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@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ aliases:
- Ilopango Air Force Base
- Ilopango
created: 2026-05-17
updated: 2026-10-08
updated: 2026-10-12
category: "Military Installation"
tags:
- Geography
@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ The operation was run openly. The assistant regional security officer for the U.
Gary Webb wrote that [[Central Intelligence Agency]] records showed Hangar No. 4 was used by the Agency for covert Contra operations until it was turned over in 1985 to the National Security Council and Oliver North's illegal arms network, "The Enterprise." CIA agent Felix Rodriguez also used Hangar No. 4 for his helicopter-based counterinsurgency program. The adjoining Hangar No. 5 continued to be used by the CIA in support of the Contra project.[^1] The CIA Inspector General's report gives a different sequence. In 1984 the CIA occupied a newly constructed warehouse and hangar, Hangar 5, and moved to it activities that had been conducted in the smaller Hangar 4. The report states that "After CIA had moved out of Hangar 4, it was used in 1985 and 1986 by NHAO and the Private Benefactors in support of their Contra-related operations."[^6]
Webb wrote that in March 1986 a cable from the Costa Rican [[DEA]] office reported that a pilot named Carlos Amador intended to fly into Ilopango, pick up cocaine at Hangar No. 4, and transport it to [[Miami]]. The Inspector General's report describes a cable of April 1986 that reported a March 18, 1986 DEA report that Amador had recently flown from Costa Rica to San Salvador, where he had access to Hangar 4.[^7] The report also records that the drafter of one 1986 cable was not certain of the nature or affiliation of another entity that had operated from Hangar 4, and surmised that it "may have been associated either with Oliver North, the Private Benefactors, or the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office (NHAO)."[^8] Amador had been working with the CIA for years, flying missions for the Costa Rican Contras. The CIA had collected information for at least a year indicating Amador was also flying drug planes between [[Costa Rica]], [[Panama]], Belize, and Miami for a pair of major cocaine traffickers, the Sarcovic brothers, at the same time he was flying for the [[White House]].[^1]
Webb wrote that in March 1986 a cable from the Costa Rican [[DEA]] office reported that a pilot named Carlos Amador intended to fly into Ilopango, pick up cocaine at Hangar No. 4, and transport it to [[Miami]]. The Justice Department Inspector General quotes a DEA Costa Rica cable dated March 20, 1986, which reported that a source said Amador intended to fly cocaine from Costa Rica through El Salvador to Miami, possibly picking it up at Hangar No. 4.[^7] The CIA Inspector General's report describes a cable of April 1986 that reported a March 18, 1986 DEA report that Amador had recently flown from Costa Rica to San Salvador, where he had access to Hangar 4.[^8] The report also records that the drafter of one 1986 cable was not certain of the nature or affiliation of another entity that had operated from Hangar 4, and surmised that it "may have been associated either with Oliver North, the Private Benefactors, or the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office (NHAO)."[^9] Amador had been working with the CIA for years, flying missions for the Costa Rican Contras. The CIA had collected information for at least a year indicating Amador was also flying drug planes between [[Costa Rica]], [[Panama]], Belize, and Miami for a pair of major cocaine traffickers, the Sarcovic brothers, at the same time he was flying for the [[White House]].[^1]
### Drug Trafficking
@ -46,21 +46,23 @@ DEA agent [[Celerino Castillo]]'s informant Murga, who wrote flight plans for pr
Former Meneses aide [[Enrique Miranda]] testified at the 1991 Nicaraguan trial that cocaine from [[Colombia]] arrived at various Costa Rican airstrips, including one on CIA operative [[John Hull]]'s farm, and was placed aboard Contra planes flown into Ilopango. There, according to Miranda, Aguado and Meneses supervised loading the cocaine onto U.S.-bound aircraft owned by the Salvadoran Air Force and, on occasion, the Miami-based CIA contractor [[Southern Air Transport]]. Miranda said Meneses told him U.S. military hardware stockpiled at Ilopango was loaded onto Salvadoran transport planes and flown south, where guns were traded for cocaine and flown back.[^1]
In February and March 1988 a CIA station cable reported that the Guatemalan suspected trafficker Reyner Veliz Cruz flew into Ilopango with Aguado in a twin-engine aircraft, the second time after customs officers had left, and that customs personnel at Ilopango "assume that Aguado has connections with drug trafficking."[^9]
In February and March 1988 a CIA station cable reported that the Guatemalan suspected trafficker Reyner Veliz Cruz flew into Ilopango with Aguado in a twin-engine aircraft, the second time after customs officers had left, and that customs personnel at Ilopango "assume that Aguado has connections with drug trafficking."[^10]
The Justice Department Inspector General reports that on December 14, 1988 Bustillo met DEA agent Celerino Castillo to discuss Castillo's suspicions that Salvadoran Air Force officers were using Ilopango for drug trafficking; Castillo named, among others, Air School Director Lieutenant Colonel Manfredo Koenigsberg, and according to a State Department cable of January 3, 1989, Bustillo said he would investigate and seek to transfer the officer. After DEA agent Richard deTriquet was detailed to Guatemala in 1989, he and Castillo went to El Salvador to investigate reports that cocaine moved through hangar five; a Salvadoran security officer denied them access, and the CIA chief of station told them there was no drug activity associated with hangar five.[^10]
The Justice Department Inspector General reports that on December 14, 1988 Bustillo met DEA agent Celerino Castillo to discuss Castillo's suspicions that Salvadoran Air Force officers were using Ilopango for drug trafficking; Castillo named, among others, Air School Director Lieutenant Colonel Manfredo Koenigsberg, and according to a State Department cable of January 3, 1989, Bustillo said he would investigate and seek to transfer the officer. In 1989 Castillo and DEA Group Supervisor [[Thomas deTriquet]] went to Ilopango about an allegation concerning Hangar 5. A Salvadoran security officer denied them access, and a CIA officer told them they could not enter Ilopango for that purpose. At the embassy the CIA chief of station assured them there was no drug activity associated with Hangar 5.[^11][^12]
The Inspector General reports that in February 1989 the CIA station in El Salvador sent the DEA a cable describing the Panamanian Miguel Antonio Rodriguez, a suspected trafficker, using Ilopango to repair his aircraft, which the station said was suspicious given the high cost of repairs in El Salvador. Stia's memorandum later said that the Guatemala office could not develop the most important information on Ilopango, which related to the allegations and intelligence about the air base, and that he intended to have Castillo and deTriquet request access again.[^12]
### CIA Obstruction of Investigations
When Celerino Castillo's investigation began probing the hangars, the CIA sent an April 1986 cable from its El Salvador station to the Costa Rican office asking if the DEA could be persuaded to back off: "El Salvador Station would appreciate Costa Rica Station advising DEA not to make any inquiries into anyone re: Hangar No. 4 at Ilopango since only legitimate CIA supported operations were conducted from this facility." The CIA official who wrote that cable later conceded "the language in the cable could be read to suggest a meaning he did not intend" but acknowledged that was the effect it had.[^1]
When Celerino Castillo's investigation began probing the hangars, the CIA El Salvador station sent a cable on April 25, 1986, in reply to a Costa Rica station cable of April 23 about Amador: "Based on that information, [El Salvador] Station would appreciate [Costa Rica] Station advising [DEA] not to make any inquiries to anyone re: hangar no. 4 at Ilopango since only legitimate [CIA] supported operations were conducted from this facility."[^7] The same cable stated that station air operations had moved from Hangar 4 into Hangar 5, which the station still occupied.[^7] The CIA official who wrote that cable later conceded "the language in the cable could be read to suggest a meaning he did not intend" but acknowledged that was the effect it had.[^1]
U.S. Ambassador Edwin Corr sent a secret "back channel" cable to the State Department requesting an internal DEA review of Castillo's allegations. The DEA informed Corr that Castillo's information was "totally inaccurate" and Castillo was told to close his investigation. When he continued, Corr personally ordered him to "stop the witch hunt." Three years later, when Castillo opened another investigation into drug trafficking at Hangar No. 5, the CIA refused to allow him on the base.[^1]
U.S. Ambassador Edwin Corr sent a secret "back channel" cable to the State Department requesting an internal DEA review of Castillo's allegations. Webb's account has the DEA telling Corr that Castillo's information was "totally inaccurate," Castillo being told to close his investigation, and Corr personally ordering him to "stop the witch hunt." Corr told the Justice Department Inspector General that DEA headquarters replied that the Grasheim case would be closed, and that he told Castillo he would have to stop the "witch hunt" if he had no evidence.[^1][^13] Webb wrote that three years later, when Castillo opened another investigation into drug trafficking at Hangar No. 5, the CIA refused to allow him on the base.[^1]
[[Alan Fiers|Alan Fiers Jr.]], the former CIA official who headed the Contra program from 1984 to 1988, acknowledged: "We had a capability and indeed a responsibility for reporting what had been happening at Ilopango." The DEA later claimed under FOIA that it had no reports from Castillo about drug trafficking at Ilopango, a claim the [[Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General|Justice Department Inspector General]] exposed as false, having found and quoted from the reports liberally.[^1]
[[Alan Fiers|Alan Fiers Jr.]], the former CIA official who headed the Contra program from 1984 to 1988, testified in *United States v. George* on July 31, 1992, in testimony Webb quotes: "We had a capability and indeed a responsibility for reporting what had been happening at Ilopango."[^1] Webb wrote that the DEA claimed under the Freedom of Information Act that it had no reports from Castillo about drug trafficking at Ilopango, and that the Inspector General located and quoted from them.[^14]
### Bombs from the Airport Battalion, 1992
Five 500-pound bombs were taken from a battalion at the San Salvador airport on February 26, 1992. [[Semana]] reported on April 12, 1992 that the arrested men, among them a Salvadoran army colonel, [[Roberto Antonio Leiva Jacobo]], confessed that members of the [[Cali Drug Cartel|Cali cartel]] had hired them and paid four million dollars for the bombs, and that the bombs were meant for a plan to kill [[Pablo Escobar]] in the [[Envigado]] prison.[^11]
Five 500-pound bombs were taken from a battalion at the San Salvador airport on February 26, 1992. [[Semana]] reported on April 12, 1992 that the arrested men, among them a Salvadoran army colonel, [[Roberto Antonio Leiva Jacobo]], confessed that members of the [[Cali Drug Cartel|Cali cartel]] had hired them and paid four million dollars for the bombs, and that the bombs were meant for a plan to kill [[Pablo Escobar]] in the [[Envigado]] prison.[^15]
### Footnotes
@ -70,8 +72,12 @@ Five 500-pound bombs were taken from a battalion at the San Salvador airport on
[^4]: "Salvador airport said to be transfer point for arms to contras," *Christian Science Monitor*, October 10, 1986, https://proof.csmonitor.com/1986/1010/omerc.html
[^5]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy*, S. Prt. 100-165 (December 1988), pp. 37, 50 to 52, https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
[^6]: CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation on allegations of connections between CIA and the Contras in cocaine trafficking, para. 1023. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06974497
[^7]: CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation, para. 447. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06974497
[^8]: CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation, para. 453. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06974497
[^9]: CIA Inspector General, *Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States*, Volume II (October 8, 1998), Marcos Antonio Aguado section and the pilots chapter (March 23, 1988 cable on Reyner Veliz Cruz), https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine2/south.html and https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine2/pilots.html
[^10]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter X, sections D and E, https://irp.fas.org/agency/doj/oig/c4rpt/ch10p3.htm
[^11]: "¿Bombas contra Escobar?", *Semana*, April 12, 1992, https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/bombas-contra-escobar/17208-3. The Cali cartel buyers are Semana's report of the arrested men's confessions and of an unnamed Salvadoran government source.
[^7]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.2 (Carlos Amador: DEA Costa Rica cable of March 20, 1986; CIA cables of April 23 and April 25, 1986). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
[^8]: CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation, para. 447. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06974497
[^9]: CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation, para. 453. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06974497
[^10]: CIA Inspector General, *Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States*, Volume II (October 8, 1998), Marcos Antonio Aguado section and the pilots chapter (March 23, 1988 cable on Reyner Veliz Cruz), https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine2/south.html and https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine2/pilots.html
[^11]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter X, sections D and E, https://irp.fas.org/agency/doj/oig/c4rpt/ch10p3.htm
[^12]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 3, section E (Castillo's later interactions with Salvadoran personnel, the deTriquet interview, the Stia memorandum). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p3.htm
[^13]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.1.b(2) (interview of Edwin Corr). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
[^14]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance*, chapter 13; U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 4, section I, and part 2, section C.1.a. https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p4.htm
[^15]: "¿Bombas contra Escobar?", *Semana*, April 12, 1992, https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/bombas-contra-escobar/17208-3. The Cali cartel buyers are Semana's report of the arrested men's confessions and of an unnamed Salvadoran government source.