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---
---
created: 2026-05-15
updated: 2026-05-15
updated: 2026-10-12
title: Bundesnachrichtendienst
aliases:
- BND
- Federal Intelligence Service
- Bundesnachrichtendienst
- Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND)
- German Federal Intelligence Service
tags:
- Organization
- Intelligence
- Germany
- ColdWar
- GehlenOrganization
- NaziPersonnel
- CryptoAG
- NSASurveillance
- Curveball
- Eikonal
- Merex
- ArmsTrade
category: "Foreign Government"
summary: "The Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) is Germany's federal foreign intelligence service, established April 1, 1956 by absorbing the CIA-funded Gehlen Organization under founder Reinhard Gehlen, and defined throughout the Cold War by the Heinz Felfe penetration scandal and its structural inheritance of former Nazi intelligence personnel."
summary: "The Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) is Germany's foreign intelligence service, formed in 1956 from the CIA-sponsored Gehlen Organization, and in October 2026 its former president August Hanning was arrested on warrants requested by the Federal Prosecutor."
start: 1956-04-01
location: "Pullach, Bavaria (original HQ); Berlin (from 2019)"
relations:
- type: head_of
with: Reinhard Gehlen
start: 1956-04-01
end: 1968
role: President
fn: 7
- type: head_of
with: Gerhard Wessel
start: 1968
role: President
fn: 12
- type: head_of
with: August Hanning
start: 1998-12-17
end: 2005-11-30
role: President
fn: 46
- type: employed_by
with: Heinz Felfe
reverse: true
start: 1951
end: 1961-11
role: counterintelligence officer
fn: 14
- type: funded
with: Central Intelligence Agency
reverse: true
start: 1946
end: 1956-04-01
role: sponsor of the Gehlen Organization
fn: 4
- type: owned
with: Crypto AG
start: 1970
end: 1993
role: joint owner with the CIA
fn: 38
- type: partner_of
with: NSA
start: 2002
role: Eikonal and Bad Aibling cooperation
fn: 41
- type: informant_for
with: Curveball
reverse: true
start: 2000
role: source whose reporting the BND supplied to the United States
fn: 36
- type: informant_for
with: Klaus Barbie
reverse: true
start: 1966-05
end: 1966-12
role: source in Bolivia, codename Adler
fn: 23
- type: informant_for
with: Gerhard Mertins
reverse: true
start: 1956
role: source codenamed Uranus, director of the arms firm Merex
fn: 25
- type: employed_by
with: Franz Rademacher
reverse: true
start: 1961
role: paid source, former German Foreign Office deportation specialist, based in Syria
fn: 21
- type: partner_of
with: Stepan Bandera
start: 1956-03
role: BND support for Ukrainian nationalist operations, including a trained team sent in July 1959
fn: 27
---
The Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND; Federal Intelligence Service) is the foreign intelligence service of the [[Germany|Federal Republic of Germany]]. It collects foreign intelligence, conducts signals intelligence (SIGINT), and coordinates counterintelligence activities in support of German national security and foreign policy. The BND is the direct institutional successor to the [[Gehlen Organization]], the private intelligence network that [[Reinhard Gehlen]] operated under CIA sponsorship from 1946 until West German sovereignty was restored.[^1]
The Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND; Federal Intelligence Service) is the foreign intelligence service of the [[Germany|Federal Republic of Germany]]. It collects foreign intelligence, conducts signals intelligence (SIGINT) and maintains liaison with the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] and the [[NSA]]. The service descends from the [[Gehlen Organization]], the network that [[Reinhard Gehlen]] ran under [[United States Army|U.S. Army]] and then CIA sponsorship from 1946 until West German sovereignty was restored, and it was formally established on April 1, 1956.[^1]
### Origins: The Gehlen Organization
### Origins under the Army and the CIA
The BND's predecessor was created through a bargain struck between Gehlen and American intelligence in May 1945. Gehlen had headed the Wehrmacht's Fremde Heere Ost (Foreign Armies East) intelligence section - the German military's primary intelligence service for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. As Germany collapsed, Gehlen had his staff microfilm their entire Soviet intelligence archive and bury it in the Bavarian mountains, then surrendered to American forces with the explicit offer to place this irreplaceable anti-Soviet intelligence in American hands.
The Gehlen group was first run under an American arrangement codenamed [[Operation RUSTY]]. Gehlen had headed the Wehrmacht's [[Fremde Heere Ost]] (Foreign Armies East) directorate, which covered the Soviet Union and the Eastern Front. His memoir describes microfilming the [[Wehrmacht]]'s files on the Soviet Union, burying them in the mountains and surrendering to American forces with the microfilm.[^2] A statement by his deputy [[Gerhard Wessel]] recorded in the CIA's history places the decision in spring 1944: Gehlen resolved then to salvage the directorate's files and records "for the West," and after [[Adolf Hitler]] relieved him on April 9, 1945, he moved the files, already photostated and microfilmed, by army truck to three sites in southern Germany, near the Wilder Kaiser, Marquartstein and Schliersee. Wessel succeeded him as chief of the directorate.[^3]
The U.S. Army, and subsequently the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]], accepted the arrangement. Gehlen and his former Wehrmacht and Abwehr staff were moved to a compound at Pullach, south of Munich, where they continued to operate under CIA oversight as the "Gehlen Organization" or simply "the Org." The CIA funded the operation, reviewed its product, and used it as the primary source of intelligence on the Soviet military from 1946 onward.[^1]
Between 1945 and 1949 the U.S. Army handled the organization and funded its intelligence collection, and the Army wanted the CIA and its predecessors to take over responsibility for it.[^4] Lieutenant General [[Lucius D. Clay]], the U.S. military governor, opposed CIA involvement in RUSTY, and his retirement in the spring of 1949 cleared the way for the Agency to assume control in July of that year. [[James H. Critchfield]]'s December 1948 report for Director of Central Intelligence [[Roscoe Hillenkoetter]] was decisive in persuading CIA officials to take responsibility for the Organization.[^5]
When West Germany (the Federal Republic) regained sovereignty under the 1955 Paris Agreements, the Org was transferred from CIA control to the new West German federal government. On April 1, 1956, it became the Bundesnachrichtendienst. Gehlen was named its first president, a position he held until 1968.[^1]
The Army's [[Counter Intelligence Corps]] arrested several Germans in 1946 who said they worked for American intelligence. The [[Strategic Services Unit]] representative who investigated the arrests reported that "some of the agents employed were [[SS]] personnel with known Nazi records and, in most cases, undesirable people."[^6] In August 1948 the acting chief of the CIA's [[Karlsruhe]] Operations Base wrote about RUSTY's recruiting methods "with great disgust." A former Wehrmacht officer named Baun had built his own network inside RUSTY, and the Americans and Gehlen removed him during 1947. In late 1947 RUSTY moved from [[Oberursel]] to its own compound at [[Pullach]], a village near [[Munich]], and Col. Willard K. Liebel replaced Col. Deane as operations officer.[^6]
### Cold War Operations
The CIA assumed responsibility for the Organization from the Army in 1949 and held it in what the CIA called "trusteeship" until 1956. Critchfield was the Agency's representative at Pullach from June 1949 until 1956.[^7] The CIA's 1945 to 1949 history describes the group as a "double edged sword" that "boosted the [[Warsaw Pact]]'s propaganda efforts" and that "suffered devastating penetrations by the [[KGB]]," as shown by the [[Heinz Felfe]] and [[Hans Clemens]] cases.[^8] The [[National Security Archive]] posted the history in February 2005 in a briefing book that notes Gehlen employed numerous former Nazis and known war criminals.[^9]
The BND's Cold War role was shaped by Germany's unique geographic position as the primary front line between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. [[Berlin]], divided between Western and Soviet occupation zones, was the central arena of East-West intelligence operations. The BND ran agent networks inside [[German Democratic Republic|East Germany]], monitored [[Stasi]] and [[KGB]] activities, and served as the CIA's primary liaison for operations targeting the Soviet Bloc.[^1]
The CIA acknowledged an intelligence relationship with Gehlen for the first time in an October 2000 court filing in the Freedom of Information Act case Oglesby v. Army. The [[Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act]] processing that followed released the Army's 2,100-page Gehlen file and nearly 2,100 further pages from CIA files, together with files on many of Gehlen's personnel and agents.[^10]
The BND suffered a structural vulnerability: the widespread use of former Nazi intelligence and SS personnel among its founding staff, many of whom had wartime connections to Soviet intelligence services through the complex loyalties of the war years.[^1]
### Founding in 1956 and the succession to Gehlen
### The Heinz Felfe Penetration
Under the 1955 [[Paris Agreements]], West Germany regained sovereignty and the Organization passed to the new federal government. On April 1, 1956 it became the Bundesnachrichtendienst, with Gehlen as its first president. He held the post until 1968.[^7] The Pullach compound, the personnel roster and the operational assets went with it, and the CIA-BND liaison replaced the CIA-Organization relationship.[^1]
The most damaging intelligence failure in BND history was the case of Heinz Felfe, a senior officer who served as head of the BND's Soviet counterintelligence section while simultaneously working as a KGB double agent.
A CIA field report distributed on December 20, 1967 relayed an account from a "qualified American observer" of a conversation with a West German official named [[Horst Ehmke|Ehmke]]. According to the account, the [[Social Democratic Party of Germany|Social Democratic Party]] (SPD) had decided to back Lieutenant General Gerhard Wessel as Gehlen's successor and wanted the vice presidency in return. The Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union had proposed Ambassador Swidbert Schnippenkoetter for the presidency. The SPD candidates for vice president were [[Guenther Nollau]], vice president of the [[Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz|BfV]], and Guenther Redding, president of the Hamburg office for the protection of the constitution.[^11] Wessel was the BND president by December 1969, when the service's telex on the security review of [[Günter Guillaume]] was sent.[^12]
Felfe had served in the SS Security Service (SD) during World War II. After the war he was briefly interned by the British before being released. He was recruited by Soviet intelligence in the late 1940s before joining the Gehlen Organization in 1951. Over the following decade Felfe rose to lead the counterintelligence section responsible for detecting Soviet penetrations - the precise position that gave him access to nearly all of the BND's anti-Soviet agent networks and methods.
The BND's Cold War work was shaped by Germany's position as the front line between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The service ran agent networks inside [[German Democratic Republic|East Germany]], monitored [[Stasi]] and KGB activities, and served as the CIA's primary liaison for operations against the Soviet Bloc. [[Berlin]], divided between Western and Soviet occupation zones, was the central arena of these operations.[^13] After the uprisings in East Germany in the summer of 1953 the Soviets and East Germans moved against the Organization: in late November 1953 the Communists announced the roll-up of West German agent networks in the East, three cases led to the exposure of hundreds of other assets, and by the end of that year more than 200 Organization agents had fled to West Germany to avoid arrest.[^7]
When Felfe was arrested on November 6, 1961, the extent of the damage became clear: he had provided the KGB with the identities of approximately one hundred Western agents operating inside the Soviet Bloc, many of whom had been arrested or killed. His 1963 trial resulted in conviction; he was sentenced to fourteen years. In 1969, Felfe was exchanged for Western agents held by the Soviet Union.
### Former SS and SD personnel
The Felfe case directly implicated Gehlen's policy of recruiting former Nazi intelligence and SS personnel regardless of wartime loyalty complications. The KGB had specifically exploited the wartime records of potential recruits to identify those who could be approached.[^1]
The Organization's counterintelligence base at Karlsruhe, designated GV"L" in the CIA's study of the Felfe case, was heavily staffed by former [[Sicherheitsdienst|SD]] and SS personnel who had to conceal their backgrounds to keep their jobs. The base developed an informal association of former SS and SD men for mutual protection and career advancement, and that group was susceptible to blackmail and to appeals based on revenge and vindication.[^14]
### The Gunter Guillaume Affair
The Soviets exploited the Organization's employment of former SS officers, and after the Felfe and Clemens scandals "it is believed that over 200 BND officers resigned or were dismissed in the 1960s because they had concealed their wartime pasts."[^7] The Pullach operations base played no role in vetting the Organization's staff, because Gehlen refused to give the true names of his staff and agents.[^7] The KGB exploited the wartime records of potential recruits to identify those who could be approached.[^13]
The BND's most politically significant Cold War case involved not its own personnel but a Stasi agent operating inside the West German government. [[Gunter Guillaume]] was an East German citizen who had emigrated to [[West Germany]] in 1956, established himself as a Social Democratic Party (SPD) activist, and risen to become a personal aide to Chancellor [[Willy Brandt]]. Guillaume was an officer of the [[Stasi|HVA]] - the Stasi's foreign intelligence directorate headed by [[Markus Wolf]].
The historians of the U.S. Interagency Working Group on the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act described nine of fourteen second-tier CIA name files as involving individuals who had contact with the Gehlen Organization. Their case summaries record the following:[^15]
BND suspicions about Guillaume developed from the late 1960s, but the sensitivity of disclosing that a spy had reached the Chancellor's office complicated the investigation. Guillaume was arrested on April 24, 1974; he confessed within days. Brandt resigned as Chancellor on May 7, 1974, partly because of the security failure. The affair was among the most damaging East German intelligence operations of the Cold War.[^2]
- [[Emil Augsburg]], an SD major and department director at the Wannsee Institute who had been wanted by Poland for war crimes, was used by the CIC in 1947 and 1948 and then taken on by the Organization. By 1953 the Organization viewed him as a "shining star" of counterespionage. Gehlen insisted in 1954 that he work outside Pullach because of his RSHA past, and he was dismissed in 1966 after the BND concluded in late 1965 that he could be a double agent.
- [[Franz Goering]], an aide to Walter Schellenberg in the RSHA foreign intelligence branch, was a BND official in 1959 when a former colleague who was a Soviet agent took intelligence records from his home in Hamburg and left a note inviting him to defect.
- [[Wilhelm Harster]], an SS lieutenant general and Security Police commander in the Netherlands and Italy, whose file notes implication in the murder of 104,000 Jews, could not join the BND as a security risk but presented himself to others as a BND agent and recommended former SS contacts to the service. He had been Heinz Felfe's superior, and the file indicates he used Felfe to reach the BND.
- [[Wilhelm Krichbaum]], former head of the Wehrmacht Secret Field Police and a district chief in the Organization, did not tell the Organization or the CIA of his contacts with two Viennese brothers-in-law who ran a literary agency in the Soviet sector of Vienna that the file describes as an espionage front. A 1963 document apparently from the BND concluded he had worked for the Soviets since 1950.
- [[Franz Six]], an Einsatzkommando officer sentenced at Nuremberg, was reported to have joined the Organization in the mid-1950s. In 1963 the East German media charged that Gehlen had recently transferred a number of former SS and SD officials, among them Six, Augsburg and Goering, to camouflaged positions to reduce criticism that he was using war criminals.
- [[Friedrich Panzinger]], a former Gestapo colonel, was released from Soviet prison in 1956 with a secret mission to penetrate the BND, reported the mission to the West German authorities and was used by them as a double agent. He killed himself in a cell in 1959 before a possible Bavarian war-crimes arrest, and West German intelligence reviews afterwards could not determine whether he had ever been loyal to the West.
- [[Hans Sommer]], a Gestapo official in Norway and France, was recruited for counterespionage in early 1950 and dropped in 1953. [[Wilfried Krallert]] was picked up in 1952. There are indications that [[Horst Kopkow]] surfaced as an Organization official. [[Guido Zimmer]] contacted Gehlen in December 1948.
### Post-Cold War and Modern Era
The same historians concluded that in settling on men such as Augsburg the CIC, the CIA and the Gehlen Organization made the West more vulnerable to Soviet espionage.[^15]
German reunification in October 1990 produced an enormous intelligence windfall: the Stasi archives, including the ROSENHOLZ files containing the identities of East German and Soviet agents throughout the West. The files took years to analyze and generated prosecutions, diplomatic incidents, and revelations about the extent of Eastern Bloc penetration of Western institutions.
The BND's own Independent Historians' Commission (Unabhängige Historikerkommission, UHK) was established by contract in February 2011. A parliamentary question of May 2022 describes its research focus as the BND's handling of the Nazi past, both its own personnel "Altlasten" and the early Federal Republic's handling of the subject, and states that fourteen studies had been published by then.[^16] The commission's first volume, by Christoph Rass, drew on a random sample of 3,650 life histories from the personnel files of the just under 12,000 staff who worked for the BND at Pullach until 1968 or for the Organization until 1956, and counted formal "markers" of National Socialist ties (NSDAP and other organizations, and service in the Reich's police, Waffen-SS and RSHA).[^17] The historian [[Dominik Rigoll]] summarized the first four volumes in 2016: Nowack's study of security reviews in the 1960s recorded the removal of 68 persons, who were treated as security risks because they could be blackmailed, and Sälter's volume described the Organization's revival of the Nazi image of the "Red Orchestra" resistance as a fifth column.[^17] In October 2022 a report attributed to Sälter's volume on Nazi continuities stated that up to 20 percent of the personnel in the Organization's early years "demonstrably had blood on their hands," that more than 30 of them had taken part in mass shootings with Einsatzgruppen, and that the recruitment of accomplices in the Holocaust and in war crimes had been a system until the 1960s.[^18]
[[Edward Snowden]]'s 2013 disclosures revealed that the BND had cooperated extensively with the [[NSA]] in mass surveillance operations targeting European communications. The BND Act was reformed in 2016 and 2021 following Federal Constitutional Court rulings that the agency's surveillance activities required more explicit statutory authorization.
The most recent study cited in the 2022 parliamentary question is [[Klaus-Dietmar Henke]], "Geheime Dienste. Die politische Inlandsspionage des BND in der Ära Adenauer," which the question describes as covering BND surveillance of the SPD carried out on the instruction of [[Konrad Adenauer]].[^16] A volume by Agilolf Keßelring on the Organization and the defense of West Germany from 1949 to 1953 documents, in a reviewer's summary, a secret emergency plan to gather veterans of the old Wehrmacht elite divisions, and of the Waffen-SS, behind the Rhine in case of a Soviet attack. The Wehrmacht colonel Albert Schnez had begun preparing such an army cadre in 1949 without the knowledge of the federal government; connections between the Schnez organization and Gehlen existed from the summer of 1951, and Gehlen evidently made the project a matter for his personal attention. About 3,000 men were recorded on index cards and lists, and the plan provided for a force of 40,000 in three divisions.[^19]
The BND's headquarters were transferred from Pullach to a new purpose-built complex in Berlin, completed in 2019.[^2]
### The BND and Alois Brunner
Members of [[Die Linke]] asked in May 2022 whether the redactions in the Henke volume concealed BND knowledge of the whereabouts of [[Alois Brunner]], whom the question described as a 1938 staff member of the Vienna office for Jewish emigration and deputy to [[Adolf Eichmann]]. The same question asked whether the BND had a "nachrichtendienstliche Verbindung" to the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem, citing [[Willi Winkler]], who wrote in the [[Süddeutsche Zeitung]] on April 20, 2022 that a lawyer may have been that link and that a journalist may have been an informant placed near the trial.[^16] In June 2022 the government answered the Brunner question with "Ja, dies kann ausgeschlossen werden" ("Yes, this can be ruled out") and referred back to earlier answers on the trial.[^20]
CIA files released under the Disclosure Act and described by the historians Richard Breitman and Norman Goda record several BND contacts around Brunner's circle in the Middle East. In 1959 a high BND official codenamed Winterstein conceded to the CIA that the BND had a loose relationship with [[Wilhelm Beisner]], a former SD officer who was in Cairo trading arms, and most of the CIA's information on his Egyptian activities originated with the Gehlen Organization. Mail to Beisner's Munich apartment was intercepted by an intelligence agency and copied to the CIA; the BND said it was a French operation and the CIA thought the BND itself might have done it. From a handwritten reply in that mail the CIA concluded, by comparing handwriting, that a correspondent in Damascus signing as Rischer was Brunner, then an adviser to Syrian intelligence. In March 1961 a BND official codenamed Glueckrath told a CIA officer in Munich that Brunner had attended meetings of an "Egyptian SS group" in late 1960 and January 1961 with [[Fritz Katzmann]] and the Nazi propagandist [[Johannes von Leers]], where Brunner claimed to hold a list of Jews who had collaborated, to be used for blackmail. The former German Foreign Office deportation specialist [[Franz Rademacher]], who had fled to Syria, was put on the payroll of the West German secret service in 1961 or early 1962; the CIA knew of his BND status and had no direct contact with him. Brunner survived an assassination attempt and, in the historians' account, remained in Syria and apparently died there in 1992.[^21]
### Klaus Barbie, Merex and the arms trade
In 1966 the BND recruited [[Klaus Barbie]], the former Gestapo chief of Lyon then living in La Paz as Klaus Altmann, as a source codenamed Adler.[^22] The historian [[Peter Hammerschmidt]] wrote in 2012 that the Amt used Barbie between May and December 1966, shielded him from prosecution and paid him 5,300 marks in total; he reported on left-wing forces in Bolivia, and the BND ended the connection after he declined to travel to Germany for training.[^23][^24] A few weeks after the recruitment Barbie became the Bolivian representative of the arms firm Merex.[^25]
Merex was run by [[Gerhard Mertins]], a former SS man who in Hammerschmidt's account had worked for the BND under the codename Uranus since 1956. The firm sold surplus [[Bundeswehr]] weapons and equipment abroad on the BND's behalf, above all in the Middle East. Hammerschmidt reported in June 2011, from files of German and American intelligence services, that a Merex representative acting as a double agent of the BND and CIA toured Latin America in July 1966, and that during the tour the former Luftwaffe pilot [[Hans-Ulrich Rudel]] introduced him to Friedrich Schwend, a former RSHA counterfeiter of British banknotes, and to the former SS officer Willem Sassen, who became a representative in Argentina two days after the first contact with the Merex representative; that Schwend, Barbie and Rudel had founded a firm named La Estrella in the early 1960s that employed former SS officers; that [[Otto Skorzeny]] was drawn into the Merex business; and that Merex and Barbie handled the delivery of four Transall C-160 aircraft from the West German defense ministry to Bolivia and Peru in March 1968. The CIA files, in Hammerschmidt's description, record that the BND was "very interested" in the representative's contacts with Rudel and other Germans in Latin America, which he called a clear sign that the Barbie recruitment was "only the tip of the iceberg" of BND collaboration with Nazi criminals.[^25] Marti wrote in 2025 that Barbie, as Merex's Bolivian representative from 1966, also arranged the delivery of Austrian tanks used in the 1980 coup, and that the Germans had made no effort to inquire about his identity.[^24]
The Federal Chancellery gave an official account of the BND's arms-trade contacts in February 1979 in a reply to the Higher Regional Court of Cologne in a civil suit involving [[Karl Carstens]]. The Chancellery stated that in the 1960s the BND maintained connections to arms trading firms, among them Merex AG and its dependent companies Deutsche Merex GmbH and Wehrexport GmbH, and a firm dependent on Dobbertin & Co. The purpose was stated as reconnaissance of the international arms trade. The BND went beyond observation: to move the firms to provide information it advised them on initiating and conducting deals, named them to the defense ministry as buyers for surplus Bundeswehr material and occasionally acted as intermediary by passing sales requests from the ministry or from foreign interested parties to the firms. From 1965 to September 1969 the Merex companies exported arms to various states on a larger scale, in numerous cases having obtained the required export approvals by naming incorrect recipient countries or, in some cases, by use of forged end-user certificates. A criminal case against Mertins and others ended in acquittal on November 26, 1975. The Chancellery stated that the BND had evidently known of the transactions in all essential phases, and that a senior BND official was released from service for five years from May 1, 1969 to steer the reconnaissance activity and took the post of deputy chairman of the management at the Dobbertin company. The same file records that Wessel told a dpa bureau chief on December 15, 1978 that the BND had never itself traded in arms and that its task was to find out where weapons were flowing.[^26]
The CIA's records also show the BND's relations with the Ukrainian nationalist leader [[Stepan Bandera]]. After a brief sponsorship by Italian military intelligence in early 1956, Bandera offered the BND his lines into Ukraine in March 1956 in return for money and weapons. The CIA warned the West Germans against any operational relationship, saying all alleged Bandera assets in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Ukraine were non-existent or ineffective. In April 1959 Gehlen's adviser Heinz Danko Herre, Bandera's contact in the BND, supported a mission, and a team trained and funded by the BND crossed from Czechoslovakia in late July.[^27]
### Heinz Felfe
Heinz Felfe was born in [[Dresden]] in 1918. According to the CIA study he was inducted into an SS reserve unit in 1938, and from then on his schooling, legal training and police career were guided by the SS; the historian Goda gives 1936 for his entry into the SS and 1943 for his commission.[^14][^28] In 1943 he joined the foreign intelligence section of the [[Reich Main Security Office]] (RSHA), serving first in its Swiss section and then in the Netherlands. He finished the war as an Obersturmführer in the [[Waffen-SS]] and was taken prisoner by the British.[^14] The British held him at an interrogation center near Utrecht that specialized in former German intelligence personnel. After his release he worked from 1947 for a British military intelligence unit in Bonn, assigned to report on communist student groups, and joined the [[Communist Party of Germany|Communist Party]] (KPD).[^14]
The British decided in April 1950 to drop Felfe, after he had tried to sell information to several agencies and two news services and had revealed himself as a British agent to his own contacts. Their files, received by the BND in 1961 and by the CIA in 1962, recorded that they told him his contacts with former SS personnel, named as [[Helmut Proebsting]] and Hans Clemens, could no longer be tolerated.[^14] Clemens was a former colleague from the RSHA foreign intelligence arm. The KGB recruited Clemens first, in Dresden in February 1950, and then, through Clemens, Felfe and a third Dresdener, [[Erwin Tiebel]].[^14] Goda dates Felfe's full status as a Soviet agent, codenamed Paul, to September 1951.[^28] After leaving the British Felfe worked for the North Rhine-Westphalia state security office and then as a refugee interrogator at the Ministry for All-German Affairs, and he was recruited into the Gehlen Organization in 1951.[^14] The CIA study records that British files showed he had told his case officer in early 1950 that he intended to offer Clemens to the North Rhine-Westphalia state security office.[^14]
Felfe was a BND officer for ten years, six of them as deputy chief of the section responsible for countering Soviet espionage, and the CIA study describes the post as in practice the real chief of the section. He was a dedicated Soviet agent throughout.[^14] Goda states that he took charge of counterintelligence against the Soviets in 1955, and Hechelhammer, the BND's chief historian, describes him as having risen to head of counterintelligence against the Soviet Union.[^28][^29] The Army's Counter Intelligence Corps had noted in 1953 his role as leader of an "SD clique" in the Organization, and in 1955 that suspicion of him and the clique was growing; the CIA suspected him by 1957, while he had Gehlen's confidence and personally briefed him on Soviet matters.[^28] The CIA's record shows that the first official briefings on the agency's Karlshorst penetration program were given to him in May 1958, February 1959 and July 1959, and that he became the BND headquarters supervisor of the joint Karlshorst program.[^14] Felfe was detected through a lead from a CIA-run penetration of the Polish intelligence service (UB), identified in the study as the defector Michal Goleniewski, and he was arrested on November 6, 1961, with Clemens and Tiebel.[^14][^30] Felfe is credited with the compromise of approximately one hundred Western agents operating in the Soviet Bloc, many of whom were arrested or killed.[^13] The CIA's 1963 damage assessment, as summarized by Goda, estimated that about 15,000 individual items were blown or compromised.[^28]
Felfe was tried in July 1963 and sentenced to fourteen years. Clemens received nine years and Tiebel two years at hard labor.[^14] From prison Felfe kept up contact with the KGB, and the Soviets tried to obtain his release in exchange for prisoners held in the East.[^14] In 1969 he was released to East Germany in exchange for three West German spies, and a BND archive photograph shows the exchange at the Herleshausen border crossing.[^28][^29] Hechelhammer states that he later worked for the Stasi as a full-time informal collaborator.[^29] He published a memoir, *Im Dienst des Gegners* (1986).[^31]
### The Günter Guillaume affair
The BND's most politically significant Cold War case involved not its own personnel but a Stasi agent operating inside the West German government. Günter Guillaume was an East German citizen who had emigrated to [[West Germany]] in 1956, established himself as a Social Democratic Party (SPD) activist and risen to become a personal aide to Chancellor [[Willy Brandt]]. Guillaume was an officer of the [[Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung|HVA]], the Stasi's foreign intelligence directorate headed by [[Markus Wolf]].[^32]
The BND had a card entry dating from April 1954 that recorded that Guillaume was reported to have travelled the Federal Republic for the East Berlin publisher [[Volk und Wissen]], to make contacts with publishers, printers and persons and then infiltrate them from the east. The Bundestag's Second Inquiry Committee reproduced a BND telex received on December 17, 1969 that reported the entry and noted that its truth could no longer be checked.[^33] The BND also held information that Volk und Wissen served as a legal residency for [[Ministry for State Security]] members.[^33]
BND suspicions about Guillaume developed from the late 1960s, but the sensitivity of disclosing that a spy had reached the Chancellor's office complicated the investigation. Guillaume was arrested on April 24, 1974, and confessed within days. Brandt resigned as Chancellor on May 7, 1974, partly because of the security failure. The affair was among the most damaging East German intelligence operations of the Cold War.[^32]
Markus Wolf wrote that the HVA penetrated the BND, the Federal Chancellery, the Foreign Ministry and both major West German parties, and that the full scope became clear only after reunification.[^34]
### Reunification and the Stasi files
The backup copy of the microfilmed index cards and statistical sheets of the Stasi's foreign intelligence directorate (Hauptverwaltung A) carries the name Rosenholz, assigned by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. The Stasi Records Agency received the data sets concerning German nationals from the CIA by March 2003; data on foreigners were not handed over. The 280,000 person records cover the whole period of the directorate's activity to January 1988, with 54 percent concerning citizens of the Federal Republic, 38 percent citizens of the GDR and 8 percent unassigned. The copies were handed to the German authorities between 1999 and 2003 on 381 CDs.[^35] The files took years to analyze and generated prosecutions, diplomatic incidents and revelations about the extent of Eastern Bloc penetration of Western institutions.
### Curveball and the Iraq assessments
The CIA's own memorandum on its contact with the BND's source codenamed [[Curveball]] states that the BND provided the vast majority of Curveball's reporting to the United States government, and that U.S. intelligence agencies had no direct access to him until mid-March 2004, when the BND allowed CIA officers to debrief him. The memorandum judges him unreliable because he fabricated his claimed access to a mobile biological weapons production project.[^36]
The [[Robb-Silberman Commission]] described Curveball as an Iraqi chemical engineer who came to the Intelligence Community's attention through a "foreign liaison service." The commission wrote that the service debriefed him and shared the results with the United States but would not give American officers direct access. Between January 2000 and September 2001 the [[Defense Intelligence Agency]]'s Defense HUMINT Service disseminated almost 100 of his reports on mobile biological weapons facilities. The commission wrote that "virtually all" of the Intelligence Community's information on those facilities came from a source "who was a fabricator."[^37] The CIA memorandum names the BND as the service.[^36]
### Crypto AG and Operation Rubicon
The Swiss parliamentary Control Delegation (Geschäftsprüfungsdelegation, GPDel) reviewed an American history of the operation, titled MINERVA, which describes how American intelligence services used the Swiss manufacturer [[Crypto AG]] for their own purposes in agreement with its Swedish owner. According to the GPDel's summary of that history, in 1970 the company passed into joint ownership of American services and the German intelligence service. German participation ended in late 1993, and the account closes in 1995. The GPDel also found that the Swiss [[Strategic Intelligence Service]] had reliable information from autumn 1993 that American and German services owned the firm, and that the Swiss service set out to break the encryption of the firm's weaker export devices.[^38]
The Washington Post reported in February 2020 that the company had been owned and run by the CIA in partnership with the BND for most of its history. In the Post's audio report the reporter [[Greg Miller]] said "By 1970, the CIA and the BND own this company," after buying it from its founder.[^39] The Post's coverage of the operation names Thesaurus and Rubicon.[^39]
### Bad Aibling and the NSA
The BND's [[Bad Aibling Station]] was built on a U.S. military site. According to the Bundestag's NSA inquiry, the American Army operated the station from 1952 to 2004, collecting satellite traffic from crisis regions. Former BND president [[August Hanning]] testified that the station was not run by the NSA and described it as a relic of the occupation period.[^40] Closure planned for 2002 was postponed after the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the NSA collected satellite traffic from the station until 2004. In April 2004 the U.S. Army gave up the station, and the [[Joint SIGINT Activity]] took over its essential technical facilities, including the antenna field. Hanning testified that the arrangement placed Bad Aibling under German sovereignty, with American access to its results provided through the BND.[^40]
### Operation Eikonal
Operation [[Eikonal]] was a BND collection point on a fibre-optic cable near Frankfurt am Main, run with the NSA in the Joint SIGINT Activity from 2004 to 2008. Its internal codename was GRANAT. Witnesses said it rested on a Memorandum of Agreement of 2002. The former BND department head [[Reinhardt Breitfelder]] testified that cooperation at Bad Aibling had been extended from satellite collection to a cable project for foreign-to-foreign traffic, with the results to be shared.[^41] A witness also said that cable collection in Frankfurt was discussed at a BND leadership conference in March 2002, and that Breitfelder sketched the plan in a paper.[^41]
The Süddeutsche Zeitung reported in June 2014 that the BND had collected data at a Frankfurt data node for years and passed raw data to the NSA, that the arrangement was halted in 2007 over its political sensitivity, and that the NSA had protested. The committee's report cites that reporting.[^41]
### NSA selectors
In late 2005 or early 2006 BND staff at Bad Aibling found NSA selectors (telephone numbers and other communication identifiers) targeting the European companies [[EADS]] and [[Eurocopter]], with numbers located outside Germany. On January 25, 2006 the station confirmed that the selectors were no longer used for collection, and the BND stopped using 74 numbers, 52 for EADS and 22 for Eurocopter.[^42] Former BND president [[Gerhard Schindler]] described the finding as the start of a third filter stage, for selectors that violated "deutsche Interessen."[^42]
According to the committee's report, in August 2013 a special review of the NSA selector stock found a large number of unlawful selectors concerning European government bodies. The Bad Aibling staff member who ran the search deleted about 12,000 features on the instruction of the station head. The report lists at least nine persons in the BND who knew of the review and its findings before March 2015, and states that the president and the Chancellery were reportedly informed only in March 2015.[^43] The report's section on the period is headed as the concealment of the NSA selector findings in the 2013 election year. Schindler was the BND president at the time of the 2013 review.[^43]
### Surveillance law and reform
The Bundestag's NSA inquiry followed the 2013 disclosures of [[Edward Snowden]], which the report describes as the source of public knowledge of the BND's role in mass surveillance.[^43] The 2016 reform of the BND Act, passed by the grand coalition, put strategic foreign-to-foreign surveillance into statute. The [[Federal Constitutional Court]] ruled on May 19, 2020 (1 BvR 2835/17) that this surveillance was unconstitutional as then regulated, that Article 10 of the [[Basic Law]] protects foreigners abroad, and that an independent oversight body was required. The legislature had until the end of 2021 to rewrite the rules.[^44] The federal cabinet approved a new bill on December 16, 2020.[^44]
### Later espionage cases and Berlin headquarters
In 2014 a BND employee, Markus R., was exposed as a source for the CIA; between 2008 and 2014 he passed on more than 200 documents, received at least 80,000 euros and was sentenced in March 2016 to eight years. In the case of the BND employee Carsten L. the Federal Prosecutor charged him with obtaining nine internal documents in September and October 2022 for the businessman Arthur E., who allegedly passed information to the Russian service FSB; both are charged with especially serious treason in a trial that began in December 2023.[^30] The BND was headquartered at Pullach until its new complex in Berlin was opened. Chancellor [[Angela Merkel]] opened the new headquarters on February 8, 2019, and called the move a milestone in the development of the German foreign intelligence service.[^45]
### Former president arrested in 2026
On October 6, 2026 the Federal Prosecutor (Bundesanwaltschaft) had August Hanning and his former office head arrested by officers of the [[Bundeskriminalamt]] in the district of Bad Tölz-Wolfratshausen in Bavaria and in the district of Steinfurt in North Rhine-Westphalia, on warrants issued by the investigating judge of the [[Federal Court of Justice]]. Searches of the suspects' premises began there and in Berlin the same day. The release states a strong suspicion against Hanning of unlawful espionage (landesverräterische Ausspähung, section 96 paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code), gathering state secrets (section 96 paragraph 2), attempted treason (section 94 paragraph 1 with section 22) and intelligence agent activity (section 99 paragraph 1 number 1). The office head is charged with aiding attempted treason and unlawful espionage (sections 94, 96 and 27).[^46]
The release gives the following facts as the warrants' allegation. Hanning was BND president from December 1998 to the end of November 2005, and the office head served as his office head, followed him as a seconded assistant when he was state secretary in the Federal Ministry of the Interior from December 2005 to November 2009, and from March 2012 to March 2026 served as office head for several later BND presidents. Probably in spring 2010 the two agreed that the office head would continuously obtain valuable BND findings for Hanning for payment, which Hanning could exploit commercially in his private consulting work. Until June 2022, by the state of the investigation, the office head supplied nearly 2,000 documents, many classified, intended only for internal BND use for briefing and preparing the agency's leadership, in particular for the intelligence situation meeting held at the Federal Chancellery. In one case Hanning used classified findings so supplied to prepare an analysis for an employee of a foreign intelligence security apparatus; whether the product reached the addressee could not be established. Hanning was also in intensive exchange with a member of another state intelligence service, whom he supplied over several years with political information, in part based on material from the office head.[^46]
The proceeding rests on finds from a search of Hanning's premises that the Hamburg public prosecutor carried out in September 2025 in an investigation concerning [[Christina Block]] and others; the matter was submitted to the Bundesanwaltschaft in early May 2026 for takeover. The investigation is conducted with the BND and the Bundeskriminalamt.[^46] A second release of October 7, 2026 states that both men were presented to the investigating judge on October 6 and 7 and that the arrest warrants were put into effect.[^47] Both men are presumed innocent. beck-aktuell reported the same charges and allegations on the day of the arrests, and ZDF reported that Hanning denies involvement in the Block case and that, as of the arrest day, nothing pointed to a political motive; ZDF described Hanning as well connected and as having run several security firms. The current BND president [[Martin Jäger]] stated that the BND had opened extensive internal investigations early, which hardened the suspicion.[^48][^49] In November 2005, while he was BND president, Hanning apologized to a journalist after BND staff had surveilled journalists to find leaks, a matter later examined by parliament.[^50]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Murphy, David E., Sergei A. Kondrashev, and George Bailey. *Battleground Berlin: CIA vs KGB in the Cold War.* Yale University Press, 1997. Andrew, Christopher, and Vasili Mitrokhin. *The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West.* Allen Lane, 1999.
[^2]: Andrew, Christopher, and Oleg Gordievsky. *KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev.* HarperCollins, 1990. Gehlen, Reinhard. *The Service: The Memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen.* World, 1972.
[^1]: Central Intelligence Agency, *Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1949-56*, Vol. 1 (Kevin C. Ruffner, ed.), foreword, declassified 2007, https://archive.org/details/CIAAndTheOriginsOfTheBND1949-1956 (the Agency held the Gehlen Organization in trusteeship until 1956, when the West German government established its own national intelligence structure).
[^2]: Gehlen, Reinhard. *The Service: The Memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen.* World, 1972 (microfilm, burial of the files, surrender).
[^3]: Central Intelligence Agency, *Forging an Intelligence Partnership*, 1945-49, Vol. 1, document appendix, "Statement of Gerhard Wessel on Development of the German Organization" (undated): spring 1944 decision, the relief of Gehlen on April 9, 1945, the removal of microfilmed files to three sites, Wessel's succession at Fremde Heere Ost. Same URL as note 3.
[^4]: Central Intelligence Agency, *Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1945-49*, Vol. 1, Ruffner, ed., declassified 2002 under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, https://archive.org/details/CIAAndTheOriginsOfTheBND1945-1949 (the U.S. Army handled the Gehlen Organization and funded its intelligence collection, 1945 to 1949).
[^5]: Central Intelligence Agency, *Forging an Intelligence Partnership*, 1945-49, Vol. 1, photograph captions (Clay's opposition and retirement in spring 1949; Critchfield's December 1948 report; the Agency assuming control in July 1949). Same URL as note 3.
[^6]: Central Intelligence Agency, *Forging an Intelligence Partnership*, 1945-49, Vol. 1, passages on the 1946 CIC arrests, the Strategic Services Unit investigation, the August 1948 Karlsruhe memorandum, the removal of Baun during 1947, and the late 1947 move to Pullach with Liebel replacing Deane. Same URL as note 3.
[^7]: Central Intelligence Agency, *Forging an Intelligence Partnership*, 1949-56, Vol. 1, Part I and foreword, declassified 2007 (trusteeship from 1949 to 1956; James H. Critchfield at Pullach from June 1949; the 1953 roll-ups and more than 200 agents fleeing; the statement that over 200 BND officers left in the 1960s; the Pullach base's role in vetting). Same URL as note 1.
[^8]: Central Intelligence Agency, *Forging an Intelligence Partnership*, 1945-49, Vol. 1, Introduction (the "double edged sword" passage). Same URL as note 3.
[^9]: National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 146, "The CIA and Nazi War Criminals," posted February 4, 2005, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB146/
[^10]: Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, *Final Report to Congress*, April 2007, Figure 12, "The Gehlen files," and the chapter on the CIA, https://www.archives.gov/files/iwg/reports/final-report-2007.pdf (Oglesby v. Army filing of October 2000; the 2,100-page Army file; Naftali, "Reinhard Gehlen and the United States," in Breitman et al., *U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis*, 2004).
[^11]: Central Intelligence Agency, field report "SPD Views on Succession to Gehlen Presidency and Vice Presidency," distributed December 20, 1967, document C07005044, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-07005044
[^12]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 7/3246, "Bericht und Antrag des 2. Untersuchungsausschusses," February 19, 1975, security review section (BND telex of the president, December 23, 1969), https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/07/032/0703246.pdf
[^13]: Murphy, David E., Sergei A. Kondrashev, and George Bailey. *Battleground Berlin: CIA vs KGB in the Cold War.* Yale University Press, 1997 (Cold War operations, KGB use of recruits' wartime records, the Felfe agent count).
[^14]: Central Intelligence Agency, "KGB Exploitation of Heinz Felfe: Successful KGB Penetration of a Western Intelligence Service," March 1969, document C02606328, released February 21, 2019, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/node/2071209 (printed pages 12 to 23 and the summary: the SD and SS background, the Utrecht internment, the British employment, the April 1950 dismissal, the 1961 and 1962 file transfers, the GV"L" base, the recruitment through Clemens, the Karlshorst briefings, the Polish UB lead, the November 1961 arrest and the July 1963 sentences).
[^15]: Breitman, Richard, "Historical Analysis of 20 Name Files from CIA Records," Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, 2001, https://www.archives.gov/iwg/declassified-records/rg-263-cia-records/historical-analysis-by-breitman.pdf (entries on Augsburg, Goering, Harster, Krichbaum, Six, Panzinger, Sommer, Krallert, Kopkow, Zimmer and the conclusion).
[^16]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 20/1963, Kleine Anfrage of Die Linke, May 24, 2022, https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/20/019/2001963.pdf (UHK contract of February 2011, fourteen studies, research focus on the Nazi past, the Henke volume, questions 7 to 10, and the citation of Willi Winkler in the Süddeutsche Zeitung, April 20, 2022). Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 19/26519, Kleine Anfrage on the UHK, February 9, 2021, https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/19/265/1926519.pdf
[^17]: Rigoll, Dominik, "Nazi-Verstrickungen beim Geheimdienst: Die braunen Wurzeln des BND," *die tageszeitung*, December 9, 2016, https://taz.de/Nazi-Verstrickungen-beim-Geheimdienst/!5363325/ (Rass's sample of 3,650 life histories from the roughly 12,000 staff to 1968; Nowack's 68 exclusions; Sälter's volume on the "Red Orchestra"; the 1953 roll-up of 93 informants).
[^18]: dts Nachrichtenagentur, "Über 30 BND-Mitarbeiter bei Kriegsverbrechen im Zweiten Weltkrieg," October 7, 2022, reporting Hessischer Rundfunk on Gerhard Sälter, *NS-Kontinuitäten im BND* (Ch. Links, 2022), https://regionalheute.de/ueber-30-bnd-mitarbeiter-bei-kriegsverbrechen-im-zweiten-weltkrieg-1665142867/
[^19]: Weise, Niels, review of Agilolf Keßelring, *Die Organisation Gehlen und die Verteidigung Westdeutschlands* (UHK Studien 3, 2014), and of the UHK conference volume, *sehepunkte* 16 (2016), no. 2, https://www.sehepunkte.de/2016/02/26494.html
[^20]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 20/2192, answer of the federal government, June 7, 2022, https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/20/021/2002192.pdf (answer to question 10, "Ja, dies kann ausgeschlossen werden," and the reference back to the answers to questions 2 to 2b for questions 7 to 9).
[^21]: Breitman, Richard, and Norman J. W. Goda, *Hitler's Shadow: Nazi War Criminals, U.S. Intelligence, and the Cold War*, National Archives, 2010, "Nazis and the Middle East," pp. 22 to 30, https://www.archives.gov/files/iwg/reports/hitlers-shadow.pdf (Beisner and the BND, Winterstein, the intercepted mail, Rischer identified as Brunner, Glueckrath's March 1961 account, Rademacher's BND payroll, Brunner's death in Syria).
[^22]: Bundesarchiv, file B 206/1983, 1966 to 1968, "Klaus Altmann als Quelle des BND (Deckname Adler)," catalogued in the Deutsche Digitale Bibliothek, https://www.deutsche-digitale-bibliothek.de/item/KN44LFOZYQMNMMVTPNQMIFALRTYMBJDK
[^23]: Hammerschmidt, Peter, "Die Geheimakte Klaus Barbie," *die tageszeitung*, January 31, 2012, https://taz.de/Ein-Altnazi-und-die-deutschen-Geheimdienste/!5101916/ (codename Adler, May to December 1966, 5,300 marks); Bundesarchiv, file B 206/1983, "Klaus Altmann als Quelle des BND (Deckname Adler)."
[^24]: Marti, Werner J., "The second life of Klaus Barbie," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, July 2, 2025, https://www.nzz.ch/english/the-second-life-of-klaus-barbie-a-nazi-war-criminals-rise-in-bolivia-ld.1891151
[^25]: Gessler, Philipp, "Alt-Nazis beim Bundesnachrichtendienst: Code-Name Uranus," *die tageszeitung*, June 19, 2011, https://taz.de/Alt-Nazis-beim-Bundesnachrichtendienst/!5118343/ (Hammerschmidt's presentation to the International Intelligence History Association; Merex, Uranus, Rudel, Schwend, Sassen, La Estrella, Skorzeny, the Transall delivery of March 1968).
[^26]: Der Chef des Bundeskanzleramtes, official information to the 6th Civil Senate of the Oberlandesgericht Köln, Rechtsstreit Prof. Carstens ./. Metzger, 6 U 164/78, February 1979, https://fragdenstaat.de/dokumente/3844/ (BND connections to arms trade firms, the Merex companies, the 1965 to 1969 exports, the acquittal of November 26, 1975, the BND officer at Dobbertin, and Wessel's statement of December 15, 1978).
[^27]: Breitman and Goda, *Hitler's Shadow*, 2010, chapter on collaborators, pp. 82 to 84 (Bandera, the BND, Herre, the July 1959 mission), https://www.archives.gov/files/iwg/reports/hitlers-shadow.pdf
[^28]: Goda, Norman J. W., "CIA Files Relating to Heinz Felfe, SS officer and KGB Spy," Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, 2008, https://fas.org/sgp/eprint/goda.pdf (the 1969 release in exchange for three West German spies; the 15,000 items; the "SD clique"; Felfe's entry to the SS and to the Organization).
[^29]: Hechelhammer, Bodo, interview, "Spion Heinz Felfe: Für ihn lieferten die Sowjets kleinere Fische ans Messer," *t-online*, March 22, 2020, https://www.t-online.de/nachrichten/panorama/wissen/geschichte/id_87517540/spion-heinz-felfe-fuer-ihn-lieferten-die-sowjets-kleinere-fische-ans-messer-.html (head of Soviet counterintelligence; the exchange at Herleshausen, photograph from the BND archive; the work for the Stasi).
[^30]: ZDF, "BND-Affären: Von Hanning und Felfe bis Landesverrat an Russland," October 6, 2026, https://www.zdfheute.de/politik/deutschland/bnd-affaeren-spionage-hanning-skandale-100.html (Markus R. and the CIA; the case of Carsten L. and Arthur E.; the 2005 surveillance of journalists; the 1961 arrest, the 1963 sentence and the 1969 exchange of Felfe).
[^31]: Felfe, Heinz. *Im Dienst des Gegners: 10 Jahre Moskaus Mann im BND.* Rasch und Röhring, 1986.
[^32]: Andrew, Christopher, and Oleg Gordievsky. *KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev.* HarperCollins, 1990 (Guillaume's emigration and career, the BND suspicions, the April 24, 1974 arrest, the May 7, 1974 resignation).
[^33]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 7/3246, security review section (the BND card entry of April 1954 and its statement that the entry's truth could no longer be checked; the BND telex of December 17, 1969; the BND information on Volk und Wissen as a residency for MfS members), https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/07/032/0703246.pdf
[^34]: Wolf, Markus. *Spionagechef im geheimen Krieg* (memoir).
[^35]: Bundesarchiv, MfS-Lexikon, "Rosenholz," https://www.bundesarchiv.de/im-archiv-recherchieren/stasi-unterlagen-einsehen/hinweise-zum-mfs/mfs-lexikon/detail/rosenholz/ (name given by the BfV; transfer by March 2003; 280,000 person records and the 54, 38 and 8 percent split; 381 CDs, 1999 to 2003).
[^36]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum "Results of Our CIA Contact with BND Source 'Curveball,'" ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-039, document 1, declassified November 21, 2017, https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2013-039-doc01.pdf
[^37]: Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, *Report to the President*, March 31, 2005, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-WMD/pdf/GPO-WMD.pdf (the Iraq biological weapons section: the "foreign liaison service" passage, the Defense HUMINT Service count and the "virtually all" sentence).
[^38]: Geschäftsprüfungsdelegation der Eidgenössischen Räte, Bericht zur Crypto AG, press release of November 10, 2020, https://www.parlament.ch/centers/documents/de/bericht-gpdel-2020-11-10-d.pdf (sections 2.1.1 on the MINERVA history and 4.1.1 on the Swiss service's information from autumn 1993).
[^39]: Greg Miller and Martine Powers, *The Washington Post*, audio report on the CIA's Crypto AG operation, February 11, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/world/national-security/cia-crypto-encryption-machines-espionage/ (archived at https://perma.cc/52JY-BEW4).
[^40]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 18/12850, Abschlussbericht des 1. Untersuchungsausschusses der 18. Wahlperiode, June 23, 2017, pp. 761 to 763 (Bad Aibling history; testimony of August Hanning, BND president from December 17, 1998 to November 30, 2005), https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/18/128/1812850.pdf
[^41]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 18/12850, June 23, 2017, pp. 887 to 888 and the Eikonal chapter (Memorandum of Agreement of 2002; the GRANAT designation; testimony of Reinhardt Breitfelder and Harald Fechner on the March 2002 conference; the Süddeutsche Zeitung reports of June 26, 2014 and October 4, 2014).
[^42]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 18/12850, June 23, 2017, p. 805 (the EADS and Eurocopter selectors, the January 25, 2006 confirmation, the 74 numbers, and the testimony of Gerhard Schindler on the third filter stage).
[^43]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 18/12850, June 23, 2017, p. 1538 (the August 2013 review, the nine persons who knew of it before March 2015, the reported March 2015 notification, and the section heading on concealment in the 2013 election year) and the report's introduction on the Snowden disclosures.
[^44]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 19/25483, Kleine Anfrage of Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, December 21, 2020, citing Bundesverfassungsgericht, judgment of May 19, 2020, 1 BvR 2835/17 (the 2016 BND Act reform, the court's requirements, the end-2021 deadline, and the cabinet bill of December 16, 2020), https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/19/254/1925483.pdf
[^45]: Bundesregierung, speech by Chancellor Angela Merkel at the opening ceremony of the new BND headquarters in Berlin, February 8, 2019, https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/rede-von-bundeskanzlerin-merkel-bei-der-eroeffnungsfeier-der-neuen-zentrale-des-bundesnachrichtendienstes-am-8-februar-2019-in-berlin-1578762
[^46]: Der Generalbundesanwalt beim Bundesgerichtshof, Pressemitteilung Nr. 66, "Festnahmen wegen mutmaßlicher landesverräterischer Ausspähung, Auskundschaften von Staatsgeheimnissen, versuchten Landesverrats und Spionage," October 6, 2026, https://www.generalbundesanwalt.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2026/Pressemitteilung-vom-06-10-2026.html
[^47]: Der Generalbundesanwalt beim Bundesgerichtshof, press release "Haftbefehle wegen mutmaßlicher landesverräterischer Ausspähung u. a. in Vollzug gesetzt," October 7, 2026, https://www.generalbundesanwalt.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2026/Pressemitteilung-vom-07-10-2026-2.html
[^48]: beck-aktuell, "Ex-BND-Präsident August Hanning festgenommen," October 6, 2026, https://www.beck-aktuell.de/heute-im-recht/rechtsgeschehen/ex-bnd-praesidenten-august-hanning-festgenommen-2026-10-06
[^49]: ZDF, "Ex-BND-Chef August Hanning wegen Spionageverdachts festgenommen," October 6, 2026, https://www.zdfheute.de/politik/deutschland/august-hanning-ex-bnd-chef-spionage-100.html
[^50]: ZDF, October 6, 2026 (note 44), on the November 2005 apology.

28
20 - ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/INTERNATIONAL/Gehlen Organization.md
View file

@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ tags:
- Soviet
- 1940s
- 1950s
summary: "The Gehlen Organization was a CIA-funded intelligence network in West Germany from 1946 to 1956, built by Reinhard Gehlen from his Wehrmacht Eastern Front directorate to provide U.S. coverage of the Soviet bloc, before being reconstituted as the Bundesnachrichtendienst in April 1956."
summary: "CIA-funded intelligence network in West Germany from 1946 to 1956, built by Reinhard Gehlen from his Wehrmacht Eastern Front directorate, reconstituted as the Bundesnachrichtendienst in April 1956."
start: 1946-07-01
end: 1956-04-01
location: "Pullach, Bavaria, West Germany"
@ -26,10 +26,12 @@ The Gehlen Organization (Organisation Gehlen), commonly called "the Org," was a
### Origins: The Gehlen Deal
In April-May 1945, anticipating German defeat, Gehlen had the files of Fremde Heere Ost microfilmed and the film containers buried in the Austrian Alps. He surrendered to U.S. Army forces on May 22, 1945, and immediately proposed a bargain to his American captors: his organization, its accumulated records on the Soviet military and political structure, and its agent networks in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, in exchange for American protection, funding, and operational support.
In April-May 1945, anticipating German defeat, Gehlen had the files of Fremde Heere Ost microfilmed and the film containers buried in the Austrian Alps, as Gehlen's memoir states. The CIA history's statement by Gehlen's deputy Gerhard Wessel records that after Hitler relieved Gehlen on April 9, 1945 the microfilmed Fremde Heere Ost files were moved by army truck and dispersed in three places in southern Germany: near the Wilder Kaiser, near Marquartstein and near Schliersee.[^2] He surrendered to U.S. Army forces on May 22, 1945, and immediately proposed a bargain to his American captors: his organization, its accumulated records on the Soviet military and political structure, and its agent networks in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, in exchange for American protection, funding, and operational support.
The offer was accepted by the Strategic Services Unit, successor to the Office of Strategic Services, and Gehlen was transported to the United States in August 1945 for debriefing at Fort Hunt, Virginia. He returned to Germany in 1946 to begin operations under American supervision. The CIA, formally established in 1947, inherited the arrangement from its predecessor organizations and took over direct management of the Gehlen network.[^1]
The arrangement with the U.S. Army was codenamed Operation RUSTY. Between 1945 and 1949 the Army handled the Organization and funded its intelligence collection.[^3] In late 1947 RUSTY moved from Oberursel to its own compound at Pullach, a village near Munich, and Col. Willard K. Liebel replaced Col. Deane as operations officer.[^3] In 1946 the Army's Counter Intelligence Corps arrested several Germans who said they worked for American intelligence; the Strategic Services Unit representative who investigated found "some of the agents employed were SS personnel with known Nazi records and, in most cases, undesirable people."[^3] The CIA's acting chief at the Karlsruhe Operations Base wrote in an August 1948 memorandum that he viewed RUSTY's recruiting methods "with great disgust."[^3] Lieutenant General Lucius D. Clay opposed CIA involvement, and his retirement in the spring of 1949 cleared the way for the Agency to assume control in July of that year; James H. Critchfield's December 1948 report was decisive in persuading CIA officials to take responsibility.[^2]
The "Gehlen deal" gave the United States what no other arrangement could provide at that moment: an existing intelligence network with deep files on the Soviet military and security apparatus, agents in place across Eastern Europe, and operational experience in the specific geographical and political environment where American intelligence was most blind. The cost - accepting an organization staffed substantially by former Wehrmacht and Nazi intelligence personnel and directed by a general who had served Hitler - was accepted as the price of operational capability during the emerging Cold War.[^1]
### Operations at Pullach
@ -44,13 +46,19 @@ The organization ran agent networks in [[East Germany]] and across the Soviet bl
The extent of former SS and Nazi party personnel within the Org was a persistent controversy that official accounts understated during the Cold War. The CIA accepted the personnel inheritance as a practical necessity: Gehlen's network was composed of the people who had relevant experience, and rebuilding from scratch would have taken years during which the United States would have lacked the coverage that German intelligence veterans could provide.
Academic research, culminating in the German government's Unabhängige Historikerkommission (Independent Historians' Commission, the Scholz Commission) report of 2013 and subsequent publications, documented the extent of former SS membership and Nazi party affiliation among Org personnel. The commission found that approximately 10 percent of Org employees had been SS members (a substantially higher proportion than in the West German government generally), and that individuals with wartime records involving repression operations had served in sensitive positions.[^2]
Academic research, including the work of the Bundesnachrichtendienst's Unabhängige Historikerkommission (Independent Historians' Commission, established by contract in February 2011, with volumes appearing from 2016),[^4] documented the extent of former SS membership and Nazi party affiliation among Org personnel. Breitman and his co-authors report that approximately 10 percent of Org employees had been SS members (a substantially higher proportion than in the West German government generally), and that individuals with wartime records involving repression operations had served in sensitive positions.[^5]
The first Historians' Commission volume, by Christoph Rass, rests on a random sample of 3,650 life histories from the roughly 12,000 staff to 1968 and counts "NS markers"; Nowack's study of security reviews counted 68 persons removed in the 1960s, and Sälter's volume was reported in 2022 as finding that up to 20 percent of the early personnel had taken part in crimes and more than 30 in Einsatzgruppen shootings.[^6][^7]
### Former SS and SD Staff in the CIA's Name Files
The CIA acknowledged an intelligence relationship with Gehlen for the first time in an October 2000 court filing in Oglesby v. Army; the Disclosure Act processing released the Army's 2,100-page Gehlen file and nearly 2,100 further pages from CIA files.[^8] The Interagency Working Group historians found that nine of fourteen second-tier CIA name files involved individuals who had contact with the Organization.[^9] Emil Augsburg, an SD major and Wannsee Institute department director, was taken on by 1953 and regarded as a "shining star" of counterintelligence; Gehlen required him in 1954 to work outside Pullach, and he was dismissed in 1966.[^9] Wilhelm Krichbaum, former head of the Wehrmacht Secret Field Police, was a district chief in the Organization; a 1963 document apparently from the BND concluded he had worked for the Soviets since 1950.[^9] Hans Sommer, a Gestapo official, was recruited for counterespionage in early 1950 and dropped in 1953; Wilfried Krallert was picked up in 1952; Franz Six was reported to have joined in the mid-1950s.[^9] In 1963 the East German media charged that Gehlen had transferred a number of former SS and SD officials, among them Six, Augsburg and Franz Goering, to camouflaged positions.[^9] Friedrich Panzinger, released from Soviet custody in 1956 with a mission to penetrate the BND, reported it and was used as a double agent until his suicide in 1959.[^9]
The CIA's own records, as disclosed through Freedom of Information Act releases, documented awareness of the Nazi personnel inheritance. Agency officials weighed the operational value of Gehlen's network against the security and political risks of employing former Nazis, consistently prioritizing operational continuity. The arrangement created long-term political vulnerabilities when the personnel roster became more widely known.[^1]
### Soviet Penetration
The Org was penetrated by Soviet intelligence from its early years. The most serious known penetration was [[Heinz Felfe]], who joined the Org in 1951 and rose to become chief of counterintelligence. Felfe was a former SS officer who had been recruited by Soviet intelligence and operated as a KGB agent within the Org and its successor the BND for approximately a decade before being exposed in November 1961. His position in counterintelligence gave him access to the operations, agent identities, and procedures that he was tasked with protecting - a near-ideal placement for a Soviet penetration agent.[^1]
The Org was penetrated by Soviet intelligence from its early years. The most serious known penetration was [[Heinz Felfe]], who joined the Org in 1951 and rose to become chief of counterintelligence (the CIA study describes him as deputy chief of the section, in practice its real chief). Felfe was a former SS officer who had been recruited by Soviet intelligence and operated as a KGB agent within the Org and its successor the BND for approximately a decade before being exposed in November 1961. His position in counterintelligence gave him access to the operations, agent identities, and procedures that he was tasked with protecting - a near-ideal placement for a Soviet penetration agent.[^1]
Additional penetrations were identified over the years, and the extent of Soviet knowledge of Org operations has never been fully assessed. The KGB had specific and well-founded interest in penetrating the Gehlen network given both its CIA connection and its operational focus on the Soviet bloc.[^1]
@ -58,7 +66,17 @@ Additional penetrations were identified over the years, and the extent of Soviet
When West Germany recovered sovereignty in 1955 and joined [[NATO]], negotiations transferred the Gehlen Organization from American to West German government control. The BND was formally established on April 1, 1956, with Gehlen as its first president. The BND retained the Pullach compound, its personnel roster, and its operational assets. The CIA-BND liaison relationship that replaced the CIA-Org relationship maintained close cooperation on Soviet bloc intelligence through the remainder of the Cold War.[^1]
The CIA held the Organization in what its own history calls "trusteeship" from 1949 to 1956, and Critchfield was the Agency's representative at Pullach from June 1949 until 1956.[^10] After the East German uprising of 1953 the Communists announced in late November the roll-up of West German agent networks in the East; three cases led to the exposure of hundreds of other assets, and by the end of that year more than 200 Organization agents had fled to West Germany.[^10] The CIA history states that after the Felfe and Clemens scandals "it is believed that over 200 BND officers resigned or were dismissed in the 1960s because they had concealed their wartime pasts."[^10]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA.* Doubleday, 2007, pp. 33-56. Gehlen, Reinhard. *Der Dienst: Erinnerungen 1942-1971.* v. Hase & Koehler, 1971 (Gehlen's memoir). Trento, Joseph. *The Secret History of the CIA.* Forum, 2001.
[^2]: Breitman, Richard, Norman J.W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, and Robert Wolfe. *U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis.* Cambridge University Press, 2005. Goschler, Constantin, and Michael Wala. *"Keine neue Gestapo": Das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz und die NS-Vergangenheit.* Rowohlt, 2015.
[^2]: Central Intelligence Agency, *Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1945-49*, Vol. 1, document appendix, "Statement of Gerhard Wessel on Development of the German Organization," and photograph captions. https://archive.org/details/CIAAndTheOriginsOfTheBND1945-1949
[^3]: Central Intelligence Agency, *Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1945-49*, Vol. 1, chapters on Operation RUSTY (CIC arrests of 1946, the August 1948 memorandum, the move to Pullach). https://archive.org/details/CIAAndTheOriginsOfTheBND1945-1949
[^4]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 20/1963, Kleine Anfrage of Die Linke, May 24, 2022. https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/20/019/2001963.pdf
[^5]: Breitman, Richard, Norman J.W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, and Robert Wolfe. *U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis.* Cambridge University Press, 2005. Goschler, Constantin, and Michael Wala. *"Keine neue Gestapo": Das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz und die NS-Vergangenheit.* Rowohlt, 2015.
[^6]: Rigoll, Dominik, "Nazi-Verstrickungen beim Geheimdienst: Die braunen Wurzeln des BND," *die tageszeitung*, December 9, 2016. https://taz.de/Nazi-Verstrickungen-beim-Geheimdienst/!5363325/
[^7]: dts Nachrichtenagentur, "Über 30 BND-Mitarbeiter bei Kriegsverbrechen im Zweiten Weltkrieg," October 7, 2022. https://regionalheute.de/ueber-30-bnd-mitarbeiter-bei-kriegsverbrechen-im-zweiten-weltkrieg-1665142867/
[^8]: Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, *Final Report to Congress*, April 2007, Figure 12. https://www.archives.gov/files/iwg/reports/final-report-2007.pdf
[^9]: Breitman, Richard, "Historical Analysis of 20 Name Files from CIA Records," Interagency Working Group, 2001. https://www.archives.gov/iwg/declassified-records/rg-263-cia-records/historical-analysis-by-breitman.pdf
[^10]: Central Intelligence Agency, *Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1949-56*, Vol. 1, declassified 2007. https://archive.org/details/CIAAndTheOriginsOfTheBND1949-1956

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20 - ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/USA/Central Intelligence Agency.md
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@ -28,19 +28,19 @@ relations:
with: "[[Psychological Strategy Board]]"
role: "Member agency; the Director of Central Intelligence chaired meeting M-8"
start: 1952-01-10
fn: 43
fn: 44
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Max Millikan]]"
reverse: true
role: "Assistant Director, Research and Reports (1951); Special Consultant (1952)"
start: 1951-01
end: 1952-03
fn: 44
fn: 45
- type: funded
with: "[[Center for International Studies]]"
role: "agency money reported to have set up the center in 1951; $300,000 reported in 1967"
start: 1951
fn: 51
fn: 52
---
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is a primary intelligence-gathering organization of the United States government. In the context of psychic research, the CIA played a significant, albeit often covert, role in funding and overseeing programs aimed at exploring and utilizing psychic phenomena for intelligence purposes.[^1]
@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ In early 1982, CIA director William J. Casey and Attorney General [[William Fren
### Ilopango Obstruction
When [[DEA]] agent [[Celerino Castillo]] began investigating Contra drug trafficking at Ilopango, the CIA intervened directly. In April 1986 the El Salvador station sent a cable asking the Costa Rica station to persuade the DEA to back off: "El Salvador Station would appreciate Costa Rica Station advising DEA not to make any inquiries into anyone re: Hangar No. 4 at Ilopango since only legitimate CIA supported operations were conducted from this facility."[^29]
When [[DEA]] agent [[Celerino Castillo]] began investigating Contra drug trafficking at Ilopango, the CIA intervened directly.[^29] On April 25, 1986 the El Salvador station replied to a Costa Rica station cable of April 23 about Carlos Amador. The reply asked: "Based on that information, [El Salvador] Station would appreciate [Costa Rica] Station advising [DEA] not to make any inquiries to anyone re: hangar no. 4 at Ilopango since only legitimate [CIA] supported operations were conducted from this facility." The same cable stated that station air operations had moved from Hangar 4 into Hangar 5, which the station still occupied.[^30]
### Inspector General Investigation
@ -144,37 +144,37 @@ Multiple CIA officials were indicted during the Iran-Contra investigation. Clarr
### Interrogation videotapes and the 2004 to 2006 directorship
[[Porter Goss]], a former House intelligence chairman, was confirmed by the Senate 77 to 17 on September 22, 2004, was sworn in at the White House on September 24, 2004, and announced his resignation on May 5, 2006.[^30] His executive director, [[Kyle Foggo]], the agency's No. 3 official, resigned in May 2006 while the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] was examining whether he had improperly helped the defense contractor [[Brent Wilkes]] obtain large CIA contracts.[^31] Foggo pleaded guilty in 2008 to one count of defrauding the government and was sentenced on February 26, 2009 to 37 months.[^32]
[[Porter Goss]], a former House intelligence chairman, was confirmed by the Senate 77 to 17 on September 22, 2004, was sworn in at the White House on September 24, 2004, and announced his resignation on May 5, 2006.[^31] His executive director, [[Kyle Foggo]], the agency's No. 3 official, resigned in May 2006 while the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] was examining whether he had improperly helped the defense contractor [[Brent Wilkes]] obtain large CIA contracts.[^32] Foggo pleaded guilty in 2008 to one count of defrauding the government and was sentenced on February 26, 2009 to 37 months.[^33]
The [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]]'s 2014 study of the detention and interrogation program records that the CIA destroyed videotapes of the interrogations of [[Abu Zubaydah]] and [[Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri]] on November 9, 2005, the day after the Senate's November 8 vote against an amendment to establish an independent commission on detainee treatment.[^33] In an October 31, 2005 email, the CIA attorney [[John Rizzo]] wrote that he needed "to be the skunk at the party again."[^33]
The [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]]'s 2014 study of the detention and interrogation program records that the CIA destroyed videotapes of the interrogations of [[Abu Zubaydah]] and [[Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri]] on November 9, 2005, the day after the Senate's November 8 vote against an amendment to establish an independent commission on detainee treatment.[^34] In an October 31, 2005 email, the CIA attorney [[John Rizzo]] wrote that he needed "to be the skunk at the party again."[^34]
Emails released by the [[United States Department of Justice|Justice Department]] in April 2010, under a Freedom of Information Act request by the [[American Civil Liberties Union]], state that in November 2005 [[Jose A. Rodriguez Jr.|Jose Rodriguez]] told Goss and others he "felt it was extremely important to destroy the tapes and that if there was any heat, he would take it," and that Goss "laughed and said he'd be the one to take the heat." The same email states: "PG, however, agreed with the decision." NBC News reported that the email is an after-the-fact summary that does not prove Goss approved the destruction, that current and former intelligence officials have said he did not and was angry to find out, and that Rodriguez's lawyer disputed that.[^34] On November 9, 2010, the Justice Department said special prosecutor [[John Durham]] would not bring criminal charges over the destruction.[^35]
Emails released by the [[United States Department of Justice|Justice Department]] in April 2010, under a Freedom of Information Act request by the [[American Civil Liberties Union]], state that in November 2005 [[Jose A. Rodriguez Jr.|Jose Rodriguez]] told Goss and others he "felt it was extremely important to destroy the tapes and that if there was any heat, he would take it," and that Goss "laughed and said he'd be the one to take the heat." The same email states: "PG, however, agreed with the decision." NBC News reported that the email is an after-the-fact summary that does not prove Goss approved the destruction, that current and former intelligence officials have said he did not and was angry to find out, and that Rodriguez's lawyer disputed that.[^35] On November 9, 2010, the Justice Department said special prosecutor [[John Durham]] would not bring criminal charges over the destruction.[^36]
### Foreign Broadcast Information Service
The [[Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service]] became a unit of the agency in 1947. The [[War Department]] had sponsored the service from January 2, 1946, and the [[Director of Central Intelligence]] assumed control of it on July 31, 1946, before the [[National Security Act of 1947]] replaced the [[Central Intelligence Group]] with the agency.[^36] The administrative history of the service's record group lists the successor as "Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Intelligence Agency, 1947-."[^37] The service's 1969 history says it came to the agency "almost mature, trained and disciplined, and ready to plunge immediately into the tasks outlined for it."[^38]
The [[Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service]] became a unit of the agency in 1947. The [[War Department]] had sponsored the service from January 2, 1946, and the [[Director of Central Intelligence]] assumed control of it on July 31, 1946, before the [[National Security Act of 1947]] replaced the [[Central Intelligence Group]] with the agency.[^37] The administrative history of the service's record group lists the successor as "Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Intelligence Agency, 1947-."[^38] The service's 1969 history says it came to the agency "almost mature, trained and disciplined, and ready to plunge immediately into the tasks outlined for it."[^39]
Within the agency the service sat under the [[Assistant Director for Operations]]. In January 1947 the Assistant Director presented a propaganda analysis program to the PRC, approving the proposed program but excluding "interpretative analysis" from its scope, and the requested staff was twelve at $61,000 a year. [[Lawrence K. White]] was announced as deputy chief of the service on January 9, 1947.[^39]
Within the agency the service sat under the [[Assistant Director for Operations]]. In January 1947 the Assistant Director presented a propaganda analysis program to the PRC, approving the proposed program but excluding "interpretative analysis" from its scope, and the requested staff was twelve at $61,000 a year. [[Lawrence K. White]] was announced as deputy chief of the service on January 9, 1947.[^40]
The service's functions were folded into the [[Open Source Center]] in November 2005. The release announcing the center said the Director of the CIA would administer it on behalf of the DNI.[^40]
The service's functions were folded into the [[Open Source Center]] in November 2005. The release announcing the center said the Director of the CIA would administer it on behalf of the DNI.[^41]
### Psychological warfare liaison, 1946 to 1952
In July 1946 the Central Intelligence Group's Central Planning Staff closed out its liaison with the Security Advisory Board of the [[Office of War Information]]. The memorandum designated a liaison officer to the Director, charged him with recommending when appropriate whether the board should be placed under the [[National Intelligence Authority]], and recorded that no further action by the Security Branch was required. The board was being replaced by a new Security Advisory Board under the [[State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee]].[^41]
In July 1946 the Central Intelligence Group's Central Planning Staff closed out its liaison with the Security Advisory Board of the [[Office of War Information]]. The memorandum designated a liaison officer to the Director, charged him with recommending when appropriate whether the board should be placed under the [[National Intelligence Authority]], and recorded that no further action by the Security Branch was required. The board was being replaced by a new Security Advisory Board under the [[State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee]].[^42]
In July 1947 the Assistant Director of the Office of Research and Evaluation complained to the chief of the Group's Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff that the arrangement for the Group's seat on the coordinating committee's subcommittee for psychological warfare was "not operable." The principal member came from the [[Office of Special Operations]] and the alternate from the Office of Research and Evaluation, and the memorandum was addressed to the Executive Director.[^42]
In July 1947 the Assistant Director of the Office of Research and Evaluation complained to the chief of the Group's Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff that the arrangement for the Group's seat on the coordinating committee's subcommittee for psychological warfare was "not operable." The principal member came from the [[Office of Special Operations]] and the alternate from the Office of Research and Evaluation, and the memorandum was addressed to the Executive Director.[^43]
On January 10, 1952 the eighth meeting of the [[Psychological Strategy Board]] was chaired by [[Walter Bedell Smith]], the Director of Central Intelligence. Its members were the Deputy Secretary of Defense, William C. Foster, and the Under Secretary of State, James E. Webb. [[Edward W. Barrett]], Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, attended as a participant from the Department of State.[^43]
On January 10, 1952 the eighth meeting of the [[Psychological Strategy Board]] was chaired by [[Walter Bedell Smith]], the Director of Central Intelligence. Its members were the Deputy Secretary of Defense, William C. Foster, and the Under Secretary of State, James E. Webb. [[Edward W. Barrett]], Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, attended as a participant from the Department of State.[^44]
In a letter stamped January 30, 1951, [[Max Millikan]] wrote that he had "gone on leave from MIT to head up the Office of Research and Reports in this Agency."[^44] On October 29, 1951 he wrote to a prospective recruit that for "the last nine or ten months" he had been "trying to put together for General Smith an organization to do economic research."[^45] A memorandum of conversation dated January 22, 1951 lists "Dr. Max Millikan, Central Intelligence Agency" among the participants in a discussion with State Department officers of psychological intelligence, and records his concern that splitting that work among several organizations would produce the shortcomings of decentralization.[^46] A memorandum of March 6, 1951, addressed to the intelligence chiefs of the State Department, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, was issued "For the Director of Central Intelligence" over Millikan's typed name as Assistant Director, Research and Reports.[^47] A letter he signed as Assistant Director on November 26, 1951 says that "Walt Rostow at the Center for International Studies has sought my assistance in finding him someone to help out with some research."[^48] A letter of March 3, 1952 addresses him as Special Consultant, Central Intelligence Agency.[^49] In an interview note of March 5, 1952 titled "Origin of PSB," a CIA historian recorded that Millikan "participated in a 'contract study,' State and MIT," which the note identifies as the "Troy Project," and that its study "had considerable to do with the creation of the PSB."[^50]
In a letter stamped January 30, 1951, [[Max Millikan]] wrote that he had "gone on leave from MIT to head up the Office of Research and Reports in this Agency."[^45] On October 29, 1951 he wrote to a prospective recruit that for "the last nine or ten months" he had been "trying to put together for General Smith an organization to do economic research."[^46] A memorandum of conversation dated January 22, 1951 lists "Dr. Max Millikan, Central Intelligence Agency" among the participants in a discussion with State Department officers of psychological intelligence, and records his concern that splitting that work among several organizations would produce the shortcomings of decentralization.[^47] A memorandum of March 6, 1951, addressed to the intelligence chiefs of the State Department, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, was issued "For the Director of Central Intelligence" over Millikan's typed name as Assistant Director, Research and Reports.[^48] A letter he signed as Assistant Director on November 26, 1951 says that "Walt Rostow at the Center for International Studies has sought my assistance in finding him someone to help out with some research."[^49] A letter of March 3, 1952 addresses him as Special Consultant, Central Intelligence Agency.[^50] In an interview note of March 5, 1952 titled "Origin of PSB," a CIA historian recorded that Millikan "participated in a 'contract study,' State and MIT," which the note identifies as the "Troy Project," and that its study "had considerable to do with the creation of the PSB."[^51]
The agency's financing of the [[Center for International Studies]] at MIT is recorded in several places. [[Patrick Oster]] reported in the Washington Post of September 11, 1977 that the agency "secretly financed a research project at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in order to gain data on how to turn Russian scientists into CIA agents," as part of "Project MK-ULTRA," with a foundation as a "front," and that the researcher was affiliated with MIT's Center for International Studies, "which was set up in 1951 with CIA money and had as its first director Max F. Millikan, a former assistant director of the agency."[^51] Time reported on February 24, 1967 "directly and without masquerade" "$300,000 to finance M.I.T.'s topflight Center for International Studies," and that MIT then "terminated the contract 'for practical, not moral reasons.'"[^52] [[Andreas Lowenfeld]], of the State Department's Office of Legal Adviser, testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee's Internal Security Subcommittee, said of the center in 1951 and 1952: "they had some kind of contract with the CIA," and, asked whether he knew it was a CIA operation, "I was never formally told, but it became apparent."[^53]
The agency's financing of the [[Center for International Studies]] at MIT is recorded in several places. [[Patrick Oster]] reported in the Washington Post of September 11, 1977 that the agency "secretly financed a research project at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in order to gain data on how to turn Russian scientists into CIA agents," as part of "Project MK-ULTRA," with a foundation as a "front," and that the researcher was affiliated with MIT's Center for International Studies, "which was set up in 1951 with CIA money and had as its first director Max F. Millikan, a former assistant director of the agency."[^52] Time reported on February 24, 1967 "directly and without masquerade" "$300,000 to finance M.I.T.'s topflight Center for International Studies," and that MIT then "terminated the contract 'for practical, not moral reasons.'"[^53] [[Andreas Lowenfeld]], of the State Department's Office of Legal Adviser, testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee's Internal Security Subcommittee, said of the center in 1951 and 1952: "they had some kind of contract with the CIA," and, asked whether he knew it was a CIA operation, "I was never formally told, but it became apparent."[^54]
The third progress report on NSC 59/1 records that the CIA had been assigned a continuing study of balloons as propaganda carriers and "instructed to stockpile one thousand large-sized propaganda balloons of the best type presently available."[^54] The [[Project Troy]] report had placed balloon work inside political warfare, stating that "The balloon problem is a part of political warfare. It cannot be handled by a separate balloon shop."[^55]
The third progress report on NSC 59/1 records that the CIA had been assigned a continuing study of balloons as propaganda carriers and "instructed to stockpile one thousand large-sized propaganda balloons of the best type presently available."[^55] The [[Project Troy]] report had placed balloon work inside political warfare, stating that "The balloon problem is a part of political warfare. It cannot be handled by a separate balloon shop."[^56]
In February 1961 [[Allen Dulles|Allen W. Dulles]] wrote to Millikan, then director of the center, that he was "very deeply interested in the proposal in your letter of January 23," and expected to attend at least part of the meetings of May 18 to 21, 1961, at which the center would review its first ten years.[^56]
In February 1961 [[Allen Dulles|Allen W. Dulles]] wrote to Millikan, then director of the center, that he was "very deeply interested in the proposal in your letter of January 23," and expected to attend at least part of the meetings of May 18 to 21, 1961, at which the center would review its first ten years.[^57]
A CIA document titled "Principles Governing Budgetary Relationships Between CENIS and CIA" describes an annual contract under which research projects were "mutually agreed upon case by case" between the agency and the Center for International Studies, within an annual authorization of $500,000. The document is undated.[^57] A CIA list of recipients of Office of Research and Reports unclassified studies names Max Millikan, [[Walt Rostow]], [[Wilfred Malenbaum]], [[Everett Hagen]], [[Evsey Domar]] and [[Thomas Schelling]], each listed under the Center for International Studies.[^58] A CIA memorandum dated February 16, 1959, forwarding a [[National Review]] Bulletin item, carries the item's text stating that [[Richard Bissell]] and [[Robert Amory]] "lean ideologically on CIA's outriding auxiliary at MIT, the Center for International Studies," and that they have been influenced by the theories of "W. W. Rostow, director of the Center."[^59] The MIT President's report for 1962 to 1963 refers to "Max F. Millikan, Director of the Center for International Studies."[^60] A CIA Office of Legislative Counsel journal entry of March 3, 1967 records that "the Agency has Senator Fulbright's letter concerning a Center for International Studies, MIT, and is preparing a response."[^61]
A CIA document titled "Principles Governing Budgetary Relationships Between CENIS and CIA" describes an annual contract under which research projects were "mutually agreed upon case by case" between the agency and the Center for International Studies, within an annual authorization of $500,000. The document is undated.[^58] A CIA list of recipients of Office of Research and Reports unclassified studies names Max Millikan, [[Walt Rostow]], [[Wilfred Malenbaum]], [[Everett Hagen]], [[Evsey Domar]] and [[Thomas Schelling]], each listed under the Center for International Studies.[^59] A CIA memorandum dated February 16, 1959, forwarding a [[National Review]] Bulletin item, carries the item's text stating that [[Richard Bissell]] and [[Robert Amory]] "lean ideologically on CIA's outriding auxiliary at MIT, the Center for International Studies," and that they have been influenced by the theories of "W. W. Rostow, director of the Center."[^60] The MIT President's report for 1962 to 1963 refers to "Max F. Millikan, Director of the Center for International Studies."[^61] A CIA Office of Legislative Counsel journal entry of March 3, 1967 records that "the Agency has Senator Fulbright's letter concerning a Center for International Studies, MIT, and is preparing a response."[^62]
### Footnotes
@ -207,35 +207,36 @@ A CIA document titled "Principles Governing Budgetary Relationships Between CENI
[^27]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom"
[^28]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue: "The damage that has been done"
[^29]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 13: "The wrong kind of friends"
[^30]: Congressional Record, Senate, September 22, 2004, Rollcall Vote No. 187 (yeas 77, nays 17). https://irp.fas.org/congress/2004_cr/goss092204.html ; "Porter Goss Sworn in As New CIA Director," PBS NewsHour, September 24, 2004 (sworn in by Andrew Card in the Oval Office). https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/government_programs-july-dec04-cia_09-24 ; Norris, "Goss Is Latest to Leave Bush Administration," NPR transcript, May 5, 2006. https://www.npr.org/transcripts/5387220
[^31]: JURIST, "FBI probes CIA defense contracts after top official resigns," May 2006 (FBI probe of Foggo's possible help to ADCS). https://www.jurist.org/news/2006/05/fbi-probes-cia-defense-contracts-after ; Paul Blumenthal, "MSNBC: Foggo Gone," Sunlight Foundation, May 8, 2006 (resignation reported Monday). https://sunlightfoundation.com/2006/05/08/msnbc-foggo-gone/
[^32]: NBC News, "Ex-CIA executive gets 37 months in prison," February 26, 2009 (one count of fraud, 27 counts dropped, Judge James Cacheris, 37 months as requested). https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna29413971 ; Associated Press, "CIA officer gets jail time for fraud," Philadelphia Inquirer, February 27, 2009. https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/nation_world/20090227_CIA_officer_gets_jail_time_for_fraud.html
[^33]: Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program, S. Rept. 113-288 (December 2014), executive summary and findings, sections on the 2005 videotapes ("The CIA destroyed the CIA interrogation videotapes the following day"; Rizzo's October 31, 2005 email). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CRPT-113srpt288.pdf
[^34]: NBC News, "Ex-CIA chief agreed with tape destruction," April 2010 (e-mails released by the Justice Department under an ACLU FOIA request; "PG, however, agreed with the decision"; the disputed account). https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna36589750
[^35]: JURIST, "No charges to be filed in CIA videotape destruction case: DOJ," November 2010 (spokesman Matthew Miller on Durham's decision; Durham appointed 2008 by Attorney General Michael Mukasey). https://www.jurist.org/news/2010/11/no-charges-to-be-filed-in-cia-videotape-destruction-case/
[^36]: Joseph E. Roop, "Foreign Broadcast Information Service. History. Part I: 1941-1947" (Central Intelligence Agency, approved for release April 1969), pp. 279, 299-300 and 303. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
[^37]: National Archives and Records Administration, Guide to Federal Records, Record Group 262, administrative history. https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/262.html.
[^38]: Roop, Part I, p. 2. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
[^39]: Roop, Part II (CIA Directorate of Intelligence, August 1970), pp. 2 and 151-152. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06741690.
[^40]: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "ODNI Announces Establishment of Open Source Center," News Release No. 6-05, November 8, 2005. https://irp.fas.org/news/2005/11/odni110805.html.
[^41]: Central Intelligence Group, Central Planning Staff, memorandum "Liquidation of Security Advisory Board, OWI (C.I.G. Liaison with New Security Advisory Board under SWNCC)," July 22, 1946. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP78-04007A000300040024-9. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-04007a000300040024-9
[^42]: Central Intelligence Group, Chief, ICAPS, to the Executive Director, memorandum "CIG Membership on SWNCC Subcommittee for Psychological Warfare," July 21, 1947. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP84-00022R000400100046-0. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp84-00022r000400100046-0
[^43]: Central Intelligence Agency, Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB M-8), January 10, 1952, membership and other participants. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP80-01065A000500100033-6. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-01065a000500100033-6
[^44]: Max F. Millikan, letter stamped January 30, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003100150032-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003100150032-1
[^45]: Max F. Millikan, letter of October 29, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP79-01157A000200020002-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp79-01157a000200020002-2
[^46]: CIA, memorandum of conversation, "Psychological Intelligence," January 22, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003500180026-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003500180026-1
[^47]: CIA, "Report of Intelligence Project Initiations, February 1951," memorandum of March 6, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP60-00213A000200030008-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp60-00213a000200030008-3
[^48]: Max F. Millikan, letter of November 26, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003000200096-6. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003000200096-6
[^49]: Stuart A. Rice, Assistant Director for Statistical Standards, Bureau of the Budget, letter to Max F. Millikan, March 3, 1952, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00662R000300120004-5. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00662r000300120004-5
[^50]: A. B. Darling, note of interview with Max Millikan, "Origin of PSB," March 5, 1952, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP83-00036R000400050039-0. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83-00036r000400050039-0
[^51]: Patrick Oster, "CIA Envisioned Soviet Scientists as U.S. Agents," Chicago Sun-Times, reprinted in the Washington Post, September 11, 1977, p. A-9, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP88-01315R000400460003-8. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp88-01315r000400460003-8
[^52]: Time, February 24, 1967, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP84-00161R000400210135-8. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp84-00161r000400210135-8
[^53]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Internal Security Subcommittee, extracts from hearings (Part 3) on State Department security and passport regulations, testimony of Andreas F. Lowenfeld, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00149R000400560007-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00149r000400560007-3
[^54]: FRUS, The Intelligence Community, 1950-1955, Document 57 (third progress report on NSC 59/1), paragraph 12. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d57
[^55]: CIA reading room document CIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8, excerpt of the Project Troy report to the Secretary of State, February 1, 1951 (balloon chapter). https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8
[^56]: Allen W. Dulles, letter to Max F. Millikan, February 27, 1961, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80B01676R003500160028-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80b01676r003500160028-9
[^57]: CIA, "Principles Governing Budgetary Relationships Between CENIS and CIA" (undated; released 2000), CIA reading room document CIA-RDP67-00059A000200090016-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp67-00059a000200090016-2
[^58]: CIA, "Recipients for ORR Unclassified Studies" (undated list), CIA reading room document CIA-RDP63-00314R000100180007-7. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp63-00314r000100180007-7
[^59]: CIA memorandum from the Assistant to the Director, February 16, 1959, forwarding a National Review Bulletin item, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00001R000100260064-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00001r000100260064-9
[^60]: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, President's Report Issue for the year ending July 1, 1963, p. 165, MIT Libraries, DSpace. https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/160055
[^61]: CIA Office of Legislative Counsel, journal entry, "Friday, 3 March 1967," CIA reading room document CIA-RDP69B00369R000200020044-4. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp69b00369r000200020044-4
[^30]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.2 (Carlos Amador: CIA cables of April 23 and April 25, 1986). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
[^31]: Congressional Record, Senate, September 22, 2004, Rollcall Vote No. 187 (yeas 77, nays 17). https://irp.fas.org/congress/2004_cr/goss092204.html ; "Porter Goss Sworn in As New CIA Director," PBS NewsHour, September 24, 2004 (sworn in by Andrew Card in the Oval Office). https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/government_programs-july-dec04-cia_09-24 ; Norris, "Goss Is Latest to Leave Bush Administration," NPR transcript, May 5, 2006. https://www.npr.org/transcripts/5387220
[^32]: JURIST, "FBI probes CIA defense contracts after top official resigns," May 2006 (FBI probe of Foggo's possible help to ADCS). https://www.jurist.org/news/2006/05/fbi-probes-cia-defense-contracts-after ; Paul Blumenthal, "MSNBC: Foggo Gone," Sunlight Foundation, May 8, 2006 (resignation reported Monday). https://sunlightfoundation.com/2006/05/08/msnbc-foggo-gone/
[^33]: NBC News, "Ex-CIA executive gets 37 months in prison," February 26, 2009 (one count of fraud, 27 counts dropped, Judge James Cacheris, 37 months as requested). https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna29413971 ; Associated Press, "CIA officer gets jail time for fraud," Philadelphia Inquirer, February 27, 2009. https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/nation_world/20090227_CIA_officer_gets_jail_time_for_fraud.html
[^34]: Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program, S. Rept. 113-288 (December 2014), executive summary and findings, sections on the 2005 videotapes ("The CIA destroyed the CIA interrogation videotapes the following day"; Rizzo's October 31, 2005 email). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CRPT-113srpt288.pdf
[^35]: NBC News, "Ex-CIA chief agreed with tape destruction," April 2010 (e-mails released by the Justice Department under an ACLU FOIA request; "PG, however, agreed with the decision"; the disputed account). https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna36589750
[^36]: JURIST, "No charges to be filed in CIA videotape destruction case: DOJ," November 2010 (spokesman Matthew Miller on Durham's decision; Durham appointed 2008 by Attorney General Michael Mukasey). https://www.jurist.org/news/2010/11/no-charges-to-be-filed-in-cia-videotape-destruction-case/
[^37]: Joseph E. Roop, "Foreign Broadcast Information Service. History. Part I: 1941-1947" (Central Intelligence Agency, approved for release April 1969), pp. 279, 299-300 and 303. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
[^38]: National Archives and Records Administration, Guide to Federal Records, Record Group 262, administrative history. https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/262.html.
[^39]: Roop, Part I, p. 2. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
[^40]: Roop, Part II (CIA Directorate of Intelligence, August 1970), pp. 2 and 151-152. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06741690.
[^41]: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "ODNI Announces Establishment of Open Source Center," News Release No. 6-05, November 8, 2005. https://irp.fas.org/news/2005/11/odni110805.html.
[^42]: Central Intelligence Group, Central Planning Staff, memorandum "Liquidation of Security Advisory Board, OWI (C.I.G. Liaison with New Security Advisory Board under SWNCC)," July 22, 1946. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP78-04007A000300040024-9. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-04007a000300040024-9
[^43]: Central Intelligence Group, Chief, ICAPS, to the Executive Director, memorandum "CIG Membership on SWNCC Subcommittee for Psychological Warfare," July 21, 1947. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP84-00022R000400100046-0. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp84-00022r000400100046-0
[^44]: Central Intelligence Agency, Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB M-8), January 10, 1952, membership and other participants. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP80-01065A000500100033-6. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-01065a000500100033-6
[^45]: Max F. Millikan, letter stamped January 30, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003100150032-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003100150032-1
[^46]: Max F. Millikan, letter of October 29, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP79-01157A000200020002-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp79-01157a000200020002-2
[^47]: CIA, memorandum of conversation, "Psychological Intelligence," January 22, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003500180026-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003500180026-1
[^48]: CIA, "Report of Intelligence Project Initiations, February 1951," memorandum of March 6, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP60-00213A000200030008-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp60-00213a000200030008-3
[^49]: Max F. Millikan, letter of November 26, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003000200096-6. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003000200096-6
[^50]: Stuart A. Rice, Assistant Director for Statistical Standards, Bureau of the Budget, letter to Max F. Millikan, March 3, 1952, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00662R000300120004-5. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00662r000300120004-5
[^51]: A. B. Darling, note of interview with Max Millikan, "Origin of PSB," March 5, 1952, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP83-00036R000400050039-0. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83-00036r000400050039-0
[^52]: Patrick Oster, "CIA Envisioned Soviet Scientists as U.S. Agents," Chicago Sun-Times, reprinted in the Washington Post, September 11, 1977, p. A-9, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP88-01315R000400460003-8. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp88-01315r000400460003-8
[^53]: Time, February 24, 1967, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP84-00161R000400210135-8. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp84-00161r000400210135-8
[^54]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Internal Security Subcommittee, extracts from hearings (Part 3) on State Department security and passport regulations, testimony of Andreas F. Lowenfeld, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00149R000400560007-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00149r000400560007-3
[^55]: FRUS, The Intelligence Community, 1950-1955, Document 57 (third progress report on NSC 59/1), paragraph 12. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d57
[^56]: CIA reading room document CIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8, excerpt of the Project Troy report to the Secretary of State, February 1, 1951 (balloon chapter). https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8
[^57]: Allen W. Dulles, letter to Max F. Millikan, February 27, 1961, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80B01676R003500160028-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80b01676r003500160028-9
[^58]: CIA, "Principles Governing Budgetary Relationships Between CENIS and CIA" (undated; released 2000), CIA reading room document CIA-RDP67-00059A000200090016-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp67-00059a000200090016-2
[^59]: CIA, "Recipients for ORR Unclassified Studies" (undated list), CIA reading room document CIA-RDP63-00314R000100180007-7. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp63-00314r000100180007-7
[^60]: CIA memorandum from the Assistant to the Director, February 16, 1959, forwarding a National Review Bulletin item, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00001R000100260064-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00001r000100260064-9
[^61]: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, President's Report Issue for the year ending July 1, 1963, p. 165, MIT Libraries, DSpace. https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/160055
[^62]: CIA Office of Legislative Counsel, journal entry, "Friday, 3 March 1967," CIA reading room document CIA-RDP69B00369R000200020044-4. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp69b00369r000200020044-4

35
20 - ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/USA/NSA.md
View file

@ -110,11 +110,21 @@ The NSA released transcripts of intercepts made after the June 8, 1967, attack o
### United Nations headquarters, Security Council delegations and Ndola
In September 1961, according to a commission of jurists reporting to the [[United Nations]] General Assembly in 2014, Charles Southall was stationed at the NSA naval communications facility near Nicosia, Cyprus, and recalled a recording played back shortly after midnight on the night of the crash that killed [[Dag Hammarskjöld]]. The Commission wrote that "from the broader evidence of the US National Security Agency's worldwide monitoring activities in and about 1961, it is highly likely that the entirety of the local and regional Ndola radio traffic on the night of 17-18 September 1961 was tracked and recorded by the NSA, and possibly also by the CIA."[^25] The Eminent Person reporting in 2019 recorded that two United States personnel confirmed as working for or in support of NSA activities said they overheard a transmission or recording of an attack on the aircraft, that both had died by 2018, and that the United States had not responded substantively to requests for clarification made since 2015.[^26]
According to a commission of jurists reporting to the [[United Nations]] General Assembly in 2014, Charles Southall recalled a recording played back shortly after midnight in September 1961, at the naval communications facility near Nicosia, Cyprus, on the night of the crash that killed [[Dag Hammarskjöld]]. The Eminent Person wrote in 2022: "It has not been disputed that he held a specialization as a "processing and reporting" officer who was assigned at a naval communications facility near Nicosia in 1961."[^25] The Commission wrote that "from the broader evidence of the US National Security Agency's worldwide monitoring activities in and about 1961, it is highly likely that the entirety of the local and regional Ndola radio traffic on the night of 17-18 September 1961 was tracked and recorded by the NSA, and possibly also by the CIA."[^26] The Eminent Person reporting in 2019 recorded that two United States personnel confirmed as working for or in support of NSA activities said they overheard a transmission or recording of an attack on the aircraft, that both had died by 2018, and that the United States had not responded substantively to requests for clarification made since 2015.[^27]
A January 31, 2003 email from [[Frank Koza]], chief of staff of the Regional Targets section of the NSA, to [[GCHQ]] asked for a "surge effort to revive/create efforts against UNSC members Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Bulgaria and Guinea." [[The Observer]] published the memo on March 2, 2003.[^27] [[Katharine Gun]], who worked at GCHQ, was charged under section 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1989; on February 25, 2004 the Crown offered no evidence.[^28]
The 2015 Independent Panel recorded that the United States, in its response of June 9, 2015, confirmed that Charles Southall was an active member of the United States Navy at the time, without saying where he was stationed or in what capacity he served.[^28] The 2019 report recorded that the United States confirmed that he joined the Navy in 1955, was released from active duty in 1969, and retired as a commander from the Naval Reserve in 1978, and that the United States gave no information on whether he worked in support of NSA activities.[^29]
In August 2013 [[Der Spiegel]] reported, on the basis of documents obtained by Edward Snowden, that NSA experts had cracked the codes of the United Nations video conferencing system in the summer of 2012, and that the number of decoded communications rose from 12 to 458 within three weeks. The same documents reportedly showed collection against the [[International Atomic Energy Agency]] and an NSA bugging program, called Special Collection Service, in more than 80 embassies and consulates.[^29]
The 2022 and 2024 reports described Southall and Paul Abram as two United States personnel who had provided information tending to confirm that they were working for or in support of NSA activities on the night of September 17 and 18, 1961, when they overheard or read a transmission concerning an attack on flight SE-BDY.[^30] Both reports recorded that the two men had passed away as of 2018.[^30] The 2024 report wrote that the failure of the United States to take up the opportunity to contradict their claims "tends to have the effect of supporting those claims."[^31]
The Panel recorded that Abram, a former United States Air Force security services officer, had said he was attached to an NSA listening post at Iraklion, Greece. It assessed that his claim to have performed special duties at the time appeared to be valid, on the basis of a discharge record describing him as a "voice intercept procedure specialist," but could not confirm that he was posted to Iraklion at the time.[^32] The 2017 report recorded that the United States confirmed his service record only in July 2017, with information that disputed his location at the time he reported hearing the intercept.[^33]
The National Security Archive at George Washington University filed Freedom of Information Act requests on behalf of the 2013 Commission of Jurists for any NSA recording or transcript of radio traffic on the night of September 17 and 18, 1961 appearing to relate to one aircraft firing upon another, and for any message intercepted concerning the approach of an aircraft to Ndola.[^34] The NSA's initial response indicated that two of three responsive documents appeared exempt by reason of "top secret" classification, and that the third was not held by the NSA; an appeal was lodged.[^34] The agency told the commission that releasing the two files "could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security."[^35] The Swedish newspaper SvD Nyheter reported on November 21, 2014 that the United States had given the Swedish foreign minister, Carl Bildt, access to the two files, quoting him as saying that the information was "trivial and unimportant." In 2015 one member of the Independent Panel, of Australian nationality, was given full access to the two files and assessed that they contained no information on the interception of communications about an attack on SE-BDY.[^35] On June 9, 2015 the United States told the Panel that its search of NSA and CIA records had not found documents matching the materials requested.[^35]
The 2024 report described Dakota aircraft at Ndola equipped to intercept, transmit and receive communications over long distances, and wrote that there was "a reasonable evidentiary basis" to consider that these aircraft "may have overheard or relayed communications from or about flight SE-BDY."[^31]
A January 31, 2003 email from [[Frank Koza]], chief of staff of the Regional Targets section of the NSA, to [[GCHQ]] asked for a "surge effort to revive/create efforts against UNSC members Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Bulgaria and Guinea." [[The Observer]] published the memo on March 2, 2003.[^36] [[Katharine Gun]], who worked at GCHQ, was charged under section 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1989; on February 25, 2004 the Crown offered no evidence.[^37]
In August 2013 [[Der Spiegel]] reported, on the basis of documents obtained by Edward Snowden, that NSA experts had cracked the codes of the United Nations video conferencing system in the summer of 2012, and that the number of decoded communications rose from 12 to 458 within three weeks. The same documents reportedly showed collection against the [[International Atomic Energy Agency]] and an NSA bugging program, called Special Collection Service, in more than 80 embassies and consulates.[^38]
### Footnotes
@ -142,8 +152,17 @@ In August 2013 [[Der Spiegel]] reported, on the basis of documents obtained by E
[^22]: National Security Agency, "U.S.S. Liberty," release page (Wayback Machine 2007 capture). http://web.archive.org/web/2007/http://www.nsa.gov/liberty
[^23]: David C. Walsh, "Former NSA Officials Agree," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, June 2003. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2003/june/former-nsa-officials-agree
[^24]: "New revelations in attack on American spy ship," *Chicago Tribune*, October 2, 2007. https://www.chicagotribune.com/2007/10/02/new-revelations-in-attack-on-american-spy-ship/
[^25]: Commission of Jurists on the Inquiry into the Death of Dag Hammarskjöld, United Nations General Assembly document A/68/800, 2014, paragraphs 13.23 to 13.28 and 15.7. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
[^26]: Report of the Eminent Person, United Nations General Assembly document A/73/973, September 12, 2019, paragraph 19. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
[^27]: Bright, Martin, Ed Vulliamy and Peter Beaumont. "Revealed: US dirty tricks to win vote on Iraq war," *The Observer,* March 2, 2003. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/02/usa.iraq ; McGovern, Ray. "When Truth Tried to Stop War," *Consortium News,* January 31, 2013. https://consortiumnews.com/2013/01/31/when-truth-tried-to-stop-war/
[^28]: House of Commons, "Katharine Gun," HC Deb 26 February 2004, vol. 418, cc. 427-40. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/2004/feb/26/katharine-gun
[^29]: Al Jazeera, "Report: US bugged UN headquarters," August 25, 2013, reporting the Der Spiegel account. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/8/25/report-us-bugged-un-headquarters ; CBC News, "NSA spied on UN, leaked files show," August 2013. https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/nsa-spied-on-un-leaked-files-show-1.1306194
[^25]: A/76/892, paragraph 370. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
[^26]: Commission of Jurists on the Inquiry into the Death of Dag Hammarskjöld, United Nations General Assembly document A/68/800, 2014, paragraphs 13.23 to 13.28 and 15.7. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
[^27]: Report of the Eminent Person, United Nations General Assembly document A/73/973, September 12, 2019, paragraph 19. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
[^28]: A/70/132, report of the Independent Panel of Experts, paragraph 84 (the United States response of June 9, 2015). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F70%2F132&l=en&t=pdf
[^29]: A/73/973, report of the Eminent Person, September 12, 2019, paragraph 102. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
[^30]: A/76/892, report of the Eminent Person, August 25, 2022, paragraph 32; A/78/1006, report of the Eminent Person, September 9, 2024, paragraph 50. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
[^31]: A/78/1006, paragraphs 47 to 50. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F78%2F1006&l=en&t=pdf
[^32]: A/70/132, paragraphs 76, 77 and 85. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F70%2F132&l=en&t=pdf
[^33]: A/71/1042, report of the Eminent Person, September 5, 2017, paragraph 7. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F71%2F1042&l=en&t=pdf
[^34]: A/68/800, paragraphs 15.11 and 15.12. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
[^35]: A/70/132, paragraphs 81 to 83. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F70%2F132&l=en&t=pdf
[^36]: Bright, Martin, Ed Vulliamy and Peter Beaumont. "Revealed: US dirty tricks to win vote on Iraq war," *The Observer,* March 2, 2003. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/02/usa.iraq ; McGovern, Ray. "When Truth Tried to Stop War," *Consortium News,* January 31, 2013. https://consortiumnews.com/2013/01/31/when-truth-tried-to-stop-war/
[^37]: House of Commons, "Katharine Gun," HC Deb 26 February 2004, vol. 418, cc. 427-40. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/2004/feb/26/katharine-gun
[^38]: Al Jazeera, "Report: US bugged UN headquarters," August 25, 2013, reporting the Der Spiegel account. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/8/25/report-us-bugged-un-headquarters ; CBC News, "NSA spied on UN, leaked files show," August 2013. https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/nsa-spied-on-un-leaked-files-show-1.1306194