/United Nations.md
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@ -34,14 +34,14 @@ relations:
start: 1953-04
end: 1961-09-18
role: "Secretary-General of the United Nations"
fn: 25
fn: 26
- type: head_of
with: "[[Kurt Waldheim]]"
reverse: true
start: 1972-01-01
end: 1981-12-31
role: "Secretary-General of the United Nations"
fn: 54
fn: 69
- type: appointed
with: "[[Folke Bernadotte]]"
reverse: true
@ -52,27 +52,27 @@ relations:
with: "[[Benon Sevan]]"
reverse: true
role: "Executive Director of the Oil-for-Food Programme"
fn: 53
fn: 68
- type: appointed
with: "[[Mohamed Chande Othman]]"
reverse: true
start: 2017
role: "Eminent Person on the death of Dag Hammarskjöld"
fn: 34
fn: 37
- type: appointed
with: "[[Cyrus Vance]]"
reverse: true
start: 1991-10-08
end: 1993-05
role: "Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yugoslavia"
fn: 66
fn: 81
- type: appointed
with: "[[James A. Baker III]]"
reverse: true
start: 1997
end: 2004
role: "Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara"
fn: 67
fn: 82
---
The United Nations is an international organization founded on October 24, 1945, by 51 original member states following [[World War II]]. Its charter established six principal organs: the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat, headed by the Secretary-General. The Security Council holds primary responsibility for international peace and security. Its five permanent members, the [[United States]], the United Kingdom, France, [[Soviet Union|Russia]], and China, hold a veto over substantive resolutions, which require nine votes including the concurring votes of the permanent members. Headquarters is in [[New York City]].[^1]
@ -99,89 +99,99 @@ On July 14, 1960, the Security Council authorized the Secretary-General to take
The [[Church Committee]] documented the American side of the same weeks. A cable of August 18, 1960 from [[Bronson Tweedy]], chief of the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]'s Africa Division, referred to "your and our belief Lumumba must be removed if possible"; on August 19 [[Richard Bissell]] cabled "You are authorized proceed with operation" to replace Lumumba with a pro-Western group; and on August 26 [[Allen Dulles]] cabled the Leopoldville station that "targets of opportunity may present themselves to you" and authorized up to $100,000 for "crash programs."[^22] The Committee reported that in the fall of 1960 two CIA officials were asked by superiors to assassinate Lumumba, that poisons were sent to the Congo and that exploratory steps were taken toward gaining access to Lumumba, and wrote that it "does not appear from the evidence that the United States was in any way involved in the killing" by Congolese rivals in early 1961. On the question of authority, the Committee wrote that the chain of events was "strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the plot to assassinate Lumumba was authorized by President Eisenhower," while the countervailing testimony and the ambiguity of the records precluded a finding that the President intended an assassination effort.[^23]
Lumumba was transferred on January 17, 1961 to the custody of the Katanga authorities, who announced his death several weeks later.[^21] On February 21, 1961, the Security Council noted "with deep regret" the announced killing of Lumumba, [[Maurice Mpolo]] and [[Joseph Okito]], urged the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the [[Congo]] of all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under United Nations Command, and of mercenaries, provided for the use of force, as a last resort, to prevent civil war, and decided that "an immediate and impartial investigation be held in order to ascertain the circumstances of the death of Mr. Lumumba and his colleagues and that the perpetrators of these crimes be punished."[^24]
Lumumba was transferred on January 17, 1961 to the custody of the Katanga authorities, who announced his death several weeks later.[^21][^24] On February 21, 1961, the Security Council noted "with deep regret" the announced killing of Lumumba, [[Maurice Mpolo]] and [[Joseph Okito]], urged the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the [[Congo]] of all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under United Nations Command, and of mercenaries, provided for the use of force, as a last resort, to prevent civil war, and decided that "an immediate and impartial investigation be held in order to ascertain the circumstances of the death of Mr. Lumumba and his colleagues and that the perpetrators of these crimes be punished."[^25]
[[Dag Hammarskjöld]], the second Secretary-General, died on the night of September 17 and 18, 1961, when a Swedish aircraft carrying sixteen people, flight SE-BDY, crashed near [[Ndola]] in what was then [[Northern Rhodesia]]. All aboard died. The Rhodesian civil aviation board of investigation found no definitive cause and could not rule out a "wilful act of some person or persons unknown"; a Rhodesian commission of inquiry under Chief Justice Sir John Clayden reported in February 1962 that the pilots had allowed the aircraft to descend too low; and the United Nations commission of inquiry reported in April 1962 that it had found no evidence of sabotage or attack but that these possibilities could not be excluded, and was unable to determine the cause.[^25] On October 26, 1962, the General Assembly adopted resolution 1759 (XVII), which took note of that report and requested the Secretary-General to inform the Assembly of any new evidence.[^26]
[[Dag Hammarskjöld]], the second Secretary-General, died on the night of September 17 and 18, 1961, when a Swedish aircraft carrying sixteen people, flight SE-BDY, crashed near [[Ndola]] in what was then [[Northern Rhodesia]]. All aboard died. The Rhodesian civil aviation board of investigation found no definitive cause and could not rule out a "wilful act of some person or persons unknown"; a Rhodesian commission of inquiry under Chief Justice Sir John Clayden reported in February 1962 that the pilots had allowed the aircraft to descend too low; and the United Nations commission of inquiry reported in April 1962 that it had found no evidence of sabotage or attack but that these possibilities could not be excluded, and was unable to determine the cause.[^26] The Foreign Relations editorial note dates a report of the Commission of Investigation to March 8, 1962.[^27] On October 26, 1962, the General Assembly adopted resolution 1759 (XVII), which took note of that report and requested the Secretary-General to inform the Assembly of any new evidence.[^28]
In 2013 a commission of jurists chaired by Sir [[Stephen Sedley]], assembled by an enabling committee under [[Lord Lea of Crondall]] rather than by the United Nations, and including [[Hans Corell]], [[Richard Goldstone]] and [[Wilhelmina Thomassen]], reported on whether the evidence would justify reopening the inquiry. Its report recorded that "there appear also to be relevant but classified records held by the US National Security Agency." It set out the account of Charles Southall, who in September 1961 was stationed at the NSA naval communications facility in Cyprus and recalled that shortly after midnight on the night of the crash a recording was played back in which a male voice said "I see a transport plane coming low. All the lights are on. I'm going down to make a run on it. Yes, it's the Transair DC6. It's the plane," followed by the sound of cannon fire and the words "I've hit it. There are flames. It's going down. It's crashing."[^27] The Commission concluded: "There is persuasive evidence that the aircraft was subjected to some form of attack or threat as it circled to land at Ndola." It also wrote that "from the broader evidence of the US National Security Agency's worldwide monitoring activities in and about 1961, it is highly likely that the entirety of the local and regional Ndola radio traffic on the night of 17-18 September 1961 was tracked and recorded by the NSA, and possibly also by the CIA," and that the sabotage claim was not capable of verification.[^28]
In 2013 a commission of jurists chaired by Sir [[Stephen Sedley]], assembled by an enabling committee under [[Lord Lea of Crondall]] rather than by the United Nations, and including [[Hans Corell]], [[Richard Goldstone]] and [[Wilhelmina Thomassen]], reported on whether the evidence would justify reopening the inquiry. Its report recorded that "there appear also to be relevant but classified records held by the US National Security Agency." It set out the account of Charles Southall, who recalled that shortly after midnight on the night of the crash a recording was played back in which a male voice said "I see a transport plane coming low. All the lights are on. I'm going down to make a run on it. Yes, it's the Transair DC6. It's the plane," followed by the sound of cannon fire and the words "I've hit it. There are flames. It's going down. It's crashing." The Eminent Person wrote in 2022 of Southall: "It has not been disputed that he held a specialization as a "processing and reporting" officer who was assigned at a naval communications facility near Nicosia in 1961."[^29][^30] The Commission concluded: "There is persuasive evidence that the aircraft was subjected to some form of attack or threat as it circled to land at Ndola." It also wrote that "from the broader evidence of the US National Security Agency's worldwide monitoring activities in and about 1961, it is highly likely that the entirety of the local and regional Ndola radio traffic on the night of 17-18 September 1961 was tracked and recorded by the NSA, and possibly also by the CIA," and that the sabotage claim was not capable of verification.[^31]
The Independent Panel of Experts, appointed under General Assembly resolution 69/246 and headed by [[Mohamed Chande Othman]], reported in July 2015. It assigned moderate probative value to nine new eyewitness accounts of more than one aircraft in the air, to the claims of two persons who heard or read alleged intercepts of an attack on SE-BDY, to new information on the air capability of Katanga, and to the possibility that communications from Hammarskjöld's CX-52 cryptographic machine were intercepted. It found that claims by mercenaries that they shot the aircraft down lacked credibility.[^29] In December 2016 the General Assembly, by resolution 71/260, requested the Secretary-General to appoint an eminent person, urged all Member States to release relevant records, and encouraged them to declassify records that "remain classified, more than 50 years after the fact."[^30]
The Independent Panel of Experts, appointed under General Assembly resolution 69/246 and headed by [[Mohamed Chande Othman]], reported in June 2015 (transmitted by the Secretary-General on July 2, 2015). It assigned moderate probative value to nine new eyewitness accounts of more than one aircraft in the air, to the claims of two persons who heard or read alleged intercepts of an attack on SE-BDY, to new information on the air capability of Katanga, and to the possibility that communications from Hammarskjöld's CX-52 cryptographic machine were intercepted. It found that claims by mercenaries that they shot the aircraft down lacked credibility.[^32] In December 2016 the General Assembly, by resolution 71/260, requested the Secretary-General to appoint an eminent person, urged all Member States to release relevant records, and encouraged them to declassify records that "remain classified, more than 50 years after the fact."[^33]
On September 5, 2017, the Secretary-General transmitted the report of Othman, appointed as Eminent Person. The transmittal letter records his conclusion "that it is almost certain that Dag Hammarskjöld and the members of the party accompanying him were not assassinated after landing and that all passengers died from injuries sustained during the plane crash, either instantaneously or soon after," and that he "considered it plausible that an external attack or threat was a cause of the crash." Othman cited "ample eyewitness evidence that tends to establish that there was more than one aircraft in the air at the time flight SE-BDY made its approach to Ndola, that any aircraft present other than flight SE-BDY was a jet and that flight SE-BDY was on fire before it collided with the ground," and wrote that SE-BDY "may have been fired upon or otherwise actively engaged by one or more other aircraft." He noted that "it remains possible that the crash was an accident caused by pilot error without external interference," that it was "not possible at present to conclude whether sabotage was a cause," and "a lack of access to original documents concerning an 'Operation Celeste'" relating to the hypothesis that a bomb had been planted on the aircraft.[^31] He further concluded "that the burden of proof has now shifted to Member States to show that they have conducted a full review of records and archives in their custody or possession, including those that remain classified, for potentially relevant information."[^31]
On September 5, 2017, the Secretary-General transmitted the report of Othman, appointed as Eminent Person. The transmittal letter records his conclusion "that it is almost certain that Dag Hammarskjöld and the members of the party accompanying him were not assassinated after landing and that all passengers died from injuries sustained during the plane crash, either instantaneously or soon after," and that he "considered it plausible that an external attack or threat was a cause of the crash." Othman cited "ample eyewitness evidence that tends to establish that there was more than one aircraft in the air at the time flight SE-BDY made its approach to Ndola, that any aircraft present other than flight SE-BDY was a jet and that flight SE-BDY was on fire before it collided with the ground," and wrote that SE-BDY "may have been fired upon or otherwise actively engaged by one or more other aircraft." He noted that "it remains possible that the crash was an accident caused by pilot error without external interference," that it was "not possible at present to conclude whether sabotage was a cause," and "a lack of access to original documents concerning an 'Operation Celeste'" relating to the hypothesis that a bomb had been planted on the aircraft.[^34] He further concluded "that the burden of proof has now shifted to Member States to show that they have conducted a full review of records and archives in their custody or possession, including those that remain classified, for potentially relevant information."[^34]
The eight Member States identified in April and May 2017 as most likely to hold relevant information were Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States; responses came from Belgium, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States.[^32] The report stated that new information from the United Kingdom, the United States, the United Nations and individuals "appears to establish that Rhodesian and United Kingdom authorities intercepted United Nations communications in the Congo in 1961," and that the United States confirmed "for the first time" the presence of its military assets in and around Ndola on the night of the crash, including between one and three Dakota aircraft with equipment able to intercept, transmit and receive communications over long distances. Of the two American personnel who had claimed to have heard or read a transmission about an attack, Southall had died in 2015, and the service record of the other, Paul Abram, a United States Air Force Security Services officer, was confirmed by the United States only in July 2017, with information that disputed his location at the time.[^33]
The eight Member States identified in April and May 2017 as most likely to hold relevant information were Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States; responses came from Belgium, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States.[^35] The report stated that new information from the United Kingdom, the United States, the United Nations and individuals "appears to establish that Rhodesian and United Kingdom authorities intercepted United Nations communications in the Congo in 1961," and that the United States confirmed "for the first time" the presence of its military assets in and around Ndola on the night of the crash, including between one and three Dakota aircraft with equipment able to intercept, transmit and receive communications over long distances. Of the two American personnel who had claimed to have heard or read a transmission about an attack, the 2017 report records that Southall had died in 2015 (the 2019 report records that the Eminent Person was informed in 2017, and the reports of 2019, 2022 and 2024 state that both men had passed away as of 2018), and the service record of the other, Paul Abram, a United States Air Force Security Services officer, was confirmed by the United States only in July 2017, with information that disputed his location at the time.[^36]
The report of September 12, 2019 reaffirmed those conclusions: "My work under the current mandate does not provide grounds to disturb either finding," namely that it was plausible that an external attack or threat was a cause and that the burden of proof had shifted to Member States.[^34] In 2018 the Eminent Person requested fourteen Member States to each appoint an independent and high-ranking official to review their intelligence, security and defence archives: Angola, Belgium, Canada, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, France, Germany, Portugal, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, Zambia and Zimbabwe.[^35] The Secretary-General's letter recorded new information on probable intercepts by Member States of relevant communications, the capacity of the armed forces of Katanga or others to stage an attack, including with aircraft and airstrips, the presence in the area of foreign paramilitary personnel, including pilots, and intelligence personnel, and further information on the [[South African Institute for Maritime Research]] in the context of Operation Celeste. It also recorded that not all Member States appointed an Independent Appointee, that searches had not been exhaustive in all, and that the burden of proof remained with Member States.[^34]
The report of September 12, 2019 reaffirmed those conclusions: "My work under the current mandate does not provide grounds to disturb either finding," namely that it was plausible that an external attack or threat was a cause and that the burden of proof had shifted to Member States.[^37] In 2018 the Eminent Person requested fourteen Member States to each appoint an independent and high-ranking official to review their intelligence, security and defence archives: Angola, Belgium, Canada, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, France, Germany, Portugal, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, Zambia and Zimbabwe.[^38] The Secretary-General's letter recorded new information on probable intercepts by Member States of relevant communications, the capacity of the armed forces of Katanga or others to stage an attack, including with aircraft and airstrips, the presence in the area of foreign paramilitary personnel, including pilots, and intelligence personnel, and further information on the [[South African Institute for Maritime Research]] in the context of Operation Celeste. It also recorded that not all Member States appointed an Independent Appointee, that searches had not been exhaustive in all, and that the burden of proof remained with Member States.[^37]
The 2019 report stated that Member States including the United Kingdom and the United States received intercepts of communications of the United Nations Operation in the Congo throughout 1961, including encoded communications on sensitive military matters, discussed at a high level by the British High Commissioner Lord Alport, the United States Consul in Elisabethville William C. Canup and the Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Sir Roy Welensky. It stated that communications sent from Hammarskjöld's CX-52 cryptographic machine "appear to have been intercepted by British and United States signals and intelligence agencies," that two United States personnel confirmed as working for or in support of National Security Agency activities said they overheard a transmission or recording of an attack on flight SE-BDY, that both had died by 2018 without a substantive response from the United States to requests for clarification made since 2015, and that it had not been possible to conclude whether sabotage was a cause, owing in part to difficulties in obtaining access to documentation in South Africa.[^36]
The 2019 report stated that Member States including the United Kingdom and the United States received intercepts of communications of the United Nations Operation in the Congo throughout 1961, including encoded communications on sensitive military matters, discussed at a high level by the British High Commissioner Lord Alport, the United States Consul in Elisabethville William C. Canup and the Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Sir Roy Welensky. It stated that communications sent from Hammarskjöld's CX-52 cryptographic machine "appear to have been intercepted by British and United States signals and intelligence agencies," that two United States personnel confirmed as working for or in support of National Security Agency activities said they overheard a transmission or recording of an attack on flight SE-BDY, that both had died by 2018 without a substantive response from the United States to requests for clarification made since 2015, and that it had not been possible to conclude whether sabotage was a cause, owing in part to difficulties in obtaining access to documentation in South Africa.[^39]
The report of August 25, 2022 stated that "it remains plausible that an external attack or threat was a cause of the crash."[^40] It recorded that encrypted communications sent by Hammarskjöld using the CX-52 cryptographic machines "appear to have been intercepted and read by Member States' signals and intelligence agencies," and that the claim that the CIA or NSA covertly monitored United Nations communications, in an operation known in the CIA first as "Thesaurus" and later as "Rubicon," "has not been refuted by the Member States concerned."[^40] The report recorded that reporting by SRF, the Washington Post and ZDF in 2020 was "stated to be based on a 96-page account completed in 2004 by the CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence and an oral history compiled by German intelligence officials in 2008."[^41]
The 2014 Commission of Jurists recorded that in July 1998 the National Intelligence Agency passed to South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission a file that contained about a dozen documents on South African Institute for Maritime Research letterhead, relating to an operation codenamed "Celeste" that purported to report a bomb planted on Hammarskjöld's aircraft.[^42] The TRC's chairman, Desmond Tutu, released copies of eight of the documents at the commission's final press conference in August 1998, and the originals were passed to the Minister of Justice, Dullah Omar.[^42] South Africa wrote to the United Nations on July 1, 2016 that "a revelation made during" the TRC hearings had pointed to a possible involvement of the institute.[^43] The 2022 report recorded that a renewed search of South African archives produced no originals, and that the address and telephone number on the letterhead did not match Johannesburg directory listings for 1960 and 1961, which it wrote "may be another flag suggesting that the documents are not authentic."[^44]
The 2019 report recorded that the Secret Intelligence Service officer Neil Ritchie, the British consul in Katanga Denzil Dunnett and the British High Commissioner in Salisbury, Lord Alport, made arrangements in September 1961 for the Ndola meeting with Tshombe, and that the arrangements used the facilities of the Union Minière.[^45] The 2022 report wrote that Ritchie flew a Union Minière engineer to Kitwe in Northern Rhodesia in September 1961, where the engineer worked with a British commercial figure who called himself British intelligence, to relay messages between the governments of Katanga, Northern Rhodesia and the United Kingdom.[^46]
The report of September 9, 2024 stated that the United States and West Germany "appear to have had covert and direct 'backdoor' access" to messages sent by Hammarskjöld with the CX-52.[^47] It identified three Dakota aircraft at Ndola, one under the naval attaché for air in Pretoria, Commander Don Ely, one under the air force attaché for air in Pretoria, Colonel Don Gaylor, and a third flown from Elisabethville by Colonel Benjamin Matlick, and stated that there was "a reasonable evidentiary basis to consider that these or other aircraft ... may have overheard or relayed communications from or about flight SE-BDY."[^48] It recorded that Charles Southall and Paul Abram had both passed away as of 2018, and that the failure of the United States to take up the opportunity to contradict their claims "tends to have the effect of supporting those claims."[^49]
General Assembly resolution 70/11 of November 19, 2015 asked the Secretary-General to pursue the Panel's pending requests for information and to explore the feasibility of a central archival holding.[^50] Resolution 72/252 of December 24, 2017 requested the Secretary-General to reappoint the Eminent Person and asked Member States to appoint independent, high-ranking officials to review their intelligence, security and defence archives.[^51] Resolution 74/248 of December 27, 2019 and resolution 77/252 of December 30, 2022 reappointed the Eminent Person.[^51]
### Cuba and the United Nations
On April 15, 1961, the day of the air raids that preceded the invasion at the [[Bay of Pigs]], the General Assembly's First Committee heard Cuban Foreign Minister [[Raúl Roa]] accuse the United States of aggression, and [[Adlai Stevenson]] told the committee that according to his information the raids had been carried out by defectors from the Cuban Air Force who had landed in Florida and asked for political asylum.[^37] On April 16, Stevenson cabled the Department of State, for the Secretary of State ([[Dean Rusk]]) and Dulles, that he was "greatly disturbed by clear indications" that the bombing incidents "were launched in part at least from outside Cuba," that his answers to Roa "were hastily concocted in Department, and revised by me at last minute on assumption this was clear case of attacks by defectors inside Cuba," and that he did not understand why he had not been "warned and provided pre-prepared material."[^38] The operation ended on April 19, 1961, with the capture of its exile force.[^39]
On April 15, 1961, the day of the air raids that preceded the invasion at the [[Bay of Pigs]], the General Assembly's First Committee heard Cuban Foreign Minister [[Raúl Roa]] accuse the United States of aggression, and [[Adlai Stevenson]] told the committee that according to his information the raids had been carried out by defectors from the Cuban Air Force who had landed in Florida and asked for political asylum.[^52] On April 16, Stevenson cabled the Department of State, for the Secretary of State ([[Dean Rusk]]) and Dulles, that he was "greatly disturbed by clear indications" that the bombing incidents "were launched in part at least from outside Cuba," that his answers to Roa "were hastily concocted in Department, and revised by me at last minute on assumption this was clear case of attacks by defectors inside Cuba," and that he did not understand why he had not been "warned and provided pre-prepared material."[^53] The operation ended on April 19, 1961, with the capture of its exile force.[^54]
### Iraq: sanctions, inspections, and Oil-for-Food
The Security Council condemned the invasion of [[Kuwait]] by [[Iraq]] and decided on August 6, 1990 that all States should prevent trade with Iraq, in the aftermath of the [[Gulf War]].[^40] Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991, set the cease-fire terms and provided for a special commission to verify the destruction of Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.[^41] The [[UN Special Commission|United Nations Special Commission]] (UNSCOM) operated in Iraq from 1991. UNSCOM evacuated all of its personnel from Iraq in December 1998, immediately before the American and British strikes, and Iraq has barred arms inspections since.[^42]
The Security Council condemned the invasion of [[Kuwait]] by [[Iraq]] and decided on August 6, 1990 that all States should prevent trade with Iraq, in the aftermath of the [[Gulf War]].[^55] Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991, set the cease-fire terms and provided for a special commission to verify the destruction of Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.[^56] The [[UN Special Commission|United Nations Special Commission]] (UNSCOM) operated in Iraq from 1991. UNSCOM evacuated all of its personnel from Iraq in December 1998, immediately before the American and British strikes, and Iraq has barred arms inspections since.[^57]
[[Barton Gellman]] reported in the [[Washington Post]] on March 2, 1999 that United States intelligence services had infiltrated agents and espionage equipment for three years into the arms control teams to eavesdrop on the Iraqi military without the knowledge of UNSCOM. According to that report, the technicians who installed the commission's remote camera monitoring system in 1996 were intelligence operatives, the repeater stations they built contained antennas that intercepted Iraqi microwave military communications, and at least two technicians lent to run the system were employees of the CIA's clandestine service. A second channel, code-named Shake the Tree, used commercial scanners to intercept Iraqi radio transmissions; it was known to UNSCOM's leaders, was disclosed by the Post and the [[Boston Globe]] in January 1999, and was confirmed by the United States government that month. Gellman wrote that the United States decided not to inform Executive Chairman [[Rolf Ekeus]] or his successor [[Richard Butler]] about the second operation, and that the CIA notified [[Charles Duelfer]], the American deputy to both, to help ensure that headquarters staff did not interfere.[^42]
[[Barton Gellman]] reported in the [[Washington Post]] on March 2, 1999 that United States intelligence services had infiltrated agents and espionage equipment for three years into the arms control teams to eavesdrop on the Iraqi military without the knowledge of UNSCOM. According to that report, the technicians who installed the commission's remote camera monitoring system in 1996 were intelligence operatives, the repeater stations they built contained antennas that intercepted Iraqi microwave military communications, and at least two technicians lent to run the system were employees of the CIA's clandestine service. A second channel, code-named Shake the Tree, used commercial scanners to intercept Iraqi radio transmissions; it was known to UNSCOM's leaders, was disclosed by the Post and the [[Boston Globe]] in January 1999, and was confirmed by the United States government that month. Gellman wrote that the United States decided not to inform Executive Chairman [[Rolf Ekeus]] or his successor [[Richard Butler]] about the second operation, and that the CIA notified [[Charles Duelfer]], the American deputy to both, to help ensure that headquarters staff did not interfere.[^57]
Ekeus said in that report that he did not believe covert antennas could have been built into the video relay system, and that if the United States had used UNSCOM cover for espionage "we have always stood against that"; he cited the 1991 inspection in which American team leaders reported directly to Washington, which, in his words, "we stopped." Butler's spokesman said Butler had no knowledge of the allegations, and Gellman reported that Butler was quoted in a private conversation as saying "If all this stuff turns out to be true, then Rolf Ekeus and I have been played for suckers, haven't we?"[^42] In a [[PBS]] [[Frontline (PBS)|Frontline]] interview, Butler said that he had approved "gifts to us, of persons and technology" to crack Iraqi deceit, that he had disapproved of some proposals as edging "towards a line that we shouldn't cross," and that he could not know whether others were piggy-backing on UNSCOM without telling him.[^43] Gellman told Frontline that when [[David Kay]] was in the parking lot and smuggled out documents in 1991, Washington heard of their contents as soon as New York, that Ekeus was angry and forbade direct communications like that, and that he was "quite confident they continued."[^44] The [[Financial Times]] reported on July 30, 2002 that Ekeus told the Swedish newspaper Svenska Dagbladet that he had learned after leaving his position that the United States had placed two of its own agents among the inspectors.[^45]
Ekeus said in that report that he did not believe covert antennas could have been built into the video relay system, and that if the United States had used UNSCOM cover for espionage "we have always stood against that"; he cited the 1991 inspection in which American team leaders reported directly to Washington, which, in his words, "we stopped." Butler's spokesman said Butler had no knowledge of the allegations, and Gellman reported that Butler was quoted in a private conversation as saying "If all this stuff turns out to be true, then Rolf Ekeus and I have been played for suckers, haven't we?"[^57] In a [[PBS]] [[Frontline (PBS)|Frontline]] interview, Butler said that he had approved "gifts to us, of persons and technology" to crack Iraqi deceit, that he had disapproved of some proposals as edging "towards a line that we shouldn't cross," and that he could not know whether others were piggy-backing on UNSCOM without telling him.[^58] Gellman told Frontline that when [[David Kay]] was in the parking lot and smuggled out documents in 1991, Washington heard of their contents as soon as New York, that Ekeus was angry and forbade direct communications like that, and that he was "quite confident they continued."[^59] The [[Financial Times]] reported on July 30, 2002 that Ekeus told the Swedish newspaper Svenska Dagbladet that he had learned after leaving his position that the United States had placed two of its own agents among the inspectors.[^60]
On January 6, 1999, the spokesman for the Secretary-General, [[Fred Eckhard]], told the noon briefing that the Secretary-General had "no evidence of any kind" that UNSCOM had assisted United States intelligence, and that Butler had "categorically denied them" when the Secretary-General asked him.[^46]
On January 6, 1999, the spokesman for the Secretary-General, [[Fred Eckhard]], told the noon briefing that the Secretary-General had "no evidence of any kind" that UNSCOM had assisted United States intelligence, and that Butler had "categorically denied them" when the Secretary-General asked him.[^61]
UNSCOM was succeeded by [[UNMOVIC]] (UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission), established by Security Council resolution 1284 on December 17, 1999.[^47] UNMOVIC inspectors under [[Hans Blix]] were in Iraq when the United States and United Kingdom invaded in March 2003, asserting that [[Saddam Hussein]] retained prohibited weapons programs. No such programs were found.
UNSCOM was succeeded by [[UNMOVIC]] (UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission), established by Security Council resolution 1284 on December 17, 1999.[^62] UNMOVIC inspectors under [[Hans Blix]] were in Iraq when the United States and United Kingdom invaded in March 2003, asserting that [[Saddam Hussein]] retained prohibited weapons programs. No such programs were found.
The UN inspection effort also employed [[Karen Jansen]], a U.S. Army major and United Nations inspector who worked on the search for Iraqi biological weapons sites. [[Ruth Sinai]] reported for the [[Associated Press]] that Jansen carried sketches of two sites where the Iraqi leader had supposedly stashed biological weapons, produced by [[Ed Dames]] of [[Psi]], a private firm specializing in remote viewing, and that the sketches were generated through remote viewing.[^48]
The UN inspection effort also employed [[Karen Jansen]], a U.S. Army major and United Nations inspector who worked on the search for Iraqi biological weapons sites. [[Ruth Sinai]] reported for the [[Associated Press]] that Jansen carried sketches of two sites where the Iraqi leader had supposedly stashed biological weapons, produced by [[Ed Dames]] of [[Psi]], a private firm specializing in remote viewing, and that the sketches were generated through remote viewing.[^63]
The Oil-for-Food Programme, established under Security Council Resolution 986 of April 14, 1995, permitted Iraq to sell oil in order to purchase food and medicine under UN supervision, and became operational in December 1996.[^49] The Independent Inquiry Committee chaired by [[Paul Volcker]], a former chairman of the [[Federal Reserve]], issued its final report on October 27, 2005. The report found that more than 2,200 companies had paid kickbacks to the Iraqi government in the form of inland transportation fees, after-sales-service fees, or both, and listed 2,253 companies in its humanitarian kickback tables. Oil surcharges were paid in connection with the contracts of 139 companies.[^50] The Christian Science Monitor reported on October 28, 2005 that the report named companies and individuals from 66 countries as having sent kickbacks to Saddam Hussein's government, and from 40 countries as having paid illegal oil surcharges.[^51] The report also stated that Iraq dispensed oil allocations to a wide array of individuals and groups "whom it considered influential in their respective countries and who espoused pro-Iraq views or organized anti-sanctions activities," and that Iraq favored companies from countries it perceived as friendly, in particular permanent members of the Security Council.[^52]
The Oil-for-Food Programme, established under Security Council Resolution 986 of April 14, 1995, permitted Iraq to sell oil in order to purchase food and medicine under UN supervision, and became operational in December 1996.[^64] The Independent Inquiry Committee chaired by [[Paul Volcker]], a former chairman of the [[Federal Reserve]], issued its final report on October 27, 2005. The report found that more than 2,200 companies had paid kickbacks to the Iraqi government in the form of inland transportation fees, after-sales-service fees, or both, and listed 2,253 companies in its humanitarian kickback tables. Oil surcharges were paid in connection with the contracts of 139 companies.[^65] The Christian Science Monitor reported on October 28, 2005 that the report named companies and individuals from 66 countries as having sent kickbacks to Saddam Hussein's government, and from 40 countries as having paid illegal oil surcharges.[^66] The report also stated that Iraq dispensed oil allocations to a wide array of individuals and groups "whom it considered influential in their respective countries and who espoused pro-Iraq views or organized anti-sanctions activities," and that Iraq favored companies from countries it perceived as friendly, in particular permanent members of the Security Council.[^67]
The committee's findings on [[Benon Sevan]], the programme's executive director, were that he corruptly received oil allocations and cash proceeds from 1998 through 2001. The proceeds passed through a business controlled by [[Fakhry Abdelnour]] and reached a Swiss bank account controlled by [[Fred Nadler]], the brother-in-law of former Secretary-General [[Boutros Boutros-Ghali]]. The committee also described an Iraqi scheme in 1996 to bribe Boutros-Ghali through [[Samir Vincent]], and wrote that it did not have evidence that Boutros-Ghali took part in or was aware of any of this corrupt activity.[^53]
The committee's findings on [[Benon Sevan]], the programme's executive director, were that he corruptly received oil allocations and cash proceeds from 1998 through 2001. The proceeds passed through a business controlled by [[Fakhry Abdelnour]] and reached a Swiss bank account controlled by [[Fred Nadler]], the brother-in-law of former Secretary-General [[Boutros Boutros-Ghali]]. The committee also described an Iraqi scheme in 1996 to bribe Boutros-Ghali through [[Samir Vincent]], and wrote that it did not have evidence that Boutros-Ghali took part in or was aware of any of this corrupt activity.[^68]
### Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim
[[Kurt Waldheim]] served as the fourth Secretary-General from January 1, 1972, to December 31, 1981.[^54] He was elected President of [[Austria]] in 1986. On December 14, 1987, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency reported that the United States had placed him on its watch list for unwanted aliens, that [[Neil Sher]] of the Justice Department's Office of Special Investigations said the documents behind the decision showed direct involvement in atrocities and could not be handed over to the international commission of historians that Waldheim had convened, and that Waldheim again rejected charges that he participated in reprisals against civilians or in the deportation of Jews to concentration camps.[^55]
[[Kurt Waldheim]] served as the fourth Secretary-General from January 1, 1972, to December 31, 1981.[^69] He was elected President of [[Austria]] in 1986. On December 14, 1987, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency reported that the United States had placed him on its watch list for unwanted aliens, that [[Neil Sher]] of the Justice Department's Office of Special Investigations said the documents behind the decision showed direct involvement in atrocities and could not be handed over to the international commission of historians that Waldheim had convened, and that Waldheim again rejected charges that he participated in reprisals against civilians or in the deportation of Jews to concentration camps.[^70]
On April 27, 2001, the [[National Archives and Records Administration]] opened the CIA's name files on Waldheim, together with files on [[Adolf Hitler]], [[Klaus Barbie]], [[Adolf Eichmann]], [[Josef Mengele]], and [[Heinrich Müller]]. The Archives stated that Waldheim had not been an intelligence resource for the United States, and that the CIA could not conclude that the Soviet Union had used or blackmailed Waldheim with information about his Nazi past.[^56]
On April 27, 2001, the [[National Archives and Records Administration]] opened the CIA's name files on Waldheim, together with files on [[Adolf Hitler]], [[Klaus Barbie]], [[Adolf Eichmann]], [[Josef Mengele]], and [[Heinrich Müller]]. The Archives stated that Waldheim had not been an intelligence resource for the United States, and that the CIA could not conclude that the Soviet Union had used or blackmailed Waldheim with information about his Nazi past.[^71]
### Penetration of UN communications
A January 31, 2003 email from [[Frank Koza]], chief of staff of the Regional Targets section of the [[National Security Agency]], to the British signals agency [[GCHQ]] asked for insight into plans to vote on Iraq-related resolutions and for a "surge effort to revive/create efforts against UNSC members Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Bulgaria and Guinea." [[The Observer]] published the memo on March 2, 2003 under the headline "Revealed: US dirty tricks to win vote on Iraq war"; its article described the targets as the delegations of Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Mexico, Guinea and Pakistan, the "Middle Six," and quoted the memo's request for the "whole gamut of information that could give US policymakers an edge in obtaining results favourable to US goals or to head off surprises." The Observer reported that three former intelligence operatives judged the memo authentic and that the NSA switchboard connected its reporters to Koza's extension.[^57][^58]
A January 31, 2003 email from [[Frank Koza]], chief of staff of the Regional Targets section of the [[National Security Agency]], to the British signals agency [[GCHQ]] asked for insight into plans to vote on Iraq-related resolutions and for a "surge effort to revive/create efforts against UNSC members Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Bulgaria and Guinea." [[The Observer]] published the memo on March 2, 2003 under the headline "Revealed: US dirty tricks to win vote on Iraq war"; its article described the targets as the delegations of Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Mexico, Guinea and Pakistan, the "Middle Six," and quoted the memo's request for the "whole gamut of information that could give US policymakers an edge in obtaining results favourable to US goals or to head off surprises." The Observer reported that three former intelligence operatives judged the memo authentic and that the NSA switchboard connected its reporters to Koza's extension.[^72][^73]
The memo was leaked by [[Katharine Gun]], who worked at GCHQ. She had been charged under section 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1989, and on February 25, 2004 the Crown offered no evidence at the Central Criminal Court. The Attorney General's statement to Parliament said that the evidential deficiency related to the prosecution's inability "to disprove the defence of necessity to be raised on the particular facts of this case," and that the determination had nothing to do with advice given by the Attorney General on the legality of the Iraq war.[^59]
The memo was leaked by [[Katharine Gun]], who worked at GCHQ. She had been charged under section 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1989, and on February 25, 2004 the Crown offered no evidence at the Central Criminal Court. The Attorney General's statement to Parliament said that the evidential deficiency related to the prosecution's inability "to disprove the defence of necessity to be raised on the particular facts of this case," and that the determination had nothing to do with advice given by the Attorney General on the legality of the Iraq war.[^74]
In August 2013 [[Der Spiegel]] reported, on the basis of documents obtained by [[Edward Snowden]], that the National Security Agency had bugged the United Nations' New York headquarters. According to the report, NSA experts cracked the codes of the UN video conferencing system in the summer of 2012, and the number of decoded communications rose from 12 to 458 within three weeks. The same documents reportedly showed collection against the [[International Atomic Energy Agency]], which is part of the UN system, and an NSA bugging program in more than 80 embassies and consulates.[^60]
In August 2013 [[Der Spiegel]] reported, on the basis of documents obtained by [[Edward Snowden]], that the National Security Agency had bugged the United Nations' New York headquarters. According to the report, NSA experts cracked the codes of the UN video conferencing system in the summer of 2012, and the number of decoded communications rose from 12 to 458 within three weeks. The same documents reportedly showed collection against the [[International Atomic Energy Agency]], which is part of the UN system, and an NSA bugging program in more than 80 embassies and consulates.[^75]
### Chile, arms embargoes, and the UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control
[[Ari Ben-Menashe]] wrote that [[Alan Sanders]] of [[ITICO]] supplied blueprints for cluster bombs to [[Carlos Cardoen]], and that Cardoen produced the bombs under a covert United States license despite a United Nations arms embargo against Chile.[^61] Security Council resolution 232 of December 16, 1966 imposed mandatory measures against Southern Rhodesia, including a prohibition on the sale or shipment of arms, and resolution 418 of November 4, 1977, adopted unanimously under Chapter VII, imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.[^62][^63]
[[Ari Ben-Menashe]] wrote that [[Alan Sanders]] of [[ITICO]] supplied blueprints for cluster bombs to [[Carlos Cardoen]], and that Cardoen produced the bombs under a covert United States license despite a United Nations arms embargo against Chile.[^76] Security Council resolution 232 of December 16, 1966 imposed mandatory measures against Southern Rhodesia, including a prohibition on the sale or shipment of arms, and resolution 418 of November 4, 1977, adopted unanimously under Chapter VII, imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.[^77][^78]
On July 14, 1976, [[Carmelo Soria]], a Spanish-Chilean official of the Latin American Demographic Center (CELADE) of [[ECLAC]], was kidnapped by [[DINA]] agents as he left work and was murdered. The [[Inter-American Commission on Human Rights]] found in Report 133/99 that his body and car were left in a stream, that the Chilean courts had determined that State agents participated in the crime and their identities were established, that Chile had violated his rights, and that the self-amnesty decree law was incompatible with the American Convention.[^64]
On July 14, 1976, [[Carmelo Soria]], a Spanish-Chilean official of the Latin American Demographic Center (CELADE) of [[ECLAC]], was kidnapped by [[DINA]] agents as he left work and was murdered. The [[Inter-American Commission on Human Rights]] found in Report 133/99 that his body and car were left in a stream, that the Chilean courts had determined that State agents participated in the crime and their identities were established, that Chile had violated his rights, and that the self-amnesty decree law was incompatible with the American Convention.[^79]
In an October 1991 affidavit given to [[Bill Hamilton]] of [[INSLAW]], [[Lester Coleman]] stated that third-party funds, including from the [[United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control]] in [[Vienna]], were generally made available for the purchase of the PROMIS systems that a DEA proprietary company sold to drug abuse control agencies in several Middle Eastern countries.[^65] The fund was a precursor to the [[UN Office on Drugs and Crime]]. The fund received funding from sources connected to the CIA-backed anti-narcotics efforts that intersected with the Contra resupply networks.
In an October 1991 affidavit given to [[Bill Hamilton]] of [[INSLAW]], [[Lester Coleman]] stated that third-party funds, including from the [[United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control]] in [[Vienna]], were generally made available for the purchase of the PROMIS systems that a DEA proprietary company sold to drug abuse control agencies in several Middle Eastern countries.[^80] The fund was a precursor to the [[UN Office on Drugs and Crime]]. The fund received funding from sources connected to the CIA-backed anti-narcotics efforts that intersected with the Contra resupply networks.
### Envoys and mediators
Security Council resolution 721 of November 27, 1991 approved the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy to Yugoslavia, a post held from October 8, 1991 by [[Cyrus Vance]].[^66] In resolution 1495 of July 31, 2003 the Council supported the peace plan for self-determination of the people of [[Western Sahara]] presented by the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy, [[James A. Baker III]], who served in that role from 1997 to 2004.[^67]
Security Council resolution 721 of November 27, 1991 approved the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy to Yugoslavia, a post held from October 8, 1991 by [[Cyrus Vance]].[^81] In resolution 1495 of July 31, 2003 the Council supported the peace plan for self-determination of the people of [[Western Sahara]] presented by the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy, [[James A. Baker III]], who served in that role from 1997 to 2004.[^82]
### CRIES and UNICEF
The [[CRIES]] (Study and Research Center on Children and Sexuality) was a Belgian group whose members were convicted in Brussels in March 1988. A UPI report of March 7, 1988 stated that sixteen people were convicted of participating in a child sex ring that used a laboratory in the cellar of a [[UNICEF]] office to develop photographs, that Jozef Verbeeck, the former director of UNICEF's Brussels office, received two years in prison, and that CRIES served as a cover organization for the ring.[^68] UNICEF's institutional name was exploited by the CRIES network, which used a UNICEF umbrella for operations until the connection was exposed in 1986. S. Dovey wrote that the X-witness dossier compiled under Judge [[Jean-Marc Connerotte]] after the 1996 appeal described the network as having used UNICEF in the production of pornography.[^69]
The [[CRIES]] (Study and Research Center on Children and Sexuality) was a Belgian group whose members were convicted in Brussels in March 1988. A UPI report of March 7, 1988 stated that sixteen people were convicted of participating in a child sex ring that used a laboratory in the cellar of a [[UNICEF]] office to develop photographs, that Jozef Verbeeck, the former director of UNICEF's Brussels office, received two years in prison, and that CRIES served as a cover organization for the ring.[^83] UNICEF's institutional name was exploited by the CRIES network, which used a UNICEF umbrella for operations until the connection was exposed in 1986. S. Dovey wrote that the X-witness dossier compiled under Judge [[Jean-Marc Connerotte]] after the 1996 appeal described the network as having used UNICEF in the production of pornography.[^84]
### Epstein-linked diplomacy
Between November 2015 and January 2017, [[Jeffrey Epstein]] exchanged iMessages with [[Vitaly Churkin]], Russia's Permanent Representative to the United Nations from April 2006 until his death. The Justice Department's Epstein productions include a message log beginning November 16, 2015, in which Epstein wrote, "I'm in town wed- fri if you have time . Jeffrey Epstein."[^70] On August 28, 2016 Epstein wrote to Churkin, "Ehud Barak and TOM Barrack at house tomorw . You are always welcome," and an email from his office that day recorded that Churkin would join the lunch with Epstein, [[Ehud Barak]] and [[Tom Barrack]]; on September 6, 2016 Epstein offered an introduction to [[Tom Pritzker]], and the logs reference a meeting with [[Larry Summers]] in January 2016.[^71]
Between November 2015 and January 2017, [[Jeffrey Epstein]] exchanged iMessages with [[Vitaly Churkin]], Russia's Permanent Representative to the United Nations from April 2006 until his death. The Justice Department's Epstein productions include a message log beginning November 16, 2015, in which Epstein wrote, "I'm in town wed- fri if you have time . Jeffrey Epstein."[^85] On August 28, 2016 Epstein wrote to Churkin, "Ehud Barak and TOM Barrack at house tomorw . You are always welcome," and an email from his office that day recorded that Churkin would join the lunch with Epstein, [[Ehud Barak]] and [[Tom Barrack]]; on September 6, 2016 Epstein offered an introduction to [[Tom Pritzker]], and the logs reference a meeting with [[Larry Summers]] in January 2016.[^86]
Churkin collapsed in his office in February 2017 and died on February 20, 2017, at the age of 64. [[CBS News]] reported on March 10, 2017 that the State Department had asked the city in writing on February 24 not to reveal the autopsy results, because Churkin's diplomatic immunity survives his death, and that the city's law department then told the medical examiner's office not to release further information.[^72]
Churkin collapsed in his office in February 2017 and died on February 20, 2017, at the age of 64. [[CBS News]] reported on March 10, 2017 that the State Department had asked the city in writing on February 24 not to reveal the autopsy results, because Churkin's diplomatic immunity survives his death, and that the city's law department then told the medical examiner's office not to release further information.[^87]
### Unidentified flying objects at the United Nations
In July 1968, [[J. Allen Hynek]] told the [[House Committee on Science and Astronautics]] that "the United States seek the cooperation of the United Nations in establishing a means for the impartial and free interchange among nations of information about, and reports of, unidentified flying objects," which he described as "a sort of international clearinghouse for the exchange of information on this subject," and that Congress should establish a UFO Scientific Board of Inquiry.[^73]
In July 1968, [[J. Allen Hynek]] told the [[House Committee on Science and Astronautics]] that "the United States seek the cooperation of the United Nations in establishing a means for the impartial and free interchange among nations of information about, and reports of, unidentified flying objects," which he described as "a sort of international clearinghouse for the exchange of information on this subject," and that Congress should establish a UFO Scientific Board of Inquiry.[^88]
On July 7, 1978, Grenada's Deputy Permanent Representative asked for the inclusion on the agenda of the thirty-third session of the General Assembly of an item entitled "Establishment of an agency or a department of the United Nations for undertaking, co-ordinating and disseminating the results of research into unidentified flying objects and related phenomena," with an explanatory memorandum; the General Assembly allocated it to the Special Political Committee on September 20, 1978.[^74] In the general debate on October 12, 1978, [[Eric Gairy]], the prime minister of Grenada, told the General Assembly that the subject of unidentified flying objects should be studied with research coordinated by United Nations organizations, and that a centre for UFO research might be established in Grenada.[^75]
On July 7, 1978, Grenada's Deputy Permanent Representative asked for the inclusion on the agenda of the thirty-third session of the General Assembly of an item entitled "Establishment of an agency or a department of the United Nations for undertaking, co-ordinating and disseminating the results of research into unidentified flying objects and related phenomena," with an explanatory memorandum; the General Assembly allocated it to the Special Political Committee on September 20, 1978.[^89] In the general debate on October 12, 1978, [[Eric Gairy]], the prime minister of Grenada, told the General Assembly that the subject of unidentified flying objects should be studied with research coordinated by United Nations organizations, and that a centre for UFO research might be established in Grenada.[^90]
On November 27, 1978, Gairy introduced to the Special Political Committee draft resolution A/SPC/33/L.20, which would have recommended that the United Nations, in consultation with the appropriate specialized agencies, "initiate, conduct and co-ordinate research into the nature and origin of unidentified flying objects," asked the Secretary-General to invite Member States, specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations to submit information and proposals by May 31, 1979, and provided for a group of experts to meet during the sessions of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. After consultations the Committee agreed by consensus on a draft decision, and Grenada did not press the draft resolution to a vote.[^74] The decision, adopted by consensus by the General Assembly on December 18, 1978 as decision 33/426, took note of Grenada's statements and draft resolutions, invited interested Member States to co-ordinate at the national level scientific research and investigation into extraterrestrial life, including unidentified flying objects, requested the Secretary-General to transmit the Grenada statements and documentation to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space for its 1979 session, and provided that the Committee would permit Grenada, at its request, to present its views.[^76]
On November 27, 1978, Gairy introduced to the Special Political Committee draft resolution A/SPC/33/L.20, which would have recommended that the United Nations, in consultation with the appropriate specialized agencies, "initiate, conduct and co-ordinate research into the nature and origin of unidentified flying objects," asked the Secretary-General to invite Member States, specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations to submit information and proposals by May 31, 1979, and provided for a group of experts to meet during the sessions of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. After consultations the Committee agreed by consensus on a draft decision, and Grenada did not press the draft resolution to a vote.[^89] The decision, adopted by consensus by the General Assembly on December 18, 1978 as decision 33/426, took note of Grenada's statements and draft resolutions, invited interested Member States to co-ordinate at the national level scientific research and investigation into extraterrestrial life, including unidentified flying objects, requested the Secretary-General to transmit the Grenada statements and documentation to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space for its 1979 session, and provided that the Committee would permit Grenada, at its request, to present its views.[^91]
In 1994, [[Laurance Rockefeller]] wrote to the White House science adviser, [[John H. Gibbons]], that preliminary talks had been held about a United Nations conference on extraterrestrial intelligence.[^77]
In 1994, [[Laurance Rockefeller]] wrote to the White House science adviser, [[John H. Gibbons]], that preliminary talks had been held about a United Nations conference on extraterrestrial intelligence.[^92]
### Footnotes
@ -208,57 +218,72 @@ In 1994, [[Laurance Rockefeller]] wrote to the White House science adviser, [[Jo
[^21]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee), *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report,* Senate Report No. 94-465, 94th Congress, 1st Session, 1975, section on the Congo (Lumumba's visit to Washington in late July 1960; dismissal of September 5; request to the United Nations force for protection; transfer to Katanga on January 17, 1961). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf
[^22]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots,* Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975, section "Dulles Cable to Leopoldville: August 26, 1960," quoting CIA cables of August 18, 19 and 26, 1960. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf
[^23]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots,* Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975, summary of the evidence concerning Patrice Lumumba, and findings and conclusions on Presidential authorization. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf
[^24]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 161 (1961), February 21, 1961, preamble and paragraphs 1 to 4. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F161%20%281961%29&l=en&t=pdf
[^25]: Commission of Jurists on the Inquiry into the Death of Dag Hammarskjöld, annexed to the letter of the Secretary-General, United Nations General Assembly document A/68/800, 2014, paragraphs 1.1, 1.2 and 9.1 to 9.4. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
[^26]: United Nations General Assembly, resolution 1759 (XVII), October 26, 1962, "Report of the Commission of investigation into the conditions and circumstances resulting in the tragic death of Mr. Dag Hammarskjold and of members of the party accompanying him." https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2FRES%2F1759%20%28XVII%29&l=en&t=pdf
[^27]: United Nations General Assembly document A/68/800, paragraphs 1.5, 2.5 and 13.23 to 13.28. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
[^28]: United Nations General Assembly document A/68/800, paragraphs 15.4, 15.5 and 15.7 to 15.10. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
[^29]: Independent Panel of Experts appointed under General Assembly resolution 69/246, report transmitted by the Secretary-General, United Nations General Assembly document A/70/132, July 2, 2015, summary of key findings. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F70%2F132&l=en&t=pdf
[^30]: United Nations General Assembly, resolution 71/260, December 23, 2016, paragraphs 1 to 3. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2FRES%2F71%2F260&l=en&t=pdf
[^31]: Report of the Eminent Person, Mohamed Chande Othman, transmitted by letter of the Secretary-General dated September 5, 2017, United Nations General Assembly document A/71/1042, transmittal letter. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F71%2F1042&l=en&t=pdf
[^32]: United Nations General Assembly document A/71/1042, report of the Eminent Person, paragraphs 4 and 6. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F71%2F1042&l=en&t=pdf
[^33]: United Nations General Assembly document A/71/1042, report of the Eminent Person, paragraphs 7 and 8. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F71%2F1042&l=en&t=pdf
[^34]: Letter dated September 12, 2019 from the Secretary-General, attaching the report of the Eminent Person, United Nations General Assembly document A/73/973, transmittal letter and report paragraphs 2, 3 and 33. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
[^35]: United Nations General Assembly document A/73/973, report of the Eminent Person, paragraph 3. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
[^36]: United Nations General Assembly document A/73/973, report of the Eminent Person, paragraphs 11 and 16 to 19. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
[^37]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963,* Volume X, Cuba, January 1961-September 1962, Document 104, editorial note on the meeting of the Political (First) Committee of April 15, 1961 (U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.1149). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d104
[^38]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963,* Volume X, Document 105, Telegram from the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, April 16, 1961. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d105
[^39]: Central Intelligence Agency, Inspector General, "Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation," October 1961, declassified 1998; published in Kornbluh, Peter, ed. *Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba.* New Press, 1998.
[^40]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 661 (1990), August 6, 1990. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F661%20%281990%29&l=en&t=pdf
[^41]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 687 (1991), April 3, 1991. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F687%20%281991%29&l=en&t=pdf
[^42]: Gellman, Barton. "U.S. Spied on Iraq Via U.N.," *Washington Post,* March 2, 1999, p. A1. https://web.archive.org/web/2005/https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/daily/march99/unscom2.htm
[^43]: PBS *Frontline,* "Spying on Saddam," interview with Richard Butler. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/unscom/interviews/butler.html
[^44]: PBS *Frontline,* "Spying on Saddam," interview with Barton Gellman. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/unscom/interviews/gellman.html
[^45]: *Financial Times,* July 30, 2002, reporting Rolf Ekeus's interview with *Svenska Dagbladet,* as quoted at https://www.eurotrib.com/?op=displaystory&sid=2007%2F5%2F31%2F16410%2F6211
[^46]: United Nations, noon briefing by the spokesman for the Secretary-General, Fred Eckhard, January 6, 1999. https://press.un.org/en/1999/19990106.db010699.html
[^47]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 1284 (1999), December 17, 1999. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F1284%20%281999%29&l=en&t=pdf
[^48]: Jacobsen, Annie. *Phenomena: The Secret History of the U.S. Government's Investigations into Extrasensory Perception and Psychokinesis.* Little, Brown and Company, 2017.
[^49]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 986 (1995), April 14, 1995. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F986%20%281995%29&l=en&t=pdf
[^50]: Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme, *Final Report,* October 27, 2005, Introduction and Executive Summary. https://web.archive.org/web/20051028130508/http://www.iic-offp.org/documents/IIC%20Final%20Report%2027Oct2005.pdf
[^51]: Grier, Peter. "UN Team Names Firms in Oil-for-Food Scandal," *Christian Science Monitor,* October 28, 2005. https://archive.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/iraq1/oilforfood/2005/1028fifthreport.htm
[^52]: Independent Inquiry Committee, *Final Report,* October 27, 2005, Introduction and Executive Summary, on oil allocations and countries perceived as friendly to Iraq. https://web.archive.org/web/20051028130508/http://www.iic-offp.org/documents/IIC%20Final%20Report%2027Oct2005.pdf
[^53]: Independent Inquiry Committee, *Final Report,* October 27, 2005, Chapter Seven, "Financial Review of the Former Secretary-General," and the Committee's findings on Benon Sevan, Fakhry Abdelnour and Fred Nadler. https://web.archive.org/web/20051028130508/http://www.iic-offp.org/documents/IIC%20Final%20Report%2027Oct2005.pdf
[^54]: United Nations, "Former Secretaries-General," Kurt Waldheim, January 1, 1972 to December 31, 1981. https://www.un.org/sg/en/node/401498
[^55]: Jewish Telegraphic Agency, "Waldheim Denies New Charges of Involvement in Atrocities," December 14, 1987. https://www.jta.org/archive/waldheim-denies-new-charges-of-involvement-in-atrocities
[^56]: National Archives and Records Administration, press release nr01-61, April 27, 2001. https://www.archives.gov/press/press-releases/2001/nr01-61
[^57]: Bright, Martin, Ed Vulliamy and Peter Beaumont. "Revealed: US dirty tricks to win vote on Iraq war," *The Observer,* March 2, 2003. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/02/usa.iraq
[^58]: McGovern, Ray. "When Truth Tried to Stop War," *Consortium News,* January 31, 2013, quoting the Koza email of January 31, 2003. https://consortiumnews.com/2013/01/31/when-truth-tried-to-stop-war/
[^59]: House of Commons, "Katharine Gun," HC Deb 26 February 2004, vol. 418, cc. 427-40, statement of the Attorney General read by the Solicitor-General. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/2004/feb/26/katharine-gun
[^60]: Al Jazeera, "Report: US bugged UN headquarters," August 25, 2013, reporting the *Der Spiegel* account of documents obtained by Edward Snowden. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/8/25/report-us-bugged-un-headquarters
[^61]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network.* Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
[^62]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 232 (1966), December 16, 1966. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F232%20%281966%29&l=en&t=pdf
[^63]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 418 (1977), November 4, 1977. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F418%20%281977%29&l=en&t=pdf
[^64]: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 133/99, Case 11.725, Carmelo Soria Espinoza (Chile), November 19, 1999, paragraphs 1 and 2. https://hrlibrary.umn.edu/cases/133-99.html
[^65]: Seymour, Cheri. *The Last Circle: Danny Casolaro's Investigation into the Octopus and the PROMIS Software Scandal.* TrineDay, 2010, reporting Lester Coleman's October 1991 affidavit.
[^66]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 721 (1991), November 27, 1991, paragraph 1. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F721%20%281991%29&l=en&t=pdf
[^67]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 1495 (2003), July 31, 2003, preamble and paragraph 1. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F1495%20%282003%29&l=en&t=pdf
[^68]: "Child sex ring run out of UNICEF office," United Press International, Brussels, March 7, 1988. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1988/03/07/Child-sex-ring-run-out-of-UNICEF-office/2464573714000/
[^69]: Dovey, S. *Eye of the Chickenhawk.* Thehotstar, 2023, drawing on Bulté, Annemie, Douglas De Coninck and Marie-Jeanne Van Heeswyck, *De X-dossiers: wat België niet mocht weten over de zaak-Dutroux,* Houtekiet, 1999.
[^70]: U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Library, EFTA01619434, DataSet 10, iMessage log with contact "Vitaly Churkin," November 16, 2015 to February 23, 2016. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2010/EFTA01619434.pdf
[^71]: U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Library, EFTA01619438, DataSet 10, iMessage log with contact "Vitaly Churkin," May 23, 2016 to September 7, 2016, https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2010/EFTA01619438.pdf ; EFTA02044775, email "Churkin to join lunch tomorrow as well," August 28, 2016, https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2010/EFTA02044775.pdf ; EFTA01619434, message of January 13, 2016.
[^72]: "Russia Ambassador Vitaly Churkin's cause of death won't be released," *CBS News / Associated Press,* March 10, 2017. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-ambassador-cause-of-death-wont-be-released/
[^73]: Hynek, J. Allen, statement at the *Symposium on Unidentified Flying Objects,* Hearings before the Committee on Science and Astronautics, House of Representatives, 90th Congress, 2d session, July 29, 1968, pp. 14-15. https://nicap.org/books/1968Sym/1968_UFO_Symposium.pdf
[^74]: United Nations General Assembly, 33rd session, document A/33/512, "Establishment of an agency or a department of the United Nations for undertaking, co-ordinating and disseminating the results of research into unidentified flying objects and related phenomena: Report of the Special Political Committee," December 16, 1978, paragraphs 1 to 9. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F33%2F512&l=en&t=pdf
[^75]: United Nations General Assembly, 33rd session, plenary meeting record A/33/PV.32, October 12, 1978, statement of Sir Eric Gairy, paragraphs 225 to 236. Verbatim record: https://un-project.org/debate/33/3504/
[^76]: United Nations General Assembly, 33rd session, 87th plenary meeting, December 18, 1978, record A/33/PV.87, report of the Special Political Committee on agenda item 126 (A/33/512), decision 33/426. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F33%2FPV.87&l=en&t=pdf
[^77]: Melvin R. Laird to Laurance Rockefeller, May 9, 1994, and Rockefeller to John H. Gibbons, June 1, 1994, attached to http://www.paradigmresearchgroup.org/Rockefeller%20Documents/RID-6-13-94.htm
[^24]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, S. Rept. No. 94-465, 1975, section on the Congo ("On January 17, 1961, the central government of the Congo transferred Lumumba to the custody of authorities in Katanga province"). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf
[^25]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 161 (1961), February 21, 1961, preamble and paragraphs 1 to 4. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F161%20%281961%29&l=en&t=pdf
[^26]: Commission of Jurists on the Inquiry into the Death of Dag Hammarskjöld, annexed to the letter of the Secretary-General, United Nations General Assembly document A/68/800, 2014, paragraphs 1.1, 1.2 and 9.1 to 9.4. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
[^27]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. XX, Congo Crisis, document 116, editorial note. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d116
[^28]: United Nations General Assembly, resolution 1759 (XVII), October 26, 1962, "Report of the Commission of investigation into the conditions and circumstances resulting in the tragic death of Mr. Dag Hammarskjold and of members of the party accompanying him." https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2FRES%2F1759%20%28XVII%29&l=en&t=pdf
[^29]: United Nations General Assembly document A/68/800, paragraphs 1.5, 2.5 and 13.23 to 13.28. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
[^30]: A/76/892, paragraph 370. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
[^31]: United Nations General Assembly document A/68/800, paragraphs 15.4, 15.5 and 15.7 to 15.10. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
[^32]: Independent Panel of Experts appointed under General Assembly resolution 69/246, report transmitted by the Secretary-General, United Nations General Assembly document A/70/132, July 2, 2015, summary of key findings. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F70%2F132&l=en&t=pdf
[^33]: United Nations General Assembly, resolution 71/260, December 23, 2016, paragraphs 1 to 3. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2FRES%2F71%2F260&l=en&t=pdf
[^34]: Report of the Eminent Person, Mohamed Chande Othman, transmitted by letter of the Secretary-General dated September 5, 2017, United Nations General Assembly document A/71/1042, transmittal letter. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F71%2F1042&l=en&t=pdf
[^35]: United Nations General Assembly document A/71/1042, report of the Eminent Person, paragraphs 4 and 6. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F71%2F1042&l=en&t=pdf
[^36]: United Nations General Assembly document A/71/1042, report of the Eminent Person, paragraphs 7 and 8. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F71%2F1042&l=en&t=pdf
[^37]: Letter dated September 12, 2019 from the Secretary-General, attaching the report of the Eminent Person, United Nations General Assembly document A/73/973, transmittal letter and report paragraphs 2, 3 and 33. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
[^38]: United Nations General Assembly document A/73/973, report of the Eminent Person, paragraph 3. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
[^39]: United Nations General Assembly document A/73/973, report of the Eminent Person, paragraphs 11 and 16 to 19. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
[^40]: A/76/892, report of the Eminent Person, August 25, 2022, introduction and paragraph 30. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
[^41]: A/76/892, paragraphs 129 to 131. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
[^42]: A/68/800, Commission of Jurists report, paragraphs 12.32 and 12.37. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
[^43]: A/71/1042, report of the Eminent Person, September 5, 2017, paragraph 102. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F71%2F1042&l=en&t=pdf
[^44]: A/76/892, paragraphs 233 to 237. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
[^45]: A/73/973, report of the Eminent Person, September 12, 2019, paragraph 25. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
[^46]: A/76/892, paragraph 33. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
[^47]: A/78/1006, report of the Eminent Person, September 9, 2024, paragraph 45. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F78%2F1006&l=en&t=pdf
[^48]: A/78/1006, paragraphs 47 to 48. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F78%2F1006&l=en&t=pdf
[^49]: A/78/1006, paragraph 50. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F78%2F1006&l=en&t=pdf
[^50]: United Nations General Assembly, resolution 70/11, November 19, 2015, operative paragraphs 1 and 2. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2FRES%2F70%2F11&l=en&t=pdf
[^51]: United Nations General Assembly, resolutions 72/252 (December 24, 2017), 74/248 (December 27, 2019) and 77/252 (December 30, 2022). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2FRES%2F72%2F252&l=en&t=pdf
[^52]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963,* Volume X, Cuba, January 1961-September 1962, Document 104, editorial note on the meeting of the Political (First) Committee of April 15, 1961 (U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.1149). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d104
[^53]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963,* Volume X, Document 105, Telegram from the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, April 16, 1961. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d105
[^54]: Central Intelligence Agency, Inspector General, "Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation," October 1961, declassified 1998; published in Kornbluh, Peter, ed. *Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba.* New Press, 1998.
[^55]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 661 (1990), August 6, 1990. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F661%20%281990%29&l=en&t=pdf
[^56]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 687 (1991), April 3, 1991. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F687%20%281991%29&l=en&t=pdf
[^57]: Gellman, Barton. "U.S. Spied on Iraq Via U.N.," *Washington Post,* March 2, 1999, p. A1. https://web.archive.org/web/2005/https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/daily/march99/unscom2.htm
[^58]: PBS *Frontline,* "Spying on Saddam," interview with Richard Butler. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/unscom/interviews/butler.html
[^59]: PBS *Frontline,* "Spying on Saddam," interview with Barton Gellman. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/unscom/interviews/gellman.html
[^60]: *Financial Times,* July 30, 2002, reporting Rolf Ekeus's interview with *Svenska Dagbladet,* as quoted at https://www.eurotrib.com/?op=displaystory&sid=2007%2F5%2F31%2F16410%2F6211
[^61]: United Nations, noon briefing by the spokesman for the Secretary-General, Fred Eckhard, January 6, 1999. https://press.un.org/en/1999/19990106.db010699.html
[^62]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 1284 (1999), December 17, 1999. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F1284%20%281999%29&l=en&t=pdf
[^63]: Jacobsen, Annie. *Phenomena: The Secret History of the U.S. Government's Investigations into Extrasensory Perception and Psychokinesis.* Little, Brown and Company, 2017.
[^64]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 986 (1995), April 14, 1995. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F986%20%281995%29&l=en&t=pdf
[^65]: Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme, *Final Report,* October 27, 2005, Introduction and Executive Summary. https://web.archive.org/web/20051028130508/http://www.iic-offp.org/documents/IIC%20Final%20Report%2027Oct2005.pdf
[^66]: Grier, Peter. "UN Team Names Firms in Oil-for-Food Scandal," *Christian Science Monitor,* October 28, 2005. https://archive.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/iraq1/oilforfood/2005/1028fifthreport.htm
[^67]: Independent Inquiry Committee, *Final Report,* October 27, 2005, Introduction and Executive Summary, on oil allocations and countries perceived as friendly to Iraq. https://web.archive.org/web/20051028130508/http://www.iic-offp.org/documents/IIC%20Final%20Report%2027Oct2005.pdf
[^68]: Independent Inquiry Committee, *Final Report,* October 27, 2005, Chapter Seven, "Financial Review of the Former Secretary-General," and the Committee's findings on Benon Sevan, Fakhry Abdelnour and Fred Nadler. https://web.archive.org/web/20051028130508/http://www.iic-offp.org/documents/IIC%20Final%20Report%2027Oct2005.pdf
[^69]: United Nations, "Former Secretaries-General," Kurt Waldheim, January 1, 1972 to December 31, 1981. https://www.un.org/sg/en/node/401498
[^70]: Jewish Telegraphic Agency, "Waldheim Denies New Charges of Involvement in Atrocities," December 14, 1987. https://www.jta.org/archive/waldheim-denies-new-charges-of-involvement-in-atrocities
[^71]: National Archives and Records Administration, press release nr01-61, April 27, 2001. https://www.archives.gov/press/press-releases/2001/nr01-61
[^72]: Bright, Martin, Ed Vulliamy and Peter Beaumont. "Revealed: US dirty tricks to win vote on Iraq war," *The Observer,* March 2, 2003. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/02/usa.iraq
[^73]: McGovern, Ray. "When Truth Tried to Stop War," *Consortium News,* January 31, 2013, quoting the Koza email of January 31, 2003. https://consortiumnews.com/2013/01/31/when-truth-tried-to-stop-war/
[^74]: House of Commons, "Katharine Gun," HC Deb 26 February 2004, vol. 418, cc. 427-40, statement of the Attorney General read by the Solicitor-General. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/2004/feb/26/katharine-gun
[^75]: Al Jazeera, "Report: US bugged UN headquarters," August 25, 2013, reporting the *Der Spiegel* account of documents obtained by Edward Snowden. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/8/25/report-us-bugged-un-headquarters
[^76]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network.* Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
[^77]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 232 (1966), December 16, 1966. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F232%20%281966%29&l=en&t=pdf
[^78]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 418 (1977), November 4, 1977. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F418%20%281977%29&l=en&t=pdf
[^79]: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 133/99, Case 11.725, Carmelo Soria Espinoza (Chile), November 19, 1999, paragraphs 1 and 2. https://hrlibrary.umn.edu/cases/133-99.html
[^80]: Seymour, Cheri. *The Last Circle: Danny Casolaro's Investigation into the Octopus and the PROMIS Software Scandal.* TrineDay, 2010, reporting Lester Coleman's October 1991 affidavit.
[^81]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 721 (1991), November 27, 1991, paragraph 1. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F721%20%281991%29&l=en&t=pdf
[^82]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 1495 (2003), July 31, 2003, preamble and paragraph 1. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F1495%20%282003%29&l=en&t=pdf
[^83]: "Child sex ring run out of UNICEF office," United Press International, Brussels, March 7, 1988. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1988/03/07/Child-sex-ring-run-out-of-UNICEF-office/2464573714000/
[^84]: Dovey, S. *Eye of the Chickenhawk.* Thehotstar, 2023, drawing on Bulté, Annemie, Douglas De Coninck and Marie-Jeanne Van Heeswyck, *De X-dossiers: wat België niet mocht weten over de zaak-Dutroux,* Houtekiet, 1999.
[^85]: U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Library, EFTA01619434, DataSet 10, iMessage log with contact "Vitaly Churkin," November 16, 2015 to February 23, 2016. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2010/EFTA01619434.pdf
[^86]: U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Library, EFTA01619438, DataSet 10, iMessage log with contact "Vitaly Churkin," May 23, 2016 to September 7, 2016, https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2010/EFTA01619438.pdf ; EFTA02044775, email "Churkin to join lunch tomorrow as well," August 28, 2016, https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2010/EFTA02044775.pdf ; EFTA01619434, message of January 13, 2016.
[^87]: "Russia Ambassador Vitaly Churkin's cause of death won't be released," *CBS News / Associated Press,* March 10, 2017. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-ambassador-cause-of-death-wont-be-released/
[^88]: Hynek, J. Allen, statement at the *Symposium on Unidentified Flying Objects,* Hearings before the Committee on Science and Astronautics, House of Representatives, 90th Congress, 2d session, July 29, 1968, pp. 14-15. https://nicap.org/books/1968Sym/1968_UFO_Symposium.pdf
[^89]: United Nations General Assembly, 33rd session, document A/33/512, "Establishment of an agency or a department of the United Nations for undertaking, co-ordinating and disseminating the results of research into unidentified flying objects and related phenomena: Report of the Special Political Committee," December 16, 1978, paragraphs 1 to 9. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F33%2F512&l=en&t=pdf
[^90]: United Nations General Assembly, 33rd session, plenary meeting record A/33/PV.32, October 12, 1978, statement of Sir Eric Gairy, paragraphs 225 to 236. Verbatim record: https://un-project.org/debate/33/3504/
[^91]: United Nations General Assembly, 33rd session, 87th plenary meeting, December 18, 1978, record A/33/PV.87, report of the Special Political Committee on agenda item 126 (A/33/512), decision 33/426. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F33%2FPV.87&l=en&t=pdf
[^92]: Melvin R. Laird to Laurance Rockefeller, May 9, 1994, and Rockefeller to John H. Gibbons, June 1, 1994, attached to http://www.paradigmresearchgroup.org/Rockefeller%20Documents/RID-6-13-94.htm

55
20 - ORGANIZATIONS/PRIVATE/Cambridge Analytica.md
View file

@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ relations:
start: 2017-05
end: 2020-10-02
role: "formal investigation into data analytics in political campaigns"
fn: 38
fn: 39
- type: subject_of
with: "[[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]]"
end: 2020-08-18
@ -158,33 +158,35 @@ The Bolton PAC's payments to the company began on July 7, 2014 with $25,000 for
Kaiser told the Senate committee that discussion of a commercial offer to the Trump campaign began in May 2015, that she and Nix met Bannon in Washington in September 2015, that [[Donald Trump]] telephoned Bannon during the meeting and directed that Nix and Kaiser come to New York to meet [[Corey Lewandowski]], and that "eight or ten weeks" of contract negotiations followed without result.[^27] Bannon told the committee he had no recollection of the call.[^27] Kaiser also said that almost every client meeting she had with a political figure was preceded by an introduction from Bannon, Rebekah Mercer or [[Kellyanne Conway]], whom the committee described as an advisor to the Mercers at the time, and that Conway was closely involved in moving the company from the Cruz campaign to the Trump campaign.[^28]
The committee recorded that the Cruz campaign spent about $5.8 million on the company and the campaign of [[Ben Carson]] more than $430,000, citing a [[CNN]] report, and that within a week of Cruz leaving the race the employees working on his campaign began moving to the Trump campaign.[^27] [[Rick Gates]] told the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]] that the campaign decided shortly after the Republican National Convention to use the company, that the [[Republican National Committee]] did not want to use it, that [[Brad Parscale]] was reluctant, that [[Jared Kushner]] wanted to use it and negotiated a package with payment at the end of the campaign.[^22] Kushner told the committee that the Mercers aggressively advocated use of the company and that the campaign engaged it to secure the Mercers' support.[^22] Parscale said he decided to hire the company in June 2016 after approval from [[Paul Manafort]] and Kushner, that he declined its offer of "psychographic profiling" services, and that he used Republican National Committee data rather than the company's data.[^22][^29]
[[Brad Parscale]] told the committee that the campaign's polling data was ingested into a visualization tool with the help of Cambridge Analytica developers, and that the tool was available on an iPad that Parscale carried.[^29]
The committee obtained a campaign data team presentation of August 22, 2016 with a slide depicting data flowing in both directions between the campaign and Cambridge Analytica, with the company's node titled "Digital Media Psychographic Analysis," and another slide showing arrows between its "Psychographic Analysis" and both the Republican National Committee's "GOP Data Center" and the campaign's San Antonio operation, which it called "Project Alamo."[^29] The committee wrote that documents it obtained suggested that the company's data may have been used in support of the campaign and that the campaign may have leveraged its psychographic analysis capabilities.[^29] Gates told the FBI that he later learned campaign data was transmitted to and analyzed in the [[United Kingdom]], which concerned him.[^29] Kaiser said that Project Alamo was "built completely from scratch" from the Republican National Committee's Data Trust database and purchased data sets.[^29]
The committee recorded that the Cruz campaign spent about $5.8 million on the company and the campaign of [[Ben Carson]] more than $430,000, citing a [[CNN]] report, and that within a week of Cruz leaving the race the employees working on his campaign began moving to the Trump campaign.[^27] [[Rick Gates]] told the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]] that the campaign decided shortly after the Republican National Convention to use the company, that the [[Republican National Committee]] did not want to use it, that Brad Parscale was reluctant, that [[Jared Kushner]] wanted to use it and negotiated a package with payment at the end of the campaign.[^22] Kushner told the committee that the Mercers aggressively advocated use of the company and that the campaign engaged it to secure the Mercers' support.[^22] Parscale said he decided to hire the company in June 2016 after approval from [[Paul Manafort]] and Kushner, that he declined its offer of "psychographic profiling" services, and that he used Republican National Committee data rather than the company's data.[^22][^30]
The committee obtained a campaign data team presentation of August 22, 2016 with a slide depicting data flowing in both directions between the campaign and Cambridge Analytica, with the company's node titled "Digital Media Psychographic Analysis," and another slide showing arrows between its "Psychographic Analysis" and both the Republican National Committee's "GOP Data Center" and the campaign's San Antonio operation, which it called "Project Alamo."[^30] The committee wrote that documents it obtained suggested that the company's data may have been used in support of the campaign and that the campaign may have leveraged its psychographic analysis capabilities.[^30] Gates told the FBI that he later learned campaign data was transmitted to and analyzed in the [[United Kingdom]], which concerned him.[^30] Kaiser said that Project Alamo was "built completely from scratch" from the Republican National Committee's Data Trust database and purchased data sets.[^30]
### Russian and WikiLeaks contacts
Wylie said that from spring 2014 through 2015 Cambridge Analytica representatives met representatives of Lukoil, that Nix's presentations included discussion of rumor and disinformation campaigns, and that in May 2018 he told the [[Senate Judiciary Committee]] that Lukoil "has formal information sharing agreements with the Russian Federal Security Service."[^30][^31] His written statement said that after a request for information from Lukoil executives in the spring of 2014, Cambridge Analytica discussed with Lukoil its experience with "foreign disinformation, rumour campaigns, microtargeting and its American data assets."[^31] Kaiser told the committee the discussions concerned a customer loyalty application for Lukoil's stations in Turkey, said she was told the data could also be useful for political activities there, and furnished a February 2015 presentation prepared by SCL Commercial; neither she nor Wylie believed that a contract resulted, and the committee stated that it did not independently corroborate the allegation that Lukoil intended to use the company to affect elections.[^30] The committee noted that the [[Office of Foreign Assets Control]] had added Lukoil to its Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List on September 12, 2014.[^30]
Wylie said that from spring 2014 through 2015 Cambridge Analytica representatives met representatives of Lukoil, that Nix's presentations included discussion of rumor and disinformation campaigns, and that in May 2018 he told the [[Senate Judiciary Committee]] that Lukoil "has formal information sharing agreements with the Russian Federal Security Service."[^31][^32] His written statement said that after a request for information from Lukoil executives in the spring of 2014, Cambridge Analytica discussed with Lukoil its experience with "foreign disinformation, rumour campaigns, microtargeting and its American data assets."[^32] Kaiser told the committee the discussions concerned a customer loyalty application for Lukoil's stations in Turkey, said she was told the data could also be useful for political activities there, and furnished a February 2015 presentation prepared by SCL Commercial; neither she nor Wylie believed that a contract resulted, and the committee stated that it did not independently corroborate the allegation that Lukoil intended to use the company to affect elections.[^31] The committee noted that the [[Office of Foreign Assets Control]] had added Lukoil to its Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List on September 12, 2014.[^31]
Wylie also told the committee that in spring 2014 Bannon approved focus groups about [[Vladimir Putin]] and Russian expansionism preparatory to a predictive model, and that Bannon and [[Konstantin Kilimnik]] were two of three people likely responsible for the idea.[^32] [[Sam Patten]], a consultant who worked for the company in Nigeria, Mexico, Kosovo and the Czech Republic, told the committee there was "no connection" between Kilimnik and Cambridge Analytica; Kaiser said that on the Nigerian project the company may have assisted its client in retaining former Israeli intelligence officers working privately to conduct opposition research.[^32]
Wylie also told the committee that in spring 2014 Bannon approved focus groups about [[Vladimir Putin]] and Russian expansionism preparatory to a predictive model, and that Bannon and [[Konstantin Kilimnik]] were two of three people likely responsible for the idea.[^33] [[Sam Patten]], a consultant who worked for the company in Nigeria, Mexico, Kosovo and the Czech Republic, told the committee there was "no connection" between Kilimnik and Cambridge Analytica; Kaiser said that on the Nigerian project the company may have assisted its client in retaining former Israeli intelligence officers working privately to conduct opposition research.[^33]
The committee reported open-source accounts that during the 2016 campaign Nix emailed [[Julian Assange]] about the possible release of [[Hillary Clinton]]'s deleted emails, and that Assange said in October 2017 that [[WikiLeaks]] had rejected an approach by Cambridge Analytica. The committee obtained no additional information, and Bannon and others close to the campaign said they had no prior awareness of the contact.[^33] The committee also recorded that it was unable to obtain the company's corporate communications, which were in the hands of United Kingdom authorities, and that Nix "generally disregarded the Committee's requests for an appearance."[^34] It found "no convincing evidence that Russia's government or intelligence services worked with or through" Cambridge Analytica, Psy Group or Colt Ventures in furtherance of the 2016 interference.[^34] Cambridge Analytica, LLC is named among the respondents in matters under review 7207, 7268, 7274 and 7623 before the Federal Election Commission, in which Commissioners Shana Broussard and Ellen Weintraub issued a statement of reasons citing Volume 5 after a certification dated April 22, 2021; the text of the statement concerns the Russian Federation, the Internet Research Agency and the Trump committee and does not mention Cambridge Analytica outside the caption.[^35]
The committee reported open-source accounts that during the 2016 campaign Nix emailed [[Julian Assange]] about the possible release of [[Hillary Clinton]]'s deleted emails, and that Assange said in October 2017 that [[WikiLeaks]] had rejected an approach by Cambridge Analytica. The committee obtained no additional information, and Bannon and others close to the campaign said they had no prior awareness of the contact.[^34] The committee also recorded that it was unable to obtain the company's corporate communications, which were in the hands of United Kingdom authorities, and that Nix "generally disregarded the Committee's requests for an appearance."[^35] It found "no convincing evidence that Russia's government or intelligence services worked with or through" Cambridge Analytica, Psy Group or Colt Ventures in furtherance of the 2016 interference.[^35] Cambridge Analytica, LLC is named among the respondents in matters under review 7207, 7268, 7274 and 7623 before the Federal Election Commission, in which Commissioners Shana Broussard and Ellen Weintraub issued a statement of reasons citing Volume 5 after a certification dated April 22, 2021; the text of the statement concerns the Russian Federation, the Internet Research Agency and the Trump committee and does not mention Cambridge Analytica outside the caption.[^36]
### Regulatory and criminal proceedings in the United Kingdom
The Information Commissioner's Office issued a monetary penalty notice of £500,000 to Facebook on October 25, 2018, the highest fine permitted under the Data Protection Act 1998, citing lack of transparency and security failures relating to the harvesting of data.[^36] The office also executed a warrant at the company's premises at 8 p.m. on March 23, 2018, seized servers and other material, and reported that Cambridge Analytica and SCL Elections entered administration on May 3, 2018, that an enforcement notice of May 4, 2018 required it to answer a subject access request from the American academic [[David Carroll]] that had been made in January 2017, and that the deadline of June 3, 2018 passed without compliance.[^18] The office reported that Nix and Kogan had declined invitations to voluntary interviews under caution and that it would have issued a substantial fine had the company not been in administration.[^18] SCL Elections pleaded guilty at [[Hendon Magistrates' Court]] on January 9, 2019, the day set for trial, to failing to comply with the enforcement notice; press reports gave the penalty as a fine of £15,000 with £6,000 in costs and a victim surcharge of £170.[^37] The Information Commissioner's 2020 letter to Parliament gives the fine as £18,000.[^38]
The Information Commissioner's Office issued a monetary penalty notice of £500,000 to Facebook on October 25, 2018, the highest fine permitted under the Data Protection Act 1998, citing lack of transparency and security failures relating to the harvesting of data.[^37] The office also executed a warrant at the company's premises at 8 p.m. on March 23, 2018, seized servers and other material, and reported that Cambridge Analytica and SCL Elections entered administration on May 3, 2018, that an enforcement notice of May 4, 2018 required it to answer a subject access request from the American academic [[David Carroll]] that had been made in January 2017, and that the deadline of June 3, 2018 passed without compliance.[^18] The office reported that Nix and Kogan had declined invitations to voluntary interviews under caution and that it would have issued a substantial fine had the company not been in administration.[^18] SCL Elections pleaded guilty at [[Hendon Magistrates' Court]] on January 9, 2019, the day set for trial, to failing to comply with the enforcement notice; press reports gave the penalty as a fine of £15,000 with £6,000 in costs and a victim surcharge of £170.[^38] The Information Commissioner's 2020 letter to Parliament gives the fine as £18,000.[^39]
On October 2, 2020 the Information Commissioner, [[Elizabeth Denham]], wrote to the chair of the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee that the office had concluded its investigation, that the company had purchased commercially available data amounting at one estimate to more than 130 billion data points, mostly about United States voters, to combine with Facebook-derived data from Kogan, that its models were mostly built from "off the shelf" tools, that the office found no further evidence to change its view that the company was not involved in the European Union referendum campaign beyond early inquiries about UK Independence Party data, and that it found no additional evidence of Russian involvement in the servers it obtained.[^38] The letter also reported evidence that in its last stages the company was drawing up plans to move its data offshore to avoid regulatory scrutiny, which it did not carry out before it ceased trading.[^38]
On October 2, 2020 the Information Commissioner, [[Elizabeth Denham]], wrote to the chair of the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee that the office had concluded its investigation, that the company had purchased commercially available data amounting at one estimate to more than 130 billion data points, mostly about United States voters, to combine with Facebook-derived data from Kogan, that its models were mostly built from "off the shelf" tools, that the office found no further evidence to change its view that the company was not involved in the European Union referendum campaign beyond early inquiries about UK Independence Party data, and that it found no additional evidence of Russian involvement in the servers it obtained.[^39] The letter also reported evidence that in its last stages the company was drawing up plans to move its data offshore to avoid regulatory scrutiny, which it did not carry out before it ceased trading.[^39]
The Insolvency Service announced in September 2020 that Nix had given an undertaking disqualifying him from acting as a company director for seven years from October 5, 2020, having, in the service's words, caused or permitted SCL Elections or associated companies to act with a lack of commercial probity by marketing services including "bribery or honey trap stings, voter disengagement campaigns, obtaining information to discredit political opponents and spreading information anonymously in political campaigns." The service did not say whether any such services were performed, and Nix told Reuters he had made no admission of wrongdoing.[^39] The Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee had recorded in February 2019 that the Insolvency Service was investigating the directors of SCL Elections, SCL Group, SCL Analytics, SCL Commercial, SCL Social and Cambridge Analytica (UK) under the [[Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986]].[^40]
The Insolvency Service announced in September 2020 that Nix had given an undertaking disqualifying him from acting as a company director for seven years from October 5, 2020, having, in the service's words, caused or permitted SCL Elections or associated companies to act with a lack of commercial probity by marketing services including "bribery or honey trap stings, voter disengagement campaigns, obtaining information to discredit political opponents and spreading information anonymously in political campaigns." The service did not say whether any such services were performed, and Nix told Reuters he had made no admission of wrongdoing.[^40] The Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee had recorded in February 2019 that the Insolvency Service was investigating the directors of SCL Elections, SCL Group, SCL Analytics, SCL Commercial, SCL Social and Cambridge Analytica (UK) under the [[Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986]].[^41]
### Emerdata and the end of the group
Emerdata Limited (Companies House number 10911848) was incorporated on August 11, 2017 with Wheatland as a director, and its persons with significant control from incorporation were Wheatland and Dr Alexander Bruce Tayler, each holding more than 25 percent and up to 50 percent until January 23, 2018.[^41] From January 23, 2018 the register shows Cambridge Analytica Holdings LLC, with an address on Orange Street in Wilmington, Delaware, as holder of more than 50 percent and less than 75 percent of shares and votes until August 9, 2022; since that date the register carries a statement that there is no registrable person.[^41] The register records the officers appointed on January 23, 2018 as Nix (resigned March 28, 2018), Johnson Chun Shun Ko (resigned May 9, 2018), Cheng Peng (resigned May 8, 2018) and Ahmad Al Khatib (resigned May 7, 2018); Tayler was a director again from March 28 to April 18, 2018, Gary Ka Chun Tiu from June 12, 2018 to December 3, 2024, and Wheatland until May 22, 2019.[^41] Rebekah and Jennifer Mercer were appointed directors on March 16, 2018 and remained in office as of the register consulted on October 1, 2026, with [[Jacquelyn James-Varga]] (appointed May 22, 2019) and Bradley David Golub (appointed December 3, 2024).[^41]
Emerdata Limited (Companies House number 10911848) was incorporated on August 11, 2017 with Wheatland as a director, and its persons with significant control from incorporation were Wheatland and Dr Alexander Bruce Tayler, each holding more than 25 percent and up to 50 percent until January 23, 2018.[^42] From January 23, 2018 the register shows Cambridge Analytica Holdings LLC, with an address on Orange Street in Wilmington, Delaware, as holder of more than 50 percent and less than 75 percent of shares and votes until August 9, 2022; since that date the register carries a statement that there is no registrable person.[^42] The register records the officers appointed on January 23, 2018 as Nix (resigned March 28, 2018), Johnson Chun Shun Ko (resigned May 9, 2018), Cheng Peng (resigned May 8, 2018) and Ahmad Al Khatib (resigned May 7, 2018); Tayler was a director again from March 28 to April 18, 2018, Gary Ka Chun Tiu from June 12, 2018 to December 3, 2024, and Wheatland until May 22, 2019.[^42] Rebekah and Jennifer Mercer were appointed directors on March 16, 2018 and remained in office as of the register consulted on October 1, 2026, with [[Jacquelyn James-Varga]] (appointed May 22, 2019) and Bradley David Golub (appointed December 3, 2024).[^42]
The Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee reported in February 2019 that Emerdata had not gone into administration, was the largest creditor of SCL Elections and was paying the administration costs, and listed shareholders as of August 10, 2018 that included Cambridge Analytica Holdings LLC, Tayler, Wheatland, trusts for the benefit of Rebekah, Jennifer and Heather Mercer, Alexander and Catherine Nix, five members of the Marland family, Henry and Roger Gabb, Nigel and Alexander Oakes, and Reza Saddlou-Bundy.[^40] The committee recommended that the [[National Crime Agency]] investigate the connections between SCL Elections and Emerdata.[^40] The committee also reported that SCL Insight Limited, owned by Nigel Oakes, had been spun off in the 2017 reorganization.[^40]
The Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee reported in February 2019 that Emerdata had not gone into administration, was the largest creditor of SCL Elections and was paying the administration costs, and listed shareholders as of August 10, 2018 that included Cambridge Analytica Holdings LLC, Tayler, Wheatland, trusts for the benefit of Rebekah, Jennifer and Heather Mercer, Alexander and Catherine Nix, five members of the Marland family, Henry and Roger Gabb, Nigel and Alexander Oakes, and Reza Saddlou-Bundy.[^41] The committee recommended that the [[National Crime Agency]] investigate the connections between SCL Elections and Emerdata.[^41] The committee also reported that SCL Insight Limited, owned by Nigel Oakes, had been spun off in the 2017 reorganization.[^41]
Emerdata entered administration on December 9, 2024, the register names Benjamin Stanyon and Nedim Patrick Ailyan as practitioners, records a cessation to act on April 8, 2026, and gives the registered office as care of Opus Restructuring LLP, Milton Keynes.[^41] SCL Group Limited, SCL Elections Limited and Cambridge Analytica (UK) Limited were in administration from May 3, 2018 to April 17, 2019, then in compulsory liquidation on a petition of August 13, 2018, which concluded on September 1, 2025; the first two were dissolved on January 31, 2026 and the third on January 30, 2026.[^42]
Emerdata entered administration on December 9, 2024, the register names Benjamin Stanyon and Nedim Patrick Ailyan as practitioners, records a cessation to act on April 8, 2026, and gives the registered office as care of Opus Restructuring LLP, Milton Keynes.[^42] SCL Group Limited, SCL Elections Limited and Cambridge Analytica (UK) Limited were in administration from May 3, 2018 to April 17, 2019, then in compulsory liquidation on a petition of August 13, 2018, which concluded on September 1, 2025; the first two were dissolved on January 31, 2026 and the third on January 30, 2026.[^43]
### Footnotes
@ -216,17 +218,18 @@ Emerdata entered administration on December 9, 2024, the register names Benjamin
[^26]: Mercer Family Foundation, Form 990-PF for 2011, Part XV (grant to OISM, P.O. Box 1279, Cave Junction, Oregon, $965,000) (https://990s.foundationcenter.org/990pf_pdf_archive/201/201982204/201982204_201112_990PF.pdf); Form 990-PF for 2021, Part XV (Oregon Institute of Science and Medicine, 2251 Dick George Road, Cave Junction, Oregon, $250,000), ProPublica Nonprofit Explorer full text (https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/201982204/202213199349104431/IRS990PF).
[^27]: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities*, report released August 18, 2020, pp. 673 to 674 and notes 4352 to 4357 (Kaiser transcript, pp. 144 to 156; Bannon transcript, p. 268; Maegan Vazquez and Paul Murphy, "Trump isn't the only Republican who gave Cambridge Analytica big bucks," CNN, March 21, 2018). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
[^28]: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities*, report released August 18, 2020, p. 672 and note 4348 (Kaiser transcript, pp. 40 to 43). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
[^29]: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities*, report released August 18, 2020, pp. 675 to 678 and notes 4367 to 4379 (Parscale transcript, pp. 53 to 60; Trump Data Team Presentation, August 22, 2016, FLYNN_SSCI_00011770 and 00011773; FBI FD-302 of Rick Gates, October 29, 2018; Kaiser transcript, pp. 161 to 164). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
[^30]: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities*, report released August 18, 2020, pp. 670 to 671 and notes 4334 to 4341 (Wylie proffer; Wylie written statement to the Senate Judiciary Committee, May 16, 2018; Kaiser transcript, pp. 66 to 67 and 121 to 123; SCL Commercial presentation for Lukoil, February 18, 2015; OFAC listing of September 12, 2014). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
[^31]: Christopher Wylie, written statement, "In the Matter of Cambridge Analytica and Other Related Issues," Senate Committee on the Judiciary, May 16, 2018, paragraphs 32 and 33. https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/06/03/2026/05-16-18-wylie-testimony
[^32]: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities*, report released August 18, 2020, p. 668 and notes 4318 to 4325 (Wylie proffer; Patten transcript, pp. 29 to 38; Kaiser transcript, pp. 67 to 68; Bannon transcript, pp. 253 to 256). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
[^33]: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities*, report released August 18, 2020, pp. 678 to 679 and notes 4380 to 4383 (Betsy Swan, "Trump Data Guru Alexander Nix: I Tried To Team Up With Julian Assange," *The Daily Beast*, October 25, 2017; Kara Scannell, Dana Bash and Marshall Cohen, CNN, October 25, 2017). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
[^34]: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities*, report released August 18, 2020, pp. 663 to 664 (section introduction, "Committee did not examine the effectiveness of the work these companies may have conducted"; limitations including Nix's non-appearance and the seizure of the company's corporate communications by U.K. authorities). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
[^35]: Federal Election Commission, Statement of Reasons of Commissioners Shana M. Broussard and Ellen L. Weintraub, MURs 7207, 7268, 7274 and 7623 (Russian Federation; Donald J. Trump for President, Inc.; Donald J. Trump; H. Russell Taub; Cambridge Analytica, LLC; Internet Research Agency; Paul Manafort), note 2 (certification dated April 22, 2021). https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/7207/7207_47.pdf
[^36]: UK Information Commissioner's Office, *Investigation into the use of data analytics in political campaigns: A report to Parliament*, November 6, 2018, section 3.2.4 (p. 38). https://www.statewatch.org/media/documents/news/2018/nov/uk-ico-report-investigation-into-use-of-data-political-campaigns-6-11-18.pdf
[^37]: UK Information Commissioner's Office, *Investigation into the use of data analytics in political campaigns*, November 6, 2018, section 3.2.3 (trial set for January 9, 2019 at Hendon Magistrates' Court); "Cambridge Analytica Pleads Guilty In UK Data Access Case," *MediaPost*, January 9, 2019 (fine of £15,000, costs of £6,000, victim surcharge of £170, citing the ICO announcement) https://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/330338/ ; Ellen Tannam, "Cambridge Analytica owner hit with £15,000 fine for disobeying UK ICO," *Silicon Republic*, January 2019 (District Judge Kenneth Grant: "wilful disregard of the enforcement notice") https://www.siliconrepublic.com/enterprise/cambridge-analytica-scl-fine
[^38]: Elizabeth Denham, Information Commissioner, letter to Julian Knight MP, Chair, Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, reference ICO/O/ED/L/RTL/0181, October 2, 2020, paragraphs 3 to 15. https://cy.ico.org.uk/media2/migrated/2618383/20201002_ico-o-ed-l-rtl-0181_to-julian-knight-mp.pdf
[^39]: "Ex-Cambridge Analytica head banned from running firms in UK," Reuters, published by Al Jazeera, September 25, 2020 (statement of the Insolvency Service of September 24, 2020; Mark Bruce, chief investigator; disqualification from October 5, 2020). https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2020/9/25/uk-bans-ex-cambridge-analytica-boss-for-unethical-services
[^40]: House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, *Disinformation and "fake news": Final Report*, HC 1791, February 18, 2019, paragraphs 285 to 290, 296 and notes 327 to 329 and 338. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/1791/1791.pdf
[^41]: Companies House, EMERDATA LIMITED (company number 10911848), overview, officers, persons with significant control and insolvency pages, viewed October 1, 2026; personal appointments pages for Jennifer Lynne Mercer, Rebekah Anne Mercer, Jacquelyn James-Varga and Bradley David Golub. https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/10911848
[^42]: Companies House, insolvency pages for SCL GROUP LIMITED (05514098), SCL ELECTIONS LIMITED (08256225) and CAMBRIDGE ANALYTICA(UK) LIMITED (09375920), viewed October 1, 2026 (administration May 3, 2018 to April 17, 2019; compulsory liquidation, petition August 13, 2018, winding up commenced April 17, 2019 and concluded September 1, 2025; dissolved January 31, 2026, January 31, 2026 and January 30, 2026). https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/05514098/insolvency
[^29]: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities*, notes 447 and 448 (Parscale transcript, p. 64). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
[^30]: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities*, report released August 18, 2020, pp. 675 to 678 and notes 4367 to 4379 (Parscale transcript, pp. 53 to 60; Trump Data Team Presentation, August 22, 2016, FLYNN_SSCI_00011770 and 00011773; FBI FD-302 of Rick Gates, October 29, 2018; Kaiser transcript, pp. 161 to 164). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
[^31]: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities*, report released August 18, 2020, pp. 670 to 671 and notes 4334 to 4341 (Wylie proffer; Wylie written statement to the Senate Judiciary Committee, May 16, 2018; Kaiser transcript, pp. 66 to 67 and 121 to 123; SCL Commercial presentation for Lukoil, February 18, 2015; OFAC listing of September 12, 2014). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
[^32]: Christopher Wylie, written statement, "In the Matter of Cambridge Analytica and Other Related Issues," Senate Committee on the Judiciary, May 16, 2018, paragraphs 32 and 33. https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/06/03/2026/05-16-18-wylie-testimony
[^33]: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities*, report released August 18, 2020, p. 668 and notes 4318 to 4325 (Wylie proffer; Patten transcript, pp. 29 to 38; Kaiser transcript, pp. 67 to 68; Bannon transcript, pp. 253 to 256). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
[^34]: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities*, report released August 18, 2020, pp. 678 to 679 and notes 4380 to 4383 (Betsy Swan, "Trump Data Guru Alexander Nix: I Tried To Team Up With Julian Assange," *The Daily Beast*, October 25, 2017; Kara Scannell, Dana Bash and Marshall Cohen, CNN, October 25, 2017). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
[^35]: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities*, report released August 18, 2020, pp. 663 to 664 (section introduction, "Committee did not examine the effectiveness of the work these companies may have conducted"; limitations including Nix's non-appearance and the seizure of the company's corporate communications by U.K. authorities). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
[^36]: Federal Election Commission, Statement of Reasons of Commissioners Shana M. Broussard and Ellen L. Weintraub, MURs 7207, 7268, 7274 and 7623 (Russian Federation; Donald J. Trump for President, Inc.; Donald J. Trump; H. Russell Taub; Cambridge Analytica, LLC; Internet Research Agency; Paul Manafort), note 2 (certification dated April 22, 2021). https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/7207/7207_47.pdf
[^37]: UK Information Commissioner's Office, *Investigation into the use of data analytics in political campaigns: A report to Parliament*, November 6, 2018, section 3.2.4 (p. 38). https://www.statewatch.org/media/documents/news/2018/nov/uk-ico-report-investigation-into-use-of-data-political-campaigns-6-11-18.pdf
[^38]: UK Information Commissioner's Office, *Investigation into the use of data analytics in political campaigns*, November 6, 2018, section 3.2.3 (trial set for January 9, 2019 at Hendon Magistrates' Court); "Cambridge Analytica Pleads Guilty In UK Data Access Case," *MediaPost*, January 9, 2019 (fine of £15,000, costs of £6,000, victim surcharge of £170, citing the ICO announcement) https://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/330338/ ; Ellen Tannam, "Cambridge Analytica owner hit with £15,000 fine for disobeying UK ICO," *Silicon Republic*, January 2019 (District Judge Kenneth Grant: "wilful disregard of the enforcement notice") https://www.siliconrepublic.com/enterprise/cambridge-analytica-scl-fine
[^39]: Elizabeth Denham, Information Commissioner, letter to Julian Knight MP, Chair, Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, reference ICO/O/ED/L/RTL/0181, October 2, 2020, paragraphs 3 to 15. https://cy.ico.org.uk/media2/migrated/2618383/20201002_ico-o-ed-l-rtl-0181_to-julian-knight-mp.pdf
[^40]: "Ex-Cambridge Analytica head banned from running firms in UK," Reuters, published by Al Jazeera, September 25, 2020 (statement of the Insolvency Service of September 24, 2020; Mark Bruce, chief investigator; disqualification from October 5, 2020). https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2020/9/25/uk-bans-ex-cambridge-analytica-boss-for-unethical-services
[^41]: House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, *Disinformation and "fake news": Final Report*, HC 1791, February 18, 2019, paragraphs 285 to 290, 296 and notes 327 to 329 and 338. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/1791/1791.pdf
[^42]: Companies House, EMERDATA LIMITED (company number 10911848), overview, officers, persons with significant control and insolvency pages, viewed October 1, 2026; personal appointments pages for Jennifer Lynne Mercer, Rebekah Anne Mercer, Jacquelyn James-Varga and Bradley David Golub. https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/10911848
[^43]: Companies House, insolvency pages for SCL GROUP LIMITED (05514098), SCL ELECTIONS LIMITED (08256225) and CAMBRIDGE ANALYTICA(UK) LIMITED (09375920), viewed October 1, 2026 (administration May 3, 2018 to April 17, 2019; compulsory liquidation, petition August 13, 2018, winding up commenced April 17, 2019 and concluded September 1, 2025; dissolved January 31, 2026, January 31, 2026 and January 30, 2026). https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/05514098/insolvency

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20 - ORGANIZATIONS/PRIVATE/Monroe Institute.md
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@ -1,25 +1,255 @@
---
created: 2025-07-22
updated: 2026-09-21
updated: 2026-10-12
title: Monroe Institute
aliases:
- The Monroe Institute
- Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences
- Monroe Institute of Applied Science
- MIAS
- TMI
tags:
- organization
- research
- consciousness
description: The Monroe Institute is a non-profit organization dedicated to the exploration of human consciousness, known for its Hemi-Sync audio technology.
- Organization
- Research
- Consciousness
- HemiSync
- Stargate
- CenterLane
- GrillFlame
- GondolaWish
- RemoteViewing
- OutOfBodyExperience
description: The Monroe Institute is a consciousness research and training center in Faber, Virginia, founded around Robert Monroe's Hemi-Sync audio method, which Army intelligence units examined from 1978 and used from 1980 in the Grill Flame and Center Lane remote viewing programs.
category: "Private Organization"
summary: "The Monroe Institute is a non-profit consciousness research organization founded by Robert Monroe, known for its Hemi-Sync audio technology, which was used by U.S. Army remote viewers in the Stargate program."
summary: "Consciousness research center in Faber, Virginia, built on Robert Monroe's Hemi-Sync audio method, which Army intelligence units used from 1980 in Grill Flame and Center Lane remote viewer training."
start: 1971
location: "Faber, Virginia, USA"
relations:
- type: founded
with: "[[Robert Monroe]]"
reverse: true
start: 1971
fn: 1
- type: head_of
with: "[[Robert Monroe]]"
reverse: true
role: Executive Director
start: 1978
fn: 7
- type: head_of
with: "[[Nancy McMoneagle]]"
reverse: true
role: Director
start: 1983
end: 1991
fn: 48
- type: head_of
with: "[[Frederick Atwater]]"
reverse: true
role: President
start: 2006
fn: 50
- type: head_of
with: "[[Nancy McMoneagle]]"
reverse: true
role: President and Executive Director
start: 2014
end: 2019
fn: 48
- type: head_of
with: "[[Scott Taylor]]"
reverse: true
role: President
start: 2019
end: 2021
fn: 44
- type: head_of
with: "[[Allyn Evans]]"
reverse: true
role: President
start: 2021
fn: 46
- type: director_of
with: "[[Thomas Campbell]]"
reverse: true
role: Board of Advisors
start: 1981
fn: 40
- type: director_of
with: "[[Stuart Twemlow]]"
reverse: true
role: Board of Advisors
start: 1981
fn: 40
- type: director_of
with: "[[Charles Tart]]"
reverse: true
role: Board of Advisors (emeritus)
start: 2009
fn: 13
- type: contractor_to
with: "[[United States Army Intelligence and Security Command]]"
start: 1980
end: 1984
role: Hemi-Sync training for remote viewers
fn: 34
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Gondola Wish]]"
start: 1978
end: 1978
fn: 7
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Grill Flame]]"
start: 1980
end: 1982
fn: 25
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Center Lane]]"
start: 1983
end: 1984
fn: 30
---
The [[Monroe Institute]] is a non-profit organization dedicated to the exploration of human consciousness, known for its Hemi-Sync audio technology. It was founded by [[Robert Monroe]]. In the context of the *Remote Viewers* narrative, [[Frederick Atwater|Skip Atwater]] became the director of research for the Institute after retiring from the [[U.S. Army]], and later served as its president. The Institute is mentioned as a place where Atwater continued his work in consciousness research, building upon his experiences with remote viewing.[^1]
The [[Monroe Institute]] of Applied Sciences is a consciousness research and training center in [[Faber, Virginia]], in the Blue Ridge foothills of [[Nelson County, Virginia]], built around the audio method [[Hemi-Sync]] developed by the broadcasting executive [[Robert Monroe]]. From 1978 its methods were examined, and from 1980 used, by [[U.S. Army|Army]] intelligence units that ran the remote viewing programs [[Grill Flame]] and [[Center Lane]], and its Gateway program was the subject of a 1983 study by an Army officer, [[Wayne McDonnell]], who found the process plausible in terms of physical-science parameters.[^1][^2]
### The Army Record
### Robert Monroe and the Founding
A memorandum of the 902d Military Intelligence Group of September 25, 1978, recording the arrangements that turned Gondola Wish into Grill Flame, noted that the institute was "not cleared." An INSCOM information paper of January 5, 1984, stated: "USAINSCOM association with MIAS dates to 1978, when the potentials of the Hemi-Sync process were considered for application within INSCOM's initial psychoenergetic efforts." By then "CENTER LANE Advanced Training with MIAS consists of four progressive phases that lead to full use of the Hemi-Sync process during CENTER LANE intelligence collection missions," and "Rapid Acquisition Personnel Training (RAPT) is an application of the Hemi-Sync process designed to improve managerial and intra-personal relations skills," "used to screen prospective source personnel and sensitize intelligence managers and consumers to intelligence applications of psychoenergetics"; INSCOM's Center for Excellence planned to use the tapes "for accelerated learning of foreign language skills." The Center Lane briefing dated the unit's advanced training with Hemi-Sync to the end of 1980, and an INSCOM request of about 1981 asked to write the institute's "Frequency Following Response" and "Hemispheric Synchronization" tapes into the Grill Flame protocol, "3-5 times per week," at no more than 20 decibels. The institute of "Nellys Ford, VA" appears in the vendor roster of INSCOM's High Performance Task Force report of March 1983, *Beyond Excellence,* beside the Pacific Institute, neuro-linguistic programming, and "New Age Thinking," its technique described as "a machine aided process which more closely aligns brain wave activity (frequency/amplitude) in both left and right brain hemispheres."[^2]
Monroe was born in [[Wabash, Indiana]] on October 30, 1915, received a BA from [[Ohio State University]] in 1937, and began a career as a radio program writer, director, producer and executive.[^2] In 1958, then a New York broadcasting executive, Monroe began leaving his body. The Institute dates its own founding to 1971, the year [[Doubleday]] published his [[Journeys Out of the Body]].[^1] He had created and produced some four hundred radio and television network programs and become owner and operator of a radio network and cable television system in Virginia.[^3] The current tax-exempt corporation reports a formation year of 1985 and an IRS ruling date of June 1, 2011.[^4][^5]
The first experiences came in the spring of 1958, during experiments in learning during sleep with Monroe himself as the subject.[^6] In 1978 he was Executive Director of the Institute, then at Post Office Box 57 in [[Afton, Virginia]], and was styled Institute Chairman in its bulletin.[^7][^8] By 1981 the address was Post Office Box 94C in Faber, and the Army's papers of 1983 and 1984 give [[Nellysford, Virginia]].[^2][^9][^10]
### Research with Charles Tart
The psychologist [[Charles Tart]] met Monroe in the fall of 1965, when Tart took a research position at the [[University of Virginia]] Medical School in [[Charlottesville, Virginia]]. Tart wrote that Monroe came in for eight late-night sessions at the hospital's EEG laboratory from December 1965 to August 1966, trying to produce out-of-body experiences while connected to recording instruments; the introduction Tart wrote for Monroe's book dates the series to September 1965 through August 1966.[^6][^11] The introduction states that on the eighth night Monroe produced two brief experiences, and that in the second he correctly described the laboratory technician as out of the room, with a man, later identified as her husband, in a corridor.[^6] Monroe's account of a session on July 19, 1966 records that the technician later confirmed to Tart that she was in the outer hall with her husband at the indicated time, that Monroe had not known he was present, and that Tart stated "the EEG shows definite unusual and unique tracings during time of activity."[^6] Tart wrote in 1998 that the result left "only weak evidence that Monroe was actually 'out'" on that occasion.[^11]
After Tart moved to the [[University of California, Davis]], he and his wife set up a distance experiment in which they concentrated on guiding Monroe to their California home at a time chosen at random, 11 P.M. Pacific time. Monroe's notes recorded a sensation of being pulled from his body within a minute of the start, at 2 A.M. in Virginia; Tart wrote that the timing matched and that Monroe's description of the home was poor.[^6][^11] In 1968, during a visit to California, Monroe had a two-hour session in Tart's sleep laboratory at Davis with two brief experiences, monitored by EEG, eye movements and plethysmograph.[^11] Tart's introduction to Journeys Out of the Body is dated Davis, California, January 10, 1971.[^6]
Tart's later role appears in military and Institute records. An Army assessment of August 25, 1978 recorded that Tart "has conducted investigations of Monroe under laboratory conditions and is convinced of the validity of Monroe's experience," and that Tart "recently recommended that anyone wanting to learn about OOBE should contact MIAS."[^7] On July 29, 1978, [[Frederick Atwater]], project officer for [[Gondola Wish]] at the [[902d Military Intelligence Group]], attended a seminar given by Tart on out-of-body experiences and strengthening ESP abilities, at which Tart was described as a consultant to [[Stanford Research Institute]] on leave from Davis. Atwater's memorandum records that when attendees asked where one could learn more about out-of-body experience, Tart referred them to the Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences.[^12] A biographical note to a 2009 interview describes Tart as an emeritus member of the Institute's board of advisors, and the Institute's 2015 Professional Seminar, held on the twentieth anniversary of Monroe's death, carried a Skype question-and-answer with Tart on his friendship and collaboration with Monroe.[^13][^14]
### The Method, the Gateway Program and the Patents
In the 1960s Monroe became interested in non-verbal audio patterns and brain-wave rhythms, advanced "from rotating disc circuit breakers" to custom-built signal generators, and made tape recordings with as many as sixteen patterns of sound mixed together on stereo channels. In the Institute's description, his system of binaural beats creates a frequency following response that "not only gives some control over the brainwave emission of each hemisphere, it also promotes brain-wave synchronization between the two hemispheres"; "an Advisory Board representing several major scientific disciplines formed around the Institute"; and in May 1975 Monroe "received a generic patent for this method."[^1] The Institute defines Hemi-Sync as the "synchronization of brain hemispheres through the use of audio pulse patterns."[^15]
A patent granted on May 20, 1975, US 3,884,218, "Method of inducing and maintaining various stages of sleep in the human being," names Robert A. Monroe as inventor and Monroe Industries Inc. as original assignee; the application was filed on September 30, 1970.[^16] In 1978 the Institute sold the "sleep-producing audio patterns discovered and patented by Robert Monroe" to the public on a Mentronics Sleep Tape.[^8] A later patent, US 5,356,368, names Monroe as inventor and [[Interstate Industries]] as original assignee, was filed on March 1, 1991 and granted on October 18, 1994, and is titled "Method of and apparatus for inducing desired states of consciousness."[^17] The Institute states that Monroe "was granted a generic patent for this method and technique in 1975, and assigned it to the Institute."[^18]
In the Institute's 1982 description, the Gateway Voyage program was originally the M-500 Research Project and is "the result of over 3,000 test exercises involving 1,932 participants, conducted by the Institute over the past ten years."[^18] The Institute scheduled twelve Gateway programs for 1982 at its training center in Faber, one of them from June 19 to 26; accepted participants were sent the Discovery album, six stereo cassettes with a guidance manual priced at $95 including postage, for home preparation at least a month before attending.[^18][^19] In 1980 the Institute opened its Professional Division for researchers and clinicians, with an executive committee of [[Arthur Gladman]], [[Stuart Twemlow]], [[Todd Mikurea]], [[Fowler Jones]], [[William Schul]] and [[Mary Jane Ledyard]].[^20] In 1978 the Institute announced that its new research site, the New Land, would occupy some 740 acres in Nelson County, with research facilities, a holistic health center under the New Community Church, an agricultural research station and residences.[^8]
The Institute's M-5000 program, a course of recorded speech and sound effects for out-of-body experience, went to the [[Esalen Institute]] in [[Carmel, California]] in 1973, by invitation, for a tryout, and some 600 pioneers had tried it by the time [[Joan Kron]] profiled it in New York magazine.[^21]
### Gondola Wish, 1977 to 1978
The 902d Military Intelligence Group at [[Fort Meade]] had been investigating Soviet parapsychology intelligence since September 1977. Its assessment of August 25, 1978 records that Monroe's name surfaced in March 1978 in an open-source document on the psychiatrist [[Elisabeth Kübler-Ross]], who had said she completed an out-of-body training conducted by Monroe. The assessment states that the [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] told the 902d that the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] had shown interest in Monroe in 1973 and 1974, that the agency then had no interest in him and called him "OK" from a security standpoint, that scientists at the [[Foreign Technology Division|Air Force Foreign Technology Division]] were most interested in his work, that [[Russell Targ]] and [[Hal Puthoff]] of SRI knew Monroe personally and believed him credible, that researchers at the [[Menninger Foundation]] had validated the concepts behind his technique with their "theta-gateway" principle, and that [[Thelma Moss]] of the University of California at Los Angeles was aware of his work. Security file checks developed no derogatory information.[^7]
Monroe was interviewed at the Institute on April 6, 1978. On May 3, 1978 he received a security indoctrination and agreed to keep contact confidential and to train three military intelligence personnel in out-of-body experience in October and November 1978 for a fee of $2,000. The project's unclassified title was Gondola Wish.[^7] On September 25, 1978, Colonel [[Littlefield]] and Lieutenant Colonel [[Robert Keenan]] of the 902d met Colonel [[Capps]] of the Army staff office DAMI-ISH, who related that the concept was cancelled, that "Monroe Institute not cleared," that a contract for training "involving experiements with the mind must be cleared through an office at HEW," and that the [[Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command]] held an ongoing contract with SRI to which the training could be added, with $15,000 from the Army intelligence staff and $50,000 from [[United States Army Intelligence and Security Command|INSCOM]].[^22] The 902d's status report of September 26, 1978 records that the 902d had been advised the week before to cease further planning for "its concept of training with the Monroe Institute," that General [[William Rolya|Rolya]] approved $50,000 in year-end funds as an add-on to the SRI contract, and that $65,000 in all was provided to the command for the SRI training.[^23] An Army human-use chronology lists the cancellation on September 26, 1978 because the Institute was not cleared for classified training and because its training "could be categorized as experimenting with human use."[^24]
### Grill Flame, 1980 to 1982
A trip report for September 18 to 28, 1980 records that from September 20 to 28 Atwater attended the Institute's eight-day training seminar to assess its applicability to the INSCOM Grill Flame Project. He recorded fifty relaxation and concentration exercises of 50 to 60 minutes each, most of them in a soundproof booth with stereo headphones carrying surf sounds combined with a four hertz beat frequency; that the exercises at the level the Institute calls Focus 10 enhance remote viewing; and that the Time Wheel exercise at Focus 15 turns attention to the future or the past. He recommended that experienced remote viewers be scheduled for the Institute's seminars.[^25] The report states that Monroe "has a SECRET security clearance," "has signed a consultant security agreement and has agreed to keep confidential his contact with IGFP personnel," that "No other personnel at MIAS are aware of this agreement," that all contact had been on a "shallow cover" basis, and that Monroe "has not been 'read in' on IGFP and remains unaware of the extent of the program."[^25]
In a memorandum of March 12, 1982, Atwater recommended the Institute's Discovery series as a screening tool and as the first phase of an "enhanced relaxation/concentration program," followed by Gateway attendance, an assessment period of three to six months, one-on-one sessions with Monroe, the use of the Monroe audio tapes during operational remote viewing sessions, and biomonitoring devices. The memorandum states that the Gateway program "is the core of the Monroe training" and that its author had completed it "for the expressed purpose of assessing it," and it proposes a trip to the Institute on April 5 and 6, 1982 to buy the Discovery series directly from Monroe and to set a schedule for a remote viewer's Gateway attendance.[^26] On April 13, 1982 the command psychologist wrote that a remote viewer identified as Joe should begin advanced training in May or June, and that a visit to the Institute by the project manager, Fred, Joe and himself would facilitate "Monroe technology transfer to DET. G."[^27] An April 21, 1982 memorandum by Lieutenant Colonel [[Robert Jachim]], the Grill Flame project manager, proposed advanced individual training of Detachment G remote viewers at the Gateway Voyage program, at a seven-day seminar from June 19 to 26 where Army personnel "will be intermixed with members of the general public," paid at $850 per individual for tuition, room and meals from ICF funds, a choice that "precludes identification of GRILL FLAME personnel to the Army finance personnel normally involved in travel processing."[^28]
A request addressed to Brigadier General [[Garrison Rapmund]], chairman of the Human Use Committee of the [[Medical Intelligence and Information Agency]], signed by Colonel [[Chad B. White]] of the Army's operations staff, states that the remote viewing office had been conducting sessions under the AMSAA Grill Flame protocol since March 1979 and under the INSCOM Grill Flame protocol of June 1, 1981, that "the most critical element conducive to reliable remote viewing is the ability of the remote viewer to physically relax and mentally concentrate on the task at hand," and that "A unique form of relaxation/concentration methodology has become available through the Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences." It proposed sessions of 30 to 60 minutes, 3 to 5 times per week, at audio levels "never to exceed 20 dBA and usually in the 5-10dBA range," and recommended that the protocol "be modified to include the MIAS methodology."[^9] A 1985 Defense Intelligence Agency memorandum records that the Army General Counsel determined in February 1979 that the activity could be classified as testing on human subjects and in December 1980 that the INSCOM program did constitute experimentation on human subjects subject to Procedure 18 of DoD Directive 5240.1-R.[^29]
The Army chronology lists a Grill Flame operative attending Gateway training at the Institute in September 1980, another from June 19 to 26, 1982, and another in November 1982.[^30] A Grill Flame session report for a session of July 6, 1982, number 928, carries the administrative note "THIS IS THE FIRST SESSION FOR THIS VIEWER AFTER PHASE II OF MONROE TRAINING."[^31]
### Center Lane, 1982 to 1984
The Army chronology records that on December 3, 1982 the project name was changed to Center Lane, and that on June 15, 1983 the Secretary of the Army approved a special access program for Center Lane, after a briefing of the Secretary by Major General [[Albert Stubblebine]] on June 13.[^30] The briefing script presented to the Secretary of the Army on October 5, 1983 states: "BY THE END OF 1980, WE BEGAN AN ADVANCED TRAINING PROGRAM USING THE HEMISPHERIC SYNCHRONIZATION PROCESS DEVELOPED BY ROBERT A. MONROE AND USED AT THE MONROE INSTITUTE OF APPLIED SCIENCE IN VIRGINIA. AS YOU RECALL, GENERAL STUBBLEBINE BRIEFED YOU ON THE HEMISYNC PROCESS AND PROVIDED YOU WITH SLEEP TAPES. THIS TRAINING ENABLES SOURCE PERSONNEL (RVERS) TO ACHIEVE STATES CONDUCIVE TO PSYCHOENERGETIC AWARENESS." Other copies of the script repeat the sentence about the end of 1980, one of them introducing Atwater as the project's operations officer.[^32][^33]
The Center Lane chronology records, under July 19, 1983, "Contract signed with Mr. Robert Monroe for 'One-on-One' training of CENTER LANE operative at MIAS," another Gateway attendance in August 1983, the start of one-on-one training with Monroe between October 31 and November 4, 1983, another Gateway attendance in November 1983, and "MIAS Advanced Training completed" on July 13, 1984.[^30] A March 7, 1985 Center Lane information paper states that the fiscal year 1983 budget of $121K included "expansion of advanced training under a consultant services agreement with Mr. Robert Monroe of the Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences, Faber, Virginia at a cost of $24.4K."[^30] A memorandum of March 29, 1984 records that "In July 1983, the CENTER LANE office awarded a personal services contract to Mr. Robert Monroe" to examine "his technology (HEMI-SYNC) in the psychoenergetic intelligence collection process," aimed initially at a seasoned source's target resolution; that better than expected results had altered its objectives to include training the source "in anticipation of his continued participation in CL as a private consultant after his retirement"; and that the project manager was "aware that Mr. McMoneagle will retire soon after completion of the training." The memorandum refers to a trip report on advanced training from March 19 to 23, 1984.[^34] [[Joe McMoneagle]] is the source named in it.
The January 5, 1984 INSCOM information paper for the Secretary of the Army states: "USAINSCOM association with MIAS dates to 1978, when the potentials of the Hemi-Sync process were considered for application within INSCOM's initial psychoenergetic efforts." It states that "CENTER LANE Advanced Training with MIAS consists of four progressive phases that lead to full use of the Hemi-Sync process during CENTER LANE intelligence collection missions," that [[Rapid Acquisition Personnel Training]] (RAPT) "is an application of the Hemi-Sync process designed to improve managerial and intra-personal relation's skills" and "is used to screen prospective source personnel and sensitize intelligence managers and consumers to intelligence applications of psychoenergetics," and that the INSCOM Center for Excellence "plans to use MIAS/Hemi-Sync technology for accelerated learning of foreign language skills."[^2] The 1985 papers describe the four phases as the Monroe Discovery series at Fort Meade, attendance at the Gateway program, one-on-one training with Monroe at the Institute, and "specially designed hemi-sync environments during applications training done at Fort Meade."[^30]
On November 10, 1983 the commanding general of INSCOM directed the use of the RAPT seminar at the Institute as a screening and sensitizing tool for the Center Lane project; "For OPSEC reasons, RAPT was funded and administered by the INSCOM Organizational Effectiveness Office (CENTEX), but managed by the ICLP Manager," and it was cancelled as a screening tool on March 13, 1984. The chronology lists RAPT seminars at the Institute from December 2 to 9, 1983 and January 20 to 27, 1984.[^30] A fact sheet of January 31, 1984 states that all INSCOM personnel who attend RAPT sign a voluntary informed consent form, and that the Secretary of the Army "was briefed concerning the INSCOM involvement of Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences on 5 January 1984, at his request."[^35]
Lieutenant Colonel [[Brian Buzby]] and Captain Atwater briefed the Secretary of the Army, [[John Marsh]], on Center Lane at the [[Pentagon]] on October 5, 1983, from 10:15 to 11:05, in a briefing Marsh had requested on September 1, 1983 when he approved continuation of the project.[^36] On January 5, 1984, from 14:05 to 14:35, Buzby and "Mr. Fred Atwater" met Marsh to discuss Monroe, the Institute and INSCOM involvement with it; Buzby handed Marsh the information paper and summarized it, and the Secretary then asked a series of questions on RAPT, Center Lane and the Institute, including the use of Monroe "in a personal services contract."[^37] The chronology notes for the January 5, 1984 briefing "MIAS discussed" with the Director of the Army Staff in attendance, and records that on March 13, 1984 that officer directed cancellation of RAPT as a Center Lane personnel screening vehicle. Operations ceased on September 28, 1984.[^30]
The INSCOM High Performance Task Force report of March 1983, *An INSCOM Beyond Excellence*, lists the Institute at "Nellysford, VA 22958" in its vendor roster, describing the technique as "A machine aided process which more closely aligns brain wave activity (frequency/amplitude) in both left and right brain hemispheres."[^10] After Center Lane passed to the Defense Intelligence Agency under a memorandum of agreement of February 11, 1985, the [[Sun Streak]] unit's reports of February 1987 and July 15, 1987 list, among advanced individual training for selected experienced remote viewers, Hemisync training "available from The Monroe Institute," which "has been successfully employed in the past and is fully documented under separate cover."[^29][^38]
### The Gateway Assessment of 1983
On June 9, 1983, Lieutenant Colonel Wayne McDonnell, signing as Commander, Det O, sent a study titled "Analysis and Assessment of Gateway Process" to the commander of the US Army Operational Group at Fort Meade. He wrote that he had been tasked to assess the Gateway Experience "in terms of its mechanics and ultimate practicality," and that conversations with a physician who took the Gateway training with him led him to the biomedical models of [[Itzhak Bentov]].[^39]
His paper describes the Gateway sequence: the "energy conversion box," resonant humming, the Hemi-Sync frequencies and numbered Focus states, with Focus 12 for expanded awareness and "tools," Focus 15 as the past and Focus 21 as the future. It states that "Probably less than five percent of all participants in any given Gateway Experience actually fully achieve the Focus 15 state during the course of the approximately seven days of training." It records that Monroe informed the Gateway class that finished May 7, 1983 that an ex-trainer operating in Charlottesville found he could guarantee out-of-body movement by bringing participants down into REM sleep and then using the Hemi-Sync tape technique, and quotes Monroe in a recent magazine article as saying that the out-of-body tape employs Beta signals of "around 2877.3 CPS."[^39]
On information collection, the paper reports that, according to one of the Institute's trainers, numerous experiments had sent persons "from one coast to the other in the out-of-body state to read a series of ten computer generated numbers in a university laboratory," and that "Although most have aquired enough of the digits to make clear that their consciousness was present none have ever succeeded in getting all ten correct." Paragraph 38 concludes: "There is a sound, rational basis in terms of physical science parameters for considering Gateway to be plausible in terms of its essential objectives."[^39]
McDonnell's recommended approach for the Army runs through twelve steps, lettered A to L. They begin with the Gateway Hemi-Sync tapes for hemisphere synchronization, add REM-sleep frequencies and hypnotic suggestion, and repeat the sequence until out-of-body movement is under conscious control, then proceed to Focus 15 and 21. Step H proposes a multi-focus approach in which three individuals go out of the body together, one viewing the target in time-space, one viewing it at Focus 15 as it slips into the immediate past and one at Focus 21 as it slips from the immediate future, with the three debriefed and compared. Step J advises being "intellectually prepared to react to possible encounters with intelligent, non-corporal energy forms when time-space boundaries are exceeded," and step K proposes that groups at Focus 12 "unite their altered consciousness to build holographic patterns around sensitive areas to repulse possible unwanted out-of-body presences."[^39]
### Board of Advisors and Staff
A memorandum for record of August 25, 1983 states that "The activities and policies of the Institute are set by a Board of Advisors," and lists seventeen names since June 1, 1981 with titles and positions. The psychiatrist Arthur Gladman was president of [[Gladman Memorial Hospital]] in Oakland, California. [[David Francis]], a senior executive, was chairman of the board of [[Princess Coal]] in Huntington, West Virginia. [[Thomas Campbell]], a physicist, was a research physicist at the [[United States Department of Defense|Department of Defense]]. Stuart Twemlow, a psychiatrist, was a clinician and researcher formerly of the Menninger Foundation. Fowler Jones, an educator, was a professor of psychology at the [[University of Kansas Medical Center]]. Todd Mikurea, a psychiatrist, was listed as a researcher and writer. Mary Jane Ledyard, a psychologist, was a transpersonal psychologist at the [[Federal Executive Institute]] in Charlottesville. [[Anthony K. Busch]], a psychiatrist, was a clinician in St. Louis. [[Arthur J. Ellison]], an educator, was chairman of the Department of Electrical Engineering at [[City University, London]]. The remaining names were [[Carole Dean]], president of [[Studio Films]] in Los Angeles; [[James Beal]], an aerospace engineer associated with [[Martin Marietta]] in New Orleans; [[Joseph Chilton Pearce|Joseph Pearce]], listed as the author of Bond of Power, Magical Child and Crack in the Cosmic Egg; [[William E. Herrmann]], a former manager of the professional training division of [[General Electric]] in New York; [[Wilson Bullard]], a biochemist and professor at the [[University of Utah]]; [[Bill D. Schul]], an educator and research psychologist directing a research foundation in Wichita, Kansas, in biofeedback research and development; [[Gregory Chandler]], a newspaper publisher on Long Island; and [[David Stanley]], a cardiovascular surgeon at [[Oak Ridge]], Tennessee, who "Currently uses tapes during actual operations."[^40]
The memorandum also lists Mary Jane Ledyard, [[Samuel Caughron]] and [[Martin Albert]] as consultants available during a seminar, and recommends that questions on the technology in use at the Institute and its medical impact "can best be answered by MG Garrison Rapmund, Commander, USA Medical Research and Development Command, Fort Detrick, MD."[^40] The Institute's 1982 bulletin gives the board as of June 1, 1981 with [[Warren Braun]], an engineer, in the place of Ellison, and lists the 1982 staff: [[R. F. Korbesmeyer]], director of administration; [[Melissa Jager]], director of training; [[Rosalind McKnight]], research coordinator; [[Lucinda Honeycutt]], registrar; and field representatives Carole Dean in Los Angeles, Arthur Ellison in London, [[Christian Schaller]] in Geneva and [[Jack Scher]] in New York.[^18]
### Officers and Finances
The Institute is a 501(c)(3) organization with employer identification number 90-0681223 and an address at 365 Roberts Mountain Road, Faber. Reported total revenue was $2,274,489 and expenses $2,402,778 for 2011, revenue was $4,552,691 for 2019, total assets were $6,300,323 at the end of 2020, and for 2023 revenue was $4,221,775, expenses $5,274,465 and assets $4,047,002.[^5]
[[Nancy McMoneagle]] was executive director and then president for tax years 2016 to 2018, with reportable compensation of $88,426, $93,017 and $96,985, and [[Angie Smith]] was secretary and treasurer at $59,281, $62,392 and $66,578. The directors for 2016 were [[Frank Kenna]], [[Fred Rible]], [[Joseph Felser]], [[Claude Swanson]], [[Chris Van Cleemput]], [[Juanita Lee Fisher]], [[Rolf Nuyts]] and [[Linda Connolly]]; by 2017 Kenna was chairman and [[Janet Reed]] and [[Stephen Ng Qui Sang]] had joined.[^41][^42][^43] [[Scott Taylor]] was president and executive officer for 2019 at $75,283 and for 2020 at $98,654, with Kenna as chairman for 2019 and Reed as board chair for 2020.[^44][^45] For 2021, [[Allyn Evans]] was interim CEO at $51,943, and for 2022 president at $99,107, with Reed as board chair, Kenna as secretary and Fred Rible as treasurer.[^46][^47] For 2023 Evans was paid $148,452, Reed as chair, Kenna as treasurer, [[Joel McGinely]] as secretary, and directors [[James Becker]] and [[Luigi Sciambarella]].[^4]
Nancy McMoneagle, Robert Monroe's stepdaughter and the wife of Joe McMoneagle, was director of the Institute from 1983 to 1991 and president and executive director from 2014 until she retired on March 4, 2019, when Scott Taylor succeeded her.[^48]
### Atwater and the Institute
Frederick Atwater, the Center Lane operations officer who first attended the Gateway program in September 1980, published a 1997 paper on binaural beat technology under the Institute's name.[^49] According to the Center Lane Project's biographical glossary, in September 1988 he accepted the position of Research Director in the Bob Monroe Research Lab at the Institute, and in December 2006 he became its president.[^50] Army papers of 1983 list him both as Captain, MI, and as "Mr."[^51] His memoir, *Captain of My Ship, Master of My Soul*, describes his Army remote viewing career and his later work at the Institute.[^52]
### The Gateway Document Release
The McDonnell study carries a CIA reading room release stamp of September 10, 2003. On January 24, 2021, [[John Greenewald]] posted it on [[The Black Vault]] as a document from the CIA's Stargate collection. The post, last modified February 19, 2024, states that page 25 of the 29-page document had been missing for as long as the site had known of the document, that a 2021 request for the page was "lost" by the CIA, that a December 2023 follow-up produced the answer that the page could not be found and that a request should be sent to INSCOM, and that page 25 was later received from the Institute itself, according to an article the post cites.[^53]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Schnabel, Jim. *Remote Viewers*. Dell, 1997.
[^2]: Keenan, Robert E., memorandum "GRILL FLAME," 902d Military Intelligence Group, September 25, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200240011-2. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection. US Army Intelligence and Security Command, information paper "The Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences," ITAGPA-F-SD, January 5, 1984, CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270004-2. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection. US Army Intelligence and Security Command. *An INSCOM Beyond Excellence: Army High Performance Task Force Report,* March 1983, archive.org item INSCOMHPTFReport. "Request for Administrative Review of INSCOM Grill Flame Protocol," c. 1981-83, CIA-RDP96-00788R001100200005-4.
[^1]: Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences, *The Gateway Program*, promotional text, c. 1980-83. CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270006-0, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection (second copy CIA-RDP96-00788R001700210040-8).
[^2]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, information paper "The Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences," IAGPA-F-SD, January 5, 1984, with attached Institute material including "The Discovery Program." CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270004-2, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
[^3]: Monroe, Robert A., *Journeys Out of the Body*, updated edition (Main Street Books, Doubleday), author note and Far Journeys reference. archive.org item journeys_out_body.
[^4]: Internal Revenue Service, Form 990 of The Monroe Institute, tax year ending December 31, 2023, Part VII and formation year, object ID 202431839349301258 (IRS TEOS XML, 2024_TEOS_XML_07A).
[^5]: ProPublica Nonprofit Explorer, The Monroe Institute, EIN 90-0681223, organization and filing data (ruling date June 2011; filing totals 2011 to 2023). projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/900681223.
[^6]: Monroe, Robert A., *Journeys Out of the Body* (Doubleday), including Charles T. Tart, introduction dated Davis, California, January 10, 1971, and Monroe's Experiment EEG-5 of July 19, 1966. archive.org item journeys_out_body.
[^7]: 902d Military Intelligence Group, GONDOLA WISH assessment report, August 25, 1978, paragraphs 3 to 8. CIA-RDP96-00788R002000160001-3, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
[^8]: Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences, *The Explorer* vol. 1, no. 2, "New Land Construction Now Under Way," 1978. CIA-RDP96-00788R001700210063-3, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
[^9]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, "Request for Administrative Review of INSCOM GRILL FLAME Protocol," undated (it refers to the protocol of June 1, 1981), signed Chad B. White, Colonel, GS, ADCSOPS-HUMINT, to BG Garrison Rapmund. CIA-RDP96-00788R001100200005-4, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
[^10]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, *An INSCOM Beyond Excellence: Army High Performance Task Force Report*, March 1983, vendor roster. archive.org item INSCOMHPTFReport, file "INSCOM_HPTF Report_djvu.txt".
[^11]: Tart, Charles T., "Six Studies of Out-of-Body Experiences," *Journal of Near-Death Studies* 17, no. 2 (1998): 73-99, third, fourth and fifth studies, pp. 83-90. digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc799368/.
[^12]: 902d Military Intelligence Group, memorandum "Attendance at Scientific Seminar in Support of GONDOLA WISH (U)," July 31, 1978, signed Frederick H. Atwater, Project Officer. CIA-RDP96-00788R002000160013-0, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
[^13]: Multidisciplinary Association for Psychedelic Studies, "Exploring the Near-Death Experience: An Interview with Charles Tart, Ph.D.," interview of December 16, 2009, biographical note. maps.org/news/bulletin/exploring-the-near-death-experience-an-interview-with-charles-tart-ph-d/.
[^14]: The Monroe Institute, "2015 Professional Seminar: Charles Tart Remembers Robert Monroe," Institute archive upload, March 17, 2015. archive.org/details/2015-charles-tart.
[^15]: Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences, "A Communication from the Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences," Hemi-Sync Process, Bulletin PR31380H. CIA-RDP96-00788R001700210065-1, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
[^16]: US Patent 3,884,218, "Method of inducing and maintaining various stages of sleep in the human being," inventor Robert A. Monroe, assignee Monroe Industries Inc., filed September 30, 1970, granted May 20, 1975. patents.google.com/patent/US3884218A.
[^17]: US Patent 5,356,368, "Method of and apparatus for inducing desired states of consciousness," inventor Robert A. Monroe, assignee Interstate Industries Inc., filed March 1, 1991, granted October 18, 1994. patents.google.com/patent/US5356368A.
[^18]: Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences, bulletin "1982 Gateway Program Schedule" with board list as of June 1, 1981, staff list and "The Gateway Voyage Program." CIA-RDP96-00788R001200060009-5, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
[^19]: Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences, "The Discovery Program" ($95.00 including postage), attachment to the INSCOM information paper of January 5, 1984. CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270004-2, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
[^20]: Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences, bulletin "Professional Division Opens," 1980. CIA-RDP96-00788R001700210061-5, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection. The executive committee member appears as Todd Mickurea in this bulletin, Todd Mijurea in the memorandum of August 25, 1983 and Todd Mikurea in the 1982 bulletin.
[^21]: Kron, Joan, profile of the Institute's M-5000 program, New York magazine, year-end issue (undated reprint). CIA-RDP96-00788R001700210026-4, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
[^22]: Keenan, Robert E., memorandum "GRILL FLAME," 902d Military Intelligence Group, TAGPA-F-CO, September 25, 1978. CIA-RDP96-00788R001200240011-2, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
[^23]: 902d Military Intelligence Group, memorandum for BG Smith, "GRILL FLAME Status Report (U)," TAGPA-CO, September 26, 1978, signed Littlefield. CIA-RDP96-00788R001100440004-9, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
[^24]: US Army, "Human Use Chronology," entry of September 26, 1978. CIA-RDP96-00788R001100430001-3, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
[^25]: Atwater, Frederick H., memorandum for the record, "Trip Report, 18-28 September 1980," September 30, 1980. CIA-RDP96-00788R001200060028-4, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
[^26]: Atwater, Frederick H., CPT, MI, Ops/Training Officer, memorandum "Your Inquiry re: Discovery Series and Gateway Program (U)," IAGPC-G, March 12, 1982. CIA-RDP96-00788R001200060027-5, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
[^27]: Command Psychologist, DA Form 2496 "Individual Training Requirements-Joe," April 13, 1982. CIA-RDP96-00788R001200060008-6, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
[^28]: Jachim, Robert J., memorandum for ADCSOPS-HUMINT, "Advanced Individual Training for DET G Personnel (U)," April 21, 1982. CIA-RDP96-00788R001200060007-7, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
[^29]: Defense Intelligence Agency, action memorandum for the Deputy Secretary of Defense, "DIA Psychoenergetics Activity," S/NF/WNINTEL-135/GC, March 1985. CIA-RDP96-00788R001100390001-8, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
[^30]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, *Center Lane Information Papers for Director, Defense Intelligence Agency*, March 7, 1985, including "CENTER LANE Mission" (October 10, 1984), the budget history, the training programs paper and the approval history chronology. CIA-RDP96-00788R000400060001-2, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection (chronology also at CIA-RDP96-00788R001100020001-8).
[^31]: INSCOM Grill Flame Program, session report, remote viewing session #928, July 6, 1982. CIA-RDP96-00788R000700290001-4, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
[^32]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, memorandum "Secretary of the Army Briefing, 5 October 1983," IAGPA-F-SD, October 12, 1983, with Inclosure 2, the briefing script. CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270014-1, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
[^33]: Center Lane briefing scripts for LTC Buzby and Fred Atwater, undated. CIA-RDP96-00788R001700340002-6 and CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270022-2, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
[^34]: Security Support Detachment, USAINSCOM, memorandum for record "Continuation of MIAS Advanced Training (U)," IAGPA-F-SD, March 29, 1984. CIA-RDP96-00788R001700210002-0, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
[^35]: Buzby, Brian, fact sheet "GRILL FLAME/CENTER LANE," January 31, 1984. CIA-RDP96-00788R001200050001-4, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
[^36]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, memorandum "Secretary of the Army Briefing, 5 October 1983," IAGPA-F-SD, October 12, 1983, paragraph 1 (attendees and times). CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270014-1, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
[^37]: Security Support Detachment, USAINSCOM, 902d Military Intelligence Group, memorandum "MIAS Briefing to the Secretary of the Army, 5 January 1984," IAGPA-F-SD, January 6, 1984. CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270003-3, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
[^38]: Defense Intelligence Agency, DT-S, "SUN STREAK Annual Report 1986," February 1987 (CIA-RDP96-00788R001000010001-0), and "SUN STREAK Report - Second Quarter CY 87," July 15, 1987 (CIA-RDP96-00788R001000390007-3), advanced individual training appendix, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
[^39]: McDonnell, Wayne M., "Analysis and Assessment of Gateway Process," US Army Operational Group, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, June 9, 1983, paragraphs 1 to 5, 32, 33, 38 and the recommended steps. CIA-RDP96-00788R001700210016-5, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
[^40]: Memorandum for record, "Board of Advisors for Monroe Institute of Applied Science (M.I.A.S.)," August 25, 1983. CIA-RDP96-00788R001700210014-7, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
[^41]: Internal Revenue Service, Form 990 of The Monroe Institute, tax year 2016, Part VII, object ID 201721239349301212 (IRS TEOS XML, download990xml_2017_3).
[^42]: Internal Revenue Service, Form 990 of The Monroe Institute, tax year 2017, Part VII, object ID 201832569349300913 (IRS TEOS XML, download990xml_2018_5).
[^43]: Internal Revenue Service, Form 990 of The Monroe Institute, tax year 2018, Part VII, object ID 201920829349300002 (IRS TEOS XML, download990xml_2019_4).
[^44]: Internal Revenue Service, Form 990 of The Monroe Institute, tax year 2019, Part VII, object ID 202000789349300500 (IRS TEOS XML, download990xml_2020_1); a second filing for the same year is object ID 202021849349300207.
[^45]: Internal Revenue Service, Form 990 of The Monroe Institute, tax year 2020, Part VII, object ID 202110779349301201 (IRS TEOS XML, 2021_TEOS_XML_01A).
[^46]: Internal Revenue Service, Form 990 of The Monroe Institute, tax year 2021, Part VII, object ID 202230879349300233 (IRS TEOS XML, 2022_TEOS_XML_01A).
[^47]: Internal Revenue Service, Form 990 of The Monroe Institute, tax year 2022, Part VII, object ID 202303139349300725 (IRS TEOS XML, 2023_TEOS_XML_11A).
[^48]: The Monroe Institute, "From the Director's Chair: March 2019, Nancy's Farewell." monroeinstitute.org/blogs/blog/director-s-chair-march-2019-nancys-farewell.
[^49]: Atwater, F. Holmes, "Accessing Anomalous States of Consciousness with a Binaural Beat Technology," *Journal of Scientific Exploration* 11, no. 3 (1997): 263-274, author affiliation line.
[^50]: Center Lane Project, glossary entry "Fred Holmes Skip Atwater." centerlane-rv.org/glossary/skip-atwater.
[^51]: Security Support Detachment, USAINSCOM, memorandum "CENTER LANE TDY/Leave Schedule - 6-16 Sep 83," IAGPA-F-SD, August 31, 1983 ("Mr. Fred Atwater"). CIA-RDP96-00788R001600520010-8, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection. The designation Captain, MI, appears in CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270014-1.
[^52]: Atwater, F. Holmes, *Captain of My Ship, Master of My Soul: Living with Guidance*. Hampton Roads, 2001.
[^53]: Greenewald, John, "Stargate Collection: Analysis and Assessment of Gateway Process, 9 June 1983," The Black Vault, posted January 24, 2021, last modified February 19, 2024. theblackvault.com/documentarchive/stargate-collection-analysis-and-assessment-of-gateway-process-9-june-1983/.