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+++ b/META/CHANGELOG.md
@ -1,3 +1,32 @@
 - 2026-10-12T1859 · [[Donald Trump]]
 - 2026-10-12T1858 · [[Joe McMoneagle]]
 - 2026-10-12T1858 · [[Robert Monroe]]
 - 2026-10-12T1858 · [[Frederick Atwater]]
 - 2026-10-12T1858 · [[Gehlen Organization]]
 - 2026-10-12T1858 · [[Heinz Felfe]]
 - 2026-10-12T1857 · [[Larry Devlin]]
 - 2026-10-12T1857 · [[United Nations]]
 - 2026-10-12T1857 · [[NSA]]
 - 2026-10-12T1857 · [[Allen Dulles]]
 - 2026-10-12T1857 · [[Cambridge Analytica]]
 - 2026-10-12T1857 · [[Charles Tart]]
 - 2026-10-12T1857 · [[Kenneth A. Kress]]
 - 2026-10-12T1857 · [[Stargate Project]]
 - 2026-10-12T1857 · [[Vernon Walters]]
 - 2026-10-12T1857 · [[Central Intelligence Agency]]
 - 2026-10-12T1857 · [[William Colby]]
 - 2026-10-12T1857 · [[Ilopango Airbase]]
 - 2026-10-12T1857 · [[Edwin Corr]]
 - 2026-10-12T1857 · [[Walter Grasheim]]
 - 2026-10-12T1857 · [[Carlos Amador]]
 - 2026-10-12T1857 · [[Yom Kippur War]]
 - 2026-10-12T1857 · [[Dag Hammarskjöld]]
 - 2026-10-12T1857 · [[Ray Hunt]]
 - 2026-10-12T1857 · [[Monroe Institute]]
 - 2026-10-12T1857 · [[Celerino Castillo]]
 - 2026-10-12T1857 · [[James R. Schlesinger]]
 - 2026-10-12T1857 · [[Bundesnachrichtendienst]]
 - 2026-10-12T1857 · [[Brent Scowcroft]]
 - 2026-10-12T1801 · [[NATO]]
 - 2026-10-12T1801 · [[U.S. Attorney General]]
 - 2026-10-12T1801 · [[William French Smith]]
@ -18,15 +47,11 @@
 - 2026-10-12T1800 · [[National Security Archive]]
 - 2026-10-12T1800 · [[Matrix Churchill]]
 - 2026-10-12T1800 · [[ITICO]]
 - 2026-10-12T1800 · [[Cambridge Analytica]]
 - 2026-10-12T1800 · [[United Nations]]
 - 2026-10-12T1800 · [[Senate Judiciary Committee]]
 - 2026-10-12T1800 · [[NSA]]
 - 2026-10-12T1800 · [[GCHQ]]
 - 2026-10-12T1800 · [[DINA]]
 - 2026-10-12T1800 · [[Mark Thatcher]]
 - 2026-10-12T1800 · [[Margaret Thatcher]]
 - 2026-10-12T1800 · [[Donald Trump]]
 - 2026-10-12T1800 · [[Jose Bueso Rosa]]
 - 2026-10-12T1800 · [[Alan Sanders]]
 - 2026-10-12T1800 · [[Ronald LeGrand]]
@ -73,28 +98,3 @@
 - 2026-10-12T1637 · [[National Institute for Discovery Science]]
 - 2026-10-12T1637 · [[Bigelow Aerospace Advanced Space Studies]]
 - 2026-10-12T1637 · [[Wright-Patterson Air Force Base]]
 - 2026-10-12T1637 · [[KONA BLUE]]
 - 2026-10-12T1637 · [[KLAS-TV]]
 - 2026-10-12T1637 · [[George Knapp]]
 - 2026-10-12T1637 · [[Shimon Peres]]
 - 2026-10-12T1637 · [[Air America]]
 - 2026-10-12T1637 · [[Shlomo Gazit]]
 - 2026-10-12T1637 · [[Operation Paperclip]]
 - 2026-10-12T1636 · [[Esquire]]
 - 2026-10-12T1636 · [[Project Blue Book]]
 - 2026-10-12T1636 · [[Project Azorian]]
 - 2026-10-12T1636 · [[LAKAM]]
 - 2026-10-12T1636 · [[Caspar Weinberger]]
 - 2026-10-12T1636 · [[Aviem Sella]]
 - 2026-10-12T1636 · [[Operation Mongoose]]
 - 2026-10-12T1635 · [[Iran-Contra Affair]]
 - 2026-10-12T1635 · [[Ehud Barak]]
 - 2026-10-12T1635 · [[Amir Elichai]]
 - 2026-10-12T1634 · [[Carbyne]]
 - 2026-10-12T1634 · [[Amos Lapidot]]
 - 2026-10-12T1634 · [[Israel]]
 - 2026-10-12T1634 · [[Project 8200]]
 - 2026-10-12T1634 · [[Beersheba]]
 - 2026-10-12T1633 · [[Gulf of Tonkin Incident]]
 - 2026-10-12T1632 · [[Colm Kelleher]]
 - 2026-10-12T1632 · [[Agency for International Development]]
--- a/PEOPLE/(A-G)/Allen
+++ b/PEOPLE/(A-G)/Allen
@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ relations:
    with: "[[Warren Commission]]"
    start: 1963-11-29
    end: 1964-09-24
-    fn: 11
+    fn: 12
 ---
 Allen Welsh Dulles (April 7, 1893 - January 29, 1969) served as [[Director of Central Intelligence]] from February 26, 1953, to November 29, 1961 - the longest tenure of any DCI, the first civilian DCI, and the only brother of a sitting Secretary of State to hold the position. Dulles built the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] into the instrument of Cold War covert action that executed [[Operation AJAX]] in [[Iran]] (1953), [[Operation PBSUCCESS]] in [[Guatemala]] (1954), and the [[Bay of Pigs]] invasion of [[Cuba]] (1961). The Bay of Pigs disaster cost him his position - President [[John F. Kennedy]] forced his resignation, along with [[Richard Bissell]] and [[Charles P. Cabell|C.P. Cabell]] - and his subsequent appointment by President [[Lyndon B. Johnson]] to the [[Warren Commission]] investigating Kennedy's assassination placed him in the remarkable position of overseeing the investigation of the event that had ended both his patron's life and his own career.[^1]
@ -68,13 +68,15 @@ Operation PBSUCCESS (June 1954): The CIA's overthrow of Guatemalan President [[J
 [[MKULTRA]]: Dulles authorized the CIA's human experimentation program in April 1953 under Technical Services Staff chief [[Sidney Gottlieb]]. The program used LSD and other substances on unconsenting subjects, including mental patients, prisoners, and unwitting CIA employees. Dulles's authorization memorandum noted concerns about Soviet brainwashing capabilities and framed the program as defensive research. The program's scope - eventually comprising 150 subprojects at 80 institutions - far exceeded what Dulles's authorization documents described.
 On August 26, 1960 Dulles cabled the Leopoldville station that the station officer was to be given "wider authority," including "even more aggressive action if it can remain covert," and wrote that "we realize that targets of opportunity may present themselves to you."[^8] The cable authorized up to $100,000 "to carry out any crash programs on which you do not have the opportunity to consult HQS," and assured the station officer that the message had been "seen and approved at competent level" in the State Department.[^8] The Church Committee documented the cable as one of a sequence that began with Tweedy's cable of August 18, 1960 and Bissell's of August 19.[^8]
 ### MKULTRA: The Sandoz Panic and the Olson Death
-Dulles approved MKULTRA on April 13, 1953, ten days after Richard Helms proposed a program for the "covert use of biological and chemical materials," with an initial $300,000 exempt from normal financial controls and payable blindly on the signatures of Gottlieb and TSS chief [[Willis Gibbons]]. Acting in a climate of Cold War urgency, that same month Dulles approved a $240,000 payment after an intelligence report claimed [[Sandoz]] wanted to sell 10 kilograms of [[LSD]] on the open market; CIA officers flew to Switzerland with a black bag of cash only to learn Sandoz had produced barely 40 grams in fifteen years, the entire panic stemming from a military attaché who confused milligrams with kilograms. When [[Frank Olson]] died in November 1953 after Gottlieb dosed him with LSD at [[Deep Creek Lodge]], Dulles ordered Inspector General [[Lyman Kirkpatrick]] to investigate; the resulting reprimands were softened through six drafts and placed in no personnel file.[^8]
+Dulles approved MKULTRA on April 13, 1953, ten days after Richard Helms proposed a program for the "covert use of biological and chemical materials," with an initial $300,000 exempt from normal financial controls and payable blindly on the signatures of Gottlieb and TSS chief [[Willis Gibbons]]. Acting in a climate of Cold War urgency, that same month Dulles approved a $240,000 payment after an intelligence report claimed [[Sandoz]] wanted to sell 10 kilograms of [[LSD]] on the open market; CIA officers flew to Switzerland with a black bag of cash only to learn Sandoz had produced barely 40 grams in fifteen years, the entire panic stemming from a military attaché who confused milligrams with kilograms. When [[Frank Olson]] died in November 1953 after Gottlieb dosed him with LSD at [[Deep Creek Lodge]], Dulles ordered Inspector General [[Lyman Kirkpatrick]] to investigate; the resulting reprimands were softened through six drafts and placed in no personnel file.[^9]
 ### Rockefeller's Special Group and the Human Ecology Front
-Under Eisenhower, Dulles reported all CIA covert operations, including MKULTRA, the coups, and assassination planning, to the NSC "[[Special Group]]" chaired by [[Nelson Rockefeller]], the structure formalized by NSC 5412/2 in December 1955 that gave the president plausible deniability; in a 1955 "Family Jewels" briefing Dulles described the full range of covert programs to Rockefeller's board. When MKULTRA needed a research hospital, Dulles sought Rockefeller's approval for a scheme to channel CIA money through private foundations to win matching federal grants for a wing at [[Georgetown University Hospital]]. The program's primary funding front, the [[Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology]], was organized at Dulles's initiative through [[Harold Wolff]], the Cornell neurologist who had treated Dulles's brain-damaged son; Dulles attended one of its first board meetings. His relationship with [[D. Ewen Cameron]] predated the funding: in November 1945, still with the OSS, Dulles had sent Cameron to Nuremberg to assess whether [[Rudolf Hess]] was fit to stand trial.[^9]
+Under Eisenhower, Dulles reported all CIA covert operations, including MKULTRA, the coups, and assassination planning, to the NSC "[[Special Group]]" chaired by [[Nelson Rockefeller]], the structure formalized by NSC 5412/2 in December 1955 that gave the president plausible deniability; in a 1955 "Family Jewels" briefing Dulles described the full range of covert programs to Rockefeller's board. When MKULTRA needed a research hospital, Dulles sought Rockefeller's approval for a scheme to channel CIA money through private foundations to win matching federal grants for a wing at [[Georgetown University Hospital]]. The program's primary funding front, the [[Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology]], was organized at Dulles's initiative through [[Harold Wolff]], the Cornell neurologist who had treated Dulles's brain-damaged son; Dulles attended one of its first board meetings. His relationship with [[D. Ewen Cameron]] predated the funding: in November 1945, still with the OSS, Dulles had sent Cameron to Nuremberg to assess whether [[Rudolf Hess]] was fit to stand trial.[^10]
 ### Bay of Pigs and Forced Resignation
@ -82,24 +84,26 @@ The Bay of Pigs invasion of April 17-19, 1961 was the catastrophic failure that
 Kennedy publicly accepted responsibility but was privately furious. He reportedly told aide [[Ted Sorensen]] that he wanted to "splinter the CIA into a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds" - a remark almost certainly apocryphal in its precise wording but consistent with his documented anger. The Taylor Commission's findings and the classified Kirkpatrick IG report both pointed to fundamental CIA failures in planning, execution, and judgment.
-Dulles submitted his resignation in September 1961; it was formally accepted November 29, 1961. He was replaced by [[John McCone]]. The CIA's own history states that a "humiliated President Kennedy did not wait for either report before cleaning house at CIA" and that he accepted resignations from Dulles and from Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell, who stayed at their posts until their successors were selected a few months later.[^10] Bissell and Cabell were also forced out. CIA veterans viewed their dismissal as Kennedy scapegoating the agency for a failure the [[White House]] had co-created by canceling the air strikes.[^1]
+Dulles submitted his resignation in September 1961; it was formally accepted November 29, 1961. He was replaced by [[John McCone]]. The CIA's own history states that a "humiliated President Kennedy did not wait for either report before cleaning house at CIA" and that he accepted resignations from Dulles and from Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell, who stayed at their posts until their successors were selected a few months later.[^11] Bissell and Cabell were also forced out. CIA veterans viewed their dismissal as Kennedy scapegoating the agency for a failure the [[White House]] had co-created by canceling the air strikes.[^1]
 ### The Warren Commission
-On November 29, 1963 - exactly two years after Dulles's forced resignation - President Lyndon Johnson appointed the Warren Commission to investigate Kennedy's assassination. Among the seven commissioners Johnson named was Allen Dulles despite Kennedy’s firing of Dulles.[^11]
+On November 29, 1963 - exactly two years after Dulles's forced resignation - President Lyndon Johnson appointed the Warren Commission to investigate Kennedy's assassination. Among the seven commissioners Johnson named was Allen Dulles despite Kennedy’s firing of Dulles.[^12]
 The investigation was examining whether CIA-connected parties (specifically the anti-Castro exile networks and organized crime figures that Dulles had directly overseen) had any role in the assassination. He was now in a position to shape what evidence the Commission sought, what witnesses it called, and what conclusions it reached regarding the CIA programs he had run.
-Dulles was reportedly among the most active commissioners in shaping the investigation's scope. He briefed commissioners on CIA history and procedures. Book V of the Church Committee's final report states that, with the exception of Dulles, it is unlikely anyone on the Warren Commission knew of the CIA's assassination efforts, and that Dulles knew of the plots with underworld figures that had taken place during his tenure as Director of Central Intelligence.[^12] The Church Committee's 1975 interim report states that Dulles "did not inform the other members about the plots that had occurred during his term as DCI,"[^13] and also states that "it is not entirely certain that Dulles was ever made aware of the true nature of the underworld operation."[^14] The [[ZR/RIFLE]] assassination plotting program was, in the same period, not disclosed to the Commission at the agency level by [[Richard Helms]] as Deputy Director for Plans. Helms testified that Dulles "was sitting right there" in the Commission's deliberations and "knew about this," and that he did not know what Dulles had said to the Commission about the plots.[^15] The CIA's failure to disclose the assassination plots to the Warren Commission was documented by the Church Committee in 1975; Dulles's role as both a commissioner and the former DCI who had authorized the programs is the structural conflict of interest the Commission's composition created.
+Dulles was reportedly among the most active commissioners in shaping the investigation's scope. He briefed commissioners on CIA history and procedures. Book V of the Church Committee's final report states that, with the exception of Dulles, it is unlikely anyone on the Warren Commission knew of the CIA's assassination efforts, and that Dulles knew of the plots with underworld figures that had taken place during his tenure as Director of Central Intelligence.[^13] The Church Committee's 1975 interim report states that Dulles "did not inform the other members about the plots that had occurred during his term as DCI,"[^14] and also states that "it is not entirely certain that Dulles was ever made aware of the true nature of the underworld operation."[^15] The [[ZR/RIFLE]] assassination plotting program was, in the same period, not disclosed to the Commission at the agency level by [[Richard Helms]] as Deputy Director for Plans. Helms testified that Dulles "was sitting right there" in the Commission's deliberations and "knew about this," and that he did not know what Dulles had said to the Commission about the plots.[^16] The CIA's failure to disclose the assassination plots to the Warren Commission was documented by the Church Committee in 1975; Dulles's role as both a commissioner and the former DCI who had authorized the programs is the structural conflict of interest the Commission's composition created.
-Angleton testified that Dulles consulted him before agreeing to President Johnson's request that he serve, that the two were in frequent contact, and that they informally discussed the progress of the investigation and what further work the CIA could do.[^16] At the January 22, 1964 executive session, the Commission took up a report that [[Lee Harvey Oswald]] had been a paid FBI informant. Dulles asked whether the purpose of such a hire could have been to penetrate the [[Fair Play for Cuba Committee]]. He said that practically any American could obtain a passport good for anywhere, and that the Passport Bureau had no record of Oswald's defection. Near the end of the meeting, Dulles said: "I think this record ought to be destroyed."[^17] FBI Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]]'s files held an index card on Dulles that cross-referenced a November 29, 1963 memorandum.[^18]
+Angleton testified that Dulles consulted him before agreeing to President Johnson's request that he serve, that the two were in frequent contact, and that they informally discussed the progress of the investigation and what further work the CIA could do.[^17] At the January 22, 1964 executive session, the Commission took up a report that [[Lee Harvey Oswald]] had been a paid FBI informant. Dulles asked whether the purpose of such a hire could have been to penetrate the [[Fair Play for Cuba Committee]]. He said that practically any American could obtain a passport good for anywhere, and that the Passport Bureau had no record of Oswald's defection. Near the end of the meeting, Dulles said: "I think this record ought to be destroyed."[^18] FBI Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]]'s files held an index card on Dulles that cross-referenced a November 29, 1963 memorandum.[^19]
-The [[HSCA|House Select Committee on Assassinations]] (1979) found that the Warren Commission's failure to investigate adequately the possibility of a conspiracy was "attributable in part to the failure of the Commission to receive all the relevant information that was in the possession of other agencies and departments of the Government," and that the CIA "was deficient in its collection and sharing of information both prior to and subsequent to the assassination."[^19] The report does not name Dulles in those findings. It states that the committee did not ignore the possibility that certain CIA officials who knew that close scrutiny of United States-Cuban relations could have exposed the CIA-Mafia plots might have tried to keep the CIA's or the Warren Commission's inquiry from the question of Cuban complicity, and that it determined that only Deputy Director Helms was in a position to have both the knowledge and the power to accomplish such a cover-up and was satisfied, on the basis of its investigation, that it was "highly unlikely he in fact did so."[^20] It found that the details of the AMLASH plot and the CIA-Mafia plots should have been provided to the Warren Commission.[^21]
+The [[HSCA|House Select Committee on Assassinations]] (1979) found that the Warren Commission's failure to investigate adequately the possibility of a conspiracy was "attributable in part to the failure of the Commission to receive all the relevant information that was in the possession of other agencies and departments of the Government," and that the CIA "was deficient in its collection and sharing of information both prior to and subsequent to the assassination."[^20] The report does not name Dulles in those findings. It states that the committee did not ignore the possibility that certain CIA officials who knew that close scrutiny of United States-Cuban relations could have exposed the CIA-Mafia plots might have tried to keep the CIA's or the Warren Commission's inquiry from the question of Cuban complicity, and that it determined that only Deputy Director Helms was in a position to have both the knowledge and the power to accomplish such a cover-up and was satisfied, on the basis of its investigation, that it was "highly unlikely he in fact did so."[^21] It found that the details of the AMLASH plot and the CIA-Mafia plots should have been provided to the Warren Commission.[^22]
 ### Death and Legacy
 Dulles spent his post-CIA years writing, lecturing, and defending the covert action programs he had built. His book *The Craft of Intelligence* (1963) was the first major public account of CIA operations by a former director. He died in Washington on January 29, 1969, of influenza complicated by pneumonia, eighteen months before the full extent of MKULTRA and the assassination plots became public.
 The 2022 report of the United Nations Eminent Person summarized the argument of Greg Poulgrain's 2020 book, *JFK vs. Allen Dulles: Battleground Indonesia*, which posits that Dulles formed a motive to remove [[Dag Hammarskjöld]] following a policy conflict over the United Nations' intended intervention in the dispute over the sovereignty of West New Guinea.[^23] The report recorded Poulgrain's proposition that the Operation Celeste documents, which refer to a plan to kill Hammarskjöld by causing his plane to crash, mention Dulles by name, stating: "UNO is becoming troublesome and it is felt that Hammarskjöld should be removed. Allen Dulles agrees and has promised full cooperation from his people."[^23] Poulgrain compared this with the Church Committee's account of Dulles expressing a "wish [to] give every possible support" to a plan to kill Lumumba.[^23] The report stated that it was not necessary at that stage to assess the probative value of Poulgrain's information, and that it underscored the importance of "proving or disproving the veracity of the Operation Celeste hypothesis and Dulles's alleged involvement (as relied on by Poulgrain)."[^24]
 ### Footnotes
 [^1]: Kinzer, Stephen. *The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War.* Times Books, 2013 (covers both brothers, the Sullivan & Cromwell connections, and the covert action programs). Grose, Peter. *Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles.* Houghton Mifflin, 1994.
@ -109,17 +113,20 @@ Dulles spent his post-CIA years writing, lecturing, and defending the covert act
 [^5]: Howard L. Bevis to Allen W. Dulles, February 7, 1958, CIA-RDP80B01676R003800020106-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80b01676r003800020106-4.
 [^6]: Hugh Wilford, The Mighty Wurlitzer (Harvard University Press, 2008), pp. 230-231.
 [^7]: Kornbluh, Peter, ed. *Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba.* New Press, 1998. Church Committee. "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders." Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975. Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy.* Random House, 1991. Chapter 4.
-[^8]: John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*. Times Books, 1979, Chapter 4; "Project MKULTRA, the CIA's Program of Research in Behavioral Modification," Joint Senate Hearing, August 3, 1977.
+[^8]: United States Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975, section on the Congo, quoting the CIA cables of August 18, August 19 and August 26, 1960. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf
-[^9]: Gerard Colby and Charlotte Dennett, *Thy Will Be Done: The Conquest of the Amazon*. HarperCollins, 1995, Ch. 18; John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*. Times Books, 1979, Chapter 9.
+[^9]: John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*. Times Books, 1979, Chapter 4; "Project MKULTRA, the CIA's Program of Research in Behavioral Modification," Joint Senate Hearing, August 3, 1977.
-[^10]: Warner, Michael, "The CIA's Internal Probe of the Bay of Pigs Affair: Lessons Unlearned," *Studies in Intelligence*, Winter 1998-1999. https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/static/Internal-Probe-Bay-Pigs.pdf
+[^10]: Gerard Colby and Charlotte Dennett, *Thy Will Be Done: The Conquest of the Amazon*. HarperCollins, 1995, Ch. 18; John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*. Times Books, 1979, Chapter 9.
-[^11]: Executive Order 11130, "Appointing a Commission To Report Upon the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy," November 29, 1963. The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-11130-appointing-commission-report-upon-the-assassination-president-john-f
+[^11]: Warner, Michael, "The CIA's Internal Probe of the Bay of Pigs Affair: Lessons Unlearned," *Studies in Intelligence*, Winter 1998-1999. https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/static/Internal-Probe-Bay-Pigs.pdf
-[^12]: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies*, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, pp. 67-68. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf
+[^12]: Executive Order 11130, "Appointing a Commission To Report Upon the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy," November 29, 1963. The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-11130-appointing-commission-report-upon-the-assassination-president-john-f
-[^13]: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report*, Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975, p. 269, note 1. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
+[^13]: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies*, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, pp. 67-68. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf
-[^14]: *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, p. 267. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
+[^14]: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report*, Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975, p. 269, note 1. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
-[^15]: Book V, p. 70 (Helms testimony of July 18, 1975). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf
+[^15]: *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, p. 267. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
-[^16]: Book V, p. 69 (note 134, Angleton testimony of February 6, 1976, pp. 31-34). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf
+[^16]: Book V, p. 70 (Helms testimony of July 18, 1975). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf
-[^17]: Warren Commission, executive session transcript, January 22, 1964, 5:30 to 7:00 p.m. https://aarclibrary.org/publib/jfk/wc/wcexec/pdf/WcEx0122.pdf
+[^17]: Book V, p. 69 (note 134, Angleton testimony of February 6, 1976, pp. 31-34). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf
-[^18]: U.S. Assassination Records Review Board, memorandum by Ronald G. Haron, "Assassination Records Among the Files of J. Edgar Hoover (FBI-36)," January 8, 1998. https://documents3.theblackvault.com/documents/jfkfiles/NARA-Oct2017/ARRB/RHARON/HARON/FBIMEM.002.pdf
+[^18]: Warren Commission, executive session transcript, January 22, 1964, 5:30 to 7:00 p.m. https://aarclibrary.org/publib/jfk/wc/wcexec/pdf/WcEx0122.pdf
-[^19]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), summary Findings I.D.4 and I.D.5(b) (p. 4). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
+[^19]: U.S. Assassination Records Review Board, memorandum by Ronald G. Haron, "Assassination Records Among the Files of J. Edgar Hoover (FBI-36)," January 8, 1998. https://documents3.theblackvault.com/documents/jfkfiles/NARA-Oct2017/ARRB/RHARON/HARON/FBIMEM.002.pdf
-[^20]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report,* H. Rept. 95-1828, p. 128. https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
+[^20]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), summary Findings I.D.4 and I.D.5(b) (p. 4). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
-[^21]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report,* H. Rept. 95-1828, pp. 112-116. https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
+[^21]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report,* H. Rept. 95-1828, p. 128. https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
 [^22]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report,* H. Rept. 95-1828, pp. 112-116. https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
 [^23]: A/76/892, report of the Eminent Person, August 25, 2022, paragraphs 241 to 244. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
 [^24]: A/76/892, paragraph 246. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
--- a/PEOPLE/(A-G)/Carlos
+++ b/PEOPLE/(A-G)/Carlos
@ -11,9 +11,18 @@ Carlos Amador was a pilot who planned to fly into [[Ilopango Airbase]] to pick u
 ### The Ilopango Connection
-DEA agent [[Celerino Castillo|Celerino Castillo III]], based in [[Guatemala City]], received reports that Amador "was intending to fly into Ilopango, pick up cocaine at Hangar No. 4, and take it to Miami." When Castillo's investigation escalated, the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] station in [[El Salvador]] sent a desperate message to [[Costa Rica]] Station advising the DEA not to make inquiries about anyone at Hangar No. 4. Amador's case illustrated how the CIA's Contra supply operation and the cocaine trade used the same facilities and infrastructure.[^2]
+DEA agent [[Celerino Castillo|Celerino Castillo III]], based in [[Guatemala City]], received reports that Amador "was intending to fly into Ilopango, pick up cocaine at Hangar No. 4, and take it to Miami." The DEA office in [[Costa Rica]] sent the cable of March 20, 1986 to the Guatemala office; the Justice Department Inspector General quotes it as reporting that a source said Amador "was intending to fly an aircraft from Costa Rica through El Salvador to Miami with cocaine." On April 25, 1986 the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] station in [[El Salvador]] replied to a Costa Rica station cable of April 23: "Based on that information, [El Salvador] Station would appreciate [Costa Rica] Station advising [DEA] not to make any inquiries to anyone re: hangar no. 4 at Ilopango since only legitimate [CIA] supported operations were conducted from this facility."[^2][^3] Amador's case illustrated how the CIA's Contra supply operation and the cocaine trade used the same facilities and infrastructure.[^2]
 ### DEA and CIA Records
 The CIA's file on Amador begins in November 1984, when a station cable describes him as a pilot for the [[ARDE]] group and reports that he gave the station information about another ARDE pilot fired for suspected contraband smuggling. A July or August 1985 Costa Rica station cable reported that the other pilot had suggested Amador was a possible trafficker. On August 27, 1985, a DEA Costa Rica report said a source had heard Amador planned to fly two aircraft from Miami to Colombia. The DEA agent who later reviewed it said it was filed in a general air intelligence file, which indicated there was not enough specific information to open an investigation.[^3]
 On June 10, 1986, the El Salvador station reported that the regional DEA official had told an embassy officer that Amador was suspected of heavy involvement in narcotics smuggling, and that if Amador was connected to the CIA the DEA would leave him alone. On June 17, 1986, CIA headquarters replied that its records showed no CIA "association" with Amador. The Inspector General states that the regional official was likely Country Attache [[Robert Stia]] or Castillo.[^3]
 On June 23, 1986, Castillo's debriefing report on informant STG6 described Amador as a "Contra Freedom Fighter" based in Miami who used a Salvadoran military credential to land at Ilopango without a customs search, and it asked for NADDIS checks on Amador and the aircraft listed. The DEA's NADDIS database shows no case initiated against Amador, and the Inspector General found no later DEA or FBI file on him.[^3]
 ### Footnotes
 [^1]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Ch. 15.
 [^2]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Ch. 15.
 [^3]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.2 (Carlos Amador: DEA cables of August 27, 1985 and March 20, 1986; CIA cables of July and August 1985, April 23, April 25, June 10 and June 17, 1986; Castillo's June 23, 1986 debriefing report; NADDIS check). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
--- a/PEOPLE/(A-G)/Celerino
+++ b/PEOPLE/(A-G)/Celerino
@ -3,43 +3,209 @@ title: Celerino Castillo
 aliases:
  - Celerino Castillo
  - Celerino Castillo III
  - Cellerino Castillo
  - Cele
 created: 2026-05-17
-updated: 2026-05-17
+updated: 2026-10-12
 category: "Law Enforcement & Legal"
 tags:
  - Person
  - LawEnforcement
  - DEA
  - ElSalvador
-  - 1980s
+  - Guatemala
  - Ilopango
  - ContraWar
  - CIAContraDrugs
  - DarkAllianceInvestigation
-summary: "DEA agent who discovered Contra drug trafficking operations at Ilopango Air Force Base in El Salvador and had his investigation repeatedly shut down by the CIA and State Department."
+  - Powderburns
  - FirearmsConviction
 summary: "DEA agent whose reports of drug flights from Ilopango Air Base were closed, in his account, by CIA and Embassy pressure, and whose core claims the 1997 Justice Department Inspector General wrote were not substantiated."
 born: 1949-01-01
 location: "Edinburg, Texas"
 relations:
  - type: employed_by
    with: "[[DEA]]"
    start: 1979
    end: 1992
    role: "special agent in New York, Peru and the Guatemala City regional office; left in 1992 on disability retirement after a proposed removal"
    fn: 1
  - type: investigated
    with: "[[DEA]]"
    reverse: true
    start: 1991-12
    end: 1992
    role: "proposed removal on six charges, including misappropriation of funds and the sale of firearms to an informant; resolved by disability retirement"
    fn: 21
  - type: investigated
    with: "[[Walter Grasheim]]"
    start: 1986-10-27
    end: 1986-11-21
    role: "DEA case on Grasheim opened by Castillo and closed by Country Attache Robert Stia"
    fn: 8
  - type: reported_to
    with: "[[Edwin Corr]]"
    start: 1986
    end: 1988
    role: "briefed the ambassador on the Grasheim investigation and on Ilopango drug allegations"
    fn: 11
  - type: investigated
    with: "[[Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General]]"
    reverse: true
    start: 1997-06
    role: "declined an interview on conditions he set; the Inspector General's chapter X reviewed his allegations"
    fn: 1
  - type: prosecuted
    with: "[[Department of Justice]]"
    reverse: true
    start: 2008-03
    end: 2012-07
    role: "charged in March 2008 in the Western District of Texas; pleaded guilty October 1, 2008 to two counts of a superseding information; sentenced October 22, 2008 to 37 months; Fifth Circuit affirmed in 2009; motion to vacate denied July 2012"
    fn: 29
 ---
-[[DEA]] agent Celerino Castillo III was assigned to the DEA's regional office in [[Guatemala City]] in October 1985, covering both [[Guatemala]] and [[El Salvador]]. Two days into his new job, agent-in-charge Robert Stia warned him that the U.S. government was running a covert operation at [[Ilopango Airbase|Ilopango Air Force Base]] and Castillo should not interfere with it. At the time, El Salvador produced no drugs and had no major drug rings; the DEA had never opened an office in the country.[^1]
+[[DEA]] special agent Celerino Castillo III served with the agency from 1979 to 1992, in [[New York City]], in [[Peru]] and in the regional office in [[Guatemala City]], which covered [[El Salvador]]. From that office he reported that pilots flying [[Contras|Contra]] resupply aircraft out of [[Ilopango Airbase|Ilopango Air Force Base]] were trafficking cocaine to the United States, and he alleged that the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] and the U.S. Embassy shut his investigation down. He set out those allegations in the 1994 book *Powderburns: Cocaine, Contras & the Drug War*, co-written with [[Dave Harmon]], and in interviews and a 1996 protest at DEA headquarters. The [[Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General]] reviewed the allegations in 1997 and wrote that the core of them was not substantiated. The CIA Inspector General's 1998 report records CIA denials and records that bear on parts of his account. In 2008 he was charged in the Western District of Texas with conspiracy to sell firearms without a license and selling them without a license, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to 37 months, as set out below.[^1]
-Through informants including a Cuban named [[Socrates Sofi-Perez]], Castillo discovered that [[Contras|Contra]] pilots based at Ilopango were brazenly flying drugs to the United States and money to [[Panama]], sometimes leaving kilos in plain view or arriving with boxloads of cash. When Castillo ran the pilots' names through DEA computers, nearly all came back as documented narcotics traffickers. Among the busiest was [[Francisco Guirola Beeche]], who was observed zooming in and out of Ilopango hauling drugs in and carrying cash to the Bahamas. His key informant, known as Murga, wrote flight plans for private planes on the civilian side of the base and could move freely on the military side.[^1]
+### Assignment to Guatemala City
-### Hangar No. 4 and CIA Obstruction
+Castillo had been a police officer in [[Edinburg, Texas]] from 1973 to 1979, when he joined the DEA as a special agent. His first posting was New York City, where he remained until 1984, when he was sent to Peru.[^1] DEA records confirm that in October 1985 he was transferred from Peru to the Guatemala City office, which covered [[Guatemala]], El Salvador, [[Belize]] and [[Honduras]], with Castillo responsible for El Salvador.[^1] Castillo told [[High Times]] that a supervisor who did not speak Spanish felt threatened by him and moved him to Central America without the promotion he had been promised. According to DEA Special Agent [[Russell Reina]], the transfer followed a photograph of Castillo posing in camouflage clothing with two machine guns that appeared on the front page of a Peruvian daily, which the DEA believed compromised his identity for undercover work.[^1]
-In March 1986, a cable from the [[Costa Rica|Costa Rican]] DEA office reported that pilot [[Carlos Amador]] intended to fly into Ilopango, pick up cocaine at Hangar No. 4, and transport it to [[Miami]]. The CIA had used Hangar No. 4 for covert Contra operations until turning it over to the [[National Security Council]] and [[Oliver North]]'s "Enterprise" in 1985. The adjoining Hangar No. 5 was still CIA-run. [[Alan Fiers]] acknowledged the CIA "had a capability and indeed a responsibility for reporting what had been happening at Ilopango." When Castillo began investigating, the CIA sent a cable asking the Costa Rica station to persuade the DEA to back off: "El Salvador Station would appreciate Costa Rica Station advising DEA not to make any inquiries into anyone re: Hangar No. 4 at Ilopango since only legitimate CIA supported operations were conducted from this facility."[^1]
+The Guatemala office had two agents, Reina and Castillo, under Country Attache [[Robert Stia]].[^2] Castillo's account, as set out in his book and in the reconstruction by [[Gary Webb]], is that Stia warned him two days after he arrived that the U.S. government was running a covert operation at Ilopango and that he should not interfere with it. Castillo also wrote that at the time El Salvador produced no drugs and the DEA had never opened an office there.[^3] The DEA opened an office in El Salvador in 1992, after Castillo had left the region.[^4]
-### Investigation Shut Down
+### Informants and the first Ilopango reports
-U.S. Ambassador [[Edwin Corr]], to whom Castillo reported, sent a secret "back channel" cable to the [[State Department]] requesting an internal DEA review. The DEA informed Corr that Castillo's information was "totally inaccurate" and he was told to close his investigation. When Castillo continued investigating, Corr personally ordered him to "stop the witch hunt." Three years later, when Castillo opened a new investigation into drug trafficking at Hangar No. 5, the CIA refused to allow him on the base and assured him there was no drug activity. Castillo was subsequently investigated by the DEA for administrative violations and forced into disability retirement. The DEA later claimed under FOIA it had no reports from Castillo about drug trafficking at Ilopango - a claim the [[Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General|Justice Department Inspector General]] exposed as false.[^1]
+On March 20, 1986, the DEA office in [[Costa Rica]] cabled the Guatemala office that a source said [[Carlos Amador]] intended to fly an aircraft from Costa Rica through El Salvador to [[Miami]] with cocaine, possibly picking it up at "Hangar No. 4" in San Salvador. The Costa Rica office asked the Guatemala office to have the Salvadoran police investigate Amador and any persons or companies associated with Hangar No. 4. The Inspector General found no written response from the Guatemala office to that cable.[^5]
-### Grasheim Raid and CIA Infiltration
+On June 23, 1986, Castillo filed a debriefing report on an informant designated STG6, who worked at the airport, listing alleged traffickers in El Salvador. The informant identified [[Walter Grasheim]] as the "head of smuggling operations at the Illopango [sic] Military International Airport" and said that "Grasheim owns and operates Hangar #4 at said airport." The report named thirteen other documented narcotics traffickers who used hangars four and five, and it was filed in a general "Air Intelligence" file.[^5] Castillo's book gives the Ilopango informant the name "Hugo Martinez," as the CIA report records.[^6] Webb's account names an informant known as "Murga," who wrote flight plans for private aircraft on the civilian side of the base.[^3] The Inspector General chapter identifies the informant only by the designation STG6. Webb wrote that Castillo's informant Murga "was indeed working for the CIA and had been for quite some time," citing the Inspector General's section on STG6.[^3][^5] Castillo's informants also included [[Socrates Sofi-Perez]], a Cuban whom Webb identifies as a [[Bay of Pigs]] veteran.[^3]
-Denied access to Ilopango, Castillo targeted weapons dealer [[Walter Grasheim|Walter "Wally" Grasheim]], whose home was raided on September 1, 1986. The raid uncovered automatic weapons, M-16s, hand grenades, C-4 explosives, and U.S. Embassy license plates and IDs. Grasheim claimed Castillo's informant was working for the CIA and had been used to divert attention from Ilopango. The Justice Department Inspector General confirmed the informant, Murga, was indeed a CIA asset, and the CIA demanded the DEA stop using him.[^1]
+Webb wrote that Murga told Castillo the Contra pilots were flying cocaine to the United States and money to [[Panama]], sometimes leaving with kilos in plain view or arriving with boxloads of cash, and that when Castillo ran the pilots' names through DEA computers nearly all returned as documented narcotics traffickers. One was [[Francisco Guirola Beeche]]; Webb quotes Castillo's memoir: "When I ran Guirola's name in the computer, it popped up in 11 DEA files, detailing his South America-to-United States cocaine, arms and money laundering." Webb wrote that Castillo and his informants watched Guirola move in and out of Ilopango hauling drugs in and carrying cash to the [[Bahamas]]. Webb also wrote that Castillo began sending reports on the pilots to DEA headquarters in January 1986 and received no replies.[^3]
-### Chretien's Role in Internal Investigation
+The Inspector General listed the DEA case and informant files that Castillo gave the DEA in October 1996. They include an "Air Intelligence" file (GFTF-86-9999) holding the March 20, 1986 cable on Amador, a Grasheim case file (TG-87-0003), a general aircraft file (GFTG-85-9999) and a file on the Pozo-Aparicio cocaine organization (TG-86-0001). The Inspector General reported that few of the files mention the Contras, and that most of the files it described make no mention of Contra or CIA involvement in drug trafficking.[^7]
-After returning to Sacramento, [[Gary Webb|Webb]] phoned Castillo and told him about [[Craig Chretien|Chretien]]'s claim that there was no proof the Contras were involved in drugs. Castillo said Chretien had been one of the DEA officials sent to Guatemala to conduct the internal investigation of him. Castillo said Chretien ordered him to use the word "alleged" in his reports to Washington about Contra drug shipments from Ilopango. "They said, 'You cannot actually come out and say this shit is going on.' And I told them, 'I'm watching the fucking things fly out of here with my own eyes! Why would I have to say alleged?'" Castillo said of Chretien's denial: "Aw, bullshit. Of all people, he knows perfectly well what was going on. He was reading all my reports, looking for grammatical errors."[^2]
+### The Grasheim investigation
 The earliest DEA reference to Grasheim that the Inspector General found was a March 10, 1986 cable from Panama. It reported that Grasheim and an Israeli national had flown into Panama from El Salvador and, when questioned, had claimed to be DEA agents. The cable also reported that the U.S. Customs Service in New York was investigating Grasheim for arms smuggling.[^8]
 Castillo's case opening report of October 27, 1986 said that two informants had linked Grasheim to air smuggling of cocaine by subjects believed to be associated with the Contra movement. It said that Salvadoran armed forces Chief of Staff General Adolfo Blandon had limited the Salvadoran investigation "for security reasons." It also reported that on May 3, 1986 Grasheim had crash-landed an aircraft near Tamiami, Florida, identified himself as a "secret agent," and turned over a suitcase that the report said weighed about 60 pounds and contained cocaine.[^8] Grasheim's own account to the Inspector General is that a clog in his fuel line forced an emergency landing at Tamiami in 1987, that Customs had him proceed to the airport, and that no one searched his person, bags or plane.[^9]
 On September 1, 1986, Salvadoran police searched Grasheim's residence. Castillo's report lists a small amount of marijuana, plastic explosives, cases of grenades, sniper equipment, silencers, anti-tank rockets, machine guns, pistols, night vision equipment, military radios and ammunition. Three vehicles were also seized, one with a license plate registered to the U.S. Embassy, which the Embassy denied belonged to it. Grasheim filed a sworn statement that the Salvadoran armed forces had named him a military advisor and given him the seized items, a claim the armed forces denied.[^8] Castillo later told the Office of Independent Counsel's 1991 interviewer that he had possessed Grasheim's identification cards, including a U.S. Embassy identification.[^10]
 On October 30, 1986, Castillo and U.S. Customs agent Richard Rivera briefed Ambassador [[Edwin Corr]] on Grasheim. Corr told the Inspector General that he welcomed the investigation but asked that it be conducted discreetly, and that he had canceled U.S. government night vision contracts with Grasheim after the search. Corr said he later sent a secret "back channel" cable asking the [[State Department]] to have the DEA review Castillo's allegations. According to Corr, DEA headquarters replied that the Grasheim case would be closed for lack of evidence. The Inspector General could not find that cable or any DEA reply in DEA files, and the State Department could not find the back-channel cable either.[^11]
 Corr told the Inspector General that after the back-channel cable Castillo's supervisors told him to close the Grasheim investigation, and that Castillo continued "to snoop around the airport and make allegations." Corr said he told Castillo that if he had evidence on Grasheim or anyone at Ilopango, Corr would support the investigation, and if he had none he would have to stop the "witch hunt."[^11] Webb's account has Corr telling Castillo to stop the "witch hunt," and reports that the DEA told Corr that Castillo's information was "totally inaccurate." Webb attributes to Corr, in his interview with Justice Department investigators, the statements that Castillo "Was a very professional and a good agent" and that the investigation had the potential to "destroy relationships with Salvadoran officials that had taken so long to build."[^3]
 The DEA closed the case on November 21, 1986. The closing report, written by Stia, stated: "DEA has no further interest in Grasheim at this time and it is unlikely to develop further drug information about Grasheim directly." It added: "[t]he drug aspect of this portion of the investigation is concluded and therefore this particular file is closed." The DEA passed its information to Customs and the Internal Revenue Service, which were conducting their own investigation of Grasheim's exports of military equipment.[^12] Rivera told the Inspector General that Customs never developed enough evidence to charge Grasheim and eventually closed its own case.[^12]
 ### Carlos Amador and the hangar cables
 The CIA's records on Amador begin in November 1984, when a cable describes him as a pilot for the [[ARDE]] group and reports that he had given the station information about another ARDE pilot fired for suspected contraband smuggling. A July or August 1985 Costa Rica station cable records that the other pilot had suggested Amador was a possible trafficker. The DEA office in Costa Rica had received an August 27, 1985 report that Amador planned to fly two aircraft from Miami to Colombia. The DEA official who reviewed that report later said it sat in a general air intelligence file, which indicated to him that there was not enough specific information to open an investigation.[^13]
 After the March 20, 1986 DEA cable, the CIA's Costa Rica station wrote to the El Salvador station on April 23, 1986. On April 25 the El Salvador station replied that Amador had stopped flying for the Contras in early 1985 and had gone into private business. The reply said Hangar 4 at Ilopango was the location of Contra operations and that the station could assure that the only items moved on Amador's flights were military supplies. It then asked: "Based on that information, [El Salvador] Station would appreciate [Costa Rica] Station advising [DEA] not to make any inquiries to anyone re: hangar no. 4 at Ilopango since only legitimate [CIA] supported operations were conducted from this facility." The same cable noted that station air operations had moved from Hangar 4 into Hangar 5, which the station still occupied.[^13]
 On June 10, 1986, the El Salvador station reported that an embassy officer, the local contact for the regional DEA official, had asked for any CIA information on Amador. According to that cable, the DEA official said that if Amador was connected to the CIA the DEA would leave him alone, and if not the DEA intended to go after him. The Inspector General judged that the regional official was likely either Robert Stia or Castillo.[^13] On June 17, 1986, CIA headquarters replied that its records showed no CIA "association" with Amador. Castillo's June 23, 1986 debriefing had described Amador as a "Contra Freedom Fighter" based in Miami who used a Salvadoran military credential to land at Ilopango without a customs search.[^5] The Inspector General found no DEA case initiated against Amador in its NADDIS database and no later DEA or FBI file on him.[^13]
 ### Hangars 4 and 5
 The CIA Inspector General's report on the Contra story describes the hangars at Ilopango. In 1984 the CIA occupied a newly built warehouse and hangar, Hangar 5, and moved to it activities that had been conducted in the smaller Hangar 4. After the CIA moved out of Hangar 4, the [[NHAO]] and the "Private Benefactors" used it in 1985 and 1986 for Contra-related operations. The two hangars shared an aircraft parking area on a restricted part of the base controlled by the Salvadoran military.[^6] Webb wrote that CIA records show Hangar 4 was used for covert Contra operations "until it was turned over in 1985 to the National Security Council and Oliver North's illegal arms network, 'The Enterprise.'"[^3] The CIA Inspector General's account of the transfer names the NHAO and the Private Benefactors and does not name the [[National Security Council]] or [[Oliver North]].[^6] Webb quotes former CIA Central American Task Force chief [[Alan Fiers]] from his testimony in *United States v. George* on July 31, 1992: "We had a capability and indeed a responsibility for reporting what had been happening at Ilopango."[^3]
 The same report identifies three main sources of drug trafficking allegations at Ilopango: a U.S. citizen, Castillo, and a CIA/DEA source known as STG6.[^6] [[Felix Rodriguez]], who went to El Salvador in 1985 to oversee a counterinsurgency program at Ilopango and who was known in the Contra supply operation as "Max Gomez," told the Inspector General that Hangar 4 was used by the Salvadoran military to store equipment and helicopters, that the CIA controlled Hangar 5, and that the sliding doors on both generally stood open. He said that he never saw or had reason to believe that drugs were carried by the Contra pilots, and that [[Juan Rafael Bustillo]] had asked Corr to place drug-sniffing dogs at the airfield after the DEA allegations.[^14] Rodriguez also said that he sent a mechanic named Carson back to the United States in 1986 after Carson said the Ilopango operation was "a money making project."[^14]
 ### Castillo's conversations with CIA officers
 In the book, Castillo describes two conversations with CIA officers. In the first, on August 15, 1986, the San Salvador chief of station, whom he names as [[Jack McCavett]], denied any connection between the CIA and the Ilopango operation. Three days later, Castillo wrote, McCavett pulled $45,000 in cash from his desk drawer and told him to spend it on cars for an anti-narcotics group. In the second, Castillo says that [[Randy Kapasar]], a CIA agent in Guatemala, knew he was investigating the Contras and followed the reasoning of informant Socrates Sofi-Perez. In Castillo's account Kapasar said: "Cele, how do you think the Contras are gonna make money? They've got to run dope, that's the only way we can finance this operation."[^15]
 The CIA Inspector General's report found CIA records showing that in mid-1986 the agency planned to spend $45,000 on three vehicles for the Government of El Salvador, and that the money was accounted for on August 18, 1986, "the same date Castillo alleged in Powderburns that he received $45,000 from a person he refers to as COS McCavett." The report added that "no information has been found to indicate that the transaction involved Castillo or DEA in any manner."[^15] The same report records an officer who met Castillo in Guatemala, and who worked with him on an unrelated project, recalling that Castillo discussed suspected narcotics trafficking at Ilopango without mentioning the Contras. That officer denied any knowledge of Contra drug trafficking and denied ever asking Castillo to back away from an investigation.[^16]
 ### The DEA's internal review
 The Inspector General reports that in February 1987 [[Douglas Everett]], chief of program and policy in the DEA Intelligence Section, went to Central America to evaluate allegations linking Nicaraguan political organizations to the drug trade. After meeting DEA, State Department and military personnel and informants, Everett reported that he could find no evidence that the [[Sandinistas]] or the Contras as entities were involved in drug trafficking. He wrote that the Guatemala office had recently closed an El Salvador investigation involving Contra allegations, and that informants had reported drug activity in hangars four and five. The Guatemala office believed the informants had exaggerated, in part because people arriving at the airport sometimes ran to the military side carrying briefcases, which the informants assumed held cocaine. Everett suggested that any smuggling at Ilopango was probably the work of Francisco Guirola Beeche, and he predicted that the allegations would keep surfacing because arrested traffickers would claim CIA authorization.[^17]
 The CIA Inspector General's report records that a DEA intelligence analyst who helped review Castillo's allegations told it that DEA found no information supporting the claims linking the Contras to drug trafficking, and that "all of the Contra allegations lacked substance."[^16]
 ### The Inspector General's 1997 review
 Chapter X of the DOJ Inspector General's 1997 report on the CIA and the Contra cocaine controversy states that Castillo refused an interview unless it was taped and [[Maxine Waters]] was present. The Inspector General agreed to tape the interview and to let him bring a personal representative, but told him Waters should not take part in an investigation it was conducting, and Waters was unable to persuade him to meet. The report also records that the former DEA country attache for Costa Rica, the former CIA chiefs of station for Costa Rica and El Salvador, and others declined interviews; that Stia did not sit for a second interview; and that the former Salvadoran air force chief Juan Rafael Bustillo and informant STG6 could not be located.[^1]
 The Inspector General's conclusion, attributed to the Inspector General alone, is that "although some of his claims have a seed of truth behind them, the inferences he draws, and his core claims about CIA support for Contra drug trafficking, were not substantiated by our review." It also found "that there was intelligence, although not hard evidence, that some Contra resupply pilots were trafficking in drugs, and that Castillo made that information available to the DEA, as he states." It found that the CIA did ask the DEA to stop using STG6, and that "there is no evidence that the CIA made this request for any reason other than that it wanted to use the informant."[^18]
 On the Ilopango operations, the Inspector General wrote that "it is clear that there were sensitive covert operations being conducted at Ilopango Airport," and that the CIA and the embassy were not anxious for the DEA to pursue its investigation there. It said it did not find proof that the CIA or the embassy wanted the DEA kept away because the agency was involved in drug trafficking, as opposed to wanting to protect covert operations.[^18]
 The Inspector General also summarized the 1991 interview of Castillo by FBI Special Agent [[Michael Foster]] for the [[Office of Independent Counsel]] investigation of the [[Iran-Contra Affair]]. Castillo told Foster that he believed North and the resupply operation were running drugs to raise money for the Contras. He said Grasheim had told Corr that "If I go down, half your Mil Group will go down with me," and that Corr had responded "Let the chips fall where they may." Foster wrote that Castillo "makes general accusations, but when I try to pin him down, he can't provide specific information that would support his conclusions." Foster told the Inspector General that Castillo would proceed from his own limited knowledge to generalizations that people "had to have known" about drug involvement.[^10]
 Other DEA and embassy personnel interviewed by the Inspector General described Castillo in similar terms. Stia said Castillo needed a lot of guidance and was quick to make judgments before conducting an adequate investigation. Reina said Castillo was quick to jump to conclusions and treated the leaders of foreign governments with disrespect. [[Janice Elmore]], the embassy's narcotics coordinator, said Castillo had often made allegations that later proved to be without merit. Delphin Von Briesen, who worked with informant STG6, said that Castillo's book "definitely embellished facts" about which Von Briesen had personal knowledge.[^19]
 ### The 1988 Bustillo meeting and Hangar 5
 On December 14, 1988, Castillo met General Bustillo about Bustillo's suspicion that Salvadoran Air Force officers were using the base for drug trafficking. Castillo told Bustillo that the DEA had similar information but lacked hard evidence because it had not been able to work at Ilopango. Pressed for names, Castillo named the Air School director, [[Manfredo Koenigsberg]]. Bustillo passed the allegation to the defense minister, General [[Vides Casanova]], who confronted Koenigsberg. Koenigsberg denied the charges, and Bustillo could produce only rumors and Castillo's information. A January 3, 1989 embassy cable to the DEA said the embassy assumed the DEA "must have some concrete evidence" to support Castillo's remarks, and it noted that Castillo had given Bustillo the impression that the DEA was prepared to assign personnel to Ilopango.[^4]
 In February 1989 the CIA station sent the DEA information that the Panamanian Miguel Antonio Rodriguez was using Ilopango to repair his aircraft. Robert Stia later reported that Castillo and Group Supervisor [[Thomas deTriquet]] went to Ilopango to investigate and were told by a CIA officer that they could not enter the base for that purpose, and that the CIA had already supplied the tail numbers and names.[^4] Stia wrote that the San Salvador station "has taken a more active stance in providing drug information to DEA," but that the Guatemala office could not develop the most important information, which concerned Ilopango.[^4]
 DeTriquet told the Inspector General that he and Castillo went to Ilopango about an allegation that unidentified dealers moved cocaine through Hangar 5 using Contra-associated pilots. A Salvadoran security officer denied them access to Hangar 5, which deTriquet believed held CIA equipment, after they tried a ruse without identifying themselves as DEA agents. At the embassy the CIA chief of station assured them there was no drug activity associated with Hangar 5, and they dropped the matter.[^4] The Inspector General's account has a Salvadoran security officer and a CIA officer as the obstacles. Castillo's version has the CIA itself refusing him access.[^3]
 The CIA ended its use of STG6 in December 1987, when it asked the DEA to stop using him because he was a current CIA informant. The DEA reactivated STG6 in 1989. Stia said the CIA chief of station had asked him to relinquish STG6 and that Castillo never expressed displeasure about it. An April 13, 1989 Stia memorandum, however, describes a "valuable asset (CI) was denied" to the Guatemala office at Ilopango.[^20]
 ### Disciplinary action and disability retirement
 In December 1991 the DEA moved to remove Castillo as a criminal investigator on six charges. The first was misappropriation of funds. A DEA source reported that Castillo had asked for $25,000 to give to special forces in Guatemala; the source said he gave Castillo the $25,000, and Castillo later said the source had given him only $10,000. The Office of Professional Responsibility found that Castillo had not followed the rules for processing money, had delayed reporting it for about five months, and had not fully advised his supervisor. The second charge concerned an attempt to sell a DEA radio to the same source for $15,000. The third was accepting a fully automatic MAC-10 machine gun from a confidential source and disregarding an order to get rid of it. The fourth concerned the sale of a .45 caliber pistol and a Mossberg 12-gauge shotgun to an informant for $3,000 and $5,000. The fifth was possessing two fully automatic weapons, an AR-15 and a MAC-10, contrary to DEA regulations. The sixth was a false statement about whether he knew the buyer of the pistol was an informant.[^21]
 Castillo denied the charges, called them administrative, and said they were brought in retaliation for his investigations of alleged Contra and CIA drug trafficking. In 1992, in lieu of the removal the DEA had proposed, he accepted disability retirement for a stress-related disorder. The Inspector General wrote that it was beyond the scope of its review to determine the validity of the charges or whether his retaliation claims had merit.[^21]
 ### The 1996 protest and the congressional record
 In October 1996 Castillo appeared at DEA headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia, with a list of cases that he said supported his allegation that the DEA had turned a deaf ear to investigations linking the CIA and the Contras to trafficking.[^7] [[Salon]] published a report by [[Dennis Bernstein]] and [[Robert Knight]] of Pacific News Service on October 8, 1996, which stated that Castillo, "flanked by civil rights activist [[Dick Gregory]] and the Rev. [[Joseph Lowery]] of the [[Southern Christian Leadership Conference]]," had staged a protest at DEA headquarters the week before, with the demand "an official investigation into the Reagan-Bush governments' clandestine Iran-Contra policy."[^22] The report states that Castillo said he tried on or about January 14, 1986 to alert Vice President [[George H. W. Bush]] at a U.S. embassy party in Guatemala that "something funny" was going on at Ilopango, and quotes him: "But he just shook my hand, smiled and walked away from me." It describes a February 14, 1989 memo from Castillo to his Guatemala-based supervisor on known traffickers using hangars at Ilopango controlled by the CIA and by North, and quotes a 1994 interview in which Castillo said: "There is no doubt that they were running large quantities of cocaine into the U.S. to support the Contras. We saw the cocaine and we saw boxes full of money." The report adds that Attorney General [[Janet Reno]] and CIA Director [[John Deutch]] had stated there was no evidence to support the allegations against the CIA.[^22]
 The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence held hearings titled "Allegations of a CIA Connection to Crack Cocaine Epidemic" on October 23 and November 26, 1996. [[Fred Hitz]] testified at the first session.[^23] The printed record of both sessions does not name Castillo. A statement in the record says the committee took testimony from a DEA agent after the agency closed its Honduras office and moved the agents to Guatemala, and that the agent "said it made no sense." The record does not name him.[^23]
 On March 16, 1998, the CIA Inspector General told the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, in a statement on the California story, that "six former CIA employees and a former DEA agent refused our request to be interviewed." The statement does not name the agent. The DOJ Inspector General records that Castillo declined an interview on conditions he set.[^1][^24]
 The 1988 Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee report, issued by the [[Kerry Committee]], does not name Castillo. It documents the flights of a C-47 transport. [[Adolfo Chamorro]] gave the subcommittee a list of the flights made by that aircraft to ferry arms from Ilopango to Costa Rica and to La Penca, and the report states that between October 18, 1984 and February 12, 1986 some 156,000 pounds of material were moved from Ilopango to airfields in Costa Rica, on 24 flights, eleven of them to La Penca.[^25] A subcommittee staff report chronology for October 14, 1986 states that [[Max Gomez]] (identified in brackets as Felix Rodriguez) was managing contra supply operations out of Ilopango after having allegedly been placed there by the National Security Council.[^26]
 ### Powderburns
 *Powderburns: Cocaine, Contras & the Drug War* was published in 1994, under the Sundial imprint of [[Mosaic Press]], with Dave Harmon as co-author.[^27] The CIA report and the Inspector General's chapter X both quote its account of Castillo's conversations with CIA officers, and both treat those claims as Castillo's allegations.[^1][^6] The CIA report quotes the book's references to "McCavett" and "Hugo Martinez," and its Kapasar passage is drawn from the book.[^15] Webb's notes for his chapter 13 cite *Powderburns* pages 112 to 113 for Stia's warning and pages 126 to 127 for Sofi-Perez, and state that his text on Castillo draws on the book, on his own interviews with Castillo, and on Castillo's interviews with Independent Counsel investigators declassified by the National Archives in 1994.[^3]
 ### Dark Alliance and the Chretien allegation
 In his book [[Dark Alliance]], Webb wrote that after returning to [[Sacramento]] he phoned Castillo and told him about [[Craig Chretien]]'s claim that there was no proof the Contras were involved in drugs. Castillo said Chretien had been one of the DEA officials sent to Guatemala to conduct the internal investigation of him. He said Chretien ordered him to use the word "alleged" in his reports to Washington about Contra drug shipments from Ilopango. Webb quotes Castillo: "They said, 'You cannot actually come out and say this shit is going on.' And I told them, 'I'm watching the fucking things fly out of here with my own eyes! Why would I have to say alleged?'" Castillo said of Chretien's denial: "Aw, bullshit. Of all people, he knows perfectly well what was going on. He was reading all my reports, looking for grammatical errors."[^28]
 Webb also wrote that in response to a Freedom of Information Act request the DEA claimed it had no reports from Castillo about drug trafficking at Ilopango, and that the Inspector General "had no trouble locating the agent's reports and quoted from them liberally." The Inspector General's chapter X, reviewing DEA files, located Castillo's June 23, 1986 debriefing report, his October 27, 1986 case opening report on Grasheim, his October 31, 1986 personal history report, and the Air Intelligence files.[^7][^8]
 ### Firearms conviction, 2008 and 2009
 The docket of *United States v. Castillo*, No. 5:08-cr-00193 in the Western District of Texas, lists the defendant as Celerino Castillo, III. A sealed complaint was filed on March 5, 2008 (No. 5:08-mj-00160) and an arrest warrant was returned executed on March 6; Castillo made an initial appearance on March 7 before Magistrate Judge John W. Primomo, who set a $25,000 unsecured bond. An indictment on two counts was filed on April 2, 2008. He pleaded guilty before the magistrate judge on June 13, 2008. On October 1, 2008 he pleaded guilty before Judge W. Royal Furgeson Jr. to two counts of a superseding information, and the indictment was dismissed on the government's motion. The minute entry for the sentencing of October 22, 2008 records 37 months of imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently, with two years of supervised release. He filed a pro se notice of appeal on October 31, 2008, and judgment was entered on November 5.[^29]
 The [[San Antonio Current]] reported in July 2009 that Celerino Castillo III, described as a Vietnam veteran and former DEA agent, was picked up at a San Antonio gun show in March 2008 and charged with conspiracy to sell guns without a license and selling guns without a license. The paper quoted him: "I did sell guns without a license because half of the gun shows do, but they wanted to actually come after me because of my history of fighting the government." It reported that he was ordered to report to the [[La Tuna Federal Correctional Institution|La Tuna federal prison]] on July 20 to serve a 22-month sentence received "late last year," and that at a July 10 hearing the judge denied his request to remain on bond during his appeal to the [[United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit|Fifth Circuit]]. It quoted Castillo: "I initiated the Iran/Contra investigation back in the '80s where we implicated our government in the drug trafficking. There were some bipartisan investigations that confirmed my allegations."[^30]
 The docket records a July 10, 2009 status conference and an order of that date extending the surrender date to July 30, 2009. The Fifth Circuit (No. 08-51144) affirmed, and its mandate was entered on November 9, 2009; the docket also records a Supreme Court order denying certiorari, transmitted in March 2010. Castillo filed a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. section 2255 on October 7, 2010 (Civil Action SA-10-CV-818). Magistrate Judge Primomo recommended denial on February 2, 2011, and Chief Judge Fred Biery accepted the recommendation and closed the case on July 24, 2012.[^29]
 ### Footnotes
-[^1]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 13: "The wrong kind of friends"
+[^1]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, "CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy," Chapter X: Celerino Castillo, introduction and sections A and B (December 1997). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p1.htm
-[^2]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 25: "Things are moving all around us"
+[^2]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 3, section F (interviews of DEA Guatemala personnel, including Reina, Holifield, Von Briesen and Elmore). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p3.htm
 [^3]: Gary Webb, *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion* (Seven Stories Press, 1998), chapter 13, "The wrong kind of friends," and the chapter notes. https://archive.org/details/dark-alliance-the-cia-the-contras-and-the-crack-cocaine-explosion-gary-webb-1998
 [^4]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 3, section E (Castillo's later interactions with Salvadoran personnel, the January 3, 1989 embassy cable, the Stia memorandum, and the deTriquet interview). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p3.htm
 [^5]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, sections C.1.a and C.2 (DEA cables and debriefing reports on Grasheim and Amador, including the March 20, 1986 Costa Rica cable and Castillo's June 23, 1986 debriefing report). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
 [^6]: CIA Office of Inspector General, *Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States*, Volume II, "The Contra Story" (1998), paragraphs 1023 and 1026 (hangars, three sources of allegations) and 1028 (Castillo's book and the "Hugo Martinez" name). https://archive.org/details/nps56-111612-04
 [^7]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 4, section I ("Castillo's Recent List of Relevant Files," including the October 1996 visit to DEA headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia, and DEA case and informant files) https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p4.htm
 [^8]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.1.a (DEA reports on Grasheim: the March 10, 1986 Panama cable, the June 23, 1986 debriefing, the October 27, 1986 case opening, the October 31, 1986 personal history report, the September 1, 1986 search, and the reports that followed). The Inspector General gives the case opening as October 27, 1986 in its file listing and as 1987 in one passage of part 2. https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
 [^9]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.1.b(6) (interview of Walter Grasheim). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
 [^10]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 4, section K (summary of the FBI report of Special Agent Michael Foster's 1991 interview of Castillo for the Office of Independent Counsel). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p4.htm
 [^11]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.1.b(2) (interview of Edwin Corr). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
 [^12]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.1.b(5) (interview of Richard Rivera) and section C.1.c (closing of the Grasheim case). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
 [^13]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.2 (Carlos Amador: CIA cables of April 23, April 25, June 10 and June 17, 1986; DEA cables of August 27, 1985 and March 20, 1986; NADDIS check). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
 [^14]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.1.b(1) (interview of Felix Rodriguez). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
 [^15]: CIA Office of Inspector General, Volume II (1998), paragraphs 1028 through 1031 (Castillo's account of conversations with the San Salvador chief of station and with Randy Kapasar, as quoted from *Powderburns*) and paragraph 1047 (CIA records of the $45,000 vehicle purchase, August 18, 1986). https://archive.org/details/nps56-111612-04
 [^16]: CIA Office of Inspector General, Volume II (1998), paragraphs 1063 (officer who met Castillo in Guatemala) and 1065 (DEA intelligence analyst). https://archive.org/details/nps56-111612-04
 [^17]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 3, section D (Douglas Everett's February 1987 review of allegations linking Nicaraguan political organizations to drug trafficking). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p3.htm
 [^18]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 4, section L (evaluation of Castillo's allegations). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p4.htm
 [^19]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.1.b(4) (interview of Robert Stia) and part 3, section F. https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p3.htm
 [^20]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 3, section H (informant STG6, CIA use and DEA reactivation, and the April 13, 1989 Stia memorandum). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p3.htm
 [^21]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 4, section J (allegation that the DEA retaliated against Castillo, December 1991 removal charges and 1992 disability retirement). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p4.htm
 [^22]: Dennis Bernstein and Robert Knight (Pacific News Service), report published by Salon, October 8, 1996. https://www.salon.com/1996/10/08/news_555/
 [^23]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Allegations of a CIA Connection to Crack Cocaine Epidemic*, hearings of October 23 and November 26, 1996, S. Hrg. 104-865. https://intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/hearings/allegationsofcia00unit.pdf
 [^24]: CIA Inspector General Frederick P. Hitz, statement before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "Volume I: The California Story," March 16, 1998. https://irp.fas.org/congress/1998_hr/980316-ps.htm
 [^25]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy*, S. Prt. 100-165 (printed December 1988), p. 51 (Chamorro flight list, C-47 flights from Ilopango).
 [^26]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy*, S. Prt. 100-165, chronology entry for October 14, 1986.
 [^27]: Celerino Castillo III and Dave Harmon, *Powderburns: Cocaine, Contras & the Drug War* (Sundial, Mosaic Press, 1994), catalogue record at Fairfield University Digital Commons. https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/petry-books/197
 [^28]: Gary Webb, *Dark Alliance* (1998), chapter 25, "Things are moving all around us."
 [^29]: Docket entries 1 to 100, *United States v. Castillo*, No. 5:08-cr-00193 (W.D. Tex., filed April 2, 2008; earlier magistrate No. 5:08-mj-00160), CourtListener RECAP archive. https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/4399978/united-states-v-castillo/
 [^30]: Alicia Ramirez, "DEA Agent Sentenced to 22 Months at La Tuna," *San Antonio Current*, July 15-21, 2009. https://www.sacurrent.com/news/dea-agent-sentenced-to-22-months-at-la-tuna-2377362/
--- a/PEOPLE/(A-G)/Edwin
+++ b/PEOPLE/(A-G)/Edwin
@ -14,9 +14,17 @@ Edwin Corr was the U.S. Ambassador to [[El Salvador]] who received [[Celerino Ca
 ### Shutting Down the Investigation
-When Castillo reported his findings about [[Cocaine]] trafficking at Ilopango to Ambassador Corr, Corr sent a secret back channel cable to Washington. Rather than supporting Castillo's investigation, the response from Washington was to shut it down. The CIA station in El Salvador sent a message to [[Costa Rica]] Station advising the [[DEA]] not to make inquiries about Hangar No. 4 at Ilopango. Corr's role in the chain of suppression illustrated how the State Department participated in protecting the Contra supply operation from law enforcement scrutiny.[^2]
+Corr sent a secret back-channel cable asking the [[State Department]] to have the [[DEA]] review Castillo's allegations. Corr told the Justice Department Inspector General that DEA headquarters replied that the [[Walter Grasheim|Grasheim]] case would be closed for lack of evidence. The Inspector General could not find that cable or the reply in DEA files, and the State Department could not find the back-channel cable.[^2] On April 25, 1986 the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] station in El Salvador asked the [[Costa Rica]] station to advise the DEA not to make any inquiries to anyone about Hangar No. 4 at Ilopango.[^3]
 Corr told the Inspector General that he had canceled U.S. government night vision contracts with Grasheim after the Salvadoran police search of Grasheim's residence, and that he thought it best to sever all ties with him. He said that after the search Castillo continued to make allegations about Grasheim's possible involvement with Salvadoran officials and Contra rebels. He said that after his back-channel cable Castillo's supervisors told Castillo to close the Grasheim investigation, and that Castillo continued "to snoop around the airport and make allegations." Corr said he told Castillo that if Castillo had evidence on Grasheim or anyone at Ilopango he would support the investigation, but that if he had none Castillo would have to stop the "witch hunt." Corr told the Inspector General that he did not recall the CIA ever asking him to pressure the DEA to back away from an investigation, and that Castillo never suggested to him that the CIA was conspiring with the Contras to traffic drugs.[^2]
 [[Gary Webb]] wrote that Corr told Castillo to stop the "witch hunt" and that the DEA told Corr Castillo's information was "totally inaccurate." Webb attributes to Corr, in his interview with Justice Department investigators, the statements that Castillo "Was a very professional and a good agent" and that the investigation had the potential to "destroy relationships with Salvadoran officials that had taken so long to build."[^1]
 Castillo told the 1991 FBI interviewer, Special Agent Michael Foster, that Grasheim had told Corr "If I go down, half your Mil Group will go down with me," and that Corr had responded "Let the chips fall where they may." Castillo's account is recorded in the Inspector General's summary of Foster's report.[^4]
 ### Footnotes
 [^1]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Ch. 15.
-[^2]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Ch. 15.
+[^2]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.1.b(2) (interview of Edwin Corr) and section C.1.a (Castillo's November 5, 1986 status report). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
 [^3]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Ch. 15.
 [^4]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 4, section K (summary of the FBI report of the 1991 interview of Castillo for the Office of Independent Counsel). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p4.htm
--- a/PEOPLE/(A-G)/Frederick
+++ b/PEOPLE/(A-G)/Frederick
@ -22,6 +22,23 @@ category: "Military"
 summary: "Army lieutenant of the 902d Military Intelligence Group attached to Grill Flame in 1978 for his earlier research, who screened the first Army remote viewers and was acting project manager of Center Lane in 1983."
 born: 1947-01-01
 location: "Glendale, California"
 relations:
  - type: head_of
    with: "[[Monroe Institute]]"
    role: President
    start: 2006
    fn: 12
  - type: employed_by
    with: "[[Monroe Institute]]"
    role: Research Director
    start: 1988
    fn: 12
  - type: participant_in
    with: "[[Gondola Wish]]"
    role: Project officer
    start: 1978
    end: 1978
    fn: 3
 ---
 Frederick Holmes "Skip" Atwater (born 1947, Glendale, California) was the [[U.S. Army]] intelligence officer at [[Fort Meade]], Maryland, who proposed the formation of a military remote viewing unit in 1977, recruited its initial personnel, and served as its operations officer through the program's most active period until his retirement from the Army in 1987. His proposal directly initiated what became the [[Stargate Project]] series of programs - Gondola Wish, Grill Flame, Center Lane, [[Sun Streak]] - that constituted the military's remote viewing research and intelligence effort for nearly two decades.
@ -56,12 +73,27 @@ Frederick H. Atwater, known as Skip, was a lieutenant in the Special Security De
 He remained the unit's operations officer through Grill Flame and [[Center Lane]]. INSCOM's chronology records, under July 7, 1983, "CPT Frederick Atwater assumes duties as Acting Project Manager," and under August 15, 1983, that Lieutenant Colonel Brian Buzby assumed duties as project manager.[^1] Published accounts by participants credit him with recruiting the first six viewers, among them Joe McMoneagle and Mel Riley, and with the unit's training in [[Robert Monroe]]'s Hemi-Sync method, which the Center Lane briefing dates to the end of 1980. After retiring from the Army in 1988 he became research director of the Monroe Institute's laboratory and, in 2006, its president, and was a founder and president of the International Remote Viewing Association.[^5][^6][^7]
 ### Gateway Training and the Monroe Institute
 On July 29, 1978, as project officer for Gondola Wish, Atwater attended a seminar by [[Charles Tart]] on out-of-body experiences; his memorandum of July 31, 1978 records that Tart referred attendees who asked where to learn more about out-of-body experience to the Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences.[^3]
 Atwater attended the Institute's eight-day training seminar from September 20 to 28, 1980 to assess it for the INSCOM Grill Flame Project. His trip report of September 30, 1980 recommended that experienced remote viewers be scheduled for the Institute's seminars and records that Robert Monroe had signed a consultant security agreement and that contact with the Institute had been on a "shallow cover" basis.[^8] In a memorandum of March 12, 1982 as Ops/Training Officer he proposed the Institute's Discovery series as a screening tool and the Gateway program as the second phase of an enhanced relaxation and concentration program, followed by one-on-one sessions with Monroe, the use of the Monroe tapes during operational sessions and biomonitoring.[^9]
 On October 5, 1983 Atwater, as Operations Officer, and Lieutenant Colonel [[Brian Buzby]] briefed the Secretary of the Army, [[John Marsh]], on Center Lane; on January 5, 1984 Buzby and "Mr. Fred Atwater" briefed Marsh on Monroe, the Institute and INSCOM involvement with it, and the Secretary asked a series of questions on RAPT, Center Lane and the Institute.[^10][^11]
 The Center Lane Project's biographical glossary states that in September 1988 Atwater accepted the position of Research Director in the Bob Monroe Research Lab at the Institute and that in December 2006 he became its president. A 1997 paper in the Journal of Scientific Exploration lists his affiliation as The Monroe Institute, Faber, Virginia. Army papers of 1983 style him "CPT Fred Atwater" (October 12, 1983), "Mr. Atwater" (August 31, 1983) and "Mr. Fred Atwater" (January 6, 1984); a Center Lane access list gives "Frederick H. Atwater, Mr., ASD, Great Skill." Other accounts give his Army retirement as 1987 and as 1988.[^12]
 ### Footnotes
 [^1]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, "List of Events from September 1977 to January 1986," CIA-RDP96-00788R001100020001-8 and the attachment to CIA-RDP96-00788R001500180001-7, cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R001500180001-7.pdf.
 [^2]: 902d Military Intelligence Group, memorandum for Chief, OPSEC Support Division, "GONDOLA WISH (U)," May 18, 1978, signed Frederick H. Atwater, 2LT, MI, CI Studies Section, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000160007-7, cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R002000160007-7.pdf.
 [^3]: 902d Military Intelligence Group, "Attendance at Scientific Seminar in Support of GONDOLA WISH (U)," July 31, 1978, signed Frederick H. Atwater, Project Officer, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000160013-0, cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R002000160013-0.pdf.
 [^4]: Memorandum for record, "Minutes of the Grill Flame Committee Meeting, 14 Feb 79," with the representatives roster as enclosure 1, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000130002-5, cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R002000130002-5.pdf.
-[^5]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, "INSCOM Project Grill Flame: Progress Report #1," February 21, 1979, with enclosures, CIA-RDP96-00788R001100070001-3. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
+[^5]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, "INSCOM Project Grill Flame: Progress Report #1," February 21, 1979, with enclosures, CIA-RDP96-00788R001100070001-3..
-[^6]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, "List of Events from September 1977 to January 1986," CIA-RDP96-00788R001100020001-8. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection. US Army Intelligence and Security Command, "Briefing - Project Center Lane," c. 1984, CIA-RDP96-00789R002100180002-8. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
+[^6]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, "List of Events from September 1977 to January 1986," CIA-RDP96-00788R001100020001-8.. US Army Intelligence and Security Command, "Briefing - Project Center Lane," c. 1984, CIA-RDP96-00789R002100180002-8..
 [^7]: Monroe Institute and International Remote Viewing Association biographical notices, and Atwater, F. Holmes. *Captain of My Ship, Master of My Soul.* Hampton Roads, 2001; McMoneagle, Joseph. *The Stargate Chronicles.* Hampton Roads, 2002.
 [^8]: Atwater, Frederick H., memorandum for the record, "Trip Report, 18-28 September 1980," September 30, 1980. CIA-RDP96-00788R001200060028-4, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^9]: Atwater, Frederick H., memorandum IAGPC-G, March 12, 1982. CIA-RDP96-00788R001200060027-5, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^10]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, memorandum of October 12, 1983. CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270014-1, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^11]: Security Support Detachment, USAINSCOM, memorandum of January 6, 1984. CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270003-3, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^12]: Center Lane Project, glossary entry "Fred Holmes Skip Atwater," centerlane-rv.org/glossary/skip-atwater; Atwater, F. Holmes, "Accessing Anomalous States of Consciousness with a Binaural Beat Technology," *Journal of Scientific Exploration* 11, no. 3 (1997): 263-274.
--- a/PEOPLE/(A-G)/Heinz
+++ b/PEOPLE/(A-G)/Heinz
@ -14,22 +14,45 @@ tags:
  - SS
  - 1950s
  - 1960s
-summary: "Heinz Felfe was a former SS officer and KGB double agent who joined the CIA-funded Gehlen Organization in 1951, rose to chief of counterintelligence for the BND, and was exposed in November 1961 after a decade compromising CIA-BND joint operations."
+summary: "Former SS officer and KGB double agent who joined the CIA-funded Gehlen Organization in 1951, rose to chief of BND Soviet counterintelligence, and was exposed in November 1961."
 born: 1918-03-18
 died: 2008-05-08
 location: "East Germany"
 updated: 2026-10-12
 relations:
  - type: employed_by
    with: "[[Gehlen Organization]]"
    start: 1951-11
    end: 1956-04
    role: counterintelligence section officer
    fn: 2
  - type: employed_by
    with: "[[Bundesnachrichtendienst]]"
    start: 1956-04
    end: 1961-11
    role: deputy chief and in practice chief of the Soviet counterintelligence section
    fn: 1
  - type: informant_for
    with: "[[Stasi]]"
    start: 1969
    role: full-time informal collaborator after the exchange
    fn: 4
 ---
-Heinz Felfe was born March 18, 1918, in Dresden, Germany. He joined the [[SS]] and served as an officer in the Sicherheitsdienst (SD), the SS intelligence service, during World War II. After the war he was captured by British forces, held briefly, and released. He died May 8, 2008, in Germany.[^1]
+Heinz Felfe was born March 18, 1918, in Dresden, Germany. He joined the [[SS]] and served as an officer in the Sicherheitsdienst (SD), the SS intelligence service, during World War II. He finished the war as an Obersturmführer in the Waffen-SS and a British prisoner of war, interned at the Blauw Kappel interrogation center near Utrecht, which specialized in former German intelligence personnel.[^1] He returned to West Germany in November 1946 and from 1947 worked as an agent of a British military intelligence unit (Sixth Area Intelligence Office, BAOR), reporting on communist student groups at the University of Bonn and joining the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) under British instruction.[^1] The British decided in April 1950 to drop him, citing his attempts to sell information to other agencies and his contacts with former SS men, among them Helmut Proebsting and Hans Clemens.[^1] The CIA study gives his entry into an SS reserve unit as 1938; the historian Norman Goda gives 1936 for his entry into the SS and 1943 for his commission.[^1][^2] He died May 8, 2008, in Germany.[^3]
 ### Soviet Recruitment
-Following his release from British custody, Felfe was recruited by [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] intelligence (the [[MGB]], predecessor to the [[KGB]]) during the postwar occupation period. The precise circumstances and date of his recruitment were never publicly established in full detail. Soviet intelligence had specific interest in recruiting former SD personnel who possessed intelligence tradecraft and might be positioned to penetrate Western intelligence structures, and Felfe's SS background, rather than disqualifying him, made him an attractive candidate for exactly this purpose.[^1]
+Following his release from British custody, Felfe was recruited by [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] intelligence (the [[MGB]], predecessor to the [[KGB]]) during the postwar occupation period.[^3] According to the CIA study, the Soviet effort ran through Felfe's former SD colleague Hans Clemens. Clemens went to Dresden in February 1950, was recruited there by a Soviet officer, and then recruited Erwin Tiebel and Felfe in West Germany; Felfe, then working as a refugee interrogator, resisted the trip east for another year.[^1] Goda dates Felfe's full status as a Soviet agent, codenamed Paul, to September 1951 and his job in the Gehlen Organization's counterintelligence section to November 1951.[^2] The CIA study adds that Felfe may have been recruited earlier, during a 1948 trip east while working for the British, and that Goleniewski reached the same view.[^1] Soviet intelligence had specific interest in recruiting former SD personnel who possessed intelligence tradecraft and might be positioned to penetrate Western intelligence structures, and Felfe's SS background, rather than disqualifying him, made him an attractive candidate for exactly this purpose.[^3]
 ### Entry into the Gehlen Organization
-In 1951, Felfe was recruited into the [[Gehlen Organization]], the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]-funded intelligence network that [[Reinhard Gehlen]] had built at Pullach, Bavaria, from the remnants of his wartime intelligence apparatus. Felfe's SS and SD background was not disqualifying within the Gehlen Organization, which recruited extensively from former Wehrmacht and Nazi intelligence veterans. He entered the counterintelligence section and rose progressively through its ranks.[^1]
+In 1951, Felfe was recruited into the [[Gehlen Organization]], the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]-funded intelligence network that [[Reinhard Gehlen]] had built at Pullach, Bavaria, from the remnants of his wartime intelligence apparatus. Felfe's SS and SD background was not disqualifying within the Gehlen Organization, which recruited extensively from former Wehrmacht and Nazi intelligence veterans. He entered the counterintelligence section and rose progressively through its ranks.[^3]
-When the [[Bundesnachrichtendienst]] (BND) formally succeeded the Gehlen Organization in April 1956, Felfe transitioned into the new service's structure and continued his rise within the counterintelligence apparatus. He eventually became chief of Soviet counterintelligence within the BND - the section responsible for identifying and neutralizing Soviet penetration agents within West German intelligence.[^1]
+When the [[Bundesnachrichtendienst]] (BND) formally succeeded the Gehlen Organization in April 1956, Felfe transitioned into the new service's structure and continued his rise within the counterintelligence apparatus. He eventually became chief of Soviet counterintelligence within the BND - the section responsible for identifying and neutralizing Soviet penetration agents within West German intelligence.[^3] The CIA study describes him as an officer of the BND for ten years, six of them as deputy chief (in practice the real chief) of the section responsible among other things for countering Soviet espionage, having succeeded his superior Reile in late 1956 or early 1957.[^1] Goda states that he took charge of counterintelligence against the Soviets in 1955.[^2] Bodo Hechelhammer, the BND's chief historian, says he rose to head of counterintelligence against the Soviet Union, and ZDF calls him head of the section "Gegenspionage Sowjetunion."[^4][^5]
 The Army's Counter Intelligence Corps noted in 1953 Felfe's role as leader of an "SD clique" in the Gehlen Organization, in 1954 that he was probably leaking to the Soviets, and in 1955 that suspicion of him and the clique was growing; the CIA suspected him by 1957, but he had the confidence of Reinhard Gehlen and personally briefed him on sensitive Soviet matters.[^2] From 1958 Felfe pressed the CIA for information on its Karlshorst penetration program. The CIA's record shows first official briefings to him in May 1958, February 1959 and July 1959, after which he became the BND headquarters supervisor of the joint program.[^1] The CIA's 1963 damage assessment estimated that roughly 15,000 individual items were blown or compromised.[^2] Hechelhammer states that the whole Soviet counterintelligence of the BND collapsed for years and had to be rebuilt.[^4]
 Wilhelm Harster, an SS lieutenant general who had been Felfe's superior, could not join the BND as a security risk but presented himself as a BND agent and recommended former SS contacts to the service; the CIA's file indicates he used Felfe to reach the BND.[^6]
 ### Decade of Penetration
@ -37,26 +60,31 @@ Felfe operated as a KGB agent throughout his tenure in the Gehlen Organization a
 The identities of Western agents operating in the Soviet bloc who had been compromised through BND channels; the existence and details of CIA-BND joint operations in [[East Germany]] and other Warsaw Pact countries; the organizational structure, personnel, and procedures of the BND itself; and material that allowed Soviet intelligence to anticipate Western counterintelligence activities.
-The full extent of the damage was difficult to assess because Felfe had in his counterintelligence role the authority to handle cases involving suspected Soviet agents - a position from which he could protect Soviet sources, mislead investigations, and channel false information to American and [[West Germany|West German]] analysts.[^1]
+The full extent of the damage was difficult to assess because Felfe had in his counterintelligence role the authority to handle cases involving suspected Soviet agents - a position from which he could protect Soviet sources, mislead investigations, and channel false information to American and [[West Germany|West German]] analysts.[^3]
 ### Exposure
-Felfe was exposed in November 1961, following information provided to Western intelligence by a Soviet defector or through signals intelligence - the specific source of his exposure was officially described in general terms but not fully disclosed publicly. He was arrested along with two accomplices, Hans Clemens and Erwin Tiebel, who had also been working within the Gehlen/BND network.[^1]
+Felfe was exposed in November 1961. The CIA study states he was detected through a lead provided by a CIA-run penetration of the Polish Intelligence Service (UB) and names the defector Michal Goleniewski, a senior UB officer, as the officer who provided the lead.[^1] He was arrested along with two accomplices, Hans Clemens and Erwin Tiebel, who had also been working within the Gehlen/BND network.[^3] News of the arrests was generally known throughout the West German government by December 2, 1961, and appeared in the newspapers by December 12.[^1]
 The timing was significant: his exposure came only months after the construction of the [[Berlin Wall]] in August 1961, a period of heightened tension in which the extent of Soviet penetration of Western intelligence was a matter of acute concern.
 ### Trial and Conviction
-Felfe was tried in West Germany on charges of treason and espionage. He was convicted in July 1963 and sentenced to fourteen years in prison. The trial established the factual record of his decade of KGB service and the scope of the material he had passed. His cooperation during trial and sentencing was limited.[^1]
+Felfe was tried in West Germany on charges of treason and espionage. He was convicted in July 1963 and sentenced to fourteen years in prison. The trial established the factual record of his decade of KGB service and the scope of the material he had passed. His cooperation during trial and sentencing was limited.[^3] Hans Clemens received nine years and Tiebel two years at hard labor.[^1] From prison Felfe re-established contact with the KGB through his mother in Dresden and corresponded with the Soviets; the Soviets several times tried to obtain his release in exchange for prisoners held in the East.[^1]
 ### Exchange and East Germany
-In February 1969, Felfe was exchanged for a group of Western agents held by East Germany in a spy exchange negotiated between the two German states. He settled in East Germany, where he was received as a hero of socialist intelligence work. He later published a memoir, *Im Dienst des Gegners* (In the Service of the Enemy, 1986), presenting his account of his career as a double agent and his motivations. He taught at Humboldt University in East Berlin and remained in Germany after reunification, dying in 2008.[^1]
+In February 1969, Felfe was exchanged for a group of Western agents held by East Germany in a spy exchange negotiated between the two German states. Goda states that Felfe was released to East Germany in 1969 in exchange for three West German spies, and a BND archive photograph published with Hechelhammer's interview shows the exchange at the Herleshausen border crossing.[^2][^4] He settled in East Germany, where he was received as a hero of socialist intelligence work; Hechelhammer states that he became a full-time informal collaborator of the Stasi.[^4] He later published a memoir, *Im Dienst des Gegners* (In the Service of the Enemy, 1986), presenting his account of his career as a double agent and his motivations. He taught at Humboldt University in East Berlin and remained in Germany after reunification, dying in 2008.[^3]
 ### Significance
-Felfe's career was among the most damaging Cold War penetrations of a Western intelligence service. Its specific significance derived from his position in counterintelligence rather than in operational work - he did not merely report on operations but actively managed the processes that were supposed to protect them. The Felfe case reinforced American intelligence concerns about the security vulnerabilities of the BND stemming from its origins in the Nazi intelligence establishment, and contributed to a reassessment of the degree of access given to BND personnel in joint operations.[^1]
+Felfe's career was among the most damaging Cold War penetrations of a Western intelligence service. Its specific significance derived from his position in counterintelligence rather than in operational work - he did not merely report on operations but actively managed the processes that were supposed to protect them. The Felfe case reinforced American intelligence concerns about the security vulnerabilities of the BND stemming from its origins in the Nazi intelligence establishment, and contributed to a reassessment of the degree of access given to BND personnel in joint operations.[^3]
 ### Footnotes
-[^1]: Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA.* Doubleday, 2007, pp. 33-56. Felfe, Heinz. *Im Dienst des Gegners: 10 Jahre Moskaus Mann im BND.* Rasch und Röhring, 1986 (Felfe's own account). Breitman, Richard, Norman J.W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, and Robert Wolfe. *U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis.* Cambridge University Press, 2005.
+[^1]: Central Intelligence Agency, "KGB Exploitation of Heinz Felfe: Successful KGB Penetration of a Western Intelligence Service," March 1969, document C02606328, released February 21, 2019. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/node/2071209
 [^2]: Goda, Norman J. W., "CIA Files Relating to Heinz Felfe, SS officer and KGB Spy," Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, 2008. https://fas.org/sgp/eprint/goda.pdf
 [^3]: Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA.* Doubleday, 2007, pp. 33-56. Felfe, Heinz. *Im Dienst des Gegners: 10 Jahre Moskaus Mann im BND.* Rasch und Röhring, 1986 (Felfe's own account). Breitman, Richard, Norman J.W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, and Robert Wolfe. *U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis.* Cambridge University Press, 2005.
 [^4]: Hechelhammer, Bodo, interview, "Spion Heinz Felfe: Für ihn lieferten die Sowjets kleinere Fische ans Messer," t-online, March 22, 2020. https://www.t-online.de/nachrichten/panorama/wissen/geschichte/id_87517540/spion-heinz-felfe-fuer-ihn-lieferten-die-sowjets-kleinere-fische-ans-messer-.html
 [^5]: ZDF, "BND-Affären: Von Hanning und Felfe bis Landesverrat an Russland," October 6, 2026. https://www.zdfheute.de/politik/deutschland/bnd-affaeren-spionage-hanning-skandale-100.html
 [^6]: Breitman, Richard, "Historical Analysis of 20 Name Files from CIA Records," Interagency Working Group, 2001 (entry on Wilhelm Harster). https://www.archives.gov/iwg/declassified-records/rg-263-cia-records/historical-analysis-by-breitman.pdf
--- a/PEOPLE/(A-G)/Larry
+++ b/PEOPLE/(A-G)/Larry
@ -29,11 +29,13 @@ When Lumumba, the Congo's first elected Prime Minister, sought [[Soviet Union|So
 Devlin testified to the [[Church Committee]] in 1975 that he never used the materials and eventually disposed of them by throwing the poison into the [[Congo River]]. His testimony acknowledged he had understood the orders but claimed moral and practical objections to carrying them out.[^1] The committee's interim report calls the Leopoldville station officer "Hedgman." The scientist it calls "Joseph Scheider" testified on October 7 and 9, 1975 that he destroyed the viability of the biological material and disposed of it in the Congo River before leaving the Congo on October 5, 1960, and the station officer testified on August 21, 1975 that he locked the material in the bottom drawer of his safe and disposed of it months later; each recalled disposing of it in the Congo River, alone. The station officer's October 7, 1960 cable to [[Bronson Tweedy]] said that "certain items of continuing usefulness" had been left.[^2]
 The 2019 report of the United Nations Eminent Person described the CIA's presence in the Congo in 1961 as including air operations and activities that included planned assassinations. It recorded that Chief of Station Larry Devlin coordinated agents designated "WIROGUE" and "QJWIN," and attributed the planned assassinations to "the programme 'ZRRIFLE' and other programmes" rather than to Devlin by name.[^3] The report did not state whether Devlin knew of or approved the programmes it named.
 ### Lumumba's Death
 Despite Devlin's claimed refusal of the assassination order, Lumumba was captured, transferred to Katanga, and killed on January 17, 1961, by Katangese forces under [[Moise Tshombe]] with Belgian officers present. The precise extent of CIA foreknowledge or facilitation of this transfer - as opposed to the separate biological assassination plan Devlin received - has not been fully resolved by the documentary record.
-Devlin acknowledged to the Church Committee that the CIA was aware of Lumumba's transfer to Katanga and that this transfer made his survival unlikely. A 2001 Belgian parliamentary inquiry found Belgian government and intelligence officers directly involved in the killing. The question of whether CIA officers encouraged or facilitated the handover remained contested.[^3]
+Devlin acknowledged to the Church Committee that the CIA was aware of Lumumba's transfer to Katanga and that this transfer made his survival unlikely. A 2001 Belgian parliamentary inquiry found Belgian government and intelligence officers directly involved in the killing. The question of whether CIA officers encouraged or facilitated the handover remained contested.[^4]
 ### Mobutu and the Congo's Political Future
@ -51,4 +53,5 @@ In 2007, one year before his death, Devlin published *Chief of Station, Congo: F
 [^1]: Devlin, Lawrence. *Chief of Station, Congo: Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone.* Public Affairs, 2007. Church Committee (U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities). *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders.* Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975.
 [^2]: Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report*, S. Rept. 94-465, November 20, 1975, pp. 24 to 31 (Scheider, October 7 and 9, 1975; Hedgman, August 21, 1975, pp. 48 to 49 and 84 to 85). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
-[^3]: Kalb, Madeleine G. *The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa from Eisenhower to Kennedy.* Macmillan, 1982. De Witte, Ludo. *The Assassination of Lumumba.* Verso, 2001.
+[^3]: A/73/973, report of the Eminent Person, September 12, 2019, paragraph 26. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
 [^4]: Kalb, Madeleine G. *The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa from Eisenhower to Kennedy.* Macmillan, 1982. De Witte, Ludo. *The Assassination of Lumumba.* Verso, 2001.
--- a/PEOPLE/(A-G)/Walter
+++ b/PEOPLE/(A-G)/Walter
@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ aliases:
  - Walter Grasheim
  - Wally Grasheim
 created: 2026-05-17
-updated: 2026-05-17
+updated: 2026-10-12
 category: "Arms Dealers & Brokers"
 tags:
  - Person
@ -15,6 +15,14 @@ tags:
  - ContraWar
  - DarkAllianceInvestigation
 summary: "New York weapons dealer and U.S. military contractor raided by DEA agent Celerino Castillo, who was found with embassy plates, C-4 explosives, and a massive weapons cache."
 relations:
  - type: investigated
    with: "[[Celerino Castillo]]"
    reverse: true
    start: 1986-10-27
    end: 1986-11-21
    role: "DEA case opened by Castillo and closed by Country Attache Robert Stia"
    fn: 4
 ---
 Walter "Wally" Grasheim was a New York weapons dealer and U.S. military contractor based in [[San Salvador]], [[El Salvador]], who was raided by [[DEA]] agent [[Celerino Castillo]] on September 1, 1986. The raid uncovered a massive weapons cache, U.S. Embassy license plates and IDs, and evidence linking Grasheim to the Contra operation at [[Ilopango Airbase|Ilopango Air Force Base]].[^1]
@ -24,7 +32,7 @@ The tall, bearded arms broker was the Salvadoran sales representative for the Li
 ### The Raid
-Denied access to the military side of Ilopango, Castillo targeted Grasheim as an off-base target linked to the Ilopango operation. One of Castillo's informants told him Grasheim was intimately involved with the Contra drug operation at the base, and DEA computers turned up several references to Grasheim as a suspected drug trafficker. Salvadoran police working with Castillo raided Grasheim's elegant hillside home in San Salvador. A pound of marijuana was found, along with an extraordinary weapons cache: "Some of the rooms in the house had munitions and explosives piled to the ceiling, including automatic weapons, M-16's, hand grenades and C-4 [plastic explosives]." The raid also uncovered U.S. Embassy license plates, radios, and IDs in Grasheim's name.[^1]
+Denied access to the military side of Ilopango, Castillo targeted Grasheim as an off-base target linked to the Ilopango operation. One of Castillo's informants told him Grasheim was intimately involved with the Contra drug operation at the base, and DEA computers turned up several references to Grasheim as a suspected drug trafficker. Salvadoran police working with Castillo raided Grasheim's elegant hillside home in San Salvador. A pound of marijuana was found, along with an extraordinary weapons cache. [[Gary Webb]] quoted the raid's contents as including: "Some of the rooms in the house had munitions and explosives piled to the ceiling, including automatic weapons, M-16's, hand grenades and C-4 [plastic explosives]." The Inspector General's inventory of the September 1, 1986 search lists "machine guns" and "pistols" and does not list M-16s. The raid also uncovered U.S. Embassy license plates, radios, and IDs in Grasheim's name.[^1][^2]
 ### Grasheim's Claims
@ -32,8 +40,29 @@ Grasheim strenuously denied involvement with either the Contras or drugs and bel
 ### CIA Infiltration of Castillo's Investigation
-The [[Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General|Justice Department Inspector General]]'s report partially confirmed Grasheim's account. Castillo's informant Murga, who directed Castillo toward Grasheim by fingering him as "head of smuggling operations at Ilopango," was indeed a CIA asset and had been for some time. Soon after putting Castillo onto Grasheim, the CIA demanded Murga back. Castillo's boss Robert Stia "recalled being asked by the CIA station chief in El Salvador to relinquish the use of informant" Murga. "The Station Chief had explained that the CIA had established the informant before he had ever worked for the DEA" and wanted the DEA to stop using him because "he was currently a CIA informant." Stia complied but complained internally that the CIA had cost the DEA a valuable asset.[^1]
+The [[Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General|Justice Department Inspector General]]'s report partially confirmed Grasheim's account. Webb wrote that Castillo's informant Murga, who directed Castillo toward Grasheim by fingering him as "head of smuggling operations at Ilopango," "was indeed working for the CIA and had been for quite some time," and that soon after putting Castillo onto Grasheim the CIA demanded Murga back.[^1] The Inspector General's report designates the informant STG6 and records that the CIA asked the DEA in December 1987 to stop using STG6 because he was currently a CIA informant; the DEA reactivated him in 1989. [[Robert Stia]] recalled being asked "by the CIA Station Chief in El Salvador to relinquish use of informant STG6," and said "The Station Chief had explained that the CIA had established the informant before he had ever worked for the DEA." Stia complied but complained internally that the CIA had cost the DEA a valuable asset.[^3] The report does not confirm Grasheim's claim that the informant worked for the CIA against Castillo; it records that CIA records showed STG6 was a CIA informant and that the CIA and the DEA disagreed over his use.[^3]
 ### Investigation Record, 1986
 The DEA's case on Grasheim began with a March 10, 1986 cable from Panama, which reported that Grasheim and an Israeli national had flown in from El Salvador and, when questioned by Panamanian authorities, had claimed to be DEA agents. The cable also reported a U.S. Customs Service investigation of Grasheim in New York for arms smuggling.[^4]
 On May 3, 1986, according to Castillo's report, Grasheim crash-landed an aircraft six miles northwest of Tamiami airport in Florida while flying from Ilopango to Florida. At the scene he identified himself as a "secret agent" with the U.S. government and turned over a suitcase that Castillo's report says weighed about 60 pounds and contained cocaine. Castillo's report also says Grasheim did not clear Customs. Grasheim told the Inspector General that a clog in his fuel line forced an emergency landing in 1987, that Customs instructed him to proceed to the airport, that he left everything in the plane except a suitcase of business records and flight plans, and that no one searched his person, bags or plane.[^2]
 The case opening report, dated October 27, 1986 in the Inspector General's file listing, named the informants STG6 and STG13 and attributed to Grasheim the "air smuggling of cocaine by subjects who were believed to be associated with the Contra movement." Castillo's report said that Grasheim allegedly abused hangars four and five, which the CIA had provided to him. The Salvadoran police search of Grasheim's residence followed on September 1, 1986, and Grasheim filed a sworn statement on September 19, 1986 saying that the Salvadoran armed forces had named him a military advisor and given him the seized items. The armed forces denied that they had done so.[^4]
 On October 30, 1986, Castillo and Customs agent Richard Rivera briefed Ambassador [[Edwin Corr]]. Corr said he welcomed an investigation but asked that it be conducted discreetly. Corr told the Inspector General that he had canceled U.S. government night vision contracts with Grasheim after the search. Grasheim later came to the embassy and asked to see Corr, and his security staff turned him away.[^5]
 The DEA closed the case on November 21, 1986. In the closing report, Country Attache Robert Stia wrote: "DEA has no further interest in Grasheim at this time and it is unlikely to develop further drug information about Grasheim directly." The report noted that Grasheim had questioned "DEA's right and authority to conduct an investigation into his activities." Stia wrote that the DEA's information was passed to Customs and the Internal Revenue Service, which were conducting their own investigation of Grasheim's exports of military supplies.[^6]
 Grasheim told the Inspector General that he was never charged with a crime or given a formal explanation for the search. He offered three explanations for why the DEA had targeted him: some of his activities were suspicious, the DEA might have been "led by the nose through the investigation by someone else" who wanted to divert attention from that person, or the investigation resulted from his "high profile" in El Salvador.[^2]
 Customs agent Rivera told the Inspector General that Customs never developed enough evidence to charge Grasheim with an offense, and that its case was closed. The Customs file the Inspector General obtained contained nothing on the CIA or the Contras.[^6]
 ### Footnotes
 [^1]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 13: "The wrong kind of friends"
 [^2]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.1.b(6) (interview of Walter Grasheim) and section C.1.a (inventory of the September 1, 1986 search). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
 [^3]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 3, section H (informant STG6, CIA use and DEA reactivation). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p3.htm
 [^4]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.1.a (DEA reports on Grasheim, including the March 10, 1986 Panama cable, the October 27, 1986 case opening report and the September 19, 1986 sworn statement). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
 [^5]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.1.b(2) (interview of Edwin Corr). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
 [^6]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, sections C.1.c (closing of the Grasheim case) and C.1.b(5) (interview of Richard Rivera). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
--- a/PEOPLE/(A-G)/William
+++ b/PEOPLE/(A-G)/William
@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ died: 1996-04-27
 location: "Saint Paul, Minnesota"
 ---
-William Egan Colby (January 4, 1920 - April 27, 1996) served as Director of Central Intelligence from September 1973 to January 1976 under Presidents Nixon and Ford. His tenure was defined by his decision to cooperate with congressional investigations into CIA domestic surveillance activities, a choice that made him deeply unpopular within the agency's leadership and among figures like [[James Jesus Angleton]] and [[Richard Helms]].[^1]
+William Egan Colby (January 4, 1920 - April 27, 1996) served as Director of Central Intelligence from September 4, 1973 to January 30, 1976 (after [[Vernon Walters]] served as acting director from July 2, 1973) under Presidents Nixon and Ford. His tenure was defined by his decision to cooperate with congressional investigations into CIA domestic surveillance activities, a choice that made him deeply unpopular within the agency's leadership and among figures like [[James Jesus Angleton]] and [[Richard Helms]].[^1][^2]
 ### Vietnam Service
@ -32,17 +32,17 @@ Colby served as CIA station chief in Saigon during the [[Vietnam War]] and from
 ### Angleton Firing and Operation CHAOS
-In December 1974, Seymour Hersh approached Colby with material for a forthcoming New York Times article on the CIA's domestic surveillance activities under [[Operation CHAOS]] (MHCHAOS). On December 17, 1974 - five days before Hersh's article appeared on December 22 - Colby dismissed Angleton, who had headed the Counterintelligence Staff that ran CHAOS under director [[Richard Ober]]. Angleton had served as the CIA's chief of counterintelligence for 21 years.[^1][^2]
+In December 1974, Seymour Hersh approached Colby with material for a forthcoming New York Times article on the CIA's domestic surveillance activities under [[Operation CHAOS]] (MHCHAOS). On December 17, 1974 - five days before Hersh's article appeared on December 22 - Colby dismissed Angleton, who had headed the Counterintelligence Staff that ran CHAOS under director [[Richard Ober]]. Angleton had served as the CIA's chief of counterintelligence for 21 years.[^1][^3]
 Colby's cooperation with the subsequent [[Church Committee]] investigation of CHAOS and other "Family Jewels" programs (a compilation of potentially illegal CIA activities assembled by Colby's predecessor [[James Schlesinger]] in 1973) was deeply controversial within the CIA. Critics including former DCI Helms accused him of betraying the agency; defenders argued he prevented far more damaging forced exposure.[^1]
 ### Israel and Nuclear Weapons
-Colby held a documented assessment of Israeli nuclear capability. He shared the assumption that Israel had a small number of nuclear weapons by 1973 and believed they would be used "only in an extreme situation." His analysis was tested during the October 1973 Yom Kippur War when Israeli military performance initially deteriorated. He believed that in the event of a potential Israeli military collapse, Israel might use its nuclear weapons.[^3]
+Colby held a documented assessment of Israeli nuclear capability. He shared the assumption that Israel had a small number of nuclear weapons by 1973 and believed they would be used "only in an extreme situation." His analysis was tested during the October 1973 Yom Kippur War when Israeli military performance initially deteriorated. He believed that in the event of a potential Israeli military collapse, Israel might use its nuclear weapons.[^4]
 ### Legacy and the Contra War
-Colby's tenure established institutional patterns in deniable covert operations that carried into the Contra war era through his protégé [[William Nelson]], who subsequently served as the CIA's Deputy Director of Operations - the head of all covert operations worldwide - before moving to [[Fluor Corporation]]. Methods developed under Colby's leadership for managing deniable operations became standard practice in the later Contra-era programs.[^4]
+Colby's tenure established institutional patterns in deniable covert operations that carried into the Contra war era through his protégé [[William Nelson]], who subsequently served as the CIA's Deputy Director of Operations - the head of all covert operations worldwide - before moving to [[Fluor Corporation]]. Methods developed under Colby's leadership for managing deniable operations became standard practice in the later Contra-era programs.[^5]
 ### Death
@ -50,12 +50,13 @@ On April 27, 1996, Colby disappeared from his weekend home in Rock Point, Maryla
 ### Israel
-William E. Colby served as the Director of the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] from 1973 to 1976. He shared the assumption that [[Israel]] had a few nuclear weapons and that if there was a collapse during the 1973 [[Yom Kippur War]], there was a possibility that Israel would use them. Colby believed that nuclear weapons would be used "only in an extreme situation."[^5]
+William E. Colby served as the Director of the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] from 1973 to 1976. He shared the assumption that [[Israel]] had a few nuclear weapons and that if there was a collapse during the 1973 [[Yom Kippur War]], there was a possibility that Israel would use them. Colby believed that nuclear weapons would be used "only in an extreme situation."[^6]
 ### Footnotes
 [^1]: Powers, Thomas. *The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA*. Knopf, 1979. Hersh, Seymour M. "Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U.S. Against Antiwar Forces." New York Times, December 22, 1974.
-[^2]: Church Committee, S. Rept. 94-755, April 26, 1976.
+[^2]: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVIII, part 2, front matter, "Persons" (Walters: "Acting Director of Central Intelligence, July 2, 1973-September 4, 1973"; Colby: "Director of Central Intelligence, September 4, 1973-January 30, 1976"; Schlesinger: "Director of Central Intelligence, February 2-July 2, 1973"). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v38p2/persons
-[^3]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 17.
+[^3]: Church Committee, S. Rept. 94-755, April 26, 1976.
-[^4]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion*. Seven Stories Press, 1998. Ch. 9.
+[^4]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 17.
-[^5]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 17.
+[^5]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion*. Seven Stories Press, 1998. Ch. 9.
 [^6]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 17.
--- a/Hammarskjöld.md
+++ b/Hammarskjöld.md
@ -0,0 +1,356 @@
 ---
 aliases:
  - Dag Hammarskjold
  - Hammarskjöld
  - Dag Hjalmar Agne Carl Hammarskjöld
 category: "Intelligence & Government"
 tags:
  - Person
  - DagHammarskjold
  - UnitedNations
  - SecretaryGeneral
  - Congo
  - Katanga
  - UnionMiniere
  - Ndola
  - PlaneCrash
  - NSA
  - CryptoAG
  - CX52
  - OperationCeleste
  - SAIMR
  - ColdWar
  - Sweden
 summary: "Dag Hammarskjöld, second Secretary-General of the United Nations, died when flight SE-BDY crashed near Ndola on the night of September 17 and 18, 1961, and the General Assembly has kept the inquiry open since 2014."
 born: 1905-07-29
 died: 1961-09-18
 location: "Ndola, Northern Rhodesia"
 created: 2026-10-12
 updated: 2026-10-12
 relations:
  - type: head_of
    with: "[[United Nations]]"
    start: 1953-04
    end: 1961-09-18
    role: "Secretary-General of the United Nations"
    fn: 5
  - type: head_of
    with: "[[Bank of Sweden]]"
    start: 1941
    end: 1948
    role: "head of the Bank of Sweden"
    fn: 4
  - type: employed_by
    with: "[[Swedish Ministry of Finance]]"
    start: 1936
    end: 1945
    role: "undersecretary"
    fn: 4
  - type: employed_by
    with: "[[Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs]]"
    start: 1946
    end: 1953
    role: "financial adviser from 1946, deputy foreign minister from 1951"
    fn: 4
  - type: participant_in
    with: "[[Suez Crisis]]"
    start: 1956-10
    end: 1956-11
    role: "commissioned the United Nations Emergency Force"
    fn: 7
  - type: investigated
    with: "[[Rishikesh Shaha]]"
    reverse: true
    start: 1961-12
    end: 1962-04
    role: "chair of the United Nations Commission of Investigation into the death"
    fn: 37
  - type: subject_of
    with: "[[Hammarskjöld Commission]]"
    start: 2012-07
    end: 2013-09-09
    role: "commission of jurists whose report was made public in 2013"
    fn: 40
  - type: investigated
    with: "[[Stephen Sedley]]"
    reverse: true
    start: 2012-07
    end: 2013-09-09
    role: "chair of the commission of jurists"
    fn: 40
  - type: subject_of
    with: "[[Independent Panel of Experts]]"
    start: 2015-03
    end: 2015-06-12
    role: "examined new information on the crash and assessed its probative value"
    fn: 62
  - type: investigated
    with: "[[Mohamed Chande Othman]]"
    reverse: true
    start: 2015-03
    role: "head of the Independent Panel of Experts in 2015, then Eminent Person reporting in 2017, 2019, 2022 and 2024"
    fn: 62
  - type: subject_of
    with: "[[Operation Celeste]]"
    start: 1961-09
    role: "alleged sabotage plot named in documents on South African Institute for Maritime Research letterhead, surfaced by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1998"
    fn: 75
 ---
 Dag Hjalmar Agne Carl Hammarskjöld (July 29, 1905 to September 18, 1961) was a Swedish economist and diplomat who served as the second Secretary-General of the [[United Nations]] from 1953 until his death.[^1] He was one of sixteen people aboard the Swedish [[Transair]] DC-6 known as the Albertina, flight SE-BDY, which crashed near [[Ndola]] in [[Northern Rhodesia]] on the night of September 17 and 18, 1961.[^2] The Rhodesian and United Nations inquiries of 1961 and 1962 did not fix the cause, and the General Assembly has kept the investigation open since 2014.
 ### Swedish career
 Hammarskjöld was the youngest of four sons of [[Hjalmar Hammarskjöld]], who had been prime minister of [[Sweden]], a member of the [[Permanent Court of Arbitration|Hague Tribunal]], governor of Uppland, and chairman of the board of the [[Nobel Foundation]].[^3] He took degrees at [[Uppsala University]] in the humanities in 1925, in economics in 1928 and in law in 1930, and a doctorate in economics in 1934. He taught economics at [[Stockholm University]] in 1933. He was secretary of a governmental commission on unemployment from 1930 to 1934, and secretary of the [[Bank of Sweden]] from 1935. He was undersecretary in the [[Swedish Ministry of Finance]] from 1936 to 1945 and head of the Bank of Sweden from 1941 to 1948. The Nobel biography says he has been credited with coining the term "planned economy."[^4] From 1946 he was financial adviser to the [[Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs]], took an official post there in 1949, became deputy foreign minister with cabinet rank in 1951, and represented Sweden at the United Nations in 1949 and again from 1951 to 1953.
 ### Secretary-General, 1953 to 1961
 The General Assembly elected him Secretary-General in 1953 for a five-year term, with fifty-seven votes out of sixty, and reelected him in 1957. The Nobel biography says that he called his method "preventive diplomacy," that in 1954 and 1955 he personally negotiated the release of American soldiers captured by the Chinese in the [[Korean War]], and that he sought more independence and effectiveness for the post itself.[^5] In 1958 he proposed to the Assembly a solution to the crises in [[Lebanon]] and [[Jordan]]. In 1959 he sent a personal representative to Southeast Asia when [[Cambodia]] and [[Thailand]] broke off diplomatic relations, and another to [[Laos]].[^6]
 ### Suez and the emergency force
 During the [[Suez Crisis]] of 1956 he exercised what the Nobel biography describes as his own personal diplomacy with the nations involved. Under the United Nations mandate he commissioned the [[United Nations Emergency Force]], "the first ever mobilized by an international organization."[^7] General Assembly resolution 1001 (ES-I) of November 5, 1956 established a United Nations Command for the force, appointed the Chief of Staff of the [[United Nations Truce Supervision Organization]] as its chief, and created an advisory committee whose chairman was the Secretary-General.[^8]
 ### Katanga and the mining interests
 On July 14, 1960 the Security Council authorized the Secretary-General to provide the Government of the Republic of the Congo with the military assistance it had asked for.[^9] On August 9, 1960 the Council reaffirmed that the United Nations Force in the Congo "will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise."[^10]
 On July 11, 1960 the Katangan politician [[Moise Tshombe]] declared the province independent, with the overt support of the Belgian military command. The Commission of Jurists wrote that Katanga contained the majority of the Congo's known mineral resources, "the world's richest uranium and four fifths of the West's cobalt supply," mined principally by a Belgian company, the [[Union Minière du Haut Katanga]]. The company immediately recognized the secessionist government in [[Elisabethville]] and began paying it royalties, so that Tshombe's regime "was well funded," and "so long as Katanga remained independent of the Congo, there was no risk that the assets of Union Minière would be expropriated."[^11]
 The Commission recorded that Union Minière had close relations with the British company [[Tanganyika Concessions]], whose chairman, Captain Charles Waterhouse, was also a director of Union Minière, and that Tanganyika Concessions had links with [[Anglo American]], the [[Rhodesian Selection Trust]] and the [[British South Africa Company]]. The prime minister of the Rhodesian Federation, [[Roy Welensky]], wrote on April 21, 1961 in a secret message to the British foreign secretary, [[Lord Home]], that "Tshombe is a very good friend of the Federation." The High Commissioner in Salisbury, [[Lord Alport]], sent London a dispatch a week after the crash blaming the United Nations' "complete failure to understand the conditions in Central Africa."[^12] The Commission wrote that there was evidence of a cleft in policy between the United States administration, which supported the United Nations, and the [[Central Intelligence Agency]], which "may have been providing materiel to Katanga," and concluded that Belgium, the British and American security services, the Rhodesian Federation with its British supporters, and South Africa "had reasons not to welcome the prospect of a reunited and independent Congo which it was the UN's policy and Dag Hammarskjöld's mission to bring about."[^13]
 On February 21, 1961 the Security Council resolved that measures be taken for the withdrawal of all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, "and mercenaries."[^14] The Commission wrote that some 500 foreign mercenaries were attached to the Katangan army by the start of 1961, at about £4,000 a year plus keep, that the principal paymasters were likely Belgium and South Africa, and that commercial sources were also possible.[^15]
 Political command of the United Nations operation was exercised by the Irish diplomat [[Conor Cruise O'Brien]], whose priority was to force Tshombe to expel the mercenaries and to acknowledge the authority of the Congolese government. Tshombe's refusal prompted [[Operation Rumpunch]], which on August 28, 1961 captured a number of strategic points in Elisabethville; Britain, Belgium and France then intervened diplomatically and took responsibility for deporting the mercenaries captured, while at least 100 remained unaccounted for. [[Operation Morthor]] followed on September 13, 1961, designed to seize key buildings in Elisabethville and facilitate the arrest of Tshombe and four of his ministers. Katanga's resources included at least one and possibly several [[Fouga Magister]] jet trainers armed with two machine guns, with mercenaries to fly them, one of which had on several occasions harassed United Nations transport planes on the ground.[^16]
 ### Lumumba
 The [[Church Committee]] documented the American side of the [[Patrice Lumumba]] affair from CIA cables. On August 18, 1960 [[Bronson Tweedy]], chief of the Africa Division of the agency's clandestine services, replied that he was seeking State Department approval for an operation based on "your and our belief Lumumba must be removed if possible." On August 19 [[Richard Bissell]], director of the agency's covert operations branch, signed a follow-up cable to Leopoldville reading "You are authorized proceed with operation."[^17]
 On August 26 [[Allen Dulles]] cabled that "targets of opportunity may present themselves to you," and authorized up to $100,000 "to carry out any crash programs on which you do not have the opportunity to consult HQS."[^18] The Committee wrote that Lumumba "was killed by Congolese rivals. It does not appear from the evidence that the United States was in any way involved in the killing."[^19] It also wrote that the evidence was "strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the plot to assassinate Lumumba was authorized by President Eisenhower."[^20] The Commission of Jurists wrote that Lumumba and two other Congolese politicians were kidnapped by the troops of [[Joseph Mobutu]] in January 1961, "allegedly with the connivance of the Belgian, British and US security services," and taken to Katanga, where they were tortured and murdered.[^13] On February 21, 1961 the Security Council, having "learnt with deep regret" of the announced killing, decided that "an immediate and impartial investigation be held."[^14]
 ### The journey to Ndola
 The Commission wrote that Hammarskjöld and his team arrived in [[Léopoldville]] from New York on September 13, 1961, to discuss an aid programme with the Congolese government, on the day that Morthor was launched without his knowledge or approval. An attempt by the British consulate in Elisabethville to broker ceasefire talks between Tshombe and O'Brien had stalled over O'Brien's requirement that Tshombe first recognize the unity of the Congo. On September 16 Hammarskjöld proposed that he and Tshombe meet in Rhodesia, and the arrangements were passed through the British consul in Katanga, [[Denzil Dunnett]]; Ndola was settled on as the venue. On September 17 the [[Secret Intelligence Service]] officer [[Neil Ritchie]], first secretary at the High Commission in Salisbury, flew with two small aircraft to collect Tshombe and Dunnett at Kipushi, where he found them with Henry Fortemps, the assistant director general of Union Minière in Elisabethville.[^21]
 The Albertina, chartered from Transair and assigned to the United Nations Force Commander, took off from Ndjili airport at 1751. Radio silence was maintained, the pilot filed a flight plan naming Luluabourg as his destination, and the aircraft flew a circuitous route to avoid interception by Katangan fighters. The Secretary-General had asked other states for air cover; Ethiopia had agreed to provide jet fighters, but the British government had not granted clearance to overfly British East African territory, which the Commission attributed to the want in London of any sense of urgency and not to more, finding no convincing evidence that the failure was deliberate. [[Lord Lansdowne]], the British Under-Secretary of State, landed at Ndola at about 2230, flying ahead of the United Nations party at the Secretary-General's suggestion. The Commission recorded that among those at the airport by midnight were Alport, Dunnett and a considerable number of journalists, and that according to the memoir of the South African mercenary commander [[Jerry Puren]], he and two other mercenaries were also at the airport and two more were in the town, a presence the Commission said had never been explained save by Puren as a coincidence.[^22] The last recorded exchange with Ndola air traffic control came at 0010 hours, when the aircraft reported "Your lights in sight, overhead Ndola, descending, confirm QNH" and, after the controller's reply, confirmed "Roger 1021." No further communication is recorded.[^23]
 The Foreign Relations of the United States editorial note records that the plane "crashed as it approached Ndola that evening," and that all aboard were killed. On September 18 [[Dean Rusk]], then in New York for the General Assembly session, called on Executive Assistant [[Andrew Cordier]] and Under Secretary-General [[Ralph Bunche]]. According to the memorandum of the conversation, Bunche "emphasized the depradations [sic] of a single jet fighter," and Rusk assured the group that "the United States could not stand idly by and let U.N. planes be interfered with on their missions."[^24]
 ### The wreck and the survivor
 The official Rhodesian account was that the wreckage was found at about 1500 hours on September 18, some fifteen hours after the aircraft failed to land. The 2022 report of the Eminent Person wrote that information from multiple sources established that it was discovered earlier, and that numerous sources refer to unidentified persons at the crash site before its official discovery.[^25] One person aboard, a United Nations security sergeant, survived the impact and died in hospital some days later. The 2024 report wrote that the Rhodesian inquiries prematurely dismissed his statements, and that some statements he may have made before he died were not put before them.[^26] The 2022 report recorded that the Ndola air traffic controller destroyed his original notes of the final communications, that no tapes were made of the control tower's interactions, and that later information cast further doubt on the completeness of his account.[^27]
 ### Intelligence and military presence at Ndola
 The 2019 report of the Eminent Person, [[Mohamed Chande Othman]], recorded that Ritchie, Dunnett and Alport, together with others, made arrangements in September 1961 for the Ndola meeting with Tshombe. British diplomatic, intelligence and commercial personnel used the facilities of the Union Minière and other channels to communicate with each other and with Belgian and Katangan authorities, and the report recorded that the United States appeared to have been aware of some of these interactions. It recorded that the intercepts of United Nations communications were discussed at a high level by Alport, by the United States Consul in Elisabethville, [[William C. Canup]], and by Welensky.[^28] The 2022 report wrote that Ritchie flew a Union Minière engineer to [[Kitwe]] in Northern Rhodesia in September 1961, where the engineer worked with a British commercial figure who referred to himself as British intelligence, to support the transmission of messages between the governments of Katanga, Northern Rhodesia and the United Kingdom, and that on the night of the crash Ritchie and these two men stayed at the same location. After the crash the engineer and Ritchie travelled to Katanga with the aim of taking the Secretary-General's documents, recovered from the crash site, to Dunnett. Ritchie wrote a secret report for the Commonwealth Relations Office in London, and the United Kingdom has not disclosed records of MI5 or MI6 personnel.[^29]
 The Commission recorded the account of [[David Doyle]], a former CIA officer who had been in charge of the agency's Elisabethville base until April 1961. Doyle wrote in a memoir that on a night visit to the airport, not long after the killing of Lumumba, he found a US-registered Stratocruiser whose civilian crew were unloading three Fouga Magister jet trainers, armed, for Katanga, which he wrote was "in direct violation" of US policy. In June 2013 Doyle told [[Charles Southall]] that after he had been posted to [[Burundi]], Tweedy "came out after and wanted to know if I had any idea what had happened." The Commission wrote that if Tweedy had to ask Doyle such a question, the possibility of direct CIA involvement in interfering with the Albertina's flight, as distinct from giving logistical support to Katanga, "begins to recede." The Commission also recorded that, according to Puren's memoir, one or more Katangan De Havilland Dove aircraft had been adapted to drop bombs of a kind manufactured by Union Minière.[^30]
 The 2019 report recorded that [[Larry Devlin]], chief of station in Léopoldville, coordinated agents designated "WIROGUE" and "QJWIN," and that the agency's activities in the Congo included planned assassinations, such as those under the programme "ZRRIFLE."[^31] The 2022 report recorded that the CIA employed the mercenary [[Mike Hoare]] in the 1960s, "though likely some years after the crash," that Hoare, who had been in the service of Katanga in 1961, stated that the crash was not an accident, and that Senator [[Frank Church]] "is said to have claimed" that the United States held significant undisclosed information relating to the crash. It recorded West German and CIA records suggesting West German operations in the Congo involving an agent of the [[Bundesnachrichtendienst]] (BND), and a telegram of December 16, 1961 from the United Kingdom representative in Salisbury reporting that "certain Federal agencies were deeply implicated in military traffic between Northern Rhodesia and Katanga" and that the Ndola representative of the Federal Intelligence and Security Bureau regularly "briefed and debriefed" Katangan pilots.[^32] The same report found that the Katangan air force, [[Avikat]], had multiple serving pilots, that its aircraft included a Fouga Magister, a Dornier DO-28 and several De Havilland Doves, and that armaments for its operations appear to have included weapons made locally with the involvement of Union Minière.[^33]
 The Commission recorded that two USAF aircraft stood on the tarmac at Ndola that night, one from Pretoria and one from Léopoldville, and quoted a British witness who said that "Those planes we understood had high powered communication equipment." A Rhodesian squadron leader, Mussell, was reported to have told the UN inquiry that "American Dakotas were sitting on the airfield with their engines running." The United States air attaché in Pretoria, [[Don Gaylor]], was according to his memoirs ordered by the Pentagon to Ndola to meet the Secretary-General.[^34] The 2024 report recorded that two Dakota aircraft had arrived at Ndola by September 16, one under the command of Commander [[Don Ely]], the naval attaché for air in Pretoria, and one under Gaylor, the air force attaché for air in Pretoria, and that a third was flown from Elisabethville on the morning of September 18 by Colonel [[Benjamin Matlick]], United States air attaché in Léopoldville. It stated that there was "a reasonable evidentiary basis to consider that these or other aircraft ... may have overheard or relayed communications from or about flight SE-BDY." Gaylor referred to his "unique intelligence operations" and reports to the Pentagon, was in the Ndola control tower on the night of the crash, and according to his accounts was among the first to locate the wreckage the next day; no reports of his activities on September 18 have been disclosed.[^35]
 ### The 1961 and 1962 inquiries
 The Rhodesian Federal Department of Civil Aviation set up an air accident investigation two days after the crash. Its Board of Investigation, which sat in private, concluded that the approach had been normal and correct except that the aircraft was about 1,700 feet lower than it should have been. It found that the evidence did not allow a "specific" or "definitive" cause, and while pilot error was a possibility it was unable to rule out a "wilful act of some person or persons unknown which might have forced the aircraft to descend or collide with the trees." A Rhodesian Commission of Inquiry chaired by the Chief Justice, [[John Clayden|Sir John Clayden]], reported in February 1962 that "the aircraft was allowed by the pilots to descend too low, so that it struck the trees and was brought to the ground."[^36]
 A United Nations Commission of Investigation, chaired by [[Rishikesh Shaha]], reported in April 1962 that it had found no evidence of sabotage or attack, but that these possibilities could not be excluded. It could not exclude material failure or human failure either. The bibliography of the Commission of Jurists dates the report, document A/5069, to April 24, 1962.[^37] The Foreign Relations editorial note dates a report of the Commission of Investigation to March 8, 1962.[^38] On October 26, 1962 the General Assembly adopted resolution 1759 (XVII), which requested the Secretary-General to inform it of "any new evidence which may come to his attention."[^39]
 ### The Hammarskjöld Commission, 2013
 In July 2012 an enabling committee chaired by [[Lord Lea of Crondall]], which included the former Commonwealth Secretary-General [[Emeka Anyaoku]] and the Archbishop Emeritus of the Church of Sweden, [[K. G. Hammar]], set up a commission of jurists chaired by Sir [[Stephen Sedley]]. Its members were [[Hans Corell]], [[Richard Goldstone]] and [[Wilhelmina Thomassen]]. The commission's report was made public on September 9, 2013. The Secretary-General transmitted it to the General Assembly as document A/68/800 on March 21, 2014, stating that he had "the duty to inform you that new evidence has come to my attention."[^40]
 The commission did not determine the cause of the crash. Its essential purpose was to consider whether the evidence pointing to a wilful act merited fuller consideration. It noted that the work of [[Susan Williams]], whose 2011 book *Who Killed Hammarskjöld?* was the principal published account of the case, "marshalled a striking quantity of evidential material."[^41]
 The commission rejected the theory of an infiltrated seventeenth passenger who hijacked the aircraft, on the ground that only sixteen identified people were found at the site.[^42] It recorded the allegation of Soviet responsibility made in the August 1978 issue of *Penthouse*, which quoted a purported CIA report to President Kennedy that "the explosive device aboard the aircraft was of standard KGB incendiary design," and wrote that there was no evidence from any source known to it to support the claim, while noting that it would be of value to know on what evidence the CIA report, assuming it was accurately quoted, was based.[^43] The Associated Press had reported on June 3, 1978 that the magazine's account rested on unnamed CIA sources and a six-month investigation by the reporters Joe Trento and Dave Roman.[^44]
 The commission wrote that "There is persuasive evidence that the aircraft was subjected to some form of attack or threat as it circled to land at Ndola." It did not consider the sabotage claim "capable of verification," and added that this "is not the same thing as saying that it is untrue." It did not recommend that the sabotage evidence be further investigated by the United Nations for the present, and wrote that the United Nations "would be justified in reopening its 1961-2 inquiry for the initial purpose of confirming or refuting, from intercept records, the evidence indicating that the descent of the Secretary-General's plane was brought about by some form of attack or threat." It added that such records "appear, on the evidence currently available, to be held, if anywhere, in the United States."[^45]
 ### The National Security Agency and the intercept records
 On the intercepts, the commission wrote that "both from the specific evidence of a physical US presence at Ndola airport with radio monitoring equipment, and from the broader evidence of the US National Security Agency's worldwide monitoring activities in and about 1961, it is highly likely that the entirety of the local and regional Ndola radio traffic on the night of 17-18 September 1961 was tracked and recorded by the NSA, and possibly also by the CIA." It added that any cockpit narrative or tower dialogue should in the ordinary course have been monitored, recorded, logged and archived by the [[National Security Agency]], and that authenticated recordings would furnish "potentially conclusive evidence of what happened to the DC6."[^46]
 The [[National Security Archive]] at [[George Washington University]] submitted Freedom of Information Act requests on the commission's behalf for any recording or transcription of radio traffic intercepted by the NSA at its Cyprus station or any other station on the night of September 17 and 18, 1961 appearing to relate to one aircraft firing upon another, and for any radio message intercepted between 2130 GMT on September 17 and 0030 GMT on September 18 concerning the landing or approach of an aircraft at Ndola. The NSA's initial response indicated that two of three documents "responsive" to the request appeared to be exempt from disclosure by reason of "top secret" classification, and that the third was not held by the NSA. On July 19, 2013 the National Security Archive's public service coordinator wrote to the commission, relaying the view of the Archive's CIA specialist, [[John Prados]], that NSA intercepts "have always been highly guarded by declassifiers," and an appeal against the continuing classification was lodged.[^47]
 The Independent Panel of Experts recorded in 2015 that the NSA advised that two files in its possession were "responsive" to the request, and that they could not be released because doing so "could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security." The Swedish newspaper [[SvD Nyheter]] reported on November 21, 2014 that the United States had given Swedish foreign minister [[Carl Bildt]] access to the two files, and quoted him as saying that the information in them was "trivial and unimportant." In response to the Panel's own request, one member of the Panel, of Australian nationality, was afforded full access to the two files under the bilateral security information-sharing arrangements between the United States and Australia; she assessed that they would not help establish the cause of the crash and contained no information on the interception of communications about an attack on SE-BDY. In a letter of June 9, 2015 the United States told the Panel that its search of NSA and CIA records had not found documents matching the materials the Panel had described.[^48]
 ### Southall and the Cyprus listening post
 Charles Southall was a former United States Navy commander who, according to the commission, had been in September 1961 at the NSA's naval communications facility in Cyprus, which maintained a listening post near [[Nicosia]], where his task was to read and if necessary decrypt intercepted messages. He described a recording played back over a loudspeaker shortly after midnight on the night of the crash. In the commission's rendering of his account, a single male voice, described as "cool and professional," said: "I see a transport plane coming low. All the lights are on. I'm going down to make a run on it. Yes, it's the Transair DC6. It's the plane." The sound of cannon-fire followed, and then a more animated voice: "I've hit it. There are flames. It's going down. It's crashing." The commission recorded that Southall was positive the traffic was consistent only with a deliberate shooting down, while noting that on its face the narrative he recounted "is not inconsistent with an accidental shooting-down."[^49]
 The Independent Panel of 2015 quoted the passage with the wording "I'm going to go down to make a run on it." Southall told the Panel that his communications watch officer, or another officer present, had told him that a Belgian pilot known as the "Lone Ranger," flying a Fouga Magister used by Katangese forces, made the transmission and that the pilot "must be waiting for Hammarskjöld's plane."[^50] The Panel recorded that an analyst at the State Department, [[Karen Engstrom]], contacted Southall on December 8, 1992 in connection with a request from Sweden for assistance with its own investigation, which was headed by the Swedish diplomat [[Bengt Rösiö]].[^51]
 The United States confirmed to the Panel in 2015 that Southall was an active member of the Navy at the time, without saying where he was stationed. Southall declined an interview with the Panel for health reasons. The Panel described his account as "solitary witness information," because no colleague present had corroborated it. In correspondence of July 28, 1993, a colleague who was then a diplomat was reported to have told a journalist that he had "no special memory of" an incident that night.[^52] The 2019 report recorded that the United States confirmed he joined the Navy in 1955, was released from active duty in 1969 and retired as a commander from the Naval Reserve in 1978, and gave no information on whether he worked in support of NSA.[^53] The 2022 report wrote that it had not been disputed that he held a specialization as a "processing and reporting" officer assigned at a naval communications facility near Nicosia in 1961, and that he consistently attempted to convey the information to officials between 1967 and 2013.[^54]
 The 2019 report recorded that a Swedish assistant air attaché in [[Rabat]] reported in 1967 that Southall had heard a radio message from a Belgian mercenary, and that [[Edelstam]], deputy director at the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, replied that "nobody had ever claimed that the plane was shot down from the ground." In the early 1980s Southall met the Scandinavian academic [[Sten Thore]] and told him about the crash. Thore's letter of October 21, 1992 to Rösiö stated that Southall "declares categorically that all the circumstances were known in detail within the CIA." The Panel had assessed Southall's information about an attack as having moderate probative value in 2015, and the 2019 report wrote that the new information received that year "is consistent with and supports his previous statements."[^55]
 ### Paul Abram
 The Panel also received an account from [[Paul Abram]], a former United States Air Force security services officer, who was attached to an NSA listening post in [[Iraklion]] on [[Crete]], Greece. He said that on the night of the crash he heard a voice say "Here comes the plane ... the plane is well lit," and that a second voice, which he judged to be non-American, then said "the Americans just shot down a UN plane." He said the transmissions were followed by a significant increase in "radio chatter." He assessed from the high frequency network that the aircraft had been shot down by ground fire. Abram first provided the additional information when he contacted the Hammarskjöld Commission in 2014, after it had concluded its work.[^56] The Panel was given a discharge record describing him as a "voice intercept procedure specialist" and "interpreter," and assessed that his claim to have performed special duties appeared to be valid. It could not confirm that he had been posted to Iraklion at the time.[^57] The 2017 report recorded that the United States confirmed his service record only in July 2017, along with information that disputed his location at the time he reported hearing the intercept.[^58]
 In 2019 the Eminent Person assessed Abram's claims as of strong probative value regarding the proposition that the United States was monitoring radio traffic and of moderate probative value insofar as they related to an attack on SE-BDY, and assessed the claims of both men as of strong probative value that the United States was monitoring radio traffic and that relevant transcripts were highly likely to have been created. The 2022 report retained that assessment.[^54]
 The reports give different accounts of the two men's deaths. The 2017 report records that Southall died in 2015, and the 2019 report that the Eminent Person was informed in 2017 that he had died since the Panel completed its work.[^53][^58] The reports of 2019, 2022 and 2024 state that both men had passed away as of 2018.[^59] The 2022 report states in one paragraph that the Eminent Person was informed in 2020, after the 2019 report, that Abram had died, and in another that he was advised in 2019; the 2024 report states that he was informed after the 2019 report was published.[^60] The 2024 report wrote that the failure of the United States to take up the opportunity to contradict Southall and Abram "tends to have the effect of supporting those claims."[^59]
 ### The Independent Panel of Experts, 2015
 General Assembly resolution 69/246, adopted December 29, 2014, requested the Secretary-General to appoint an independent panel of experts to examine new information and assess its probative value.[^61] The Secretary-General appointed on March 16, 2015 Mohamed Chande Othman, then Chief Justice of [[Tanzania]], as head of the Panel, with [[Kerryn Macaulay]] of Australia as an aviation safety expert and [[Henrik Larsen]] of Denmark as a ballistics expert. The Panel worked from March 30 to June 12, 2015, and the Secretary-General transmitted its report on July 2, 2015.[^62]
 The Panel assigned moderate probative value to nine new eyewitness accounts that more than one aircraft was in the air, to the claims of two persons who heard or read alleged intercepts, to new information on the air capability of Katangan forces, to the possibility that communications sent from Hammarskjöld's CX-52 cryptographic machine were intercepted, to crew fatigue, and to new information that called into question the time of discovery of the wreck. It found that "claims made by mercenaries, or their interlocutors, and other agents that they shot or otherwise forced down SE-BDY in an aerial attack" lacked credibility, and wrote that the new information "may also provide an appreciable lead in pursuing the truth of the probable cause or causes of the air crash and tragic deaths."[^62]
 ### The CX-52 and Crypto AG
 Hammarskjöld's party used CX-52 cryptographic machines, which were produced by the Swiss company [[Crypto AG]]. The 2017 report recorded a claim made to the Panel by a brother-in-law of [[Boris Hagelin]], the founder of Crypto AG, that the NSA had covertly monitored communications sent from the CX-52 by way of a "backdoor" in the encryption, and had shared the intelligence with the CIA, [[Government Communications Headquarters]] and possibly other services. The claimant said that Hagelin's memoirs carried full details but were scheduled for publication no earlier than 2033, fifty years after Hagelin's death. The Panel assessed the claim as having moderate probative value.[^63] The report also recorded that Lord Alport "peculiarly ... refused to return to the UN representatives coding machines and books which the Federal authorities had recovered from the wreck," according to a United States dispatch from Lusaka transmitted from Salisbury on September 27, 1961.[^64] The 2022 report recorded that United Nations officials were suspicious when the CX-52 machines were not immediately returned after the crash, despite the entreaty of ONUC Colonel Björn Egge.[^65]
 The 2019 report stated that communications sent from the CX-52 "appear to have been intercepted by British and United States signals and intelligence agencies as a result of a secret interception and decryption setting that those agencies held that enabled them to intercept surreptitiously."[^66]
 In 2020 the Eminent Person was given new information on reporting by SRF (Swiss television), the [[Washington Post]] and ZDF (German television) on the involvement of the CIA, the NSA and the BND in an operation designed to let the United States and West Germany secretly read encrypted communications in devices made by Crypto AG, which were said to have been sold to the United Nations and to governments. The 2022 report recorded that this reporting was "stated to be based on a 96-page account completed in 2004 by the CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence and an oral history compiled by German intelligence officials in 2008," and that it alleged a joint operation of the CIA and the BND known in the CIA first as "Thesaurus" and later as "Rubicon."[^67] In 2017 the United States had advised the Eminent Person that it "ha[d] no comments on this item," and in the 2022 mandate the United Kingdom and the United States, invited to comment, gave no comment or clarification.[^68] The Eminent Person wrote: "I consider it to be established that communications sent from Hammarskjöld's CX-52 cryptographic machines were covertly intercepted by or shared with specific Member States. I assess it to be of strong probative value that those Member States were monitoring the Secretary-General's confidential communications." He also considered it highly likely that records of those communications were created but have not been disclosed.[^67] The claim that the CIA or NSA monitored United Nations communications under the names "Thesaurus" and "Rubicon" "has not been refuted by the Member States concerned."[^69]
 The Swiss parliamentary Control Delegation reported on November 2, 2020 on a history of the operation prepared by American services after 2000 with representatives of the German intelligence service, titled MINERVA. It describes how the American services used Crypto AG, which had manufactured encryption devices in Switzerland from the 1950s, in agreement with its Swedish owner, and records that in 1970 the company passed into the joint ownership of American services and the German service, that the German side withdrew at the end of 1993, and that the account closes in 1995.[^70] The 2024 report stated that the United States and West Germany "appear to have had covert and direct 'backdoor' access" to messages sent with the CX-52, and recorded that Germany's sole clarification, received in 2024, was that German archives did not reveal any indication that West German intelligence agencies had access to Hammarskjöld's communications before the crash.[^71]
 ### The 2017 and 2019 reports
 Othman's first report as Eminent Person, under resolution 71/260, was transmitted by the Secretary-General, [[António Guterres]], on September 5, 2017. The report recorded that it was "almost certain" that Hammarskjöld and the members of the party with him were not assassinated after landing. It considered it "plausible that an external attack or threat was a cause of the crash," and stated that "it is not possible at present to conclude whether sabotage was a cause of the crash." The transmittal letter said that the burden had "now shifted to Member States" to show that they had reviewed their records and archives, including those that remain classified.[^72]
 The 2017 report dealt with an unauthenticated claim by a Belgian pilot, "Beukels," made to [[Claude de Kemoularia]] in 1967 that Beukels had shot down or otherwise forced SE-BDY to crash. The report found that De Kemoularia's agendas appeared to verify his meeting with "Beukels" and other mercenaries that year, but that the identity of "Beukels" could not be verified.[^73] The 2019 report, transmitted on September 12, 2019, wrote that de Kemoularia's notes of a June 16, 1993 meeting with the former mercenary [[Bob Denard]] do not mention Beukels. It recorded that the military archives of Belgium did not contain any reference to a pilot named Beukels, and concluded that the new information "goes to disproving this hypothesis," while noting that "it may still be that parts of the story are true, while others are false."[^74]
 The 2019 report stated that "it appears established that British and Northern Rhodesian officials attempted to influence the findings of those inquiries to conclude that the crash was the result of pilot error, rather than any type of external interference."[^66] It also recorded that the two United States personnel who claimed to have overheard a transmission about an attack had both passed away by 2018, and that the United States had not responded to their claims substantively.
 ### Operation Celeste and the SAIMR
 In July 1998 the South African [[National Intelligence Agency]] passed to the [[Truth and Reconciliation Commission]] (TRC) a file concerning the 1993 assassination of the leader of the South African Communist Party, [[Chris Hani]]. The TRC's researcher found in it about a dozen documents, on the letterhead of the [[South African Institute for Maritime Research]] (SAIMR), relating not to Hani but to an operation codenamed Celeste. The TRC's chairman, [[Desmond Tutu]], released copies of eight of them at the commission's final press conference in August 1998, and the originals were passed to the Minister of Justice, [[Dullah Omar]], who died in 2004 without making further comment. Attempts by Susan Williams and others to examine the originals failed, and a search made by the Ministry at the request of Justice Goldstone on behalf of the commission was unsuccessful. The Commission of Jurists noted that the assassination of Hani was not the work of the National Intelligence Agency.[^75]
 The Commission of Jurists reproduced the documents' text. An order dated September 14, 1961 states that a DC-6 in Transair livery is parked at Léopoldville to be used for transport of "subject," and that "our technician has orders to plant 6 lbs TNT in the wheelbay with contact detonator to activate as wheels are retracted on taking off." An undated typescript, evidently relating to early September 1961, purports to record the decisions following a meeting between "M.I.5, Special Ops. Executive, and SAIMR": "UNO is becoming troublesome and it is felt that Hammarskjöld should be removed. Allen Dulles [head of the CIA] agrees and has promised full cooperation from his people." It adds: "If McKeown and O'Brien can be dealt with simultaneously it would be useful but not if it could compromise the main operation." The last document, headed "Operation Celeste 18.9.61," reads in part: "1. Device failed on take-off. ... 3. Device activated [........] prior to landing. 4. As advised O'Brien and McKeown were not aboard. 5. Mission accomplished: satisfactory," and is marked as from "Congo Red."[^76] The Commission wrote that there was nothing on the face of the documents that could be confidently shown to be false, and nothing in them that could not have been known to, or invented by, a forger, and that "by themselves neither the SAIMR documents nor their contents can be treated as trustworthy."[^77]
 The 2017 report recorded that the Panel had found the Operation Celeste documents lacked probative value. Their authenticity could not be established, their chain of possession was uncertain, and it had not been confirmed that the institute existed in 1961. The Panel wrote to South Africa on June 23, 2015 to request that it search for and share any records relating to the documents, and had not heard back from South Africa when it completed its work. South Africa wrote to the United Nations on July 1, 2016 that a "revelation made during the Republic of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) hearings in the 1990s" had pointed to the possible involvement of the institute in Hammarskjöld's death.[^78]
 The 2019 report accepted that the institute "appears to have existed in South Africa in the 1980s and 1990s," and wrote that it could not confirm whether it existed in 1961.[^79] A former South African soldier told the Independent Appointee in 2019 that he had joined the institute around 1990 after answering a newspaper advertisement. At a recruitment meeting in Johannesburg the recruits were introduced to two individuals, one of whom was [[Keith Maxwell]], known as "the Commodore." The recruits were shown photographs of an operation that Maxwell said had taken place in the Congo in 1960.[^80]
 The 2019 report recorded a handwritten version of Maxwell's memoirs, obtained through a film team. Its extract "Johannesburg 1961" describes a meeting at which an "Acting Commodore Wagman" tells officers that three men are to be "removed," and a technician who plants explosive material in the Transair DC-6, the device of which fails to harm the aircraft. The report noted internal inconsistencies, including a letter dated "12 July 1960" that refers to Fouga jets that were not delivered to Katanga until months later. Several sources in the film team claimed that some of the Operation Celeste documents were in Maxwell's handwriting. The report's author wrote that this was an untrained analysis, and that if the handwriting was Maxwell's the documents could also have been forged. In a 1998 statement reported by the [[BBC]], the British [[Foreign and Commonwealth Office]] answered allegations of British involvement with the words: "intelligence agents of the United Kingdom do not go around bumping people off. At this time during the Cold War, Soviet misinformation was quite rampant so [the letters] may have been put out by them."[^81]
 The 2022 report recorded that South Africa's renewed search of its archives produced no originals: "despite a thorough and diligent search the original documents could not be located." It recorded that the address and telephone number on the SAIMR letterhead did not match the Johannesburg directory listings for 1960 and 1961, and wrote that this "may be another flag suggesting that the documents are not authentic." It also recorded that a former mercenary who had been in Ndola on the night of the crash told a journalist that he had never heard of the institute.[^82]
 The 2022 report summarized the argument of [[Greg Poulgrain]]'s 2020 book, *JFK vs. Allen Dulles: Battleground Indonesia*, which posits that Dulles formed a motive to remove Hammarskjöld because of a policy conflict over the dispute concerning the sovereignty of West New Guinea, and that the Operation Celeste documents show Dulles's involvement. Poulgrain compared the documents' wording with the Church Committee's account of Dulles expressing a "wish [to] give every possible support" to the plan against Lumumba. The report recorded that Conor Cruise O'Brien and [[George Ivan Smith]], who had both been senior United Nations officials in the Congo in 1961, had expressed to Poulgrain their view that Hammarskjöld had been intentionally killed. The Eminent Person wrote that the information focused on a motive and did not require an assessment of probative value at that stage, and that it underscored the importance of "proving or disproving the veracity of the Operation Celeste hypothesis and Dulles's alleged involvement."[^83]
 ### The 2022 and 2024 reports
 Othman was reappointed Eminent Person in March 2020 under resolution 74/248, and the General Assembly extended his mandate in December 2020. His report of August 25, 2022 (A/76/892) stated that "it remains plausible that an external attack or threat was a cause of the crash." It found no evidence of mechanical failure or of an incorrect altimeter setting, that crew fatigue may have affected the co-pilot and flight engineer, that pilot error could not be excluded, and that it would be unsound to rule out an external attack "in circumstances where it is clear that not all relevant evidence has been disclosed." It recorded that the United Kingdom, the United States and Northern Rhodesia intercepted and received interceptions of confidential United Nations communications throughout 1961 without the knowledge or consent of the United Nations, and that encrypted communications sent by Hammarskjöld using the CX-52 "appear to have been intercepted and read by Member States' signals and intelligence agencies."[^84]
 The report of September 9, 2024 (A/78/1006) repeated the findings on the Dakota aircraft and the NSA, and recorded that "almost all new information provided between 2020 and 2024 has originated from individual researchers and non-State entities." It stated that "I respectfully consider that the burden of proof assigned to key Member States remains to be discharged," that the non-cooperation of Member States "may be seen to be approaching intentional obstruction of the full truth of the circumstances and events," and that it was almost certain that further relevant information exists, including radio or other communications.[^85]
 ### Responses of the Member States
 In April and May 2017 the Eminent Person asked eight Member States identified as most likely to hold relevant information: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States. Responses came from Belgium, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States.[^86]
 Germany appointed Thomas Fitschen as its Independent Appointee in 2018; he confirmed that Germany had given him full access to all files and archives, including those of the BND and of the intelligence service of the former German Democratic Republic.[^87] South Africa appointed Mxolisi Nkosi as a focal point in 2019. In 2021 its Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Grace Naledi Mandisa Pandor, advised that "no documents relating to the death of former UNSG Hammarskjöld" had been found, and the Eminent Person stated that he had requested searches for the transfer of personnel and equipment from South Africa to Katanga, South African mercenaries and intelligence personnel who served in Katanga, and links between Katangan, Belgian and South African entities. By 2024 he had received no new information or specific responses from South Africa and considered that there were grounds to believe that further undisclosed information existed in its archives.[^88]
 The United Kingdom stated in November 2018 that it did not intend to appoint an independent appointee because all information of direct value had already been made available. In June 2019 it appointed Graham Hand, who stated that all responsive documents had been provided. The Independent Appointee of Zimbabwe noted that, before Zimbabwe's independence, Rhodesian authorities under the direction of British colonial authorities had "meticulously removed almost every record or archive associated with the Dag Hammarskjöld Crash." In 2022 the United Kingdom responded without addressing the specific requests or listing the archives searched. In April 2024 Phil Dixon of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office wrote that "our firm assessment (independently confirmed by Mr. Hand) remains that all information of value to the Inquiry has already been provided to the Inquiry itself or has been released to The National Archives at Kew and is available to the public there." The Eminent Person considered that there were grounds to believe that further undisclosed information existed in British archives.[^89]
 In April 2019 the United States Independent Appointee stated that searches had been comprehensive and included intelligence, security and defence archives, and sent a single document. In November 2021 the Independent Appointee, David McFarland, stated that the Director of National Intelligence, Avril Haines, had tasked the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency to search contemporary and archival records, that the only result of the search coordinated by the CIA was two issues of the "President's Intelligence Checklist" dated September 18 and 19, 1961, and that "no holdings reviewed then, or acquired since, mention the crash or Hammarskjöld's death," notwithstanding searches by the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the NSA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Eminent Person's requests for information at a more granular level, and for a list of the archives searched and the search terms applied, were not answered. In March 2024 McFarland wrote: "I am not aware of any additional information pertaining to the specific questions in your request, but will reconfirm with relevant agencies." The Eminent Person considered that there were grounds to believe that further undisclosed information existed in United States archives.[^90]
 No response had been received from the Republic of the Congo, to requests for airport and air force records from Brazzaville in September 1961, or from Ethiopia, to requests for records relating to a Swedish instructor with the Ethiopian Air Force who reported overhearing a short-wave radio conversation at about midnight on the night of the crash in which flight controllers, one of them at Ndola airport, expressed surprise that one plane was being followed by another. Italy confirmed it had commenced enquiries.[^91] The Eminent Person has had unrestricted access to all United Nations archives; all files of the United Nations Operation in the Congo are public except twenty-three that remain "strictly confidential."[^92]
 ### General Assembly resolutions
 Resolution 1759 (XVII) of 1962 is the basis of the reopened inquiry. Resolution 69/246 (December 29, 2014) recalled it, acknowledged the commission's report, and requested the Panel. Resolution 70/11 (November 19, 2015) asked the Secretary-General to pursue the Panel's pending requests for information and to explore the feasibility of a central archival holding for records of the death.[^93] Resolution 71/260 (December 23, 2016) requested an eminent person, and called on Member States to ensure that records "that remain classified, more than 50 years after the fact, are declassified or otherwise made available for review."[^94] Resolution 72/252 (December 24, 2017) requested the Secretary-General to reappoint the Eminent Person, asked Member States to appoint independent, high-ranking officials to review their intelligence, security and defence archives, and asked the United Nations to review its own specific records and archives for possible declassification.[^95] Resolutions 74/248 (December 27, 2019) and 77/252 (December 30, 2022) reappointed him again.[^96][^97]
 ### Footnotes
 [^1]: Nobel Foundation, "Dag Hammarskjöld: Biographical," Nobel Peace Prize 1961. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1961/hammarskjold/biographical/
 [^2]: A/68/800, report of the Commission of Jurists on the Inquiry into the Death of Dag Hammarskjöld, transmitted by the note of the Secretary-General of March 21, 2014, paragraph 1.1 (sixteen people aboard). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
 [^3]: Nobel Foundation, "Dag Hammarskjöld: Biographical," family background, degrees from Uppsala University and teaching at Stockholm University in 1933. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1961/hammarskjold/biographical/
 [^4]: Nobel Foundation, "Dag Hammarskjöld: Biographical," account of the Bank of Sweden, Ministry of Finance and Foreign Ministry appointments, the "planned economy" attribution, and the 1949 and 1951 to 1953 United Nations delegations. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1961/hammarskjold/biographical/
 [^5]: Nobel Foundation, "Dag Hammarskjöld: Biographical," election in 1953 with fifty-seven votes out of sixty, reelection in 1957, the 1954 to 1955 prisoner releases, "preventive diplomacy," and the post's independence. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1961/hammarskjold/biographical/
 [^6]: Nobel Foundation, "Dag Hammarskjöld: Biographical," account of the 1958 Lebanon and Jordan proposal and the 1959 representatives to Southeast Asia and Laos. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1961/hammarskjold/biographical/
 [^7]: Nobel Foundation, "Dag Hammarskjöld: Biographical," Suez Canal crisis of 1956, personal diplomacy, and the United Nations Emergency Force "the first ever mobilized by an international organization." https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1961/hammarskjold/biographical/
 [^8]: United Nations General Assembly, resolution 1001 (ES-I), November 5, 1956, operative paragraphs 1 to 2 and the advisory committee paragraph. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2FRES%2F1001%20%28ES-I%29&l=en&t=pdf
 [^9]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 143 (1960), July 14, 1960, paragraph 2. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F143%20%281960%29&l=en&t=pdf
 [^10]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 146 (1960), August 9, 1960, paragraph 4. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F146%20%281960%29&l=en&t=pdf
 [^11]: A/68/800, paragraphs 3.2 and 3.3 (the declaration of July 11, 1960 with Belgian military support; the mineral resources of Katanga; Union Minière recognition and royalties). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
 [^12]: A/68/800, paragraphs 3.5 to 3.7 (the Rhodesian Federation, Welensky's message of April 21, 1961 to Lord Home, Union Minière and Tanganyika Concessions, Lord Alport's dispatch). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
 [^13]: A/68/800, paragraphs 3.4, 3.9 and 3.10 (the January 1961 transfer of Lumumba; the divide between the United States administration and the CIA; the states and enterprises with a stake in the secession). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
 [^14]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 161 (1961), February 21, 1961, preamble and paragraphs 1 to 4. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F161%20%281961%29&l=en&t=pdf
 [^15]: A/68/800, paragraph 10.10 (some 500 foreign mercenaries attached to the Katangan army; the likely paymasters). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
 [^16]: A/68/800, paragraphs 4.1 to 4.4 (resolution 161 and ONUC; the aircraft and mercenaries available to Katanga; Operations Rumpunch and Morthor). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
 [^17]: United States Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975, section on the Congo, quoting CIA cables of August 18 and 19, 1960. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf
 [^18]: Church Committee, Senate Report No. 94-465, section on the Congo, quoting the cable of August 26, 1960. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf
 [^19]: Church Committee, Senate Report No. 94-465, interim summary on the Congo. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf
 [^20]: Church Committee, Senate Report No. 94-465, section on the level at which the plot was authorized. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf
 [^21]: A/68/800, paragraphs 5.1 to 5.3 (arrival in Léopoldville on September 13, 1961; the proposal of September 16; Dunnett; Ritchie, Fortemps and the journey to Ndola). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
 [^22]: A/68/800, paragraphs 5.4 to 5.9 and 6.1 to 6.2 (departure from Ndjili at 1751; Lansdowne; those present at Ndola airport; Puren's memoir; Ethiopian jets; the flight plan and route). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
 [^23]: A/76/892, report of the Eminent Person, August 25, 2022, paragraph 127 (the last recorded exchange with Ndola at 0010 hours). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
 [^24]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, volume XX, Congo Crisis, document 116, editorial note on the Secretary-General's death and the memorandum of the conversation of September 18, 1961 as summarized there. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d116
 [^25]: A/76/892, paragraphs 39 and 47 (unidentified persons at the crash site before its official discovery; the wreckage found earlier than the official account of about 1500 hours on September 18). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
 [^26]: A/78/1006, report of the Eminent Person, September 9, 2024, paragraphs 39 and 40 (the sole survivor's death in hospital; his statements prematurely dismissed by the Rhodesian inquiries). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F78%2F1006&l=en&t=pdf
 [^27]: A/76/892, paragraphs 45 and 371 (the Ndola air traffic controller's destroyed notes and the absence of tapes). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
 [^28]: A/73/973, report of the Eminent Person, September 12, 2019, paragraph 25 (British arrangements for the Ndola meeting) and paragraph 16 (the intercepts discussed at a high level, including by Lord Alport, the United States Consul in Elisabethville and Sir Roy Welensky). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
 [^29]: A/76/892, paragraphs 33 and 41 (Ritchie, Loeb and Hunt; the Ritchie report; the post-crash journey to Katanga with the Secretary-General's documents). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
 [^30]: A/68/800, paragraphs 13.17 to 13.19 (Doyle's memoir, the Stratocruiser and the Fouga Magisters; the remark attributed to Tweedy; the Dove aircraft and Union Minière bombs). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
 [^31]: A/73/973, paragraph 26 (CIA stations in Léopoldville and Elisabethville; Chief of Station Larry Devlin; "WIROGUE," "QJWIN," and "ZRRIFLE"). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
 [^32]: A/76/892, paragraphs 42 to 44 and 135 (CIA presence; Mike Hoare; Senator Church; West German operations; Northern Rhodesian intelligence; the telegram of December 16, 1961). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
 [^33]: A/76/892, paragraphs 34 to 38 (the Katangan air force; arms made locally with the involvement of Union Minière; the pilots and mercenaries). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
 [^34]: A/68/800, paragraphs 13.20 to 13.22 (two USAF aircraft at Ndola; the evidence of a British witness and of Squadron Leader Mussell; Gaylor's functions). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
 [^35]: A/78/1006, paragraphs 47 to 49 (Dakota aircraft at Ndola; Ely, Gaylor and Matlick; Gaylor's "unique intelligence operations"). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F78%2F1006&l=en&t=pdf
 [^36]: A/68/800, paragraphs 9.1 to 9.4, summarizing the report of the Board of Investigation of the Rhodesian Federal Department of Civil Aviation, the report of the Rhodesian Commission of Inquiry chaired by Sir John Clayden (February 1962) and the report of the United Nations Commission of Investigation. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
 [^37]: A/68/800, bibliography (United Nations Commission of Investigation chaired by Rishikesh Shaha, report of April 24, 1962, document A/5069). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
 [^38]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, volume XX, document 116, editorial note (a report of the United Nations Commission of Investigation dated March 8, 1962, citing A/5069 and Add.1). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d116
 [^39]: United Nations General Assembly, resolution 1759 (XVII), October 26, 1962, paragraph 3. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2FRES%2F1759%20%28XVII%29&l=en&t=pdf
 [^40]: A/68/800, note of the Secretary-General of March 21, 2014, paragraphs 1 to 3 (the enabling committee of July 2012; the membership of the commission; publication on September 9, 2013). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
 [^41]: A/68/800, paragraphs 1.3 to 1.5 and 9.2 (the work of Susan Williams and the purpose of the report). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
 [^42]: A/68/800, paragraph 10.5 (the hijacking hypothesis). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
 [^43]: A/68/800, paragraphs 10.7 and 10.8 (the Penthouse allegation of August 1978 and the Commission's assessment). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
 [^44]: The Washington Post, "Hammarskjold Said Murdered," Associated Press, June 3, 1978, page A-9 (copy in the CIA Records Search Tool, CIA-RDP81M00980R000600080076-5). https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp81m00980r000600080076-5
 [^45]: A/68/800, paragraphs 15.4 to 15.6 and 15.14 to 15.16 (the Commission's conclusions and recommendation). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
 [^46]: A/68/800, paragraphs 15.7 to 15.10 (the NSA's monitoring of Ndola radio traffic and the value of archived recordings). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
 [^47]: A/68/800, paragraphs 15.11 and 15.12 (the Freedom of Information Act requests; the NSA's response; the letter of July 19, 2013 from the National Security Archive; the appeal). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
 [^48]: A/70/132, report of the Independent Panel of Experts, letter of the Secretary-General dated July 2, 2015, paragraphs 81 to 83 (the NSA's response to the Freedom of Information Act request; the SvD Nyheter report of November 21, 2014; the examination of the two files by a Panel member; the United States letter of June 9, 2015). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F70%2F132&l=en&t=pdf
 [^49]: A/68/800, paragraphs 13.23 to 13.28 (Southall's position at the Cyprus listening post, the recording, and his view of its meaning). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
 [^50]: A/70/132, paragraphs 72 and 73 (Southall's statements of 2009 to 2013; the "Lone Ranger"). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F70%2F132&l=en&t=pdf
 [^51]: A/70/132, paragraph 75 (Engstrom's contact of December 8, 1992; the Swedish investigation headed by Bengt Rösiö). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F70%2F132&l=en&t=pdf
 [^52]: A/70/132, paragraphs 80, 84 and 86 (Southall's inability to be interviewed; the 2015 United States confirmation of his Navy service; "solitary witness information"; the correspondence of July 28, 1993). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F70%2F132&l=en&t=pdf
 [^53]: A/73/973, paragraphs 102 and 103 (United States confirmation of Southall's Navy service and retirement; his death reported in 2017). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
 [^54]: A/76/892, paragraphs 367 to 370 (the assessments of Southall's and Abram's claims; the United States confirmation of Southall's position; "processing and reporting" officer). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
 [^55]: A/73/973, paragraphs 109 to 112 (the 1967 Swedish report from Rabat; Edelstam's reply; Thore's letter of October 21, 1992; the assessments). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
 [^56]: A/70/132, paragraphs 76 to 79 (Abram's account of the Iraklion listening post and the transmissions; his 2013 book; his contact with the Commission in 2014). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F70%2F132&l=en&t=pdf
 [^57]: A/70/132, paragraph 85 (discharge record; the Panel's assessment; the unconfirmed posting). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F70%2F132&l=en&t=pdf
 [^58]: A/71/1042, report of the Eminent Person, September 5, 2017, paragraph 7 (Southall's death in 2015; the July 2017 confirmation of Abram's record and the dispute over his location). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F71%2F1042&l=en&t=pdf
 [^59]: A/78/1006, paragraph 50 (both men "passed away" as of 2018; "tends to have the effect of supporting those claims"). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F78%2F1006&l=en&t=pdf
 [^60]: A/76/892, paragraphs 102 to 104 and 368 (the 2019 assessment of the claims of Abram; the notice of his death given as 2020 and as 2019); A/78/1006, paragraph 93 (the notice after the publication of the 2019 report). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
 [^61]: United Nations General Assembly, resolution 69/246, adopted December 29, 2014, preamble and operative paragraphs 1 to 3. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2FRES%2F69%2F246&l=en&t=pdf
 [^62]: A/70/132, introduction (the appointment of March 16, 2015; the composition of the Panel; work from March 30 to June 12, 2015; the letters of June 11 and July 2, 2015), paragraph 2 (moderate probative value; the claims of mercenaries) and paragraph 261 (the "appreciable lead"). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F70%2F132&l=en&t=pdf
 [^63]: A/71/1042, paragraphs 27 and 121 (the claim of the brother-in-law of the founder of Crypto AG; the CX-52 "backdoor"; Hagelin's memoirs and the 2033 date; moderate probative value). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F71%2F1042&l=en&t=pdf
 [^64]: A/71/1042, paragraph 123 (the Lusaka dispatch transmitted from Salisbury on September 27, 1961). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F71%2F1042&l=en&t=pdf
 [^65]: A/76/892, paragraph 132 (the CX-52 machines not returned to the United Nations after the crash; ONUC Colonel Egge; the dispatch quoting Lord Alport). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
 [^66]: A/73/973, paragraphs 8 and 15 to 19 (the shortcomings of the early inquiries; the CX-52 interception; the two United States personnel). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
 [^67]: A/76/892, paragraphs 129 to 134 (the SRF, Washington Post and ZDF reporting; the 96-page CIA account of 2004; the BND oral history of 2008; the finding on the CX-52 interception). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
 [^68]: A/76/892, paragraph 130 (the United States response of 2017, "no comments on this item"). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
 [^69]: A/76/892, paragraphs 29 and 30 (interception of United Nations communications; the CX-52; "Thesaurus" and "Rubicon"). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
 [^70]: Geschäftsprüfungsdelegation der Eidgenössischen Räte, "Fall Crypto AG," Bericht vom 2. November 2020, Bundesblatt 2020, sections "Das Wichtigste in Kürze" and 2.1.1 (the MINERVA report). https://www.parlament.ch/centers/documents/de/bericht-gpdel-2020-11-10-d.pdf
 [^71]: A/78/1006, paragraphs 45 and 46 (backdoor access by the United States and West Germany; "Thesaurus" and "Rubicon"; the German clarification of 2024). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F78%2F1006&l=en&t=pdf
 [^72]: A/71/1042, summary of findings and transmittal letter, September 5, 2017. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F71%2F1042&l=en&t=pdf
 [^73]: A/71/1042, paragraph 13 (the "Beukels" claim and De Kemoularia's records). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F71%2F1042&l=en&t=pdf
 [^74]: A/73/973, paragraphs 141 and 153 to 161 (de Kemoularia's notes of the June 16, 1993 meeting with Bob Denard; Belgian military archives; the assessment). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
 [^75]: A/68/800, paragraphs 12.32, 12.33 and 12.37 (the National Intelligence Agency file of July 1998 concerning the 1993 assassination of Chris Hani; the SAIMR; the press conference of August 1998; the originals passed to the Minister of Justice). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
 [^76]: A/68/800, paragraphs 12.34 to 12.36 (the text of the documents). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
 [^77]: A/68/800, paragraphs 12.38 to 12.41 (the Commission's assessment of the documents). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
 [^78]: A/71/1042, paragraphs 100 to 102 (the Operation Celeste documents; the Panel's letter of June 23, 2015 to South Africa; South Africa's letter of July 1, 2016). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F71%2F1042&l=en&t=pdf
 [^79]: A/73/973, paragraph 29 (the SAIMR in the 1980s and 1990s; existence in 1961 unconfirmed). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
 [^80]: A/73/973, paragraphs 260 to 266 (the SAIMR recruitment meeting; "the Commodore"). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
 [^81]: A/73/973, paragraphs 274 to 280 (Maxwell memoir extracts, "Johannesburg 1961," the letter of "12 July 1960," the handwriting analysis, and the BBC article of August 20, 1998 on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office statement). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
 [^82]: A/76/892, paragraphs 233 to 240 (South Africa's renewed search; the letterhead; the former mercenary's statement). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
 [^83]: A/76/892, paragraphs 241 to 248 (Poulgrain's 2020 book; the views of O'Brien and Smith; the Church Committee comparison; the Eminent Person's assessment). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
 [^84]: A/76/892, introduction and transmittal (reappointment in March 2020; extension in December 2020), and paragraphs 21 to 32 (key findings of 2022). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
 [^85]: A/78/1006, summary page and paragraphs 74 to 78 (the burden of proof; "approaching intentional obstruction"; the origin of new information). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F78%2F1006&l=en&t=pdf
 [^86]: A/71/1042, paragraphs 4 to 6 (the eight Member States asked in April and May 2017; the five that responded). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F71%2F1042&l=en&t=pdf
 [^87]: A/78/1006, paragraphs 44 to 46 and 57 to 59 (requests to Member States in 2020 and 2023; Germany's appointee and access to BND and Staatssicherheitsdienst files). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F78%2F1006&l=en&t=pdf
 [^88]: A/78/1006, paragraphs 60 to 64 (South Africa). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F78%2F1006&l=en&t=pdf
 [^89]: A/78/1006, paragraphs 65 to 72 (the United Kingdom, including the Zimbabwean Independent Appointee's remark on the removal of Rhodesian records). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F78%2F1006&l=en&t=pdf
 [^90]: A/78/1006, paragraphs 73 to 78 (the United States). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F78%2F1006&l=en&t=pdf
 [^91]: A/78/1006, paragraphs 49 to 56 (the Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia and Italy). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F78%2F1006&l=en&t=pdf
 [^92]: A/78/1006, paragraph 79 (United Nations archives). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F78%2F1006&l=en&t=pdf
 [^93]: United Nations General Assembly, resolution 70/11, November 19, 2015, operative paragraphs 1 and 2. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2FRES%2F70%2F11&l=en&t=pdf
 [^94]: United Nations General Assembly, resolution 71/260, December 23, 2016, operative paragraphs 1 to 3. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2FRES%2F71%2F260&l=en&t=pdf
 [^95]: United Nations General Assembly, resolution 72/252, December 24, 2017, operative paragraph 1 (reappointment), the paragraph on independent officials reviewing intelligence, security and defence archives, and the paragraph on the United Nations' own records. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2FRES%2F72%2F252&l=en&t=pdf
 [^96]: United Nations General Assembly, resolution 74/248, December 27, 2019. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2FRES%2F74%2F248&l=en&t=pdf
 [^97]: United Nations General Assembly, resolution 77/252, December 30, 2022. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2FRES%2F77%2F252&l=en&t=pdf
--- a/PEOPLE/(H-M)/Joe
+++ b/PEOPLE/(H-M)/Joe
@ -61,12 +61,20 @@ His Legion of Merit citation of 1984, as quoted by [[Edwin May]], read that he "
 McMoneagle retired from the Army in 1984 with the rank of Chief Warrant Officer. His Legion of Merit citation referenced his contributions to intelligence collection through unconventional means. After retirement, he continued as a civilian consultant to the STAR GATE program - operating under DIA oversight through the [[Sun Streak]] and STAR GATE code names - until its declassification in 1995.
-He married Nancy Lea Honeychurch, the sister of Robert Monroe, the founder of the Monroe Institute in Faber, Virginia. The Monroe Institute had developed methods for inducing altered states of consciousness using binaural audio technology and had trained some STARGATE viewers in out-of-body techniques. McMoneagle became associated with the institute after his retirement.
+He married Nancy Lea, the stepdaughter of Robert Monroe, the founder of the Monroe Institute in Faber, Virginia.[^4] The Monroe Institute had developed methods for inducing altered states of consciousness using binaural audio technology and had trained some STARGATE viewers in out-of-body techniques. McMoneagle became associated with the institute after his retirement.
 A memorandum of March 29, 1984 records that the Center Lane office awarded a personal services contract to [[Robert Monroe]] in July 1983 to examine his Hemi-Sync technology in the collection process, that its objectives were extended to train the source in Hemi-Sync "in anticipation of his continued participation in CL as a private consultant after his retirement," and that the project manager was "aware that Mr. McMoneagle will retire soon after completion of the training."[^5] The Center Lane chronology records the start of one-on-one training with Monroe between October 31 and November 4, 1983 and "MIAS Advanced Training completed" on July 13, 1984.[^6]
 His wife [[Nancy McMoneagle]] was director of the Monroe Institute from 1983 to 1991 and president and executive director from 2014 until she retired on March 4, 2019; the Institute's Forms 990 list her as executive director and then president for tax years 2016 to 2018 at reportable compensation of $88,426, $93,017 and $96,985.[^4][^7]
 He published two books describing his work and his theoretical framework: *Mind Trek: Exploring Consciousness, Time, and Space Through Remote Viewing* (Hampton Roads, 1993) and *Remote Viewing Secrets: A Handbook* (Hampton Roads, 2000). He has continued to participate in publicly available remote viewing demonstrations and research.
 ### Footnotes
-[^1]: Grill Flame volunteer security agreements, consent statements, and counseling statements for Joseph W. McMoneagle (February 8, 1979; October 26, 1979; February 19, 1980), Melvin C. Riley (February 8, 1979), and Robert C. Cowart (June 3 and October 2, 1981), and "Requirement for Access to DIA Sun Streak Project (Brian Buzby)," May 10, 1985, CIA-RDP96-00789R0021001500xx series. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
+[^1]: Grill Flame volunteer security agreements, consent statements, and counseling statements for Joseph W. McMoneagle (February 8, 1979; October 26, 1979; February 19, 1980), Melvin C. Riley (February 8, 1979), and Robert C. Cowart (June 3 and October 2, 1981), and "Requirement for Access to DIA Sun Streak Project (Brian Buzby)," May 10, 1985, CIA-RDP96-00789R0021001500 series.
-[^2]: Jachim, Robert J., memorandum "Briefing for MG A.N. Stubblebine III," October 8, 1982, CIA-RDP96-00788R001700220022-7; Buzby, Brian, memoranda "CENTER LANE Briefing for CG, USAINSCOM," August 29, 1983 (CIA-RDP96-00788R001700220011-9), "Meeting With MG Stubblebine on 30 November 1983," December 6, 1983 (CIA-RDP96-00788R001700220010-0), and "Meeting with MG Stubblebine on 6 January 1984," January 17, 1984 (CIA-RDP96-00788R001700220009-2); letter of the ACSI to Stubblebine, "CENTER LANE," April 1983 (CIA-RDP96-00788R001700220002-9). Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
+[^2]: Jachim, Robert J., memorandum "Briefing for MG A.N. Stubblebine III," October 8, 1982, CIA-RDP96-00788R001700220022-7; Buzby, Brian, memoranda "CENTER LANE Briefing for CG, USAINSCOM," August 29, 1983 (CIA-RDP96-00788R001700220011-9), "Meeting With MG Stubblebine on 30 November 1983," December 6, 1983 (CIA-RDP96-00788R001700220010-0), and "Meeting with MG Stubblebine on 6 January 1984," January 17, 1984 (CIA-RDP96-00788R001700220009-2); letter of the ACSI to Stubblebine, "CENTER LANE," April 1983 (CIA-RDP96-00788R001700220002-9)..
-[^3]: May, Edwin C. "The American Institutes for Research Review of the Department of Defense's STAR GATE Program: A Commentary," *Journal of Parapsychology,* vol. 60, no. 1, March 1996, pp. 3-23. "Psychic Spies: Cold War Whimsy or Secret Weapon?," ABC News *Nightline,* November 28, 1995, Radio TV Reports transcript for the CIA Public Affairs Staff, CIA-RDP99-01448R000402140001-7, read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room.
+[^3]: May, Edwin C. "The American Institutes for Research Review of the Department of Defense's STAR GATE Program: A Commentary," *Journal of Parapsychology,* vol. 60, no. 1, March 1996, pp. 3-23. "Psychic Spies: Cold War Whimsy or Secret Weapon?," ABC News *Nightline,* November 28, 1995, Radio TV Reports transcript for the CIA Public Affairs Staff, CIA-RDP99-01448R000402140001-7.
 [^4]: The Monroe Institute, "From the Director's Chair: March 2019, Nancy's Farewell." https://monroeinstitute.org/blogs/blog/director-s-chair-march-2019-nancys-farewell
 [^5]: Security Support Detachment, USAINSCOM, memorandum for record "Continuation of MIAS Advanced Training (U)," March 29, 1984. CIA-RDP96-00788R001700210002-0, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^6]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, *Center Lane Information Papers for Director, Defense Intelligence Agency*, March 7, 1985. CIA-RDP96-00788R000400060001-2, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^7]: Internal Revenue Service, Forms 990 of The Monroe Institute, tax years 2016, 2017 and 2018, Part VII, object IDs 201721239349301212, 201832569349300913 and 201920829349300002.
--- a/PEOPLE/(H-M)/Kenneth
+++ b/PEOPLE/(H-M)/Kenneth
@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Kenneth A. Kress was a physicist in the CIA's [[CIA Office of Technical Service|
 ### SCANATE
-The office had spent 874 dollars on a few days' work in August 1972 and 2,500 more before it "funded a $50,000 expanded effort in parapsychology" on October 1, 1972. Kress carried the project through the review of April and May 1973, when [[William Colby]] sent it to the Executive Management Committee and the matter went to the director, [[James Schlesinger]]; \"I was soon told not to increase the scope of the project,\" and into the joint program with the Office of Research and Development that began on February 1, 1974. He wrote that at one point "I began to have serious feelings of being involved with a fraud," and had the agency's computer office re-analyze the SRI random-number machine, finding "no evidence of nonrandomness." In July 1974 he designed the test of Pat Price against [[Semipalatinsk]], choosing "the tall crane and the four structures resembling oil well derricks" as the checks, and concluded that "as proof of remote viewing, the data are at best inconclusive." When the program was reviewed in 1975 he was "judged to be a positively biased advocate of paranormal functioning" and removed from evaluation; the research support was dropped as "not productive or even competent."[^2]
+The office had spent 874 dollars on a few days' work in August 1972 and 2,500 more before it "funded a $50,000 expanded effort in parapsychology" on October 1, 1972. Kress carried the project through the review of April and May 1973, when [[William Colby]] sent it to the Executive Management Committee and the matter went to the director, [[James Schlesinger]]; "I was soon told not to increase the scope of the project and not to anticipate any follow-on in this area," and into the joint program with the Office of Research and Development that began on February 1, 1974. He wrote that at one point "I began to have serious feelings of being involved with a fraud," and had the agency's computer office re-analyze the SRI random-number machine, finding "no evidence of nonrandomness." In July 1974 he designed the test of Pat Price against [[Semipalatinsk]], choosing "the tall crane and the four structures resembling oil well derricks" as the checks, and concluded that "as proof of remote viewing, the data are at best inconclusive." When the program was reviewed in 1975 he was "judged to be a positively biased advocate of paranormal functioning" and removed from evaluation; the research support was dropped as "not productive or even competent."[^2]
 ### The Article
--- a/PEOPLE/(H-M)/Ray
+++ b/PEOPLE/(H-M)/Ray
@ -39,17 +39,17 @@ Hunt Oil found the Alif field near [[Marib]] in 1984, the first oil discovered i
 Hunt joined the Halliburton board in 1998, when [[Dick Cheney]] was chief executive, and went at once onto its compensation committee, which that year gave Cheney a bonus of 1.1 million dollars and restricted stock worth 1.5 million on a salary of 1.18 million. He joined the board of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas the same year. He was a [[Bush Pioneers|Pioneer]] fundraiser for George W. Bush, who made him finance chairman of the Republican National Committee in May 2000. His son [[Hunter Hunt|Hunter L. Hunt]] took leave from the company to work on the campaign's energy policy group.[^2][^9]
-On October 5, 2001, the [[White House]] announced Hunt's appointment to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board under General [[Brent Scowcroft]]. The other members included [[Jim Barksdale]], [[Robert Addison Day]], [[Stephen Friedman]], [[Alfred Lerner]], [[Rita Hauser]], Admiral [[David Jeremiah]], [[Arnold Kanter]], [[James C. Langdon Jr.]], [[Pete Wilson]], and [[Philip Zelikow]]. Scowcroft was removed after criticizing the [[Iraq]] war. On October 27, 2005, the White House reappointed Hunt for a term beginning December 20 under Friedman, with [[Donald Evans]], [[Arthur B. Culvahouse]], [[William O. DeWitt Jr.]], and [[Lee Hamilton]]. In the same years two Hunt Oil executives became ambassadors. [[Jeanne L. Phillips]], a senior vice president and a fundraiser for the Bush campaign and inaugural, was ambassador to the [[Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development|OECD]] from August 2001 to June 2003 and returned to the company. Oberwetter was sworn in as ambassador to [[Saudi Arabia]] on January 8, 2004.[^2][^3][^10]
+On October 5, 2001, the [[White House]] announced Hunt's appointment to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board under General [[Brent Scowcroft]]. The other members included [[Jim Barksdale]], [[Robert Addison Day]], [[Stephen Friedman]], [[Alfred Lerner]], [[Rita Hauser]], Admiral [[David Jeremiah]], [[Arnold Kanter]], [[James C. Langdon Jr.]], [[Pete Wilson]], and [[Philip Zelikow]]. [[Robert Bryce]] wrote in *Salon* on November 17, 2005 that George W. Bush had dismissed Scowcroft from the chairmanship about a year earlier because of his public criticism of the decision to invade [[Iraq]].[^2] [[Steve Clemons]] wrote on October 27, 2005 that Scowcroft was not asked to return to the board when his term expired at the end of 2004 and that he reportedly told a gathering just after the New Year: "I just got fired."[^10] On October 27, 2005, the White House reappointed Hunt for a term beginning December 20 under Friedman, with [[Donald Evans]], [[Arthur B. Culvahouse]], [[William O. DeWitt Jr.]], and [[Lee Hamilton]]. In the same years two Hunt Oil executives became ambassadors. [[Jeanne L. Phillips]], a senior vice president and a fundraiser for the Bush campaign and inaugural, was ambassador to the [[Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development|OECD]] from August 2001 to June 2003 and returned to the company. Oberwetter was sworn in as ambassador to [[Saudi Arabia]] on January 8, 2004.[^2][^3][^11]
 ### Kurdistan
-On September 8, 2007, Hunt Oil and the [[Kurdistan Regional Government]] announced a production-sharing contract for a block in the Dohuk area, signed under a regional oil law that the Kurdish parliament had passed a month earlier and that the government in [[Baghdad]] did not recognize. The Bush administration's policy was that no contracts should be signed before a national oil law. Three days before the signing, Hunt Oil's regional manager, [[David McDonald (Hunt Oil)|David McDonald]], told the head of the [[State Department]]'s reconstruction team in [[Erbil]] that the company was interested in the Shekhan and Akra districts of northern [[Nineveh Governorate|Nineveh]], territory disputed between Erbil and Baghdad. "This is a significant opportunity that outweighs the legal ambiguity," he said, and of the geology: "It's like shooting fish in a barrel." The embassy's cable reporting the contract went to Washington on September 12. Ray Hunt said he was pleased to be "actively participating in the establishment of the petroleum industry in the [[Kurdistan Region|Kurdistan Region of Iraq]]." President Bush said: "I know nothing about the deal."[^11][^12]
+On September 8, 2007, Hunt Oil and the [[Kurdistan Regional Government]] announced a production-sharing contract for a block in the Dohuk area, signed under a regional oil law that the Kurdish parliament had passed a month earlier and that the government in [[Baghdad]] did not recognize. The Bush administration's policy was that no contracts should be signed before a national oil law. Three days before the signing, Hunt Oil's regional manager, [[David McDonald (Hunt Oil)|David McDonald]], told the head of the [[State Department]]'s reconstruction team in [[Erbil]] that the company was interested in the Shekhan and Akra districts of northern [[Nineveh Governorate|Nineveh]], territory disputed between Erbil and Baghdad. "This is a significant opportunity that outweighs the legal ambiguity," he said, and of the geology: "It's like shooting fish in a barrel." The embassy's cable reporting the contract went to Washington on September 12. Ray Hunt said he was pleased to be "actively participating in the establishment of the petroleum industry in the [[Kurdistan Region|Kurdistan Region of Iraq]]." President Bush said: "I know nothing about the deal."[^12][^13]
-On July 2, 2008, Representative [[Henry Waxman]], chairman of the [[House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform]], released company and government documents and wrote to [[United States Secretary of State|Secretary of State]] [[Condoleezza Rice]] that "contrary to the denials of Administration officials, advisors to the President and officials in the State and Commerce Departments knew about Hunt Oil's interest in the Kurdish region months before the contract was executed." Hunt Oil officials had met the State Department team in Erbil on June 12, 2007. Hunt had written to the intelligence board on July 12 and August 30, 2007, describing his contacts with the Kurds. An internal Hunt Oil message quoted in the letter read: "This is really good for us ... I find it a huge compliment that he is tipping us off about this ... This is a lucky break."[^12]
+On July 2, 2008, Representative [[Henry Waxman]], chairman of the [[House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform]], released company and government documents and wrote to [[United States Secretary of State|Secretary of State]] [[Condoleezza Rice]] that "contrary to the denials of Administration officials, advisors to the President and officials in the State and Commerce Departments knew about Hunt Oil's interest in the Kurdish region months before the contract was executed." Hunt Oil officials had met the State Department team in Erbil on June 12, 2007. Hunt had written to the intelligence board on July 12 and August 30, 2007, describing his contacts with the Kurds. An internal Hunt Oil message quoted in the letter read: "This is really good for us ... I find it a huge compliment that he is tipping us off about this ... This is a lucky break."[^13]
 ### Sharyland
-Hunter Hunt founded [[Sharyland Utilities]] in 1999, the first new regulated electric utility in the [[United States]] in three decades. Under the Competitive Renewable Energy Zone program that the [[Texas Legislature]] created in 2005, Sharyland was awarded about 300 miles of transmission lines in the Panhandle. In 2010 the family placed the lines in a real estate investment trust, [[InfraREIT]], which leased them back to the utility. In 2016 Sharyland's average residential delivery charge was 90.39 dollars a month against 38.59 dollars at [[Oncor]]. Oncor and [[Sempra Energy]] bought the assets in 2019 in transactions worth about 1.3 billion dollars.[^13]
+Hunter Hunt founded [[Sharyland Utilities]] in 1999, the first new regulated electric utility in the [[United States]] in three decades. Under the Competitive Renewable Energy Zone program that the [[Texas Legislature]] created in 2005, Sharyland was awarded about 300 miles of transmission lines in the Panhandle. In 2010 the family placed the lines in a real estate investment trust, [[InfraREIT]], which leased them back to the utility. In 2016 Sharyland's average residential delivery charge was 90.39 dollars a month against 38.59 dollars at [[Oncor]]. Oncor and [[Sempra Energy]] bought the assets in 2019 in transactions worth about 1.3 billion dollars.[^14]
 ### Footnotes
@ -62,7 +62,8 @@ Hunter Hunt founded [[Sharyland Utilities]] in 1999, the first new regulated ele
 [^7]: "Vice President George Bush, completing a 10-day trip aimed...," *United Press International,* April 12, 1986. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1986/04/12/Vice-President-George-Bush-completing-a-10-day-trip-aimed/5692513666000/
 [^8]: "Hunt Oil & ExxonMobil File for Arbitration on Yemen Field," *Rigzone,* 2005.
 [^9]: Halliburton Company, Schedule 14A proxy statement, 2004, Securities and Exchange Commission.
-[^10]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, "Jeanne L. Phillips," Department History.; "Ambassador focuses on U.S.-Saudi cooperation," *NBC News.* https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna8293255
+[^10]: Clemons, Steve. "Stephen Friedman Named to Chair President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," *The Washington Note,* October 27, 2005. https://washingtonnote.com/stephen_friedma/
-[^11]: U.S. Embassy Baghdad, "Hunt Oil Signs Agreement with KRG under KRG Oil Law," cable 07BAGHDAD3071, September 12, 2007. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07BAGHDAD3071_a.html
+[^11]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, "Jeanne L. Phillips," Department History.; "Ambassador focuses on U.S.-Saudi cooperation," *NBC News.* https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna8293255
-[^12]: Waxman, Henry A., letter to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, July 2, 2008, as reported in "Bush Officials Condoned Regional Iraqi Oil Deal," *The Washington Post,* July 3, 2008, and "U.S. officials condoned Kurdish oil deal," *NBC News.* https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna25506968
+[^12]: U.S. Embassy Baghdad, "Hunt Oil Signs Agreement with KRG under KRG Oil Law," cable 07BAGHDAD3071, September 12, 2007. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07BAGHDAD3071_a.html
-[^13]: *The Texas Tribune,* 2016 reporting on Sharyland Utilities delivery rates; "Texas regulators seal Oncor's nearly $1.3 billion power line deal with Hunt family," *The Dallas Morning News,* May 9, 2019.
+[^13]: Waxman, Henry A., letter to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, July 2, 2008, as reported in "Bush Officials Condoned Regional Iraqi Oil Deal," *The Washington Post,* July 3, 2008, and "U.S. officials condoned Kurdish oil deal," *NBC News.* https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna25506968
 [^14]: *The Texas Tribune,* 2016 reporting on Sharyland Utilities delivery rates; "Texas regulators seal Oncor's nearly $1.3 billion power line deal with Hunt family," *The Dallas Morning News,* May 9, 2019.
--- a/PEOPLE/(H-M)/Robert
+++ b/PEOPLE/(H-M)/Robert
@ -10,14 +10,59 @@ summary: "American businessman who founded The Monroe Institute, known for Hemi-
 born: 1915-10-30
 died: 1995-03-17
 location: "Lexington, Kentucky, USA"
 relations:
  - type: founded
    with: "[[Monroe Institute]]"
    start: 1971
    fn: 1
  - type: head_of
    with: "[[Monroe Institute]]"
    role: Executive Director
    start: 1978
    fn: 7
  - type: contractor_to
    with: "[[United States Army Intelligence and Security Command]]"
    start: 1980
    end: 1984
    role: Hemi-Sync training for remote viewers
    fn: 8
  - type: participant_in
    with: "[[Gondola Wish]]"
    start: 1978
    end: 1978
    fn: 7
  - type: participant_in
    with: "[[Center Lane]]"
    start: 1983
    end: 1984
    fn: 9
 ---
-[[Robert Monroe]] was an American businessman and explorer of human consciousness. He is known for his extensive personal experiences with out-of-body experiences (OBEs) and for founding [[Monroe Institute|The Monroe Institute]], a non-profit organization dedicated to the exploration of human consciousness through various techniques, including Hemi-Sync audio technology. While not directly involved in the [[Stargate Project|Stargate Project]], his work and institute became a post-military career path for figures like [[Frederick Atwater|Skip Atwater]], who became president of the Institute.[^1]
+[[Robert Monroe]] was an American businessman and explorer of human consciousness. He is known for his extensive personal experiences with out-of-body experiences (OBEs) and for founding [[Monroe Institute|The Monroe Institute]], a non-profit organization dedicated to the exploration of human consciousness through various techniques, including Hemi-Sync audio technology.[^1] While not directly involved in the [[Stargate Project|Stargate Project]], his work and institute became a post-military career path for figures like [[Frederick Atwater|Skip Atwater]], who became president of the Institute.[^2]
-An INSCOM information paper of January 5, 1984, gave his particulars: "Born on 30 Oct 1915, in [[Wabash, Indiana]], Robert A. Monroe received a BA degree from [[Ohio State University]] in 1937," was "the author of the book *Journeys Out of the Body,* published in 1971," and "has a DoD SECRET security clearance based on a NAC completed on 18 January 1980." The Army's association with his institute dated from 1978, and by 1984 its Hemi-Sync process was in use in the [[Center Lane]] unit's training and collection missions.[^2]
+An INSCOM information paper of January 5, 1984, gave his particulars: "Born on 30 Oct 1915, in [[Wabash, Indiana]], Robert A. Monroe received a BA degree from [[Ohio State University]] in 1937," was "the author of the book *Journeys Out of the Body,* published in 1971," and "has a DoD SECRET security clearance based on a NAC completed on 18 January 1980." The Army's association with his institute dated from 1978, and by 1984 its Hemi-Sync process was in use in the [[Center Lane]] unit's training and collection missions.[^3]
 Monroe created and produced some four hundred radio and television network programs and became owner and operator of a radio network and cable television system in Virginia.[^4] The psychologist [[Charles Tart]] met him in the fall of 1965 at the [[University of Virginia]] Medical School and recorded him in eight late-night EEG sessions between December 1965 and August 1966, and in a two-hour session at the [[University of California, Davis]] in 1968; Tart wrote that the results left "only weak evidence that Monroe was actually 'out'" on the occasion in which he named the laboratory technician's location, and Tart wrote the introduction to Monroe's *Journeys Out of the Body*, dated January 10, 1971.[^5][^6]
 A 902d Military Intelligence Group assessment of August 25, 1978 records that Monroe, interviewed at the Institute on April 6, 1978, received a security indoctrination on May 3, 1978 and agreed to train three military intelligence personnel for a fee of $2,000.[^7] In a trip report of September 30, 1980, Frederick Atwater wrote that Monroe held a SECRET clearance, "has signed a consultant security agreement" and had been dealt with on a "shallow cover" basis, with no other Institute personnel aware of the agreement.[^8] The Center Lane chronology records a contract signed with Monroe on July 19, 1983 for one-on-one training of a Center Lane operative, and the fiscal year 1983 budget lists $24.4K for a consultant services agreement with him.[^9] On October 5, 1983 and January 5, 1984 the Secretary of the Army, [[John Marsh]], was briefed on Monroe and the Institute.[^10]
 A patent granted on May 20, 1975, US 3,884,218, "Method of inducing and maintaining various stages of sleep in the human being," names Monroe as inventor and Monroe Industries Inc. as original assignee. A later patent, US 5,356,368, names him as inventor and [[Interstate Industries]] as original assignee, filed March 1, 1991 and granted October 18, 1994.[^11][^12]
 The INSCOM information paper of January 5, 1984 gives his birthplace as Wabash, Indiana; the Society for Psychical Research's Psi Encyclopedia gives Lexington, Kentucky.[^3][^13]
 ### Footnotes
-[^1]: Schnabel, Jim. *Remote Viewers*. Dell, 1997.
+[^1]: Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences, *The Gateway Program*, promotional text. CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270006-0, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
-[^2]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, information paper "The Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences," ITAGPA-F-SD, January 5, 1984, CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270004-2. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
+[^2]: Schnabel, Jim. *Remote Viewers*. Dell, 1997.
 [^3]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, information paper "The Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences," ITAGPA-F-SD, January 5, 1984, CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270004-2..
 [^4]: Monroe, Robert A., *Journeys Out of the Body*, updated edition (Main Street Books, Doubleday), author note. https://archive.org/details/journeys_out_body
 [^5]: Tart, Charles T., "Six Studies of Out-of-Body Experiences," *Journal of Near-Death Studies* 17, no. 2 (1998): 73-99, pp. 83-90. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc799368/
 [^6]: Monroe, Robert A., *Journeys Out of the Body*, Tart introduction dated Davis, California, January 10, 1971. https://archive.org/details/journeys_out_body
 [^7]: 902d Military Intelligence Group, GONDOLA WISH assessment report, August 25, 1978. CIA-RDP96-00788R002000160001-3, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^8]: Atwater, Frederick H., memorandum for the record, "Trip Report, 18-28 September 1980," September 30, 1980. CIA-RDP96-00788R001200060028-4, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^9]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, *Center Lane Information Papers for Director, Defense Intelligence Agency*, March 7, 1985. CIA-RDP96-00788R000400060001-2, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^10]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, memoranda of October 12, 1983 (CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270014-1) and January 6, 1984 (CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270003-3), CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^11]: US Patent 3,884,218, granted May 20, 1975. https://patents.google.com/patent/US3884218A
 [^12]: US Patent 5,356,368, granted October 18, 1994. https://patents.google.com/patent/US5356368A
 [^13]: Wehrstein, KM, "Robert Monroe," Psi Encyclopedia, Society for Psychical Research. https://psi-encyclopedia.spr.ac.uk/articles/robert-monroe
--- a/PEOPLE/(N-S)/Brent
+++ b/PEOPLE/(N-S)/Brent
@ -3,31 +3,260 @@ category: "Intelligence & Government"
 tags:
  - Person
  - BrentScowcroft
  - KissingerAssociates
  - NationalSecurityCouncil
  - KissingerAssociates
  - BNLScandal
-  - Iraq
+  - Iraqgate
  - GeorgeHWBush
-summary: "Vice chairman of Kissinger Associates, where he advised Banca Nazionale del Lavoro for fees, who as national security adviser kept agricultural credits flowing to Iraq in 1990 while his staff resisted measures singling Iraq out."
+  - GeraldFord
  - TowerCommission
  - ScowcroftCommission
  - PresidentsForeignIntelligenceAdvisoryBoard
  - GulfWar
  - NSD26
  - AspenStrategyGroup
  - TheScowcroftGroup
 aliases:
  - Brent Scowcroft
  - Scowcroft
  - Gen. Brent Scowcroft
  - General Scowcroft
  - Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft
 summary: "Retired Air Force lieutenant general, national security adviser to Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush, chairman of the 1983 Commission on Strategic Forces and of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 2001 to 2005."
 location: "Washington, D.C."
 created: 2026-09-21
-updated: 2026-09-21
+updated: 2026-10-12
 relations:
  - type: appointed
    with: "[[Richard Nixon]]"
    start: "1971"
    end: "1973"
    role: "military aide to the President"
    fn: 5
  - type: reported_to
    with: "[[Henry A. Kissinger]]"
    start: "1973"
    end: "1975"
    role: "deputy assistant to the President for national security affairs"
    fn: 5
  - type: appointed
    with: "[[Gerald R. Ford]]"
    start: "1975"
    end: "1977"
    role: "Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs"
    fn: 10
  - type: participant_in
    with: "[[Yom Kippur War]]"
    start: "1973"
    end: "1973"
    role: "attended the October 24 or 25, 1973 meeting at which DEFCON III was set"
    fn: 7
  - type: employed_by
    with: "[[Kissinger Associates]]"
    start: "1982"
    end: "1989"
    role: "vice chairman; headed the firm's Washington office"
    fn: 14
  - type: head_of
    with: "[[Scowcroft Commission]]"
    start: "1983"
    end: "1983"
    role: "chairman of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces"
    fn: 21
  - type: director_of
    with: "[[Council on Foreign Relations]]"
    start: "1984"
    end: "1986"
    role: "director, term expiring 1986, and member of the Nominating and Membership committees"
    fn: 25
  - type: member_of
    with: "[[Tower Commission]]"
    start: "1987"
    end: "1987"
    role: "member of the President's Special Review Board"
    fn: 26
  - type: contractor_to
    with: "[[Banca Nazionale del Lavoro]]"
    start: "1986"
    end: "1989"
    role: "adviser to bank management through Kissinger Associates; briefed the bank's board three times, as reported by Gonzalez"
    fn: 19
  - type: appointed
    with: "[[George H.W. Bush]]"
    start: "1989"
    end: "1993"
    role: "Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs"
    fn: 1
  - type: investigated
    with: "[[Frederick Lacey]]"
    reverse: true
    start: "1992"
    end: "1992"
    role: "special counsel's review of the BNL matter, which examined his contacts with BNL management"
    fn: 15
  - type: founded
    with: "[[The Scowcroft Group]]"
    start: "1994"
    role: "founder of the international business advisory firm"
    fn: 4
  - type: head_of
    with: "[[President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board]]"
    start: "2001"
    end: "2005"
    role: "chairman"
    fn: 49
  - type: participant_in
    with: "[[Aspen Strategy Group]]"
    start: "2016"
    end: "2016"
    role: "named by Tom Pritzker as one of three people who run the group"
    fn: 55
 ---
-Brent Scowcroft, a retired [[United States Air Force|Air Force]] lieutenant general, was vice chairman of [[Kissinger Associates]] until January 1989, when he became national security adviser to President [[George H.W. Bush]].[^1]
+Brent Scowcroft (March 19, 1925 to August 6, 2020) was a retired [[United States Air Force|Air Force]] lieutenant general who served as national security adviser to President [[Gerald R. Ford]] from 1975 to 1977 and to President [[George H.W. Bush]] from 1989 to 1993.[^1][^2] He chaired the President's Commission on Strategic Forces in 1983, was a member of the [[Tower Commission]] in 1987, was vice chairman of [[Kissinger Associates]] until January 1989, founded [[The Scowcroft Group]] in 1994 and chaired the [[President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board]] from 2001 to 2005.[^3][^4]
-### The Bank
+### Air Force and the Nixon White House
-"BNL was a client of Mr. Scowcroft's while he was the vice-chairman of Kissinger Associates," Representative [[Henry B. Gonzalez]] told the House on April 28, 1992. "Mr. Scowcroft regularly provided advice to BNL's management and received hefty fees in return." At a meeting in [[New York City|New York]] in 1987 he, [[Henry A. Kissinger|Henry Kissinger]], [[Lawrence Eagleburger]], and [[Alan Stoga]] advised officers of the [[Banca Nazionale del Lavoro]], and he and Stoga took them to lunch. The special counsel [[Frederick Lacey]] found that the two men "came into contact with BNL management" and saw nothing to suggest they knew of the lending to [[Iraq]] by the bank's [[Atlanta]] branch.[^1][^2]
+[[Henry B. Gonzalez]], the chairman of the [[House Banking Committee]], told the House on April 28, 1992 that early in his career Scowcroft served one year as air attaché at the [[United States Embassy in Belgrade]] in [[Yugoslavia]].[^5] After earning a Ph.D. and working in academia from 1962 to 1968, he held a succession of national security posts in the [[Department of Defense]].[^5] In 1971 President [[Richard Nixon]] appointed him military aide to the President, and in 1973 [[Henry A. Kissinger|Kissinger]] chose him as deputy assistant to the President for national security affairs.[^5] The Scowcroft Group's biography of him describes a twenty-nine-year military career that began with graduation from [[United States Military Academy|West Point]] and ended at the rank of lieutenant general after service as Deputy National Security Advisor.[^3] [[R. W. Apple Jr.]], who wrote the introduction to the Tower Commission report, described him as "a retired Air Force general who served several Republican presidents as a key foreign-policy adviser."[^6]
-### The White House
+### Deputy to Kissinger, 1973 to 1975
-[[Bryan Siebert]] of the [[United States Department of Energy|Energy Department]] "had been waging a lonely and unsuccessful battle to get [[James Baker]] and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft to do something about the steady flow of U.S. exports that were materially assisting Iraq's nuclear weapons program." [[Matrix Churchill]] "was not discussed at the cabinet meeting, even though the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] had reported its activities to both the [[White House]] and the [[State Department]] in November 1989." Scowcroft's aides "objected to any measures 'that singled out Iraq.'" On May 18, 1990, he telephoned Secretary of Agriculture [[Clayton Yeutter]] and asked him "not to put out any press release today saying we are terminating the program" of [[Commodity Credit Corporation Iraq Program|credit guarantees]]. "We would be shooting ourselves in the foot," his staff said of cancelling the second 500 million dollars. Iraq invaded [[Kuwait]] on August 2.[^3]
+A memorandum for the record that Admiral [[Thomas H. Moorer]] prepared on October 26, 1973 reproduces Kissinger's record of schedule for a meeting in Washington on the night of October 24 to 25, 1973 (10:30 p.m. to 3:30 a.m.), which lists the attendees as Kissinger, [[James R. Schlesinger]], [[William Colby]], Moorer, Scowcroft, [[Alexander Haig]] and [[Jonathan Howe]]. The memorandum lists among the actions taken that day the setting of [[DEFCON]] III, during the [[Yom Kippur War]].[^7] Kissinger later recalled that immediately after the alert was set he instructed Scowcroft to call [[Anatoly Dobrynin]] to tell him to desist from all action until there was a U.S. reply, "and to warn him that any unilateral actions by the Soviet Union would have the most serious consequences."[^7] The Foreign Relations of the United States editors note that [[Ray Cline|Cline]] called the meeting a "curious little rump NSC meeting" in the Winter 1974 to 1975 issue of [[Foreign Policy]].[^7] Gonzalez told the House that Scowcroft often took charge of the [[National Security Council]] while Kissinger was fulfilling his duties as Secretary of State.[^8]
-Lawyers of his staff under [[C. Nicholas Rostow|Nicholas Rostow]] met with those of other agencies to coordinate replies to congressional requests for documents on Iraq. Gonzalez called them "the Rostow gang." His investigator was told by Rostow that "it would be a cold day in hell before Congress got NSD 26."[^3]
+### National security adviser to Ford, 1975 to 1977
 On May 27, 1975 Ford met in the [[White House Cabinet Room|Cabinet Room]] with Schlesinger, Colby, [[Donald Rumsfeld]], [[Robert Ingersoll]] and Scowcroft, who is listed in the memorandum of conversation as Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, about a [[New York Times]] article by [[Seymour Hersh]] on American submarine intercept missions in Soviet waters. Ford said: "Somehow someone must be made an example of." Scowcroft said: "The real problem is not the press. The real problem is the people who are leaking the material to the press. They are the ones we have to go after."[^9]
 At a news conference on November 3, 1975, Ford announced that "Brent Scowcroft, who has been serving ably for 3 years as Deputy Assistant at the White House, will move up to Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs" when Kissinger relinquished that post to devote his full time to being Secretary of State.[^10] The report of the Tower Commission summarizes that "Under President Ford, Lt Gen Brent Scowcroft became National Security Advisor, with Henry Kissinger remaining as Secretary of State."[^11]
 In April 1976 Scowcroft briefed Vice President [[Nelson Rockefeller]] before an April 20 courtesy call on [[Anastasio Somoza]] at the Nicaraguan Ambassador's residence in Washington, covering Nicaraguan affairs and U.S.-Nicaraguan relations.[^12] Gonzalez told the House that Scowcroft resigned the post during the [[Jimmy Carter|Carter]] administration but stayed active as a member of the President's general advisory committee on arms control.[^13]
 ### Kissinger Associates and the BNL account, 1982 to 1989
 In 1982 Scowcroft joined Kissinger in setting up Kissinger Associates, according to Gonzalez, who said Scowcroft served as vice chairman and head of the firm's Washington, D.C. office until he became national security adviser in January 1989.[^14] The firm's biography of him states that in that capacity he advised and assisted US and foreign corporate leaders on global joint venture opportunities, strategic planning and risk assessment.[^3]
 [[Frederick Lacey]], who was appointed as special counsel in the [[BNL Scandal|Banca Nazionale del Lavoro]] investigation, wrote that Scowcroft had served as vice president of Kissinger Associates and had headed its Washington, D.C. office before joining the Bush administration as national security adviser in January 1989.[^15] Lacey's report states: "It is clear that, while at Kissinger Associates, Scowcroft and Eagleburger came into contact with BNL management. I have seen nothing, however, to suggest that they knew of BNL-Atlanta's wrongful loans to Iraq or influenced the prosecution of this matter."[^15] The passage refers to [[Lawrence Eagleburger]], who had been president of the firm and became deputy secretary of state.
 Gonzalez told the House that Kissinger, Scowcroft and Eagleburger "maintain that they were unaware of the BNL loans to [[Iraq]]. I offer no definitive proof that they were aware of the BNL loans."[^16] He reported that Scowcroft worked on the account of [[Banca Nazionale del Lavoro|BNL]] at Kissinger Associates, met BNL management on numerous occasions, and briefed the bank's board on international political and economic developments on three occasions between 1986 and 1989, and that when the president of BNL traveled to the United States for the annual International Monetary Fund conference he met Kissinger and Scowcroft in [[New York City|New York]].[^17] Gonzalez reported that a former head of BNL's American operations said he attended a 1987 meeting in New York with [[Alan Stoga]], the head of BNL's Rome headquarters, Kissinger, Scowcroft and Eagleburger, convened to give BNL advice on doing business in several countries including India, and that Stoga and Scowcroft took the BNL officers to lunch afterward.[^18] Gonzalez said: "BNL was a client of Mr. Scowcroft's while he was the vice-chairman of Kissinger Associates. Mr. Scowcroft regularly provided advice to BNL's management and received hefty fees in return."[^19]
 Luigi Sardelli, BNL's regional manager in the United States, gave the Banking Committee written answers in 1993 in which he stated that in February 1989 Dr. Pedde, BNL's managing director, asked him to contact Stoga, that he understood the bank was looking for space in Washington and that, because Scowcroft had just been appointed to the Bush White House, his mission may have been to find out whether a room would be available at Kissinger Associates in Washington for a BNL officer. Sardelli wrote that he did not recall posing the question to Stoga, and that he never discussed any loan to Iraq with Kissinger Associates.[^20]
 ### Scowcroft Commission, 1983
 On January 3, 1983 President [[Ronald Reagan]] announced the establishment of a bipartisan Commission on Strategic Forces (the [[Scowcroft Commission]]) to review the strategic modernization program, with particular focus on the land-based intercontinental ballistic missile system and its basing alternatives, and named "The Honorable Brent Scowcroft, former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to serve as Chairman." The other members were [[Thomas C. Reed]] as vice chairman, [[Nicholas Brady]], [[Harold Brown]], [[William Clements]], [[John Deutch]], Alexander M. Haig Jr., [[Richard Helms]], [[John Lyons]] of the [[AFL-CIO]], Vice Admiral Levering Smith and [[James Woolsey]].[^21] The statement notes that Reagan signed the establishing executive order the same day in the Cabinet Room with Scowcroft, several commission members, Secretary of State [[George P. Shultz]] and Secretary of Defense [[Caspar Weinberger]] present.[^21] Executive Order 12400 set the commission at no more than fifteen members, directed it to report by February 18, 1983, provided that information supplied to or developed by it would not, to the extent permitted by law, be available for public inspection, and assigned its administrative support to the Secretary of Defense.[^22]
 On April 19, 1983 Reagan, acknowledging "Brent Scowcroft, the Commission's Chairman," announced that the commission had unanimously arrived at its recommendations and that he would send them to Congress with his endorsement; he said the commission had held dozens of formal meetings and talked to over 200 technical experts.[^23] On April 9, 1984 Reagan issued a statement on the commission's final report, saying that it reiterated the original recommendations, namely an arms control structure with incentives for stability at reduced levels, deployment of 100 [[MX missile|MX missiles]] and development of a small single-warhead ICBM, and that it recommended extreme caution in proceeding to engineering development of an active strategic defense system.[^24]
 ### Council on Foreign Relations, 1984 to 1986
 The annual report of the [[Council on Foreign Relations]] for July 1, 1984 to June 30, 1985 lists Scowcroft among the directors with terms expiring in 1986, alongside Harold Brown, [[Lane Kirkland]], [[Juanita Kreps]] and [[Robert Scalapino]]. He is listed on the Membership Committee chaired by [[Theodore Hesburgh]] and on the five-member board Nominating Committee with [[Nicholas Katzenbach]], [[Philip Geyelin]], [[William D. Rogers]] and [[Marina Whitman]]. The report records a Council session of former national security advisers, chaired jointly by [[Winston Lord]] and Eagleburger, at which [[Zbigniew Brzezinski]], [[Walt Rostow]] and Scowcroft spoke, and a Council book, Michael Krepon's *Strategic Stalemate*, with parallel prefaces by Scowcroft and [[Paul Warnke]].[^25]
 ### Tower Commission, 1987
 Scowcroft was one of the members of the President's Special Review Board, chaired by [[John Tower]], with [[Edmund Muskie]] as the other member.[^26] The board examined the [[Iran-Contra affair]] and the role of the National Security Council in it. Apple's introduction reports that Scowcroft considered the lack of written records "appalling" and added: "It may be that some went into the shredder, but we can't prove it."[^26]
 ### National Security Directive 26, October 2, 1989
 National Security Directive 26, "U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf," is dated October 2, 1989 and was addressed to the Vice President, the Secretaries of State, the Treasury, Defense and Energy, the Attorney General, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the directors of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the United States Information Agency. Its section on Iraq reads in part: "Normal relations between the United States and Iraq would serve our longer-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East. The United States Government should propose economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior and to increase our influence with Iraq." It continues that "any illegal use of chemical and/or biological weapons will lead to economic and political sanctions" and that "Any breach by Iraq of IAEA safeguards in its nuclear program will result in a similar response." A further paragraph states: "We should pursue, and seek to facilitate, opportunities for U.S. firms to participate in the reconstruction of the Iraqi economy, particularly in the energy area," and that the United States should consider sales of non-lethal military assistance, training courses and medical exchanges to Iraq's defense establishment on a case by case basis.[^27]
 Gonzalez told the House that after the BNL offices in [[Atlanta]] were raided in August 1989, the White House and the National Security Council acted to protect the [[Commodity Credit Corporation Iraq Program|credit guarantee program for Iraq]] that the [[Commodity Credit Corporation]] ran. He said that State Department officials, including Secretary [[James A. Baker III|Baker]], "repeatedly referred to NSD-26 which stated that 'the President wished to improve relations with Iraq'" as the justification for pressing other agencies to approve the program.[^28] State Department talking points for the November 8, 1989 meeting of the National Advisory Council deputies, which Gonzalez reproduced, read: "In NSD-26, the President mandated that we seek to improve and expand our relationship with Iraq."[^29]
 Gonzalez stated that under Scowcroft's direction the NSC staff was heavily involved in winning approval of the one billion dollar program for fiscal 1990 in late 1989, and that Scowcroft himself was directly involved in trying to win the release of the second 500 million dollar installment, which was delayed because of the BNL scandal.[^30] A State Department memorandum of March 5, 1990, which Gonzalez quoted, states: "National Security Council staff [NSCS] contacted the USDA March 2 to inquire about the delay after the Iraqi Ambassador complained to General Scowcroft."[^31] Gonzalez said the [[United States Department of Agriculture|Department of Agriculture]] sent a background memorandum to Scowcroft in preparation for the NSC meeting in May 1990 stating that "it cannot be overemphasized that any constraint on CCC credit guarantees must not be based on a foreign policy rationale," and said the program was suspended at that meeting. He also quoted a May 25, 1990 Treasury Department memorandum summarizing a meeting of Agriculture, Treasury and State officials: "The NSC prevailed on Agriculture to say only that their investigation showed the improprieties may have occurred and remained silent on the suspension."[^32]
 On May 18, 1992 Gonzalez named Scowcroft, [[C. Boyden Gray]], [[John Schmitz]], [[Richard Haass]], [[Clayton Yeutter]] and others as White House and NSC staff involved in the decision and in the administrative review of the BNL scandal, said that "many White House and NSC staff were involved" and asked why neither Scowcroft nor Eagleburger had recused himself, and said: "So the White House and NSC, armed with National Security Directive 26, sprang into action in order to save the CCC Program for Iraq."[^33] The same Record pages print his letter of October 1, 1991 asking Scowcroft for the President's report on exports of nuclear, biological, chemical and ballistic missile technology to Iraq, Scowcroft's reply of November 1, 1991 offering a copy of the report "as a courtesy," Gonzalez's letter of April 29, 1992 asking Scowcroft for all NSC information on [[Carlos Cardoen]] and [[Gerald Bull]], and his letter of the same date to Bush asking that Scowcroft and the other named staff be made available for interview.[^34]
 Gonzalez described an interagency group of lawyers chaired by [[C. Nicholas Rostow]], the NSC's legal adviser, which met in April 1991 and which he called the "Rostow gang." He said the group "gave the White House a direct hand in regulating the flow of information to the Congress, thus limiting oversight of Iraq policy."[^35] In a May 2, 1991 letter to Bush, Gonzalez detailed his concerns about the links among BNL, Kissinger, Scowcroft and Eagleburger.[^36]
 The report of the independent counsel Lacey, printed in the Banking Committee record, quotes a February 8, 1991 memorandum from Rostow to Scowcroft at the National Security Council on the BNL indictment, which names [[Robert Mueller]] and states: "I have informed Robert Mueller ... of your reluctance to seek an indictment of Iraqi government officials whom we are unlikely to take into custody."[^37]
 [[Alan Friedman]] wrote that [[Bryan Siebert]] of the [[United States Department of Energy|Energy Department]] "had been waging a lonely and unsuccessful battle to get James Baker and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft to do something about the steady flow of U.S. exports that were materially assisting Iraq's nuclear weapons program." Friedman wrote that on May 18, 1990 Scowcroft telephoned Secretary of Agriculture Yeutter and asked him "not to put out any press release today saying we are terminating the program" of credit guarantees, and that Scowcroft's aides "objected to any measures 'that singled out Iraq.'" Friedman quoted Scowcroft's staff as saying of cancelling the second 500 million dollars: "We would be shooting ourselves in the foot." Friedman wrote that [[Matrix Churchill]] "was not discussed at the cabinet meeting, even though the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] had reported its activities to both the [[White House]] and the [[State Department]] in November 1989." According to Friedman, Rostow told Gonzalez's investigator that "it would be a cold day in hell before Congress got NSD 26."[^38]
 ### Beijing after Tiananmen, 1989
 On July 2, 1989 Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger met [[Deng Xiaoping]] and Premier [[Li Peng]] in the [[Great Hall of the People]] in [[Beijing]]. The memorandum of conversation records Deng saying that the turmoil in China had begun shortly after Bush took office, that the United States was too deeply involved in it, that U.S. foreign policy had cornered China, and that the aim of what he called the counter-revolutionary rebellion had been to overthrow the People's Republic. Deng said that the person who tied the knot should be the one to untie it, and that his hope was that the United States would do so.[^39]
 Scowcroft and Eagleburger returned to Beijing in December 1989. At a banquet on December 9 Qian toasted the health of Scowcroft, Eagleburger and Lilley and the resumption and development of normal Sino-U.S. relations. On December 10 Scowcroft, Eagleburger, Ambassador [[James R. Lilley]], [[Chase Untermeyer]] and the National Security Council's Asian affairs director [[Douglas Paal]] attended a working luncheon with Foreign Minister [[Qian Qichen]] at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse, and Scowcroft met Li Peng from 8:45 to 9:40 a.m., with a meeting with the General Secretary scheduled for 9:45. Li Peng asked Scowcroft whether the United States considered the Cold War ended after the Malta meeting.[^40]
 ### Gulf War decisions, 1990
 On July 28, 1990, in a telephone call from [[Kennebunkport, Maine|Kennebunkport]], Maine, Bush told King [[Hussein of Jordan|Hussein]], who was about to travel to Baghdad, that he had "just had lunch with Barbara, my daughter, and Brent Scowcroft," that there were problems with Iraq's behavior he would rather not discuss on that line, and that the United States had tried to send signals to [[Saddam Hussein]] with a congressional delegation. The King asked Bush to tell Scowcroft hello.[^41] On August 2, 1990, aboard [[Air Force One]] en route to [[Aspen, Colorado|Aspen]], Colorado, Bush told King Hussein and President [[Hosni Mubarak]] that the United States was "very surprised at this outrageous invasion."[^42] On August 3 Bush told Prime Minister [[Margaret Thatcher]] by telephone that "Brent will be talking with Woerner" ([[Manfred Wörner]]) and that "Brent is here and will get in touch"; Thatcher thanked him for "all the kind things you said at Aspen," and Bush replied: "I told Brent to keep you informed."[^43]
 On August 2, 1990 Iraqi tanks sped the 80 miles to Kuwait City to begin the occupation of [[Kuwait]].[^44] [[James P. Pfiffner]] wrote that on August 3, 1990, at a White House meeting, Scowcroft made the argument that the invasion was something the United States could not leave unanswered.[^44] Pfiffner quoted a White House official as saying: "it was Brent's presentation at one of the meetings on August 3, that Friday after the invasion, that made clear what the stakes were, crystallized people's thinking and galvanized support for a very strong response." Pfiffner's note attributes the quotation to an article by [[Andrew Rosenthal]] in the New York Times of February 21, 1991.[^45] In late September 1990 [[Colin Powell]] went to the White House with [[Richard Cheney]] to meet with Bush and Scowcroft, for what Pfiffner described as the most formal presentation of the sanctions option to the president.[^46]
 ### Essay against an attack on Iraq, August 2002
 On August 15, 2002 Scowcroft published an essay in the [[Wall Street Journal]] under the headline "Don't Attack Saddam."[^47][^48] A news report of the essay quotes him as writing that if the United States "were seen to be turning our backs" on the Israeli-Palestinian dispute "in order to go after Iraq, there would be an explosion of outrage against us."[^47] The same report quotes him as writing: "There is a virtual consensus in the world against an attack on Iraq at this time. So long as that sentiment persists, it would require the U.S. to pursue a virtual go-it-alone strategy against Iraq, making any military operations correspondingly more difficult and expensive."[^47]
 ### President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 2001 to 2005
 On October 5, 2001 the White House announced that President [[George W. Bush]] intended to appoint "Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft who will serve as Chairman" of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, for a term of two years, together with Cresencio Arcos, [[Jim Barksdale]], Robert Addison Day, [[Stephen Friedman]], [[Alfred Lerner]], [[Ray Hunt|Ray Lee Hunt]], [[Rita Hauser]], [[David E. Jeremiah]], [[Arnold Kanter]], [[James C. Langdon Jr.]], [[Elisabeth Pate-Cornell]], [[John Streicker]], [[Pete Wilson]] and [[Philip Zelikow]].[^49]
 [[Steve Clemons]] wrote on October 27, 2005 that Scowcroft was not asked by the President to return to the board when his term expired at the end of 2004, that most had assumed he would continue as chairman, and that at a gathering at the home of Brzezinski just after the New Year Scowcroft reportedly said: "I just got fired." Clemons wrote that on January 6 Scowcroft spoke with Brzezinski at the [[New America Foundation]].[^50] [[Jeffrey Goldberg]] published "Breaking Ranks: What Turned Brent Scowcroft Against the Bush Administration?" in The New Yorker of October 31, 2005, in which Scowcroft described his objections to the administration's Iraq policy; Goldberg's article also drew on an interview with George H.W. Bush.[^51] [[Robert Bryce]] wrote in Salon on November 17, 2005 that Bush had dismissed Scowcroft from the chairmanship about a year earlier because of his criticism of the decision to invade Iraq.[^52]
 On October 27, 2005 the White House announced that Stephen Friedman would be appointed to the board for a term beginning on December 20, 2005, and that he would be designated its chairman upon appointment. The announcement also named Hunt, [[Donald Evans]], [[Arthur B. Culvahouse]], [[William O. DeWitt Jr.]], [[Lee Hamilton]] and others as members.[^53]
 ### The Scowcroft Group
 The Scowcroft Group states that it was founded in 1994 by Scowcroft and is an international business advisory firm that has served US and multinational firms in a variety of sectors.[^4] Its services include geopolitical risk, sanctions and export controls, energy and resource security and scenario planning, and it lists partnerships with Fulcrum Macro Advisors, Vriens & Partners and McLarty Associates.[^54]
 ### Aspen Strategy Group roster, 2016
 On August 8, 2016 [[Tom Pritzker]] wrote to [[Jeffrey Epstein]] that he had just finished a presentation on leadership to the "grand pooh baahs of Aspen Strategy Group." Epstein asked "who attends," and Pritzker replied: "You have to be a bit of a wonk to know some of the names, but Nye, Scowcroft and [[Nicholas Burns|Nick Burns]] run it (Scowcroft being replaced by [[Condoleezza Rice|Condi]])." The message lists members including [[David Petraeus]], [[Madeleine Albright]], [[Stephen Hadley]], [[Jake Sullivan]], [[William Burns|Bill Burns]] and [[John Sawers]] (MI6).[^55]
 ### Footnotes
-[^1]: Gonzalez, Henry B. "Kissinger Associates, Scowcroft, Eagleburger, Stoga, Iraq, and BNL," *Congressional Record,* House, April 28, 1992, pp. H2694-H2701.
+[^1]: Brookings Institution, "Remembering Brent Scowcroft: A True National Security Maverick," which states that he served two presidents, Gerald Ford and George H. W. Bush, after a career in the United States Air Force. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/remembering-brent-scowcroft-a-true-national-security-maverick
-[^2]: Lacey, Frederick B. "The Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Investigation: Report of the Independent Counsel," reproduced in House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Serial No. 103-95, pp. 514-15.
+[^2]: Atlantic Council, "The Passing of Brent Scowcroft: March 19, 1925 - August 6, 2020," press release. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/press-releases/the-passing-of-brent-scowcroft-march-19-1925-august-6-2020/
-[^3]: Friedman, Alan. *Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq*. Bantam, 1993, pp. 153-156, 162, 192, 216, 221.
+[^3]: The Scowcroft Group, "General Scowcroft" (national security adviser to both Presidents Ford and Bush; vice chairman of Kissinger Associates 1982 to 1989; twenty-nine-year military career; the President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control, the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, the President's Special Review Board; chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board). https://www.scowcroft.com/generalscowcroft
 [^4]: The Scowcroft Group, "Our Firm" ("Founded in 1994 by General Brent Scowcroft"). https://www.scowcroft.com/ourfirm
 [^5]: Gonzalez, Henry B. "Kissinger Associates, Scowcroft, Eagleburger, Stoga, Iraq, and BNL," *Congressional Record,* House, April 28, 1992, p. H2695 (Belgrade air attache, academia 1962 to 1968, Department of Defense posts, 1971 military aide, 1973 deputy to Kissinger). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm
 [^6]: *The Tower Commission Report: The Full Text of the President's Special Review Board* (1987), introduction by R. W. Apple Jr. https://archive.org/details/towercommission00unit
 [^7]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, Document 269, memorandum for the record by Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, October 26, 1973, Washington, October 24/25, 1973, with editorial notes citing Cline, "Policy Without Intelligence," *Foreign Policy*, no. 17 (Winter 1974-1975), p. 128. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25/d269
 [^8]: Gonzalez, *Congressional Record*, April 28, 1992, p. H2695 (Scowcroft often took charge of the National Security Council while Kissinger was Secretary of State; succeeded Kissinger as national security adviser in 1975). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm
 [^9]: Memorandum of conversation, May 27, 1975, Ford, Schlesinger, Colby, Rumsfeld, Ingersoll and Scowcroft. National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 12, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. The memorandum is partly declassified. https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1553088.pdf
 [^10]: "The President's News Conference," November 3, 1975, statement on personnel changes in the administration. The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-60
 [^11]: *The Tower Commission Report* (1987), the report's historical summary of the National Security Advisor's role under President Ford. https://archive.org/details/towercommission00unit
 [^12]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. E-11, part 1, Document 263, memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to Vice President Rockefeller, "Call on Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza, Tuesday, April 20, 1976," Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Latin American Affairs Staff Files, Box 14. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p1/d263
 [^13]: Gonzalez, *Congressional Record*, April 28, 1992, p. H2695 (resigned the post during the Carter administration; member of the President's general advisory committee on arms control). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm
 [^14]: Gonzalez, *Congressional Record*, April 28, 1992, p. H2695 (joined Kissinger in setting up Kissinger Associates in 1982; vice chairman and head of the Washington office until January 1989). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm
 [^15]: Lacey, Frederick B. "The Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Investigation: Report of the Independent Counsel," reproduced in U.S. House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, *Testimony of Former Employees of the BNL*, Serial No. 103-95 (1994), pp. 514-515. https://archive.org/details/testimonyofforme1994unit
 [^16]: Gonzalez, *Congressional Record*, April 28, 1992, p. H2694 (quoting the denials of Kissinger, Scowcroft and Eagleburger and the statement "I offer no definitive proof that they were aware of the BNL loans"). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm
 [^17]: Gonzalez, *Congressional Record*, April 28, 1992, p. H2696 (BNL account, three board briefings between 1986 and 1989, and the BNL president's meeting with Kissinger and Scowcroft in New York). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm
 [^18]: Gonzalez, *Congressional Record*, April 28, 1992, p. H2698 (1987 New York meeting as reported by Gonzalez from a former head of BNL's American operations; lunch taken by Stoga and Scowcroft). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm
 [^19]: Gonzalez, *Congressional Record*, April 28, 1992, p. H2699 (quoted sentences on BNL's client relationship and "hefty fees"). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm
 [^20]: Luigi Sardelli, written responses to Chairman Gonzalez's questions, in U.S. House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, *Testimony of Former Employees of the BNL*, Serial No. 103-95 (1994), p. 164. https://archive.org/details/testimonyofforme1994unit
 [^21]: Ronald Reagan, "Statement Announcing the Establishment and Membership of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, and Designation of Chairman and Vice Chairman," January 3, 1983, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/statement-announcing-establishment-and-membership-presidents-commission-strategic
 [^22]: Executive Order 12400, "President's Commission on Strategic Forces," January 3, 1983, sections 1 to 4, *Federal Register*, vol. 48, no. 3 (January 5, 1983), pp. 381-382. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1983-01-05/pdf/FR-1983-01-05.pdf
 [^23]: Ronald Reagan, "Remarks Endorsing the Recommendations in the Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces," April 19, 1983, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/41983a
 [^24]: Ronald Reagan, "Statement on the Final Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces," April 9, 1984, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/statement-final-report-presidents-commission-strategic-forces
 [^25]: Council on Foreign Relations, Annual Report, July 1, 1984 to June 30, 1985 (New York, 1985): Officers and Directors; Membership Committee; Nominating Committee; former National Security Advisers session; Krepon, *Strategic Stalemate*. CIA CREST copy, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00806r000100210066-5
 [^26]: *The Tower Commission Report* (1987), title page (John Tower, chairman; Edmund Muskie and Brent Scowcroft, members) and Apple introduction. https://archive.org/details/towercommission00unit
 [^27]: National Security Directive 26, "U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf," October 2, 1989, signed by George Bush, sections "Arms Sales," "Iraq" and "Iran," declassified, George H.W. Bush Presidential Library. https://web.archive.org/web/2022/https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/nsd/nsd26.pdf
 [^28]: Gonzalez, Henry B. Remarks on Commodity Credit Corporation credits for Iraq and NSD-26, *Congressional Record*, House, March 2, 1992, p. H863. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920302g.htm
 [^29]: *Congressional Record*, House, March 2, 1992, p. H867, State Department "Talking Points for NAC Deputies Meeting, November 8, 1989," reproduced in Gonzalez's remarks. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920302g.htm
 [^30]: Gonzalez, *Congressional Record*, April 28, 1992, pp. H2696-H2697 (late 1989 $1 billion allocation and NSC direction; second $500 million installment). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm
 [^31]: Gonzalez, *Congressional Record*, April 28, 1992, p. H2697, quoting a State Department memorandum of March 5, 1990. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm
 [^32]: Gonzalez, Henry B. Remarks on the USDA review and the NSC, *Congressional Record*, House, March 16, 1992, p. H1278 (USDA background memorandum to Scowcroft before the May 1990 NSC meeting; Treasury Department memorandum of May 25, 1990). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920316g.htm
 [^33]: Gonzalez, Henry B. Special order on BNL, *Congressional Record*, House, May 18, 1992, pp. H3367-H3368 (list of White House and NSC staff; recusal question; "So the White House and NSC, armed with National Security Directive 26, sprang into action"). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920518g.htm
 [^34]: Gonzalez, *Congressional Record*, May 18, 1992, pp. H3373-H3374 (letters of October 1, 1991, November 1, 1991 and April 29, 1992). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920518g.htm
 [^35]: Gonzalez, Henry B. Remarks on the NSC legal group, *Congressional Record*, House, March 16, 1992, pp. H1274-H1275 (Rostow meeting in April 1991; "Rostow gang"). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920316g.htm
 [^36]: Gonzalez, *Congressional Record*, May 18, 1992, p. H3367 (letter to President Bush of May 2, 1991). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920518g.htm
 [^37]: Lacey, "The Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Investigation: Report of the Independent Counsel," in Serial No. 103-95, p. 598 (memorandum from Nicholas Rostow to Brent Scowcroft, February 8, 1991, Lacey Ex.). https://archive.org/details/testimonyofforme1994unit
 [^38]: Friedman, Alan. *Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq* (Bantam, 1993), pp. 153-156, 162, 192, 216, 221.
 [^39]: Memorandum of conversation, LTG Brent Scowcroft, Deng Xiaoping et al., Great Hall of the People, July 2, 1989, George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, in "U.S. Government Documents Following Tiananmen Square Crackdown" (compilation pp. 19-32), published by ChinaFile. https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6184537/U-S-Government-Documents-Following-Tiananmen.pdf
 [^40]: Toast of Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, December 9, 1989; memorandum of conversation, working luncheon, Diaoyutai State Guesthouse, December 10, 1989; memorandum of conversation, Premier Li Peng and General Scowcroft, December 10, 1989, Beijing, George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, in the same compilation. https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6184537/U-S-Government-Documents-Following-Tiananmen.pdf
 [^41]: Memorandum of telephone conversation, Bush and King Hussein of Jordan, July 28, 1990, Kennebunkport, George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, Memcons and Telcons. https://web.archive.org/web/20221024145017/https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1990-07-28--Hussein%20I.pdf
 [^42]: Memorandum of telephone conversation, Bush, King Hussein and President Mubarak, August 2, 1990, aboard Air Force One, George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, Memcons and Telcons. https://web.archive.org/web/20221024145017/https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1990-08-02--Hussein%20I.pdf
 [^43]: Memorandum of conversation, telephone call to Prime Minister Thatcher, August 3, 1990, Oval Office, 3:03 to 3:10 p.m., George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, Memcons and Telcons. https://web.archive.org/web/20221024145017/https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1990-08-03--Thatcher.pdf
 [^44]: Pfiffner, James P. "Presidential Policy-Making and the Gulf War," chapter 1 in Marcia Lynn Whicker, James P. Pfiffner and Raymond A. Moore, eds., *The Presidency and the Persian Gulf War* (Praeger, 1993), section "The Decision to Commit U.S. Troops."
 [^45]: Pfiffner, "Presidential Policy-Making and the Gulf War," note 4, citing Andrew Rosenthal, "Scowcroft and Gates: A Team Rivals Baker," *New York Times*, February 21, 1991, p. A14.
 [^46]: Pfiffner, "Presidential Policy-Making and the Gulf War," chapter 1 (late September 1990 meeting of Powell, Cheney, Bush and Scowcroft).
 [^47]: "Top Republicans Break With Bush on Iraq Strategy," news report of August 16, 2002 quoting Scowcroft's essay in the *Wall Street Journal*, reproduced on the World Systems Network list. https://wsarch.ucr.edu/wsnmail/2002/msg00949.html
 [^48]: "Brent Scowcroft is Wrong: We Must Attack Saddam," Middle East Forum, August 20, 2002, identifying the essay as "Don't Attack Saddam" in the *Wall Street Journal* "on Thursday." https://www.meforum.org/brent-scowcroft-is-wrong-we-must-attack-saddam
 [^49]: White House, "Personnel Announcement," October 5, 2001, members of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, including "Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft who will serve as Chairman." https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011005-8.html
 [^50]: Clemons, Steve. "Stephen Friedman Named to Chair President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," The Washington Note, October 27, 2005. https://washingtonnote.com/stephen_friedma/
 [^51]: Goldberg, Jeffrey. "Breaking Ranks: What Turned Brent Scowcroft Against the Bush Administration?," *The New Yorker*, October 31, 2005, as excerpted in Clemons, Steve. "Brent Scowcroft 'Breaks Ranks' with George W. Bush in Major New Yorker Article," The Washington Note, October 23, 2005. https://washingtonnote.com/brent_scowcroft_2/
 [^52]: Bryce, Robert. "Top-secret cronies," *Salon*, November 17, 2005. https://www.salon.com/2005/11/17/pfiab/
 [^53]: White House, "Personnel Announcement," October 27, 2005, members of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Stephen Friedman designated chairman, term beginning December 20, 2005. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051027-7.html
 [^54]: The Scowcroft Group, "What We Offer" and "Our Firm" (partnerships). https://www.scowcroft.com/whatwedo
 [^55]: U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Library, EFTA01783338, DataSet 10, email exchange between Tom Pritzker and Jeffrey Epstein, August 8, 2016. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2010/EFTA01783338.pdf
--- a/PEOPLE/(N-S)/James
+++ b/PEOPLE/(N-S)/James
@ -2,17 +2,36 @@
 category: "Intelligence & Government"
 aliases:
  - "James Schlesinger"
  - "James A. Schlesinger"
  - "James Rodney Schlesinger"
 tags:
  - Person
  - CIA
  - Nuclear
  - DepartmentOfDefense
  - DepartmentOfEnergy
  - FamilyJewels
-summary: "Economist who chaired the Atomic Energy Commission, directed the CIA in 1973 and ordered the Family Jewels compilation, and served as Secretary of Defense and the first Secretary of Energy."
+  - RAND
  - Watergate
  - Stargate
  - AbuGhraib
 summary: "Economist and RAND strategist who chaired the Atomic Energy Commission, directed the CIA in 1973 and ordered the Family Jewels compilation, then served as Secretary of Defense and the first Secretary of Energy."
 born: 1929-02-15
 died: 2014-03-27
 location: "New York City, New York"
 relations:
  - type: employed_by
    with: "[[RAND Corporation]]"
    role: "senior staff member, later Director of Strategic Studies"
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    end: 1969
    fn: 1
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    role: "assistant director"
    start: 1969
    end: 1971
    fn: 1
  - type: head_of
    with: "[[Atomic Energy Commission]]"
    role: "chairman"
@ -24,39 +43,164 @@ relations:
    role: "Director of Central Intelligence"
    start: 1973-02-02
    end: 1973-07-02
-    fn: 2
+    fn: 3
  - type: participant_in
    with: "[[CIA Family Jewels]]"
    role: "ordered the compilation by memorandum of May 9, 1973"
    start: 1973-05-09
    end: 1973-09
    fn: 11
  - type: head_of
    with: "[[Department of Defense]]"
    role: "Secretary of Defense"
-    start: 1973-07
+    start: 1973-07-02
-    end: 1975-11
+    end: 1975-11-19
-    fn: 1
+    fn: 3
  - type: head_of
    with: "[[Department of Energy]]"
    role: "first Secretary of Energy"
    start: 1977-08-06
    end: 1979-08-23
-    fn: 1
+    fn: 2
  - type: employed_by
    with: "[[Lehman Brothers]]"
    role: "senior adviser"
    start: 1979
    fn: 4
  - type: director_of
    with: "[[MITRE Corporation]]"
    role: "chairman of the board"
    fn: 38
  - type: member_of
    with: "[[Defense Policy Board]]"
    role: "member"
    fn: 38
  - type: participant_in
    with: "[[Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations]]"
    role: "chairman"
    start: 2004-05-12
    end: 2004-08-24
    fn: 29
  - type: participant_in
    with: "[[Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management]]"
    role: "chairman"
    start: 2008-09
    end: 2008-12
    fn: 36
 created: 2025-08-05
-updated: 2026-09-22
+updated: 2026-10-12
 ---
-James R. Schlesinger was born in New York City on February 15, 1929, and took a doctorate at Harvard in 1956. He chaired the [[Atomic Energy Commission]] from 1971 to 1973, directed the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] in 1973, was Secretary of Defense from 1973 to 1975, and after serving as an assistant to President [[Jimmy Carter]] was confirmed on August 4, 1977, as the first Secretary of Energy, holding the office from August 6, 1977, to August 23, 1979.[^1]
+James Rodney Schlesinger (February 15, 1929 to March 27, 2014) was an economist and nuclear strategist who chaired the [[Atomic Energy Commission]] from 1971 to 1973, directed the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] from February 2 to July 2, 1973, served as [[Department of Defense|Secretary of Defense]] from July 2, 1973, to November 19, 1975, and was the first [[Department of Energy|Secretary of Energy]], from August 6, 1977, to August 23, 1979.[^1][^2][^3]
 ### Academic work and RAND
 Schlesinger was born in New York City. He took his bachelor's, master's and doctoral degrees at [[Harvard University]] (1950, 1952 and 1956), taught economics at the [[University of Virginia]] from 1956 to 1963, and was a consultant to the [[Federal Reserve Board]] and to the [[RAND Corporation]] during part of that period. He was academic consultant in economics to the [[Naval War College]] in 1957, and his lectures there were published in 1960 as *The Political Economy of National Security*.[^1]
 From 1963 to 1969 he was a senior staff member at RAND in Santa Monica, California, and later its director of strategic studies, where he worked on strategic analysis "with particular reference to nuclear weaponry."[^1][^4]
 ### Budget Bureau and Atomic Energy Commission
 In 1969 [[Richard Nixon]] appointed him assistant director of the [[Bureau of the Budget]]. He later became assistant director of the [[Office of Management and Budget]] and served as acting director during the transition between the two agencies. His responsibilities included national security and international programs, the Budget Bureau's place on the [[Environmental Quality Council]] and the [[National Space Council]], and its representation on several [[National Security Council]] committees.[^1][^4]
 He chaired the Atomic Energy Commission from 1971 to 1973 and headed the United States delegation to the sixteenth General Conference of the [[International Atomic Energy Agency]].[^1]
 ### Director of Central Intelligence
-Schlesinger was Director of Central Intelligence from February 2 to July 2, 1973. On May 9, 1973, he signed a memorandum, drafted by [[William Colby]], ordering senior officers to report any current or past activities "which might be construed to be outside the legislative charter of this Agency"; the replies became the 693-page compilation known as the [[CIA Family Jewels|Family Jewels]], which passed to Colby when he succeeded Schlesinger.[^2][^3] In the same weeks the question of the agency's parapsychology research at [[SRI International|SRI]] reached him; [[Kenneth A. Kress]] wrote that he "was soon told not to increase the scope of the project. The project was too sensitive and potentially embarrassing. It should be tabled."[^4] Testifying about [[Watergate]], [[James McCord]] said his lawyer, Gerald Alch, had proposed a defense under which the agency would supply a recall-to-duty record and that "the new Director, Dr. Schlesinger, 'would go along with it'"; Alch denied it.[^5]
+[[Richard Helms]] resigned as Director of Central Intelligence on February 2, 1973, the day Schlesinger was sworn in. The President had appointed Schlesinger on December 21, 1972, and the Senate confirmed him on January 23, 1973.[^5] Schlesinger served until July 2, 1973, when he became Secretary of Defense. Lieutenant General [[Vernon A. Walters]], the deputy director, was acting director from July 2 to September 4, 1973, when [[William Colby]] (deputy director for operations from March 2 to August 24, 1973) became director.[^3] Colby later estimated, in his memoirs, that under Schlesinger's purge about 7 percent of the agency's staff were "fired or were forced to resign or retired."[^6]
 The historian [[David S. Robarge]], writing in [[Studies in Intelligence]], listed Schlesinger among six directors he classed as "manager-reformer outsiders," and recorded that at 43 he was the youngest of the directors he surveyed.[^7] Robarge wrote that when directors tried to "clean house" (Schlesinger and [[Stansfield Turner]]), the result was "administrative disarray and low morale," and that Schlesinger and Turner "facilitated the departure of hundreds of clandestine services veterans."[^7] Robarge also recorded that Schlesinger told veteran [[John McMahon]] and his superior, [[Carl Duckett]], that he had just appointed McMahon to head the [[Office of Technical Service]]. When Duckett suggested that McMahon start on the first of the month, Schlesinger answered, "How about at 10:00?"[^7]
 The [[House Committee on Armed Services]] special subcommittee on intelligence opened its inquiry into the agency's role in the [[Watergate]] scandal and the [[Daniel Ellsberg|Ellsberg]] matter on May 11, 1973, and issued its report on October 23, 1973.[^8] The report states that in February 1973 "Mr. Dean" called Schlesinger to ask whether the CIA could recover from the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] the file material the agency had given the Justice Department about its contact with [[Howard Hunt|E. Howard Hunt]], and that "This was not done."[^8] The report described a view of the agency's assistance to Hunt as "the better view, although charitable," which it said was "probably expressed by" Schlesinger, and gave the words: "The Agency was insufficiently cautious in the initiation of assistance to Hunt."[^9] The report also recorded the account given by [[James McCord]] of a meeting with his lawyer, [[Gerald Alch]], at which Alch proposed a CIA defense in which McCord's records would be doctored to show a recall to duty, and that "the new Director, Dr. Schlesinger, 'would go along with it.'" The report records that Alch disputed McCord's version "in the strongest of terms."[^10]
 On May 9, 1973, Schlesinger signed a memorandum, drafted by deputy director for operations William Colby, calling on senior officers to report any current or past activities "which might be construed to be outside the legislative charter of this Agency."[^11] Schlesinger issued the directive after learning that Hunt and James McCord, both veteran CIA officers, had received cooperation from the agency as they carried out "dirty tricks" for President Nixon.[^11] The replies were compiled into a 693-page file, the [[CIA Family Jewels|Family Jewels]], which passed to Colby when he succeeded Schlesinger. The file was declassified in June 2007.[^12]
 On January 3, 1975, Colby briefed [[Gerald R. Ford]] on the file, describing the compilation as the agency's "skeletons," including surveillance of student radicals, illegal wiretaps, assassination plots, and the confinement of a Soviet defector for three years.[^13] On February 20, 1975, Cabinet and sub-cabinet officials led by [[Henry A. Kissinger]], with Schlesinger and Colby present, discussed ways to protect information sought by the [[Church Committee]] and the House [[Pike Committee]] investigations.[^14]
 The agency's contract for parapsychology research at [[SRI International]] reached Schlesinger in the spring of 1973. A new contract continuing and expanding the work went from the Office of Technical Service and the [[Office of Research and Development]] to Colby in April 1973 and was referred to the [[Executive Management Committee]]. [[Kenneth A. Kress]], the project officer, wrote in his 1977 study for Studies in Intelligence that an approval memorandum was written "for the signature of the DCI, then Dr. James Schlesinger," that Colby "took the memorandum to the DCI a few days later," and that he was "soon told not to increase the scope of the project and not to anticipate any follow-on in this area. The project was too sensitive and potentially embarrassing. It should be tabled."[^15] Kress added that the Office of Technical Service was then being investigated for involvement in Watergate and that in May 1973 the DCI had issued his memorandum asking employees to report improper activities.[^15] An Office of Technical Service memorandum for the record of November 17, 1977, prepared for a briefing of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, gives the same chronology: in March 1973 a third subject, [[Pat Price]], "is discovered with an apparent ability for 'remote viewing,'" and in May 1973 "The contract is finally sent to the DCI (Schlesinger) who decides to allow the existing contract to be completed without a follow-on." The memorandum continues that an informal SRI experiment with a scientist of the Office of Scientific Intelligence uncovered classified information about a military site and convinced "the new DCI (Colby) to renew work on ESP."[^16]
 ### Secretary of Defense
-During the [[Yom Kippur War]] of 1973, [[Henry A. Kissinger]] told Schlesinger that his goal was to "let [[Israel]] come out ahead, but bleed." Schlesinger noted that Israel's ammunition consumption had been gauged for a seven-day war, and concluded from Kissinger's sudden push for resupply that Israeli use of a nuclear weapon was not out of the question.[^6] After the *[[Glomar Explorer]]* operation leaked in March 1975, Schlesinger recommended at the [[White House]] acknowledging the "bare facts"; President [[Gerald R. Ford]] took Colby's advice instead.[^7] In November 1975 Ford removed both Colby and Schlesinger in the same announcement.[^3]
+Schlesinger moved from the agency to the [[Pentagon]] as Secretary of Defense on July 2, 1973, after about five months as director.[^3][^4]
 During the [[Yom Kippur War]] of 1973, [[Seymour Hersh]] wrote in *[[The Samson Option]]* (1991) that Kissinger made no secret of his strategy, telling Schlesinger that his goal was to "let [[Israel]] come out ahead, but bleed."[^17] In the same book Hersh quoted Schlesinger, whom he interviewed on April 25, 1989: "Israel's [ammunition] consumption rate was gauged for a seven-day war," but "Kissinger just turned around totally. He got a little hysterical" in urging an immediate and massive resupply, and "Henry seemed to be more concerned than I was over the possibility of a nuclear exchange" in the Middle East. Schlesinger added: "From where we sat, there was an assumption that Israel had a few nukes and that if there was a collapse, there was a possibility that Israel would use them." Hersh wrote that Colby, then director of the CIA, shared the assumption: "We were afraid Israel might go for broke."[^18]
 The claim that Schlesinger told the military not to act on White House orders, particularly on nuclear matters, in the last days of the Nixon presidency rests on an account that [[Stanley I. Kutler]] traced to an unnamed "senior Pentagon official." As Kutler summarized it, Schlesinger asked General [[George S. Brown]], Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to monitor all orders from any source to military units, because Nixon or his aides might reach units outside Pentagon channels, and the account says Schlesinger supposedly prepared plans to deploy troops in Washington if there were anything but a peaceful succession.[^19] In an essay in [[The American Interest]] of January 12, 2018, [[Larry Diamond]] wrote that Schlesinger "reportedly told the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff not to follow any presidential orders to the military without checking with Schlesinger first," and quoted the historian [[Gil Troy]] calling the act "the most patriotic act of treason in American history."[^20] Kutler wrote in the [[History News Network]] in 2014 that, "as far as can be determined, such information emanated from Schlesinger himself," and that there are "no corroborating documents." He described a message from Brown on August 8, 1974, advising increased vigilance to commanders, and two messages on August 9, 1974, sent over Schlesinger's name, one of which conveyed the remarks of the new president, Ford. Kutler called both August 9 messages "boilerplate," and quoted [[Thomas H. Moorer]], a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, calling Schlesinger's communiqué "ridiculous."[^19] Haig, Nixon's chief of staff, later told senators, in Kutler's quotation, "There were no tanks. No troops were drawn up."[^19]
 The National Security Council met four times on the seizure of the [[SS Mayaguez]] by Cambodian forces, and the minutes list Schlesinger as a principal at each meeting. On May 12, 1975 (12:05 to 12:50 p.m.), he told Gerald R. Ford the options: "We can have a passive stance or we can be active. We can do such things as seizing Cambodian assets. We can assemble forces. We could seize a small island as a hostage. We might also consider a blockade," and when [[Donald Rumsfeld]] asked "Isn't this piracy?" he answered "Yes."[^21] On May 13 he described the force options (Marines and helicopters at Utapao, and the carrier [[USS Coral Sea]]) and the minutes record an exchange with Vice President [[Nelson Rockefeller]] over where the ship was.[^22] On May 14, after General [[David C. Jones]] recommended landing on the island and on the ship, Schlesinger asked "How about a local ultimatum?" and Kissinger answered that the action should not depend on one.[^23] At the meeting of May 15, 1975 (4:02 to 4:20 p.m.), held after the recovery, Schlesinger corrected the number of aircraft used ("Not the 81 that had been on the carrier") and Ford asked him for "a full factual report giving a summary and chronology of what happened."[^24]
 On May 27, 1975, Ford met with Schlesinger, Colby, Donald Rumsfeld, [[Robert Ingersoll]] and [[Brent Scowcroft]] about a Seymour Hersh article on American submarines operating off Soviet waters. The memorandum of conversation records Ford saying, "Somehow someone must be made an example of." Schlesinger called the disclosure "a flagrant violation" of the law, said he had spoken to the Attorney General the month before, and stated that "There is some indication that Hersh has files of signals intelligence material." He then asked, "How about a search warrant to get them?"[^25]
 On March 19, 1975, the day front-page stories revealed that [[Howard Hughes]]'s *[[Glomar Explorer]]* had recovered part of a sunken Soviet submarine in an operation led by the CIA, Ford met in the Cabinet Room of the [[White House]] with Schlesinger, Colby, [[Philip Buchen]], [[John O. Marsh Jr.]], Rumsfeld and Scowcroft (11:20 a.m. to 12:25 p.m.). Schlesinger called the operation "a major American accomplishment" and "a marvel, technically, and with maintaining secrecy," and advised: "If we don't confirm the mission details, acknowledge the bare facts. It has been confirmed privately by Colby. There is no plausible denial story, so 'no comment' will be taken as a confirmation. If we move now we can take the high ground, if not we will be pilloried." He offered to make the statement himself. Colby answered, "I go back to the U-2. I think we should not put the Soviet Union under such pressure to respond." The volume editors record that no statement by Schlesinger or Ford was found and that the press reported the administration refused to comment.[^26] President Ford took Colby's advice instead.[^27]
 On November 3, 1975, Ford announced that he intended to nominate Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense, and thanked Schlesinger "for his able service" as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Director of the CIA, and Secretary of Defense. Asked why Schlesinger and Colby did not fit on the new team, Ford answered, "I think any President has to have the opportunity to put together his own team." Asked about reports of conflict between Schlesinger and Kissinger over détente, he said, "There were no basic differences."[^28]
 ### Secretary of Energy
 [[Jimmy Carter]] appointed Schlesinger his special adviser on energy in January 1977.[^4] He was confirmed as the first Secretary of Energy on August 4, 1977, and served from August 6, 1977, to August 23, 1979.[^2]
 ### Later career
 After leaving the Energy Department he became senior adviser to [[Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb]] in New York.[^4] He served on the [[President's Commission on Strategic Forces]] from 1982 to 1983, was vice chairman of the [[President's Blue Ribbon Task Group on Nuclear Weapons Program Management]] from 1984 to 1985, was a member of the [[U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century]] from 1998 to 2001, and sat on the [[Panel to Assess the Reliability, Safety, and Security of the U.S. Nuclear Stockpile]] from 1999 to 2003.[^4] He co-chaired a [[Defense Science Board]] task force on the future of the [[Global Positioning System]].[^4]
 ### Independent Panel on DoD detention operations (2004)
 The Secretary of Defense chartered the [[Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations]] on May 12, 2004, to review Department of Defense investigations into detention operations and to advise on their causes and corrective measures.[^29] Schlesinger chaired the panel, whose members were [[Harold Brown]], [[Tillie Fowler]] and [[Charles Horner]], with [[James A. Blackwell Jr.]] as executive director. The report is dated August 24, 2004, and is addressed to Rumsfeld.[^29]
 The panel found that "the most egregious instances of detainee abuse were caused by the aberrant behavior of a limited number of soldiers and the predilections of the non-commissioned officers on the night shift of Tier 1 at Abu Ghraib," and that commanding officers and staffs "at various levels failed in their duties," adding that "Military and civilian leaders at the Department of Defense share this burden of responsibility" (p. 43). It stated that "the weak and ineffectual leadership of the Commanding General of the 800th MP Brigade and the Commanding Officer of the 205th MI Brigade allowed the abuses at [[Abu Ghraib]]," and found no evidence that organizations above those two brigades "were directly involved in the incidents at Abu Ghraib" (p. 43).[^30]
 On policy, the report recounts the Secretary of Defense decision of December 2, 2002, authorizing "as a matter of policy" Category I and II techniques and one Category III technique, rescinded after concern from the Navy General Counsel, and states that the legal resources of the Services' judge advocates and general counsels "were not utilized to their fullest potential" (pp. 35-36). It found that "pressure for additional intelligence and the more aggressive methods sanctioned by the Secretary of Defense memorandum resulted in stronger interrogation techniques" (p. 36), and that "Some individuals seized the opportunity provided by this environment to give vent to latent sadistic urges" while others "found themselves in uncharted ethical ground, with frequently changing guidance from above" (p. 29).[^31] Among the leaders who could have adjusted the detention plan after July 2003 it listed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and "the Office of the Secretary of Defense," and wrote, "In most cases these were errors of omission, but they were errors that should not go unnoted" (p. 47).[^32]
 On the CIA, the panel wrote: "CIA personnel conducted interrogations in DoD detention facilities... at Abu Ghraib the CIA was allowed to conduct its interrogations separately. No memorandum of understanding existed on interrogations operations between the CIA and CJTF-7, and the CIA was allowed to operate under different rules." It added, "We are aware of the issue of unregistered detainees, but the Panel did not have sufficient access to CIA information to make any determinations in this regard" (p. 70), and recommended that "Clearer guidelines for the interaction of CIA with the Department of Defense in detention and interrogation operations must be defined" (p. 91).[^33]
 On contractors, it stated: "Contractors were a particular problem at Abu Ghraib. The Army Inspector General found that 35 percent of the contractors employed did not receive formal training in military interrogation techniques, policy, or doctrine" (p. 69).[^34] On ghost detainees: "Secretary Rumsfeld publicly declared he directed one detainee be held secretly at the request of the Director of Central Intelligence" (p. 87).[^35]
 ### Nuclear weapons management task forces (2008)
 In June 2008 Secretary of Defense [[Robert Gates]] appointed the Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, a subcommittee of the [[Defense Policy Board]], with Schlesinger as chairman and [[Michael P. C. Carns]], [[J. D. Crouch II]], [[Jacques S. Gansler]], [[Edmund P. Giambastiani Jr.]], [[John J. Hamre]], [[Franklin C. Miller]] and [[Christopher A. Williams]] as members and James Blackwell as executive director, after the 2006 misshipment of intercontinental ballistic missile components to Taiwan and the 2007 unauthorized transfer of nuclear weapons from [[Minot Air Force Base]] to [[Barksdale Air Force Base]]. Its Phase I report, transmitted to Gates on September 12, 2008, found "an unambiguous, dramatic, and unacceptable decline in the Air Force's commitment to perform the nuclear mission" and that "Air Force leaders failed in their leadership responsibilities to shift priorities and adjust policies and resources in ways needed to maintain robust nuclear stewardship, resulting in the inattention that led to the Minot-Barksdale and Taiwan incidents" (Executive Summary, pp. 1-3). It listed five trends, including that "no one Command in the Air Force had 'ownership' of the nuclear mission," and made 33 recommendations.[^36] The Phase II report of December 2008 found that "the lack of interest in and attention to the nuclear mission and nuclear deterrence... go well beyond the Air Force," "widespread fragmentation, dispersal of responsibility, and weakening of authorities" in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and "a distressing degree of inattention to the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence among many senior DoD military and civilian leaders" (Executive Summary, pp. iii-v). It recommended an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Deterrence.[^37]
 ### Boards and advisory posts
 Schlesinger was chairman of the board of [[MITRE Corporation]], a member of the Defense Policy Board and of the [[International Security Advisory Board]], and a counselor and trustee of the [[Center for Strategic and International Studies]]. He chaired the [[National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing Advisory Board]] from 2007 until his death on March 27, 2014, while serving his fourth term as chairman.[^38]
 ### Footnotes
-[^1]: U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Legacy Management, "Secretaries of Energy." https://www.energy.gov/lm/secretaries-energy
+[^1]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Biography, James R. Schlesinger," reading room document CIA-RDP75B00380R000400150017-8, copy at https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75b00380r000400150017-8
-[^2]: Blanton, Thomas, ed. "The CIA's Family Jewels," National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 222, June 21, 2007, with Schlesinger's memorandum of May 9, 1973. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/index.htm
+[^2]: U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Legacy Management, "Secretaries of Energy," entry for James Schlesinger (confirmed August 4, 1977; term of office August 6, 1977 to August 23, 1979). https://www.energy.gov/lm/secretaries-energy
-[^3]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Family Jewels," CIA FOIA Reading Room, released 2007; Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA.* Doubleday, 2007, pp. 316-327.
+[^3]: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVIII, part 2, front matter, "Persons" (Schlesinger: "Director of Central Intelligence, February 2-July 2, 1973; Secretary of Defense, July 2, 1973-November 19, 1975"; Walters: "Acting Director of Central Intelligence, July 2, 1973-September 4, 1973"; Colby: "Director of Central Intelligence, September 4, 1973-January 30, 1976"). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v38p2/persons
-[^4]: Kress, Kenneth A. "Parapsychology in Intelligence: A Personal Review and Conclusions." *Studies in Intelligence,* vol. 21, no. 4, winter 1977, declassified.
+[^4]: Miller Center, University of Virginia, "James R. Schlesinger (1973-1974)," https://millercenter.org/node/1002; and "James R. Schlesinger (1977-1979)," https://millercenter.org/node/1152
-[^5]: House Committee on Armed Services, Special Subcommittee on Intelligence, report on the inquiry into the alleged involvement of the CIA in the Watergate and Ellsberg matters, October 23, 1973.
+[^5]: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. II, Document 284, editorial note (Schlesinger "sworn in on February 2, the same day that Helms resigned"). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v02/d284
-[^6]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy.* Random House, 1991, ch. 17.
+[^6]: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVIII, part 2, Document 2, editorial note quoting William Colby's memoirs on the staff reduction under Schlesinger. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v38p2/d2
-[^7]: Burr, William, ed. "Project Azorian: The CIA's Declassified History of the Glomar Explorer." National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 305, February 12, 2010.
+[^7]: David S. Robarge, survey of the Directors of Central Intelligence, 1946 to 2005, Studies in Intelligence, vol. 49, no. 3, CIA reading room document C05460742, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-16290853
 [^8]: House Committee on Armed Services, Special Subcommittee on Intelligence, "Inquiry into the Alleged Involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Watergate and Ellsberg Matters," report, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., October 23, 1973 (HASC No. 93-25), passage on the February 1973 call from Mr. Dean. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80b01495r000500030007-0
 [^9]: Same report, passage on the assistance to Hunt and Schlesinger's view of it.
 [^10]: Same report, passage on McCord's account of the meeting with Gerald Alch and Alch's denial.
 [^11]: National Security Archive, "The CIA's Family Jewels," Electronic Briefing Book No. 222, June 21, 2007, with the memorandum of May 9, 1973. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/index.htm
 [^12]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Family Jewels," compilation of 693 pages, declassified June 2007, full text PDF as posted by the National Security Archive. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/family_jewels_full_ocr.pdf
 [^13]: National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 222, Document 2, "Colby Briefs President Ford on the Family Jewels," memorandum of conversation, January 3, 1975, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/index.htm
 [^14]: National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 222, Document 4, "Investigations Continue," memorandum of conversation, "Investigations of Allegations of CIA Domestic Activities," February 20, 1975, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/index.htm
 [^15]: Kenneth A. Kress, "Parapsychology in Intelligence: A Personal Review and Conclusions," Studies in Intelligence, vol. 21, no. 4, winter 1977, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200030040-0. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00791r000200030040-0
 [^16]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Technical Service, Memorandum for the Record, OTS/BAB Memo #287-77, "Briefing for House Permanent Select Committee re OTS Involvement in ESP Research," November 17, 1977, CIA-RDP96-00787R000500170001-0. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00787r000500170001-0
 [^17]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Random House, 1991), p. 227. https://archive.org/details/Sampson_Option
 [^18]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, p. 230 (index entry "Schlesinger, James R., 227, 230"); the author's notes date the Schlesinger interview April 25, 1989, in Washington, and the Colby interview January 10, 1991.
 [^19]: Stanley I. Kutler, "The Fast One James Schlesinger Pulled on the Media," *History News Network*, April 2, 2014, summarizing an account attributed to an unnamed "senior Pentagon official." https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/155168
 [^20]: Larry Diamond, "Our Year of Living Dangerously," *The American Interest*, January 12, 2018, quoting Gil Troy. https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/01/12/year-living-dangerously
 [^21]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. X, Document 285, Minutes of National Security Council Meeting, May 12, 1975, 12:05 to 12:50 p.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d285
 [^22]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. X, Document 291, Minutes of National Security Council Meeting, May 13, 1975, 10:22 to 11:17 a.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d291
 [^23]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. X, Document 298, Minutes of National Security Council Meeting, May 14, 1975, 3:52 to 5:42 p.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d298
 [^24]: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. X, Document 301, "Minutes of National Security Council Meeting," May 15, 1975, 4:02 to 4:20 p.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d301
 [^25]: Memorandum of conversation, May 27, 1975, Ford, Schlesinger, Colby, Rumsfeld, Ingersoll and Scowcroft, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 12, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1553088.pdf (declassified in part)
 [^26]: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXV, Document 197, Memorandum of Conversation, "MATADOR Meeting," Washington, March 19, 1975, 11:20 a.m., with editorial notes citing Jack Nelson, "Administration Won't Talk About Sub Raised by CIA," Los Angeles Times, March 20, 1975, pp. A1, A14-A16. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v35/d197
 [^27]: Burr, William, ed. "Project Azorian: The CIA's Declassified History of the Glomar Explorer." National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 305, February 12, 2010. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB305/index.htm
 [^28]: Gerald R. Ford, "The President's News Conference," November 3, 1975, The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-60
 [^29]: Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, *Final Report*, August 2004, DTIC ADA428743, copy at https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA428743; cover letter of August 24, 2004, and Introduction ("Charter and Methodology"), p. 21.
 [^30]: Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, *Final Report*, August 2004, DTIC ADA428743, copy at https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA428743; "Command Responsibilities," pp. 43-47.
 [^31]: Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, *Final Report*, August 2004, DTIC ADA428743, copy at https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA428743; chapter on the Secretary of Defense policy decisions of December 2, 2002 and April 16, 2003, pp. 35-36, and "The Changing Threat," p. 29.
 [^32]: Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, *Final Report*, August 2004, DTIC ADA428743, copy at https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA428743; "Failure of the Combatant Command to Adjust the Plan," p. 47.
 [^33]: Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, *Final Report*, August 2004, DTIC ADA428743, copy at https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA428743; "Role of CIA," p. 70, and recommendation 8, p. 91.
 [^34]: Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, *Final Report*, August 2004, DTIC ADA428743, copy at https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA428743; "Use of Contractors as Interrogators," p. 69.
 [^35]: Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, *Final Report*, August 2004, DTIC ADA428743, copy at https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA428743; "The Role of the ICRC," p. 87.
 [^36]: Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, *Phase I: The Air Force's Nuclear Mission*, transmittal letter of September 12, 2008, Executive Summary pp. 1-4 and recommendations, DTIC ADA486299; the figure of 33 recommendations is stated in the Phase II Executive Summary, p. iii. https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA486299
 [^37]: Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, *Phase II: Review of the DoD Nuclear Mission*, December 2008, Executive Summary pp. iii-v, DTIC ADA492647. https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA492647
 [^38]: Global Positioning System, "James Schlesinger," advisory board member biography, archive.gps.gov (Advisory Board Chair, 2007 to 2014; death on March 27, 2014). https://archive.gps.gov/governance/advisory/members/schlesinger/
--- a/PEOPLE/(T-Z)/Charles
+++ b/PEOPLE/(T-Z)/Charles
@ -13,7 +13,12 @@ born: 1937-04-29
 died: 2025-03-05
 location: "Davis, California"
 created: 2026-09-22
-updated: 2026-10-09
+updated: 2026-10-12
 relations:
  - type: director_of
    with: "[[Monroe Institute]]"
    role: Board of Advisors (emeritus)
    fn: 8
 ---
 Charles T. Tart was born in Morrisville, [[Pennsylvania]], on April 29, 1937, "but grew up mostly in [[New Jersey]]," a teenage radio engineer who entered the engineering program at [[Massachusetts Institute of Technology|MIT]] and, "after several personal experiences" of drugs "that produced altered states of consciousness" and after reading [[J. B. Rhine]], "transferred from MIT to [[Duke University]] in order to meet and be mentored by Rhine." He took his doctorate in psychology at the University of North Carolina in 1963 on "post-hypnotic suggestions to influence dreaming," did post-doctoral work with [[Ernest Hilgard]] at [[Stanford University]], and served 28 years on the psychology faculty of the [[University of California, Davis]], holding concurrently a senior research fellowship at the [[Institute of Noetic Sciences]], the Bigelow Chair of Consciousness Studies at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, a visiting professorship at the California Institute of Integral Studies, and a post as "a consultant on government funded parapsychological research at the [[Stanford Research Institute]]." His *Altered States of Consciousness* appeared in 1969 and *Transpersonal Psychologies* in 1975; he was president of the Parapsychological Association. He died on March 5, 2025.[^1]
@ -24,8 +29,22 @@ A report entered as Plaintiff's Exhibit 7 in Puharich v. Brenner lists a Charles
 With Whitson, Bogart and [[John Palmer]] he published "Preliminary experiments in group 'remote viewing'" in the Proceedings of the IEEE in 1976. When [[David Marks]] and [[Richard Kammann]] argued in Nature in 1978 that cues in the transcripts explained the [[Pat Price]] series, [[Hal Puthoff]] and [[Russell Targ]] turned the nine transcripts over to "an independent research psychologist," Tart, "for rejudging on the basis of the criteria implied by the Marks-Kammann criticism." By his own account he first tested two candidate judges on transcripts from "another successful remote-viewing series," disqualifying the one who scored at chance, "edited them to delete all references that could conceivably give any indication as to the order of the experiments," and had the judge, [[Phyllis Matson]], rate each transcript at each site; "for seven of the nine target sites the highest correspondence rating was given to the correct transcript." "I would hypothesize that Marks and Kammann were unable to obtain significant results in their reanalysis of the subset of the Price series because their judges either lacked the necessary discriminative skills and/or were not sufficiently motivated to use them effectively." The Army's [[Grill Flame Scientific Evaluation Committee]] met "Mr. Targ/Dr. Puthoff/Dr. Tart" at SRI on July 24 and 25, 1979.[^3]
 ### Out-of-Body Studies with Robert Monroe
 Tart met [[Robert Monroe]] in the fall of 1965, when he took a research position at the [[University of Virginia]] Medical School. He wrote that Monroe came in for eight late-night sessions at the hospital's EEG laboratory from December 1965 to August 1966; the introduction Tart wrote for Monroe's *Journeys Out of the Body* dates the series to September 1965 through August 1966. In a session in which Monroe reported leaving his body, the technician's location in the corridor with a man later identified as her husband matched his account; Tart wrote in 1998 that this left "only weak evidence that Monroe was actually 'out'." After moving to the University of California, Davis, Tart and his wife concentrated one evening on guiding Monroe to their home at a random time, 11 P.M. Pacific, and Monroe reported being pulled from his body within a minute of the start; Tart wrote that the timing matched and the description of the home was poor. On a visit in 1968 Monroe had two brief experiences in Tart's sleep laboratory, monitored by EEG, eye movements and plethysmograph.[^4][^5] Tart's introduction to the book is dated Davis, California, January 10, 1971.[^5]
 An Army assessment of August 25, 1978 recorded that Tart "has conducted investigations of Monroe under laboratory conditions and is convinced of the validity of Monroe's experience" and "recently recommended that anyone wanting to learn about OOBE should contact MIAS."[^6] [[Frederick Atwater]], then project officer for [[Gondola Wish]], attended Tart's seminar on July 29, 1978, held while Tart was on leave from Davis as a consultant to Stanford Research Institute; Atwater's memorandum records that Tart told attendees the Soviets were far ahead in parapsychology, that US Government sponsored research was almost zero, that he had approached US Government officials on several occasions "but was discouraged," and that he referred them to the [[Monroe Institute]] of Applied Sciences.[^7]
 A biographical note to a December 16, 2009 interview calls Tart an emeritus member of the Monroe Institute's board of advisors, and the Institute's 2015 Professional Seminar carried a Skype question-and-answer with Tart on his friendship and collaboration with Monroe.[^8][^9]
 ### Footnotes
 [^1]: Schwartz, Stephan A. "Charles T. Tart Obituary, 29 April 1937 - 5 March 2025." Institut Metapsychique International, April 2025. https://www.metapsychique.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Tart-VO.pdf The obituary gives his age at death as 86, which its own dates do not support.
 [^2]: Plaintiff's Exhibit 7, Transcript of Record, Appendix, Puharich v. Brenner, No. 22286 (D.C. Cir.), section 8.80. https://archive.org/details/dc_circ_1968_22286_henry_k_puharich_v_edward_j_brenner
 [^3]: Puthoff, H. E., and Russell Targ, "Information Transmission in Remote Viewing Experiments: II," and Tart, Charles T., "Reanalysis of SRI Remote Viewing Experiments," January 1979, CIA-RDP96-00787R000200090017-5. *Report by the Grill Flame Scientific Evaluation Committee,* December 1979, CIA-RDP96-00788R001300120001-5; Stoner, William L., memorandum of conversation, January 14, 1980, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200230017-7; Jachim, Robert J., "Information Briefing for Senator Clairborne Pell," October 6, 1982, CIA-RDP96-00788R001100320001-5. Snyder, Harry L., and Arlene G. Snyder. *Summary and Critical Evaluation of Research in Remote Viewing,* Report RV-79-1, June 1, 1979, part 2, CIA-RDP96-00787R000100260003-2.
 [^4]: Tart, Charles T., "Six Studies of Out-of-Body Experiences," *Journal of Near-Death Studies* 17, no. 2 (1998): 73-99, pp. 83-90. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc799368/
 [^5]: Monroe, Robert A., *Journeys Out of the Body*, updated edition (Doubleday), Tart introduction dated January 10, 1971. https://archive.org/details/journeys_out_body
 [^6]: 902d Military Intelligence Group, GONDOLA WISH assessment report, August 25, 1978. CIA-RDP96-00788R002000160001-3, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^7]: 902d Military Intelligence Group, memorandum of July 31, 1978. CIA-RDP96-00788R002000160013-0, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^8]: Multidisciplinary Association for Psychedelic Studies, "Exploring the Near-Death Experience: An Interview with Charles Tart, Ph.D." https://maps.org/news/bulletin/exploring-the-near-death-experience-an-interview-with-charles-tart-ph-d/
 [^9]: The Monroe Institute, "2015 Professional Seminar: Charles Tart Remembers Robert Monroe." https://archive.org/details/2015-charles-tart
--- a/PEOPLE/(T-Z)/Donald
+++ b/PEOPLE/(T-Z)/Donald
@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 ---
 aliases:
  - Donald John Trump
  - Donald J. Trump
  - Trump
 category: "Political Figure"
 tags:
  - KeyFigure
@ -14,71 +16,250 @@ tags:
  - LeonardLeo
  - DarkMoney
  - FederalistSociety
-summary: "Donald Trump is the 45th and 47th President of the United States, whose administrations placed figures from the Peter Thiel, Leonard Leo and Jared Kushner networks in federal power and oversaw the Epstein file releases."
+  - JeffreyEpstein
  - EpsteinFilesTransparencyAct
  - SupremeCourt
  - RussiaInvestigation
  - UAP
  - RoyCohn
  - CambridgeAnalytica
 summary: "45th and 47th President of the United States, defended by Roy Cohn in the 1973 housing suit, whose administrations appointed Thiel, Leo and Kushner network figures and who signed the Epstein Files Act."
 born: 1946-06-14
 location: "Queens, New York City (born)"
 relations:
  - type: appointed
    with: "[[Neil Gorsuch]]"
    start: 2017-04-10
    fn: 1
  - type: appointed
    with: "[[Brett Kavanaugh]]"
    start: 2018-10-06
    fn: 1
  - type: appointed
    with: "[[Amy Coney Barrett]]"
    start: 2020-10-26
    fn: 1
  - type: appointed
    with: "[[Alexander Acosta]]"
    start: 2017-04-27
    fn: 1
  - type: appointed
    with: "[[Pam Bondi]]"
    start: 2025-02-04
    end: 2026-04-02
    fn: 34
  - type: appointed
    with: "[[Todd Blanche]]"
    start: 2026-04-02
    role: acting Attorney General
    fn: 34
  - type: appointed
    with: "[[Howard Lutnick]]"
    start: 2025-02
    fn: 34
  - type: appointed
    with: "[[David Sacks]]"
    start: 2024-12
    fn: 33
  - type: appointed
    with: "[[Jay Clayton]]"
    start: 2026-10-04
    role: White House AI czar
    fn: 33
  - type: represented
    with: "[[Todd Blanche]]"
    reverse: true
    start: 2023
    fn: 34
  - type: represented
    with: "[[Roy Cohn]]"
    reverse: true
    start: 1973
    role: defense counsel in United States v. Fred C. Trump, et al., No. 73 C 1529 (E.D.N.Y.)
    fn: 6
  - type: investigated
    with: "[[Robert Mueller]]"
    reverse: true
    start: 2017-05-17
    end: 2019-03-22
    fn: 21
  - type: employed_by
    with: "[[Steve Bannon]]"
    reverse: true
    start: 2016-08
    role: campaign chief executive
    fn: 14
  - type: relative_of
    with: "[[Jared Kushner]]"
    role: son-in-law
    fn: 28
  - type: spouse_of
    with: "[[Melania Trump]]"
    fn: 36
 created: 2026-06-18
 updated: 2026-10-12
 ---
-Donald Trump (born June 14, 1946) is the 45th and 47th [[President of the United States]], serving 2017-2021 and 2025-present. His two administrations functioned as the political vehicle through which the [[Peter Thiel|Peter Thiel]] commercial network ([[Palantir Technologies|Palantir]] contracting expansion, [[Clearview AI]] seed funding, [[Founders Fund]] defense portfolio), the [[Leonard Leo|Leonard Leo]] judicial-selection network (the [[Neil Gorsuch|Gorsuch]], [[Brett Kavanaugh|Kavanaugh]], [[Amy Coney Barrett|Barrett]] Supreme Court confirmations), and the [[Jared Kushner|Jared Kushner]] [[Middle East]] network ([[Abraham Accords|Abraham Accords]], U.S.-[[Saudi Arabia|Saudi Arabia]] arms sales, the documented [[Mohammed bin Salman|MBS]] WhatsApp channel) exercised documented federal power. Thiel spoke at the 2016 [[Republican National Convention|Republican National Convention]] endorsing Trump, served on the transition executive committee, and placed associates including [[Kevin Harrington|Kevin Harrington]] on the [[National Security Council|National Security Council]].[^1][^2][^3]
+Donald Trump (born June 14, 1946) is the 45th and 47th [[President of the United States]], serving from 2017 to 2021 and from 2025. His administrations appointed figures from the [[Peter Thiel|Peter Thiel]] commercial network, the [[Leonard Leo|Leonard Leo]] judicial-selection network and the [[Jared Kushner|Jared Kushner]] [[Middle East|Middle East]] network to federal office and contracts, and the second administration signed the [[Epstein Files Transparency Act|Epstein Files Transparency Act]] into law on November 19, 2025.[^1][^2]
-### The 2016 Thiel Endorsement and the Transition
+### New York and the Trump Organization
-Thiel endorsed Trump at the July 2016 Republican National Convention in [[Cleveland|Cleveland]], the first openly gay speaker at a Republican convention in sixteen years, and donated over one million dollars to Trump-supporting super PACs alongside the [[Mercer family|Mercer family]], the Republican donors who funded [[Breitbart|Breitbart]] and the [[Cambridge Analytica|Cambridge Analytica]] data operation. After the November 2016 election, Trump placed Thiel on the transition team's executive committee. Thiel used the position to place Harrington as Senior Director for Strategic Planning on the National Security Council and a Thiel aide as White House Deputy Chief Technology Officer. *Politico* reported that companies Thiel backed, especially Palantir, stood to benefit from the transition role.[^1][^2][^4]
+Trump was born in [[Queens, New York|Queens]], the son of the real estate developer [[Fred Trump|Fred C. Trump]], and became the chief executive of the [[Trump Organization|Trump Organization]] in New York. He later held casino and resort interests in [[Atlantic City, New Jersey|Atlantic City]]. He bought the [[Mar-a-Lago|Mar-a-Lago]] estate in [[Palm Beach, Florida|Palm Beach]] in 1985.[^3]
-The Mercer family connection was the other documented channel of the 2016 operation. [[Robert Mercer|Robert Mercer]] and his daughter [[Rebekah Mercer|Rebekah Mercer]] funded Breitbart News (where [[Steve Bannon|Steve Bannon]] served as executive chairman before becoming the Trump campaign CEO in August 2016), Cambridge Analytica (the data-targeting firm that deployed psychographic profiling of voters using Facebook data acquired through the [[ Aleksandr Kogan | Aleksandr Kogan / Joseph Chancellor ]] academic-researcher channel), and the [[Government Accountability Institute|Government Accountability Institute]] (the research nonprofit that produced *Clinton Cash*). The Mercer-Breitbart-Cambridge Analytica infrastructure was the documented digital-and-media backbone of the 2016 campaign, and the convergence with the Thiel commercial network (Palantir, Founders Fund) through the shared Trump support produced the documented 2016 alignment of the [[Silicon Valley]] billionaire network with the Republican political operation.[^4][^5]
+In the 1980s [[Alan Greenberg|Alan Greenberg]] of [[Bear Stearns|Bear Stearns]] was among the advisers who helped Trump accumulate 9.6 percent of [[Bally Entertainment|Bally Entertainment]] in an unsuccessful 1986 takeover attempt. Trump said in 2006 that he had placed his children's accounts with Greenberg.[^4]
-### The Palantir Contracting Expansion
+### The Housing Suit and Roy Cohn
-The first Trump administration produced the documented expansion of Palantir's government contracting. The [[U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement|ICE]] contracts (FALCON, ICM, ImmigrationOS, ELITE) expanded through the administration's immigration-enforcement escalation. The [[Customs and Border Protection|CBP]] and [[Department of Defense|DoD]] contracts grew alongside the border-enforcement and defense-spending increases. The [[In-Q-Tel|In-Q-Tel]]-seeded relationship between Palantir and the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] deepened as Palantir's Gotham platform became the standard data-fusion tool across multiple agencies. Thiel chaired Palantir throughout, while simultaneously placing associates in the NSC and running the [[Dialog]] convening network whose government-side attendees included the congressional oversight and military-command principals responsible for the agencies Palantir serves.[^3][^6]
+On October 15, 1973 the United States sued Fred C. Trump, Donald Trump and Trump Management, Inc. in the [[United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York|Eastern District of New York]] under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, Civil Action No. 73 C 1529, before Judge [[Edward R. Neaher|Edward R. Neaher]].[^5][^6] The complaint covered 39 buildings with more than 14,000 apartments and drew on reports from black and white testers sent by the Open Housing Center of the [[New York Urban League|New York Urban League]]; the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] interviewed company employees, former employees and applicants in the investigation that preceded the suit.[^7]
-The second administration (2025-present) has extended the contracting expansion. ICE awarded Palantir the 30 million dollar [[ImmigrationOS|ImmigrationOS]] contract for the administration's mass-deportation operations. Palantir signed the January 2024 strategic partnership with the [[Israeli Ministry of Defense|Israeli Ministry of Defense]] for "war-related missions" in the [[Gaza war|Gaza war]], placing the [[Palantir Gotham|Gotham]] "AI-powered kill chain" platform in an active combat zone. The [[Anduril Industries|Anduril]] [[Sentry Tower|Sentry Tower]] deployment expanded to over 350 towers covering 30 percent of the southern border under a 363 million dollar CBP contract. The documented combination of Palantir (case management and targeting), Anduril (autonomous detection), and Clearview (facial identification) across the deportation and border-enforcement pipelines constitutes the commercial operation of the [[Thiel Influence Network|Thiel network]] against the documented target populations.[^3][^6][^7]
+The defendants retained [[Roy Cohn|Roy M. Cohn]] of the firm Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley. Cohn had been admitted to the New York bar in 1948 and in 1952 appeared among the counsel for the United States on the Second Circuit appeal in [[United States v. Rosenberg|United States v. Rosenberg]]; the Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse summary of the Trump case describes him as a former aide to Senator [[Joseph McCarthy|Joseph McCarthy]].[^7][^8] The docket shows that on December 12, 1973 the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint and filed a counterclaim, that the government moved on January 8, 1974 to dismiss the counterclaim, and that both motions were argued before Neaher on January 25, 1974. The docket records the government's response to affidavits of Donald Trump and Roy Cohn, a government motion for sanctions returnable in May 1974, and a notice to take Donald Trump's deposition.[^5] The counterclaim sought 100 million dollars from the government for defamation, and it failed.[^7][^9]
 [[David Marcus|David Marcus]], identified as Cohn's cousin, said in the 2024 [[PBS Frontline|FRONTLINE]] film The Choice 2024 that when Cohn met Trump he told him, "You might be guilty; it doesn't matter. Go after the Justice Department. Don't ever admit guilt." Ken Auletta of The New Yorker said in the same film that Trump was "totally taken" by Cohn's advice to "fight it" and "just deny everything and fight."[^9]
 The case ended in a consent order entered June 10, 1975. It recites that the order was entered "without adjudication of the merit and without any admission as to the existence or absence of liability," that "Defendants vigorously deny said allegations," and that Trump Management's execution of it was "in no way an admission" of a violation. It dismissed the complaint against Fred Trump and Donald Trump personally, with prejudice. It permanently enjoined the company from refusing to rent or sell, discriminating in terms, and representing that a dwelling was unavailable when it was available, directed the principal officers to "thoroughly acquaint themselves personally on a detailed basis" with the Fair Housing Act, and required a two-year affirmative program that began with written notice to the Open Housing Center of the New York Urban League. Cohn signed for the defendants and Frank E. Schwelb, Chief of the Housing Section of the Civil Rights Division, for the United States.[^6]
 On June 23, 1986 the Appellate Division, First Department, in Matter of Cohn, 118 A.D.2d 15, sustained four charges brought by the Departmental Disciplinary Committee in the fall of 1982 and disbarred Cohn effective immediately, in a per curiam opinion joined by Justices Sandler, Fein, Lynch, Rosenberger and Ellerin. Cohn's counsel were [[Michael Mukasey|Michael B. Mukasey]] and [[Harold R. Tyler Jr.|Harold R. Tyler, Jr.]] The charges concerned a 100,000-dollar loan from a client in 1966 that remained unpaid until 1984; the violation of an escrow order in a Securities and Exchange Commission fraud action involving two yachts; a December 6, 1975 codicil to the will of [[Lewis Rosenstiel|Lewis S. Rosenstiel]], signed in a Miami hospital room weeks before his death and naming Cohn as an additional executor and trustee; and a false answer on Cohn's July 28, 1982 application to the District of Columbia Bar. The court wrote that "for an attorney practicing for nearly 40 years in this State, such misconduct is inexcusable" and that the evidence on each charge left "no recourse but to order disbarment."[^10] The FBI's online Vault carries a 748-page file titled Roy Cohn, Part 01 of 01.[^11]
 ### The 2016 Campaign and the Thiel Network
 Peter Thiel, a [[Silicon Valley|Silicon Valley]] investor, endorsed Trump at the July 2016 [[Republican National Convention|Republican National Convention]] in [[Cleveland|Cleveland]], as the first openly gay speaker at a Republican convention in sixteen years. Federal Election Commission schedule A records list Thiel's itemized individual contributions for the 2015 to 2016 cycle, including two contributions of 1,000,000 dollars each to committees named Fighting for Ohio Fund (August 10, 2016) and Make America Number 1 (October 26, 2016), a 250,000-dollar contribution to Trump Victory (October 6, 2016), and a 2,700-dollar contribution to Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. (October 6, 2016). A 2,000,000-dollar contribution dated August 25, 2015 went to a committee named Conservative, Authentic, Responsive Leadership for You and for America.[^12]
 After the November 2016 election Trump placed Thiel on the transition team's executive committee. Thiel used the position to place [[Kevin Harrington|Kevin Harrington]] as Senior Director for Strategic Planning on the [[National Security Council|National Security Council]] and a Thiel aide as White House Deputy Chief Technology Officer. The [[The Guardian|Guardian]] and [[Politico|Politico]] reported in November and December 2016 that companies Thiel backed, especially [[Palantir Technologies|Palantir]], stood to benefit from the transition role.[^13]
 The [[Robert Mercer|Robert Mercer]] and [[Rebekah Mercer|Rebekah Mercer]] family funded [[Breitbart News|Breitbart News]], where [[Steve Bannon|Steve Bannon]] served as executive chairman before becoming Trump's campaign chief executive in August 2016. The Mercer Family Foundation also gave 7,460,000 dollars to the [[Government Accountability Institute|Government Accountability Institute]] in tax years 2013 to 2017; Bannon was the institute's chairman and Rebekah Mercer a director in its 2012 return, and the institute produced the book [[Clinton Cash|Clinton Cash]]. The family also funded [[Cambridge Analytica|Cambridge Analytica]], which obtained Facebook user data through an academic researcher, [[Aleksandr Kogan|Aleksandr Kogan]], and used psychographic profiling in the campaign.[^14]
 The [[Federal Trade Commission|Federal Trade Commission]] issued an administrative complaint against Cambridge Analytica on July 24, 2019. The Commission's opinion and final order of November 25, 2019 (Docket No. 9383) granted complaint counsel's unopposed motion for summary decision, found that the company harvested profile data from approximately 250,000 to 270,000 U.S. app users and from 50 to 65 million of their Facebook friends, and ordered it to delete or destroy the covered information and to stop misrepresenting its privacy practices and its Privacy Shield participation; the company had filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in May 2018.[^15] The United Kingdom Information Commissioner's final letter to Parliament, dated October 2, 2020, stated that the Commissioner "did not find any additional evidence of Russian involvement" in the material on the SCL Elections and Cambridge Analytica servers, and that earlier details of reported Russia-located activity had been referred to the National Crime Agency.[^16] The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reported that Cambridge Analytica developers helped ingest the campaign's polling data into a visualization tool that [[Brad Parscale|Brad Parscale]] carried on an iPad.[^17]
 ### The Russia Investigation
 The Special Counsel's report on Russian interference in the 2016 election, Volume I, stated that candidate Trump signed a letter of intent for [[Trump Tower Moscow|Trump Tower Moscow]] by November 2015, and that Trump Organization executive [[Michael Cohen|Michael Cohen]] pursued the project through at least June 2016, including by considering travel to Russia by Cohen and candidate Trump. The report places the letter of intent between approximately October 13 and November 2, 2015, signed by Trump for the Trump Organization.[^18][^19]
 The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, in Volume 5 of its report on Russian active measures (2020), stated that Trump authorized Cohen in September 2015 to pursue the deal through [[Felix Sater|Felix Sater]], a longtime business associate of Trump. The committee found that Sater had senior-level ties to Russian businessmen and former officials, though it stated that he almost certainly inflated some of his claims.[^20]
 The Special Counsel's Volume II addressed obstruction. Its introduction, its executive summary and its conclusion each state: "while this report does not conclude that the President committed a crime, it also does not exonerate him." The report adds that "if we had confidence after a thorough investigation of the facts that the President clearly did not commit obstruction of justice, we would so state," and that "we are unable to reach that judgment."[^21]
 ### The Supreme Court and the Leo Network
-Trump's three Supreme Court appointments (Gorsuch 2017, Kavanaugh 2018, Barrett 2020) were selected and shepherded through the Leonard Leo / [[Federalist Society|Federalist Society]] pipeline. Leo advised Trump on all three selections and the [[Judicial Crisis Network|Judicial Crisis Network]] (now the [[Concord Fund|Concord Fund]]) dark-money operation funded the confirmation campaigns. The conservative supermajority produced by the confirmations has been the structural outcome that shapes U.S. law on reproductive rights, gun regulation, campaign finance, and executive power. The Leo operation and the Thiel operation overlap through the shared [[Teneo Network|Teneo Network]] institutional terrain and the shared 501(c)(4) dark-money infrastructure.[^8]
+Trump nominated [[Neil Gorsuch|Neil Gorsuch]], [[Brett Kavanaugh|Brett Kavanaugh]] and [[Amy Coney Barrett|Amy Coney Barrett]] to the [[Supreme Court of the United States|Supreme Court]]. The Senate confirmed Gorsuch on April 7, 2017 by 54 to 45, Kavanaugh on October 6, 2018 by 50 to 48, and Barrett on October 26, 2020 by 52 to 48.[^1]
-The Kavanaugh confirmation (2018) was the most contested of the three and drew the documented engagement of the Thiel-aligned political infrastructure. The confirmation followed a sexual-assault allegation against Kavanaugh and the [[Senate Judiciary Committee]] hearings, and the conservative dark-money operation that funded the confirmation campaign (the JCN / Concord Fund network) spent millions on advertising and grassroots mobilization. Leo personally managed the confirmation strategy. The Kavanaugh confirmation solidified the conservative supermajority that produced the 2022 [[Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization|Dobbs]] decision overturning [[Roe v. Wade|Roe v. Wade]].[^8]
+Leonard Leo, the longtime executive vice president of the [[Federalist Society|Federalist Society]], advised Trump on all three selections, according to [[ProPublica|ProPublica]], which reported on Leo's role in March 2023.[^22] The [[Judicial Crisis Network|Judicial Crisis Network]], later renamed the [[Concord Fund|Concord Fund]], funded campaigns for the confirmations. Leo managed the Kavanaugh confirmation strategy, and the Judicial Crisis Network and Concord Fund network spent millions of dollars on advertising and grassroots mobilization.[^22] The Kavanaugh confirmation followed a sexual assault allegation against Kavanaugh, and the [[Senate Judiciary Committee|Senate Judiciary Committee]] held hearings on it. The Court's 2022 decision in [[Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization|Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization]] overturned [[Roe v. Wade|Roe v. Wade]]. The conservative majority that followed the three confirmations has decided cases on abortion, gun regulation, campaign finance and executive power.
 The Leo and Thiel operations share the [[Teneo Network|Teneo Network]] institutional terrain and the 501(c)(4) dark-money structure described on the Leo page.[^22]
 ### Palantir and the Immigration Contracts
 Palantir expanded its federal contracting during the first administration. Thiel chaired Palantir throughout, placed associates on the National Security Council, and ran the [[Dialog|Dialog]] convening network, a membership list of which was reported by WIRED in June 2026.[^23] The cluster is known as the [[Thiel Influence Network|Thiel network]]. Its [[U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement|ICE]] contracts include the FALCON database, awarded under contract HSCETC15C00001 (May 28, 2015 to May 27, 2018, about 39.3 million dollars) and continued under contract 70CTD019C00000001 (November 28, 2018 to May 27, 2022, about 37.8 million dollars), and the Investigative Case Management system, awarded as order 70CTD022FR0000170 (September 26, 2022 to September 25, 2027, about 170.8 million dollars). Palantir's ICE work also included a contract known as ELITE. [[In-Q-Tel|In-Q-Tel]] had seeded Palantir's relationship with the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]], and Palantir's Gotham platform became a standard data-fusion tool across multiple agencies.[^24]
 On April 11, 2025 ICE modified order 70CTD022FR0000170 by about 29.9 million dollars; the USAspending record describes the modification as adding licenses, configuration and engineering services to deploy "new targeting and enforcement prioritization, self-deportation tracking, and immigration lifecycle process capabilities." ICE described a system called [[ImmigrationOS|ImmigrationOS]] in connection with this work, to track immigrants for deportation. In May and June 2026 ICE placed two further Palantir orders, 70CTD026FC0000012 (about 86.3 million dollars, enforcement removal operations modernization for the Enforcement Case Management System) and 70CTD026FC0000018 (about 45.8 million dollars, Homeland Security Investigations system modernization).[^25]
 [[Anduril Industries|Anduril]] holds contracts from [[Customs and Border Protection|CBP]] for [[Sentry Tower|Sentry Tower]] surveillance towers along the southern border, including a 363 million dollar award for extended-range towers; the deployment expanded to over 350 towers covering 30 percent of the southern border. [[Clearview AI|Clearview AI]], seeded by [[Founders Fund|Founders Fund]], supplies facial identification to CBP.[^26] The Palantir partnership with the [[Israeli Ministry of Defense|Israeli Ministry of Defense]] for "war-related missions" during the [[Gaza war|Gaza war]] was announced in January 2024, during the Biden administration, and is not an action of the second Trump administration. Palantir markets its [[Palantir Gotham|Gotham]] platform as an "AI-powered kill chain."[^27]
 ### The Kushner Middle East Policy
-Kushner, Trump's son-in-law and senior advisor, handled the Middle East portfolio that produced the Abraham Accords (2020 normalization agreements between [[Israel|Israel]] and the [[United Arab Emirates|UAE]], [[Bahrain|Bahrain]], [[Sudan|Sudan]], and [[Morocco|Morocco]]). The accords broke with the prior U.S. framework that had conditioned normalization on Israeli-Palestinian progress, and Kushner led the negotiation alongside the administration's recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the [[Golan Heights|Golan Heights]] and the relocation of the U.S. embassy to [[Jerusalem|Jerusalem]].[^9]
+Jared Kushner, Trump's son-in-law, led Middle East policy in the first administration. It produced the 2020 [[Abraham Accords|Abraham Accords]] normalization agreements between [[Israel|Israel]] and the [[United Arab Emirates|UAE]], [[Bahrain|Bahrain]], [[Sudan|Sudan]] and [[Morocco|Morocco]]. The administration recognized Israeli sovereignty over the [[Golan Heights|Golan Heights]] and moved the U.S. embassy to [[Jerusalem|Jerusalem]]. The accords departed from the earlier U.S. framework that had conditioned normalization on Israeli-Palestinian progress.[^28]
-The U.S.-Saudi Arabia arms sales proceeded over congressional opposition, with the administration invoking emergency authority to bypass the congressional review process. The arms sales ran through the period of the [[Jamal Khashoggi|Khashoggi]] murder (October 2018), after which the CIA assessed with high confidence that MBS had ordered the assassination. Kushner maintained his relationship with MBS after the murder and maintained the WhatsApp channel the CIA assessed as compromised.[^9]
+The administration approved U.S.-[[Saudi Arabia|Saudi Arabia]] arms sales over congressional opposition, using emergency authority to bypass congressional review. The sales went forward after the October 2018 murder of [[Jamal Khashoggi|Jamal Khashoggi]]. The CIA was reported to have assessed with high confidence that [[Mohammed bin Salman|Mohammed bin Salman]] had ordered the killing, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's assessment dated February 11, 2021, declassified on February 25 and released on February 26, 2021, stated: "We assess that Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman approved an operation in Istanbul, Turkey to capture or kill Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi."[^29] Kushner maintained his relationship with the crown prince after the murder and kept up the WhatsApp channel that the CIA assessed as compromised; he used WhatsApp to communicate with the crown prince during his government service.[^28] The Guardian reported in January 2020 that [[Jeff Bezos|Jeff Bezos]]'s phone had been hacked in May 2018 through a file sent from the crown prince's WhatsApp account.[^28]
-After the administration ended, the [[Public Investment Fund|Saudi sovereign wealth fund]] committed 2 billion dollars to Kushner's [[Affinity Partners|Affinity Partners]] fund despite the fund's own due-diligence panel rejecting the deal as "unsatisfactory in all aspects." The Kushner-MBS channel, the [[NSO Group|NSO Group]] Pegasus surveillance of Khashoggi's associates, and the Abraham Accords together constitute the documented Middle East policy outcome.[^9]
+After the first administration ended, the [[Public Investment Fund|Saudi sovereign wealth fund]] committed 2 billion dollars to Kushner's [[Affinity Partners|Affinity Partners]]. The [[NSO Group|NSO Group]] Pegasus spyware was used against associates of Khashoggi, according to leaked data reported in July 2021. The House Committee on Oversight opened a probe of the investment in June 2022. Its letter stated that the fund's screening panel had rated the firm's due diligence unsatisfactory before the fund's board approved the investment.[^30]
-### The 2024 Campaign and the Second Administration
+### DOGE and the Second Administration
-Thiel funded the 2022 [[JD Vance|JD Vance]] Senate campaign (approximately fifteen million dollars) and the [[Blake Masters|Blake Masters]] campaign (approximately fifteen million dollars), and brokered Vance's selection as Trump's 2024 vice-presidential running mate. The Vance selection compressed a three-and-a-half-year path from private citizen to Vice President on a single-donor financial base.[^1][^3]
+Executive Order 14158 established the [[Department of Government Efficiency|Department of Government Efficiency]] (DOGE), led by [[Elon Musk|Elon Musk]], on January 20, 2025.[^31] An April 2025 whistleblower disclosure stated that DOGE personnel had taken sensitive data from the [[National Labor Relations Board|National Labor Relations Board]] in what the whistleblower described as an [[NLRB Data Exfiltration|NLRB data exfiltration]] and that a login attempt to NLRB systems came from a Russian IP address, as reported by [[NPR|NPR]] and [[Nextgov|Nextgov/FCW]].[^32]
-The [[Heritage Foundation|Heritage Foundation]]'s [[Project 2025|Project 2025]] produced the personnel pipeline for the second administration. [[ProPublica|ProPublica]] reported that [[Paul Dans|Paul Dans]], the Project 2025 director, created a personnel database of over 10,000 vetted candidates ("a conservative LinkedIn") to staff a second Trump term. [[NBC News|NBC News]] reported that several prominent Project 2025 authors secured executive-branch roles. [[Center for American Progress|CAP]] documented that 80 percent of Project 2025's authors were former Trump administration officials or close advisors, and 140 people who worked for Trump contributed to the project. Trump publicly disavowed Project 2025 during the campaign but the personnel overlap is documented.[^1][^5]
+Thiel funded the 2022 Senate campaigns of [[JD Vance|JD Vance]] in Ohio and [[Blake Masters|Blake Masters]] in Arizona, at approximately fifteen million dollars each, and brokered Vance's selection as Trump's 2024 vice-presidential running mate.[^13]
-The second Trump administration (2025-present) has produced the documented expansion of Palantir's ICE contracting (the 30 million dollar ImmigrationOS contract), the Palantir-Israel strategic partnership for "war-related missions" in the Gaza war, and the [[Department of Government Efficiency|DOGE]] access to federal systems. [[David Sacks|David Sacks]], the PayPal Mafia COO, received the White House AI and cryptocurrency czar appointment. The DOGE, led by [[Elon Musk|Musk]], produced the documented [[NLRB Data Exfiltration|NLRB data exfiltration]] with Russian IP login attempts and the documented exfiltration of union-organizing records.[^1][^3][^10]
+[[David Sacks|David Sacks]], a former chief operating officer of [[PayPal|PayPal]] and a member of the [[PayPal Mafia|PayPal Mafia]], was named in December 2024 as White House AI and cryptocurrency czar. NPR reported in October 2026 that Sacks had stepped down from the role earlier that year and become co-chair of the [[President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology|President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology]], and that on October 4, 2026 Trump named Director of National Intelligence [[Jay Clayton|Jay Clayton]] as AI czar to lead a White House "Super Intelligence Force."[^33] [[Project 2025|Project 2025]], the [[Heritage Foundation|Heritage Foundation]] policy project, was run by [[Paul Dans|Paul Dans]], who according to ProPublica built a personnel database of more than 10,000 vetted candidates for a second Trump term. [[NBC News|NBC News]] reported that several prominent Project 2025 authors secured executive-branch roles. The [[Center for American Progress|Center for American Progress]] reported that 80 percent of the project's authors had been former Trump administration officials or close advisers, and that 140 people who worked for Trump contributed to the project. Trump publicly disavowed Project 2025 during the 2024 campaign.[^33]
-[[Howard Lutnick|Howard Lutnick]], the [[Cantor Fitzgerald|Cantor Fitzgerald]] CEO whose Epstein emails are documented in the 2026 file releases, received the [[Secretary of Commerce|Secretary of Commerce]] appointment. [[Pam Bondi|Pam Bondi]] received the [[Attorney General|Attorney General]] appointment and was confirmed on February 4, 2025; a year later she co-signed the February 2026 report to Congress under the [[Epstein Files Transparency Act]] that listed some 300 names of officials and public figures referenced in the [[Jeffrey Epstein|Epstein]] files, among them [[Elvis Presley|Elvis]], [[Princess Diana|Princess Diana]], and [[Kurt Cobain|Kurt Cobain]]. [[Todd Blanche|Todd Blanche]], the deputy attorney general who announced the 3.5 million page Epstein-files publication, was previously Trump's personal defense attorney in the Manhattan criminal case. The second-administration personnel pattern places documented Epstein-network contacts (Lutnick) and Epstein-files oversight figures (Bondi, Blanche) in the executive branch.[^1]
+[[Howard Lutnick|Howard Lutnick]], chief executive of [[Cantor Fitzgerald|Cantor Fitzgerald]], became [[Secretary of Commerce|Secretary of Commerce]] in February 2025. Lutnick's emails with Epstein appear in the 2026 file releases. [[Pam Bondi|Pam Bondi]] was confirmed as [[Attorney General|Attorney General]] on February 4, 2025, and Trump announced her departure on April 2, 2026, naming [[Todd Blanche|Todd Blanche]] acting attorney general. Blanche, whose office announced on January 30, 2026 the publication of more than 3 million additional pages and a total of nearly 3.5 million, had been Trump's personal criminal defense lawyer in the Manhattan case, and the Senate confirmed him as Attorney General on August 8, 2026 by 50 to 49.[^34][^35]
 ### The Epstein Relationship
-Trump and Epstein socialized from the late 1980s through 2004, mostly in [[Palm Beach, Florida|Palm Beach]] and New York. Archival [[NBC]] footage from 1992 shows the two men together at [[Mar-a-Lago]] watching dancers, with [[Ghislaine Maxwell]] present, and photographs place Trump, [[Melania Trump]], Epstein, and Maxwell together in the period. In a 2002 [[New York Magazine]] profile Trump said of Epstein, "I've known Jeff for fifteen years. Terrific guy," adding that "he likes beautiful women as much as I do, and many of them are on the younger side." Epstein's address books listed multiple Trump telephone numbers, and Trump's name appears roughly seven times in the flight logs of Epstein's aircraft (the [[Lolita Express]]) on domestic legs, with no log entry placing Trump on [[Little St. James]].[^11]
+Trump and [[Jeffrey Epstein|Jeffrey Epstein]] socialized from the late 1980s through 2004, mostly in Palm Beach and New York. Archival [[NBC|NBC]] footage from 1992 shows the two men together at Mar-a-Lago watching dancers, with [[Ghislaine Maxwell|Ghislaine Maxwell]] present. A photograph taken at Mar-a-Lago on February 12, 2000 shows Trump, [[Melania Trump|Melania Knauss]], Epstein and Maxwell together.[^36]
-The relationship broke in 2004 over a Palm Beach property. In November 2004 Trump outbid Epstein for the oceanfront mansion [[Maison de l'Amitie]], paying 41.35 million dollars, and the bankruptcy trustee for the estate described the two men lobbying him and disparaging each other's finances. Trump later said he had a falling out with Epstein "a long time ago" and had thrown him out of Mar-a-Lago as "persona non grata" for poaching club staff. Little public record of contact survives after 2004. [[Maria Farmer]], who reported Epstein to the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] in 1996, said she had also flagged a 1990s encounter involving Trump, an account that remains an uncorroborated allegation. No allegation of criminal wrongdoing by Trump in connection with Epstein has been established in any court or official finding.[^12]
+In an October 28, 2002 profile by Landon Thomas Jr. in New York magazine, Trump, speaking by speakerphone, said: "I've known Jeff for fifteen years. Terrific guy. He's a lot of fun to be with. It is even said that he likes beautiful women as much as I do, and many of them are on the younger side."[^37] On July 9, 2019, asked about Epstein at the White House, Trump said: "I had a falling out with him a long time ago. I don't think I've spoken to him for 15 years." He added: "I was not a fan of his. That I can tell you."[^38]
-The relationship returned as a political liability across 2025. As president, Trump presided over the Justice Department that handled the file releases; he denied authoring the 2003 "birthday book" letter that the [[Wall Street Journal]] reported bore his signature and a drawing of a nude woman, dismissed the report as fake, and filed a multibillion-dollar defamation suit against the paper. After months of pressure from members of his own coalition demanding disclosure, Trump signed the Epstein Files Transparency Act in November 2025. The staged releases, the missing "client list" that Bondi had promised, and the unexplained redactions kept the Trump-Epstein history in continuous national coverage through the end of 2025.[^13]
+Epstein's address books listed multiple Trump telephone numbers. Former Epstein pilot [[Larry Visoski|Larry Visoski]] testified on November 29 and 30, 2021 that he had flown Trump on Epstein's aircraft, the [[Lolita Express|Lolita Express]], "more than once, I believe." Trump's name appears in the flight logs of the aircraft on domestic legs, roughly seven times by one count. No flight log entry places Trump on [[Little St. James|Little St. James]].[^39]
 The relationship broke in 2004 over a Palm Beach property. In November 2004 Trump bought the oceanfront mansion [[Maison de l'Amitie|Maison de l'Amitie]] for 41.35 million dollars. The bankruptcy trustee, Joseph Luzinski, described the two men bidding as "two very large Palm Beach egos going at it."[^40] Speaking at his Turnberry course in Scotland on July 28, 2025, Trump said of Epstein: "He stole people that worked for me. I said, 'Don't ever do that again.' He did it again, and I threw him out of the place, persona non grata."[^41]
 [[Maria Farmer]], who reported Epstein to the FBI in 1996, later said that she had also flagged a 1990s encounter involving Trump; the account remains an uncorroborated allegation. Trump has denied wrongdoing in connection with Epstein.[^42]
 Trump's name also appears in the 2003 "birthday book" assembled for Epstein's fiftieth birthday. The [[Wall Street Journal|Wall Street Journal]] reported in July 2025 that a letter in the book bore Trump's signature and a drawing of a nude woman. Trump denied authoring the letter, called the report fake, and filed a multibillion-dollar defamation suit against the paper.[^43] The staged releases, the missing "client list" that Bondi had promised, and the redactions kept the Trump-Epstein history in national coverage through the end of 2025.
 ### The Epstein Files Transparency Act
 The House passed the Epstein Files Transparency Act (H.R. 4405) on November 18, 2025, and Trump signed it on November 19, 2025 as Public Law 119-38. The statute required the Attorney General to release the unclassified records of the [[Department of Justice|Department of Justice]] and the FBI within thirty days, and allowed withholding of material that would jeopardize an active federal investigation.[^2]
 On November 14, 2025 Trump asked the Justice Department to investigate Epstein's dealings with [[Bill Clinton|Bill Clinton]], [[Larry Summers|Larry Summers]], [[Reid Hoffman|Reid Hoffman]] and [[JPMorgan Chase|JPMorgan Chase]]. Attorney General Bondi assigned the investigation to Jay Clayton that day.[^44]
 On February 14, 2026 the Justice Department sent the Senate and House Judiciary Committees a letter under section 3 of the Act, on the letterhead of the Office of the Deputy Attorney General and signed by Attorney General Pamela J. Bondi and Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche. It listed all categories of records released and withheld, a summary of redactions, and a list of "all government officials and politically exposed persons" named or referenced in the released materials. The letter states that the term "politically exposed persons" was not defined in the Act, that names appear in the files "in a wide variety of contexts," and that "some individuals had extensive direct email contact with Epstein or Maxwell while other individuals are mentioned only in a portion of a document (including press reporting) that on its face is unrelated to the Epstein and Maxwell matters." The alphabetical list runs to about 300 names, from Alexander Acosta to Mark Zuckerberg, and includes Donald Trump, Ivanka Trump, Melania Trump, JD Vance, Jared Kushner, Howard Lutnick, Steve Bannon, Elon Musk, Peter Thiel, Leonard Leo, Elvis Presley, Princess Diana and Kurt Cobain.[^45] [[Ro Khanna|Ro Khanna]] described the list as "purposefully muddying the waters on who was a predator and who was mentioned in an email."[^45]
 ### The January 2026 Release Allegations
 The Justice Department's January 30, 2026 release of [[Epstein Files|Epstein files]] included FBI interview memoranda from 2019 in which a woman told investigators that she had been sexually assaulted by Epstein and by Trump in the 1980s, when she said she was a teenager. The Justice Department stated that the files contain false and unverified claims. Trump has denied the allegations.[^35]
 ### Unidentified Aerial Phenomena
 The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Public Law 116-260, which Trump signed on December 27, 2020, contained the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 as Division W. Division W has no provision in its text on unidentified aerial phenomena. Its section 3 provides that the explanatory statement printed in the Congressional Record by the chairmen of the House and Senate intelligence committees "shall have the same effect with respect to the implementation of this division as if it were a joint explanatory statement of a committee of conference."[^46] That explanatory statement, Part II, "incorporates by reference, and the Executive Branch shall comply with, all direction contained in the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report to accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (S. Rept. 116-233)."[^47] Senate Report 116-233, filed June 17, 2020 by [[Marco Rubio|Marco Rubio]] for the committee, contains a section titled "Advanced Aerial Threats." It states the committee's concern that "there is no unified, comprehensive process within the Federal Government for collecting and analyzing intelligence on unidentified aerial phenomena" and directs the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, to submit within 180 days of enactment an unclassified report, with a classified annex permitted, that includes an analysis of data held by the [[Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force|Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force]] at the [[Office of Naval Intelligence|Office of Naval Intelligence]] and by the FBI, an interagency collection process with a named accountable official, an assessment of foreign-adversary attribution, and recommendations.[^48]
 The statute that created the permanent office is a different law. The James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, Public Law 117-81, approved December 27, 2021 by President [[Joe Biden|Joe Biden]], contains section 1683, which directed the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, to establish an office to address unidentified aerial phenomena within 180 days of enactment.[^49]
 On February 19, 2026 Trump wrote on Truth Social that, "based on the tremendous interest shown," he would be directing Defense Secretary [[Pete Hegseth|Pete Hegseth]] and other agencies "to begin the process of identifying and releasing Government files related to alien and extraterrestrial life, unidentified aerial phenomena (UAP), and unidentified flying objects (UFOs), and any and all other information connected to these highly complex, but extremely interesting and important, matters." The post followed his statement to a reporter that [[Barack Obama|Barack Obama]] had given classified information when Obama said in a podcast interview that aliens were "real."[^50] On May 8, 2026 the Department of Defense began posting the files at war.gov/UFO, with more than 160 files covering more than 400 incidents, and said additional files would follow "on a rolling basis."[^51]
 On July 11, 2026 [[The Harvard Crimson|The Harvard Crimson]] reported that [[Avi Loeb|Avi Loeb]] said he had served on the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology under Trump. The paper also reported that a representative of the [[Office of the Director of National Intelligence|Office of the Director of National Intelligence]] visited Loeb to request a group that Loeb formed as the [[UAP Science Advisory Council|UAP Science Advisory Council]], "in support of President Trump's directive on UAP transparency."[^52] In August 2026 [[Ross Coulthart|Ross Coulthart]] wrote on NewsNation that unnamed White House sources told him Trump "has personally authorized" a government program using the methods of the [[Sky Watcher|Skywatcher]] organization. Coulthart attributed each statement to unnamed sources.[^53]
 ### Footnotes
-[^1]: For Thiel's 2016 endorsement, the RNC speech, and the transition team role, see the contemporaneous press (*Guardian*, *Politico*, *ABC News*) and the Peter Thiel page.
+[^1]: Senate roll call votes. 115th Congress, 1st Session, vote 111 (Nomination of Neil M. Gorsuch, April 7, 2017, 54 to 45). https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1151/vote_115_1_00111.xml ; vote 116 (Nomination of R. Alexander Acosta as Secretary of Labor, April 27, 2017, 60 to 38). https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1151/vote_115_1_00116.xml ; 115th Congress, 2nd Session, vote 223 (Nomination of Brett M. Kavanaugh, October 6, 2018, 50 to 48). https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1152/vote_115_2_00223.xml ; 116th Congress, 2nd Session, vote 224 (Nomination of Amy Coney Barrett, October 26, 2020, 52 to 48). https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1162/vote_116_2_00224.xml
-[^2]: "Peter Thiel goes 'big league', joining Trump's presidential transition team." *The Guardian,* November 11, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/nov/11/peter-thiel-joins-donald-trump-transition-team ; "Thiel could gain from Trump transition." *Politico,* December 2016. https://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/peter-thiel-trump-transition-benefits-232233
+[^2]: Epstein Files Transparency Act, Pub. L. No. 119-38, sections 1 to 3, 139 Stat. 656 to 658 (approved November 19, 2025; House passage November 18, Senate passage November 19). https://www.congress.gov/119/plaws/publ38/PLAW-119publ38.pdf
-[^3]: Cameron, Dell, and Yulia Almazova. "Leak Exposes Members of Peter Thiel's Secretive 'Dialog' Society." *WIRED,* June 16, 2026. https://www.wired.com/story/leak-exposes-members-of-peter-thiels-secretive-dialog-society/
+[^3]: "Trump did open Mar-a-Lago to blacks and Jews, but in a business move, not a crusade." *PolitiFact,* February 11, 2020 (purchase in 1985). https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2020/feb/11/viral-image/trump-did-open-mar-lago-blacks-and-jews-business-m/ ; "President Donald J. Trump," The White House (Wharton School; real estate development in New York City). https://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/donald-j-trump/
-[^4]: "Who Is Kevin Harrington, the Peter Thiel Associate Who Just Joined the National Security Council Staff?" *Gizmodo,* February 2017. https://gizmodo.com/who-is-kevin-harrington-the-peter-thiel-associate-who-1791925769 ; "Disrupting the White House: Peter Thiel's Influence is Shaping the National Security Council." *Just Security,* 2017. https://www.justsecurity.org/37466/disrupting-white-house-peter-thiels-influence-shaping-national-security-council/
+[^4]: "Alan 'Ace' Greenberg, who remade Bear Stearns, dies at 86." *Bloomberg News,* via *Portland Press Herald,* July 25, 2014. https://www.pressherald.com/2014/07/25/alan-ace-greenberg-who-remade-bear-stearns-dies-at-86/
-[^5]: For the Mercer-Breitbart-Cambridge Analytica infrastructure, see the contemporaneous press coverage of the 2016 campaign digital operation and the Cambridge Analytica documentation. For the Government Accountability Institute and *Clinton Cash*, see the published record. For Project 2025: "Paul Dans, the Man Behind Project 2025's Most Radical Plans." *ProPublica.* https://www.propublica.org/article/project-2025-trump-campaign-heritage-foundation-paul-dans ; "The key Project 2025 authors now staffing the Trump administration." *NBC News.* https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/trump-administration/key-project-2025-authors-now-staffing-trump-administration-rcna195107
+[^5]: United States v. Fred C. Trump, Donald Trump and Trump Management, Inc., No. 73 C 1529 (E.D.N.Y.), civil docket (complaint filed October 15, 1973; motion to dismiss and counterclaim filed December 12, 1973; motion to dismiss counterclaim January 8, 1974; argument January 25, 1974; entries on affidavits of Donald Trump and Roy Cohn, plaintiff's motion for sanctions and notice of deposition of Donald Trump). Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, document 82945. https://clearinghouse-umich-production.s3.amazonaws.com/media/doc/82945.pdf
-[^6]: "ICE to Use ImmigrationOS by Palantir, a New AI System, to Track Immigrants' Movements." *American Immigration Council,* April 2025. https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/blog/ice-immigrationos-palantir-ai-track-immigrants/ ; "ICE enlists Palantir to develop all-seeing 'ImmigrationOS' eye to speed up deportations." *The Register,* April 21, 2025. https://www.theregister.com/2025/04/21/ice_enlists_palantir_to_develop/
+[^6]: United States v. Fred C. Trump, Donald Trump and Trump Management, Inc., Consent Order, No. 73 C 1529 (E.D.N.Y. June 10, 1975) (Neaher, J.), parts I to IV and signature page (Roy M. Cohn, Saxe, Bacon, Bolan & Manley, for defendants; Frank E. Schwelb, Chief, Housing Section, Civil Rights Division, for plaintiff). Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, document 83283. https://clearinghouse-umich-production.s3.amazonaws.com/media/doc/83283.pdf ; Order to Show Cause, June 10, 1975, document 83277. https://clearinghouse-umich-production.s3.amazonaws.com/media/doc/83277.pdf
-[^7]: "Anduril Wins $363 Million CBP Contract to Deploy Over 200 Extended Range AI Surveillance Towers." *The Defense News,* 2025. https://www.thedefensenews.com/Anduril-Wins-363-Million-CBP-Contract-to-Deploy-Over-200-Extended-Range-AI-Surveillance-Towers/ ; "CBP to strengthen 'tactical targeting,' 'counter-network analysis' with Clearview AI." *FedScoop,* 2026. https://fedscoop.com/dhs-cbp-contract-biometric-facial-recognition-ai/
+[^7]: "United States v. Fred C. Trump, Donald Trump, and Trump Management, Inc.," case summary, Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, University of Michigan Law School (39 buildings, more than 14,000 apartments; tester evidence; retention of Roy Cohn; counterclaim of 100 million dollars for defamation dismissed by Judge Neaher; FBI investigation records released in 2017). https://clearinghouse.net/case/15342/
-[^8]: "We Don't Talk About Leonard: The Man Behind the Right's Supreme Court Supermajority." *ProPublica,* March 2023. https://www.propublica.org/article/we-dont-talk-about-leonard-leo-supreme-court-supermajority
+[^8]: United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. Feb. 25, 1952) (counsel: Myles J. Lane, with Roy M. Cohn of counsel, for the United States). https://static.case.law/f2d/195/cases/0583-01.json
-[^9]: "Chairwoman Maloney Launches Probe of Saudi Government's $2 Billion Investment in Affinity Partners." House Committee on Oversight, June 2, 2022, citing the PIF screening panel that rated the firm's due diligence "unsatisfactory in all aspects" before MBS overruled it. https://oversightdemocrats.house.gov/news/press-releases/chairwoman-maloney-launches-probe-of-saudi-government-s-2-billion-investment-in
+[^9]: "How Donald Trump and Roy Cohn fought the race discrimination lawsuit," excerpt from *The Choice 2024: Harris vs. Trump,* PBS FRONTLINE, September 24, 2024 (David Marcus; Ken Auletta). https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/donald-trump-roy-cohn-race-discrimination-lawsuit-fight-documentary-excerpt
-[^10]: "Whistleblower details how DOGE may have taken sensitive NLRB data." *NPR,* April 15, 2025. https://www.npr.org/2025/04/15/nx-s1-5355896/doge-nlrb-elon-musk-spacex-security ; "User with Russian IP address tried to log into NLRB systems following DOGE access, whistleblower says." *Nextgov/FCW,* April 2025. https://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2025/04/user-russian-ip-address-tried-log-nlrb-systems-following-doge-access-whistleblower-says/404574/
+[^10]: Matter of Cohn, 118 A.D.2d 15, 503 N.Y.S.2d 759 (1st Dep't June 23, 1986) (per curiam) (charges I to IV; disbarment). https://static.case.law/ad2d/118/cases/0015-01.json ; https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6021889/in-re-cohn/
-[^11]: "Trump called Epstein a 'terrific guy' who enjoyed 'younger' women before denying relationship with him." *Washington Post,* July 8, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-called-epstein-a-terrific-guy-before-denying-relationship-with-him/2019/07/08/a01e0f00-a1be-11e9-bd56-eac6bb02d01d_story.html ; "Trump and Epstein: A Timeline of Their Relationship." *Time,* 2025. https://time.com/7333365/trump-epstein-relationship-timeline/
+[^11]: "Roy Cohn," Part 01 of 01, FBI Records: The Vault, 748 pages. https://vault.fbi.gov/roy-cohn (archived January 18, 2021: https://web.archive.org/web/20210118074105/https://vault.fbi.gov/roy-cohn)
-[^12]: "What we know about the Trump-Epstein falling out." *PolitiFact,* July 31, 2025. https://www.politifact.com/article/2025/jul/31/what-we-know-about-the-trump-epstein-falling-out/ ; "President Donald Trump explains why he kicked Jeffrey Epstein out of Mar-a-Lago." *Fox News,* 2025. https://www.foxnews.com/us/jeffrey-epstein-thrown-out-mar-a-lago-hiring-help-trump
+[^12]: Federal Election Commission, Schedule A itemized individual contributions, contributor name THIEL, PETER, two-year transaction period 2016 (retrieved October 12, 2026 through the FEC API). Entries cited: Fighting for Ohio Fund, August 10, 2016, 1,000,000; Make America Number 1, October 26, 2016, 1,000,000; Trump Victory, October 6, 2016, 250,000; Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., October 6, 2016, 2,700; Conservative, Authentic, Responsive Leadership for You and for America, August 25, 2015, 2,000,000. https://api.open.fec.gov/v1/schedules/schedule_a/
-[^13]: "Birthday letter to Epstein bore Trump's signature, drawing of naked woman, Wall Street Journal reports." *CNN,* July 17, 2025. https://www.cnn.com/2025/07/17/politics/epstein-birthday-letter-trump ; U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Files Transparency Act disclosures. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/doj-disclosures
+[^13]: "Peter Thiel goes 'big league', joining Trump's presidential transition team." *The Guardian,* November 11, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/nov/11/peter-thiel-joins-donald-trump-transition-team ; "Thiel could gain from Trump transition." *Politico,* December 2016. https://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/peter-thiel-trump-transition-benefits-232233 ; "Who Is Kevin Harrington, the Peter Thiel Associate Who Just Joined the National Security Council Staff?" *Gizmodo,* February 2017. https://gizmodo.com/who-is-kevin-harrington-the-peter-thiel-associate-who-1791925769
 [^14]: Jim Zarroli, "Billionaire Investor Robert Mercer To Step Down From Firm, Selling Stake In Breitbart." *NPR,* November 2, 2017. https://www.kpbs.org/news/2017/nov/02/billionaire-investor-robert-mercer-steps-down ; Government Accountability Institute (EIN 45-4681912), Form 990 for 2012, Part VII (Bannon, chairman; Rebekah Mercer, director). https://990s.foundationcenter.org/990_pdf_archive/454/454681912/454681912_201212_990.pdf ; Mercer Family Foundation (EIN 20-1982204), grants to the Government Accountability Institute, tax years 2013 to 2017, ProPublica Nonprofit Explorer. https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/201982204 ; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Volume 5, pp. 664 to 667 (SCL, Cambridge Analytica and the Mercer family). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
 [^15]: Federal Trade Commission, In the Matter of Cambridge Analytica, LLC, Docket No. 9383: Complaint (July 24, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/182_3107_cambridge_analytica_administrative_complaint_7-24-19.pdf ; Opinion of the Commission and Final Order (issued November 25, 2019; announced December 6, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/d09389_comm_final_opinionpublic.pdf and https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/d09389_comm_final_orderpublic.pdf ; press release, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2019/12/ftc-issues-opinion-order-against-cambridge-analytica-deceiving-consumers-about-collection-facebook
 [^16]: Information Commissioner's Office, letter from Elizabeth Denham to Julian Knight MP, Chair, Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee, "ICO investigation into use of personal information and political influence," October 2, 2020 (ref. ICO/O/ED/L/RTL/0181), paragraph 9. https://ico.org.uk/media2/migrated/2618383/20201002_ico-o-ed-l-rtl-0181_to-julian-knight-mp.pdf
 [^17]: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities, notes 447 and 448 (Parscale testimony on the polling data visualization tool and Cambridge Analytica developers). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
 [^18]: Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller III, Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election, Volume I, Executive Summary, p. 5 (March 2019). https://www.justice.gov/archives/sco/file/1373816/dl
 [^19]: Mueller Report, Volume I, section IV.A.1.c.i, "Trump Signs the Letter of Intent on behalf of the Trump Organization," p. 70 (letter of intent completed between approximately October 13 and November 2, 2015). https://www.justice.gov/archives/sco/file/1373816/dl
 [^20]: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities, Executive Summary, "Trump Tower Moscow," p. ix (116th Congress). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
 [^21]: Mueller Report, Volume II, Introduction, p. 2; Executive Summary, p. 8; and section IV, Conclusion, p. 182 (the same two sentences appear in each). https://www.justice.gov/archives/sco/file/1373816/dl
 [^22]: "We Don't Talk About Leonard: The Man Behind the Right's Supreme Court Supermajority." *ProPublica,* March 2023. https://www.propublica.org/article/we-dont-talk-about-leonard-leo-supreme-court-supermajority
 [^23]: "Leak exposes members of Peter Thiel's secretive Dialog society." *WIRED,* June 16, 2026. https://www.wired.com/story/leak-exposes-members-of-peter-thiels-secretive-dialog-society/ ; "CBP to strengthen 'tactical targeting,' 'counter-network analysis' with Clearview AI." *FedScoop,* 2026. https://fedscoop.com/dhs-cbp-contract-biometric-facial-recognition-ai/
 [^24]: USAspending.gov award records, recipient Palantir Technologies Inc., awarding sub-agency U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (retrieved October 12, 2026 through the USAspending API): HSCETC15C00001, "FALCON operations and maintenance (O&M), system enhancement," 39,340,900.82 dollars, May 28, 2015 to May 27, 2018 (CONT_AWD_HSCETC15C00001_7012_-NONE-_-NONE-); 70CTD019C00000001, "FALCON O&M support services," 37,839,725.17 dollars, November 28, 2018 to May 27, 2022 (CONT_AWD_70CTD019C00000001_7012_-NONE-_-NONE-); 70CTD022FR0000170, "Investigative Case Management (ICM) operations and maintenance support services and custom enhancements," 170,765,322.37 dollars, September 26, 2022 to September 25, 2027 (CONT_AWD_70CTD022FR0000170_7012_GS35F0086U_4730). https://www.usaspending.gov/award/CONT_AWD_70CTD022FR0000170_7012_GS35F0086U_4730 ; EPIC v. ICE FOIA litigation on ICE-Palantir databases. https://epic.org/documents/epic-v-ice-palantir-databases/
 [^25]: USAspending.gov transaction record, award 70CTD022FR0000170, action date April 11, 2025, 29,898,236 dollars (retrieved through the USAspending API); awards 70CTD026FC0000012 (start May 5, 2026, 86,271,599.30 dollars; CONT_AWD_70CTD026FC0000012_7012_70RTAC26A00000001_7001) and 70CTD026FC0000018 (start June 26, 2026, 45,848,616.80 dollars; CONT_AWD_70CTD026FC0000018_7012_70RTAC26A00000001_7001). https://api.usaspending.gov/api/v2/search/spending_by_award/ ; "ICE to Use ImmigrationOS by Palantir, a New AI System, to Track Immigrants' Movements." *American Immigration Council,* April 2025. https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/blog/ice-immigrationos-palantir-ai-track-immigrants/
 [^26]: "Anduril Wins $363M CBP Contract for XR Sentry Towers." *Tectonic Defense.* https://www.tectonic-defense.com/anduril-wins-363m-cbp-contract-for-xr-sentry-towers/ ; "Anduril Surveillance Towers," U.S. Customs and Border Protection FOIA record. https://www.cbp.gov/document/foia-record/anduril-surveillance-towers ; "CBP to strengthen 'tactical targeting,' 'counter-network analysis' with Clearview AI." *FedScoop,* 2026. https://fedscoop.com/dhs-cbp-contract-biometric-facial-recognition-ai/
 [^27]: "Palantir, Israel Agree Strategic Partnership for Battle Tech." *Bloomberg,* January 12, 2024. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-12/palantir-israel-agree-to-strategic-partnership
 [^28]: "Jared Kushner, Mohammed bin Salman, and the Making of the Trump-Saudi Alliance." *The Intercept,* March 21, 2018. https://theintercept.com/2018/03/21/jared-kushner-saudi-crown-prince-mohammed-bin-salman/ ; "Jared Kushner used WhatsApp to message foreign contacts in White House." *ABC News.* https://abcnews.com/Politics/jared-kushner-whatsapp-foreign-contacts-lawyer-tells-congress/story?id=61843329 ; "Amazon boss Jeff Bezos's phone 'hacked by Saudi crown prince.'" *The Guardian,* January 21, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/jan/21/amazon-boss-jeff-bezoss-phone-hacked-by-saudi-crown-prince
 [^29]: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *Assessing the Saudi Government's Role in the Killing of Jamal Khashoggi,* February 11, 2021 (declassified by the Director of National Intelligence on February 25, 2021 and released February 26, 2021), Executive Summary. https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/Assessment-Saudi-Gov-Role-in-JK-Death-20210226v2.pdf
 [^30]: "Chairwoman Maloney Launches Probe of Saudi Government's $2 Billion Investment in Affinity Partners." House Committee on Oversight, June 2, 2022. https://oversightdemocrats.house.gov/news/press-releases/chairwoman-maloney-launches-probe-of-saudi-government-s-2-billion-investment-in ; Wyden investigation of Affinity Partners, U.S. Senate Committee on Finance. https://www.finance.senate.gov/chairmans-news/wyden-investigation-of-kushner-firm-continues-new-letter-outlines-affinity-partners-fee-structure-lack-of-return-to-investors-ques ; "NSO spyware used to target family of Jamal Khashoggi, leaked data shows." *The Guardian,* July 18, 2021. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/18/nso-spyware-used-to-target-family-of-jamal-khashoggi-leaked-data-shows-saudis-pegasus
 [^31]: Executive Order 14158, "Establishing and Implementing the President's 'Department of Government Efficiency'" (signed January 20, 2025). *Federal Register.* https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/29/2025-02005/establishing-and-implementing-the-presidents-department-of-government-efficiency
 [^32]: "Whistleblower details how DOGE may have taken sensitive NLRB data." *NPR,* April 15, 2025. https://www.npr.org/2025/04/15/nx-s1-5355896/doge-nlrb-elon-musk-spacex-security ; "User with Russian IP address tried to log into NLRB systems following DOGE access, whistleblower says." *Nextgov/FCW,* April 2025. https://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2025/04/user-russian-ip-address-tried-log-nlrb-systems-following-doge-access-whistleblower-says/404574/
 [^33]: Statement by President-elect Donald J. Trump Announcing the Appointment of David O. Sacks as "White House A.I. & Crypto Czar," December 5, 2024, The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-president-elect-donald-j-trump-announcing-the-appointment-david-o-sacks-white ; Chandelis Duster, "Trump names national intelligence chief Jay Clayton as new AI czar." *NPR,* October 4, 2026. https://www.npr.org/2026/10/04/nx-s1-5990781/jay-clayton-ai-czar-trump ; "Paul Dans, the Man Behind Project 2025's Most Radical Plans." *ProPublica.* https://www.propublica.org/article/project-2025-trump-campaign-heritage-foundation-paul-dans ; "The key Project 2025 authors now staffing the Trump administration." *NBC News.* https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/trump-administration/key-project-2025-authors-now-staffing-trump-administration-rcna195107
 [^34]: "Trump fires Pam Bondi as attorney general, installs Todd Blanche as acting AG." *CBS News,* April 2, 2026. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-pam-bondi-attorney-general/ ; U.S. Senate, Roll Call Votes 119th Congress, 2nd Session, Nos. 229 (cloture) and 230 (confirmation), Todd Blanche to be Attorney General, August 8, 2026. https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1192/vote_119_2_00230.htm ; "Senate votes to confirm Todd Blanche as attorney general." *NPR,* August 8, 2026. https://www.npr.org/2026/08/08/g-s1-137631/senate-confirms-todd-blanche-attorney-general ; Ruetenik, Daniel, and Graham Kates. "Lutnick and Epstein were in business together, Epstein files show." *CBS News,* updated February 7, 2026. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/howard-lutnick-jeffrey-epstein-in-business-together/ ; "Howard Lutnick," U.S. Department of Commerce. https://www.commerce.gov/about/leadership/howard-lutnick
 [^35]: "Epstein files live updates: Trump DOJ releases millions more pages of records." *NBC News,* January 30, 2026. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/justice-department/live-blog/epstein-files-trump-doj-release-live-updates-rcna256639 ; "DOJ releases FBI memos detailing woman's allegation against Trump in Epstein probe." *The Wire,* 2026. https://ticklethewire.com/doj-releases-fbi-memos-detailing-womans-allegation-against-trump-in-epstein-probe/
 [^36]: "Trump and Epstein: A Timeline of Their Relationship." *Time,* 2025 (1992 NBC footage; photograph of February 12, 2000). https://time.com/7333365/trump-epstein-relationship-timeline/
 [^37]: Landon Thomas Jr., "Jeffrey Epstein: International Moneyman of Mystery." *New York,* October 28, 2002. https://nymag.com/nymetro/news/people/n_7912/ (archived May 21, 2011: https://web.archive.org/web/20110521191003/http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/people/n_7912/)
 [^38]: "Trump defends embattled Acosta, says he had a 'falling out' with Jeffrey Epstein 'a long time ago.'" *NBC News,* July 9, 2019. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-defends-embattled-acosta-says-he-had-falling-out-jeffrey-n1027861
 [^39]: Lauren del Valle and Eric Levenson, "Jeffrey Epstein's former pilot testifies Bill Clinton, Donald Trump, Prince Andrew flew aboard Epstein's private plane," *CNN,* November 30, 2021. https://abc17news.com/news/national-world/cnn-national/2021/11/30/prosecution-links-ghislaine-maxwell-to-jeffrey-epstein-while-defense-says-she-is-being-blamed-for-his-actions/ ; "Trump called Epstein a 'terrific guy' who enjoyed 'younger' women before denying relationship with him." *Washington Post,* July 8, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-called-epstein-a-terrific-guy-before-denying-relationship-with-him/2019/07/08/a01e0f00-a1be-11e9-bd56-eac6bb02d01d_story.html
 [^40]: "Trump and Epstein: A Timeline of Their Relationship." *Time,* 2025 (2004 Maison de l'Amitie bidding; trustee Joseph Luzinski quoted by the Washington Post). https://time.com/7333365/trump-epstein-relationship-timeline/
 [^41]: "What we know about the Trump-Epstein falling out." *PolitiFact,* July 31, 2025. https://www.politifact.com/article/2025/jul/31/what-we-know-about-the-trump-epstein-falling-out/ ; "President Donald Trump explains why he kicked Jeffrey Epstein out of Mar-a-Lago." *Fox News,* 2025. https://www.foxnews.com/us/jeffrey-epstein-thrown-out-mar-a-lago-hiring-help-trump
 [^42]: "Maria Farmer and Marsh Law Firm's Persistent Advocacy Vindicated as FBI Releases Farmer's 1996 Report on Jeffrey Epstein." *Marsh Law Firm,* December 23, 2025 (the 1996 FBI report). https://www.jamesmarshlaw.com/persistent-advocacy-vindicated/ ; Trump's denial: "What we know about the Trump-Epstein falling out." *PolitiFact,* July 31, 2025. https://www.politifact.com/article/2025/jul/31/what-we-know-about-the-trump-epstein-falling-out/
 [^43]: "Birthday letter to Epstein bore Trump's signature, drawing of naked woman, Wall Street Journal reports." *CNN,* July 17, 2025. https://www.cnn.com/2025/07/17/politics/epstein-birthday-letter-trump
 [^44]: "Bondi taps acting U.S. Attorney Jay Clayton to probe Democrats' ties to Epstein." *The Washington Times,* November 14, 2025. https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2025/nov/14/bondi-taps-acting-us-attorney-jay-clayton-probe-democrats-ties/ ; Epstein Files Transparency Act, Pub. L. No. 119-38.
 [^45]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, letter to Chairman Grassley, Ranking Member Durbin, Chairman Jordan and Ranking Member Raskin, "Re: Epstein Files Transparency Act, Section 3 Report to Congress," February 14, 2026, pages 1 to 6 (signed Pamela J. Bondi, United States Attorney General, and Todd Blanche, Deputy United States Attorney General). https://www.justice.gov/opa/media/1434856/dl ; coverage in "Justice Department lists hundreds of prominent people named in Epstein files in letter to Congress." *CNN,* February 15, 2026. https://kvia.com/politics/cnn-us-politics/2026/02/15/justice-department-lists-hundreds-of-prominent-people-named-in-epstein-files-in-letter-to-congress/
 [^46]: Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260, approved December 27, 2020, 134 Stat. 1182; Division W, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, section 3 ("Explanatory statement"), 134 Stat. 2362 to 2363. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-116publ260/pdf/PLAW-116publ260.pdf
 [^47]: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Division W, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021), Part II, Select Unclassified Congressional Direction, December 21, 2020. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-iaa-fy21-jes-final-2-12-15-20.pdf
 [^48]: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, S. Rept. 116-233 (to accompany S. 3905), June 17, 2020, "Advanced Aerial Threats," pp. 11 to 12. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CRPT-116srpt233/pdf/CRPT-116srpt233.pdf
 [^49]: James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-81, section 1683, "Establishment of office, organizational structure, and authorities to address unidentified aerial phenomena" (approved December 27, 2021). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-117publ81/pdf/PLAW-117publ81.pdf
 [^50]: "Trump says he's directing the Pentagon to release files related to UFOs and aliens." *NBC News,* February 19, 2026 (quoting Trump's Truth Social post). https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/trump-administration/trump-says-directing-pentagon-release-files-related-ufos-aliens-rcna259833
 [^51]: "Pentagon releases declassified UFO files including videos and photos held by the government for decades." *NBC News,* May 8, 2026. https://www.nbcnews.com/science/ufos-and-anomalous-phenomena/ufo-uap-files-pentagon-release-trump-rcna344204
 [^52]: Neil H. Shah, Theresa F. Bartelme and Risha Sinha, "Inside Avi Loeb's New UAP Council, Built From His Harvard Orbit." *The Harvard Crimson,* July 11, 2026. https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2026/7/11/avi-loeb-uap-council/
 [^53]: Ross Coulthart, "Is the Trump administration running a covert UFO program?," NewsNation Reality Check, about August 2026. https://www.newsnationnow.com/podcasts-newsnation/reality-check/trump-administration-covert-ufo-program/amp/
--- a/PEOPLE/(T-Z)/Vernon
+++ b/PEOPLE/(T-Z)/Vernon
@ -53,31 +53,31 @@ After the coup succeeded on April 1, 1964, Walters helped facilitate the early U
 ### CIA Deputy Director and Watergate
-President Nixon appointed Walters Deputy Director of Central Intelligence on May 2, 1972, promoting him to Lieutenant General at the same time. Walters served as Acting Director of Central Intelligence from July 2 to September 4, 1973, during [[James Schlesinger]]'s transition period.
+President Nixon appointed Walters Deputy Director of Central Intelligence on May 2, 1972, promoting him to Lieutenant General at the same time. Walters served as Acting Director of Central Intelligence from July 2 to September 4, 1973, between [[James Schlesinger]]'s departure for the Department of Defense and [[William Colby]]'s appointment as director.[^14]
-Walters's appointment placed him at the CIA at the precise moment the [[Watergate]] scandal was breaking. On June 23, 1972, six days after the Watergate break-in, Nixon directed chief of staff [[H.R. Haldeman]] to instruct CIA Director [[Richard Helms]] and Walters to tell acting FBI Director [[L. Patrick Gray]] to stay out of the Watergate investigation on grounds of national security. Helms and Walters were called to a White House meeting with Haldeman and [[John Ehrlichman]] on June 23, where Haldeman relayed the instruction: "Stay the hell out of this." This conversation, captured on White House audio tape, became the "smoking gun" tape that destroyed Nixon's presidency when it became public on August 5, 1974.[^14]
+Walters's appointment placed him at the CIA at the precise moment the [[Watergate]] scandal was breaking. On June 23, 1972, six days after the Watergate break-in, Nixon directed chief of staff [[H.R. Haldeman]] to instruct CIA Director [[Richard Helms]] and Walters to tell acting FBI Director [[L. Patrick Gray]] to stay out of the Watergate investigation on grounds of national security. Helms and Walters were called to a White House meeting with Haldeman and [[John Ehrlichman]] on June 23, where Haldeman relayed the instruction: "Stay the hell out of this." This conversation, captured on White House audio tape, became the "smoking gun" tape that destroyed Nixon's presidency when it became public on August 5, 1974.[^15]
-Walters did meet with Gray and initially asked him to go slow on the Mexican money-laundering connection, but when Gray demanded a written declaration that a CIA operation in Mexico could be compromised by further investigation, Walters replied that he could not supply this "because it would not be true." He delivered a three-page memo, marked Secret, that did not in fact ask the FBI to halt its interviews.[^15]
+Walters did meet with Gray and initially asked him to go slow on the Mexican money-laundering connection, but when Gray demanded a written declaration that a CIA operation in Mexico could be compromised by further investigation, Walters replied that he could not supply this "because it would not be true." He delivered a three-page memo, marked Secret, that did not in fact ask the FBI to halt its interviews.[^16]
-Subsequently, counsel [[John Dean]] approached Walters asking the CIA to provide funds as hush money for the Watergate burglars. Walters refused. A memorandum from Director Helms to Walters, dated June 28, 1972, addressed the Watergate affair and became significant in later congressional investigations. Walters met again with Gray on July 12, 1972, to discuss CIA assistance previously provided to retired CIA officer [[E. Howard Hunt]] of the White House "Plumbers" unit. Walters documented the approaches made to him in a series of memoranda that were subsequently presented as evidence before the [[Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities]].[^16]
+Subsequently, counsel [[John Dean]] approached Walters asking the CIA to provide funds as hush money for the Watergate burglars. Walters refused. A memorandum from Director Helms to Walters, dated June 28, 1972, addressed the Watergate affair and became significant in later congressional investigations. Walters met again with Gray on July 12, 1972, to discuss CIA assistance previously provided to retired CIA officer [[E. Howard Hunt]] of the White House "Plumbers" unit. Walters documented the approaches made to him in a series of memoranda that were subsequently presented as evidence before the [[Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities]].[^17]
 Walters later stated he had "flatly refused" to involve the CIA and had informed "the highest levels of the executive branch" that further pressure would result in his immediate resignation.
 ### Chile and the DINA Connection
-As DDCI, Walters was not limited to the Watergate crisis. In mid-February 1974, he secretly traveled to [[Santiago]], [[Chile]] to meet with [[General Augusto Pinochet]] following the September 1973 coup. In a cable classified Secret and addressed personally to [[Henry Kissinger]], dated February 14, 1974, Walters reported conveying "greetings from the President and Secretary" and "friendship and support and our wish to be helpful in a discreet way." Pinochet accepted the CIA's offer of assistance and specifically requested support for his newly established secret police service, [[DINA]], and its director, [[Colonel Manuel Contreras]], described as "his key man." Walters reported telling Pinochet: "I told him we would be glad to have Contreras or anyone else come up to see us to see what we could do to be of assistance to them."[^17]
+As DDCI, Walters was not limited to the Watergate crisis. In mid-February 1974, he secretly traveled to [[Santiago]], [[Chile]] to meet with [[General Augusto Pinochet]] following the September 1973 coup. In a cable classified Secret and addressed personally to [[Henry Kissinger]], dated February 14, 1974, Walters reported conveying "greetings from the President and Secretary" and "friendship and support and our wish to be helpful in a discreet way." Pinochet accepted the CIA's offer of assistance and specifically requested support for his newly established secret police service, [[DINA]], and its director, [[Colonel Manuel Contreras]], described as "his key man." Walters reported telling Pinochet: "I told him we would be glad to have Contreras or anyone else come up to see us to see what we could do to be of assistance to them."[^18]
-Three weeks after the Walters-Pinochet meeting, Contreras traveled to [[CIA]] headquarters at [[Langley]] for briefings on intelligence service organization. Contreras met with Walters twice in Washington, in 1974 and 1975, during the period when Walters was second-in-command at the Agency. In mid-1975, the CIA briefly placed Contreras on its payroll as a paid asset. DINA subsequently became the primary instrument of the Pinochet regime's repression, responsible for torture centers, extrajudicial executions, forced disappearances, and international terrorism including the [[Letelier assassination]] in Washington in 1976.[^18]
+Three weeks after the Walters-Pinochet meeting, Contreras traveled to [[CIA]] headquarters at [[Langley]] for briefings on intelligence service organization. Contreras met with Walters twice in Washington, in 1974 and 1975, during the period when Walters was second-in-command at the Agency. In mid-1975, the CIA briefly placed Contreras on its payroll as a paid asset. DINA subsequently became the primary instrument of the Pinochet regime's repression, responsible for torture centers, extrajudicial executions, forced disappearances, and international terrorism including the [[Letelier assassination]] in Washington in 1976.[^19]
-On Saturday, July 5, 1975, Walters met Contreras secretly at a CIA office at [[Fort Myer]]. He reported that Contreras asked how Chile might obtain American arms despite the congressional ban: "Wonder if there is any way they could get it indirectly via [[Spain]], [[Brazil]], or the Republic of Korea." They lunched at Langley on August 25. Ambassador [[David Popper]] had advised that publicity "could be counterproductive" but that "it would be worthwhile if General Walters could give Contreras a little time." Walters told the FBI in 1979 that "part of his function as deputy director of the CIA was to coordinate and conduct foreign liaison," and that he had received Contreras in that capacity. Contreras said from prison in 1999 that Walters had proposed placing CIA officers inside DINA and hiring five retired senators as lobbyists for Chile at two million dollars a year.[^19]
+On Saturday, July 5, 1975, Walters met Contreras secretly at a CIA office at [[Fort Myer]]. He reported that Contreras asked how Chile might obtain American arms despite the congressional ban: "Wonder if there is any way they could get it indirectly via [[Spain]], [[Brazil]], or the Republic of Korea." They lunched at Langley on August 25. Ambassador [[David Popper]] had advised that publicity "could be counterproductive" but that "it would be worthwhile if General Walters could give Contreras a little time." Walters told the FBI in 1979 that "part of his function as deputy director of the CIA was to coordinate and conduct foreign liaison," and that he had received Contreras in that capacity. Contreras said from prison in 1999 that Walters had proposed placing CIA officers inside DINA and hiring five retired senators as lobbyists for Chile at two million dollars a year.[^20]
-In June 1976 Walters went to [[Paraguay]] to remove the CIA station chief, who had deceived Ambassador [[George Landau]], and to ask the government of General [[Alfredo Stroessner]] not to kill a Paraguayan agent of the CIA who had been arrested and tortured. He was received by Stroessner's aide [[Conrado Pappalardo]] and left in the last week of June with the agent still in prison. In July Pappalardo asked Landau for American visas in false Paraguayan passports for two Chilean officers, saying that they were to contact Walters in Washington. Landau told Walters that the request appeared to be "the quid pro quo that Paraguay was demanding in exchange for sparing the CIA agent's life," issued the visas, and sent photographs of the passports to Walters through the State Department's "Roger Channel" on July 28. Walters was on leave in [[Florida]] before retirement, and the cable went to Director [[George H.W. Bush|George Bush]]. On August 4 Walters replied that he had made no arrangement with Pappalardo, that he and Bush "had agreed that the agency wanted nothing to do with the DINA matter," and that the request was "highly irregular" and "a strange way of doing business." Two DINA captains using the same false names reached Washington on August 22 and had the Chilean embassy telephone Walters's office at Langley. The CIA did not tell the prosecutor of the [[Orlando Letelier|Letelier]] murder, [[Eugene Propper]], of any of this when it began sending him files that fall.[^20]
+In June 1976 Walters went to [[Paraguay]] to remove the CIA station chief, who had deceived Ambassador [[George Landau]], and to ask the government of General [[Alfredo Stroessner]] not to kill a Paraguayan agent of the CIA who had been arrested and tortured. He was received by Stroessner's aide [[Conrado Pappalardo]] and left in the last week of June with the agent still in prison. In July Pappalardo asked Landau for American visas in false Paraguayan passports for two Chilean officers, saying that they were to contact Walters in Washington. Landau told Walters that the request appeared to be "the quid pro quo that Paraguay was demanding in exchange for sparing the CIA agent's life," issued the visas, and sent photographs of the passports to Walters through the State Department's "Roger Channel" on July 28. Walters was on leave in [[Florida]] before retirement, and the cable went to Director [[George H.W. Bush|George Bush]]. On August 4 Walters replied that he had made no arrangement with Pappalardo, that he and Bush "had agreed that the agency wanted nothing to do with the DINA matter," and that the request was "highly irregular" and "a strange way of doing business." Two DINA captains using the same false names reached Washington on August 22 and had the Chilean embassy telephone Walters's office at Langley. The CIA did not tell the prosecutor of the [[Orlando Letelier|Letelier]] murder, [[Eugene Propper]], of any of this when it began sending him files that fall.[^21]
-One of the two, Captain René Riveros Valderrama, gave a sworn statement in Santiago on March 22, 1978, to the Chilean court investigating Contreras and Espinoza. He and Captain Rolando Mosqueira Jarpa had left for Washington on August 21, 1976, on official passports in the names Juan Williams Rose and Alejandro Romeral Jara, prepared by DINA's passport section, on a mission given them by Contreras "to make contact with the North American General Don Vernon Walters in order to receive certain information relating to the names of certain persons." They could not reach him: he was handing over his post and on leave, and "finally a CIA secretary whom we could not identify told us that General Walters no longer worked at that intelligence agency." They then called on a Chilean general Mosqueira knew, giving their real names and ranks but not their errand, and when every approach failed telephoned Espinoza, DINA's chief of operations, who authorized them to return.[^21]
+One of the two, Captain René Riveros Valderrama, gave a sworn statement in Santiago on March 22, 1978, to the Chilean court investigating Contreras and Espinoza. He and Captain Rolando Mosqueira Jarpa had left for Washington on August 21, 1976, on official passports in the names Juan Williams Rose and Alejandro Romeral Jara, prepared by DINA's passport section, on a mission given them by Contreras "to make contact with the North American General Don Vernon Walters in order to receive certain information relating to the names of certain persons." They could not reach him: he was handing over his post and on leave, and "finally a CIA secretary whom we could not identify told us that General Walters no longer worked at that intelligence agency." They then called on a Chilean general Mosqueira knew, giving their real names and ranks but not their errand, and when every approach failed telephoned Espinoza, DINA's chief of operations, who authorized them to return.[^22]
-Contreras told the Chilean military prosecutor on March 22, 1978, that "around June or early July 1976, CIA Chile informed me that the Deputy Director of the CIA, General Vernon Walters, needed a contact in the US to give us a list of lobbyists and people who could cooperate with Chile before the US Senate and also for the UN's forthcoming session that year." Espinoza testified on April 24 that Contreras ordered him to designate an agent for the mission with a companion fluent in English; he chose Fernández Larios, and "the name of the second man was suggested by then-Major [[Raúl Iturriaga Neumann|Iturriaga]], under the name Andrés Wilson," who "turned out to be the same person I had known since November or December 1974 as [[Michael Townley]]." Fernández Larios said he was told "once in the US I had to speak with a CIA chief named Vernon Walters, because he was going to give me a list of people sympathetic to Chile for purposes of presenting the Chilean position before the United Nations." The second pair, Captains [[René Riveros]] and [[Rolando Mosqueira]], could not find him; General [[Nilo Floody]] of the Chilean military mission, who had known Walters since 1974, had his secretary telephone Walters's office and was told "that he was out of town, that he no longer belonged to the CIA, and that upon his return he would presumably rejoin the Army." The FBI interviewed Walters on June 14, 1978, at the Chilean prosecutor's request. "When told that several DINA officials were claiming that their trip to the US in August of 1976 was to see him, the General laughed and dismissed the idea as being ludicrous on its face, saying it was impossible since he had retired during the previous month." He said his trip to Paraguay "had been completely unrelated to the Letelier assassination," that "at no time had he discussed with any Paraguayan officials the issuance of false passports," that his only contact with Contreras had been the 1975 visit, and he "offered to take a polygraph examination." Propper added: "I have been advised by the CIA that General Vernon Walters retired from the CIA on July 2, 1976. He was no longer there at the time either mission to the United States by DINA personnel took place."[^22]
+Contreras told the Chilean military prosecutor on March 22, 1978, that "around June or early July 1976, CIA Chile informed me that the Deputy Director of the CIA, General Vernon Walters, needed a contact in the US to give us a list of lobbyists and people who could cooperate with Chile before the US Senate and also for the UN's forthcoming session that year." Espinoza testified on April 24 that Contreras ordered him to designate an agent for the mission with a companion fluent in English; he chose Fernández Larios, and "the name of the second man was suggested by then-Major [[Raúl Iturriaga Neumann|Iturriaga]], under the name Andrés Wilson," who "turned out to be the same person I had known since November or December 1974 as [[Michael Townley]]." Fernández Larios said he was told "once in the US I had to speak with a CIA chief named Vernon Walters, because he was going to give me a list of people sympathetic to Chile for purposes of presenting the Chilean position before the United Nations." The second pair, Captains [[René Riveros]] and [[Rolando Mosqueira]], could not find him; General [[Nilo Floody]] of the Chilean military mission, who had known Walters since 1974, had his secretary telephone Walters's office and was told "that he was out of town, that he no longer belonged to the CIA, and that upon his return he would presumably rejoin the Army." The FBI interviewed Walters on June 14, 1978, at the Chilean prosecutor's request. "When told that several DINA officials were claiming that their trip to the US in August of 1976 was to see him, the General laughed and dismissed the idea as being ludicrous on its face, saying it was impossible since he had retired during the previous month." He said his trip to Paraguay "had been completely unrelated to the Letelier assassination," that "at no time had he discussed with any Paraguayan officials the issuance of false passports," that his only contact with Contreras had been the 1975 visit, and he "offered to take a polygraph examination." Propper added: "I have been advised by the CIA that General Vernon Walters retired from the CIA on July 2, 1976. He was no longer there at the time either mission to the United States by DINA personnel took place."[^23]
-As ambassador at large for President [[Ronald Reagan]], Walters visited Pinochet in February 1981. "We spoke as old friends," he reported. "He offered full support and said he would do anything we wanted to help us in the Salvadoran situation." He told a congressional committee that the Letelier bombing had been "a mistake," like [[Napoleon]]'s execution of the Duke of Enghien: "You can't rub their noses in it forever."[^19]
+As ambassador at large for President [[Ronald Reagan]], Walters visited Pinochet in February 1981. "We spoke as old friends," he reported. "He offered full support and said he would do anything we wanted to help us in the Salvadoran situation." He told a congressional committee that the Letelier bombing had been "a mistake," like [[Napoleon]]'s execution of the Duke of Enghien: "You can't rub their noses in it forever."[^20]
 ### Later Career
@ -100,12 +100,13 @@ Under President Ronald Reagan, Walters served as Ambassador-at-Large from 1981 t
 [^11]: FRUS 1964-68, Vol. XXXI, Document 198: Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Brazil, March 31, 1964, formally assigning the code name "Brother Sam."
 [^12]: Colby and Dennett, Ch. 29.
 [^13]: De Oliveira, *Attaché Extraordinaire*; State Department Biographic Register, 1965-1967 Brazil posting.
-[^14]: White House audio tape, June 23, 1972 (Nixon Presidential Library, Conversation No. 741-002), published as the "smoking gun" tape August 5, 1974. Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, Final Report, June 1974.
+[^14]: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVIII, part 2, front matter, "Persons" (Walters: "Acting Director of Central Intelligence, July 2, 1973-September 4, 1973"; Colby: "Director of Central Intelligence, September 4, 1973-January 30, 1976"; Schlesinger: "Director of Central Intelligence, February 2-July 2, 1973"). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v38p2/persons
-[^15]: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, Final Report, June 1974; Walters, *Silent Missions*, pp. 603-606.
+[^15]: White House audio tape, June 23, 1972 (Nixon Presidential Library, Conversation No. 741-002), published as the "smoking gun" tape August 5, 1974. Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, Final Report, June 1974.
-[^16]: CIA FOIA, Memorandum for Deputy Director Walters from Richard Helms, June 28, 1972, Watergate Affair (CIA-RDP75B00380R000100110051-7); Judicial Watch, "CIA Inspector General's Watergate History Report" (declassified 2014), citing Walters-Gray meeting of July 12, 1972.
+[^16]: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, Final Report, June 1974; Walters, *Silent Missions*, pp. 603-606.
-[^17]: National Security Archive, CIA Cable, "Personal to Dr. Henry A. Kissinger [from CIA Deputy Director Vernon Walters on Secret Meeting with Pinochet]," Secret, February 14, 1974 (Document 5 in NSAEBB series on DINA).
+[^17]: CIA FOIA, Memorandum for Deputy Director Walters from Richard Helms, June 28, 1972, Watergate Affair (CIA-RDP75B00380R000100110051-7); Judicial Watch, "CIA Inspector General's Watergate History Report" (declassified 2014), citing Walters-Gray meeting of July 12, 1972.
-[^18]: National Security Archive, "The Pinochet Regime Declassified: DINA," June 2024; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Staff Report on Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973," December 18, 1975 (released by Church Committee); Contreras CIA payroll: CIA Inspector General report on DINA relationship, released 2023.
+[^18]: National Security Archive, CIA Cable, "Personal to Dr. Henry A. Kissinger [from CIA Deputy Director Vernon Walters on Secret Meeting with Pinochet]," Secret, February 14, 1974 (Document 5 in NSAEBB series on DINA).
-[^19]: Kornbluh, Peter. *The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability*. New Press, 2003, pp. 213-215, 409-410, and note 34 at p. 522.
+[^19]: National Security Archive, "The Pinochet Regime Declassified: DINA," June 2024; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Staff Report on Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973," December 18, 1975 (released by Church Committee); Contreras CIA payroll: CIA Inspector General report on DINA relationship, released 2023.
-[^20]: Dinges, John, and Saul Landau. *Assassination on Embassy Row*. McGraw-Hill, 1980, pp. 200-201, 242-243, 309-311, 383-384.
+[^20]: Kornbluh, Peter. *The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability*. New Press, 2003, pp. 213-215, 409-410, and note 34 at p. 522.
-[^21]: Corte Suprema de Justicia de Chile, proceso contra Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda y Pedro Espinoza Bravo, ministro instructor Adolfo Bañados, tomo 1, declaración de René Miguel Riveros Valderrama, Santiago, March 22, 1978, scan at latinamericanstudies.org, Causa-Contreras-Espinoza-1991.pdf. Quotations translated from the Spanish
+[^21]: Dinges, John, and Saul Landau. *Assassination on Embassy Row*. McGraw-Hill, 1980, pp. 200-201, 242-243, 309-311, 383-384.
-[^22]: Fiscalía Militar Ad-Hoc, Santiago, causa 192-78 (fiscal Héctor Orozco), as reproduced in *Proceso contra Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda y Pedro Espinoza Bravo,* ministro instructor Adolfo Bañados, tomo 1, scan at https://www.latinamericanstudies.org/MNC/Causa-Contreras-Espinoza-1991.pdf. Quotations translated from the Spanish, declaraciones of Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda (March 22, 1978), Armando Fernández Larios (March 22, 1978), and Pedro Espinoza Bravo (April 24, 1978); Fiscalía Militar Ad-Hoc, Santiago, causa 192-78, as reproduced in *Proceso contra Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda y Pedro Espinoza Bravo,* tomo 2, scan at https://www.latinamericanstudies.org/MNC/Causa-Contreras-Espinoza-1991-2.pdf. Quotations translated from the Spanish, memorandum of Eugene M. Propper and E. Lawrence Barcella, June 22, 1978, with the FBI report of the interview of June 14, 1978, and addendum of June 9, 1978.
+[^22]: Corte Suprema de Justicia de Chile, proceso contra Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda y Pedro Espinoza Bravo, ministro instructor Adolfo Bañados, tomo 1, declaración de René Miguel Riveros Valderrama, Santiago, March 22, 1978, scan at latinamericanstudies.org, Causa-Contreras-Espinoza-1991.pdf. Quotations translated from the Spanish
 [^23]: Fiscalía Militar Ad-Hoc, Santiago, causa 192-78 (fiscal Héctor Orozco), as reproduced in *Proceso contra Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda y Pedro Espinoza Bravo,* ministro instructor Adolfo Bañados, tomo 1, scan at https://www.latinamericanstudies.org/MNC/Causa-Contreras-Espinoza-1991.pdf. Quotations translated from the Spanish, declaraciones of Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda (March 22, 1978), Armando Fernández Larios (March 22, 1978), and Pedro Espinoza Bravo (April 24, 1978); Fiscalía Militar Ad-Hoc, Santiago, causa 192-78, as reproduced in *Proceso contra Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda y Pedro Espinoza Bravo,* tomo 2, scan at https://www.latinamericanstudies.org/MNC/Causa-Contreras-Espinoza-1991-2.pdf. Quotations translated from the Spanish, memorandum of Eugene M. Propper and E. Lawrence Barcella, June 22, 1978, with the FBI report of the interview of June 14, 1978, and addendum of June 9, 1978.
--- a/ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/INTERNATIONAL/Bundesnachrichtendienst.md
+++ b/ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/INTERNATIONAL/Bundesnachrichtendienst.md
@ -1,63 +1,282 @@
---
+---
 created: 2026-05-15
-updated: 2026-05-15
+updated: 2026-10-12
 title: Bundesnachrichtendienst
 aliases:
  - BND
  - Federal Intelligence Service
  - Bundesnachrichtendienst
  - Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND)
  - German Federal Intelligence Service
 tags:
  - Organization
  - Intelligence
  - Germany
  - ColdWar
  - GehlenOrganization
  - NaziPersonnel
  - CryptoAG
  - NSASurveillance
  - Curveball
  - Eikonal
  - Merex
  - ArmsTrade
 category: "Foreign Government"
-summary: "The Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) is Germany's federal foreign intelligence service, established April 1, 1956 by absorbing the CIA-funded Gehlen Organization under founder Reinhard Gehlen, and defined throughout the Cold War by the Heinz Felfe penetration scandal and its structural inheritance of former Nazi intelligence personnel."
+summary: "The Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) is Germany's foreign intelligence service, formed in 1956 from the CIA-sponsored Gehlen Organization, and in October 2026 its former president August Hanning was arrested on warrants requested by the Federal Prosecutor."
 start: 1956-04-01
 location: "Pullach, Bavaria (original HQ); Berlin (from 2019)"
 relations:
  - type: head_of
    with: Reinhard Gehlen
    start: 1956-04-01
    end: 1968
    role: President
    fn: 7
  - type: head_of
    with: Gerhard Wessel
    start: 1968
    role: President
    fn: 12
  - type: head_of
    with: August Hanning
    start: 1998-12-17
    end: 2005-11-30
    role: President
    fn: 46
  - type: employed_by
    with: Heinz Felfe
    reverse: true
    start: 1951
    end: 1961-11
    role: counterintelligence officer
    fn: 14
  - type: funded
    with: Central Intelligence Agency
    reverse: true
    start: 1946
    end: 1956-04-01
    role: sponsor of the Gehlen Organization
    fn: 4
  - type: owned
    with: Crypto AG
    start: 1970
    end: 1993
    role: joint owner with the CIA
    fn: 38
  - type: partner_of
    with: NSA
    start: 2002
    role: Eikonal and Bad Aibling cooperation
    fn: 41
  - type: informant_for
    with: Curveball
    reverse: true
    start: 2000
    role: source whose reporting the BND supplied to the United States
    fn: 36
  - type: informant_for
    with: Klaus Barbie
    reverse: true
    start: 1966-05
    end: 1966-12
    role: source in Bolivia, codename Adler
    fn: 23
  - type: informant_for
    with: Gerhard Mertins
    reverse: true
    start: 1956
    role: source codenamed Uranus, director of the arms firm Merex
    fn: 25
  - type: employed_by
    with: Franz Rademacher
    reverse: true
    start: 1961
    role: paid source, former German Foreign Office deportation specialist, based in Syria
    fn: 21
  - type: partner_of
    with: Stepan Bandera
    start: 1956-03
    role: BND support for Ukrainian nationalist operations, including a trained team sent in July 1959
    fn: 27
 ---
-The Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND; Federal Intelligence Service) is the foreign intelligence service of the [[Germany|Federal Republic of Germany]]. It collects foreign intelligence, conducts signals intelligence (SIGINT), and coordinates counterintelligence activities in support of German national security and foreign policy. The BND is the direct institutional successor to the [[Gehlen Organization]], the private intelligence network that [[Reinhard Gehlen]] operated under CIA sponsorship from 1946 until West German sovereignty was restored.[^1]
+The Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND; Federal Intelligence Service) is the foreign intelligence service of the [[Germany|Federal Republic of Germany]]. It collects foreign intelligence, conducts signals intelligence (SIGINT) and maintains liaison with the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] and the [[NSA]]. The service descends from the [[Gehlen Organization]], the network that [[Reinhard Gehlen]] ran under [[United States Army|U.S. Army]] and then CIA sponsorship from 1946 until West German sovereignty was restored, and it was formally established on April 1, 1956.[^1]
-### Origins: The Gehlen Organization
+### Origins under the Army and the CIA
-The BND's predecessor was created through a bargain struck between Gehlen and American intelligence in May 1945. Gehlen had headed the Wehrmacht's Fremde Heere Ost (Foreign Armies East) intelligence section - the German military's primary intelligence service for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. As Germany collapsed, Gehlen had his staff microfilm their entire Soviet intelligence archive and bury it in the Bavarian mountains, then surrendered to American forces with the explicit offer to place this irreplaceable anti-Soviet intelligence in American hands.
+The Gehlen group was first run under an American arrangement codenamed [[Operation RUSTY]]. Gehlen had headed the Wehrmacht's [[Fremde Heere Ost]] (Foreign Armies East) directorate, which covered the Soviet Union and the Eastern Front. His memoir describes microfilming the [[Wehrmacht]]'s files on the Soviet Union, burying them in the mountains and surrendering to American forces with the microfilm.[^2] A statement by his deputy [[Gerhard Wessel]] recorded in the CIA's history places the decision in spring 1944: Gehlen resolved then to salvage the directorate's files and records "for the West," and after [[Adolf Hitler]] relieved him on April 9, 1945, he moved the files, already photostated and microfilmed, by army truck to three sites in southern Germany, near the Wilder Kaiser, Marquartstein and Schliersee. Wessel succeeded him as chief of the directorate.[^3]
-The U.S. Army, and subsequently the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]], accepted the arrangement. Gehlen and his former Wehrmacht and Abwehr staff were moved to a compound at Pullach, south of Munich, where they continued to operate under CIA oversight as the "Gehlen Organization" or simply "the Org." The CIA funded the operation, reviewed its product, and used it as the primary source of intelligence on the Soviet military from 1946 onward.[^1]
+Between 1945 and 1949 the U.S. Army handled the organization and funded its intelligence collection, and the Army wanted the CIA and its predecessors to take over responsibility for it.[^4] Lieutenant General [[Lucius D. Clay]], the U.S. military governor, opposed CIA involvement in RUSTY, and his retirement in the spring of 1949 cleared the way for the Agency to assume control in July of that year. [[James H. Critchfield]]'s December 1948 report for Director of Central Intelligence [[Roscoe Hillenkoetter]] was decisive in persuading CIA officials to take responsibility for the Organization.[^5]
-When West Germany (the Federal Republic) regained sovereignty under the 1955 Paris Agreements, the Org was transferred from CIA control to the new West German federal government. On April 1, 1956, it became the Bundesnachrichtendienst. Gehlen was named its first president, a position he held until 1968.[^1]
+The Army's [[Counter Intelligence Corps]] arrested several Germans in 1946 who said they worked for American intelligence. The [[Strategic Services Unit]] representative who investigated the arrests reported that "some of the agents employed were [[SS]] personnel with known Nazi records and, in most cases, undesirable people."[^6] In August 1948 the acting chief of the CIA's [[Karlsruhe]] Operations Base wrote about RUSTY's recruiting methods "with great disgust." A former Wehrmacht officer named Baun had built his own network inside RUSTY, and the Americans and Gehlen removed him during 1947. In late 1947 RUSTY moved from [[Oberursel]] to its own compound at [[Pullach]], a village near [[Munich]], and Col. Willard K. Liebel replaced Col. Deane as operations officer.[^6]
-### Cold War Operations
+The CIA assumed responsibility for the Organization from the Army in 1949 and held it in what the CIA called "trusteeship" until 1956. Critchfield was the Agency's representative at Pullach from June 1949 until 1956.[^7] The CIA's 1945 to 1949 history describes the group as a "double edged sword" that "boosted the [[Warsaw Pact]]'s propaganda efforts" and that "suffered devastating penetrations by the [[KGB]]," as shown by the [[Heinz Felfe]] and [[Hans Clemens]] cases.[^8] The [[National Security Archive]] posted the history in February 2005 in a briefing book that notes Gehlen employed numerous former Nazis and known war criminals.[^9]
-The BND's Cold War role was shaped by Germany's unique geographic position as the primary front line between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. [[Berlin]], divided between Western and Soviet occupation zones, was the central arena of East-West intelligence operations. The BND ran agent networks inside [[German Democratic Republic|East Germany]], monitored [[Stasi]] and [[KGB]] activities, and served as the CIA's primary liaison for operations targeting the Soviet Bloc.[^1]
+The CIA acknowledged an intelligence relationship with Gehlen for the first time in an October 2000 court filing in the Freedom of Information Act case Oglesby v. Army. The [[Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act]] processing that followed released the Army's 2,100-page Gehlen file and nearly 2,100 further pages from CIA files, together with files on many of Gehlen's personnel and agents.[^10]
-The BND suffered a structural vulnerability: the widespread use of former Nazi intelligence and SS personnel among its founding staff, many of whom had wartime connections to Soviet intelligence services through the complex loyalties of the war years.[^1]
+### Founding in 1956 and the succession to Gehlen
-### The Heinz Felfe Penetration
+Under the 1955 [[Paris Agreements]], West Germany regained sovereignty and the Organization passed to the new federal government. On April 1, 1956 it became the Bundesnachrichtendienst, with Gehlen as its first president. He held the post until 1968.[^7] The Pullach compound, the personnel roster and the operational assets went with it, and the CIA-BND liaison replaced the CIA-Organization relationship.[^1]
-The most damaging intelligence failure in BND history was the case of Heinz Felfe, a senior officer who served as head of the BND's Soviet counterintelligence section while simultaneously working as a KGB double agent.
+A CIA field report distributed on December 20, 1967 relayed an account from a "qualified American observer" of a conversation with a West German official named [[Horst Ehmke|Ehmke]]. According to the account, the [[Social Democratic Party of Germany|Social Democratic Party]] (SPD) had decided to back Lieutenant General Gerhard Wessel as Gehlen's successor and wanted the vice presidency in return. The Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union had proposed Ambassador Swidbert Schnippenkoetter for the presidency. The SPD candidates for vice president were [[Guenther Nollau]], vice president of the [[Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz|BfV]], and Guenther Redding, president of the Hamburg office for the protection of the constitution.[^11] Wessel was the BND president by December 1969, when the service's telex on the security review of [[Günter Guillaume]] was sent.[^12]
-Felfe had served in the SS Security Service (SD) during World War II. After the war he was briefly interned by the British before being released. He was recruited by Soviet intelligence in the late 1940s before joining the Gehlen Organization in 1951. Over the following decade Felfe rose to lead the counterintelligence section responsible for detecting Soviet penetrations - the precise position that gave him access to nearly all of the BND's anti-Soviet agent networks and methods.
+The BND's Cold War work was shaped by Germany's position as the front line between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The service ran agent networks inside [[German Democratic Republic|East Germany]], monitored [[Stasi]] and KGB activities, and served as the CIA's primary liaison for operations against the Soviet Bloc. [[Berlin]], divided between Western and Soviet occupation zones, was the central arena of these operations.[^13] After the uprisings in East Germany in the summer of 1953 the Soviets and East Germans moved against the Organization: in late November 1953 the Communists announced the roll-up of West German agent networks in the East, three cases led to the exposure of hundreds of other assets, and by the end of that year more than 200 Organization agents had fled to West Germany to avoid arrest.[^7]
-When Felfe was arrested on November 6, 1961, the extent of the damage became clear: he had provided the KGB with the identities of approximately one hundred Western agents operating inside the Soviet Bloc, many of whom had been arrested or killed. His 1963 trial resulted in conviction; he was sentenced to fourteen years. In 1969, Felfe was exchanged for Western agents held by the Soviet Union.
+### Former SS and SD personnel
-The Felfe case directly implicated Gehlen's policy of recruiting former Nazi intelligence and SS personnel regardless of wartime loyalty complications. The KGB had specifically exploited the wartime records of potential recruits to identify those who could be approached.[^1]
+The Organization's counterintelligence base at Karlsruhe, designated GV"L" in the CIA's study of the Felfe case, was heavily staffed by former [[Sicherheitsdienst|SD]] and SS personnel who had to conceal their backgrounds to keep their jobs. The base developed an informal association of former SS and SD men for mutual protection and career advancement, and that group was susceptible to blackmail and to appeals based on revenge and vindication.[^14]
-### The Gunter Guillaume Affair
+The Soviets exploited the Organization's employment of former SS officers, and after the Felfe and Clemens scandals "it is believed that over 200 BND officers resigned or were dismissed in the 1960s because they had concealed their wartime pasts."[^7] The Pullach operations base played no role in vetting the Organization's staff, because Gehlen refused to give the true names of his staff and agents.[^7] The KGB exploited the wartime records of potential recruits to identify those who could be approached.[^13]
-The BND's most politically significant Cold War case involved not its own personnel but a Stasi agent operating inside the West German government. [[Gunter Guillaume]] was an East German citizen who had emigrated to [[West Germany]] in 1956, established himself as a Social Democratic Party (SPD) activist, and risen to become a personal aide to Chancellor [[Willy Brandt]]. Guillaume was an officer of the [[Stasi|HVA]] - the Stasi's foreign intelligence directorate headed by [[Markus Wolf]].
+The historians of the U.S. Interagency Working Group on the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act described nine of fourteen second-tier CIA name files as involving individuals who had contact with the Gehlen Organization. Their case summaries record the following:[^15]
-BND suspicions about Guillaume developed from the late 1960s, but the sensitivity of disclosing that a spy had reached the Chancellor's office complicated the investigation. Guillaume was arrested on April 24, 1974; he confessed within days. Brandt resigned as Chancellor on May 7, 1974, partly because of the security failure. The affair was among the most damaging East German intelligence operations of the Cold War.[^2]
+- [[Emil Augsburg]], an SD major and department director at the Wannsee Institute who had been wanted by Poland for war crimes, was used by the CIC in 1947 and 1948 and then taken on by the Organization. By 1953 the Organization viewed him as a "shining star" of counterespionage. Gehlen insisted in 1954 that he work outside Pullach because of his RSHA past, and he was dismissed in 1966 after the BND concluded in late 1965 that he could be a double agent.
 - [[Franz Goering]], an aide to Walter Schellenberg in the RSHA foreign intelligence branch, was a BND official in 1959 when a former colleague who was a Soviet agent took intelligence records from his home in Hamburg and left a note inviting him to defect.
 - [[Wilhelm Harster]], an SS lieutenant general and Security Police commander in the Netherlands and Italy, whose file notes implication in the murder of 104,000 Jews, could not join the BND as a security risk but presented himself to others as a BND agent and recommended former SS contacts to the service. He had been Heinz Felfe's superior, and the file indicates he used Felfe to reach the BND.
 - [[Wilhelm Krichbaum]], former head of the Wehrmacht Secret Field Police and a district chief in the Organization, did not tell the Organization or the CIA of his contacts with two Viennese brothers-in-law who ran a literary agency in the Soviet sector of Vienna that the file describes as an espionage front. A 1963 document apparently from the BND concluded he had worked for the Soviets since 1950.
 - [[Franz Six]], an Einsatzkommando officer sentenced at Nuremberg, was reported to have joined the Organization in the mid-1950s. In 1963 the East German media charged that Gehlen had recently transferred a number of former SS and SD officials, among them Six, Augsburg and Goering, to camouflaged positions to reduce criticism that he was using war criminals.
 - [[Friedrich Panzinger]], a former Gestapo colonel, was released from Soviet prison in 1956 with a secret mission to penetrate the BND, reported the mission to the West German authorities and was used by them as a double agent. He killed himself in a cell in 1959 before a possible Bavarian war-crimes arrest, and West German intelligence reviews afterwards could not determine whether he had ever been loyal to the West.
 - [[Hans Sommer]], a Gestapo official in Norway and France, was recruited for counterespionage in early 1950 and dropped in 1953. [[Wilfried Krallert]] was picked up in 1952. There are indications that [[Horst Kopkow]] surfaced as an Organization official. [[Guido Zimmer]] contacted Gehlen in December 1948.
-### Post-Cold War and Modern Era
+The same historians concluded that in settling on men such as Augsburg the CIC, the CIA and the Gehlen Organization made the West more vulnerable to Soviet espionage.[^15]
-German reunification in October 1990 produced an enormous intelligence windfall: the Stasi archives, including the ROSENHOLZ files containing the identities of East German and Soviet agents throughout the West. The files took years to analyze and generated prosecutions, diplomatic incidents, and revelations about the extent of Eastern Bloc penetration of Western institutions.
+The BND's own Independent Historians' Commission (Unabhängige Historikerkommission, UHK) was established by contract in February 2011. A parliamentary question of May 2022 describes its research focus as the BND's handling of the Nazi past, both its own personnel "Altlasten" and the early Federal Republic's handling of the subject, and states that fourteen studies had been published by then.[^16] The commission's first volume, by Christoph Rass, drew on a random sample of 3,650 life histories from the personnel files of the just under 12,000 staff who worked for the BND at Pullach until 1968 or for the Organization until 1956, and counted formal "markers" of National Socialist ties (NSDAP and other organizations, and service in the Reich's police, Waffen-SS and RSHA).[^17] The historian [[Dominik Rigoll]] summarized the first four volumes in 2016: Nowack's study of security reviews in the 1960s recorded the removal of 68 persons, who were treated as security risks because they could be blackmailed, and Sälter's volume described the Organization's revival of the Nazi image of the "Red Orchestra" resistance as a fifth column.[^17] In October 2022 a report attributed to Sälter's volume on Nazi continuities stated that up to 20 percent of the personnel in the Organization's early years "demonstrably had blood on their hands," that more than 30 of them had taken part in mass shootings with Einsatzgruppen, and that the recruitment of accomplices in the Holocaust and in war crimes had been a system until the 1960s.[^18]
-[[Edward Snowden]]'s 2013 disclosures revealed that the BND had cooperated extensively with the [[NSA]] in mass surveillance operations targeting European communications. The BND Act was reformed in 2016 and 2021 following Federal Constitutional Court rulings that the agency's surveillance activities required more explicit statutory authorization.
+The most recent study cited in the 2022 parliamentary question is [[Klaus-Dietmar Henke]], "Geheime Dienste. Die politische Inlandsspionage des BND in der Ära Adenauer," which the question describes as covering BND surveillance of the SPD carried out on the instruction of [[Konrad Adenauer]].[^16] A volume by Agilolf Keßelring on the Organization and the defense of West Germany from 1949 to 1953 documents, in a reviewer's summary, a secret emergency plan to gather veterans of the old Wehrmacht elite divisions, and of the Waffen-SS, behind the Rhine in case of a Soviet attack. The Wehrmacht colonel Albert Schnez had begun preparing such an army cadre in 1949 without the knowledge of the federal government; connections between the Schnez organization and Gehlen existed from the summer of 1951, and Gehlen evidently made the project a matter for his personal attention. About 3,000 men were recorded on index cards and lists, and the plan provided for a force of 40,000 in three divisions.[^19]
-The BND's headquarters were transferred from Pullach to a new purpose-built complex in Berlin, completed in 2019.[^2]
+### The BND and Alois Brunner
 Members of [[Die Linke]] asked in May 2022 whether the redactions in the Henke volume concealed BND knowledge of the whereabouts of [[Alois Brunner]], whom the question described as a 1938 staff member of the Vienna office for Jewish emigration and deputy to [[Adolf Eichmann]]. The same question asked whether the BND had a "nachrichtendienstliche Verbindung" to the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem, citing [[Willi Winkler]], who wrote in the [[Süddeutsche Zeitung]] on April 20, 2022 that a lawyer may have been that link and that a journalist may have been an informant placed near the trial.[^16] In June 2022 the government answered the Brunner question with "Ja, dies kann ausgeschlossen werden" ("Yes, this can be ruled out") and referred back to earlier answers on the trial.[^20]
 CIA files released under the Disclosure Act and described by the historians Richard Breitman and Norman Goda record several BND contacts around Brunner's circle in the Middle East. In 1959 a high BND official codenamed Winterstein conceded to the CIA that the BND had a loose relationship with [[Wilhelm Beisner]], a former SD officer who was in Cairo trading arms, and most of the CIA's information on his Egyptian activities originated with the Gehlen Organization. Mail to Beisner's Munich apartment was intercepted by an intelligence agency and copied to the CIA; the BND said it was a French operation and the CIA thought the BND itself might have done it. From a handwritten reply in that mail the CIA concluded, by comparing handwriting, that a correspondent in Damascus signing as Rischer was Brunner, then an adviser to Syrian intelligence. In March 1961 a BND official codenamed Glueckrath told a CIA officer in Munich that Brunner had attended meetings of an "Egyptian SS group" in late 1960 and January 1961 with [[Fritz Katzmann]] and the Nazi propagandist [[Johannes von Leers]], where Brunner claimed to hold a list of Jews who had collaborated, to be used for blackmail. The former German Foreign Office deportation specialist [[Franz Rademacher]], who had fled to Syria, was put on the payroll of the West German secret service in 1961 or early 1962; the CIA knew of his BND status and had no direct contact with him. Brunner survived an assassination attempt and, in the historians' account, remained in Syria and apparently died there in 1992.[^21]
 ### Klaus Barbie, Merex and the arms trade
 In 1966 the BND recruited [[Klaus Barbie]], the former Gestapo chief of Lyon then living in La Paz as Klaus Altmann, as a source codenamed Adler.[^22] The historian [[Peter Hammerschmidt]] wrote in 2012 that the Amt used Barbie between May and December 1966, shielded him from prosecution and paid him 5,300 marks in total; he reported on left-wing forces in Bolivia, and the BND ended the connection after he declined to travel to Germany for training.[^23][^24] A few weeks after the recruitment Barbie became the Bolivian representative of the arms firm Merex.[^25]
 Merex was run by [[Gerhard Mertins]], a former SS man who in Hammerschmidt's account had worked for the BND under the codename Uranus since 1956. The firm sold surplus [[Bundeswehr]] weapons and equipment abroad on the BND's behalf, above all in the Middle East. Hammerschmidt reported in June 2011, from files of German and American intelligence services, that a Merex representative acting as a double agent of the BND and CIA toured Latin America in July 1966, and that during the tour the former Luftwaffe pilot [[Hans-Ulrich Rudel]] introduced him to Friedrich Schwend, a former RSHA counterfeiter of British banknotes, and to the former SS officer Willem Sassen, who became a representative in Argentina two days after the first contact with the Merex representative; that Schwend, Barbie and Rudel had founded a firm named La Estrella in the early 1960s that employed former SS officers; that [[Otto Skorzeny]] was drawn into the Merex business; and that Merex and Barbie handled the delivery of four Transall C-160 aircraft from the West German defense ministry to Bolivia and Peru in March 1968. The CIA files, in Hammerschmidt's description, record that the BND was "very interested" in the representative's contacts with Rudel and other Germans in Latin America, which he called a clear sign that the Barbie recruitment was "only the tip of the iceberg" of BND collaboration with Nazi criminals.[^25] Marti wrote in 2025 that Barbie, as Merex's Bolivian representative from 1966, also arranged the delivery of Austrian tanks used in the 1980 coup, and that the Germans had made no effort to inquire about his identity.[^24]
 The Federal Chancellery gave an official account of the BND's arms-trade contacts in February 1979 in a reply to the Higher Regional Court of Cologne in a civil suit involving [[Karl Carstens]]. The Chancellery stated that in the 1960s the BND maintained connections to arms trading firms, among them Merex AG and its dependent companies Deutsche Merex GmbH and Wehrexport GmbH, and a firm dependent on Dobbertin & Co. The purpose was stated as reconnaissance of the international arms trade. The BND went beyond observation: to move the firms to provide information it advised them on initiating and conducting deals, named them to the defense ministry as buyers for surplus Bundeswehr material and occasionally acted as intermediary by passing sales requests from the ministry or from foreign interested parties to the firms. From 1965 to September 1969 the Merex companies exported arms to various states on a larger scale, in numerous cases having obtained the required export approvals by naming incorrect recipient countries or, in some cases, by use of forged end-user certificates. A criminal case against Mertins and others ended in acquittal on November 26, 1975. The Chancellery stated that the BND had evidently known of the transactions in all essential phases, and that a senior BND official was released from service for five years from May 1, 1969 to steer the reconnaissance activity and took the post of deputy chairman of the management at the Dobbertin company. The same file records that Wessel told a dpa bureau chief on December 15, 1978 that the BND had never itself traded in arms and that its task was to find out where weapons were flowing.[^26]
 The CIA's records also show the BND's relations with the Ukrainian nationalist leader [[Stepan Bandera]]. After a brief sponsorship by Italian military intelligence in early 1956, Bandera offered the BND his lines into Ukraine in March 1956 in return for money and weapons. The CIA warned the West Germans against any operational relationship, saying all alleged Bandera assets in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Ukraine were non-existent or ineffective. In April 1959 Gehlen's adviser Heinz Danko Herre, Bandera's contact in the BND, supported a mission, and a team trained and funded by the BND crossed from Czechoslovakia in late July.[^27]
 ### Heinz Felfe
 Heinz Felfe was born in [[Dresden]] in 1918. According to the CIA study he was inducted into an SS reserve unit in 1938, and from then on his schooling, legal training and police career were guided by the SS; the historian Goda gives 1936 for his entry into the SS and 1943 for his commission.[^14][^28] In 1943 he joined the foreign intelligence section of the [[Reich Main Security Office]] (RSHA), serving first in its Swiss section and then in the Netherlands. He finished the war as an Obersturmführer in the [[Waffen-SS]] and was taken prisoner by the British.[^14] The British held him at an interrogation center near Utrecht that specialized in former German intelligence personnel. After his release he worked from 1947 for a British military intelligence unit in Bonn, assigned to report on communist student groups, and joined the [[Communist Party of Germany|Communist Party]] (KPD).[^14]
 The British decided in April 1950 to drop Felfe, after he had tried to sell information to several agencies and two news services and had revealed himself as a British agent to his own contacts. Their files, received by the BND in 1961 and by the CIA in 1962, recorded that they told him his contacts with former SS personnel, named as [[Helmut Proebsting]] and Hans Clemens, could no longer be tolerated.[^14] Clemens was a former colleague from the RSHA foreign intelligence arm. The KGB recruited Clemens first, in Dresden in February 1950, and then, through Clemens, Felfe and a third Dresdener, [[Erwin Tiebel]].[^14] Goda dates Felfe's full status as a Soviet agent, codenamed Paul, to September 1951.[^28] After leaving the British Felfe worked for the North Rhine-Westphalia state security office and then as a refugee interrogator at the Ministry for All-German Affairs, and he was recruited into the Gehlen Organization in 1951.[^14] The CIA study records that British files showed he had told his case officer in early 1950 that he intended to offer Clemens to the North Rhine-Westphalia state security office.[^14]
 Felfe was a BND officer for ten years, six of them as deputy chief of the section responsible for countering Soviet espionage, and the CIA study describes the post as in practice the real chief of the section. He was a dedicated Soviet agent throughout.[^14] Goda states that he took charge of counterintelligence against the Soviets in 1955, and Hechelhammer, the BND's chief historian, describes him as having risen to head of counterintelligence against the Soviet Union.[^28][^29] The Army's Counter Intelligence Corps had noted in 1953 his role as leader of an "SD clique" in the Organization, and in 1955 that suspicion of him and the clique was growing; the CIA suspected him by 1957, while he had Gehlen's confidence and personally briefed him on Soviet matters.[^28] The CIA's record shows that the first official briefings on the agency's Karlshorst penetration program were given to him in May 1958, February 1959 and July 1959, and that he became the BND headquarters supervisor of the joint Karlshorst program.[^14] Felfe was detected through a lead from a CIA-run penetration of the Polish intelligence service (UB), identified in the study as the defector Michal Goleniewski, and he was arrested on November 6, 1961, with Clemens and Tiebel.[^14][^30] Felfe is credited with the compromise of approximately one hundred Western agents operating in the Soviet Bloc, many of whom were arrested or killed.[^13] The CIA's 1963 damage assessment, as summarized by Goda, estimated that about 15,000 individual items were blown or compromised.[^28]
 Felfe was tried in July 1963 and sentenced to fourteen years. Clemens received nine years and Tiebel two years at hard labor.[^14] From prison Felfe kept up contact with the KGB, and the Soviets tried to obtain his release in exchange for prisoners held in the East.[^14] In 1969 he was released to East Germany in exchange for three West German spies, and a BND archive photograph shows the exchange at the Herleshausen border crossing.[^28][^29] Hechelhammer states that he later worked for the Stasi as a full-time informal collaborator.[^29] He published a memoir, *Im Dienst des Gegners* (1986).[^31]
 ### The Günter Guillaume affair
 The BND's most politically significant Cold War case involved not its own personnel but a Stasi agent operating inside the West German government. Günter Guillaume was an East German citizen who had emigrated to [[West Germany]] in 1956, established himself as a Social Democratic Party (SPD) activist and risen to become a personal aide to Chancellor [[Willy Brandt]]. Guillaume was an officer of the [[Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung|HVA]], the Stasi's foreign intelligence directorate headed by [[Markus Wolf]].[^32]
 The BND had a card entry dating from April 1954 that recorded that Guillaume was reported to have travelled the Federal Republic for the East Berlin publisher [[Volk und Wissen]], to make contacts with publishers, printers and persons and then infiltrate them from the east. The Bundestag's Second Inquiry Committee reproduced a BND telex received on December 17, 1969 that reported the entry and noted that its truth could no longer be checked.[^33] The BND also held information that Volk und Wissen served as a legal residency for [[Ministry for State Security]] members.[^33]
 BND suspicions about Guillaume developed from the late 1960s, but the sensitivity of disclosing that a spy had reached the Chancellor's office complicated the investigation. Guillaume was arrested on April 24, 1974, and confessed within days. Brandt resigned as Chancellor on May 7, 1974, partly because of the security failure. The affair was among the most damaging East German intelligence operations of the Cold War.[^32]
 Markus Wolf wrote that the HVA penetrated the BND, the Federal Chancellery, the Foreign Ministry and both major West German parties, and that the full scope became clear only after reunification.[^34]
 ### Reunification and the Stasi files
 The backup copy of the microfilmed index cards and statistical sheets of the Stasi's foreign intelligence directorate (Hauptverwaltung A) carries the name Rosenholz, assigned by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. The Stasi Records Agency received the data sets concerning German nationals from the CIA by March 2003; data on foreigners were not handed over. The 280,000 person records cover the whole period of the directorate's activity to January 1988, with 54 percent concerning citizens of the Federal Republic, 38 percent citizens of the GDR and 8 percent unassigned. The copies were handed to the German authorities between 1999 and 2003 on 381 CDs.[^35] The files took years to analyze and generated prosecutions, diplomatic incidents and revelations about the extent of Eastern Bloc penetration of Western institutions.
 ### Curveball and the Iraq assessments
 The CIA's own memorandum on its contact with the BND's source codenamed [[Curveball]] states that the BND provided the vast majority of Curveball's reporting to the United States government, and that U.S. intelligence agencies had no direct access to him until mid-March 2004, when the BND allowed CIA officers to debrief him. The memorandum judges him unreliable because he fabricated his claimed access to a mobile biological weapons production project.[^36]
 The [[Robb-Silberman Commission]] described Curveball as an Iraqi chemical engineer who came to the Intelligence Community's attention through a "foreign liaison service." The commission wrote that the service debriefed him and shared the results with the United States but would not give American officers direct access. Between January 2000 and September 2001 the [[Defense Intelligence Agency]]'s Defense HUMINT Service disseminated almost 100 of his reports on mobile biological weapons facilities. The commission wrote that "virtually all" of the Intelligence Community's information on those facilities came from a source "who was a fabricator."[^37] The CIA memorandum names the BND as the service.[^36]
 ### Crypto AG and Operation Rubicon
 The Swiss parliamentary Control Delegation (Geschäftsprüfungsdelegation, GPDel) reviewed an American history of the operation, titled MINERVA, which describes how American intelligence services used the Swiss manufacturer [[Crypto AG]] for their own purposes in agreement with its Swedish owner. According to the GPDel's summary of that history, in 1970 the company passed into joint ownership of American services and the German intelligence service. German participation ended in late 1993, and the account closes in 1995. The GPDel also found that the Swiss [[Strategic Intelligence Service]] had reliable information from autumn 1993 that American and German services owned the firm, and that the Swiss service set out to break the encryption of the firm's weaker export devices.[^38]
 The Washington Post reported in February 2020 that the company had been owned and run by the CIA in partnership with the BND for most of its history. In the Post's audio report the reporter [[Greg Miller]] said "By 1970, the CIA and the BND own this company," after buying it from its founder.[^39] The Post's coverage of the operation names Thesaurus and Rubicon.[^39]
 ### Bad Aibling and the NSA
 The BND's [[Bad Aibling Station]] was built on a U.S. military site. According to the Bundestag's NSA inquiry, the American Army operated the station from 1952 to 2004, collecting satellite traffic from crisis regions. Former BND president [[August Hanning]] testified that the station was not run by the NSA and described it as a relic of the occupation period.[^40] Closure planned for 2002 was postponed after the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the NSA collected satellite traffic from the station until 2004. In April 2004 the U.S. Army gave up the station, and the [[Joint SIGINT Activity]] took over its essential technical facilities, including the antenna field. Hanning testified that the arrangement placed Bad Aibling under German sovereignty, with American access to its results provided through the BND.[^40]
 ### Operation Eikonal
 Operation [[Eikonal]] was a BND collection point on a fibre-optic cable near Frankfurt am Main, run with the NSA in the Joint SIGINT Activity from 2004 to 2008. Its internal codename was GRANAT. Witnesses said it rested on a Memorandum of Agreement of 2002. The former BND department head [[Reinhardt Breitfelder]] testified that cooperation at Bad Aibling had been extended from satellite collection to a cable project for foreign-to-foreign traffic, with the results to be shared.[^41] A witness also said that cable collection in Frankfurt was discussed at a BND leadership conference in March 2002, and that Breitfelder sketched the plan in a paper.[^41]
 The Süddeutsche Zeitung reported in June 2014 that the BND had collected data at a Frankfurt data node for years and passed raw data to the NSA, that the arrangement was halted in 2007 over its political sensitivity, and that the NSA had protested. The committee's report cites that reporting.[^41]
 ### NSA selectors
 In late 2005 or early 2006 BND staff at Bad Aibling found NSA selectors (telephone numbers and other communication identifiers) targeting the European companies [[EADS]] and [[Eurocopter]], with numbers located outside Germany. On January 25, 2006 the station confirmed that the selectors were no longer used for collection, and the BND stopped using 74 numbers, 52 for EADS and 22 for Eurocopter.[^42] Former BND president [[Gerhard Schindler]] described the finding as the start of a third filter stage, for selectors that violated "deutsche Interessen."[^42]
 According to the committee's report, in August 2013 a special review of the NSA selector stock found a large number of unlawful selectors concerning European government bodies. The Bad Aibling staff member who ran the search deleted about 12,000 features on the instruction of the station head. The report lists at least nine persons in the BND who knew of the review and its findings before March 2015, and states that the president and the Chancellery were reportedly informed only in March 2015.[^43] The report's section on the period is headed as the concealment of the NSA selector findings in the 2013 election year. Schindler was the BND president at the time of the 2013 review.[^43]
 ### Surveillance law and reform
 The Bundestag's NSA inquiry followed the 2013 disclosures of [[Edward Snowden]], which the report describes as the source of public knowledge of the BND's role in mass surveillance.[^43] The 2016 reform of the BND Act, passed by the grand coalition, put strategic foreign-to-foreign surveillance into statute. The [[Federal Constitutional Court]] ruled on May 19, 2020 (1 BvR 2835/17) that this surveillance was unconstitutional as then regulated, that Article 10 of the [[Basic Law]] protects foreigners abroad, and that an independent oversight body was required. The legislature had until the end of 2021 to rewrite the rules.[^44] The federal cabinet approved a new bill on December 16, 2020.[^44]
 ### Later espionage cases and Berlin headquarters
 In 2014 a BND employee, Markus R., was exposed as a source for the CIA; between 2008 and 2014 he passed on more than 200 documents, received at least 80,000 euros and was sentenced in March 2016 to eight years. In the case of the BND employee Carsten L. the Federal Prosecutor charged him with obtaining nine internal documents in September and October 2022 for the businessman Arthur E., who allegedly passed information to the Russian service FSB; both are charged with especially serious treason in a trial that began in December 2023.[^30] The BND was headquartered at Pullach until its new complex in Berlin was opened. Chancellor [[Angela Merkel]] opened the new headquarters on February 8, 2019, and called the move a milestone in the development of the German foreign intelligence service.[^45]
 ### Former president arrested in 2026
 On October 6, 2026 the Federal Prosecutor (Bundesanwaltschaft) had August Hanning and his former office head arrested by officers of the [[Bundeskriminalamt]] in the district of Bad Tölz-Wolfratshausen in Bavaria and in the district of Steinfurt in North Rhine-Westphalia, on warrants issued by the investigating judge of the [[Federal Court of Justice]]. Searches of the suspects' premises began there and in Berlin the same day. The release states a strong suspicion against Hanning of unlawful espionage (landesverräterische Ausspähung, section 96 paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code), gathering state secrets (section 96 paragraph 2), attempted treason (section 94 paragraph 1 with section 22) and intelligence agent activity (section 99 paragraph 1 number 1). The office head is charged with aiding attempted treason and unlawful espionage (sections 94, 96 and 27).[^46]
 The release gives the following facts as the warrants' allegation. Hanning was BND president from December 1998 to the end of November 2005, and the office head served as his office head, followed him as a seconded assistant when he was state secretary in the Federal Ministry of the Interior from December 2005 to November 2009, and from March 2012 to March 2026 served as office head for several later BND presidents. Probably in spring 2010 the two agreed that the office head would continuously obtain valuable BND findings for Hanning for payment, which Hanning could exploit commercially in his private consulting work. Until June 2022, by the state of the investigation, the office head supplied nearly 2,000 documents, many classified, intended only for internal BND use for briefing and preparing the agency's leadership, in particular for the intelligence situation meeting held at the Federal Chancellery. In one case Hanning used classified findings so supplied to prepare an analysis for an employee of a foreign intelligence security apparatus; whether the product reached the addressee could not be established. Hanning was also in intensive exchange with a member of another state intelligence service, whom he supplied over several years with political information, in part based on material from the office head.[^46]
 The proceeding rests on finds from a search of Hanning's premises that the Hamburg public prosecutor carried out in September 2025 in an investigation concerning [[Christina Block]] and others; the matter was submitted to the Bundesanwaltschaft in early May 2026 for takeover. The investigation is conducted with the BND and the Bundeskriminalamt.[^46] A second release of October 7, 2026 states that both men were presented to the investigating judge on October 6 and 7 and that the arrest warrants were put into effect.[^47] Both men are presumed innocent. beck-aktuell reported the same charges and allegations on the day of the arrests, and ZDF reported that Hanning denies involvement in the Block case and that, as of the arrest day, nothing pointed to a political motive; ZDF described Hanning as well connected and as having run several security firms. The current BND president [[Martin Jäger]] stated that the BND had opened extensive internal investigations early, which hardened the suspicion.[^48][^49] In November 2005, while he was BND president, Hanning apologized to a journalist after BND staff had surveilled journalists to find leaks, a matter later examined by parliament.[^50]
 ### Footnotes
-[^1]: Murphy, David E., Sergei A. Kondrashev, and George Bailey. *Battleground Berlin: CIA vs KGB in the Cold War.* Yale University Press, 1997. Andrew, Christopher, and Vasili Mitrokhin. *The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West.* Allen Lane, 1999.
+[^1]: Central Intelligence Agency, *Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1949-56*, Vol. 1 (Kevin C. Ruffner, ed.), foreword, declassified 2007, https://archive.org/details/CIAAndTheOriginsOfTheBND1949-1956 (the Agency held the Gehlen Organization in trusteeship until 1956, when the West German government established its own national intelligence structure).
-[^2]: Andrew, Christopher, and Oleg Gordievsky. *KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev.* HarperCollins, 1990. Gehlen, Reinhard. *The Service: The Memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen.* World, 1972.
+[^2]: Gehlen, Reinhard. *The Service: The Memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen.* World, 1972 (microfilm, burial of the files, surrender).
 [^3]: Central Intelligence Agency, *Forging an Intelligence Partnership*, 1945-49, Vol. 1, document appendix, "Statement of Gerhard Wessel on Development of the German Organization" (undated): spring 1944 decision, the relief of Gehlen on April 9, 1945, the removal of microfilmed files to three sites, Wessel's succession at Fremde Heere Ost. Same URL as note 3.
 [^4]: Central Intelligence Agency, *Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1945-49*, Vol. 1, Ruffner, ed., declassified 2002 under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, https://archive.org/details/CIAAndTheOriginsOfTheBND1945-1949 (the U.S. Army handled the Gehlen Organization and funded its intelligence collection, 1945 to 1949).
 [^5]: Central Intelligence Agency, *Forging an Intelligence Partnership*, 1945-49, Vol. 1, photograph captions (Clay's opposition and retirement in spring 1949; Critchfield's December 1948 report; the Agency assuming control in July 1949). Same URL as note 3.
 [^6]: Central Intelligence Agency, *Forging an Intelligence Partnership*, 1945-49, Vol. 1, passages on the 1946 CIC arrests, the Strategic Services Unit investigation, the August 1948 Karlsruhe memorandum, the removal of Baun during 1947, and the late 1947 move to Pullach with Liebel replacing Deane. Same URL as note 3.
 [^7]: Central Intelligence Agency, *Forging an Intelligence Partnership*, 1949-56, Vol. 1, Part I and foreword, declassified 2007 (trusteeship from 1949 to 1956; James H. Critchfield at Pullach from June 1949; the 1953 roll-ups and more than 200 agents fleeing; the statement that over 200 BND officers left in the 1960s; the Pullach base's role in vetting). Same URL as note 1.
 [^8]: Central Intelligence Agency, *Forging an Intelligence Partnership*, 1945-49, Vol. 1, Introduction (the "double edged sword" passage). Same URL as note 3.
 [^9]: National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 146, "The CIA and Nazi War Criminals," posted February 4, 2005, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB146/
 [^10]: Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, *Final Report to Congress*, April 2007, Figure 12, "The Gehlen files," and the chapter on the CIA, https://www.archives.gov/files/iwg/reports/final-report-2007.pdf (Oglesby v. Army filing of October 2000; the 2,100-page Army file; Naftali, "Reinhard Gehlen and the United States," in Breitman et al., *U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis*, 2004).
 [^11]: Central Intelligence Agency, field report "SPD Views on Succession to Gehlen Presidency and Vice Presidency," distributed December 20, 1967, document C07005044, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-07005044
 [^12]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 7/3246, "Bericht und Antrag des 2. Untersuchungsausschusses," February 19, 1975, security review section (BND telex of the president, December 23, 1969), https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/07/032/0703246.pdf
 [^13]: Murphy, David E., Sergei A. Kondrashev, and George Bailey. *Battleground Berlin: CIA vs KGB in the Cold War.* Yale University Press, 1997 (Cold War operations, KGB use of recruits' wartime records, the Felfe agent count).
 [^14]: Central Intelligence Agency, "KGB Exploitation of Heinz Felfe: Successful KGB Penetration of a Western Intelligence Service," March 1969, document C02606328, released February 21, 2019, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/node/2071209 (printed pages 12 to 23 and the summary: the SD and SS background, the Utrecht internment, the British employment, the April 1950 dismissal, the 1961 and 1962 file transfers, the GV"L" base, the recruitment through Clemens, the Karlshorst briefings, the Polish UB lead, the November 1961 arrest and the July 1963 sentences).
 [^15]: Breitman, Richard, "Historical Analysis of 20 Name Files from CIA Records," Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, 2001, https://www.archives.gov/iwg/declassified-records/rg-263-cia-records/historical-analysis-by-breitman.pdf (entries on Augsburg, Goering, Harster, Krichbaum, Six, Panzinger, Sommer, Krallert, Kopkow, Zimmer and the conclusion).
 [^16]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 20/1963, Kleine Anfrage of Die Linke, May 24, 2022, https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/20/019/2001963.pdf (UHK contract of February 2011, fourteen studies, research focus on the Nazi past, the Henke volume, questions 7 to 10, and the citation of Willi Winkler in the Süddeutsche Zeitung, April 20, 2022). Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 19/26519, Kleine Anfrage on the UHK, February 9, 2021, https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/19/265/1926519.pdf
 [^17]: Rigoll, Dominik, "Nazi-Verstrickungen beim Geheimdienst: Die braunen Wurzeln des BND," *die tageszeitung*, December 9, 2016, https://taz.de/Nazi-Verstrickungen-beim-Geheimdienst/!5363325/ (Rass's sample of 3,650 life histories from the roughly 12,000 staff to 1968; Nowack's 68 exclusions; Sälter's volume on the "Red Orchestra"; the 1953 roll-up of 93 informants).
 [^18]: dts Nachrichtenagentur, "Über 30 BND-Mitarbeiter bei Kriegsverbrechen im Zweiten Weltkrieg," October 7, 2022, reporting Hessischer Rundfunk on Gerhard Sälter, *NS-Kontinuitäten im BND* (Ch. Links, 2022), https://regionalheute.de/ueber-30-bnd-mitarbeiter-bei-kriegsverbrechen-im-zweiten-weltkrieg-1665142867/
 [^19]: Weise, Niels, review of Agilolf Keßelring, *Die Organisation Gehlen und die Verteidigung Westdeutschlands* (UHK Studien 3, 2014), and of the UHK conference volume, *sehepunkte* 16 (2016), no. 2, https://www.sehepunkte.de/2016/02/26494.html
 [^20]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 20/2192, answer of the federal government, June 7, 2022, https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/20/021/2002192.pdf (answer to question 10, "Ja, dies kann ausgeschlossen werden," and the reference back to the answers to questions 2 to 2b for questions 7 to 9).
 [^21]: Breitman, Richard, and Norman J. W. Goda, *Hitler's Shadow: Nazi War Criminals, U.S. Intelligence, and the Cold War*, National Archives, 2010, "Nazis and the Middle East," pp. 22 to 30, https://www.archives.gov/files/iwg/reports/hitlers-shadow.pdf (Beisner and the BND, Winterstein, the intercepted mail, Rischer identified as Brunner, Glueckrath's March 1961 account, Rademacher's BND payroll, Brunner's death in Syria).
 [^22]: Bundesarchiv, file B 206/1983, 1966 to 1968, "Klaus Altmann als Quelle des BND (Deckname Adler)," catalogued in the Deutsche Digitale Bibliothek, https://www.deutsche-digitale-bibliothek.de/item/KN44LFOZYQMNMMVTPNQMIFALRTYMBJDK
 [^23]: Hammerschmidt, Peter, "Die Geheimakte Klaus Barbie," *die tageszeitung*, January 31, 2012, https://taz.de/Ein-Altnazi-und-die-deutschen-Geheimdienste/!5101916/ (codename Adler, May to December 1966, 5,300 marks); Bundesarchiv, file B 206/1983, "Klaus Altmann als Quelle des BND (Deckname Adler)."
 [^24]: Marti, Werner J., "The second life of Klaus Barbie," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, July 2, 2025, https://www.nzz.ch/english/the-second-life-of-klaus-barbie-a-nazi-war-criminals-rise-in-bolivia-ld.1891151
 [^25]: Gessler, Philipp, "Alt-Nazis beim Bundesnachrichtendienst: Code-Name Uranus," *die tageszeitung*, June 19, 2011, https://taz.de/Alt-Nazis-beim-Bundesnachrichtendienst/!5118343/ (Hammerschmidt's presentation to the International Intelligence History Association; Merex, Uranus, Rudel, Schwend, Sassen, La Estrella, Skorzeny, the Transall delivery of March 1968).
 [^26]: Der Chef des Bundeskanzleramtes, official information to the 6th Civil Senate of the Oberlandesgericht Köln, Rechtsstreit Prof. Carstens ./. Metzger, 6 U 164/78, February 1979, https://fragdenstaat.de/dokumente/3844/ (BND connections to arms trade firms, the Merex companies, the 1965 to 1969 exports, the acquittal of November 26, 1975, the BND officer at Dobbertin, and Wessel's statement of December 15, 1978).
 [^27]: Breitman and Goda, *Hitler's Shadow*, 2010, chapter on collaborators, pp. 82 to 84 (Bandera, the BND, Herre, the July 1959 mission), https://www.archives.gov/files/iwg/reports/hitlers-shadow.pdf
 [^28]: Goda, Norman J. W., "CIA Files Relating to Heinz Felfe, SS officer and KGB Spy," Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, 2008, https://fas.org/sgp/eprint/goda.pdf (the 1969 release in exchange for three West German spies; the 15,000 items; the "SD clique"; Felfe's entry to the SS and to the Organization).
 [^29]: Hechelhammer, Bodo, interview, "Spion Heinz Felfe: Für ihn lieferten die Sowjets kleinere Fische ans Messer," *t-online*, March 22, 2020, https://www.t-online.de/nachrichten/panorama/wissen/geschichte/id_87517540/spion-heinz-felfe-fuer-ihn-lieferten-die-sowjets-kleinere-fische-ans-messer-.html (head of Soviet counterintelligence; the exchange at Herleshausen, photograph from the BND archive; the work for the Stasi).
 [^30]: ZDF, "BND-Affären: Von Hanning und Felfe bis Landesverrat an Russland," October 6, 2026, https://www.zdfheute.de/politik/deutschland/bnd-affaeren-spionage-hanning-skandale-100.html (Markus R. and the CIA; the case of Carsten L. and Arthur E.; the 2005 surveillance of journalists; the 1961 arrest, the 1963 sentence and the 1969 exchange of Felfe).
 [^31]: Felfe, Heinz. *Im Dienst des Gegners: 10 Jahre Moskaus Mann im BND.* Rasch und Röhring, 1986.
 [^32]: Andrew, Christopher, and Oleg Gordievsky. *KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev.* HarperCollins, 1990 (Guillaume's emigration and career, the BND suspicions, the April 24, 1974 arrest, the May 7, 1974 resignation).
 [^33]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 7/3246, security review section (the BND card entry of April 1954 and its statement that the entry's truth could no longer be checked; the BND telex of December 17, 1969; the BND information on Volk und Wissen as a residency for MfS members), https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/07/032/0703246.pdf
 [^34]: Wolf, Markus. *Spionagechef im geheimen Krieg* (memoir).
 [^35]: Bundesarchiv, MfS-Lexikon, "Rosenholz," https://www.bundesarchiv.de/im-archiv-recherchieren/stasi-unterlagen-einsehen/hinweise-zum-mfs/mfs-lexikon/detail/rosenholz/ (name given by the BfV; transfer by March 2003; 280,000 person records and the 54, 38 and 8 percent split; 381 CDs, 1999 to 2003).
 [^36]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum "Results of Our CIA Contact with BND Source 'Curveball,'" ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-039, document 1, declassified November 21, 2017, https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2013-039-doc01.pdf
 [^37]: Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, *Report to the President*, March 31, 2005, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-WMD/pdf/GPO-WMD.pdf (the Iraq biological weapons section: the "foreign liaison service" passage, the Defense HUMINT Service count and the "virtually all" sentence).
 [^38]: Geschäftsprüfungsdelegation der Eidgenössischen Räte, Bericht zur Crypto AG, press release of November 10, 2020, https://www.parlament.ch/centers/documents/de/bericht-gpdel-2020-11-10-d.pdf (sections 2.1.1 on the MINERVA history and 4.1.1 on the Swiss service's information from autumn 1993).
 [^39]: Greg Miller and Martine Powers, *The Washington Post*, audio report on the CIA's Crypto AG operation, February 11, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/world/national-security/cia-crypto-encryption-machines-espionage/ (archived at https://perma.cc/52JY-BEW4).
 [^40]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 18/12850, Abschlussbericht des 1. Untersuchungsausschusses der 18. Wahlperiode, June 23, 2017, pp. 761 to 763 (Bad Aibling history; testimony of August Hanning, BND president from December 17, 1998 to November 30, 2005), https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/18/128/1812850.pdf
 [^41]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 18/12850, June 23, 2017, pp. 887 to 888 and the Eikonal chapter (Memorandum of Agreement of 2002; the GRANAT designation; testimony of Reinhardt Breitfelder and Harald Fechner on the March 2002 conference; the Süddeutsche Zeitung reports of June 26, 2014 and October 4, 2014).
 [^42]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 18/12850, June 23, 2017, p. 805 (the EADS and Eurocopter selectors, the January 25, 2006 confirmation, the 74 numbers, and the testimony of Gerhard Schindler on the third filter stage).
 [^43]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 18/12850, June 23, 2017, p. 1538 (the August 2013 review, the nine persons who knew of it before March 2015, the reported March 2015 notification, and the section heading on concealment in the 2013 election year) and the report's introduction on the Snowden disclosures.
 [^44]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 19/25483, Kleine Anfrage of Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, December 21, 2020, citing Bundesverfassungsgericht, judgment of May 19, 2020, 1 BvR 2835/17 (the 2016 BND Act reform, the court's requirements, the end-2021 deadline, and the cabinet bill of December 16, 2020), https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/19/254/1925483.pdf
 [^45]: Bundesregierung, speech by Chancellor Angela Merkel at the opening ceremony of the new BND headquarters in Berlin, February 8, 2019, https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/rede-von-bundeskanzlerin-merkel-bei-der-eroeffnungsfeier-der-neuen-zentrale-des-bundesnachrichtendienstes-am-8-februar-2019-in-berlin-1578762
 [^46]: Der Generalbundesanwalt beim Bundesgerichtshof, Pressemitteilung Nr. 66, "Festnahmen wegen mutmaßlicher landesverräterischer Ausspähung, Auskundschaften von Staatsgeheimnissen, versuchten Landesverrats und Spionage," October 6, 2026, https://www.generalbundesanwalt.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2026/Pressemitteilung-vom-06-10-2026.html
 [^47]: Der Generalbundesanwalt beim Bundesgerichtshof, press release "Haftbefehle wegen mutmaßlicher landesverräterischer Ausspähung u. a. in Vollzug gesetzt," October 7, 2026, https://www.generalbundesanwalt.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2026/Pressemitteilung-vom-07-10-2026-2.html
 [^48]: beck-aktuell, "Ex-BND-Präsident August Hanning festgenommen," October 6, 2026, https://www.beck-aktuell.de/heute-im-recht/rechtsgeschehen/ex-bnd-praesidenten-august-hanning-festgenommen-2026-10-06
 [^49]: ZDF, "Ex-BND-Chef August Hanning wegen Spionageverdachts festgenommen," October 6, 2026, https://www.zdfheute.de/politik/deutschland/august-hanning-ex-bnd-chef-spionage-100.html
 [^50]: ZDF, October 6, 2026 (note 44), on the November 2005 apology.
--- a/ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/INTERNATIONAL/Gehlen
+++ b/ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/INTERNATIONAL/Gehlen
@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ tags:
  - Soviet
  - 1940s
  - 1950s
-summary: "The Gehlen Organization was a CIA-funded intelligence network in West Germany from 1946 to 1956, built by Reinhard Gehlen from his Wehrmacht Eastern Front directorate to provide U.S. coverage of the Soviet bloc, before being reconstituted as the Bundesnachrichtendienst in April 1956."
+summary: "CIA-funded intelligence network in West Germany from 1946 to 1956, built by Reinhard Gehlen from his Wehrmacht Eastern Front directorate, reconstituted as the Bundesnachrichtendienst in April 1956."
 start: 1946-07-01
 end: 1956-04-01
 location: "Pullach, Bavaria, West Germany"
@ -26,10 +26,12 @@ The Gehlen Organization (Organisation Gehlen), commonly called "the Org," was a
 ### Origins: The Gehlen Deal
-In April-May 1945, anticipating German defeat, Gehlen had the files of Fremde Heere Ost microfilmed and the film containers buried in the Austrian Alps. He surrendered to U.S. Army forces on May 22, 1945, and immediately proposed a bargain to his American captors: his organization, its accumulated records on the Soviet military and political structure, and its agent networks in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, in exchange for American protection, funding, and operational support.
+In April-May 1945, anticipating German defeat, Gehlen had the files of Fremde Heere Ost microfilmed and the film containers buried in the Austrian Alps, as Gehlen's memoir states. The CIA history's statement by Gehlen's deputy Gerhard Wessel records that after Hitler relieved Gehlen on April 9, 1945 the microfilmed Fremde Heere Ost files were moved by army truck and dispersed in three places in southern Germany: near the Wilder Kaiser, near Marquartstein and near Schliersee.[^2] He surrendered to U.S. Army forces on May 22, 1945, and immediately proposed a bargain to his American captors: his organization, its accumulated records on the Soviet military and political structure, and its agent networks in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, in exchange for American protection, funding, and operational support.
 The offer was accepted by the Strategic Services Unit, successor to the Office of Strategic Services, and Gehlen was transported to the United States in August 1945 for debriefing at Fort Hunt, Virginia. He returned to Germany in 1946 to begin operations under American supervision. The CIA, formally established in 1947, inherited the arrangement from its predecessor organizations and took over direct management of the Gehlen network.[^1]
 The arrangement with the U.S. Army was codenamed Operation RUSTY. Between 1945 and 1949 the Army handled the Organization and funded its intelligence collection.[^3] In late 1947 RUSTY moved from Oberursel to its own compound at Pullach, a village near Munich, and Col. Willard K. Liebel replaced Col. Deane as operations officer.[^3] In 1946 the Army's Counter Intelligence Corps arrested several Germans who said they worked for American intelligence; the Strategic Services Unit representative who investigated found "some of the agents employed were SS personnel with known Nazi records and, in most cases, undesirable people."[^3] The CIA's acting chief at the Karlsruhe Operations Base wrote in an August 1948 memorandum that he viewed RUSTY's recruiting methods "with great disgust."[^3] Lieutenant General Lucius D. Clay opposed CIA involvement, and his retirement in the spring of 1949 cleared the way for the Agency to assume control in July of that year; James H. Critchfield's December 1948 report was decisive in persuading CIA officials to take responsibility.[^2]
 The "Gehlen deal" gave the United States what no other arrangement could provide at that moment: an existing intelligence network with deep files on the Soviet military and security apparatus, agents in place across Eastern Europe, and operational experience in the specific geographical and political environment where American intelligence was most blind. The cost - accepting an organization staffed substantially by former Wehrmacht and Nazi intelligence personnel and directed by a general who had served Hitler - was accepted as the price of operational capability during the emerging Cold War.[^1]
 ### Operations at Pullach
@ -44,13 +46,19 @@ The organization ran agent networks in [[East Germany]] and across the Soviet bl
 The extent of former SS and Nazi party personnel within the Org was a persistent controversy that official accounts understated during the Cold War. The CIA accepted the personnel inheritance as a practical necessity: Gehlen's network was composed of the people who had relevant experience, and rebuilding from scratch would have taken years during which the United States would have lacked the coverage that German intelligence veterans could provide.
-Academic research, culminating in the German government's Unabhängige Historikerkommission (Independent Historians' Commission, the Scholz Commission) report of 2013 and subsequent publications, documented the extent of former SS membership and Nazi party affiliation among Org personnel. The commission found that approximately 10 percent of Org employees had been SS members (a substantially higher proportion than in the West German government generally), and that individuals with wartime records involving repression operations had served in sensitive positions.[^2]
+Academic research, including the work of the Bundesnachrichtendienst's Unabhängige Historikerkommission (Independent Historians' Commission, established by contract in February 2011, with volumes appearing from 2016),[^4] documented the extent of former SS membership and Nazi party affiliation among Org personnel. Breitman and his co-authors report that approximately 10 percent of Org employees had been SS members (a substantially higher proportion than in the West German government generally), and that individuals with wartime records involving repression operations had served in sensitive positions.[^5]
 The first Historians' Commission volume, by Christoph Rass, rests on a random sample of 3,650 life histories from the roughly 12,000 staff to 1968 and counts "NS markers"; Nowack's study of security reviews counted 68 persons removed in the 1960s, and Sälter's volume was reported in 2022 as finding that up to 20 percent of the early personnel had taken part in crimes and more than 30 in Einsatzgruppen shootings.[^6][^7]
 ### Former SS and SD Staff in the CIA's Name Files
 The CIA acknowledged an intelligence relationship with Gehlen for the first time in an October 2000 court filing in Oglesby v. Army; the Disclosure Act processing released the Army's 2,100-page Gehlen file and nearly 2,100 further pages from CIA files.[^8] The Interagency Working Group historians found that nine of fourteen second-tier CIA name files involved individuals who had contact with the Organization.[^9] Emil Augsburg, an SD major and Wannsee Institute department director, was taken on by 1953 and regarded as a "shining star" of counterintelligence; Gehlen required him in 1954 to work outside Pullach, and he was dismissed in 1966.[^9] Wilhelm Krichbaum, former head of the Wehrmacht Secret Field Police, was a district chief in the Organization; a 1963 document apparently from the BND concluded he had worked for the Soviets since 1950.[^9] Hans Sommer, a Gestapo official, was recruited for counterespionage in early 1950 and dropped in 1953; Wilfried Krallert was picked up in 1952; Franz Six was reported to have joined in the mid-1950s.[^9] In 1963 the East German media charged that Gehlen had transferred a number of former SS and SD officials, among them Six, Augsburg and Franz Goering, to camouflaged positions.[^9] Friedrich Panzinger, released from Soviet custody in 1956 with a mission to penetrate the BND, reported it and was used as a double agent until his suicide in 1959.[^9]
 The CIA's own records, as disclosed through Freedom of Information Act releases, documented awareness of the Nazi personnel inheritance. Agency officials weighed the operational value of Gehlen's network against the security and political risks of employing former Nazis, consistently prioritizing operational continuity. The arrangement created long-term political vulnerabilities when the personnel roster became more widely known.[^1]
 ### Soviet Penetration
-The Org was penetrated by Soviet intelligence from its early years. The most serious known penetration was [[Heinz Felfe]], who joined the Org in 1951 and rose to become chief of counterintelligence. Felfe was a former SS officer who had been recruited by Soviet intelligence and operated as a KGB agent within the Org and its successor the BND for approximately a decade before being exposed in November 1961. His position in counterintelligence gave him access to the operations, agent identities, and procedures that he was tasked with protecting - a near-ideal placement for a Soviet penetration agent.[^1]
+The Org was penetrated by Soviet intelligence from its early years. The most serious known penetration was [[Heinz Felfe]], who joined the Org in 1951 and rose to become chief of counterintelligence (the CIA study describes him as deputy chief of the section, in practice its real chief). Felfe was a former SS officer who had been recruited by Soviet intelligence and operated as a KGB agent within the Org and its successor the BND for approximately a decade before being exposed in November 1961. His position in counterintelligence gave him access to the operations, agent identities, and procedures that he was tasked with protecting - a near-ideal placement for a Soviet penetration agent.[^1]
 Additional penetrations were identified over the years, and the extent of Soviet knowledge of Org operations has never been fully assessed. The KGB had specific and well-founded interest in penetrating the Gehlen network given both its CIA connection and its operational focus on the Soviet bloc.[^1]
@ -58,7 +66,17 @@ Additional penetrations were identified over the years, and the extent of Soviet
 When West Germany recovered sovereignty in 1955 and joined [[NATO]], negotiations transferred the Gehlen Organization from American to West German government control. The BND was formally established on April 1, 1956, with Gehlen as its first president. The BND retained the Pullach compound, its personnel roster, and its operational assets. The CIA-BND liaison relationship that replaced the CIA-Org relationship maintained close cooperation on Soviet bloc intelligence through the remainder of the Cold War.[^1]
 The CIA held the Organization in what its own history calls "trusteeship" from 1949 to 1956, and Critchfield was the Agency's representative at Pullach from June 1949 until 1956.[^10] After the East German uprising of 1953 the Communists announced in late November the roll-up of West German agent networks in the East; three cases led to the exposure of hundreds of other assets, and by the end of that year more than 200 Organization agents had fled to West Germany.[^10] The CIA history states that after the Felfe and Clemens scandals "it is believed that over 200 BND officers resigned or were dismissed in the 1960s because they had concealed their wartime pasts."[^10]
 ### Footnotes
 [^1]: Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA.* Doubleday, 2007, pp. 33-56. Gehlen, Reinhard. *Der Dienst: Erinnerungen 1942-1971.* v. Hase & Koehler, 1971 (Gehlen's memoir). Trento, Joseph. *The Secret History of the CIA.* Forum, 2001.
-[^2]: Breitman, Richard, Norman J.W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, and Robert Wolfe. *U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis.* Cambridge University Press, 2005. Goschler, Constantin, and Michael Wala. *"Keine neue Gestapo": Das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz und die NS-Vergangenheit.* Rowohlt, 2015.
+[^2]: Central Intelligence Agency, *Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1945-49*, Vol. 1, document appendix, "Statement of Gerhard Wessel on Development of the German Organization," and photograph captions. https://archive.org/details/CIAAndTheOriginsOfTheBND1945-1949
 [^3]: Central Intelligence Agency, *Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1945-49*, Vol. 1, chapters on Operation RUSTY (CIC arrests of 1946, the August 1948 memorandum, the move to Pullach). https://archive.org/details/CIAAndTheOriginsOfTheBND1945-1949
 [^4]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 20/1963, Kleine Anfrage of Die Linke, May 24, 2022. https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/20/019/2001963.pdf
 [^5]: Breitman, Richard, Norman J.W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, and Robert Wolfe. *U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis.* Cambridge University Press, 2005. Goschler, Constantin, and Michael Wala. *"Keine neue Gestapo": Das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz und die NS-Vergangenheit.* Rowohlt, 2015.
 [^6]: Rigoll, Dominik, "Nazi-Verstrickungen beim Geheimdienst: Die braunen Wurzeln des BND," *die tageszeitung*, December 9, 2016. https://taz.de/Nazi-Verstrickungen-beim-Geheimdienst/!5363325/
 [^7]: dts Nachrichtenagentur, "Über 30 BND-Mitarbeiter bei Kriegsverbrechen im Zweiten Weltkrieg," October 7, 2022. https://regionalheute.de/ueber-30-bnd-mitarbeiter-bei-kriegsverbrechen-im-zweiten-weltkrieg-1665142867/
 [^8]: Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, *Final Report to Congress*, April 2007, Figure 12. https://www.archives.gov/files/iwg/reports/final-report-2007.pdf
 [^9]: Breitman, Richard, "Historical Analysis of 20 Name Files from CIA Records," Interagency Working Group, 2001. https://www.archives.gov/iwg/declassified-records/rg-263-cia-records/historical-analysis-by-breitman.pdf
 [^10]: Central Intelligence Agency, *Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1949-56*, Vol. 1, declassified 2007. https://archive.org/details/CIAAndTheOriginsOfTheBND1949-1956
--- a/ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/USA/Central
+++ b/ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/USA/Central
@ -28,19 +28,19 @@ relations:
    with: "[[Psychological Strategy Board]]"
    role: "Member agency; the Director of Central Intelligence chaired meeting M-8"
    start: 1952-01-10
-    fn: 43
+    fn: 44
  - type: employed_by
    with: "[[Max Millikan]]"
    reverse: true
    role: "Assistant Director, Research and Reports (1951); Special Consultant (1952)"
    start: 1951-01
    end: 1952-03
-    fn: 44
+    fn: 45
  - type: funded
    with: "[[Center for International Studies]]"
    role: "agency money reported to have set up the center in 1951; $300,000 reported in 1967"
    start: 1951
-    fn: 51
+    fn: 52
 ---
 The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is a primary intelligence-gathering organization of the United States government. In the context of psychic research, the CIA played a significant, albeit often covert, role in funding and overseeing programs aimed at exploring and utilizing psychic phenomena for intelligence purposes.[^1]
@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ In early 1982, CIA director William J. Casey and Attorney General [[William Fren
 ### Ilopango Obstruction
-When [[DEA]] agent [[Celerino Castillo]] began investigating Contra drug trafficking at Ilopango, the CIA intervened directly. In April 1986 the El Salvador station sent a cable asking the Costa Rica station to persuade the DEA to back off: "El Salvador Station would appreciate Costa Rica Station advising DEA not to make any inquiries into anyone re: Hangar No. 4 at Ilopango since only legitimate CIA supported operations were conducted from this facility."[^29]
+When [[DEA]] agent [[Celerino Castillo]] began investigating Contra drug trafficking at Ilopango, the CIA intervened directly.[^29] On April 25, 1986 the El Salvador station replied to a Costa Rica station cable of April 23 about Carlos Amador. The reply asked: "Based on that information, [El Salvador] Station would appreciate [Costa Rica] Station advising [DEA] not to make any inquiries to anyone re: hangar no. 4 at Ilopango since only legitimate [CIA] supported operations were conducted from this facility." The same cable stated that station air operations had moved from Hangar 4 into Hangar 5, which the station still occupied.[^30]
 ### Inspector General Investigation
@ -144,37 +144,37 @@ Multiple CIA officials were indicted during the Iran-Contra investigation. Clarr
 ### Interrogation videotapes and the 2004 to 2006 directorship
-[[Porter Goss]], a former House intelligence chairman, was confirmed by the Senate 77 to 17 on September 22, 2004, was sworn in at the White House on September 24, 2004, and announced his resignation on May 5, 2006.[^30] His executive director, [[Kyle Foggo]], the agency's No. 3 official, resigned in May 2006 while the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] was examining whether he had improperly helped the defense contractor [[Brent Wilkes]] obtain large CIA contracts.[^31] Foggo pleaded guilty in 2008 to one count of defrauding the government and was sentenced on February 26, 2009 to 37 months.[^32]
+[[Porter Goss]], a former House intelligence chairman, was confirmed by the Senate 77 to 17 on September 22, 2004, was sworn in at the White House on September 24, 2004, and announced his resignation on May 5, 2006.[^31] His executive director, [[Kyle Foggo]], the agency's No. 3 official, resigned in May 2006 while the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] was examining whether he had improperly helped the defense contractor [[Brent Wilkes]] obtain large CIA contracts.[^32] Foggo pleaded guilty in 2008 to one count of defrauding the government and was sentenced on February 26, 2009 to 37 months.[^33]
-The [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]]'s 2014 study of the detention and interrogation program records that the CIA destroyed videotapes of the interrogations of [[Abu Zubaydah]] and [[Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri]] on November 9, 2005, the day after the Senate's November 8 vote against an amendment to establish an independent commission on detainee treatment.[^33] In an October 31, 2005 email, the CIA attorney [[John Rizzo]] wrote that he needed "to be the skunk at the party again."[^33]
+The [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]]'s 2014 study of the detention and interrogation program records that the CIA destroyed videotapes of the interrogations of [[Abu Zubaydah]] and [[Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri]] on November 9, 2005, the day after the Senate's November 8 vote against an amendment to establish an independent commission on detainee treatment.[^34] In an October 31, 2005 email, the CIA attorney [[John Rizzo]] wrote that he needed "to be the skunk at the party again."[^34]
-Emails released by the [[United States Department of Justice|Justice Department]] in April 2010, under a Freedom of Information Act request by the [[American Civil Liberties Union]], state that in November 2005 [[Jose A. Rodriguez Jr.|Jose Rodriguez]] told Goss and others he "felt it was extremely important to destroy the tapes and that if there was any heat, he would take it," and that Goss "laughed and said he'd be the one to take the heat." The same email states: "PG, however, agreed with the decision." NBC News reported that the email is an after-the-fact summary that does not prove Goss approved the destruction, that current and former intelligence officials have said he did not and was angry to find out, and that Rodriguez's lawyer disputed that.[^34] On November 9, 2010, the Justice Department said special prosecutor [[John Durham]] would not bring criminal charges over the destruction.[^35]
+Emails released by the [[United States Department of Justice|Justice Department]] in April 2010, under a Freedom of Information Act request by the [[American Civil Liberties Union]], state that in November 2005 [[Jose A. Rodriguez Jr.|Jose Rodriguez]] told Goss and others he "felt it was extremely important to destroy the tapes and that if there was any heat, he would take it," and that Goss "laughed and said he'd be the one to take the heat." The same email states: "PG, however, agreed with the decision." NBC News reported that the email is an after-the-fact summary that does not prove Goss approved the destruction, that current and former intelligence officials have said he did not and was angry to find out, and that Rodriguez's lawyer disputed that.[^35] On November 9, 2010, the Justice Department said special prosecutor [[John Durham]] would not bring criminal charges over the destruction.[^36]
 ### Foreign Broadcast Information Service
-The [[Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service]] became a unit of the agency in 1947. The [[War Department]] had sponsored the service from January 2, 1946, and the [[Director of Central Intelligence]] assumed control of it on July 31, 1946, before the [[National Security Act of 1947]] replaced the [[Central Intelligence Group]] with the agency.[^36] The administrative history of the service's record group lists the successor as "Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Intelligence Agency, 1947-."[^37] The service's 1969 history says it came to the agency "almost mature, trained and disciplined, and ready to plunge immediately into the tasks outlined for it."[^38]
+The [[Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service]] became a unit of the agency in 1947. The [[War Department]] had sponsored the service from January 2, 1946, and the [[Director of Central Intelligence]] assumed control of it on July 31, 1946, before the [[National Security Act of 1947]] replaced the [[Central Intelligence Group]] with the agency.[^37] The administrative history of the service's record group lists the successor as "Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Intelligence Agency, 1947-."[^38] The service's 1969 history says it came to the agency "almost mature, trained and disciplined, and ready to plunge immediately into the tasks outlined for it."[^39]
-Within the agency the service sat under the [[Assistant Director for Operations]]. In January 1947 the Assistant Director presented a propaganda analysis program to the PRC, approving the proposed program but excluding "interpretative analysis" from its scope, and the requested staff was twelve at $61,000 a year. [[Lawrence K. White]] was announced as deputy chief of the service on January 9, 1947.[^39]
+Within the agency the service sat under the [[Assistant Director for Operations]]. In January 1947 the Assistant Director presented a propaganda analysis program to the PRC, approving the proposed program but excluding "interpretative analysis" from its scope, and the requested staff was twelve at $61,000 a year. [[Lawrence K. White]] was announced as deputy chief of the service on January 9, 1947.[^40]
-The service's functions were folded into the [[Open Source Center]] in November 2005. The release announcing the center said the Director of the CIA would administer it on behalf of the DNI.[^40]
+The service's functions were folded into the [[Open Source Center]] in November 2005. The release announcing the center said the Director of the CIA would administer it on behalf of the DNI.[^41]
 ### Psychological warfare liaison, 1946 to 1952
-In July 1946 the Central Intelligence Group's Central Planning Staff closed out its liaison with the Security Advisory Board of the [[Office of War Information]]. The memorandum designated a liaison officer to the Director, charged him with recommending when appropriate whether the board should be placed under the [[National Intelligence Authority]], and recorded that no further action by the Security Branch was required. The board was being replaced by a new Security Advisory Board under the [[State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee]].[^41]
+In July 1946 the Central Intelligence Group's Central Planning Staff closed out its liaison with the Security Advisory Board of the [[Office of War Information]]. The memorandum designated a liaison officer to the Director, charged him with recommending when appropriate whether the board should be placed under the [[National Intelligence Authority]], and recorded that no further action by the Security Branch was required. The board was being replaced by a new Security Advisory Board under the [[State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee]].[^42]
-In July 1947 the Assistant Director of the Office of Research and Evaluation complained to the chief of the Group's Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff that the arrangement for the Group's seat on the coordinating committee's subcommittee for psychological warfare was "not operable." The principal member came from the [[Office of Special Operations]] and the alternate from the Office of Research and Evaluation, and the memorandum was addressed to the Executive Director.[^42]
+In July 1947 the Assistant Director of the Office of Research and Evaluation complained to the chief of the Group's Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff that the arrangement for the Group's seat on the coordinating committee's subcommittee for psychological warfare was "not operable." The principal member came from the [[Office of Special Operations]] and the alternate from the Office of Research and Evaluation, and the memorandum was addressed to the Executive Director.[^43]
-On January 10, 1952 the eighth meeting of the [[Psychological Strategy Board]] was chaired by [[Walter Bedell Smith]], the Director of Central Intelligence. Its members were the Deputy Secretary of Defense, William C. Foster, and the Under Secretary of State, James E. Webb. [[Edward W. Barrett]], Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, attended as a participant from the Department of State.[^43]
+On January 10, 1952 the eighth meeting of the [[Psychological Strategy Board]] was chaired by [[Walter Bedell Smith]], the Director of Central Intelligence. Its members were the Deputy Secretary of Defense, William C. Foster, and the Under Secretary of State, James E. Webb. [[Edward W. Barrett]], Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, attended as a participant from the Department of State.[^44]
-In a letter stamped January 30, 1951, [[Max Millikan]] wrote that he had "gone on leave from MIT to head up the Office of Research and Reports in this Agency."[^44] On October 29, 1951 he wrote to a prospective recruit that for "the last nine or ten months" he had been "trying to put together for General Smith an organization to do economic research."[^45] A memorandum of conversation dated January 22, 1951 lists "Dr. Max Millikan, Central Intelligence Agency" among the participants in a discussion with State Department officers of psychological intelligence, and records his concern that splitting that work among several organizations would produce the shortcomings of decentralization.[^46] A memorandum of March 6, 1951, addressed to the intelligence chiefs of the State Department, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, was issued "For the Director of Central Intelligence" over Millikan's typed name as Assistant Director, Research and Reports.[^47] A letter he signed as Assistant Director on November 26, 1951 says that "Walt Rostow at the Center for International Studies has sought my assistance in finding him someone to help out with some research."[^48] A letter of March 3, 1952 addresses him as Special Consultant, Central Intelligence Agency.[^49] In an interview note of March 5, 1952 titled "Origin of PSB," a CIA historian recorded that Millikan "participated in a 'contract study,' State and MIT," which the note identifies as the "Troy Project," and that its study "had considerable to do with the creation of the PSB."[^50]
+In a letter stamped January 30, 1951, [[Max Millikan]] wrote that he had "gone on leave from MIT to head up the Office of Research and Reports in this Agency."[^45] On October 29, 1951 he wrote to a prospective recruit that for "the last nine or ten months" he had been "trying to put together for General Smith an organization to do economic research."[^46] A memorandum of conversation dated January 22, 1951 lists "Dr. Max Millikan, Central Intelligence Agency" among the participants in a discussion with State Department officers of psychological intelligence, and records his concern that splitting that work among several organizations would produce the shortcomings of decentralization.[^47] A memorandum of March 6, 1951, addressed to the intelligence chiefs of the State Department, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, was issued "For the Director of Central Intelligence" over Millikan's typed name as Assistant Director, Research and Reports.[^48] A letter he signed as Assistant Director on November 26, 1951 says that "Walt Rostow at the Center for International Studies has sought my assistance in finding him someone to help out with some research."[^49] A letter of March 3, 1952 addresses him as Special Consultant, Central Intelligence Agency.[^50] In an interview note of March 5, 1952 titled "Origin of PSB," a CIA historian recorded that Millikan "participated in a 'contract study,' State and MIT," which the note identifies as the "Troy Project," and that its study "had considerable to do with the creation of the PSB."[^51]
-The agency's financing of the [[Center for International Studies]] at MIT is recorded in several places. [[Patrick Oster]] reported in the Washington Post of September 11, 1977 that the agency "secretly financed a research project at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in order to gain data on how to turn Russian scientists into CIA agents," as part of "Project MK-ULTRA," with a foundation as a "front," and that the researcher was affiliated with MIT's Center for International Studies, "which was set up in 1951 with CIA money and had as its first director Max F. Millikan, a former assistant director of the agency."[^51] Time reported on February 24, 1967 "directly and without masquerade" "$300,000 to finance M.I.T.'s topflight Center for International Studies," and that MIT then "terminated the contract 'for practical, not moral reasons.'"[^52] [[Andreas Lowenfeld]], of the State Department's Office of Legal Adviser, testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee's Internal Security Subcommittee, said of the center in 1951 and 1952: "they had some kind of contract with the CIA," and, asked whether he knew it was a CIA operation, "I was never formally told, but it became apparent."[^53]
+The agency's financing of the [[Center for International Studies]] at MIT is recorded in several places. [[Patrick Oster]] reported in the Washington Post of September 11, 1977 that the agency "secretly financed a research project at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in order to gain data on how to turn Russian scientists into CIA agents," as part of "Project MK-ULTRA," with a foundation as a "front," and that the researcher was affiliated with MIT's Center for International Studies, "which was set up in 1951 with CIA money and had as its first director Max F. Millikan, a former assistant director of the agency."[^52] Time reported on February 24, 1967 "directly and without masquerade" "$300,000 to finance M.I.T.'s topflight Center for International Studies," and that MIT then "terminated the contract 'for practical, not moral reasons.'"[^53] [[Andreas Lowenfeld]], of the State Department's Office of Legal Adviser, testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee's Internal Security Subcommittee, said of the center in 1951 and 1952: "they had some kind of contract with the CIA," and, asked whether he knew it was a CIA operation, "I was never formally told, but it became apparent."[^54]
-The third progress report on NSC 59/1 records that the CIA had been assigned a continuing study of balloons as propaganda carriers and "instructed to stockpile one thousand large-sized propaganda balloons of the best type presently available."[^54] The [[Project Troy]] report had placed balloon work inside political warfare, stating that "The balloon problem is a part of political warfare. It cannot be handled by a separate balloon shop."[^55]
+The third progress report on NSC 59/1 records that the CIA had been assigned a continuing study of balloons as propaganda carriers and "instructed to stockpile one thousand large-sized propaganda balloons of the best type presently available."[^55] The [[Project Troy]] report had placed balloon work inside political warfare, stating that "The balloon problem is a part of political warfare. It cannot be handled by a separate balloon shop."[^56]
-In February 1961 [[Allen Dulles|Allen W. Dulles]] wrote to Millikan, then director of the center, that he was "very deeply interested in the proposal in your letter of January 23," and expected to attend at least part of the meetings of May 18 to 21, 1961, at which the center would review its first ten years.[^56]
+In February 1961 [[Allen Dulles|Allen W. Dulles]] wrote to Millikan, then director of the center, that he was "very deeply interested in the proposal in your letter of January 23," and expected to attend at least part of the meetings of May 18 to 21, 1961, at which the center would review its first ten years.[^57]
-A CIA document titled "Principles Governing Budgetary Relationships Between CENIS and CIA" describes an annual contract under which research projects were "mutually agreed upon case by case" between the agency and the Center for International Studies, within an annual authorization of $500,000. The document is undated.[^57] A CIA list of recipients of Office of Research and Reports unclassified studies names Max Millikan, [[Walt Rostow]], [[Wilfred Malenbaum]], [[Everett Hagen]], [[Evsey Domar]] and [[Thomas Schelling]], each listed under the Center for International Studies.[^58] A CIA memorandum dated February 16, 1959, forwarding a [[National Review]] Bulletin item, carries the item's text stating that [[Richard Bissell]] and [[Robert Amory]] "lean ideologically on CIA's outriding auxiliary at MIT, the Center for International Studies," and that they have been influenced by the theories of "W. W. Rostow, director of the Center."[^59] The MIT President's report for 1962 to 1963 refers to "Max F. Millikan, Director of the Center for International Studies."[^60] A CIA Office of Legislative Counsel journal entry of March 3, 1967 records that "the Agency has Senator Fulbright's letter concerning a Center for International Studies, MIT, and is preparing a response."[^61]
+A CIA document titled "Principles Governing Budgetary Relationships Between CENIS and CIA" describes an annual contract under which research projects were "mutually agreed upon case by case" between the agency and the Center for International Studies, within an annual authorization of $500,000. The document is undated.[^58] A CIA list of recipients of Office of Research and Reports unclassified studies names Max Millikan, [[Walt Rostow]], [[Wilfred Malenbaum]], [[Everett Hagen]], [[Evsey Domar]] and [[Thomas Schelling]], each listed under the Center for International Studies.[^59] A CIA memorandum dated February 16, 1959, forwarding a [[National Review]] Bulletin item, carries the item's text stating that [[Richard Bissell]] and [[Robert Amory]] "lean ideologically on CIA's outriding auxiliary at MIT, the Center for International Studies," and that they have been influenced by the theories of "W. W. Rostow, director of the Center."[^60] The MIT President's report for 1962 to 1963 refers to "Max F. Millikan, Director of the Center for International Studies."[^61] A CIA Office of Legislative Counsel journal entry of March 3, 1967 records that "the Agency has Senator Fulbright's letter concerning a Center for International Studies, MIT, and is preparing a response."[^62]
 ### Footnotes
@ -207,35 +207,36 @@ A CIA document titled "Principles Governing Budgetary Relationships Between CENI
 [^27]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom"
 [^28]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue: "The damage that has been done"
 [^29]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 13: "The wrong kind of friends"
-[^30]: Congressional Record, Senate, September 22, 2004, Rollcall Vote No. 187 (yeas 77, nays 17). https://irp.fas.org/congress/2004_cr/goss092204.html ; "Porter Goss Sworn in As New CIA Director," PBS NewsHour, September 24, 2004 (sworn in by Andrew Card in the Oval Office). https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/government_programs-july-dec04-cia_09-24 ; Norris, "Goss Is Latest to Leave Bush Administration," NPR transcript, May 5, 2006. https://www.npr.org/transcripts/5387220
+[^30]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.2 (Carlos Amador: CIA cables of April 23 and April 25, 1986). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
-[^31]: JURIST, "FBI probes CIA defense contracts after top official resigns," May 2006 (FBI probe of Foggo's possible help to ADCS). https://www.jurist.org/news/2006/05/fbi-probes-cia-defense-contracts-after ; Paul Blumenthal, "MSNBC: Foggo Gone," Sunlight Foundation, May 8, 2006 (resignation reported Monday). https://sunlightfoundation.com/2006/05/08/msnbc-foggo-gone/
+[^31]: Congressional Record, Senate, September 22, 2004, Rollcall Vote No. 187 (yeas 77, nays 17). https://irp.fas.org/congress/2004_cr/goss092204.html ; "Porter Goss Sworn in As New CIA Director," PBS NewsHour, September 24, 2004 (sworn in by Andrew Card in the Oval Office). https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/government_programs-july-dec04-cia_09-24 ; Norris, "Goss Is Latest to Leave Bush Administration," NPR transcript, May 5, 2006. https://www.npr.org/transcripts/5387220
-[^32]: NBC News, "Ex-CIA executive gets 37 months in prison," February 26, 2009 (one count of fraud, 27 counts dropped, Judge James Cacheris, 37 months as requested). https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna29413971 ; Associated Press, "CIA officer gets jail time for fraud," Philadelphia Inquirer, February 27, 2009. https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/nation_world/20090227_CIA_officer_gets_jail_time_for_fraud.html
+[^32]: JURIST, "FBI probes CIA defense contracts after top official resigns," May 2006 (FBI probe of Foggo's possible help to ADCS). https://www.jurist.org/news/2006/05/fbi-probes-cia-defense-contracts-after ; Paul Blumenthal, "MSNBC: Foggo Gone," Sunlight Foundation, May 8, 2006 (resignation reported Monday). https://sunlightfoundation.com/2006/05/08/msnbc-foggo-gone/
-[^33]: Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program, S. Rept. 113-288 (December 2014), executive summary and findings, sections on the 2005 videotapes ("The CIA destroyed the CIA interrogation videotapes the following day"; Rizzo's October 31, 2005 email). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CRPT-113srpt288.pdf
+[^33]: NBC News, "Ex-CIA executive gets 37 months in prison," February 26, 2009 (one count of fraud, 27 counts dropped, Judge James Cacheris, 37 months as requested). https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna29413971 ; Associated Press, "CIA officer gets jail time for fraud," Philadelphia Inquirer, February 27, 2009. https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/nation_world/20090227_CIA_officer_gets_jail_time_for_fraud.html
-[^34]: NBC News, "Ex-CIA chief agreed with tape destruction," April 2010 (e-mails released by the Justice Department under an ACLU FOIA request; "PG, however, agreed with the decision"; the disputed account). https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna36589750
+[^34]: Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program, S. Rept. 113-288 (December 2014), executive summary and findings, sections on the 2005 videotapes ("The CIA destroyed the CIA interrogation videotapes the following day"; Rizzo's October 31, 2005 email). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CRPT-113srpt288.pdf
-[^35]: JURIST, "No charges to be filed in CIA videotape destruction case: DOJ," November 2010 (spokesman Matthew Miller on Durham's decision; Durham appointed 2008 by Attorney General Michael Mukasey). https://www.jurist.org/news/2010/11/no-charges-to-be-filed-in-cia-videotape-destruction-case/
+[^35]: NBC News, "Ex-CIA chief agreed with tape destruction," April 2010 (e-mails released by the Justice Department under an ACLU FOIA request; "PG, however, agreed with the decision"; the disputed account). https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna36589750
-[^36]: Joseph E. Roop, "Foreign Broadcast Information Service. History. Part I: 1941-1947" (Central Intelligence Agency, approved for release April 1969), pp. 279, 299-300 and 303. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
+[^36]: JURIST, "No charges to be filed in CIA videotape destruction case: DOJ," November 2010 (spokesman Matthew Miller on Durham's decision; Durham appointed 2008 by Attorney General Michael Mukasey). https://www.jurist.org/news/2010/11/no-charges-to-be-filed-in-cia-videotape-destruction-case/
-[^37]: National Archives and Records Administration, Guide to Federal Records, Record Group 262, administrative history. https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/262.html.
+[^37]: Joseph E. Roop, "Foreign Broadcast Information Service. History. Part I: 1941-1947" (Central Intelligence Agency, approved for release April 1969), pp. 279, 299-300 and 303. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
-[^38]: Roop, Part I, p. 2. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
+[^38]: National Archives and Records Administration, Guide to Federal Records, Record Group 262, administrative history. https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/262.html.
-[^39]: Roop, Part II (CIA Directorate of Intelligence, August 1970), pp. 2 and 151-152. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06741690.
+[^39]: Roop, Part I, p. 2. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
-[^40]: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "ODNI Announces Establishment of Open Source Center," News Release No. 6-05, November 8, 2005. https://irp.fas.org/news/2005/11/odni110805.html.
+[^40]: Roop, Part II (CIA Directorate of Intelligence, August 1970), pp. 2 and 151-152. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06741690.
-[^41]: Central Intelligence Group, Central Planning Staff, memorandum "Liquidation of Security Advisory Board, OWI (C.I.G. Liaison with New Security Advisory Board under SWNCC)," July 22, 1946. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP78-04007A000300040024-9. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-04007a000300040024-9
+[^41]: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "ODNI Announces Establishment of Open Source Center," News Release No. 6-05, November 8, 2005. https://irp.fas.org/news/2005/11/odni110805.html.
-[^42]: Central Intelligence Group, Chief, ICAPS, to the Executive Director, memorandum "CIG Membership on SWNCC Subcommittee for Psychological Warfare," July 21, 1947. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP84-00022R000400100046-0. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp84-00022r000400100046-0
+[^42]: Central Intelligence Group, Central Planning Staff, memorandum "Liquidation of Security Advisory Board, OWI (C.I.G. Liaison with New Security Advisory Board under SWNCC)," July 22, 1946. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP78-04007A000300040024-9. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-04007a000300040024-9
-[^43]: Central Intelligence Agency, Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB M-8), January 10, 1952, membership and other participants. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP80-01065A000500100033-6. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-01065a000500100033-6
+[^43]: Central Intelligence Group, Chief, ICAPS, to the Executive Director, memorandum "CIG Membership on SWNCC Subcommittee for Psychological Warfare," July 21, 1947. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP84-00022R000400100046-0. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp84-00022r000400100046-0
-[^44]: Max F. Millikan, letter stamped January 30, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003100150032-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003100150032-1
+[^44]: Central Intelligence Agency, Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB M-8), January 10, 1952, membership and other participants. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP80-01065A000500100033-6. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-01065a000500100033-6
-[^45]: Max F. Millikan, letter of October 29, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP79-01157A000200020002-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp79-01157a000200020002-2
+[^45]: Max F. Millikan, letter stamped January 30, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003100150032-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003100150032-1
-[^46]: CIA, memorandum of conversation, "Psychological Intelligence," January 22, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003500180026-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003500180026-1
+[^46]: Max F. Millikan, letter of October 29, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP79-01157A000200020002-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp79-01157a000200020002-2
-[^47]: CIA, "Report of Intelligence Project Initiations, February 1951," memorandum of March 6, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP60-00213A000200030008-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp60-00213a000200030008-3
+[^47]: CIA, memorandum of conversation, "Psychological Intelligence," January 22, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003500180026-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003500180026-1
-[^48]: Max F. Millikan, letter of November 26, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003000200096-6. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003000200096-6
+[^48]: CIA, "Report of Intelligence Project Initiations, February 1951," memorandum of March 6, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP60-00213A000200030008-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp60-00213a000200030008-3
-[^49]: Stuart A. Rice, Assistant Director for Statistical Standards, Bureau of the Budget, letter to Max F. Millikan, March 3, 1952, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00662R000300120004-5. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00662r000300120004-5
+[^49]: Max F. Millikan, letter of November 26, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003000200096-6. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003000200096-6
-[^50]: A. B. Darling, note of interview with Max Millikan, "Origin of PSB," March 5, 1952, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP83-00036R000400050039-0. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83-00036r000400050039-0
+[^50]: Stuart A. Rice, Assistant Director for Statistical Standards, Bureau of the Budget, letter to Max F. Millikan, March 3, 1952, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00662R000300120004-5. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00662r000300120004-5
-[^51]: Patrick Oster, "CIA Envisioned Soviet Scientists as U.S. Agents," Chicago Sun-Times, reprinted in the Washington Post, September 11, 1977, p. A-9, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP88-01315R000400460003-8. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp88-01315r000400460003-8
+[^51]: A. B. Darling, note of interview with Max Millikan, "Origin of PSB," March 5, 1952, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP83-00036R000400050039-0. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83-00036r000400050039-0
-[^52]: Time, February 24, 1967, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP84-00161R000400210135-8. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp84-00161r000400210135-8
+[^52]: Patrick Oster, "CIA Envisioned Soviet Scientists as U.S. Agents," Chicago Sun-Times, reprinted in the Washington Post, September 11, 1977, p. A-9, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP88-01315R000400460003-8. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp88-01315r000400460003-8
-[^53]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Internal Security Subcommittee, extracts from hearings (Part 3) on State Department security and passport regulations, testimony of Andreas F. Lowenfeld, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00149R000400560007-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00149r000400560007-3
+[^53]: Time, February 24, 1967, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP84-00161R000400210135-8. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp84-00161r000400210135-8
-[^54]: FRUS, The Intelligence Community, 1950-1955, Document 57 (third progress report on NSC 59/1), paragraph 12. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d57
+[^54]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Internal Security Subcommittee, extracts from hearings (Part 3) on State Department security and passport regulations, testimony of Andreas F. Lowenfeld, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00149R000400560007-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00149r000400560007-3
-[^55]: CIA reading room document CIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8, excerpt of the Project Troy report to the Secretary of State, February 1, 1951 (balloon chapter). https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8
+[^55]: FRUS, The Intelligence Community, 1950-1955, Document 57 (third progress report on NSC 59/1), paragraph 12. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d57
-[^56]: Allen W. Dulles, letter to Max F. Millikan, February 27, 1961, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80B01676R003500160028-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80b01676r003500160028-9
+[^56]: CIA reading room document CIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8, excerpt of the Project Troy report to the Secretary of State, February 1, 1951 (balloon chapter). https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8
-[^57]: CIA, "Principles Governing Budgetary Relationships Between CENIS and CIA" (undated; released 2000), CIA reading room document CIA-RDP67-00059A000200090016-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp67-00059a000200090016-2
+[^57]: Allen W. Dulles, letter to Max F. Millikan, February 27, 1961, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80B01676R003500160028-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80b01676r003500160028-9
-[^58]: CIA, "Recipients for ORR Unclassified Studies" (undated list), CIA reading room document CIA-RDP63-00314R000100180007-7. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp63-00314r000100180007-7
+[^58]: CIA, "Principles Governing Budgetary Relationships Between CENIS and CIA" (undated; released 2000), CIA reading room document CIA-RDP67-00059A000200090016-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp67-00059a000200090016-2
-[^59]: CIA memorandum from the Assistant to the Director, February 16, 1959, forwarding a National Review Bulletin item, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00001R000100260064-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00001r000100260064-9
+[^59]: CIA, "Recipients for ORR Unclassified Studies" (undated list), CIA reading room document CIA-RDP63-00314R000100180007-7. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp63-00314r000100180007-7
-[^60]: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, President's Report Issue for the year ending July 1, 1963, p. 165, MIT Libraries, DSpace. https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/160055
+[^60]: CIA memorandum from the Assistant to the Director, February 16, 1959, forwarding a National Review Bulletin item, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00001R000100260064-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00001r000100260064-9
-[^61]: CIA Office of Legislative Counsel, journal entry, "Friday, 3 March 1967," CIA reading room document CIA-RDP69B00369R000200020044-4. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp69b00369r000200020044-4
+[^61]: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, President's Report Issue for the year ending July 1, 1963, p. 165, MIT Libraries, DSpace. https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/160055
 [^62]: CIA Office of Legislative Counsel, journal entry, "Friday, 3 March 1967," CIA reading room document CIA-RDP69B00369R000200020044-4. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp69b00369r000200020044-4
--- a/ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/USA/NSA.md
+++ b/ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/USA/NSA.md
@ -110,11 +110,21 @@ The NSA released transcripts of intercepts made after the June 8, 1967, attack o
 ### United Nations headquarters, Security Council delegations and Ndola
-In September 1961, according to a commission of jurists reporting to the [[United Nations]] General Assembly in 2014, Charles Southall was stationed at the NSA naval communications facility near Nicosia, Cyprus, and recalled a recording played back shortly after midnight on the night of the crash that killed [[Dag Hammarskjöld]]. The Commission wrote that "from the broader evidence of the US National Security Agency's worldwide monitoring activities in and about 1961, it is highly likely that the entirety of the local and regional Ndola radio traffic on the night of 17-18 September 1961 was tracked and recorded by the NSA, and possibly also by the CIA."[^25] The Eminent Person reporting in 2019 recorded that two United States personnel confirmed as working for or in support of NSA activities said they overheard a transmission or recording of an attack on the aircraft, that both had died by 2018, and that the United States had not responded substantively to requests for clarification made since 2015.[^26]
+According to a commission of jurists reporting to the [[United Nations]] General Assembly in 2014, Charles Southall recalled a recording played back shortly after midnight in September 1961, at the naval communications facility near Nicosia, Cyprus, on the night of the crash that killed [[Dag Hammarskjöld]]. The Eminent Person wrote in 2022: "It has not been disputed that he held a specialization as a "processing and reporting" officer who was assigned at a naval communications facility near Nicosia in 1961."[^25] The Commission wrote that "from the broader evidence of the US National Security Agency's worldwide monitoring activities in and about 1961, it is highly likely that the entirety of the local and regional Ndola radio traffic on the night of 17-18 September 1961 was tracked and recorded by the NSA, and possibly also by the CIA."[^26] The Eminent Person reporting in 2019 recorded that two United States personnel confirmed as working for or in support of NSA activities said they overheard a transmission or recording of an attack on the aircraft, that both had died by 2018, and that the United States had not responded substantively to requests for clarification made since 2015.[^27]
-A January 31, 2003 email from [[Frank Koza]], chief of staff of the Regional Targets section of the NSA, to [[GCHQ]] asked for a "surge effort to revive/create efforts against UNSC members Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Bulgaria and Guinea." [[The Observer]] published the memo on March 2, 2003.[^27] [[Katharine Gun]], who worked at GCHQ, was charged under section 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1989; on February 25, 2004 the Crown offered no evidence.[^28]
+The 2015 Independent Panel recorded that the United States, in its response of June 9, 2015, confirmed that Charles Southall was an active member of the United States Navy at the time, without saying where he was stationed or in what capacity he served.[^28] The 2019 report recorded that the United States confirmed that he joined the Navy in 1955, was released from active duty in 1969, and retired as a commander from the Naval Reserve in 1978, and that the United States gave no information on whether he worked in support of NSA activities.[^29]
-In August 2013 [[Der Spiegel]] reported, on the basis of documents obtained by Edward Snowden, that NSA experts had cracked the codes of the United Nations video conferencing system in the summer of 2012, and that the number of decoded communications rose from 12 to 458 within three weeks. The same documents reportedly showed collection against the [[International Atomic Energy Agency]] and an NSA bugging program, called Special Collection Service, in more than 80 embassies and consulates.[^29]
+The 2022 and 2024 reports described Southall and Paul Abram as two United States personnel who had provided information tending to confirm that they were working for or in support of NSA activities on the night of September 17 and 18, 1961, when they overheard or read a transmission concerning an attack on flight SE-BDY.[^30] Both reports recorded that the two men had passed away as of 2018.[^30] The 2024 report wrote that the failure of the United States to take up the opportunity to contradict their claims "tends to have the effect of supporting those claims."[^31]
 The Panel recorded that Abram, a former United States Air Force security services officer, had said he was attached to an NSA listening post at Iraklion, Greece. It assessed that his claim to have performed special duties at the time appeared to be valid, on the basis of a discharge record describing him as a "voice intercept procedure specialist," but could not confirm that he was posted to Iraklion at the time.[^32] The 2017 report recorded that the United States confirmed his service record only in July 2017, with information that disputed his location at the time he reported hearing the intercept.[^33]
 The National Security Archive at George Washington University filed Freedom of Information Act requests on behalf of the 2013 Commission of Jurists for any NSA recording or transcript of radio traffic on the night of September 17 and 18, 1961 appearing to relate to one aircraft firing upon another, and for any message intercepted concerning the approach of an aircraft to Ndola.[^34] The NSA's initial response indicated that two of three responsive documents appeared exempt by reason of "top secret" classification, and that the third was not held by the NSA; an appeal was lodged.[^34] The agency told the commission that releasing the two files "could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security."[^35] The Swedish newspaper SvD Nyheter reported on November 21, 2014 that the United States had given the Swedish foreign minister, Carl Bildt, access to the two files, quoting him as saying that the information was "trivial and unimportant." In 2015 one member of the Independent Panel, of Australian nationality, was given full access to the two files and assessed that they contained no information on the interception of communications about an attack on SE-BDY.[^35] On June 9, 2015 the United States told the Panel that its search of NSA and CIA records had not found documents matching the materials requested.[^35]
 The 2024 report described Dakota aircraft at Ndola equipped to intercept, transmit and receive communications over long distances, and wrote that there was "a reasonable evidentiary basis" to consider that these aircraft "may have overheard or relayed communications from or about flight SE-BDY."[^31]
 A January 31, 2003 email from [[Frank Koza]], chief of staff of the Regional Targets section of the NSA, to [[GCHQ]] asked for a "surge effort to revive/create efforts against UNSC members Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Bulgaria and Guinea." [[The Observer]] published the memo on March 2, 2003.[^36] [[Katharine Gun]], who worked at GCHQ, was charged under section 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1989; on February 25, 2004 the Crown offered no evidence.[^37]
 In August 2013 [[Der Spiegel]] reported, on the basis of documents obtained by Edward Snowden, that NSA experts had cracked the codes of the United Nations video conferencing system in the summer of 2012, and that the number of decoded communications rose from 12 to 458 within three weeks. The same documents reportedly showed collection against the [[International Atomic Energy Agency]] and an NSA bugging program, called Special Collection Service, in more than 80 embassies and consulates.[^38]
 ### Footnotes
@ -142,8 +152,17 @@ In August 2013 [[Der Spiegel]] reported, on the basis of documents obtained by E
 [^22]: National Security Agency, "U.S.S. Liberty," release page (Wayback Machine 2007 capture). http://web.archive.org/web/2007/http://www.nsa.gov/liberty
 [^23]: David C. Walsh, "Former NSA Officials Agree," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, June 2003. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2003/june/former-nsa-officials-agree
 [^24]: "New revelations in attack on American spy ship," *Chicago Tribune*, October 2, 2007. https://www.chicagotribune.com/2007/10/02/new-revelations-in-attack-on-american-spy-ship/
-[^25]: Commission of Jurists on the Inquiry into the Death of Dag Hammarskjöld, United Nations General Assembly document A/68/800, 2014, paragraphs 13.23 to 13.28 and 15.7. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
+[^25]: A/76/892, paragraph 370. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
-[^26]: Report of the Eminent Person, United Nations General Assembly document A/73/973, September 12, 2019, paragraph 19. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
+[^26]: Commission of Jurists on the Inquiry into the Death of Dag Hammarskjöld, United Nations General Assembly document A/68/800, 2014, paragraphs 13.23 to 13.28 and 15.7. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
-[^27]: Bright, Martin, Ed Vulliamy and Peter Beaumont. "Revealed: US dirty tricks to win vote on Iraq war," *The Observer,* March 2, 2003. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/02/usa.iraq ; McGovern, Ray. "When Truth Tried to Stop War," *Consortium News,* January 31, 2013. https://consortiumnews.com/2013/01/31/when-truth-tried-to-stop-war/
+[^27]: Report of the Eminent Person, United Nations General Assembly document A/73/973, September 12, 2019, paragraph 19. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
-[^28]: House of Commons, "Katharine Gun," HC Deb 26 February 2004, vol. 418, cc. 427-40. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/2004/feb/26/katharine-gun
+[^28]: A/70/132, report of the Independent Panel of Experts, paragraph 84 (the United States response of June 9, 2015). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F70%2F132&l=en&t=pdf
-[^29]: Al Jazeera, "Report: US bugged UN headquarters," August 25, 2013, reporting the Der Spiegel account. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/8/25/report-us-bugged-un-headquarters ; CBC News, "NSA spied on UN, leaked files show," August 2013. https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/nsa-spied-on-un-leaked-files-show-1.1306194
+[^29]: A/73/973, report of the Eminent Person, September 12, 2019, paragraph 102. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
 [^30]: A/76/892, report of the Eminent Person, August 25, 2022, paragraph 32; A/78/1006, report of the Eminent Person, September 9, 2024, paragraph 50. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
 [^31]: A/78/1006, paragraphs 47 to 50. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F78%2F1006&l=en&t=pdf
 [^32]: A/70/132, paragraphs 76, 77 and 85. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F70%2F132&l=en&t=pdf
 [^33]: A/71/1042, report of the Eminent Person, September 5, 2017, paragraph 7. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F71%2F1042&l=en&t=pdf
 [^34]: A/68/800, paragraphs 15.11 and 15.12. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
 [^35]: A/70/132, paragraphs 81 to 83. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F70%2F132&l=en&t=pdf
 [^36]: Bright, Martin, Ed Vulliamy and Peter Beaumont. "Revealed: US dirty tricks to win vote on Iraq war," *The Observer,* March 2, 2003. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/02/usa.iraq ; McGovern, Ray. "When Truth Tried to Stop War," *Consortium News,* January 31, 2013. https://consortiumnews.com/2013/01/31/when-truth-tried-to-stop-war/
 [^37]: House of Commons, "Katharine Gun," HC Deb 26 February 2004, vol. 418, cc. 427-40. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/2004/feb/26/katharine-gun
 [^38]: Al Jazeera, "Report: US bugged UN headquarters," August 25, 2013, reporting the Der Spiegel account. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/8/25/report-us-bugged-un-headquarters ; CBC News, "NSA spied on UN, leaked files show," August 2013. https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/nsa-spied-on-un-leaked-files-show-1.1306194
--- a/ORGANIZATIONS/INTERNATIONAL/United
+++ b/ORGANIZATIONS/INTERNATIONAL/United
@ -34,14 +34,14 @@ relations:
    start: 1953-04
    end: 1961-09-18
    role: "Secretary-General of the United Nations"
-    fn: 25
+    fn: 26
  - type: head_of
    with: "[[Kurt Waldheim]]"
    reverse: true
    start: 1972-01-01
    end: 1981-12-31
    role: "Secretary-General of the United Nations"
-    fn: 54
+    fn: 69
  - type: appointed
    with: "[[Folke Bernadotte]]"
    reverse: true
@ -52,27 +52,27 @@ relations:
    with: "[[Benon Sevan]]"
    reverse: true
    role: "Executive Director of the Oil-for-Food Programme"
-    fn: 53
+    fn: 68
  - type: appointed
    with: "[[Mohamed Chande Othman]]"
    reverse: true
    start: 2017
    role: "Eminent Person on the death of Dag Hammarskjöld"
-    fn: 34
+    fn: 37
  - type: appointed
    with: "[[Cyrus Vance]]"
    reverse: true
    start: 1991-10-08
    end: 1993-05
    role: "Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yugoslavia"
-    fn: 66
+    fn: 81
  - type: appointed
    with: "[[James A. Baker III]]"
    reverse: true
    start: 1997
    end: 2004
    role: "Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara"
-    fn: 67
+    fn: 82
 ---
 The United Nations is an international organization founded on October 24, 1945, by 51 original member states following [[World War II]]. Its charter established six principal organs: the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat, headed by the Secretary-General. The Security Council holds primary responsibility for international peace and security. Its five permanent members, the [[United States]], the United Kingdom, France, [[Soviet Union|Russia]], and China, hold a veto over substantive resolutions, which require nine votes including the concurring votes of the permanent members. Headquarters is in [[New York City]].[^1]
@ -99,89 +99,99 @@ On July 14, 1960, the Security Council authorized the Secretary-General to take
 The [[Church Committee]] documented the American side of the same weeks. A cable of August 18, 1960 from [[Bronson Tweedy]], chief of the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]'s Africa Division, referred to "your and our belief Lumumba must be removed if possible"; on August 19 [[Richard Bissell]] cabled "You are authorized proceed with operation" to replace Lumumba with a pro-Western group; and on August 26 [[Allen Dulles]] cabled the Leopoldville station that "targets of opportunity may present themselves to you" and authorized up to $100,000 for "crash programs."[^22] The Committee reported that in the fall of 1960 two CIA officials were asked by superiors to assassinate Lumumba, that poisons were sent to the Congo and that exploratory steps were taken toward gaining access to Lumumba, and wrote that it "does not appear from the evidence that the United States was in any way involved in the killing" by Congolese rivals in early 1961. On the question of authority, the Committee wrote that the chain of events was "strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the plot to assassinate Lumumba was authorized by President Eisenhower," while the countervailing testimony and the ambiguity of the records precluded a finding that the President intended an assassination effort.[^23]
-Lumumba was transferred on January 17, 1961 to the custody of the Katanga authorities, who announced his death several weeks later.[^21] On February 21, 1961, the Security Council noted "with deep regret" the announced killing of Lumumba, [[Maurice Mpolo]] and [[Joseph Okito]], urged the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the [[Congo]] of all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under United Nations Command, and of mercenaries, provided for the use of force, as a last resort, to prevent civil war, and decided that "an immediate and impartial investigation be held in order to ascertain the circumstances of the death of Mr. Lumumba and his colleagues and that the perpetrators of these crimes be punished."[^24]
+Lumumba was transferred on January 17, 1961 to the custody of the Katanga authorities, who announced his death several weeks later.[^21][^24] On February 21, 1961, the Security Council noted "with deep regret" the announced killing of Lumumba, [[Maurice Mpolo]] and [[Joseph Okito]], urged the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the [[Congo]] of all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under United Nations Command, and of mercenaries, provided for the use of force, as a last resort, to prevent civil war, and decided that "an immediate and impartial investigation be held in order to ascertain the circumstances of the death of Mr. Lumumba and his colleagues and that the perpetrators of these crimes be punished."[^25]
-[[Dag Hammarskjöld]], the second Secretary-General, died on the night of September 17 and 18, 1961, when a Swedish aircraft carrying sixteen people, flight SE-BDY, crashed near [[Ndola]] in what was then [[Northern Rhodesia]]. All aboard died. The Rhodesian civil aviation board of investigation found no definitive cause and could not rule out a "wilful act of some person or persons unknown"; a Rhodesian commission of inquiry under Chief Justice Sir John Clayden reported in February 1962 that the pilots had allowed the aircraft to descend too low; and the United Nations commission of inquiry reported in April 1962 that it had found no evidence of sabotage or attack but that these possibilities could not be excluded, and was unable to determine the cause.[^25] On October 26, 1962, the General Assembly adopted resolution 1759 (XVII), which took note of that report and requested the Secretary-General to inform the Assembly of any new evidence.[^26]
+[[Dag Hammarskjöld]], the second Secretary-General, died on the night of September 17 and 18, 1961, when a Swedish aircraft carrying sixteen people, flight SE-BDY, crashed near [[Ndola]] in what was then [[Northern Rhodesia]]. All aboard died. The Rhodesian civil aviation board of investigation found no definitive cause and could not rule out a "wilful act of some person or persons unknown"; a Rhodesian commission of inquiry under Chief Justice Sir John Clayden reported in February 1962 that the pilots had allowed the aircraft to descend too low; and the United Nations commission of inquiry reported in April 1962 that it had found no evidence of sabotage or attack but that these possibilities could not be excluded, and was unable to determine the cause.[^26] The Foreign Relations editorial note dates a report of the Commission of Investigation to March 8, 1962.[^27] On October 26, 1962, the General Assembly adopted resolution 1759 (XVII), which took note of that report and requested the Secretary-General to inform the Assembly of any new evidence.[^28]
-In 2013 a commission of jurists chaired by Sir [[Stephen Sedley]], assembled by an enabling committee under [[Lord Lea of Crondall]] rather than by the United Nations, and including [[Hans Corell]], [[Richard Goldstone]] and [[Wilhelmina Thomassen]], reported on whether the evidence would justify reopening the inquiry. Its report recorded that "there appear also to be relevant but classified records held by the US National Security Agency." It set out the account of Charles Southall, who in September 1961 was stationed at the NSA naval communications facility in Cyprus and recalled that shortly after midnight on the night of the crash a recording was played back in which a male voice said "I see a transport plane coming low. All the lights are on. I'm going down to make a run on it. Yes, it's the Transair DC6. It's the plane," followed by the sound of cannon fire and the words "I've hit it. There are flames. It's going down. It's crashing."[^27] The Commission concluded: "There is persuasive evidence that the aircraft was subjected to some form of attack or threat as it circled to land at Ndola." It also wrote that "from the broader evidence of the US National Security Agency's worldwide monitoring activities in and about 1961, it is highly likely that the entirety of the local and regional Ndola radio traffic on the night of 17-18 September 1961 was tracked and recorded by the NSA, and possibly also by the CIA," and that the sabotage claim was not capable of verification.[^28]
+In 2013 a commission of jurists chaired by Sir [[Stephen Sedley]], assembled by an enabling committee under [[Lord Lea of Crondall]] rather than by the United Nations, and including [[Hans Corell]], [[Richard Goldstone]] and [[Wilhelmina Thomassen]], reported on whether the evidence would justify reopening the inquiry. Its report recorded that "there appear also to be relevant but classified records held by the US National Security Agency." It set out the account of Charles Southall, who recalled that shortly after midnight on the night of the crash a recording was played back in which a male voice said "I see a transport plane coming low. All the lights are on. I'm going down to make a run on it. Yes, it's the Transair DC6. It's the plane," followed by the sound of cannon fire and the words "I've hit it. There are flames. It's going down. It's crashing." The Eminent Person wrote in 2022 of Southall: "It has not been disputed that he held a specialization as a "processing and reporting" officer who was assigned at a naval communications facility near Nicosia in 1961."[^29][^30] The Commission concluded: "There is persuasive evidence that the aircraft was subjected to some form of attack or threat as it circled to land at Ndola." It also wrote that "from the broader evidence of the US National Security Agency's worldwide monitoring activities in and about 1961, it is highly likely that the entirety of the local and regional Ndola radio traffic on the night of 17-18 September 1961 was tracked and recorded by the NSA, and possibly also by the CIA," and that the sabotage claim was not capable of verification.[^31]
-The Independent Panel of Experts, appointed under General Assembly resolution 69/246 and headed by [[Mohamed Chande Othman]], reported in July 2015. It assigned moderate probative value to nine new eyewitness accounts of more than one aircraft in the air, to the claims of two persons who heard or read alleged intercepts of an attack on SE-BDY, to new information on the air capability of Katanga, and to the possibility that communications from Hammarskjöld's CX-52 cryptographic machine were intercepted. It found that claims by mercenaries that they shot the aircraft down lacked credibility.[^29] In December 2016 the General Assembly, by resolution 71/260, requested the Secretary-General to appoint an eminent person, urged all Member States to release relevant records, and encouraged them to declassify records that "remain classified, more than 50 years after the fact."[^30]
+The Independent Panel of Experts, appointed under General Assembly resolution 69/246 and headed by [[Mohamed Chande Othman]], reported in June 2015 (transmitted by the Secretary-General on July 2, 2015). It assigned moderate probative value to nine new eyewitness accounts of more than one aircraft in the air, to the claims of two persons who heard or read alleged intercepts of an attack on SE-BDY, to new information on the air capability of Katanga, and to the possibility that communications from Hammarskjöld's CX-52 cryptographic machine were intercepted. It found that claims by mercenaries that they shot the aircraft down lacked credibility.[^32] In December 2016 the General Assembly, by resolution 71/260, requested the Secretary-General to appoint an eminent person, urged all Member States to release relevant records, and encouraged them to declassify records that "remain classified, more than 50 years after the fact."[^33]
-On September 5, 2017, the Secretary-General transmitted the report of Othman, appointed as Eminent Person. The transmittal letter records his conclusion "that it is almost certain that Dag Hammarskjöld and the members of the party accompanying him were not assassinated after landing and that all passengers died from injuries sustained during the plane crash, either instantaneously or soon after," and that he "considered it plausible that an external attack or threat was a cause of the crash." Othman cited "ample eyewitness evidence that tends to establish that there was more than one aircraft in the air at the time flight SE-BDY made its approach to Ndola, that any aircraft present other than flight SE-BDY was a jet and that flight SE-BDY was on fire before it collided with the ground," and wrote that SE-BDY "may have been fired upon or otherwise actively engaged by one or more other aircraft." He noted that "it remains possible that the crash was an accident caused by pilot error without external interference," that it was "not possible at present to conclude whether sabotage was a cause," and "a lack of access to original documents concerning an 'Operation Celeste'" relating to the hypothesis that a bomb had been planted on the aircraft.[^31] He further concluded "that the burden of proof has now shifted to Member States to show that they have conducted a full review of records and archives in their custody or possession, including those that remain classified, for potentially relevant information."[^31]
+On September 5, 2017, the Secretary-General transmitted the report of Othman, appointed as Eminent Person. The transmittal letter records his conclusion "that it is almost certain that Dag Hammarskjöld and the members of the party accompanying him were not assassinated after landing and that all passengers died from injuries sustained during the plane crash, either instantaneously or soon after," and that he "considered it plausible that an external attack or threat was a cause of the crash." Othman cited "ample eyewitness evidence that tends to establish that there was more than one aircraft in the air at the time flight SE-BDY made its approach to Ndola, that any aircraft present other than flight SE-BDY was a jet and that flight SE-BDY was on fire before it collided with the ground," and wrote that SE-BDY "may have been fired upon or otherwise actively engaged by one or more other aircraft." He noted that "it remains possible that the crash was an accident caused by pilot error without external interference," that it was "not possible at present to conclude whether sabotage was a cause," and "a lack of access to original documents concerning an 'Operation Celeste'" relating to the hypothesis that a bomb had been planted on the aircraft.[^34] He further concluded "that the burden of proof has now shifted to Member States to show that they have conducted a full review of records and archives in their custody or possession, including those that remain classified, for potentially relevant information."[^34]
-The eight Member States identified in April and May 2017 as most likely to hold relevant information were Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States; responses came from Belgium, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States.[^32] The report stated that new information from the United Kingdom, the United States, the United Nations and individuals "appears to establish that Rhodesian and United Kingdom authorities intercepted United Nations communications in the Congo in 1961," and that the United States confirmed "for the first time" the presence of its military assets in and around Ndola on the night of the crash, including between one and three Dakota aircraft with equipment able to intercept, transmit and receive communications over long distances. Of the two American personnel who had claimed to have heard or read a transmission about an attack, Southall had died in 2015, and the service record of the other, Paul Abram, a United States Air Force Security Services officer, was confirmed by the United States only in July 2017, with information that disputed his location at the time.[^33]
+The eight Member States identified in April and May 2017 as most likely to hold relevant information were Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States; responses came from Belgium, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States.[^35] The report stated that new information from the United Kingdom, the United States, the United Nations and individuals "appears to establish that Rhodesian and United Kingdom authorities intercepted United Nations communications in the Congo in 1961," and that the United States confirmed "for the first time" the presence of its military assets in and around Ndola on the night of the crash, including between one and three Dakota aircraft with equipment able to intercept, transmit and receive communications over long distances. Of the two American personnel who had claimed to have heard or read a transmission about an attack, the 2017 report records that Southall had died in 2015 (the 2019 report records that the Eminent Person was informed in 2017, and the reports of 2019, 2022 and 2024 state that both men had passed away as of 2018), and the service record of the other, Paul Abram, a United States Air Force Security Services officer, was confirmed by the United States only in July 2017, with information that disputed his location at the time.[^36]
-The report of September 12, 2019 reaffirmed those conclusions: "My work under the current mandate does not provide grounds to disturb either finding," namely that it was plausible that an external attack or threat was a cause and that the burden of proof had shifted to Member States.[^34] In 2018 the Eminent Person requested fourteen Member States to each appoint an independent and high-ranking official to review their intelligence, security and defence archives: Angola, Belgium, Canada, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, France, Germany, Portugal, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, Zambia and Zimbabwe.[^35] The Secretary-General's letter recorded new information on probable intercepts by Member States of relevant communications, the capacity of the armed forces of Katanga or others to stage an attack, including with aircraft and airstrips, the presence in the area of foreign paramilitary personnel, including pilots, and intelligence personnel, and further information on the [[South African Institute for Maritime Research]] in the context of Operation Celeste. It also recorded that not all Member States appointed an Independent Appointee, that searches had not been exhaustive in all, and that the burden of proof remained with Member States.[^34]
+The report of September 12, 2019 reaffirmed those conclusions: "My work under the current mandate does not provide grounds to disturb either finding," namely that it was plausible that an external attack or threat was a cause and that the burden of proof had shifted to Member States.[^37] In 2018 the Eminent Person requested fourteen Member States to each appoint an independent and high-ranking official to review their intelligence, security and defence archives: Angola, Belgium, Canada, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, France, Germany, Portugal, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, Zambia and Zimbabwe.[^38] The Secretary-General's letter recorded new information on probable intercepts by Member States of relevant communications, the capacity of the armed forces of Katanga or others to stage an attack, including with aircraft and airstrips, the presence in the area of foreign paramilitary personnel, including pilots, and intelligence personnel, and further information on the [[South African Institute for Maritime Research]] in the context of Operation Celeste. It also recorded that not all Member States appointed an Independent Appointee, that searches had not been exhaustive in all, and that the burden of proof remained with Member States.[^37]
-The 2019 report stated that Member States including the United Kingdom and the United States received intercepts of communications of the United Nations Operation in the Congo throughout 1961, including encoded communications on sensitive military matters, discussed at a high level by the British High Commissioner Lord Alport, the United States Consul in Elisabethville William C. Canup and the Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Sir Roy Welensky. It stated that communications sent from Hammarskjöld's CX-52 cryptographic machine "appear to have been intercepted by British and United States signals and intelligence agencies," that two United States personnel confirmed as working for or in support of National Security Agency activities said they overheard a transmission or recording of an attack on flight SE-BDY, that both had died by 2018 without a substantive response from the United States to requests for clarification made since 2015, and that it had not been possible to conclude whether sabotage was a cause, owing in part to difficulties in obtaining access to documentation in South Africa.[^36]
+The 2019 report stated that Member States including the United Kingdom and the United States received intercepts of communications of the United Nations Operation in the Congo throughout 1961, including encoded communications on sensitive military matters, discussed at a high level by the British High Commissioner Lord Alport, the United States Consul in Elisabethville William C. Canup and the Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Sir Roy Welensky. It stated that communications sent from Hammarskjöld's CX-52 cryptographic machine "appear to have been intercepted by British and United States signals and intelligence agencies," that two United States personnel confirmed as working for or in support of National Security Agency activities said they overheard a transmission or recording of an attack on flight SE-BDY, that both had died by 2018 without a substantive response from the United States to requests for clarification made since 2015, and that it had not been possible to conclude whether sabotage was a cause, owing in part to difficulties in obtaining access to documentation in South Africa.[^39]
 The report of August 25, 2022 stated that "it remains plausible that an external attack or threat was a cause of the crash."[^40] It recorded that encrypted communications sent by Hammarskjöld using the CX-52 cryptographic machines "appear to have been intercepted and read by Member States' signals and intelligence agencies," and that the claim that the CIA or NSA covertly monitored United Nations communications, in an operation known in the CIA first as "Thesaurus" and later as "Rubicon," "has not been refuted by the Member States concerned."[^40] The report recorded that reporting by SRF, the Washington Post and ZDF in 2020 was "stated to be based on a 96-page account completed in 2004 by the CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence and an oral history compiled by German intelligence officials in 2008."[^41]
 The 2014 Commission of Jurists recorded that in July 1998 the National Intelligence Agency passed to South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission a file that contained about a dozen documents on South African Institute for Maritime Research letterhead, relating to an operation codenamed "Celeste" that purported to report a bomb planted on Hammarskjöld's aircraft.[^42] The TRC's chairman, Desmond Tutu, released copies of eight of the documents at the commission's final press conference in August 1998, and the originals were passed to the Minister of Justice, Dullah Omar.[^42] South Africa wrote to the United Nations on July 1, 2016 that "a revelation made during" the TRC hearings had pointed to a possible involvement of the institute.[^43] The 2022 report recorded that a renewed search of South African archives produced no originals, and that the address and telephone number on the letterhead did not match Johannesburg directory listings for 1960 and 1961, which it wrote "may be another flag suggesting that the documents are not authentic."[^44]
 The 2019 report recorded that the Secret Intelligence Service officer Neil Ritchie, the British consul in Katanga Denzil Dunnett and the British High Commissioner in Salisbury, Lord Alport, made arrangements in September 1961 for the Ndola meeting with Tshombe, and that the arrangements used the facilities of the Union Minière.[^45] The 2022 report wrote that Ritchie flew a Union Minière engineer to Kitwe in Northern Rhodesia in September 1961, where the engineer worked with a British commercial figure who called himself British intelligence, to relay messages between the governments of Katanga, Northern Rhodesia and the United Kingdom.[^46]
 The report of September 9, 2024 stated that the United States and West Germany "appear to have had covert and direct 'backdoor' access" to messages sent by Hammarskjöld with the CX-52.[^47] It identified three Dakota aircraft at Ndola, one under the naval attaché for air in Pretoria, Commander Don Ely, one under the air force attaché for air in Pretoria, Colonel Don Gaylor, and a third flown from Elisabethville by Colonel Benjamin Matlick, and stated that there was "a reasonable evidentiary basis to consider that these or other aircraft ... may have overheard or relayed communications from or about flight SE-BDY."[^48] It recorded that Charles Southall and Paul Abram had both passed away as of 2018, and that the failure of the United States to take up the opportunity to contradict their claims "tends to have the effect of supporting those claims."[^49]
 General Assembly resolution 70/11 of November 19, 2015 asked the Secretary-General to pursue the Panel's pending requests for information and to explore the feasibility of a central archival holding.[^50] Resolution 72/252 of December 24, 2017 requested the Secretary-General to reappoint the Eminent Person and asked Member States to appoint independent, high-ranking officials to review their intelligence, security and defence archives.[^51] Resolution 74/248 of December 27, 2019 and resolution 77/252 of December 30, 2022 reappointed the Eminent Person.[^51]
 ### Cuba and the United Nations
-On April 15, 1961, the day of the air raids that preceded the invasion at the [[Bay of Pigs]], the General Assembly's First Committee heard Cuban Foreign Minister [[Raúl Roa]] accuse the United States of aggression, and [[Adlai Stevenson]] told the committee that according to his information the raids had been carried out by defectors from the Cuban Air Force who had landed in Florida and asked for political asylum.[^37] On April 16, Stevenson cabled the Department of State, for the Secretary of State ([[Dean Rusk]]) and Dulles, that he was "greatly disturbed by clear indications" that the bombing incidents "were launched in part at least from outside Cuba," that his answers to Roa "were hastily concocted in Department, and revised by me at last minute on assumption this was clear case of attacks by defectors inside Cuba," and that he did not understand why he had not been "warned and provided pre-prepared material."[^38] The operation ended on April 19, 1961, with the capture of its exile force.[^39]
+On April 15, 1961, the day of the air raids that preceded the invasion at the [[Bay of Pigs]], the General Assembly's First Committee heard Cuban Foreign Minister [[Raúl Roa]] accuse the United States of aggression, and [[Adlai Stevenson]] told the committee that according to his information the raids had been carried out by defectors from the Cuban Air Force who had landed in Florida and asked for political asylum.[^52] On April 16, Stevenson cabled the Department of State, for the Secretary of State ([[Dean Rusk]]) and Dulles, that he was "greatly disturbed by clear indications" that the bombing incidents "were launched in part at least from outside Cuba," that his answers to Roa "were hastily concocted in Department, and revised by me at last minute on assumption this was clear case of attacks by defectors inside Cuba," and that he did not understand why he had not been "warned and provided pre-prepared material."[^53] The operation ended on April 19, 1961, with the capture of its exile force.[^54]
 ### Iraq: sanctions, inspections, and Oil-for-Food
-The Security Council condemned the invasion of [[Kuwait]] by [[Iraq]] and decided on August 6, 1990 that all States should prevent trade with Iraq, in the aftermath of the [[Gulf War]].[^40] Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991, set the cease-fire terms and provided for a special commission to verify the destruction of Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.[^41] The [[UN Special Commission|United Nations Special Commission]] (UNSCOM) operated in Iraq from 1991. UNSCOM evacuated all of its personnel from Iraq in December 1998, immediately before the American and British strikes, and Iraq has barred arms inspections since.[^42]
+The Security Council condemned the invasion of [[Kuwait]] by [[Iraq]] and decided on August 6, 1990 that all States should prevent trade with Iraq, in the aftermath of the [[Gulf War]].[^55] Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991, set the cease-fire terms and provided for a special commission to verify the destruction of Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.[^56] The [[UN Special Commission|United Nations Special Commission]] (UNSCOM) operated in Iraq from 1991. UNSCOM evacuated all of its personnel from Iraq in December 1998, immediately before the American and British strikes, and Iraq has barred arms inspections since.[^57]
-[[Barton Gellman]] reported in the [[Washington Post]] on March 2, 1999 that United States intelligence services had infiltrated agents and espionage equipment for three years into the arms control teams to eavesdrop on the Iraqi military without the knowledge of UNSCOM. According to that report, the technicians who installed the commission's remote camera monitoring system in 1996 were intelligence operatives, the repeater stations they built contained antennas that intercepted Iraqi microwave military communications, and at least two technicians lent to run the system were employees of the CIA's clandestine service. A second channel, code-named Shake the Tree, used commercial scanners to intercept Iraqi radio transmissions; it was known to UNSCOM's leaders, was disclosed by the Post and the [[Boston Globe]] in January 1999, and was confirmed by the United States government that month. Gellman wrote that the United States decided not to inform Executive Chairman [[Rolf Ekeus]] or his successor [[Richard Butler]] about the second operation, and that the CIA notified [[Charles Duelfer]], the American deputy to both, to help ensure that headquarters staff did not interfere.[^42]
+[[Barton Gellman]] reported in the [[Washington Post]] on March 2, 1999 that United States intelligence services had infiltrated agents and espionage equipment for three years into the arms control teams to eavesdrop on the Iraqi military without the knowledge of UNSCOM. According to that report, the technicians who installed the commission's remote camera monitoring system in 1996 were intelligence operatives, the repeater stations they built contained antennas that intercepted Iraqi microwave military communications, and at least two technicians lent to run the system were employees of the CIA's clandestine service. A second channel, code-named Shake the Tree, used commercial scanners to intercept Iraqi radio transmissions; it was known to UNSCOM's leaders, was disclosed by the Post and the [[Boston Globe]] in January 1999, and was confirmed by the United States government that month. Gellman wrote that the United States decided not to inform Executive Chairman [[Rolf Ekeus]] or his successor [[Richard Butler]] about the second operation, and that the CIA notified [[Charles Duelfer]], the American deputy to both, to help ensure that headquarters staff did not interfere.[^57]
-Ekeus said in that report that he did not believe covert antennas could have been built into the video relay system, and that if the United States had used UNSCOM cover for espionage "we have always stood against that"; he cited the 1991 inspection in which American team leaders reported directly to Washington, which, in his words, "we stopped." Butler's spokesman said Butler had no knowledge of the allegations, and Gellman reported that Butler was quoted in a private conversation as saying "If all this stuff turns out to be true, then Rolf Ekeus and I have been played for suckers, haven't we?"[^42] In a [[PBS]] [[Frontline (PBS)|Frontline]] interview, Butler said that he had approved "gifts to us, of persons and technology" to crack Iraqi deceit, that he had disapproved of some proposals as edging "towards a line that we shouldn't cross," and that he could not know whether others were piggy-backing on UNSCOM without telling him.[^43] Gellman told Frontline that when [[David Kay]] was in the parking lot and smuggled out documents in 1991, Washington heard of their contents as soon as New York, that Ekeus was angry and forbade direct communications like that, and that he was "quite confident they continued."[^44] The [[Financial Times]] reported on July 30, 2002 that Ekeus told the Swedish newspaper Svenska Dagbladet that he had learned after leaving his position that the United States had placed two of its own agents among the inspectors.[^45]
+Ekeus said in that report that he did not believe covert antennas could have been built into the video relay system, and that if the United States had used UNSCOM cover for espionage "we have always stood against that"; he cited the 1991 inspection in which American team leaders reported directly to Washington, which, in his words, "we stopped." Butler's spokesman said Butler had no knowledge of the allegations, and Gellman reported that Butler was quoted in a private conversation as saying "If all this stuff turns out to be true, then Rolf Ekeus and I have been played for suckers, haven't we?"[^57] In a [[PBS]] [[Frontline (PBS)|Frontline]] interview, Butler said that he had approved "gifts to us, of persons and technology" to crack Iraqi deceit, that he had disapproved of some proposals as edging "towards a line that we shouldn't cross," and that he could not know whether others were piggy-backing on UNSCOM without telling him.[^58] Gellman told Frontline that when [[David Kay]] was in the parking lot and smuggled out documents in 1991, Washington heard of their contents as soon as New York, that Ekeus was angry and forbade direct communications like that, and that he was "quite confident they continued."[^59] The [[Financial Times]] reported on July 30, 2002 that Ekeus told the Swedish newspaper Svenska Dagbladet that he had learned after leaving his position that the United States had placed two of its own agents among the inspectors.[^60]
-On January 6, 1999, the spokesman for the Secretary-General, [[Fred Eckhard]], told the noon briefing that the Secretary-General had "no evidence of any kind" that UNSCOM had assisted United States intelligence, and that Butler had "categorically denied them" when the Secretary-General asked him.[^46]
+On January 6, 1999, the spokesman for the Secretary-General, [[Fred Eckhard]], told the noon briefing that the Secretary-General had "no evidence of any kind" that UNSCOM had assisted United States intelligence, and that Butler had "categorically denied them" when the Secretary-General asked him.[^61]
-UNSCOM was succeeded by [[UNMOVIC]] (UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission), established by Security Council resolution 1284 on December 17, 1999.[^47] UNMOVIC inspectors under [[Hans Blix]] were in Iraq when the United States and United Kingdom invaded in March 2003, asserting that [[Saddam Hussein]] retained prohibited weapons programs. No such programs were found.
+UNSCOM was succeeded by [[UNMOVIC]] (UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission), established by Security Council resolution 1284 on December 17, 1999.[^62] UNMOVIC inspectors under [[Hans Blix]] were in Iraq when the United States and United Kingdom invaded in March 2003, asserting that [[Saddam Hussein]] retained prohibited weapons programs. No such programs were found.
-The UN inspection effort also employed [[Karen Jansen]], a U.S. Army major and United Nations inspector who worked on the search for Iraqi biological weapons sites. [[Ruth Sinai]] reported for the [[Associated Press]] that Jansen carried sketches of two sites where the Iraqi leader had supposedly stashed biological weapons, produced by [[Ed Dames]] of [[Psi]], a private firm specializing in remote viewing, and that the sketches were generated through remote viewing.[^48]
+The UN inspection effort also employed [[Karen Jansen]], a U.S. Army major and United Nations inspector who worked on the search for Iraqi biological weapons sites. [[Ruth Sinai]] reported for the [[Associated Press]] that Jansen carried sketches of two sites where the Iraqi leader had supposedly stashed biological weapons, produced by [[Ed Dames]] of [[Psi]], a private firm specializing in remote viewing, and that the sketches were generated through remote viewing.[^63]
-The Oil-for-Food Programme, established under Security Council Resolution 986 of April 14, 1995, permitted Iraq to sell oil in order to purchase food and medicine under UN supervision, and became operational in December 1996.[^49] The Independent Inquiry Committee chaired by [[Paul Volcker]], a former chairman of the [[Federal Reserve]], issued its final report on October 27, 2005. The report found that more than 2,200 companies had paid kickbacks to the Iraqi government in the form of inland transportation fees, after-sales-service fees, or both, and listed 2,253 companies in its humanitarian kickback tables. Oil surcharges were paid in connection with the contracts of 139 companies.[^50] The Christian Science Monitor reported on October 28, 2005 that the report named companies and individuals from 66 countries as having sent kickbacks to Saddam Hussein's government, and from 40 countries as having paid illegal oil surcharges.[^51] The report also stated that Iraq dispensed oil allocations to a wide array of individuals and groups "whom it considered influential in their respective countries and who espoused pro-Iraq views or organized anti-sanctions activities," and that Iraq favored companies from countries it perceived as friendly, in particular permanent members of the Security Council.[^52]
+The Oil-for-Food Programme, established under Security Council Resolution 986 of April 14, 1995, permitted Iraq to sell oil in order to purchase food and medicine under UN supervision, and became operational in December 1996.[^64] The Independent Inquiry Committee chaired by [[Paul Volcker]], a former chairman of the [[Federal Reserve]], issued its final report on October 27, 2005. The report found that more than 2,200 companies had paid kickbacks to the Iraqi government in the form of inland transportation fees, after-sales-service fees, or both, and listed 2,253 companies in its humanitarian kickback tables. Oil surcharges were paid in connection with the contracts of 139 companies.[^65] The Christian Science Monitor reported on October 28, 2005 that the report named companies and individuals from 66 countries as having sent kickbacks to Saddam Hussein's government, and from 40 countries as having paid illegal oil surcharges.[^66] The report also stated that Iraq dispensed oil allocations to a wide array of individuals and groups "whom it considered influential in their respective countries and who espoused pro-Iraq views or organized anti-sanctions activities," and that Iraq favored companies from countries it perceived as friendly, in particular permanent members of the Security Council.[^67]
-The committee's findings on [[Benon Sevan]], the programme's executive director, were that he corruptly received oil allocations and cash proceeds from 1998 through 2001. The proceeds passed through a business controlled by [[Fakhry Abdelnour]] and reached a Swiss bank account controlled by [[Fred Nadler]], the brother-in-law of former Secretary-General [[Boutros Boutros-Ghali]]. The committee also described an Iraqi scheme in 1996 to bribe Boutros-Ghali through [[Samir Vincent]], and wrote that it did not have evidence that Boutros-Ghali took part in or was aware of any of this corrupt activity.[^53]
+The committee's findings on [[Benon Sevan]], the programme's executive director, were that he corruptly received oil allocations and cash proceeds from 1998 through 2001. The proceeds passed through a business controlled by [[Fakhry Abdelnour]] and reached a Swiss bank account controlled by [[Fred Nadler]], the brother-in-law of former Secretary-General [[Boutros Boutros-Ghali]]. The committee also described an Iraqi scheme in 1996 to bribe Boutros-Ghali through [[Samir Vincent]], and wrote that it did not have evidence that Boutros-Ghali took part in or was aware of any of this corrupt activity.[^68]
 ### Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim
-[[Kurt Waldheim]] served as the fourth Secretary-General from January 1, 1972, to December 31, 1981.[^54] He was elected President of [[Austria]] in 1986. On December 14, 1987, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency reported that the United States had placed him on its watch list for unwanted aliens, that [[Neil Sher]] of the Justice Department's Office of Special Investigations said the documents behind the decision showed direct involvement in atrocities and could not be handed over to the international commission of historians that Waldheim had convened, and that Waldheim again rejected charges that he participated in reprisals against civilians or in the deportation of Jews to concentration camps.[^55]
+[[Kurt Waldheim]] served as the fourth Secretary-General from January 1, 1972, to December 31, 1981.[^69] He was elected President of [[Austria]] in 1986. On December 14, 1987, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency reported that the United States had placed him on its watch list for unwanted aliens, that [[Neil Sher]] of the Justice Department's Office of Special Investigations said the documents behind the decision showed direct involvement in atrocities and could not be handed over to the international commission of historians that Waldheim had convened, and that Waldheim again rejected charges that he participated in reprisals against civilians or in the deportation of Jews to concentration camps.[^70]
-On April 27, 2001, the [[National Archives and Records Administration]] opened the CIA's name files on Waldheim, together with files on [[Adolf Hitler]], [[Klaus Barbie]], [[Adolf Eichmann]], [[Josef Mengele]], and [[Heinrich Müller]]. The Archives stated that Waldheim had not been an intelligence resource for the United States, and that the CIA could not conclude that the Soviet Union had used or blackmailed Waldheim with information about his Nazi past.[^56]
+On April 27, 2001, the [[National Archives and Records Administration]] opened the CIA's name files on Waldheim, together with files on [[Adolf Hitler]], [[Klaus Barbie]], [[Adolf Eichmann]], [[Josef Mengele]], and [[Heinrich Müller]]. The Archives stated that Waldheim had not been an intelligence resource for the United States, and that the CIA could not conclude that the Soviet Union had used or blackmailed Waldheim with information about his Nazi past.[^71]
 ### Penetration of UN communications
-A January 31, 2003 email from [[Frank Koza]], chief of staff of the Regional Targets section of the [[National Security Agency]], to the British signals agency [[GCHQ]] asked for insight into plans to vote on Iraq-related resolutions and for a "surge effort to revive/create efforts against UNSC members Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Bulgaria and Guinea." [[The Observer]] published the memo on March 2, 2003 under the headline "Revealed: US dirty tricks to win vote on Iraq war"; its article described the targets as the delegations of Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Mexico, Guinea and Pakistan, the "Middle Six," and quoted the memo's request for the "whole gamut of information that could give US policymakers an edge in obtaining results favourable to US goals or to head off surprises." The Observer reported that three former intelligence operatives judged the memo authentic and that the NSA switchboard connected its reporters to Koza's extension.[^57][^58]
+A January 31, 2003 email from [[Frank Koza]], chief of staff of the Regional Targets section of the [[National Security Agency]], to the British signals agency [[GCHQ]] asked for insight into plans to vote on Iraq-related resolutions and for a "surge effort to revive/create efforts against UNSC members Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Bulgaria and Guinea." [[The Observer]] published the memo on March 2, 2003 under the headline "Revealed: US dirty tricks to win vote on Iraq war"; its article described the targets as the delegations of Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Mexico, Guinea and Pakistan, the "Middle Six," and quoted the memo's request for the "whole gamut of information that could give US policymakers an edge in obtaining results favourable to US goals or to head off surprises." The Observer reported that three former intelligence operatives judged the memo authentic and that the NSA switchboard connected its reporters to Koza's extension.[^72][^73]
-The memo was leaked by [[Katharine Gun]], who worked at GCHQ. She had been charged under section 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1989, and on February 25, 2004 the Crown offered no evidence at the Central Criminal Court. The Attorney General's statement to Parliament said that the evidential deficiency related to the prosecution's inability "to disprove the defence of necessity to be raised on the particular facts of this case," and that the determination had nothing to do with advice given by the Attorney General on the legality of the Iraq war.[^59]
+The memo was leaked by [[Katharine Gun]], who worked at GCHQ. She had been charged under section 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1989, and on February 25, 2004 the Crown offered no evidence at the Central Criminal Court. The Attorney General's statement to Parliament said that the evidential deficiency related to the prosecution's inability "to disprove the defence of necessity to be raised on the particular facts of this case," and that the determination had nothing to do with advice given by the Attorney General on the legality of the Iraq war.[^74]
-In August 2013 [[Der Spiegel]] reported, on the basis of documents obtained by [[Edward Snowden]], that the National Security Agency had bugged the United Nations' New York headquarters. According to the report, NSA experts cracked the codes of the UN video conferencing system in the summer of 2012, and the number of decoded communications rose from 12 to 458 within three weeks. The same documents reportedly showed collection against the [[International Atomic Energy Agency]], which is part of the UN system, and an NSA bugging program in more than 80 embassies and consulates.[^60]
+In August 2013 [[Der Spiegel]] reported, on the basis of documents obtained by [[Edward Snowden]], that the National Security Agency had bugged the United Nations' New York headquarters. According to the report, NSA experts cracked the codes of the UN video conferencing system in the summer of 2012, and the number of decoded communications rose from 12 to 458 within three weeks. The same documents reportedly showed collection against the [[International Atomic Energy Agency]], which is part of the UN system, and an NSA bugging program in more than 80 embassies and consulates.[^75]
 ### Chile, arms embargoes, and the UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control
-[[Ari Ben-Menashe]] wrote that [[Alan Sanders]] of [[ITICO]] supplied blueprints for cluster bombs to [[Carlos Cardoen]], and that Cardoen produced the bombs under a covert United States license despite a United Nations arms embargo against Chile.[^61] Security Council resolution 232 of December 16, 1966 imposed mandatory measures against Southern Rhodesia, including a prohibition on the sale or shipment of arms, and resolution 418 of November 4, 1977, adopted unanimously under Chapter VII, imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.[^62][^63]
+[[Ari Ben-Menashe]] wrote that [[Alan Sanders]] of [[ITICO]] supplied blueprints for cluster bombs to [[Carlos Cardoen]], and that Cardoen produced the bombs under a covert United States license despite a United Nations arms embargo against Chile.[^76] Security Council resolution 232 of December 16, 1966 imposed mandatory measures against Southern Rhodesia, including a prohibition on the sale or shipment of arms, and resolution 418 of November 4, 1977, adopted unanimously under Chapter VII, imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.[^77][^78]
-On July 14, 1976, [[Carmelo Soria]], a Spanish-Chilean official of the Latin American Demographic Center (CELADE) of [[ECLAC]], was kidnapped by [[DINA]] agents as he left work and was murdered. The [[Inter-American Commission on Human Rights]] found in Report 133/99 that his body and car were left in a stream, that the Chilean courts had determined that State agents participated in the crime and their identities were established, that Chile had violated his rights, and that the self-amnesty decree law was incompatible with the American Convention.[^64]
+On July 14, 1976, [[Carmelo Soria]], a Spanish-Chilean official of the Latin American Demographic Center (CELADE) of [[ECLAC]], was kidnapped by [[DINA]] agents as he left work and was murdered. The [[Inter-American Commission on Human Rights]] found in Report 133/99 that his body and car were left in a stream, that the Chilean courts had determined that State agents participated in the crime and their identities were established, that Chile had violated his rights, and that the self-amnesty decree law was incompatible with the American Convention.[^79]
-In an October 1991 affidavit given to [[Bill Hamilton]] of [[INSLAW]], [[Lester Coleman]] stated that third-party funds, including from the [[United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control]] in [[Vienna]], were generally made available for the purchase of the PROMIS systems that a DEA proprietary company sold to drug abuse control agencies in several Middle Eastern countries.[^65] The fund was a precursor to the [[UN Office on Drugs and Crime]]. The fund received funding from sources connected to the CIA-backed anti-narcotics efforts that intersected with the Contra resupply networks.
+In an October 1991 affidavit given to [[Bill Hamilton]] of [[INSLAW]], [[Lester Coleman]] stated that third-party funds, including from the [[United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control]] in [[Vienna]], were generally made available for the purchase of the PROMIS systems that a DEA proprietary company sold to drug abuse control agencies in several Middle Eastern countries.[^80] The fund was a precursor to the [[UN Office on Drugs and Crime]]. The fund received funding from sources connected to the CIA-backed anti-narcotics efforts that intersected with the Contra resupply networks.
 ### Envoys and mediators
-Security Council resolution 721 of November 27, 1991 approved the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy to Yugoslavia, a post held from October 8, 1991 by [[Cyrus Vance]].[^66] In resolution 1495 of July 31, 2003 the Council supported the peace plan for self-determination of the people of [[Western Sahara]] presented by the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy, [[James A. Baker III]], who served in that role from 1997 to 2004.[^67]
+Security Council resolution 721 of November 27, 1991 approved the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy to Yugoslavia, a post held from October 8, 1991 by [[Cyrus Vance]].[^81] In resolution 1495 of July 31, 2003 the Council supported the peace plan for self-determination of the people of [[Western Sahara]] presented by the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy, [[James A. Baker III]], who served in that role from 1997 to 2004.[^82]
 ### CRIES and UNICEF
-The [[CRIES]] (Study and Research Center on Children and Sexuality) was a Belgian group whose members were convicted in Brussels in March 1988. A UPI report of March 7, 1988 stated that sixteen people were convicted of participating in a child sex ring that used a laboratory in the cellar of a [[UNICEF]] office to develop photographs, that Jozef Verbeeck, the former director of UNICEF's Brussels office, received two years in prison, and that CRIES served as a cover organization for the ring.[^68] UNICEF's institutional name was exploited by the CRIES network, which used a UNICEF umbrella for operations until the connection was exposed in 1986. S. Dovey wrote that the X-witness dossier compiled under Judge [[Jean-Marc Connerotte]] after the 1996 appeal described the network as having used UNICEF in the production of pornography.[^69]
+The [[CRIES]] (Study and Research Center on Children and Sexuality) was a Belgian group whose members were convicted in Brussels in March 1988. A UPI report of March 7, 1988 stated that sixteen people were convicted of participating in a child sex ring that used a laboratory in the cellar of a [[UNICEF]] office to develop photographs, that Jozef Verbeeck, the former director of UNICEF's Brussels office, received two years in prison, and that CRIES served as a cover organization for the ring.[^83] UNICEF's institutional name was exploited by the CRIES network, which used a UNICEF umbrella for operations until the connection was exposed in 1986. S. Dovey wrote that the X-witness dossier compiled under Judge [[Jean-Marc Connerotte]] after the 1996 appeal described the network as having used UNICEF in the production of pornography.[^84]
 ### Epstein-linked diplomacy
-Between November 2015 and January 2017, [[Jeffrey Epstein]] exchanged iMessages with [[Vitaly Churkin]], Russia's Permanent Representative to the United Nations from April 2006 until his death. The Justice Department's Epstein productions include a message log beginning November 16, 2015, in which Epstein wrote, "I'm in town wed- fri if you have time . Jeffrey Epstein."[^70] On August 28, 2016 Epstein wrote to Churkin, "Ehud Barak and TOM Barrack at house tomorw . You are always welcome," and an email from his office that day recorded that Churkin would join the lunch with Epstein, [[Ehud Barak]] and [[Tom Barrack]]; on September 6, 2016 Epstein offered an introduction to [[Tom Pritzker]], and the logs reference a meeting with [[Larry Summers]] in January 2016.[^71]
+Between November 2015 and January 2017, [[Jeffrey Epstein]] exchanged iMessages with [[Vitaly Churkin]], Russia's Permanent Representative to the United Nations from April 2006 until his death. The Justice Department's Epstein productions include a message log beginning November 16, 2015, in which Epstein wrote, "I'm in town wed- fri if you have time . Jeffrey Epstein."[^85] On August 28, 2016 Epstein wrote to Churkin, "Ehud Barak and TOM Barrack at house tomorw . You are always welcome," and an email from his office that day recorded that Churkin would join the lunch with Epstein, [[Ehud Barak]] and [[Tom Barrack]]; on September 6, 2016 Epstein offered an introduction to [[Tom Pritzker]], and the logs reference a meeting with [[Larry Summers]] in January 2016.[^86]
-Churkin collapsed in his office in February 2017 and died on February 20, 2017, at the age of 64. [[CBS News]] reported on March 10, 2017 that the State Department had asked the city in writing on February 24 not to reveal the autopsy results, because Churkin's diplomatic immunity survives his death, and that the city's law department then told the medical examiner's office not to release further information.[^72]
+Churkin collapsed in his office in February 2017 and died on February 20, 2017, at the age of 64. [[CBS News]] reported on March 10, 2017 that the State Department had asked the city in writing on February 24 not to reveal the autopsy results, because Churkin's diplomatic immunity survives his death, and that the city's law department then told the medical examiner's office not to release further information.[^87]
 ### Unidentified flying objects at the United Nations
-In July 1968, [[J. Allen Hynek]] told the [[House Committee on Science and Astronautics]] that "the United States seek the cooperation of the United Nations in establishing a means for the impartial and free interchange among nations of information about, and reports of, unidentified flying objects," which he described as "a sort of international clearinghouse for the exchange of information on this subject," and that Congress should establish a UFO Scientific Board of Inquiry.[^73]
+In July 1968, [[J. Allen Hynek]] told the [[House Committee on Science and Astronautics]] that "the United States seek the cooperation of the United Nations in establishing a means for the impartial and free interchange among nations of information about, and reports of, unidentified flying objects," which he described as "a sort of international clearinghouse for the exchange of information on this subject," and that Congress should establish a UFO Scientific Board of Inquiry.[^88]
-On July 7, 1978, Grenada's Deputy Permanent Representative asked for the inclusion on the agenda of the thirty-third session of the General Assembly of an item entitled "Establishment of an agency or a department of the United Nations for undertaking, co-ordinating and disseminating the results of research into unidentified flying objects and related phenomena," with an explanatory memorandum; the General Assembly allocated it to the Special Political Committee on September 20, 1978.[^74] In the general debate on October 12, 1978, [[Eric Gairy]], the prime minister of Grenada, told the General Assembly that the subject of unidentified flying objects should be studied with research coordinated by United Nations organizations, and that a centre for UFO research might be established in Grenada.[^75]
+On July 7, 1978, Grenada's Deputy Permanent Representative asked for the inclusion on the agenda of the thirty-third session of the General Assembly of an item entitled "Establishment of an agency or a department of the United Nations for undertaking, co-ordinating and disseminating the results of research into unidentified flying objects and related phenomena," with an explanatory memorandum; the General Assembly allocated it to the Special Political Committee on September 20, 1978.[^89] In the general debate on October 12, 1978, [[Eric Gairy]], the prime minister of Grenada, told the General Assembly that the subject of unidentified flying objects should be studied with research coordinated by United Nations organizations, and that a centre for UFO research might be established in Grenada.[^90]
-On November 27, 1978, Gairy introduced to the Special Political Committee draft resolution A/SPC/33/L.20, which would have recommended that the United Nations, in consultation with the appropriate specialized agencies, "initiate, conduct and co-ordinate research into the nature and origin of unidentified flying objects," asked the Secretary-General to invite Member States, specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations to submit information and proposals by May 31, 1979, and provided for a group of experts to meet during the sessions of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. After consultations the Committee agreed by consensus on a draft decision, and Grenada did not press the draft resolution to a vote.[^74] The decision, adopted by consensus by the General Assembly on December 18, 1978 as decision 33/426, took note of Grenada's statements and draft resolutions, invited interested Member States to co-ordinate at the national level scientific research and investigation into extraterrestrial life, including unidentified flying objects, requested the Secretary-General to transmit the Grenada statements and documentation to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space for its 1979 session, and provided that the Committee would permit Grenada, at its request, to present its views.[^76]
+On November 27, 1978, Gairy introduced to the Special Political Committee draft resolution A/SPC/33/L.20, which would have recommended that the United Nations, in consultation with the appropriate specialized agencies, "initiate, conduct and co-ordinate research into the nature and origin of unidentified flying objects," asked the Secretary-General to invite Member States, specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations to submit information and proposals by May 31, 1979, and provided for a group of experts to meet during the sessions of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. After consultations the Committee agreed by consensus on a draft decision, and Grenada did not press the draft resolution to a vote.[^89] The decision, adopted by consensus by the General Assembly on December 18, 1978 as decision 33/426, took note of Grenada's statements and draft resolutions, invited interested Member States to co-ordinate at the national level scientific research and investigation into extraterrestrial life, including unidentified flying objects, requested the Secretary-General to transmit the Grenada statements and documentation to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space for its 1979 session, and provided that the Committee would permit Grenada, at its request, to present its views.[^91]
-In 1994, [[Laurance Rockefeller]] wrote to the White House science adviser, [[John H. Gibbons]], that preliminary talks had been held about a United Nations conference on extraterrestrial intelligence.[^77]
+In 1994, [[Laurance Rockefeller]] wrote to the White House science adviser, [[John H. Gibbons]], that preliminary talks had been held about a United Nations conference on extraterrestrial intelligence.[^92]
 ### Footnotes
@ -208,57 +218,72 @@ In 1994, [[Laurance Rockefeller]] wrote to the White House science adviser, [[Jo
 [^21]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee), *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report,* Senate Report No. 94-465, 94th Congress, 1st Session, 1975, section on the Congo (Lumumba's visit to Washington in late July 1960; dismissal of September 5; request to the United Nations force for protection; transfer to Katanga on January 17, 1961). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf
 [^22]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots,* Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975, section "Dulles Cable to Leopoldville: August 26, 1960," quoting CIA cables of August 18, 19 and 26, 1960. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf
 [^23]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots,* Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975, summary of the evidence concerning Patrice Lumumba, and findings and conclusions on Presidential authorization. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf
-[^24]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 161 (1961), February 21, 1961, preamble and paragraphs 1 to 4. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F161%20%281961%29&l=en&t=pdf
+[^24]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, S. Rept. No. 94-465, 1975, section on the Congo ("On January 17, 1961, the central government of the Congo transferred Lumumba to the custody of authorities in Katanga province"). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf
-[^25]: Commission of Jurists on the Inquiry into the Death of Dag Hammarskjöld, annexed to the letter of the Secretary-General, United Nations General Assembly document A/68/800, 2014, paragraphs 1.1, 1.2 and 9.1 to 9.4. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
+[^25]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 161 (1961), February 21, 1961, preamble and paragraphs 1 to 4. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F161%20%281961%29&l=en&t=pdf
-[^26]: United Nations General Assembly, resolution 1759 (XVII), October 26, 1962, "Report of the Commission of investigation into the conditions and circumstances resulting in the tragic death of Mr. Dag Hammarskjold and of members of the party accompanying him." https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2FRES%2F1759%20%28XVII%29&l=en&t=pdf
+[^26]: Commission of Jurists on the Inquiry into the Death of Dag Hammarskjöld, annexed to the letter of the Secretary-General, United Nations General Assembly document A/68/800, 2014, paragraphs 1.1, 1.2 and 9.1 to 9.4. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
-[^27]: United Nations General Assembly document A/68/800, paragraphs 1.5, 2.5 and 13.23 to 13.28. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
+[^27]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. XX, Congo Crisis, document 116, editorial note. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d116
-[^28]: United Nations General Assembly document A/68/800, paragraphs 15.4, 15.5 and 15.7 to 15.10. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
+[^28]: United Nations General Assembly, resolution 1759 (XVII), October 26, 1962, "Report of the Commission of investigation into the conditions and circumstances resulting in the tragic death of Mr. Dag Hammarskjold and of members of the party accompanying him." https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2FRES%2F1759%20%28XVII%29&l=en&t=pdf
-[^29]: Independent Panel of Experts appointed under General Assembly resolution 69/246, report transmitted by the Secretary-General, United Nations General Assembly document A/70/132, July 2, 2015, summary of key findings. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F70%2F132&l=en&t=pdf
+[^29]: United Nations General Assembly document A/68/800, paragraphs 1.5, 2.5 and 13.23 to 13.28. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
-[^30]: United Nations General Assembly, resolution 71/260, December 23, 2016, paragraphs 1 to 3. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2FRES%2F71%2F260&l=en&t=pdf
+[^30]: A/76/892, paragraph 370. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
-[^31]: Report of the Eminent Person, Mohamed Chande Othman, transmitted by letter of the Secretary-General dated September 5, 2017, United Nations General Assembly document A/71/1042, transmittal letter. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F71%2F1042&l=en&t=pdf
+[^31]: United Nations General Assembly document A/68/800, paragraphs 15.4, 15.5 and 15.7 to 15.10. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
-[^32]: United Nations General Assembly document A/71/1042, report of the Eminent Person, paragraphs 4 and 6. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F71%2F1042&l=en&t=pdf
+[^32]: Independent Panel of Experts appointed under General Assembly resolution 69/246, report transmitted by the Secretary-General, United Nations General Assembly document A/70/132, July 2, 2015, summary of key findings. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F70%2F132&l=en&t=pdf
-[^33]: United Nations General Assembly document A/71/1042, report of the Eminent Person, paragraphs 7 and 8. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F71%2F1042&l=en&t=pdf
+[^33]: United Nations General Assembly, resolution 71/260, December 23, 2016, paragraphs 1 to 3. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2FRES%2F71%2F260&l=en&t=pdf
-[^34]: Letter dated September 12, 2019 from the Secretary-General, attaching the report of the Eminent Person, United Nations General Assembly document A/73/973, transmittal letter and report paragraphs 2, 3 and 33. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
+[^34]: Report of the Eminent Person, Mohamed Chande Othman, transmitted by letter of the Secretary-General dated September 5, 2017, United Nations General Assembly document A/71/1042, transmittal letter. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F71%2F1042&l=en&t=pdf
-[^35]: United Nations General Assembly document A/73/973, report of the Eminent Person, paragraph 3. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
+[^35]: United Nations General Assembly document A/71/1042, report of the Eminent Person, paragraphs 4 and 6. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F71%2F1042&l=en&t=pdf
-[^36]: United Nations General Assembly document A/73/973, report of the Eminent Person, paragraphs 11 and 16 to 19. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
+[^36]: United Nations General Assembly document A/71/1042, report of the Eminent Person, paragraphs 7 and 8. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F71%2F1042&l=en&t=pdf
-[^37]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963,* Volume X, Cuba, January 1961-September 1962, Document 104, editorial note on the meeting of the Political (First) Committee of April 15, 1961 (U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.1149). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d104
+[^37]: Letter dated September 12, 2019 from the Secretary-General, attaching the report of the Eminent Person, United Nations General Assembly document A/73/973, transmittal letter and report paragraphs 2, 3 and 33. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
-[^38]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963,* Volume X, Document 105, Telegram from the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, April 16, 1961. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d105
+[^38]: United Nations General Assembly document A/73/973, report of the Eminent Person, paragraph 3. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
-[^39]: Central Intelligence Agency, Inspector General, "Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation," October 1961, declassified 1998; published in Kornbluh, Peter, ed. *Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba.* New Press, 1998.
+[^39]: United Nations General Assembly document A/73/973, report of the Eminent Person, paragraphs 11 and 16 to 19. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
-[^40]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 661 (1990), August 6, 1990. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F661%20%281990%29&l=en&t=pdf
+[^40]: A/76/892, report of the Eminent Person, August 25, 2022, introduction and paragraph 30. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
-[^41]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 687 (1991), April 3, 1991. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F687%20%281991%29&l=en&t=pdf
+[^41]: A/76/892, paragraphs 129 to 131. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
-[^42]: Gellman, Barton. "U.S. Spied on Iraq Via U.N.," *Washington Post,* March 2, 1999, p. A1. https://web.archive.org/web/2005/https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/daily/march99/unscom2.htm
+[^42]: A/68/800, Commission of Jurists report, paragraphs 12.32 and 12.37. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
-[^43]: PBS *Frontline,* "Spying on Saddam," interview with Richard Butler. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/unscom/interviews/butler.html
+[^43]: A/71/1042, report of the Eminent Person, September 5, 2017, paragraph 102. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F71%2F1042&l=en&t=pdf
-[^44]: PBS *Frontline,* "Spying on Saddam," interview with Barton Gellman. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/unscom/interviews/gellman.html
+[^44]: A/76/892, paragraphs 233 to 237. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
-[^45]: *Financial Times,* July 30, 2002, reporting Rolf Ekeus's interview with *Svenska Dagbladet,* as quoted at https://www.eurotrib.com/?op=displaystory&sid=2007%2F5%2F31%2F16410%2F6211
+[^45]: A/73/973, report of the Eminent Person, September 12, 2019, paragraph 25. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
-[^46]: United Nations, noon briefing by the spokesman for the Secretary-General, Fred Eckhard, January 6, 1999. https://press.un.org/en/1999/19990106.db010699.html
+[^46]: A/76/892, paragraph 33. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf
-[^47]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 1284 (1999), December 17, 1999. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F1284%20%281999%29&l=en&t=pdf
+[^47]: A/78/1006, report of the Eminent Person, September 9, 2024, paragraph 45. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F78%2F1006&l=en&t=pdf
-[^48]: Jacobsen, Annie. *Phenomena: The Secret History of the U.S. Government's Investigations into Extrasensory Perception and Psychokinesis.* Little, Brown and Company, 2017.
+[^48]: A/78/1006, paragraphs 47 to 48. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F78%2F1006&l=en&t=pdf
-[^49]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 986 (1995), April 14, 1995. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F986%20%281995%29&l=en&t=pdf
+[^49]: A/78/1006, paragraph 50. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F78%2F1006&l=en&t=pdf
-[^50]: Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme, *Final Report,* October 27, 2005, Introduction and Executive Summary. https://web.archive.org/web/20051028130508/http://www.iic-offp.org/documents/IIC%20Final%20Report%2027Oct2005.pdf
+[^50]: United Nations General Assembly, resolution 70/11, November 19, 2015, operative paragraphs 1 and 2. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2FRES%2F70%2F11&l=en&t=pdf
-[^51]: Grier, Peter. "UN Team Names Firms in Oil-for-Food Scandal," *Christian Science Monitor,* October 28, 2005. https://archive.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/iraq1/oilforfood/2005/1028fifthreport.htm
+[^51]: United Nations General Assembly, resolutions 72/252 (December 24, 2017), 74/248 (December 27, 2019) and 77/252 (December 30, 2022). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2FRES%2F72%2F252&l=en&t=pdf
-[^52]: Independent Inquiry Committee, *Final Report,* October 27, 2005, Introduction and Executive Summary, on oil allocations and countries perceived as friendly to Iraq. https://web.archive.org/web/20051028130508/http://www.iic-offp.org/documents/IIC%20Final%20Report%2027Oct2005.pdf
+[^52]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963,* Volume X, Cuba, January 1961-September 1962, Document 104, editorial note on the meeting of the Political (First) Committee of April 15, 1961 (U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.1149). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d104
-[^53]: Independent Inquiry Committee, *Final Report,* October 27, 2005, Chapter Seven, "Financial Review of the Former Secretary-General," and the Committee's findings on Benon Sevan, Fakhry Abdelnour and Fred Nadler. https://web.archive.org/web/20051028130508/http://www.iic-offp.org/documents/IIC%20Final%20Report%2027Oct2005.pdf
+[^53]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963,* Volume X, Document 105, Telegram from the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, April 16, 1961. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d105
-[^54]: United Nations, "Former Secretaries-General," Kurt Waldheim, January 1, 1972 to December 31, 1981. https://www.un.org/sg/en/node/401498
+[^54]: Central Intelligence Agency, Inspector General, "Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation," October 1961, declassified 1998; published in Kornbluh, Peter, ed. *Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba.* New Press, 1998.
-[^55]: Jewish Telegraphic Agency, "Waldheim Denies New Charges of Involvement in Atrocities," December 14, 1987. https://www.jta.org/archive/waldheim-denies-new-charges-of-involvement-in-atrocities
+[^55]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 661 (1990), August 6, 1990. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F661%20%281990%29&l=en&t=pdf
-[^56]: National Archives and Records Administration, press release nr01-61, April 27, 2001. https://www.archives.gov/press/press-releases/2001/nr01-61
+[^56]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 687 (1991), April 3, 1991. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F687%20%281991%29&l=en&t=pdf
-[^57]: Bright, Martin, Ed Vulliamy and Peter Beaumont. "Revealed: US dirty tricks to win vote on Iraq war," *The Observer,* March 2, 2003. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/02/usa.iraq
+[^57]: Gellman, Barton. "U.S. Spied on Iraq Via U.N.," *Washington Post,* March 2, 1999, p. A1. https://web.archive.org/web/2005/https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/daily/march99/unscom2.htm
-[^58]: McGovern, Ray. "When Truth Tried to Stop War," *Consortium News,* January 31, 2013, quoting the Koza email of January 31, 2003. https://consortiumnews.com/2013/01/31/when-truth-tried-to-stop-war/
+[^58]: PBS *Frontline,* "Spying on Saddam," interview with Richard Butler. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/unscom/interviews/butler.html
-[^59]: House of Commons, "Katharine Gun," HC Deb 26 February 2004, vol. 418, cc. 427-40, statement of the Attorney General read by the Solicitor-General. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/2004/feb/26/katharine-gun
+[^59]: PBS *Frontline,* "Spying on Saddam," interview with Barton Gellman. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/unscom/interviews/gellman.html
-[^60]: Al Jazeera, "Report: US bugged UN headquarters," August 25, 2013, reporting the *Der Spiegel* account of documents obtained by Edward Snowden. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/8/25/report-us-bugged-un-headquarters
+[^60]: *Financial Times,* July 30, 2002, reporting Rolf Ekeus's interview with *Svenska Dagbladet,* as quoted at https://www.eurotrib.com/?op=displaystory&sid=2007%2F5%2F31%2F16410%2F6211
-[^61]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network.* Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
+[^61]: United Nations, noon briefing by the spokesman for the Secretary-General, Fred Eckhard, January 6, 1999. https://press.un.org/en/1999/19990106.db010699.html
-[^62]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 232 (1966), December 16, 1966. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F232%20%281966%29&l=en&t=pdf
+[^62]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 1284 (1999), December 17, 1999. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F1284%20%281999%29&l=en&t=pdf
-[^63]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 418 (1977), November 4, 1977. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F418%20%281977%29&l=en&t=pdf
+[^63]: Jacobsen, Annie. *Phenomena: The Secret History of the U.S. Government's Investigations into Extrasensory Perception and Psychokinesis.* Little, Brown and Company, 2017.
-[^64]: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 133/99, Case 11.725, Carmelo Soria Espinoza (Chile), November 19, 1999, paragraphs 1 and 2. https://hrlibrary.umn.edu/cases/133-99.html
+[^64]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 986 (1995), April 14, 1995. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F986%20%281995%29&l=en&t=pdf
-[^65]: Seymour, Cheri. *The Last Circle: Danny Casolaro's Investigation into the Octopus and the PROMIS Software Scandal.* TrineDay, 2010, reporting Lester Coleman's October 1991 affidavit.
+[^65]: Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme, *Final Report,* October 27, 2005, Introduction and Executive Summary. https://web.archive.org/web/20051028130508/http://www.iic-offp.org/documents/IIC%20Final%20Report%2027Oct2005.pdf
-[^66]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 721 (1991), November 27, 1991, paragraph 1. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F721%20%281991%29&l=en&t=pdf
+[^66]: Grier, Peter. "UN Team Names Firms in Oil-for-Food Scandal," *Christian Science Monitor,* October 28, 2005. https://archive.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/iraq1/oilforfood/2005/1028fifthreport.htm
-[^67]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 1495 (2003), July 31, 2003, preamble and paragraph 1. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F1495%20%282003%29&l=en&t=pdf
+[^67]: Independent Inquiry Committee, *Final Report,* October 27, 2005, Introduction and Executive Summary, on oil allocations and countries perceived as friendly to Iraq. https://web.archive.org/web/20051028130508/http://www.iic-offp.org/documents/IIC%20Final%20Report%2027Oct2005.pdf
-[^68]: "Child sex ring run out of UNICEF office," United Press International, Brussels, March 7, 1988. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1988/03/07/Child-sex-ring-run-out-of-UNICEF-office/2464573714000/
+[^68]: Independent Inquiry Committee, *Final Report,* October 27, 2005, Chapter Seven, "Financial Review of the Former Secretary-General," and the Committee's findings on Benon Sevan, Fakhry Abdelnour and Fred Nadler. https://web.archive.org/web/20051028130508/http://www.iic-offp.org/documents/IIC%20Final%20Report%2027Oct2005.pdf
-[^69]: Dovey, S. *Eye of the Chickenhawk.* Thehotstar, 2023, drawing on Bulté, Annemie, Douglas De Coninck and Marie-Jeanne Van Heeswyck, *De X-dossiers: wat België niet mocht weten over de zaak-Dutroux,* Houtekiet, 1999.
+[^69]: United Nations, "Former Secretaries-General," Kurt Waldheim, January 1, 1972 to December 31, 1981. https://www.un.org/sg/en/node/401498
-[^70]: U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Library, EFTA01619434, DataSet 10, iMessage log with contact "Vitaly Churkin," November 16, 2015 to February 23, 2016. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2010/EFTA01619434.pdf
+[^70]: Jewish Telegraphic Agency, "Waldheim Denies New Charges of Involvement in Atrocities," December 14, 1987. https://www.jta.org/archive/waldheim-denies-new-charges-of-involvement-in-atrocities
-[^71]: U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Library, EFTA01619438, DataSet 10, iMessage log with contact "Vitaly Churkin," May 23, 2016 to September 7, 2016, https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2010/EFTA01619438.pdf ; EFTA02044775, email "Churkin to join lunch tomorrow as well," August 28, 2016, https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2010/EFTA02044775.pdf ; EFTA01619434, message of January 13, 2016.
+[^71]: National Archives and Records Administration, press release nr01-61, April 27, 2001. https://www.archives.gov/press/press-releases/2001/nr01-61
-[^72]: "Russia Ambassador Vitaly Churkin's cause of death won't be released," *CBS News / Associated Press,* March 10, 2017. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-ambassador-cause-of-death-wont-be-released/
+[^72]: Bright, Martin, Ed Vulliamy and Peter Beaumont. "Revealed: US dirty tricks to win vote on Iraq war," *The Observer,* March 2, 2003. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/02/usa.iraq
-[^73]: Hynek, J. Allen, statement at the *Symposium on Unidentified Flying Objects,* Hearings before the Committee on Science and Astronautics, House of Representatives, 90th Congress, 2d session, July 29, 1968, pp. 14-15. https://nicap.org/books/1968Sym/1968_UFO_Symposium.pdf
+[^73]: McGovern, Ray. "When Truth Tried to Stop War," *Consortium News,* January 31, 2013, quoting the Koza email of January 31, 2003. https://consortiumnews.com/2013/01/31/when-truth-tried-to-stop-war/
-[^74]: United Nations General Assembly, 33rd session, document A/33/512, "Establishment of an agency or a department of the United Nations for undertaking, co-ordinating and disseminating the results of research into unidentified flying objects and related phenomena: Report of the Special Political Committee," December 16, 1978, paragraphs 1 to 9. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F33%2F512&l=en&t=pdf
+[^74]: House of Commons, "Katharine Gun," HC Deb 26 February 2004, vol. 418, cc. 427-40, statement of the Attorney General read by the Solicitor-General. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/2004/feb/26/katharine-gun
-[^75]: United Nations General Assembly, 33rd session, plenary meeting record A/33/PV.32, October 12, 1978, statement of Sir Eric Gairy, paragraphs 225 to 236. Verbatim record: https://un-project.org/debate/33/3504/
+[^75]: Al Jazeera, "Report: US bugged UN headquarters," August 25, 2013, reporting the *Der Spiegel* account of documents obtained by Edward Snowden. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/8/25/report-us-bugged-un-headquarters
-[^76]: United Nations General Assembly, 33rd session, 87th plenary meeting, December 18, 1978, record A/33/PV.87, report of the Special Political Committee on agenda item 126 (A/33/512), decision 33/426. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F33%2FPV.87&l=en&t=pdf
+[^76]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network.* Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
-[^77]: Melvin R. Laird to Laurance Rockefeller, May 9, 1994, and Rockefeller to John H. Gibbons, June 1, 1994, attached to http://www.paradigmresearchgroup.org/Rockefeller%20Documents/RID-6-13-94.htm
+[^77]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 232 (1966), December 16, 1966. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F232%20%281966%29&l=en&t=pdf
 [^78]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 418 (1977), November 4, 1977. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F418%20%281977%29&l=en&t=pdf
 [^79]: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 133/99, Case 11.725, Carmelo Soria Espinoza (Chile), November 19, 1999, paragraphs 1 and 2. https://hrlibrary.umn.edu/cases/133-99.html
 [^80]: Seymour, Cheri. *The Last Circle: Danny Casolaro's Investigation into the Octopus and the PROMIS Software Scandal.* TrineDay, 2010, reporting Lester Coleman's October 1991 affidavit.
 [^81]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 721 (1991), November 27, 1991, paragraph 1. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F721%20%281991%29&l=en&t=pdf
 [^82]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 1495 (2003), July 31, 2003, preamble and paragraph 1. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F1495%20%282003%29&l=en&t=pdf
 [^83]: "Child sex ring run out of UNICEF office," United Press International, Brussels, March 7, 1988. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1988/03/07/Child-sex-ring-run-out-of-UNICEF-office/2464573714000/
 [^84]: Dovey, S. *Eye of the Chickenhawk.* Thehotstar, 2023, drawing on Bulté, Annemie, Douglas De Coninck and Marie-Jeanne Van Heeswyck, *De X-dossiers: wat België niet mocht weten over de zaak-Dutroux,* Houtekiet, 1999.
 [^85]: U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Library, EFTA01619434, DataSet 10, iMessage log with contact "Vitaly Churkin," November 16, 2015 to February 23, 2016. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2010/EFTA01619434.pdf
 [^86]: U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Library, EFTA01619438, DataSet 10, iMessage log with contact "Vitaly Churkin," May 23, 2016 to September 7, 2016, https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2010/EFTA01619438.pdf ; EFTA02044775, email "Churkin to join lunch tomorrow as well," August 28, 2016, https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2010/EFTA02044775.pdf ; EFTA01619434, message of January 13, 2016.
 [^87]: "Russia Ambassador Vitaly Churkin's cause of death won't be released," *CBS News / Associated Press,* March 10, 2017. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-ambassador-cause-of-death-wont-be-released/
 [^88]: Hynek, J. Allen, statement at the *Symposium on Unidentified Flying Objects,* Hearings before the Committee on Science and Astronautics, House of Representatives, 90th Congress, 2d session, July 29, 1968, pp. 14-15. https://nicap.org/books/1968Sym/1968_UFO_Symposium.pdf
 [^89]: United Nations General Assembly, 33rd session, document A/33/512, "Establishment of an agency or a department of the United Nations for undertaking, co-ordinating and disseminating the results of research into unidentified flying objects and related phenomena: Report of the Special Political Committee," December 16, 1978, paragraphs 1 to 9. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F33%2F512&l=en&t=pdf
 [^90]: United Nations General Assembly, 33rd session, plenary meeting record A/33/PV.32, October 12, 1978, statement of Sir Eric Gairy, paragraphs 225 to 236. Verbatim record: https://un-project.org/debate/33/3504/
 [^91]: United Nations General Assembly, 33rd session, 87th plenary meeting, December 18, 1978, record A/33/PV.87, report of the Special Political Committee on agenda item 126 (A/33/512), decision 33/426. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F33%2FPV.87&l=en&t=pdf
 [^92]: Melvin R. Laird to Laurance Rockefeller, May 9, 1994, and Rockefeller to John H. Gibbons, June 1, 1994, attached to http://www.paradigmresearchgroup.org/Rockefeller%20Documents/RID-6-13-94.htm
--- a/ORGANIZATIONS/PRIVATE/Cambridge
+++ b/ORGANIZATIONS/PRIVATE/Cambridge
@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ relations:
    start: 2017-05
    end: 2020-10-02
    role: "formal investigation into data analytics in political campaigns"
-    fn: 38
+    fn: 39
  - type: subject_of
    with: "[[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]]"
    end: 2020-08-18
@ -158,33 +158,35 @@ The Bolton PAC's payments to the company began on July 7, 2014 with $25,000 for
 Kaiser told the Senate committee that discussion of a commercial offer to the Trump campaign began in May 2015, that she and Nix met Bannon in Washington in September 2015, that [[Donald Trump]] telephoned Bannon during the meeting and directed that Nix and Kaiser come to New York to meet [[Corey Lewandowski]], and that "eight or ten weeks" of contract negotiations followed without result.[^27] Bannon told the committee he had no recollection of the call.[^27] Kaiser also said that almost every client meeting she had with a political figure was preceded by an introduction from Bannon, Rebekah Mercer or [[Kellyanne Conway]], whom the committee described as an advisor to the Mercers at the time, and that Conway was closely involved in moving the company from the Cruz campaign to the Trump campaign.[^28]
-The committee recorded that the Cruz campaign spent about $5.8 million on the company and the campaign of [[Ben Carson]] more than $430,000, citing a [[CNN]] report, and that within a week of Cruz leaving the race the employees working on his campaign began moving to the Trump campaign.[^27] [[Rick Gates]] told the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]] that the campaign decided shortly after the Republican National Convention to use the company, that the [[Republican National Committee]] did not want to use it, that [[Brad Parscale]] was reluctant, that [[Jared Kushner]] wanted to use it and negotiated a package with payment at the end of the campaign.[^22] Kushner told the committee that the Mercers aggressively advocated use of the company and that the campaign engaged it to secure the Mercers' support.[^22] Parscale said he decided to hire the company in June 2016 after approval from [[Paul Manafort]] and Kushner, that he declined its offer of "psychographic profiling" services, and that he used Republican National Committee data rather than the company's data.[^22][^29]
+[[Brad Parscale]] told the committee that the campaign's polling data was ingested into a visualization tool with the help of Cambridge Analytica developers, and that the tool was available on an iPad that Parscale carried.[^29]
-The committee obtained a campaign data team presentation of August 22, 2016 with a slide depicting data flowing in both directions between the campaign and Cambridge Analytica, with the company's node titled "Digital Media Psychographic Analysis," and another slide showing arrows between its "Psychographic Analysis" and both the Republican National Committee's "GOP Data Center" and the campaign's San Antonio operation, which it called "Project Alamo."[^29] The committee wrote that documents it obtained suggested that the company's data may have been used in support of the campaign and that the campaign may have leveraged its psychographic analysis capabilities.[^29] Gates told the FBI that he later learned campaign data was transmitted to and analyzed in the [[United Kingdom]], which concerned him.[^29] Kaiser said that Project Alamo was "built completely from scratch" from the Republican National Committee's Data Trust database and purchased data sets.[^29]
+The committee recorded that the Cruz campaign spent about $5.8 million on the company and the campaign of [[Ben Carson]] more than $430,000, citing a [[CNN]] report, and that within a week of Cruz leaving the race the employees working on his campaign began moving to the Trump campaign.[^27] [[Rick Gates]] told the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]] that the campaign decided shortly after the Republican National Convention to use the company, that the [[Republican National Committee]] did not want to use it, that Brad Parscale was reluctant, that [[Jared Kushner]] wanted to use it and negotiated a package with payment at the end of the campaign.[^22] Kushner told the committee that the Mercers aggressively advocated use of the company and that the campaign engaged it to secure the Mercers' support.[^22] Parscale said he decided to hire the company in June 2016 after approval from [[Paul Manafort]] and Kushner, that he declined its offer of "psychographic profiling" services, and that he used Republican National Committee data rather than the company's data.[^22][^30]
 The committee obtained a campaign data team presentation of August 22, 2016 with a slide depicting data flowing in both directions between the campaign and Cambridge Analytica, with the company's node titled "Digital Media Psychographic Analysis," and another slide showing arrows between its "Psychographic Analysis" and both the Republican National Committee's "GOP Data Center" and the campaign's San Antonio operation, which it called "Project Alamo."[^30] The committee wrote that documents it obtained suggested that the company's data may have been used in support of the campaign and that the campaign may have leveraged its psychographic analysis capabilities.[^30] Gates told the FBI that he later learned campaign data was transmitted to and analyzed in the [[United Kingdom]], which concerned him.[^30] Kaiser said that Project Alamo was "built completely from scratch" from the Republican National Committee's Data Trust database and purchased data sets.[^30]
 ### Russian and WikiLeaks contacts
-Wylie said that from spring 2014 through 2015 Cambridge Analytica representatives met representatives of Lukoil, that Nix's presentations included discussion of rumor and disinformation campaigns, and that in May 2018 he told the [[Senate Judiciary Committee]] that Lukoil "has formal information sharing agreements with the Russian Federal Security Service."[^30][^31] His written statement said that after a request for information from Lukoil executives in the spring of 2014, Cambridge Analytica discussed with Lukoil its experience with "foreign disinformation, rumour campaigns, microtargeting and its American data assets."[^31] Kaiser told the committee the discussions concerned a customer loyalty application for Lukoil's stations in Turkey, said she was told the data could also be useful for political activities there, and furnished a February 2015 presentation prepared by SCL Commercial; neither she nor Wylie believed that a contract resulted, and the committee stated that it did not independently corroborate the allegation that Lukoil intended to use the company to affect elections.[^30] The committee noted that the [[Office of Foreign Assets Control]] had added Lukoil to its Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List on September 12, 2014.[^30]
+Wylie said that from spring 2014 through 2015 Cambridge Analytica representatives met representatives of Lukoil, that Nix's presentations included discussion of rumor and disinformation campaigns, and that in May 2018 he told the [[Senate Judiciary Committee]] that Lukoil "has formal information sharing agreements with the Russian Federal Security Service."[^31][^32] His written statement said that after a request for information from Lukoil executives in the spring of 2014, Cambridge Analytica discussed with Lukoil its experience with "foreign disinformation, rumour campaigns, microtargeting and its American data assets."[^32] Kaiser told the committee the discussions concerned a customer loyalty application for Lukoil's stations in Turkey, said she was told the data could also be useful for political activities there, and furnished a February 2015 presentation prepared by SCL Commercial; neither she nor Wylie believed that a contract resulted, and the committee stated that it did not independently corroborate the allegation that Lukoil intended to use the company to affect elections.[^31] The committee noted that the [[Office of Foreign Assets Control]] had added Lukoil to its Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List on September 12, 2014.[^31]
-Wylie also told the committee that in spring 2014 Bannon approved focus groups about [[Vladimir Putin]] and Russian expansionism preparatory to a predictive model, and that Bannon and [[Konstantin Kilimnik]] were two of three people likely responsible for the idea.[^32] [[Sam Patten]], a consultant who worked for the company in Nigeria, Mexico, Kosovo and the Czech Republic, told the committee there was "no connection" between Kilimnik and Cambridge Analytica; Kaiser said that on the Nigerian project the company may have assisted its client in retaining former Israeli intelligence officers working privately to conduct opposition research.[^32]
+Wylie also told the committee that in spring 2014 Bannon approved focus groups about [[Vladimir Putin]] and Russian expansionism preparatory to a predictive model, and that Bannon and [[Konstantin Kilimnik]] were two of three people likely responsible for the idea.[^33] [[Sam Patten]], a consultant who worked for the company in Nigeria, Mexico, Kosovo and the Czech Republic, told the committee there was "no connection" between Kilimnik and Cambridge Analytica; Kaiser said that on the Nigerian project the company may have assisted its client in retaining former Israeli intelligence officers working privately to conduct opposition research.[^33]
-The committee reported open-source accounts that during the 2016 campaign Nix emailed [[Julian Assange]] about the possible release of [[Hillary Clinton]]'s deleted emails, and that Assange said in October 2017 that [[WikiLeaks]] had rejected an approach by Cambridge Analytica. The committee obtained no additional information, and Bannon and others close to the campaign said they had no prior awareness of the contact.[^33] The committee also recorded that it was unable to obtain the company's corporate communications, which were in the hands of United Kingdom authorities, and that Nix "generally disregarded the Committee's requests for an appearance."[^34] It found "no convincing evidence that Russia's government or intelligence services worked with or through" Cambridge Analytica, Psy Group or Colt Ventures in furtherance of the 2016 interference.[^34] Cambridge Analytica, LLC is named among the respondents in matters under review 7207, 7268, 7274 and 7623 before the Federal Election Commission, in which Commissioners Shana Broussard and Ellen Weintraub issued a statement of reasons citing Volume 5 after a certification dated April 22, 2021; the text of the statement concerns the Russian Federation, the Internet Research Agency and the Trump committee and does not mention Cambridge Analytica outside the caption.[^35]
+The committee reported open-source accounts that during the 2016 campaign Nix emailed [[Julian Assange]] about the possible release of [[Hillary Clinton]]'s deleted emails, and that Assange said in October 2017 that [[WikiLeaks]] had rejected an approach by Cambridge Analytica. The committee obtained no additional information, and Bannon and others close to the campaign said they had no prior awareness of the contact.[^34] The committee also recorded that it was unable to obtain the company's corporate communications, which were in the hands of United Kingdom authorities, and that Nix "generally disregarded the Committee's requests for an appearance."[^35] It found "no convincing evidence that Russia's government or intelligence services worked with or through" Cambridge Analytica, Psy Group or Colt Ventures in furtherance of the 2016 interference.[^35] Cambridge Analytica, LLC is named among the respondents in matters under review 7207, 7268, 7274 and 7623 before the Federal Election Commission, in which Commissioners Shana Broussard and Ellen Weintraub issued a statement of reasons citing Volume 5 after a certification dated April 22, 2021; the text of the statement concerns the Russian Federation, the Internet Research Agency and the Trump committee and does not mention Cambridge Analytica outside the caption.[^36]
 ### Regulatory and criminal proceedings in the United Kingdom
-The Information Commissioner's Office issued a monetary penalty notice of £500,000 to Facebook on October 25, 2018, the highest fine permitted under the Data Protection Act 1998, citing lack of transparency and security failures relating to the harvesting of data.[^36] The office also executed a warrant at the company's premises at 8 p.m. on March 23, 2018, seized servers and other material, and reported that Cambridge Analytica and SCL Elections entered administration on May 3, 2018, that an enforcement notice of May 4, 2018 required it to answer a subject access request from the American academic [[David Carroll]] that had been made in January 2017, and that the deadline of June 3, 2018 passed without compliance.[^18] The office reported that Nix and Kogan had declined invitations to voluntary interviews under caution and that it would have issued a substantial fine had the company not been in administration.[^18] SCL Elections pleaded guilty at [[Hendon Magistrates' Court]] on January 9, 2019, the day set for trial, to failing to comply with the enforcement notice; press reports gave the penalty as a fine of £15,000 with £6,000 in costs and a victim surcharge of £170.[^37] The Information Commissioner's 2020 letter to Parliament gives the fine as £18,000.[^38]
+The Information Commissioner's Office issued a monetary penalty notice of £500,000 to Facebook on October 25, 2018, the highest fine permitted under the Data Protection Act 1998, citing lack of transparency and security failures relating to the harvesting of data.[^37] The office also executed a warrant at the company's premises at 8 p.m. on March 23, 2018, seized servers and other material, and reported that Cambridge Analytica and SCL Elections entered administration on May 3, 2018, that an enforcement notice of May 4, 2018 required it to answer a subject access request from the American academic [[David Carroll]] that had been made in January 2017, and that the deadline of June 3, 2018 passed without compliance.[^18] The office reported that Nix and Kogan had declined invitations to voluntary interviews under caution and that it would have issued a substantial fine had the company not been in administration.[^18] SCL Elections pleaded guilty at [[Hendon Magistrates' Court]] on January 9, 2019, the day set for trial, to failing to comply with the enforcement notice; press reports gave the penalty as a fine of £15,000 with £6,000 in costs and a victim surcharge of £170.[^38] The Information Commissioner's 2020 letter to Parliament gives the fine as £18,000.[^39]
-On October 2, 2020 the Information Commissioner, [[Elizabeth Denham]], wrote to the chair of the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee that the office had concluded its investigation, that the company had purchased commercially available data amounting at one estimate to more than 130 billion data points, mostly about United States voters, to combine with Facebook-derived data from Kogan, that its models were mostly built from "off the shelf" tools, that the office found no further evidence to change its view that the company was not involved in the European Union referendum campaign beyond early inquiries about UK Independence Party data, and that it found no additional evidence of Russian involvement in the servers it obtained.[^38] The letter also reported evidence that in its last stages the company was drawing up plans to move its data offshore to avoid regulatory scrutiny, which it did not carry out before it ceased trading.[^38]
+On October 2, 2020 the Information Commissioner, [[Elizabeth Denham]], wrote to the chair of the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee that the office had concluded its investigation, that the company had purchased commercially available data amounting at one estimate to more than 130 billion data points, mostly about United States voters, to combine with Facebook-derived data from Kogan, that its models were mostly built from "off the shelf" tools, that the office found no further evidence to change its view that the company was not involved in the European Union referendum campaign beyond early inquiries about UK Independence Party data, and that it found no additional evidence of Russian involvement in the servers it obtained.[^39] The letter also reported evidence that in its last stages the company was drawing up plans to move its data offshore to avoid regulatory scrutiny, which it did not carry out before it ceased trading.[^39]
-The Insolvency Service announced in September 2020 that Nix had given an undertaking disqualifying him from acting as a company director for seven years from October 5, 2020, having, in the service's words, caused or permitted SCL Elections or associated companies to act with a lack of commercial probity by marketing services including "bribery or honey trap stings, voter disengagement campaigns, obtaining information to discredit political opponents and spreading information anonymously in political campaigns." The service did not say whether any such services were performed, and Nix told Reuters he had made no admission of wrongdoing.[^39] The Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee had recorded in February 2019 that the Insolvency Service was investigating the directors of SCL Elections, SCL Group, SCL Analytics, SCL Commercial, SCL Social and Cambridge Analytica (UK) under the [[Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986]].[^40]
+The Insolvency Service announced in September 2020 that Nix had given an undertaking disqualifying him from acting as a company director for seven years from October 5, 2020, having, in the service's words, caused or permitted SCL Elections or associated companies to act with a lack of commercial probity by marketing services including "bribery or honey trap stings, voter disengagement campaigns, obtaining information to discredit political opponents and spreading information anonymously in political campaigns." The service did not say whether any such services were performed, and Nix told Reuters he had made no admission of wrongdoing.[^40] The Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee had recorded in February 2019 that the Insolvency Service was investigating the directors of SCL Elections, SCL Group, SCL Analytics, SCL Commercial, SCL Social and Cambridge Analytica (UK) under the [[Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986]].[^41]
 ### Emerdata and the end of the group
-Emerdata Limited (Companies House number 10911848) was incorporated on August 11, 2017 with Wheatland as a director, and its persons with significant control from incorporation were Wheatland and Dr Alexander Bruce Tayler, each holding more than 25 percent and up to 50 percent until January 23, 2018.[^41] From January 23, 2018 the register shows Cambridge Analytica Holdings LLC, with an address on Orange Street in Wilmington, Delaware, as holder of more than 50 percent and less than 75 percent of shares and votes until August 9, 2022; since that date the register carries a statement that there is no registrable person.[^41] The register records the officers appointed on January 23, 2018 as Nix (resigned March 28, 2018), Johnson Chun Shun Ko (resigned May 9, 2018), Cheng Peng (resigned May 8, 2018) and Ahmad Al Khatib (resigned May 7, 2018); Tayler was a director again from March 28 to April 18, 2018, Gary Ka Chun Tiu from June 12, 2018 to December 3, 2024, and Wheatland until May 22, 2019.[^41] Rebekah and Jennifer Mercer were appointed directors on March 16, 2018 and remained in office as of the register consulted on October 1, 2026, with [[Jacquelyn James-Varga]] (appointed May 22, 2019) and Bradley David Golub (appointed December 3, 2024).[^41]
+Emerdata Limited (Companies House number 10911848) was incorporated on August 11, 2017 with Wheatland as a director, and its persons with significant control from incorporation were Wheatland and Dr Alexander Bruce Tayler, each holding more than 25 percent and up to 50 percent until January 23, 2018.[^42] From January 23, 2018 the register shows Cambridge Analytica Holdings LLC, with an address on Orange Street in Wilmington, Delaware, as holder of more than 50 percent and less than 75 percent of shares and votes until August 9, 2022; since that date the register carries a statement that there is no registrable person.[^42] The register records the officers appointed on January 23, 2018 as Nix (resigned March 28, 2018), Johnson Chun Shun Ko (resigned May 9, 2018), Cheng Peng (resigned May 8, 2018) and Ahmad Al Khatib (resigned May 7, 2018); Tayler was a director again from March 28 to April 18, 2018, Gary Ka Chun Tiu from June 12, 2018 to December 3, 2024, and Wheatland until May 22, 2019.[^42] Rebekah and Jennifer Mercer were appointed directors on March 16, 2018 and remained in office as of the register consulted on October 1, 2026, with [[Jacquelyn James-Varga]] (appointed May 22, 2019) and Bradley David Golub (appointed December 3, 2024).[^42]
-The Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee reported in February 2019 that Emerdata had not gone into administration, was the largest creditor of SCL Elections and was paying the administration costs, and listed shareholders as of August 10, 2018 that included Cambridge Analytica Holdings LLC, Tayler, Wheatland, trusts for the benefit of Rebekah, Jennifer and Heather Mercer, Alexander and Catherine Nix, five members of the Marland family, Henry and Roger Gabb, Nigel and Alexander Oakes, and Reza Saddlou-Bundy.[^40] The committee recommended that the [[National Crime Agency]] investigate the connections between SCL Elections and Emerdata.[^40] The committee also reported that SCL Insight Limited, owned by Nigel Oakes, had been spun off in the 2017 reorganization.[^40]
+The Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee reported in February 2019 that Emerdata had not gone into administration, was the largest creditor of SCL Elections and was paying the administration costs, and listed shareholders as of August 10, 2018 that included Cambridge Analytica Holdings LLC, Tayler, Wheatland, trusts for the benefit of Rebekah, Jennifer and Heather Mercer, Alexander and Catherine Nix, five members of the Marland family, Henry and Roger Gabb, Nigel and Alexander Oakes, and Reza Saddlou-Bundy.[^41] The committee recommended that the [[National Crime Agency]] investigate the connections between SCL Elections and Emerdata.[^41] The committee also reported that SCL Insight Limited, owned by Nigel Oakes, had been spun off in the 2017 reorganization.[^41]
-Emerdata entered administration on December 9, 2024, the register names Benjamin Stanyon and Nedim Patrick Ailyan as practitioners, records a cessation to act on April 8, 2026, and gives the registered office as care of Opus Restructuring LLP, Milton Keynes.[^41] SCL Group Limited, SCL Elections Limited and Cambridge Analytica (UK) Limited were in administration from May 3, 2018 to April 17, 2019, then in compulsory liquidation on a petition of August 13, 2018, which concluded on September 1, 2025; the first two were dissolved on January 31, 2026 and the third on January 30, 2026.[^42]
+Emerdata entered administration on December 9, 2024, the register names Benjamin Stanyon and Nedim Patrick Ailyan as practitioners, records a cessation to act on April 8, 2026, and gives the registered office as care of Opus Restructuring LLP, Milton Keynes.[^42] SCL Group Limited, SCL Elections Limited and Cambridge Analytica (UK) Limited were in administration from May 3, 2018 to April 17, 2019, then in compulsory liquidation on a petition of August 13, 2018, which concluded on September 1, 2025; the first two were dissolved on January 31, 2026 and the third on January 30, 2026.[^43]
 ### Footnotes
@ -216,17 +218,18 @@ Emerdata entered administration on December 9, 2024, the register names Benjamin
 [^26]: Mercer Family Foundation, Form 990-PF for 2011, Part XV (grant to OISM, P.O. Box 1279, Cave Junction, Oregon, $965,000) (https://990s.foundationcenter.org/990pf_pdf_archive/201/201982204/201982204_201112_990PF.pdf); Form 990-PF for 2021, Part XV (Oregon Institute of Science and Medicine, 2251 Dick George Road, Cave Junction, Oregon, $250,000), ProPublica Nonprofit Explorer full text (https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/201982204/202213199349104431/IRS990PF).
 [^27]: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities*, report released August 18, 2020, pp. 673 to 674 and notes 4352 to 4357 (Kaiser transcript, pp. 144 to 156; Bannon transcript, p. 268; Maegan Vazquez and Paul Murphy, "Trump isn't the only Republican who gave Cambridge Analytica big bucks," CNN, March 21, 2018). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
 [^28]: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities*, report released August 18, 2020, p. 672 and note 4348 (Kaiser transcript, pp. 40 to 43). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
-[^29]: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities*, report released August 18, 2020, pp. 675 to 678 and notes 4367 to 4379 (Parscale transcript, pp. 53 to 60; Trump Data Team Presentation, August 22, 2016, FLYNN_SSCI_00011770 and 00011773; FBI FD-302 of Rick Gates, October 29, 2018; Kaiser transcript, pp. 161 to 164). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
+[^29]: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities*, notes 447 and 448 (Parscale transcript, p. 64). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
-[^30]: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities*, report released August 18, 2020, pp. 670 to 671 and notes 4334 to 4341 (Wylie proffer; Wylie written statement to the Senate Judiciary Committee, May 16, 2018; Kaiser transcript, pp. 66 to 67 and 121 to 123; SCL Commercial presentation for Lukoil, February 18, 2015; OFAC listing of September 12, 2014). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
+[^30]: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities*, report released August 18, 2020, pp. 675 to 678 and notes 4367 to 4379 (Parscale transcript, pp. 53 to 60; Trump Data Team Presentation, August 22, 2016, FLYNN_SSCI_00011770 and 00011773; FBI FD-302 of Rick Gates, October 29, 2018; Kaiser transcript, pp. 161 to 164). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
-[^31]: Christopher Wylie, written statement, "In the Matter of Cambridge Analytica and Other Related Issues," Senate Committee on the Judiciary, May 16, 2018, paragraphs 32 and 33. https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/06/03/2026/05-16-18-wylie-testimony
+[^31]: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities*, report released August 18, 2020, pp. 670 to 671 and notes 4334 to 4341 (Wylie proffer; Wylie written statement to the Senate Judiciary Committee, May 16, 2018; Kaiser transcript, pp. 66 to 67 and 121 to 123; SCL Commercial presentation for Lukoil, February 18, 2015; OFAC listing of September 12, 2014). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
-[^32]: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities*, report released August 18, 2020, p. 668 and notes 4318 to 4325 (Wylie proffer; Patten transcript, pp. 29 to 38; Kaiser transcript, pp. 67 to 68; Bannon transcript, pp. 253 to 256). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
+[^32]: Christopher Wylie, written statement, "In the Matter of Cambridge Analytica and Other Related Issues," Senate Committee on the Judiciary, May 16, 2018, paragraphs 32 and 33. https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/06/03/2026/05-16-18-wylie-testimony
-[^33]: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities*, report released August 18, 2020, pp. 678 to 679 and notes 4380 to 4383 (Betsy Swan, "Trump Data Guru Alexander Nix: I Tried To Team Up With Julian Assange," *The Daily Beast*, October 25, 2017; Kara Scannell, Dana Bash and Marshall Cohen, CNN, October 25, 2017). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
+[^33]: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities*, report released August 18, 2020, p. 668 and notes 4318 to 4325 (Wylie proffer; Patten transcript, pp. 29 to 38; Kaiser transcript, pp. 67 to 68; Bannon transcript, pp. 253 to 256). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
-[^34]: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities*, report released August 18, 2020, pp. 663 to 664 (section introduction, "Committee did not examine the effectiveness of the work these companies may have conducted"; limitations including Nix's non-appearance and the seizure of the company's corporate communications by U.K. authorities). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
+[^34]: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities*, report released August 18, 2020, pp. 678 to 679 and notes 4380 to 4383 (Betsy Swan, "Trump Data Guru Alexander Nix: I Tried To Team Up With Julian Assange," *The Daily Beast*, October 25, 2017; Kara Scannell, Dana Bash and Marshall Cohen, CNN, October 25, 2017). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
-[^35]: Federal Election Commission, Statement of Reasons of Commissioners Shana M. Broussard and Ellen L. Weintraub, MURs 7207, 7268, 7274 and 7623 (Russian Federation; Donald J. Trump for President, Inc.; Donald J. Trump; H. Russell Taub; Cambridge Analytica, LLC; Internet Research Agency; Paul Manafort), note 2 (certification dated April 22, 2021). https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/7207/7207_47.pdf
+[^35]: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities*, report released August 18, 2020, pp. 663 to 664 (section introduction, "Committee did not examine the effectiveness of the work these companies may have conducted"; limitations including Nix's non-appearance and the seizure of the company's corporate communications by U.K. authorities). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
-[^36]: UK Information Commissioner's Office, *Investigation into the use of data analytics in political campaigns: A report to Parliament*, November 6, 2018, section 3.2.4 (p. 38). https://www.statewatch.org/media/documents/news/2018/nov/uk-ico-report-investigation-into-use-of-data-political-campaigns-6-11-18.pdf
+[^36]: Federal Election Commission, Statement of Reasons of Commissioners Shana M. Broussard and Ellen L. Weintraub, MURs 7207, 7268, 7274 and 7623 (Russian Federation; Donald J. Trump for President, Inc.; Donald J. Trump; H. Russell Taub; Cambridge Analytica, LLC; Internet Research Agency; Paul Manafort), note 2 (certification dated April 22, 2021). https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/7207/7207_47.pdf
-[^37]: UK Information Commissioner's Office, *Investigation into the use of data analytics in political campaigns*, November 6, 2018, section 3.2.3 (trial set for January 9, 2019 at Hendon Magistrates' Court); "Cambridge Analytica Pleads Guilty In UK Data Access Case," *MediaPost*, January 9, 2019 (fine of £15,000, costs of £6,000, victim surcharge of £170, citing the ICO announcement) https://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/330338/ ; Ellen Tannam, "Cambridge Analytica owner hit with £15,000 fine for disobeying UK ICO," *Silicon Republic*, January 2019 (District Judge Kenneth Grant: "wilful disregard of the enforcement notice") https://www.siliconrepublic.com/enterprise/cambridge-analytica-scl-fine
+[^37]: UK Information Commissioner's Office, *Investigation into the use of data analytics in political campaigns: A report to Parliament*, November 6, 2018, section 3.2.4 (p. 38). https://www.statewatch.org/media/documents/news/2018/nov/uk-ico-report-investigation-into-use-of-data-political-campaigns-6-11-18.pdf
-[^38]: Elizabeth Denham, Information Commissioner, letter to Julian Knight MP, Chair, Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, reference ICO/O/ED/L/RTL/0181, October 2, 2020, paragraphs 3 to 15. https://cy.ico.org.uk/media2/migrated/2618383/20201002_ico-o-ed-l-rtl-0181_to-julian-knight-mp.pdf
+[^38]: UK Information Commissioner's Office, *Investigation into the use of data analytics in political campaigns*, November 6, 2018, section 3.2.3 (trial set for January 9, 2019 at Hendon Magistrates' Court); "Cambridge Analytica Pleads Guilty In UK Data Access Case," *MediaPost*, January 9, 2019 (fine of £15,000, costs of £6,000, victim surcharge of £170, citing the ICO announcement) https://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/330338/ ; Ellen Tannam, "Cambridge Analytica owner hit with £15,000 fine for disobeying UK ICO," *Silicon Republic*, January 2019 (District Judge Kenneth Grant: "wilful disregard of the enforcement notice") https://www.siliconrepublic.com/enterprise/cambridge-analytica-scl-fine
-[^39]: "Ex-Cambridge Analytica head banned from running firms in UK," Reuters, published by Al Jazeera, September 25, 2020 (statement of the Insolvency Service of September 24, 2020; Mark Bruce, chief investigator; disqualification from October 5, 2020). https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2020/9/25/uk-bans-ex-cambridge-analytica-boss-for-unethical-services
+[^39]: Elizabeth Denham, Information Commissioner, letter to Julian Knight MP, Chair, Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, reference ICO/O/ED/L/RTL/0181, October 2, 2020, paragraphs 3 to 15. https://cy.ico.org.uk/media2/migrated/2618383/20201002_ico-o-ed-l-rtl-0181_to-julian-knight-mp.pdf
-[^40]: House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, *Disinformation and "fake news": Final Report*, HC 1791, February 18, 2019, paragraphs 285 to 290, 296 and notes 327 to 329 and 338. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/1791/1791.pdf
+[^40]: "Ex-Cambridge Analytica head banned from running firms in UK," Reuters, published by Al Jazeera, September 25, 2020 (statement of the Insolvency Service of September 24, 2020; Mark Bruce, chief investigator; disqualification from October 5, 2020). https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2020/9/25/uk-bans-ex-cambridge-analytica-boss-for-unethical-services
-[^41]: Companies House, EMERDATA LIMITED (company number 10911848), overview, officers, persons with significant control and insolvency pages, viewed October 1, 2026; personal appointments pages for Jennifer Lynne Mercer, Rebekah Anne Mercer, Jacquelyn James-Varga and Bradley David Golub. https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/10911848
+[^41]: House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, *Disinformation and "fake news": Final Report*, HC 1791, February 18, 2019, paragraphs 285 to 290, 296 and notes 327 to 329 and 338. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/1791/1791.pdf
-[^42]: Companies House, insolvency pages for SCL GROUP LIMITED (05514098), SCL ELECTIONS LIMITED (08256225) and CAMBRIDGE ANALYTICA(UK) LIMITED (09375920), viewed October 1, 2026 (administration May 3, 2018 to April 17, 2019; compulsory liquidation, petition August 13, 2018, winding up commenced April 17, 2019 and concluded September 1, 2025; dissolved January 31, 2026, January 31, 2026 and January 30, 2026). https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/05514098/insolvency
+[^42]: Companies House, EMERDATA LIMITED (company number 10911848), overview, officers, persons with significant control and insolvency pages, viewed October 1, 2026; personal appointments pages for Jennifer Lynne Mercer, Rebekah Anne Mercer, Jacquelyn James-Varga and Bradley David Golub. https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/10911848
 [^43]: Companies House, insolvency pages for SCL GROUP LIMITED (05514098), SCL ELECTIONS LIMITED (08256225) and CAMBRIDGE ANALYTICA(UK) LIMITED (09375920), viewed October 1, 2026 (administration May 3, 2018 to April 17, 2019; compulsory liquidation, petition August 13, 2018, winding up commenced April 17, 2019 and concluded September 1, 2025; dissolved January 31, 2026, January 31, 2026 and January 30, 2026). https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/05514098/insolvency
--- a/ORGANIZATIONS/PRIVATE/Monroe
+++ b/ORGANIZATIONS/PRIVATE/Monroe
@ -1,25 +1,255 @@
 ---
 created: 2025-07-22
-updated: 2026-09-21
+updated: 2026-10-12
 title: Monroe Institute
 aliases:
  - The Monroe Institute
  - Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences
  - Monroe Institute of Applied Science
  - MIAS
  - TMI
 tags:
-  - organization
+  - Organization
-  - research
+  - Research
-  - consciousness
+  - Consciousness
-description: The Monroe Institute is a non-profit organization dedicated to the exploration of human consciousness, known for its Hemi-Sync audio technology.
+  - HemiSync
  - Stargate
  - CenterLane
  - GrillFlame
  - GondolaWish
  - RemoteViewing
  - OutOfBodyExperience
 description: The Monroe Institute is a consciousness research and training center in Faber, Virginia, founded around Robert Monroe's Hemi-Sync audio method, which Army intelligence units examined from 1978 and used from 1980 in the Grill Flame and Center Lane remote viewing programs.
 category: "Private Organization"
-summary: "The Monroe Institute is a non-profit consciousness research organization founded by Robert Monroe, known for its Hemi-Sync audio technology, which was used by U.S. Army remote viewers in the Stargate program."
+summary: "Consciousness research center in Faber, Virginia, built on Robert Monroe's Hemi-Sync audio method, which Army intelligence units used from 1980 in Grill Flame and Center Lane remote viewer training."
 start: 1971
 location: "Faber, Virginia, USA"
 relations:
  - type: founded
    with: "[[Robert Monroe]]"
    reverse: true
    start: 1971
    fn: 1
  - type: head_of
    with: "[[Robert Monroe]]"
    reverse: true
    role: Executive Director
    start: 1978
    fn: 7
  - type: head_of
    with: "[[Nancy McMoneagle]]"
    reverse: true
    role: Director
    start: 1983
    end: 1991
    fn: 48
  - type: head_of
    with: "[[Frederick Atwater]]"
    reverse: true
    role: President
    start: 2006
    fn: 50
  - type: head_of
    with: "[[Nancy McMoneagle]]"
    reverse: true
    role: President and Executive Director
    start: 2014
    end: 2019
    fn: 48
  - type: head_of
    with: "[[Scott Taylor]]"
    reverse: true
    role: President
    start: 2019
    end: 2021
    fn: 44
  - type: head_of
    with: "[[Allyn Evans]]"
    reverse: true
    role: President
    start: 2021
    fn: 46
  - type: director_of
    with: "[[Thomas Campbell]]"
    reverse: true
    role: Board of Advisors
    start: 1981
    fn: 40
  - type: director_of
    with: "[[Stuart Twemlow]]"
    reverse: true
    role: Board of Advisors
    start: 1981
    fn: 40
  - type: director_of
    with: "[[Charles Tart]]"
    reverse: true
    role: Board of Advisors (emeritus)
    start: 2009
    fn: 13
  - type: contractor_to
    with: "[[United States Army Intelligence and Security Command]]"
    start: 1980
    end: 1984
    role: Hemi-Sync training for remote viewers
    fn: 34
  - type: participant_in
    with: "[[Gondola Wish]]"
    start: 1978
    end: 1978
    fn: 7
  - type: participant_in
    with: "[[Grill Flame]]"
    start: 1980
    end: 1982
    fn: 25
  - type: participant_in
    with: "[[Center Lane]]"
    start: 1983
    end: 1984
    fn: 30
 ---
-The [[Monroe Institute]] is a non-profit organization dedicated to the exploration of human consciousness, known for its Hemi-Sync audio technology. It was founded by [[Robert Monroe]]. In the context of the *Remote Viewers* narrative, [[Frederick Atwater|Skip Atwater]] became the director of research for the Institute after retiring from the [[U.S. Army]], and later served as its president. The Institute is mentioned as a place where Atwater continued his work in consciousness research, building upon his experiences with remote viewing.[^1]
+The [[Monroe Institute]] of Applied Sciences is a consciousness research and training center in [[Faber, Virginia]], in the Blue Ridge foothills of [[Nelson County, Virginia]], built around the audio method [[Hemi-Sync]] developed by the broadcasting executive [[Robert Monroe]]. From 1978 its methods were examined, and from 1980 used, by [[U.S. Army|Army]] intelligence units that ran the remote viewing programs [[Grill Flame]] and [[Center Lane]], and its Gateway program was the subject of a 1983 study by an Army officer, [[Wayne McDonnell]], who found the process plausible in terms of physical-science parameters.[^1][^2]
-### The Army Record
+### Robert Monroe and the Founding
-A memorandum of the 902d Military Intelligence Group of September 25, 1978, recording the arrangements that turned Gondola Wish into Grill Flame, noted that the institute was "not cleared." An INSCOM information paper of January 5, 1984, stated: "USAINSCOM association with MIAS dates to 1978, when the potentials of the Hemi-Sync process were considered for application within INSCOM's initial psychoenergetic efforts." By then "CENTER LANE Advanced Training with MIAS consists of four progressive phases that lead to full use of the Hemi-Sync process during CENTER LANE intelligence collection missions," and "Rapid Acquisition Personnel Training (RAPT) is an application of the Hemi-Sync process designed to improve managerial and intra-personal relations skills," "used to screen prospective source personnel and sensitize intelligence managers and consumers to intelligence applications of psychoenergetics"; INSCOM's Center for Excellence planned to use the tapes "for accelerated learning of foreign language skills." The Center Lane briefing dated the unit's advanced training with Hemi-Sync to the end of 1980, and an INSCOM request of about 1981 asked to write the institute's "Frequency Following Response" and "Hemispheric Synchronization" tapes into the Grill Flame protocol, "3-5 times per week," at no more than 20 decibels. The institute of "Nellys Ford, VA" appears in the vendor roster of INSCOM's High Performance Task Force report of March 1983, *Beyond Excellence,* beside the Pacific Institute, neuro-linguistic programming, and "New Age Thinking," its technique described as "a machine aided process which more closely aligns brain wave activity (frequency/amplitude) in both left and right brain hemispheres."[^2]
+Monroe was born in [[Wabash, Indiana]] on October 30, 1915, received a BA from [[Ohio State University]] in 1937, and began a career as a radio program writer, director, producer and executive.[^2] In 1958, then a New York broadcasting executive, Monroe began leaving his body. The Institute dates its own founding to 1971, the year [[Doubleday]] published his [[Journeys Out of the Body]].[^1] He had created and produced some four hundred radio and television network programs and become owner and operator of a radio network and cable television system in Virginia.[^3] The current tax-exempt corporation reports a formation year of 1985 and an IRS ruling date of June 1, 2011.[^4][^5]
 The first experiences came in the spring of 1958, during experiments in learning during sleep with Monroe himself as the subject.[^6] In 1978 he was Executive Director of the Institute, then at Post Office Box 57 in [[Afton, Virginia]], and was styled Institute Chairman in its bulletin.[^7][^8] By 1981 the address was Post Office Box 94C in Faber, and the Army's papers of 1983 and 1984 give [[Nellysford, Virginia]].[^2][^9][^10]
 ### Research with Charles Tart
 The psychologist [[Charles Tart]] met Monroe in the fall of 1965, when Tart took a research position at the [[University of Virginia]] Medical School in [[Charlottesville, Virginia]]. Tart wrote that Monroe came in for eight late-night sessions at the hospital's EEG laboratory from December 1965 to August 1966, trying to produce out-of-body experiences while connected to recording instruments; the introduction Tart wrote for Monroe's book dates the series to September 1965 through August 1966.[^6][^11] The introduction states that on the eighth night Monroe produced two brief experiences, and that in the second he correctly described the laboratory technician as out of the room, with a man, later identified as her husband, in a corridor.[^6] Monroe's account of a session on July 19, 1966 records that the technician later confirmed to Tart that she was in the outer hall with her husband at the indicated time, that Monroe had not known he was present, and that Tart stated "the EEG shows definite unusual and unique tracings during time of activity."[^6] Tart wrote in 1998 that the result left "only weak evidence that Monroe was actually 'out'" on that occasion.[^11]
 After Tart moved to the [[University of California, Davis]], he and his wife set up a distance experiment in which they concentrated on guiding Monroe to their California home at a time chosen at random, 11 P.M. Pacific time. Monroe's notes recorded a sensation of being pulled from his body within a minute of the start, at 2 A.M. in Virginia; Tart wrote that the timing matched and that Monroe's description of the home was poor.[^6][^11] In 1968, during a visit to California, Monroe had a two-hour session in Tart's sleep laboratory at Davis with two brief experiences, monitored by EEG, eye movements and plethysmograph.[^11] Tart's introduction to Journeys Out of the Body is dated Davis, California, January 10, 1971.[^6]
 Tart's later role appears in military and Institute records. An Army assessment of August 25, 1978 recorded that Tart "has conducted investigations of Monroe under laboratory conditions and is convinced of the validity of Monroe's experience," and that Tart "recently recommended that anyone wanting to learn about OOBE should contact MIAS."[^7] On July 29, 1978, [[Frederick Atwater]], project officer for [[Gondola Wish]] at the [[902d Military Intelligence Group]], attended a seminar given by Tart on out-of-body experiences and strengthening ESP abilities, at which Tart was described as a consultant to [[Stanford Research Institute]] on leave from Davis. Atwater's memorandum records that when attendees asked where one could learn more about out-of-body experience, Tart referred them to the Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences.[^12] A biographical note to a 2009 interview describes Tart as an emeritus member of the Institute's board of advisors, and the Institute's 2015 Professional Seminar, held on the twentieth anniversary of Monroe's death, carried a Skype question-and-answer with Tart on his friendship and collaboration with Monroe.[^13][^14]
 ### The Method, the Gateway Program and the Patents
 In the 1960s Monroe became interested in non-verbal audio patterns and brain-wave rhythms, advanced "from rotating disc circuit breakers" to custom-built signal generators, and made tape recordings with as many as sixteen patterns of sound mixed together on stereo channels. In the Institute's description, his system of binaural beats creates a frequency following response that "not only gives some control over the brainwave emission of each hemisphere, it also promotes brain-wave synchronization between the two hemispheres"; "an Advisory Board representing several major scientific disciplines formed around the Institute"; and in May 1975 Monroe "received a generic patent for this method."[^1] The Institute defines Hemi-Sync as the "synchronization of brain hemispheres through the use of audio pulse patterns."[^15]
 A patent granted on May 20, 1975, US 3,884,218, "Method of inducing and maintaining various stages of sleep in the human being," names Robert A. Monroe as inventor and Monroe Industries Inc. as original assignee; the application was filed on September 30, 1970.[^16] In 1978 the Institute sold the "sleep-producing audio patterns discovered and patented by Robert Monroe" to the public on a Mentronics Sleep Tape.[^8] A later patent, US 5,356,368, names Monroe as inventor and [[Interstate Industries]] as original assignee, was filed on March 1, 1991 and granted on October 18, 1994, and is titled "Method of and apparatus for inducing desired states of consciousness."[^17] The Institute states that Monroe "was granted a generic patent for this method and technique in 1975, and assigned it to the Institute."[^18]
 In the Institute's 1982 description, the Gateway Voyage program was originally the M-500 Research Project and is "the result of over 3,000 test exercises involving 1,932 participants, conducted by the Institute over the past ten years."[^18] The Institute scheduled twelve Gateway programs for 1982 at its training center in Faber, one of them from June 19 to 26; accepted participants were sent the Discovery album, six stereo cassettes with a guidance manual priced at $95 including postage, for home preparation at least a month before attending.[^18][^19] In 1980 the Institute opened its Professional Division for researchers and clinicians, with an executive committee of [[Arthur Gladman]], [[Stuart Twemlow]], [[Todd Mikurea]], [[Fowler Jones]], [[William Schul]] and [[Mary Jane Ledyard]].[^20] In 1978 the Institute announced that its new research site, the New Land, would occupy some 740 acres in Nelson County, with research facilities, a holistic health center under the New Community Church, an agricultural research station and residences.[^8]
 The Institute's M-5000 program, a course of recorded speech and sound effects for out-of-body experience, went to the [[Esalen Institute]] in [[Carmel, California]] in 1973, by invitation, for a tryout, and some 600 pioneers had tried it by the time [[Joan Kron]] profiled it in New York magazine.[^21]
 ### Gondola Wish, 1977 to 1978
 The 902d Military Intelligence Group at [[Fort Meade]] had been investigating Soviet parapsychology intelligence since September 1977. Its assessment of August 25, 1978 records that Monroe's name surfaced in March 1978 in an open-source document on the psychiatrist [[Elisabeth Kübler-Ross]], who had said she completed an out-of-body training conducted by Monroe. The assessment states that the [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] told the 902d that the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] had shown interest in Monroe in 1973 and 1974, that the agency then had no interest in him and called him "OK" from a security standpoint, that scientists at the [[Foreign Technology Division|Air Force Foreign Technology Division]] were most interested in his work, that [[Russell Targ]] and [[Hal Puthoff]] of SRI knew Monroe personally and believed him credible, that researchers at the [[Menninger Foundation]] had validated the concepts behind his technique with their "theta-gateway" principle, and that [[Thelma Moss]] of the University of California at Los Angeles was aware of his work. Security file checks developed no derogatory information.[^7]
 Monroe was interviewed at the Institute on April 6, 1978. On May 3, 1978 he received a security indoctrination and agreed to keep contact confidential and to train three military intelligence personnel in out-of-body experience in October and November 1978 for a fee of $2,000. The project's unclassified title was Gondola Wish.[^7] On September 25, 1978, Colonel [[Littlefield]] and Lieutenant Colonel [[Robert Keenan]] of the 902d met Colonel [[Capps]] of the Army staff office DAMI-ISH, who related that the concept was cancelled, that "Monroe Institute not cleared," that a contract for training "involving experiements with the mind must be cleared through an office at HEW," and that the [[Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command]] held an ongoing contract with SRI to which the training could be added, with $15,000 from the Army intelligence staff and $50,000 from [[United States Army Intelligence and Security Command|INSCOM]].[^22] The 902d's status report of September 26, 1978 records that the 902d had been advised the week before to cease further planning for "its concept of training with the Monroe Institute," that General [[William Rolya|Rolya]] approved $50,000 in year-end funds as an add-on to the SRI contract, and that $65,000 in all was provided to the command for the SRI training.[^23] An Army human-use chronology lists the cancellation on September 26, 1978 because the Institute was not cleared for classified training and because its training "could be categorized as experimenting with human use."[^24]
 ### Grill Flame, 1980 to 1982
 A trip report for September 18 to 28, 1980 records that from September 20 to 28 Atwater attended the Institute's eight-day training seminar to assess its applicability to the INSCOM Grill Flame Project. He recorded fifty relaxation and concentration exercises of 50 to 60 minutes each, most of them in a soundproof booth with stereo headphones carrying surf sounds combined with a four hertz beat frequency; that the exercises at the level the Institute calls Focus 10 enhance remote viewing; and that the Time Wheel exercise at Focus 15 turns attention to the future or the past. He recommended that experienced remote viewers be scheduled for the Institute's seminars.[^25] The report states that Monroe "has a SECRET security clearance," "has signed a consultant security agreement and has agreed to keep confidential his contact with IGFP personnel," that "No other personnel at MIAS are aware of this agreement," that all contact had been on a "shallow cover" basis, and that Monroe "has not been 'read in' on IGFP and remains unaware of the extent of the program."[^25]
 In a memorandum of March 12, 1982, Atwater recommended the Institute's Discovery series as a screening tool and as the first phase of an "enhanced relaxation/concentration program," followed by Gateway attendance, an assessment period of three to six months, one-on-one sessions with Monroe, the use of the Monroe audio tapes during operational remote viewing sessions, and biomonitoring devices. The memorandum states that the Gateway program "is the core of the Monroe training" and that its author had completed it "for the expressed purpose of assessing it," and it proposes a trip to the Institute on April 5 and 6, 1982 to buy the Discovery series directly from Monroe and to set a schedule for a remote viewer's Gateway attendance.[^26] On April 13, 1982 the command psychologist wrote that a remote viewer identified as Joe should begin advanced training in May or June, and that a visit to the Institute by the project manager, Fred, Joe and himself would facilitate "Monroe technology transfer to DET. G."[^27] An April 21, 1982 memorandum by Lieutenant Colonel [[Robert Jachim]], the Grill Flame project manager, proposed advanced individual training of Detachment G remote viewers at the Gateway Voyage program, at a seven-day seminar from June 19 to 26 where Army personnel "will be intermixed with members of the general public," paid at $850 per individual for tuition, room and meals from ICF funds, a choice that "precludes identification of GRILL FLAME personnel to the Army finance personnel normally involved in travel processing."[^28]
 A request addressed to Brigadier General [[Garrison Rapmund]], chairman of the Human Use Committee of the [[Medical Intelligence and Information Agency]], signed by Colonel [[Chad B. White]] of the Army's operations staff, states that the remote viewing office had been conducting sessions under the AMSAA Grill Flame protocol since March 1979 and under the INSCOM Grill Flame protocol of June 1, 1981, that "the most critical element conducive to reliable remote viewing is the ability of the remote viewer to physically relax and mentally concentrate on the task at hand," and that "A unique form of relaxation/concentration methodology has become available through the Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences." It proposed sessions of 30 to 60 minutes, 3 to 5 times per week, at audio levels "never to exceed 20 dBA and usually in the 5-10dBA range," and recommended that the protocol "be modified to include the MIAS methodology."[^9] A 1985 Defense Intelligence Agency memorandum records that the Army General Counsel determined in February 1979 that the activity could be classified as testing on human subjects and in December 1980 that the INSCOM program did constitute experimentation on human subjects subject to Procedure 18 of DoD Directive 5240.1-R.[^29]
 The Army chronology lists a Grill Flame operative attending Gateway training at the Institute in September 1980, another from June 19 to 26, 1982, and another in November 1982.[^30] A Grill Flame session report for a session of July 6, 1982, number 928, carries the administrative note "THIS IS THE FIRST SESSION FOR THIS VIEWER AFTER PHASE II OF MONROE TRAINING."[^31]
 ### Center Lane, 1982 to 1984
 The Army chronology records that on December 3, 1982 the project name was changed to Center Lane, and that on June 15, 1983 the Secretary of the Army approved a special access program for Center Lane, after a briefing of the Secretary by Major General [[Albert Stubblebine]] on June 13.[^30] The briefing script presented to the Secretary of the Army on October 5, 1983 states: "BY THE END OF 1980, WE BEGAN AN ADVANCED TRAINING PROGRAM USING THE HEMISPHERIC SYNCHRONIZATION PROCESS DEVELOPED BY ROBERT A. MONROE AND USED AT THE MONROE INSTITUTE OF APPLIED SCIENCE IN VIRGINIA. AS YOU RECALL, GENERAL STUBBLEBINE BRIEFED YOU ON THE HEMISYNC PROCESS AND PROVIDED YOU WITH SLEEP TAPES. THIS TRAINING ENABLES SOURCE PERSONNEL (RVERS) TO ACHIEVE STATES CONDUCIVE TO PSYCHOENERGETIC AWARENESS." Other copies of the script repeat the sentence about the end of 1980, one of them introducing Atwater as the project's operations officer.[^32][^33]
 The Center Lane chronology records, under July 19, 1983, "Contract signed with Mr. Robert Monroe for 'One-on-One' training of CENTER LANE operative at MIAS," another Gateway attendance in August 1983, the start of one-on-one training with Monroe between October 31 and November 4, 1983, another Gateway attendance in November 1983, and "MIAS Advanced Training completed" on July 13, 1984.[^30] A March 7, 1985 Center Lane information paper states that the fiscal year 1983 budget of $121K included "expansion of advanced training under a consultant services agreement with Mr. Robert Monroe of the Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences, Faber, Virginia at a cost of $24.4K."[^30] A memorandum of March 29, 1984 records that "In July 1983, the CENTER LANE office awarded a personal services contract to Mr. Robert Monroe" to examine "his technology (HEMI-SYNC) in the psychoenergetic intelligence collection process," aimed initially at a seasoned source's target resolution; that better than expected results had altered its objectives to include training the source "in anticipation of his continued participation in CL as a private consultant after his retirement"; and that the project manager was "aware that Mr. McMoneagle will retire soon after completion of the training." The memorandum refers to a trip report on advanced training from March 19 to 23, 1984.[^34] [[Joe McMoneagle]] is the source named in it.
 The January 5, 1984 INSCOM information paper for the Secretary of the Army states: "USAINSCOM association with MIAS dates to 1978, when the potentials of the Hemi-Sync process were considered for application within INSCOM's initial psychoenergetic efforts." It states that "CENTER LANE Advanced Training with MIAS consists of four progressive phases that lead to full use of the Hemi-Sync process during CENTER LANE intelligence collection missions," that [[Rapid Acquisition Personnel Training]] (RAPT) "is an application of the Hemi-Sync process designed to improve managerial and intra-personal relation's skills" and "is used to screen prospective source personnel and sensitize intelligence managers and consumers to intelligence applications of psychoenergetics," and that the INSCOM Center for Excellence "plans to use MIAS/Hemi-Sync technology for accelerated learning of foreign language skills."[^2] The 1985 papers describe the four phases as the Monroe Discovery series at Fort Meade, attendance at the Gateway program, one-on-one training with Monroe at the Institute, and "specially designed hemi-sync environments during applications training done at Fort Meade."[^30]
 On November 10, 1983 the commanding general of INSCOM directed the use of the RAPT seminar at the Institute as a screening and sensitizing tool for the Center Lane project; "For OPSEC reasons, RAPT was funded and administered by the INSCOM Organizational Effectiveness Office (CENTEX), but managed by the ICLP Manager," and it was cancelled as a screening tool on March 13, 1984. The chronology lists RAPT seminars at the Institute from December 2 to 9, 1983 and January 20 to 27, 1984.[^30] A fact sheet of January 31, 1984 states that all INSCOM personnel who attend RAPT sign a voluntary informed consent form, and that the Secretary of the Army "was briefed concerning the INSCOM involvement of Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences on 5 January 1984, at his request."[^35]
 Lieutenant Colonel [[Brian Buzby]] and Captain Atwater briefed the Secretary of the Army, [[John Marsh]], on Center Lane at the [[Pentagon]] on October 5, 1983, from 10:15 to 11:05, in a briefing Marsh had requested on September 1, 1983 when he approved continuation of the project.[^36] On January 5, 1984, from 14:05 to 14:35, Buzby and "Mr. Fred Atwater" met Marsh to discuss Monroe, the Institute and INSCOM involvement with it; Buzby handed Marsh the information paper and summarized it, and the Secretary then asked a series of questions on RAPT, Center Lane and the Institute, including the use of Monroe "in a personal services contract."[^37] The chronology notes for the January 5, 1984 briefing "MIAS discussed" with the Director of the Army Staff in attendance, and records that on March 13, 1984 that officer directed cancellation of RAPT as a Center Lane personnel screening vehicle. Operations ceased on September 28, 1984.[^30]
 The INSCOM High Performance Task Force report of March 1983, *An INSCOM Beyond Excellence*, lists the Institute at "Nellysford, VA 22958" in its vendor roster, describing the technique as "A machine aided process which more closely aligns brain wave activity (frequency/amplitude) in both left and right brain hemispheres."[^10] After Center Lane passed to the Defense Intelligence Agency under a memorandum of agreement of February 11, 1985, the [[Sun Streak]] unit's reports of February 1987 and July 15, 1987 list, among advanced individual training for selected experienced remote viewers, Hemisync training "available from The Monroe Institute," which "has been successfully employed in the past and is fully documented under separate cover."[^29][^38]
 ### The Gateway Assessment of 1983
 On June 9, 1983, Lieutenant Colonel Wayne McDonnell, signing as Commander, Det O, sent a study titled "Analysis and Assessment of Gateway Process" to the commander of the US Army Operational Group at Fort Meade. He wrote that he had been tasked to assess the Gateway Experience "in terms of its mechanics and ultimate practicality," and that conversations with a physician who took the Gateway training with him led him to the biomedical models of [[Itzhak Bentov]].[^39]
 His paper describes the Gateway sequence: the "energy conversion box," resonant humming, the Hemi-Sync frequencies and numbered Focus states, with Focus 12 for expanded awareness and "tools," Focus 15 as the past and Focus 21 as the future. It states that "Probably less than five percent of all participants in any given Gateway Experience actually fully achieve the Focus 15 state during the course of the approximately seven days of training." It records that Monroe informed the Gateway class that finished May 7, 1983 that an ex-trainer operating in Charlottesville found he could guarantee out-of-body movement by bringing participants down into REM sleep and then using the Hemi-Sync tape technique, and quotes Monroe in a recent magazine article as saying that the out-of-body tape employs Beta signals of "around 2877.3 CPS."[^39]
 On information collection, the paper reports that, according to one of the Institute's trainers, numerous experiments had sent persons "from one coast to the other in the out-of-body state to read a series of ten computer generated numbers in a university laboratory," and that "Although most have aquired enough of the digits to make clear that their consciousness was present none have ever succeeded in getting all ten correct." Paragraph 38 concludes: "There is a sound, rational basis in terms of physical science parameters for considering Gateway to be plausible in terms of its essential objectives."[^39]
 McDonnell's recommended approach for the Army runs through twelve steps, lettered A to L. They begin with the Gateway Hemi-Sync tapes for hemisphere synchronization, add REM-sleep frequencies and hypnotic suggestion, and repeat the sequence until out-of-body movement is under conscious control, then proceed to Focus 15 and 21. Step H proposes a multi-focus approach in which three individuals go out of the body together, one viewing the target in time-space, one viewing it at Focus 15 as it slips into the immediate past and one at Focus 21 as it slips from the immediate future, with the three debriefed and compared. Step J advises being "intellectually prepared to react to possible encounters with intelligent, non-corporal energy forms when time-space boundaries are exceeded," and step K proposes that groups at Focus 12 "unite their altered consciousness to build holographic patterns around sensitive areas to repulse possible unwanted out-of-body presences."[^39]
 ### Board of Advisors and Staff
 A memorandum for record of August 25, 1983 states that "The activities and policies of the Institute are set by a Board of Advisors," and lists seventeen names since June 1, 1981 with titles and positions. The psychiatrist Arthur Gladman was president of [[Gladman Memorial Hospital]] in Oakland, California. [[David Francis]], a senior executive, was chairman of the board of [[Princess Coal]] in Huntington, West Virginia. [[Thomas Campbell]], a physicist, was a research physicist at the [[United States Department of Defense|Department of Defense]]. Stuart Twemlow, a psychiatrist, was a clinician and researcher formerly of the Menninger Foundation. Fowler Jones, an educator, was a professor of psychology at the [[University of Kansas Medical Center]]. Todd Mikurea, a psychiatrist, was listed as a researcher and writer. Mary Jane Ledyard, a psychologist, was a transpersonal psychologist at the [[Federal Executive Institute]] in Charlottesville. [[Anthony K. Busch]], a psychiatrist, was a clinician in St. Louis. [[Arthur J. Ellison]], an educator, was chairman of the Department of Electrical Engineering at [[City University, London]]. The remaining names were [[Carole Dean]], president of [[Studio Films]] in Los Angeles; [[James Beal]], an aerospace engineer associated with [[Martin Marietta]] in New Orleans; [[Joseph Chilton Pearce|Joseph Pearce]], listed as the author of Bond of Power, Magical Child and Crack in the Cosmic Egg; [[William E. Herrmann]], a former manager of the professional training division of [[General Electric]] in New York; [[Wilson Bullard]], a biochemist and professor at the [[University of Utah]]; [[Bill D. Schul]], an educator and research psychologist directing a research foundation in Wichita, Kansas, in biofeedback research and development; [[Gregory Chandler]], a newspaper publisher on Long Island; and [[David Stanley]], a cardiovascular surgeon at [[Oak Ridge]], Tennessee, who "Currently uses tapes during actual operations."[^40]
 The memorandum also lists Mary Jane Ledyard, [[Samuel Caughron]] and [[Martin Albert]] as consultants available during a seminar, and recommends that questions on the technology in use at the Institute and its medical impact "can best be answered by MG Garrison Rapmund, Commander, USA Medical Research and Development Command, Fort Detrick, MD."[^40] The Institute's 1982 bulletin gives the board as of June 1, 1981 with [[Warren Braun]], an engineer, in the place of Ellison, and lists the 1982 staff: [[R. F. Korbesmeyer]], director of administration; [[Melissa Jager]], director of training; [[Rosalind McKnight]], research coordinator; [[Lucinda Honeycutt]], registrar; and field representatives Carole Dean in Los Angeles, Arthur Ellison in London, [[Christian Schaller]] in Geneva and [[Jack Scher]] in New York.[^18]
 ### Officers and Finances
 The Institute is a 501(c)(3) organization with employer identification number 90-0681223 and an address at 365 Roberts Mountain Road, Faber. Reported total revenue was $2,274,489 and expenses $2,402,778 for 2011, revenue was $4,552,691 for 2019, total assets were $6,300,323 at the end of 2020, and for 2023 revenue was $4,221,775, expenses $5,274,465 and assets $4,047,002.[^5]
 [[Nancy McMoneagle]] was executive director and then president for tax years 2016 to 2018, with reportable compensation of $88,426, $93,017 and $96,985, and [[Angie Smith]] was secretary and treasurer at $59,281, $62,392 and $66,578. The directors for 2016 were [[Frank Kenna]], [[Fred Rible]], [[Joseph Felser]], [[Claude Swanson]], [[Chris Van Cleemput]], [[Juanita Lee Fisher]], [[Rolf Nuyts]] and [[Linda Connolly]]; by 2017 Kenna was chairman and [[Janet Reed]] and [[Stephen Ng Qui Sang]] had joined.[^41][^42][^43] [[Scott Taylor]] was president and executive officer for 2019 at $75,283 and for 2020 at $98,654, with Kenna as chairman for 2019 and Reed as board chair for 2020.[^44][^45] For 2021, [[Allyn Evans]] was interim CEO at $51,943, and for 2022 president at $99,107, with Reed as board chair, Kenna as secretary and Fred Rible as treasurer.[^46][^47] For 2023 Evans was paid $148,452, Reed as chair, Kenna as treasurer, [[Joel McGinely]] as secretary, and directors [[James Becker]] and [[Luigi Sciambarella]].[^4]
 Nancy McMoneagle, Robert Monroe's stepdaughter and the wife of Joe McMoneagle, was director of the Institute from 1983 to 1991 and president and executive director from 2014 until she retired on March 4, 2019, when Scott Taylor succeeded her.[^48]
 ### Atwater and the Institute
 Frederick Atwater, the Center Lane operations officer who first attended the Gateway program in September 1980, published a 1997 paper on binaural beat technology under the Institute's name.[^49] According to the Center Lane Project's biographical glossary, in September 1988 he accepted the position of Research Director in the Bob Monroe Research Lab at the Institute, and in December 2006 he became its president.[^50] Army papers of 1983 list him both as Captain, MI, and as "Mr."[^51] His memoir, *Captain of My Ship, Master of My Soul*, describes his Army remote viewing career and his later work at the Institute.[^52]
 ### The Gateway Document Release
 The McDonnell study carries a CIA reading room release stamp of September 10, 2003. On January 24, 2021, [[John Greenewald]] posted it on [[The Black Vault]] as a document from the CIA's Stargate collection. The post, last modified February 19, 2024, states that page 25 of the 29-page document had been missing for as long as the site had known of the document, that a 2021 request for the page was "lost" by the CIA, that a December 2023 follow-up produced the answer that the page could not be found and that a request should be sent to INSCOM, and that page 25 was later received from the Institute itself, according to an article the post cites.[^53]
 ### Footnotes
-[^1]: Schnabel, Jim. *Remote Viewers*. Dell, 1997.
+[^1]: Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences, *The Gateway Program*, promotional text, c. 1980-83. CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270006-0, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection (second copy CIA-RDP96-00788R001700210040-8).
-[^2]: Keenan, Robert E., memorandum "GRILL FLAME," 902d Military Intelligence Group, September 25, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200240011-2. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection. US Army Intelligence and Security Command, information paper "The Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences," ITAGPA-F-SD, January 5, 1984, CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270004-2. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection. US Army Intelligence and Security Command. *An INSCOM Beyond Excellence: Army High Performance Task Force Report,* March 1983, archive.org item INSCOMHPTFReport. "Request for Administrative Review of INSCOM Grill Flame Protocol," c. 1981-83, CIA-RDP96-00788R001100200005-4.
+[^2]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, information paper "The Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences," IAGPA-F-SD, January 5, 1984, with attached Institute material including "The Discovery Program." CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270004-2, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^3]: Monroe, Robert A., *Journeys Out of the Body*, updated edition (Main Street Books, Doubleday), author note and Far Journeys reference. archive.org item journeys_out_body.
 [^4]: Internal Revenue Service, Form 990 of The Monroe Institute, tax year ending December 31, 2023, Part VII and formation year, object ID 202431839349301258 (IRS TEOS XML, 2024_TEOS_XML_07A).
 [^5]: ProPublica Nonprofit Explorer, The Monroe Institute, EIN 90-0681223, organization and filing data (ruling date June 2011; filing totals 2011 to 2023). projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/900681223.
 [^6]: Monroe, Robert A., *Journeys Out of the Body* (Doubleday), including Charles T. Tart, introduction dated Davis, California, January 10, 1971, and Monroe's Experiment EEG-5 of July 19, 1966. archive.org item journeys_out_body.
 [^7]: 902d Military Intelligence Group, GONDOLA WISH assessment report, August 25, 1978, paragraphs 3 to 8. CIA-RDP96-00788R002000160001-3, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^8]: Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences, *The Explorer* vol. 1, no. 2, "New Land Construction Now Under Way," 1978. CIA-RDP96-00788R001700210063-3, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^9]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, "Request for Administrative Review of INSCOM GRILL FLAME Protocol," undated (it refers to the protocol of June 1, 1981), signed Chad B. White, Colonel, GS, ADCSOPS-HUMINT, to BG Garrison Rapmund. CIA-RDP96-00788R001100200005-4, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^10]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, *An INSCOM Beyond Excellence: Army High Performance Task Force Report*, March 1983, vendor roster. archive.org item INSCOMHPTFReport, file "INSCOM_HPTF Report_djvu.txt".
 [^11]: Tart, Charles T., "Six Studies of Out-of-Body Experiences," *Journal of Near-Death Studies* 17, no. 2 (1998): 73-99, third, fourth and fifth studies, pp. 83-90. digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc799368/.
 [^12]: 902d Military Intelligence Group, memorandum "Attendance at Scientific Seminar in Support of GONDOLA WISH (U)," July 31, 1978, signed Frederick H. Atwater, Project Officer. CIA-RDP96-00788R002000160013-0, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^13]: Multidisciplinary Association for Psychedelic Studies, "Exploring the Near-Death Experience: An Interview with Charles Tart, Ph.D.," interview of December 16, 2009, biographical note. maps.org/news/bulletin/exploring-the-near-death-experience-an-interview-with-charles-tart-ph-d/.
 [^14]: The Monroe Institute, "2015 Professional Seminar: Charles Tart Remembers Robert Monroe," Institute archive upload, March 17, 2015. archive.org/details/2015-charles-tart.
 [^15]: Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences, "A Communication from the Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences," Hemi-Sync Process, Bulletin PR31380H. CIA-RDP96-00788R001700210065-1, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^16]: US Patent 3,884,218, "Method of inducing and maintaining various stages of sleep in the human being," inventor Robert A. Monroe, assignee Monroe Industries Inc., filed September 30, 1970, granted May 20, 1975. patents.google.com/patent/US3884218A.
 [^17]: US Patent 5,356,368, "Method of and apparatus for inducing desired states of consciousness," inventor Robert A. Monroe, assignee Interstate Industries Inc., filed March 1, 1991, granted October 18, 1994. patents.google.com/patent/US5356368A.
 [^18]: Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences, bulletin "1982 Gateway Program Schedule" with board list as of June 1, 1981, staff list and "The Gateway Voyage Program." CIA-RDP96-00788R001200060009-5, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^19]: Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences, "The Discovery Program" ($95.00 including postage), attachment to the INSCOM information paper of January 5, 1984. CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270004-2, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^20]: Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences, bulletin "Professional Division Opens," 1980. CIA-RDP96-00788R001700210061-5, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection. The executive committee member appears as Todd Mickurea in this bulletin, Todd Mijurea in the memorandum of August 25, 1983 and Todd Mikurea in the 1982 bulletin.
 [^21]: Kron, Joan, profile of the Institute's M-5000 program, New York magazine, year-end issue (undated reprint). CIA-RDP96-00788R001700210026-4, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^22]: Keenan, Robert E., memorandum "GRILL FLAME," 902d Military Intelligence Group, TAGPA-F-CO, September 25, 1978. CIA-RDP96-00788R001200240011-2, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^23]: 902d Military Intelligence Group, memorandum for BG Smith, "GRILL FLAME Status Report (U)," TAGPA-CO, September 26, 1978, signed Littlefield. CIA-RDP96-00788R001100440004-9, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^24]: US Army, "Human Use Chronology," entry of September 26, 1978. CIA-RDP96-00788R001100430001-3, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^25]: Atwater, Frederick H., memorandum for the record, "Trip Report, 18-28 September 1980," September 30, 1980. CIA-RDP96-00788R001200060028-4, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^26]: Atwater, Frederick H., CPT, MI, Ops/Training Officer, memorandum "Your Inquiry re: Discovery Series and Gateway Program (U)," IAGPC-G, March 12, 1982. CIA-RDP96-00788R001200060027-5, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^27]: Command Psychologist, DA Form 2496 "Individual Training Requirements-Joe," April 13, 1982. CIA-RDP96-00788R001200060008-6, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^28]: Jachim, Robert J., memorandum for ADCSOPS-HUMINT, "Advanced Individual Training for DET G Personnel (U)," April 21, 1982. CIA-RDP96-00788R001200060007-7, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^29]: Defense Intelligence Agency, action memorandum for the Deputy Secretary of Defense, "DIA Psychoenergetics Activity," S/NF/WNINTEL-135/GC, March 1985. CIA-RDP96-00788R001100390001-8, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^30]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, *Center Lane Information Papers for Director, Defense Intelligence Agency*, March 7, 1985, including "CENTER LANE Mission" (October 10, 1984), the budget history, the training programs paper and the approval history chronology. CIA-RDP96-00788R000400060001-2, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection (chronology also at CIA-RDP96-00788R001100020001-8).
 [^31]: INSCOM Grill Flame Program, session report, remote viewing session #928, July 6, 1982. CIA-RDP96-00788R000700290001-4, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^32]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, memorandum "Secretary of the Army Briefing, 5 October 1983," IAGPA-F-SD, October 12, 1983, with Inclosure 2, the briefing script. CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270014-1, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^33]: Center Lane briefing scripts for LTC Buzby and Fred Atwater, undated. CIA-RDP96-00788R001700340002-6 and CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270022-2, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^34]: Security Support Detachment, USAINSCOM, memorandum for record "Continuation of MIAS Advanced Training (U)," IAGPA-F-SD, March 29, 1984. CIA-RDP96-00788R001700210002-0, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^35]: Buzby, Brian, fact sheet "GRILL FLAME/CENTER LANE," January 31, 1984. CIA-RDP96-00788R001200050001-4, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^36]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, memorandum "Secretary of the Army Briefing, 5 October 1983," IAGPA-F-SD, October 12, 1983, paragraph 1 (attendees and times). CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270014-1, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^37]: Security Support Detachment, USAINSCOM, 902d Military Intelligence Group, memorandum "MIAS Briefing to the Secretary of the Army, 5 January 1984," IAGPA-F-SD, January 6, 1984. CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270003-3, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^38]: Defense Intelligence Agency, DT-S, "SUN STREAK Annual Report 1986," February 1987 (CIA-RDP96-00788R001000010001-0), and "SUN STREAK Report - Second Quarter CY 87," July 15, 1987 (CIA-RDP96-00788R001000390007-3), advanced individual training appendix, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^39]: McDonnell, Wayne M., "Analysis and Assessment of Gateway Process," US Army Operational Group, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, June 9, 1983, paragraphs 1 to 5, 32, 33, 38 and the recommended steps. CIA-RDP96-00788R001700210016-5, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^40]: Memorandum for record, "Board of Advisors for Monroe Institute of Applied Science (M.I.A.S.)," August 25, 1983. CIA-RDP96-00788R001700210014-7, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection.
 [^41]: Internal Revenue Service, Form 990 of The Monroe Institute, tax year 2016, Part VII, object ID 201721239349301212 (IRS TEOS XML, download990xml_2017_3).
 [^42]: Internal Revenue Service, Form 990 of The Monroe Institute, tax year 2017, Part VII, object ID 201832569349300913 (IRS TEOS XML, download990xml_2018_5).
 [^43]: Internal Revenue Service, Form 990 of The Monroe Institute, tax year 2018, Part VII, object ID 201920829349300002 (IRS TEOS XML, download990xml_2019_4).
 [^44]: Internal Revenue Service, Form 990 of The Monroe Institute, tax year 2019, Part VII, object ID 202000789349300500 (IRS TEOS XML, download990xml_2020_1); a second filing for the same year is object ID 202021849349300207.
 [^45]: Internal Revenue Service, Form 990 of The Monroe Institute, tax year 2020, Part VII, object ID 202110779349301201 (IRS TEOS XML, 2021_TEOS_XML_01A).
 [^46]: Internal Revenue Service, Form 990 of The Monroe Institute, tax year 2021, Part VII, object ID 202230879349300233 (IRS TEOS XML, 2022_TEOS_XML_01A).
 [^47]: Internal Revenue Service, Form 990 of The Monroe Institute, tax year 2022, Part VII, object ID 202303139349300725 (IRS TEOS XML, 2023_TEOS_XML_11A).
 [^48]: The Monroe Institute, "From the Director's Chair: March 2019, Nancy's Farewell." monroeinstitute.org/blogs/blog/director-s-chair-march-2019-nancys-farewell.
 [^49]: Atwater, F. Holmes, "Accessing Anomalous States of Consciousness with a Binaural Beat Technology," *Journal of Scientific Exploration* 11, no. 3 (1997): 263-274, author affiliation line.
 [^50]: Center Lane Project, glossary entry "Fred Holmes Skip Atwater." centerlane-rv.org/glossary/skip-atwater.
 [^51]: Security Support Detachment, USAINSCOM, memorandum "CENTER LANE TDY/Leave Schedule - 6-16 Sep 83," IAGPA-F-SD, August 31, 1983 ("Mr. Fred Atwater"). CIA-RDP96-00788R001600520010-8, CIA reading room, STARGATE collection. The designation Captain, MI, appears in CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270014-1.
 [^52]: Atwater, F. Holmes, *Captain of My Ship, Master of My Soul: Living with Guidance*. Hampton Roads, 2001.
 [^53]: Greenewald, John, "Stargate Collection: Analysis and Assessment of Gateway Process, 9 June 1983," The Black Vault, posted January 24, 2021, last modified February 19, 2024. theblackvault.com/documentarchive/stargate-collection-analysis-and-assessment-of-gateway-process-9-june-1983/.
--- a/PROJECTS/PSI_RESEARCH_PROGRAMS/Stargate
+++ b/PROJECTS/PSI_RESEARCH_PROGRAMS/Stargate
@ -33,67 +33,67 @@ Star Gate was the last of the names given to the [[United States]] government's
 The agency's interest went back to the 1950s. After [[Andrija Puharich]] lectured a Pentagon conference in 1952 on "the possible usefulness of extrasensory perception in psychological warfare," the chief of the [[Technical Services Division]] had Stephen Abrams of the parapsychology laboratory at [[Oxford University|Oxford]] prepare a review, under a project the declassified scan renders as "Project ULTRA," which "claimed ESP was demonstrated but not understood or controllable" and "produced no further action for another" decade.[^2]
-[[Russell Targ]], a laser physicist "avocationally interested" in parapsychology, met officers of the CIA's Office of Scientific Intelligence in April 1972 and showed them Soviet films of psychokinesis; the office referred him to the Office of Research and Development and the [[CIA Office of Technical Service|Office of Technical Service]], and Targ, who had just joined SRI, proposed work with [[Hal Puthoff]]. "For a cost of $874, one OTS and one ORD representative worked with Targ and Puthoff for a few days in August, 1972"; the director of OTS "approved another $2,500 work order"; and on October 1, 1972, OTS "funded a $50,000 expanded effort in parapsychology" under contract 8473, with [[Kenneth A. Kress|Ken Kress]] as project officer. [[Pat Price]] became the third subject in the spring of 1973. On April 24, 1973, [[William Colby]] "decided that the Executive Management Committee should pass judgment," and by mid-May the question reached the director, [[James Schlesinger]]. "I was soon told not to increase the scope of the project," Kress wrote. "The project was too sensitive and potentially embarrassing. It should be tabled." A joint ORD and OTS program began on February 1, 1974, ORD funding basic research and OTS the tests of operational use. Puthoff's account gives the first contract as an eight-month "Biofield Measurements Program" of 49,909 dollars and the second year, January 1974 to February 1975, as 149,555 dollars; an SRI table gives the CIA's total for 1971 to 1975 as 195,000 dollars.[^2][^3]
+[[Russell Targ]], a laser physicist "avocationally interested" in parapsychology, met officers of the CIA's Office of Scientific Intelligence in April 1972 and showed them Soviet films of psychokinesis; the office referred him to the Office of Research and Development and the [[CIA Office of Technical Service|Office of Technical Service]], and Targ, who had just joined SRI, proposed work with [[Hal Puthoff]]. "For a cost of $874, one OTS and one ORD representative worked with Targ and Puthoff for a few days in August, 1972"; the director of OTS "approved another $2,500 work order"; and on October 1, 1972, OTS "funded a $50,000 expanded effort in parapsychology" under contract 8473, with [[Kenneth A. Kress|Ken Kress]] as project officer. [[Pat Price]] became the third subject in the spring of 1973. On April 24, 1973, [[William Colby]] "decided that the Executive Management Committee should pass judgment," and by mid-May the question reached the director, [[James Schlesinger]]. "I was soon told not to increase the scope of the project and not to anticipate any follow-on in this area," Kress wrote. "The project was too sensitive and potentially embarrassing. It should be tabled." The Office of Technical Service's own chronology of November 17, 1977 records for 3/73 that "a third 'sensitive' (Pat Price) is discovered with an apparent ability for 'remote viewing'"; for 4/73 that a new contract "to continue and expand the work" went from OTS/ORD to the DDO, "Mr. Colby," and was referred to the Executive Management Committee because of its sensitivity; and for 5/73 that "the contract is finally sent to the DCI (Schlesinger) who decides to allow the existing contract to be completed without a follow-on. OTS is told this work is too sensitive and potentially embarrassing. At this time OTS is in the midst of an investigation regarding its role in the Watergate affair."[^3] A joint ORD and OTS program began on February 1, 1974, ORD funding basic research and OTS the tests of operational use. Puthoff's account gives the first contract as an eight-month "Biofield Measurements Program" of 49,909 dollars and the second year, January 1974 to February 1975, as 149,555 dollars; an SRI table gives the CIA's total for 1971 to 1975 as 195,000 dollars.[^2][^4]
-In the summer of 1973 a test on "a vacation property in the eastern United States" led Price to "a sensitive government installation a few miles from the vacation property," and, tasked on its interior, he produced project titles and the site's code name, "data subsequently verified by sponsor sources," with wrong personnel names. Price then "went on to scan the other side of the globe for a Communist Bloc equivalent and found one located in the Urals." In July 1974 the target was "the [[Semipalatinsk]] Unidentified Research and Development Facility-3 (URDF-3, formerly known as PNUTS)." Kress chose "the tall crane and the four structures resembling oil well derricks" as checks; Price said of the derricks, "I didn't see them because they are not there any more," and new photography weeks later showed "two derricks were partially disassembled." A photo interpreter and a nuclear analyst at [[Los Alamos National Laboratory|Los Alamos]] judged his crane drawing accurate, the latter writing that either "he, the subject, actually saw it through remote viewing, or two: he was informed what to draw by someone knowledgeable of URDF-3." Kress concluded: "since there was so much bad information mixed in with the good, the overall result was not considered useful. As proof of remote viewing, the data are at best inconclusive." An internal summary of the same four days was harsher: "The remote-viewing experiment of URDF-3 by [Price] proved to be unsuccessful," since besides the crane he drew "several landmark-type objects that simply did not exist" and, shown the surface features of an underground building, denied that anything lay beneath, "his most negative evidence yet." Price also "correctly located the coderooms" of two foreign embassies already known to the agency's audio teams, and described a Libyan site as "a guerrilla training site" with "a related underwater sabotage training facility," partly confirmed by reconnaissance. "Price died of a heart attack a few days later, and the program stopped."[^2][^4]
+In the summer of 1973 a test on "a vacation property in the eastern United States" led Price to "a sensitive government installation a few miles from the vacation property," and, tasked on its interior, he produced project titles and the site's code name, "data subsequently verified by sponsor sources," with wrong personnel names. Price then "went on to scan the other side of the globe for a Communist Bloc equivalent and found one located in the Urals." In July 1974 the target was "the [[Semipalatinsk]] Unidentified Research and Development Facility-3 (URDF-3, formerly known as PNUTS)." Kress chose "the tall crane and the four structures resembling oil well derricks" as checks; Price said of the derricks, "I didn't see them because they are not there any more," and new photography weeks later showed "two derricks were partially disassembled." A photo interpreter and a nuclear analyst at [[Los Alamos National Laboratory|Los Alamos]] judged his crane drawing accurate, the latter writing that either "he, the subject, actually saw it through remote viewing, or two: he was informed what to draw by someone knowledgeable of URDF-3." Kress concluded: "since there was so much bad information mixed in with the good, the overall result was not considered useful. As proof of remote viewing, the data are at best inconclusive." An internal summary of the same four days was harsher: "The remote-viewing experiment of URDF-3 by [Price] proved to be unsuccessful," since besides the crane he drew "several landmark-type objects that simply did not exist" and, shown the surface features of an underground building, denied that anything lay beneath, "his most negative evidence yet." Price also "correctly located the coderooms" of two foreign embassies already known to the agency's audio teams, and described a Libyan site as "a guerrilla training site" with "a related underwater sabotage training facility," partly confirmed by reconnaissance. "Price died of a heart attack a few days later, and the program stopped."[^2][^5]
-The agency's reasons, as Kress gave them in 1977: "the research was not productive or even competent; therefore, research support to SRI was dropped. The Director of OTS felt the OTS charter would not support research; therefore, all Agency funding in paranormal research stopped"; operational utility was "considered questionable but deserved further testing"; the contractor tests gave way to "a personal services contract with Price"; and Kress himself, "judged to be a positively biased advocate," was taken off evaluation. The director of OTS, [[David Brandwein]], wrote on February 20, 1976, "I directed that OTS support of this effort be terminated," and on October 7, 1976, "OTS will not support any further research in parapsychology." Director [[George H.W. Bush|George Bush]] was briefed in 1976 after learning that Soviet visitors were "questioning Puthoff and Targ at SRI," and left before reacting; [[Stansfield Turner]] acknowledged an "operational interest in parapsychology" in August 1977. Puthoff attributed the withdrawal to "pressure on the Agency (unrelated to the RV Program) from the Church-Pike Congressional Committee." By 1977 DIA "remains interested on a low priority basis," the Navy had funded a brief replication and stopped over "mind warfare" concerns, DARPA had held "a hostile confrontation briefing," and "active funding has shifted to the Air Force's Foreign Technology Division." SRI's later accounting of these years: NAVELEX 74,000 dollars (1975-76), the [[Foreign Technology Division]] at [[Wright-Patterson Air Force Base|Wright-Patterson]] 300,000 (1976-79), the Missile Intelligence Agency at [[Redstone Arsenal]] 281,000 (1977-80) for "remote perturbation," the [[Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity]] 230,000 (1978-80), DIA 228,000 (1978-80).[^2][^3][^5]
+The agency's reasons, as Kress gave them in 1977: "the research was not productive or even competent; therefore, research support to SRI was dropped. The Director of OTS felt the OTS charter would not support research; therefore, all Agency funding in paranormal research stopped"; operational utility was "considered questionable but deserved further testing"; the contractor tests gave way to "a personal services contract with Price"; and Kress himself, "judged to be a positively biased advocate," was taken off evaluation. The director of OTS, [[David Brandwein]], wrote on February 20, 1976, "I directed that OTS support of this effort be terminated," and on October 7, 1976, "OTS will not support any further research in parapsychology." Director [[George H.W. Bush|George Bush]] was briefed in 1976 after learning that Soviet visitors were "questioning Puthoff and Targ at SRI," and left before reacting; [[Stansfield Turner]] acknowledged an "operational interest in parapsychology" in August 1977. Puthoff attributed the withdrawal to "pressure on the Agency (unrelated to the RV Program) from the Church-Pike Congressional Committee." By 1977 DIA "remains interested on a low priority basis," the Navy had funded a brief replication and stopped over "mind warfare" concerns, DARPA had held "a hostile confrontation briefing," and "active funding has shifted to the Air Force's Foreign Technology Division." SRI's later accounting of these years: NAVELEX 74,000 dollars (1975-76), the [[Foreign Technology Division]] at [[Wright-Patterson Air Force Base|Wright-Patterson]] 300,000 (1976-79), the Missile Intelligence Agency at [[Redstone Arsenal]] 281,000 (1977-80) for "remote perturbation," the [[Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity]] 230,000 (1978-80), DIA 228,000 (1978-80).[^2][^4][^6]
 ### Gondola Wish and Grill Flame
-"The US Army Intelligence and Security Command's involvement with psychoenergetics began in September 1977. At that time, an INSCOM element implemented the Gondola Wish program which was designed to integrate the Soviet and East European psychoenergetic intelligence collection threat into the all-source operations security (OPSEC) support scenario." By the spring of 1978 the assistant chief of staff for intelligence, Major General [[Edmund Thompson]], "concluded there was sufficient evidence to warrant the development of a comprehensive program," cancelled Gondola Wish, "placed a complete security envelope over Army's interest in psychoenergetics," and began "a new program directed towards intelligence collection using remote viewing." A message of July 6, 1978, issued "the unclassified code name GRILL FLAME to replace any open reference to US Army involvement in parapsychology." In October 1978 Colonel A. W. Hamel of [[United States Army Intelligence and Security Command|INSCOM]] was told to find a project officer, and Major [[Murray Watt]] was named on October 27. "There exists no written tasking between OACSI and HQ, INSCOM," the first progress report recorded; three INSCOM men were to be trained at SRI. In parallel the Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity at [[Aberdeen Proving Ground]], after Puthoff's lectures of March 21, 1978, ran twenty sessions of its own to test "confirmation and/or rejection of the SRI remote viewing protocol," renaming "subject" as "remote viewer" and "experiment" as "session," and found that "our replication of the protocol did not result in statistical significance." Its acknowledgments include General [[Lewis Walt]] and the physicist [[Evan Harris Walker]].[^6][^7]
+"The US Army Intelligence and Security Command's involvement with psychoenergetics began in September 1977. At that time, an INSCOM element implemented the Gondola Wish program which was designed to integrate the Soviet and East European psychoenergetic intelligence collection threat into the all-source operations security (OPSEC) support scenario." By the spring of 1978 the assistant chief of staff for intelligence, Major General [[Edmund Thompson]], "concluded there was sufficient evidence to warrant the development of a comprehensive program," cancelled Gondola Wish, "placed a complete security envelope over Army's interest in psychoenergetics," and began "a new program directed towards intelligence collection using remote viewing." A message of July 6, 1978, issued "the unclassified code name GRILL FLAME to replace any open reference to US Army involvement in parapsychology." In October 1978 Colonel A. W. Hamel of [[United States Army Intelligence and Security Command|INSCOM]] was told to find a project officer, and Major [[Murray Watt]] was named on October 27. "There exists no written tasking between OACSI and HQ, INSCOM," the first progress report recorded; three INSCOM men were to be trained at SRI. In parallel the Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity at [[Aberdeen Proving Ground]], after Puthoff's lectures of March 21, 1978, ran twenty sessions of its own to test "confirmation and/or rejection of the SRI remote viewing protocol," renaming "subject" as "remote viewer" and "experiment" as "session," and found that "our replication of the protocol did not result in statistical significance." Its acknowledgments include General [[Lewis Walt]] and the physicist [[Evan Harris Walker]].[^7][^8]
-On February 15, 1979, the Army general counsel found that Grill Flame involved testing on human subjects and halted the AMSAA work. A subcommittee of the surgeon general's review board met on March 26 with Puthoff, Targ, and Colonel Garrison Rapmund of [[Walter Reed Army Institute of Research|Walter Reed]] and ruled the SRI work "technology transfer rather than research," while noting that "there clearly is no fixed and formally appointed professional oversight for work being done under 'Grill Flame.'" On November 20, with [[Edwin May]] attending as "Grill Flame Project Leader," it found that the revised protocols "did constitute human use," recommended that consent forms warn subjects they might "lose the esteem or respect from certain colleagues," and noted that some subjects had believed they could use the ability "for personal financial gain in games of chance/investment." The under secretary of the Army approved continuation in April 1980, and the secretary renewed it on January 14, 1981, February 1, 1982, and September 1, 1983. A memorandum of understanding of 1981 set up a Grill Flame committee of two voting members each from DIA and the Army, with 150,000 dollars from INSCOM and 300,000 from DIA in fiscal 1981; Thompson's request of May 8, 1981, to use civilian contractors under Procedure 18 of the Defense Department's intelligence rules was approved on May 27 on condition that the work serve "an important foreign intelligence or counterintelligence purpose."[^7]
+On February 15, 1979, the Army general counsel found that Grill Flame involved testing on human subjects and halted the AMSAA work. A subcommittee of the surgeon general's review board met on March 26 with Puthoff, Targ, and Colonel Garrison Rapmund of [[Walter Reed Army Institute of Research|Walter Reed]] and ruled the SRI work "technology transfer rather than research," while noting that "there clearly is no fixed and formally appointed professional oversight for work being done under 'Grill Flame.'" On November 20, with [[Edwin May]] attending as "Grill Flame Project Leader," it found that the revised protocols "did constitute human use," recommended that consent forms warn subjects they might "lose the esteem or respect from certain colleagues," and noted that some subjects had believed they could use the ability "for personal financial gain in games of chance/investment." The under secretary of the Army approved continuation in April 1980, and the secretary renewed it on January 14, 1981, February 1, 1982, and September 1, 1983. A memorandum of understanding of 1981 set up a Grill Flame committee of two voting members each from DIA and the Army, with 150,000 dollars from INSCOM and 300,000 from DIA in fiscal 1981; Thompson's request of May 8, 1981, to use civilian contractors under Procedure 18 of the Defense Department's intelligence rules was approved on May 27 on condition that the work serve "an important foreign intelligence or counterintelligence purpose."[^8]
-"During 1979, we conducted 79 operational missions, 43 of which were dedicated to assisting the intelligence community during the Iranian hostage crisis. During 1980 we were able to increase our production to 386 operational missions, 154 of which were still dedicated to Iran." A session report of the [[Iran Hostage Crisis|hostage crisis]] states that it was "conducted in compliance with a request from SOD, J3, OJCS, Pentagon," the special operations division of the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]], and that "the remote viewer's impressions of the target are provided as raw intelligence data and as such have not been subjected to any intermediate analysis, evaluation or collation." The unit began in 1979 with five people, two of them viewers; "by the end of 1980, we began an advanced training program using the hemispheric synchronization (Hemi-Sync) process developed by [[Robert Monroe|Robert A. Monroe]] and used at the [[Monroe Institute]]," whose tapes INSCOM later asked to write into the protocol, "3-5 times per week," and "in mid 1982, we began a new training program in [[Coordinate Remote Viewing|coordinate remote viewing]] with SRI." On February 6, 1980, the under secretary of defense for research, [[William Perry]], restricted the use of Program 6 funds, holding it "not appropriate for Army to fund technology programs aimed at scientific demonstration of parapsychology"; an Army history gives the order as March 1980.[^7] After Brigadier General [[James Dozier]] was kidnapped in Italy on December 17, 1981, "on 18 December, we conducted our first session"; DIA told the Secretary of Defense that data had gone "to U.S. authorities for discreet release to Italian officials with no source attribution given," adding, "we can not at this time attest to the method's accuracy or usefulness." A drawing from the first session was used by a DIA analyst to brief the commander in Italy "that the search for General Dozier should be concentrated in the Padua area," two days before the rescue there; a session of January 20, 1982, named Padua but "was not forwarded to Italy," because the Italian police "were having difficulty with information they were getting from psychics all over the world." A memorandum in the file records that Dozier was briefed on the program on February 9, 1982, and shown the sketches.[^6][^8][^9]
+"During 1979, we conducted 79 operational missions, 43 of which were dedicated to assisting the intelligence community during the Iranian hostage crisis. During 1980 we were able to increase our production to 386 operational missions, 154 of which were still dedicated to Iran." A session report of the [[Iran Hostage Crisis|hostage crisis]] states that it was "conducted in compliance with a request from SOD, J3, OJCS, Pentagon," the special operations division of the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]], and that "the remote viewer's impressions of the target are provided as raw intelligence data and as such have not been subjected to any intermediate analysis, evaluation or collation." The unit began in 1979 with five people, two of them viewers; "by the end of 1980, we began an advanced training program using the hemispheric synchronization (Hemi-Sync) process developed by [[Robert Monroe|Robert A. Monroe]] and used at the [[Monroe Institute]]," whose tapes INSCOM later asked to write into the protocol, "3-5 times per week," and "in mid 1982, we began a new training program in [[Coordinate Remote Viewing|coordinate remote viewing]] with SRI." On February 6, 1980, the under secretary of defense for research, [[William Perry]], restricted the use of Program 6 funds, holding it "not appropriate for Army to fund technology programs aimed at scientific demonstration of parapsychology"; an Army history gives the order as March 1980.[^8] After Brigadier General [[James Dozier]] was kidnapped in Italy on December 17, 1981, "on 18 December, we conducted our first session"; DIA told the Secretary of Defense that data had gone "to U.S. authorities for discreet release to Italian officials with no source attribution given," adding, "we can not at this time attest to the method's accuracy or usefulness." A drawing from the first session was used by a DIA analyst to brief the commander in Italy "that the search for General Dozier should be concentrated in the Padua area," two days before the rescue there; a session of January 20, 1982, named Padua but "was not forwarded to Italy," because the Italian police "were having difficulty with information they were getting from psychics all over the world." A memorandum in the file records that Dozier was briefed on the program on February 9, 1982, and shown the sketches.[^7][^9][^10]
-The three-year joint program of fiscal 1981 to 1983 cost 1,475,500 dollars, 962,000 of it from DIA, 313,500 from INSCOM, and 200,000 from DARPA, of which 575,000 went to training. DIA's report of October 19, 1983, found: "Remote viewing is a real phenomenon, and is not degraded by distance or shielding. Remote viewing ability can be improved by appropriate training procedures. Remote viewing has potential for US intelligence applications. However, at this stage of development, descriptive content (e.g., sketches, configurations) is more reliable than analytic content." It reported that INSCOM's viewers "detected the remote site successfully in 50 percent of their projects (89 sites)," and that "a potential threat to US national security exists from foreign achievements in psychoenergetics. In the USSR and in China, this research is well funded." SRI's list of clients served included "a secret NSA facility, including codeword retrieval" and "Soviet R&D facility at Semipalatinsk (PNUTS)."[^3][^10]
+The three-year joint program of fiscal 1981 to 1983 cost 1,475,500 dollars, 962,000 of it from DIA, 313,500 from INSCOM, and 200,000 from DARPA, of which 575,000 went to training. DIA's report of October 19, 1983, found: "Remote viewing is a real phenomenon, and is not degraded by distance or shielding. Remote viewing ability can be improved by appropriate training procedures. Remote viewing has potential for US intelligence applications. However, at this stage of development, descriptive content (e.g., sketches, configurations) is more reliable than analytic content." It reported that INSCOM's viewers "detected the remote site successfully in 50 percent of their projects (89 sites)," and that "a potential threat to US national security exists from foreign achievements in psychoenergetics. In the USSR and in China, this research is well funded." SRI's list of clients served included "a secret NSA facility, including codeword retrieval" and "Soviet R&D facility at Semipalatinsk (PNUTS)."[^4][^11]
-The Defense Department's coordination began at a meeting in [[Jack Vorona]]'s conference room at Pomponio Plaza on August 24, 1978, attended by Vorona, Colonel Jack Capps of the Army staff, Charlie Carter of the Missile Intelligence Agency and [[Dale Graff]] of the Foreign Technology Division, "to establish a unified DoD effort in the development of remote viewing technology for intelligence purposes." Vorona said "the effort is fully supported by the Director of DIA," that "the Soviet Union has a significant commitment in this area," and that DIA, FTD and AMSAA "have contractual funds at the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) for some preliminary investigations into remote viewing feasibility. However, this funding will cease at the end of the current fiscal year (30 September 1978)"; he "decided against the establishment of a restricted access list and a special codeword for the program," marking all papers "SECRET, ORCON"; the working group "will consist of DoD and NSA personnel only." The Naval Intelligence Command replied on September 14 that it was "unable at this time to pledge a specific level of funding support"; the Air Force on September 29 that it "has supported $100K of contractual assistance for FTD to verify data on Warsaw Pact experiments in paranormal techniques" and "cannot commit additional funds at this time"; the Army on October 4 that "the term Remote Viewing may be more correctly replaced with Parapsychology," that "Army Intelligence obligated $75K, this past week, of year-end funds to support an SRI Subject selection and training program for INSCOM personnel over the next year," and that "there are occasional, but persistent indications that the Navy has maintained its research into Parapsychology." A draft Army request of July 7, 1978, with [[E. H. Walker]] as principal investigator, had asked for 350,000 dollars in fiscal 1979 "to determine feasibility of developing automatic equipment capable of producing remote viewing in hard copy form," equipment that "might have the same utility in any future conflict as that of the Ultra machine used in WWII."[^11]
+The Defense Department's coordination began at a meeting in [[Jack Vorona]]'s conference room at Pomponio Plaza on August 24, 1978, attended by Vorona, Colonel Jack Capps of the Army staff, Charlie Carter of the Missile Intelligence Agency and [[Dale Graff]] of the Foreign Technology Division, "to establish a unified DoD effort in the development of remote viewing technology for intelligence purposes." Vorona said "the effort is fully supported by the Director of DIA," that "the Soviet Union has a significant commitment in this area," and that DIA, FTD and AMSAA "have contractual funds at the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) for some preliminary investigations into remote viewing feasibility. However, this funding will cease at the end of the current fiscal year (30 September 1978)"; he "decided against the establishment of a restricted access list and a special codeword for the program," marking all papers "SECRET, ORCON"; the working group "will consist of DoD and NSA personnel only." The Naval Intelligence Command replied on September 14 that it was "unable at this time to pledge a specific level of funding support"; the Air Force on September 29 that it "has supported $100K of contractual assistance for FTD to verify data on Warsaw Pact experiments in paranormal techniques" and "cannot commit additional funds at this time"; the Army on October 4 that "the term Remote Viewing may be more correctly replaced with Parapsychology," that "Army Intelligence obligated $75K, this past week, of year-end funds to support an SRI Subject selection and training program for INSCOM personnel over the next year," and that "there are occasional, but persistent indications that the Navy has maintained its research into Parapsychology." A draft Army request of July 7, 1978, with [[E. H. Walker]] as principal investigator, had asked for 350,000 dollars in fiscal 1979 "to determine feasibility of developing automatic equipment capable of producing remote viewing in hard copy form," equipment that "might have the same utility in any future conflict as that of the Ultra machine used in WWII."[^12]
-Oversight in the Pentagon followed a letter of October 25, 1978, from Representative [[Charlie Rose]] to [[Ruth Davis]], the deputy under secretary of defense for research and advanced technology, asking "to see the Department of Defense undertake those efforts deemed necessary and appropriate to investigate remote viewing," and with her memorandum to Vorona of November 20 setting eight questions for "the oversight groups you will establish," among them measures "developed by other than the current experimenters" that "ensure that the magicians' processes of deception, feedback to subjects, etc. are not inadvertantly allowed" and "a stark clear statement of events, data, etc. that will justify termination of continued funding." The Grill Flame steering committee first met on February 13, 1979, with "all Service ACSI's, Dr. Ruth Davis, Dr. [[Walter LaBerge|LaBerge]], and Dr. Vorona (standing in for LTG [[Eugene Tighe|Tighe]])." The [[Grill Flame Scientific Evaluation Committee]] appointed that summer put the money spent to date at "CIA, 1972-78: $240K. DIA, 1979: $100K. USAF, 1976-79: $300K. Army, 1977-79: $490K," recorded that the Navy's representatives "attend all DOD meetings, but remain uncommitted and literally silent," and reported in December 1979 that remote viewing "thus far have not proved the existence of the phenomena," a report the Pentagon's working group called "misleading and inadequate."[^12]
+Oversight in the Pentagon followed a letter of October 25, 1978, from Representative [[Charlie Rose]] to [[Ruth Davis]], the deputy under secretary of defense for research and advanced technology, asking "to see the Department of Defense undertake those efforts deemed necessary and appropriate to investigate remote viewing," and with her memorandum to Vorona of November 20 setting eight questions for "the oversight groups you will establish," among them measures "developed by other than the current experimenters" that "ensure that the magicians' processes of deception, feedback to subjects, etc. are not inadvertantly allowed" and "a stark clear statement of events, data, etc. that will justify termination of continued funding." The Grill Flame steering committee first met on February 13, 1979, with "all Service ACSI's, Dr. Ruth Davis, Dr. [[Walter LaBerge|LaBerge]], and Dr. Vorona (standing in for LTG [[Eugene Tighe|Tighe]])." The [[Grill Flame Scientific Evaluation Committee]] appointed that summer put the money spent to date at "CIA, 1972-78: $240K. DIA, 1979: $100K. USAF, 1976-79: $300K. Army, 1977-79: $490K," recorded that the Navy's representatives "attend all DOD meetings, but remain uncommitted and literally silent," and reported in December 1979 that remote viewing "thus far have not proved the existence of the phenomena," a report the Pentagon's working group called "misleading and inadequate."[^13]
-The committee first met as "the DoD Committee on Special Sensors" on November 28, 1978, in Vorona's conference room and named itself the DoD Grill Flame Committee. Its oversight committee was "Dr. Jack Vorona, DIA; MG E. R. Thompson, Army ACSI; RADM S. Shapiro, Commander, NIC; Maj Gen J. L. Brown, Air Force ACSI; Dr. Lowell Dailey, USDR&E Representative" in DIA's minutes (INSCOM's summary of the same meeting has it as "service ACSI's, Dr. Vorona and Dr. Ruth Davis," and calls Dailey "Bob Dailey - DUSRAT/Consultant"), "responsible for insuring that research and experiments fall within the legal guidelines"; "DIA will have 'Intelligence Oversight' responsibility; local IG cannot inspect without approval." Permanent members "must possess SI/TK clearances"; "Dr. Vorona expressed concern that parapsychology activities within DoD elements were springing up all over. He directed that agencies (represented on committee) develop policy for turning off 'exposures' as they come up"; "all documents originating as a result of the GRILL FLAME program would undergo downgrading review only after 20 years"; "Mr. Graff next suggested that a cover story be developed for the program; Dr. Vorona suggested that the National Academy of Sciences might back an open program to investigate paranormal phenomena"; it was agreed that a CIA representative be invited; and a review of "the SRI remote viewing experiments carried out at DIA this past summer" found "the results appear to be inconclusive."[^13]
+The committee first met as "the DoD Committee on Special Sensors" on November 28, 1978, in Vorona's conference room and named itself the DoD Grill Flame Committee. Its oversight committee was "Dr. Jack Vorona, DIA; MG E. R. Thompson, Army ACSI; RADM S. Shapiro, Commander, NIC; Maj Gen J. L. Brown, Air Force ACSI; Dr. Lowell Dailey, USDR&E Representative" in DIA's minutes (INSCOM's summary of the same meeting has it as "service ACSI's, Dr. Vorona and Dr. Ruth Davis," and calls Dailey "Bob Dailey - DUSRAT/Consultant"), "responsible for insuring that research and experiments fall within the legal guidelines"; "DIA will have 'Intelligence Oversight' responsibility; local IG cannot inspect without approval." Permanent members "must possess SI/TK clearances"; "Dr. Vorona expressed concern that parapsychology activities within DoD elements were springing up all over. He directed that agencies (represented on committee) develop policy for turning off 'exposures' as they come up"; "all documents originating as a result of the GRILL FLAME program would undergo downgrading review only after 20 years"; "Mr. Graff next suggested that a cover story be developed for the program; Dr. Vorona suggested that the National Academy of Sciences might back an open program to investigate paranormal phenomena"; it was agreed that a CIA representative be invited; and a review of "the SRI remote viewing experiments carried out at DIA this past summer" found "the results appear to be inconclusive."[^14]
-DIA's 1995 history of the service programs adds the Army's Missile Research and Development Command (MIRADCOM), which "had Stanford Research Institute (SRI) under contract" under the sponsorship of the Missile Intelligence Agency (MIA), whose object "was to determine whether selected individuals could interact and influence" electronic equipment; MIRADCOM "had responsibility for developing a 'Remote Perturbation' experimental program," and "from May 1979 to September 1979, SRI assisted MIRADCOM in developing sensitive measurement equipment for the experiment." Its funding table, in thousands of dollars: MIA, 80 for psychokinesis in 1977-78 and 118 in 1979; AMSAA, 220 for remote viewing in 1978; INSCOM, 75 for remote viewing in 1978-80 and 25 for operations in 1979-80; MIRADCOM, 90 for psychokinesis and 190 for an unknown purpose in 1979-80; the Army staff and INSCOM, 150 for remote viewing in fiscal 1981; and DARCOM, 700 for remote viewing in fiscal 1981. Of the Navy and Air Force work of the same years, "no further information is on file."[^14]
+DIA's 1995 history of the service programs adds the Army's Missile Research and Development Command (MIRADCOM), which "had Stanford Research Institute (SRI) under contract" under the sponsorship of the Missile Intelligence Agency (MIA), whose object "was to determine whether selected individuals could interact and influence" electronic equipment; MIRADCOM "had responsibility for developing a 'Remote Perturbation' experimental program," and "from May 1979 to September 1979, SRI assisted MIRADCOM in developing sensitive measurement equipment for the experiment." Its funding table, in thousands of dollars: MIA, 80 for psychokinesis in 1977-78 and 118 in 1979; AMSAA, 220 for remote viewing in 1978; INSCOM, 75 for remote viewing in 1978-80 and 25 for operations in 1979-80; MIRADCOM, 90 for psychokinesis and 190 for an unknown purpose in 1979-80; the Army staff and INSCOM, 150 for remote viewing in fiscal 1981; and DARCOM, 700 for remote viewing in fiscal 1981. Of the Navy and Air Force work of the same years, "no further information is on file."[^15]
-The unit's personnel file, released with the collection, holds Grill Flame security agreements dated February 8, 1979, with consent statements, in the names of [[Joe McMoneagle|Joseph W. McMoneagle]], [[Mel Riley|Melvin C. Riley]], Ann E. Djupman, Stephen C. Horton, Donald L. Hopkins, Maurice C. Himes and Nancy K. Stout, with [[Ken Bell|Kenneth V. Bell, Jr.]]'s form of May 9, 1979, and later ones for Lawrence J. Rickard (1981), [[Rob Cowart|Robert C. Cowart]] (1981) and the DIA Sun Streak access forms of 1985 to 1988 signed by Vorona; McMoneagle's participant counseling statement as a warrant officer, "INSCOM Op Ctr Analyst," carries a date the scan renders as October 1977, elsewhere read as October 26, 1979.[^15]
+The unit's personnel file, released with the collection, holds Grill Flame security agreements dated February 8, 1979, with consent statements, in the names of [[Joe McMoneagle|Joseph W. McMoneagle]], [[Mel Riley|Melvin C. Riley]], Ann E. Djupman, Stephen C. Horton, Donald L. Hopkins, Maurice C. Himes and Nancy K. Stout, with [[Ken Bell|Kenneth V. Bell, Jr.]]'s form of May 9, 1979, and later ones for Lawrence J. Rickard (1981), [[Rob Cowart|Robert C. Cowart]] (1981) and the DIA Sun Streak access forms of 1985 to 1988 signed by Vorona; McMoneagle's participant counseling statement as a warrant officer, "INSCOM Op Ctr Analyst," carries a date the scan renders as October 1977, elsewhere read as October 26, 1979.[^16]
-The DIA report on Soviet parapsychology, DST-1810S-387-75, was issued in September 1975 under the directorship of Graham, who held the post from September 1974 to January 1, 1976.[^16] The same document is item 5 in the reference list of the SRI report "Advanced Threat Technique Assessment" (Puthoff, Targ, May and Swann, October 1978).[^17]
+The DIA report on Soviet parapsychology, DST-1810S-387-75, was issued in September 1975 under the directorship of Graham, who held the post from September 1974 to January 1, 1976.[^17] The same document is item 5 in the reference list of the SRI report "Advanced Threat Technique Assessment" (Puthoff, Targ, May and Swann, October 1978).[^18]
 ### Center Lane
-In 1981 the ACSI "transferred total management responsibility for the project to INSCOM," and a joint services committee of DIA, the Air Force, and the Army was formed; "the Navy expressed no interest and later the Air Force Chief of Staff directed that the Air Force withdraw." At the end of fiscal 1982 "the budget subcommittee of the [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]] (Senator [[Malcolm Wallop|Wallop]]) curtailed all psychoenergetic operational activities conducted by the Army in the National Foreign Intelligence Program." The commander of INSCOM, [[Albert Stubblebine]], "decided to continue INSCOM's project and provide funding with Security and Investigative Activities (S&IA) monies," under "a provisional special access program nicknamed Center Lane," approved by the Secretary of the Army as a special access program on June 15, 1983, and continued on September 1, with a compartment called "Center Lane Level 4." Its mission statement ran: "Conduct intelligence collection and counterintelligence operations utilizing all psychoenergetic processes applicable," and "expand operational capabilities and training beyond the confines of information collection into the fields of psychoenergetic communication and psychokinesis." By the end of fiscal 1984 it had nine operational and two support personnel, and "in the past five years we have conducted over 750 operational intelligence collection missions."[^6]
+In 1981 the ACSI "transferred total management responsibility for the project to INSCOM," and a joint services committee of DIA, the Air Force, and the Army was formed; "the Navy expressed no interest and later the Air Force Chief of Staff directed that the Air Force withdraw." At the end of fiscal 1982 "the budget subcommittee of the [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]] (Senator [[Malcolm Wallop|Wallop]]) curtailed all psychoenergetic operational activities conducted by the Army in the National Foreign Intelligence Program." The commander of INSCOM, [[Albert Stubblebine]], "decided to continue INSCOM's project and provide funding with Security and Investigative Activities (S&IA) monies," under "a provisional special access program nicknamed Center Lane," approved by the Secretary of the Army as a special access program on June 15, 1983, and continued on September 1, with a compartment called "Center Lane Level 4." Its mission statement ran: "Conduct intelligence collection and counterintelligence operations utilizing all psychoenergetic processes applicable," and "expand operational capabilities and training beyond the confines of information collection into the fields of psychoenergetic communication and psychokinesis." By the end of fiscal 1984 it had nine operational and two support personnel, and "in the past five years we have conducted over 750 operational intelligence collection missions."[^7]
-From March 21 to April 20, 1984, the unit "conducted 11 remote viewing interviews at the request of the Central Intelligence Agency" on [[William Buckley]], the station chief kidnapped in [[Beirut]] on March 16: where he was, his condition, his captors, and "CIA point of contact for release negotiation." A CIA memorandum of May 1, 1984, over the title block of the deputy director for operations, stated: "CIA's relationship with the US Army activities covered under the designator of CENTER LANE has been that of a customer. We have no Agency people or funds assigned to or otherwise designated in support of those activities." Its sources "have often 'made contact' far beyond what might be expected by probabilities and coincidence," with "a less than hoped for signal-to-noise ratio and a less than photographic resolution, as well as some outright misses"; "we would like to continue to call upon CENTER LANE." The overview of May 4, 1984, by Lieutenant Colonel Brian Buzby recommended that the work continue within INSCOM. A memorandum chain of November and December 1984 recorded that the fiscal 1983 appropriation language "directed that future parapsychological experimentation be conducted outside the NFIP," that DIA's funds for 1984 and 1985 were 79,000 dollars each for "evaluation of foreign research only," that DARPA had put in 600,000 dollars in 1984, that the Army surgeon general anticipated two million for 1985, and that DIA planned "to detail the operational remote viewing unit from HQDA/INSCOM to DIA."[^10][^18]
+From March 21 to April 20, 1984, the unit "conducted 11 remote viewing interviews at the request of the Central Intelligence Agency" on [[William Buckley]], the station chief kidnapped in [[Beirut]] on March 16: where he was, his condition, his captors, and "CIA point of contact for release negotiation." A CIA memorandum of May 1, 1984, over the title block of the deputy director for operations, stated: "CIA's relationship with the US Army activities covered under the designator of CENTER LANE has been that of a customer. We have no Agency people or funds assigned to or otherwise designated in support of those activities." Its sources "have often 'made contact' far beyond what might be expected by probabilities and coincidence," with "a less than hoped for signal-to-noise ratio and a less than photographic resolution, as well as some outright misses"; "we would like to continue to call upon CENTER LANE." The overview of May 4, 1984, by Lieutenant Colonel Brian Buzby recommended that the work continue within INSCOM. A memorandum chain of November and December 1984 recorded that the fiscal 1983 appropriation language "directed that future parapsychological experimentation be conducted outside the NFIP," that DIA's funds for 1984 and 1985 were 79,000 dollars each for "evaluation of foreign research only," that DARPA had put in 600,000 dollars in 1984, that the Army surgeon general anticipated two million for 1985, and that DIA planned "to detail the operational remote viewing unit from HQDA/INSCOM to DIA."[^11][^19]
-INSCOM's chronology of the unit lists briefings of an official of the [[Office of Management and Budget]] (April 1982), the House and Senate intelligence and appropriations staffs (1981 to 1983), Lieutenant General [[Lincoln D. Faurer]] of the NSA (August 5, 1982, and December 5, 1983), Senator [[Claiborne Pell]] (September 29, 1982), Senator Wallop (October 5, 1983), Vice President Bush (1983), the Secretary of the Army, and the Army inspector general (April 10, 1984). The Grill Flame Scientific Evaluation Committee under [[Manfred Gale]] had reported in December 1979 that the research "thus far have not proved the existence of the phenomena," with a majority of five of eight allowing INSCOM's operational work to continue under oversight. The unit ceased collection on September 28, 1984, and passed under DIA's operational control on March 7, 1985.[^19]
+INSCOM's chronology of the unit lists briefings of an official of the [[Office of Management and Budget]] (April 1982), the House and Senate intelligence and appropriations staffs (1981 to 1983), Lieutenant General [[Lincoln D. Faurer]] of the NSA (August 5, 1982, and December 5, 1983), Senator [[Claiborne Pell]] (September 29, 1982), Senator Wallop (October 5, 1983), Vice President Bush (1983), the Secretary of the Army, and the Army inspector general (April 10, 1984). The Grill Flame Scientific Evaluation Committee under [[Manfred Gale]] had reported in December 1979 that the research "thus far have not proved the existence of the phenomena," with a majority of five of eight allowing INSCOM's operational work to continue under oversight. The unit ceased collection on September 28, 1984, and passed under DIA's operational control on March 7, 1985.[^20]
 ### The Science Panel
-A "congressionally directed independent scientific review" met in August and September 1983 and reported on March 1, 1984, over the signatures of W. Ross Adey, [[Donald M. Kerr]], and F. Zachariasen: "The evidence shown to us is too impressive to dismiss as mere coincidence. Certain similarities between the SRI and Princeton results, obtained in very different circumstances by unrelated investigators, are particularly compelling." The panel "found no obvious evidence of cueing or collusion," thought "remote viewing is either real or due to some sort of experimental interference from one or some of the participants," found that "repeated attempts to elicit a rational basis" for [[Ingo Swann]]'s coordinate training "were uniformly unsuccessful," and concluded "that Dr. Puthoff's team warrants cautious continued fiscal support, and that the research should be conducted as much as possible in an open unclassified mode." DIA was still citing the report in 1993.[^20]
+A "congressionally directed independent scientific review" met in August and September 1983 and reported on March 1, 1984, over the signatures of W. Ross Adey, [[Donald M. Kerr]], and F. Zachariasen: "The evidence shown to us is too impressive to dismiss as mere coincidence. Certain similarities between the SRI and Princeton results, obtained in very different circumstances by unrelated investigators, are particularly compelling." The panel "found no obvious evidence of cueing or collusion," thought "remote viewing is either real or due to some sort of experimental interference from one or some of the participants," found that "repeated attempts to elicit a rational basis" for [[Ingo Swann]]'s coordinate training "were uniformly unsuccessful," and concluded "that Dr. Puthoff's team warrants cautious continued fiscal support, and that the research should be conducted as much as possible in an open unclassified mode." DIA was still citing the report in 1993.[^21]
 ### Sun Streak
-The DIA phase is described on the page Sun Streak. "In January 1985, Project GRILL FLAME was transferred to DIA and was placed under the staff cognizance of the former Directorate for Scientific and Technical Intelligence. Moreover, a 5-year psychoenergetics program (FY 1986-1990), using Army medical research and development funds authorized by the then U.S. Army Surgeon General, was begun at SRI," to "document that psychoenergetic phenomena are real and reproducible, to determine the underlying mechanisms, and to bring psychoenergetics research into the mainstream of human performance research." The Fort Meade unit "was transferred to DIA in 1986 when 12 billets were authorized in the GDIP budget for this activity. A Special Access Program (SAP), SUN STREAK, was established in order to protect identity of the individuals." It worked 192 projects from 1986 to 1989. A Military Intelligence Board review of 1989 and 1990 found "potential applications exist for certain project types: counternarcotics (CN), counterterrorism (CT), counterintelligence (CI)," "limited potential" for detailed data, and "low potential" for prediction; in a 1990 Army counternarcotics test, of 32 projects with ground truth "about one third of all projects were judged to have provided data of good quality." The Army surgeon general's money ran 1.9 million dollars in 1985-86, 2.3 million in 1987, 1.15 million in 1988, and one million in 1989. "The effort at SRI was discontinued in 1990."[^21]
+The DIA phase is described on the page Sun Streak. "In January 1985, Project GRILL FLAME was transferred to DIA and was placed under the staff cognizance of the former Directorate for Scientific and Technical Intelligence. Moreover, a 5-year psychoenergetics program (FY 1986-1990), using Army medical research and development funds authorized by the then U.S. Army Surgeon General, was begun at SRI," to "document that psychoenergetic phenomena are real and reproducible, to determine the underlying mechanisms, and to bring psychoenergetics research into the mainstream of human performance research." The Fort Meade unit "was transferred to DIA in 1986 when 12 billets were authorized in the GDIP budget for this activity. A Special Access Program (SAP), SUN STREAK, was established in order to protect identity of the individuals." It worked 192 projects from 1986 to 1989. A Military Intelligence Board review of 1989 and 1990 found "potential applications exist for certain project types: counternarcotics (CN), counterterrorism (CT), counterintelligence (CI)," "limited potential" for detailed data, and "low potential" for prediction; in a 1990 Army counternarcotics test, of 32 projects with ground truth "about one third of all projects were judged to have provided data of good quality." The Army surgeon general's money ran 1.9 million dollars in 1985-86, 2.3 million in 1987, 1.15 million in 1988, and one million in 1989. "The effort at SRI was discontinued in 1990."[^22]
 ### Star Gate
-"In the FY 1991 Defense Authorization Act, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was identified as executive agent for initiating a new program to investigate parapsychological/anomalous phenomena. A funding level of $2 million was authorized," repeated in the fiscal 1992 appropriation, which also ordered DIA to "realign 10 civilian billets" and to assess foreign "weaponization." The project "was formally established as a limited dissemination (LIMDIS) project early-on and given the official project name, STAR GATE," and the research went to the Cognitive Sciences Laboratory of [[Science Applications International Corporation]] in [[Menlo Park, California|Menlo Park]] under May. DIA's budget paper of March 1995 listed among the customers [[United States Special Operations Command|USSOCOM]], [[United States Central Command|CENTCOM]], the Joint Interagency Task Forces East and West, JTF-6, and the [[El Paso Intelligence Center]], and gave DIA's own funding as 600,000 dollars in 1993, 500,000 in 1994, and 650,000 in 1995; "since FY 1980, the manpower structure devoted to Project STAR GATE remained constant (10 billets)." Congress in fiscal 1994 required a plan "to determine whether the STAR GATE program can show results that are cost-effective," subject "to peer review by neutral scientific experts"; the SAIC contract expired in May 1994 and was twice extended without cost to the end of the year, and 45 SRI and SAIC reports were approved for declassification. SAIC's own assessment, quoted by DIA: "The evidence for a valid information transfer anomaly (anomalous cognition (AC)) meets all recognized statistical and methodological criteria," its size "medium-to-large when compared to other known human behaviors," and "approximately 1 percent of the general population appears to meet strict statistical criteria for exhibiting a robust AC ability."[^22]
+"In the FY 1991 Defense Authorization Act, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was identified as executive agent for initiating a new program to investigate parapsychological/anomalous phenomena. A funding level of $2 million was authorized," repeated in the fiscal 1992 appropriation, which also ordered DIA to "realign 10 civilian billets" and to assess foreign "weaponization." The project "was formally established as a limited dissemination (LIMDIS) project early-on and given the official project name, STAR GATE," and the research went to the Cognitive Sciences Laboratory of [[Science Applications International Corporation]] in [[Menlo Park, California|Menlo Park]] under May. DIA's budget paper of March 1995 listed among the customers [[United States Special Operations Command|USSOCOM]], [[United States Central Command|CENTCOM]], the Joint Interagency Task Forces East and West, JTF-6, and the [[El Paso Intelligence Center]], and gave DIA's own funding as 600,000 dollars in 1993, 500,000 in 1994, and 650,000 in 1995; "since FY 1980, the manpower structure devoted to Project STAR GATE remained constant (10 billets)." Congress in fiscal 1994 required a plan "to determine whether the STAR GATE program can show results that are cost-effective," subject "to peer review by neutral scientific experts"; the SAIC contract expired in May 1994 and was twice extended without cost to the end of the year, and 45 SRI and SAIC reports were approved for declassification. SAIC's own assessment, quoted by DIA: "The evidence for a valid information transfer anomaly (anomalous cognition (AC)) meets all recognized statistical and methodological criteria," its size "medium-to-large when compared to other known human behaviors," and "approximately 1 percent of the general population appears to meet strict statistical criteria for exhibiting a robust AC ability."[^23]
-DIA's account of the Star Gate years: the project was "established on 31 January 1991"; the fiscal 1991 money, "$2 million received and obligated ($1.5 million R&D, $0.5 million O&M)," went to a sole-source contract with SAIC's Cognitive Sciences Laboratory "on line by July 1991," to a "Long-Range Comprehensive Plan" published by May 30, 1991, and to magnetoencephalograph measurements at Los Alamos National Laboratory whose "analysis of results was reported to be inconclusive." Under the fiscal 1992 authorization DIA realigned the ten billets, delivered a report, "Project Architecture," ODT-S-1042-SL, on March 30, 1992, and was to balance the program among "over 12 users" including USSOCOM, USCENTCOM, the joint interagency task forces and JTF-6. Fiscal 1993 language "authorized $0.6 million for STAR GATE and directed the DIA Director to determine the feasibility of transferring" it to the Armed Services Medical Intelligence Center at [[Fort Detrick]]; "the study was undertaken and a decision was made to retain the project at Fort Meade." For fiscal 1994 DIA published "Project STAR GATE Research and Review Plan," PAG-TA-1068-SL, in June 1994, but "core R&D program funds expired in May 1994," and the customer base was "expanded through visits" to the commands, task forces and the El Paso Intelligence Center.[^14]
+DIA's account of the Star Gate years: the project was "established on 31 January 1991"; the fiscal 1991 money, "$2 million received and obligated ($1.5 million R&D, $0.5 million O&M)," went to a sole-source contract with SAIC's Cognitive Sciences Laboratory "on line by July 1991," to a "Long-Range Comprehensive Plan" published by May 30, 1991, and to magnetoencephalograph measurements at Los Alamos National Laboratory whose "analysis of results was reported to be inconclusive." Under the fiscal 1992 authorization DIA realigned the ten billets, delivered a report, "Project Architecture," ODT-S-1042-SL, on March 30, 1992, and was to balance the program among "over 12 users" including USSOCOM, USCENTCOM, the joint interagency task forces and JTF-6. Fiscal 1993 language "authorized $0.6 million for STAR GATE and directed the DIA Director to determine the feasibility of transferring" it to the Armed Services Medical Intelligence Center at [[Fort Detrick]]; "the study was undertaken and a decision was made to retain the project at Fort Meade." For fiscal 1994 DIA published "Project STAR GATE Research and Review Plan," PAG-TA-1068-SL, in June 1994, but "core R&D program funds expired in May 1994," and the customer base was "expanded through visits" to the commands, task forces and the El Paso Intelligence Center.[^15]
-"From 1986 to the first quarter of FY 1995, the DoD paranormal psychology program received more than 200 tasks from operational military organizations." Only in 1994 did it adopt a numerical evaluation. By May 1, 1995, its three viewers, all full-time government employees, had answered 40 tasks from five organizations, 26 of them from DIA in support of two joint task forces, others on "North Korean (NK) capabilities and leadership." Of 99 accuracy scores on a six-point scale, 55 were 2s and 3s and 13 were 1s; of 100 value scores on a five-point scale, none was "major significance." The summary report of the evaluations concluded: "The utility of RV for operational intelligence collection cannot be substantiated. The ambiguous and subjective nature of the process actually creates a need for additional efforts of questionable operational return."[^23]
+"From 1986 to the first quarter of FY 1995, the DoD paranormal psychology program received more than 200 tasks from operational military organizations." Only in 1994 did it adopt a numerical evaluation. By May 1, 1995, its three viewers, all full-time government employees, had answered 40 tasks from five organizations, 26 of them from DIA in support of two joint task forces, others on "North Korean (NK) capabilities and leadership." Of 99 accuracy scores on a six-point scale, 55 were 2s and 3s and 13 were 1s; of 100 value scores on a five-point scale, none was "major significance." The summary report of the evaluations concluded: "The utility of RV for operational intelligence collection cannot be substantiated. The ambiguous and subjective nature of the process actually creates a need for additional efforts of questionable operational return."[^24]
 ### Termination
-"In early 1995, Senate conferees directed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to transfer the 'Star Gate' program from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to CIA. Specifically, the conferees directed the transfer of ten civilian billets and $500,000 in Star Gate program resources by July 1, 1995," together with "a technical review of Star Gate going back twenty years, a declassification review, and establishment of a cooperative activity with the Russians in parapsychology." The Senate Appropriations Committee had already required "a retrospective review and technical analysis of the data that has been produced by the program since its inception 20 years ago." DIA told the CIA in a memorandum of May 10 (logged as received on May 16 in the CIA's chronology) that "any decision on declassification actions regarding Project STAR GATE should be made by the CIA" and that it had "no objection to a declassification of the 'fact of' a DIA program to employ paranormal phenomena for intelligence purposes"; DIA's log of the files, sent after a telephone call of October 10, counted 38 boxes transferred in July, where the CIA's papers counted 43 ([[1995 transfer of Star Gate to the CIA]]). The CIA contracted the [[American Institutes for Research]] in June ([[1995 AIR evaluation of Star Gate]]), whose report of September 29 it quoted in its management paper: "the information provided by remote viewing is vague and ambiguous, making it difficult if not impossible for the technique to yield information of sufficient quality and accuracy for actionable intelligence," and "it remains unclear whether the existence of a paranormal phenomenon, remote viewing, has been demonstrated." The paper recommended terminating both operations and research, adding that "this does not mean that research in parapsychology is not important or that it should not continue in the public domain," a declassification review of "at least five different programs including Star Gate, Grill Flame, Center Lane, Sun Streak, and SCANATE," some "43 document boxes," and, on the advice of the Directorate of Intelligence and the [[National Intelligence Council]], "no resources to the assessment of foreign developments in parapsychology": "we view developments in parapsychology as a relatively low threat to the United States," and "in none of this Russian research do we see credible evidence of developments that could significantly add to the threat that Russia currently poses."[^22][^24]
+"In early 1995, Senate conferees directed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to transfer the 'Star Gate' program from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to CIA. Specifically, the conferees directed the transfer of ten civilian billets and $500,000 in Star Gate program resources by July 1, 1995," together with "a technical review of Star Gate going back twenty years, a declassification review, and establishment of a cooperative activity with the Russians in parapsychology." The Senate Appropriations Committee had already required "a retrospective review and technical analysis of the data that has been produced by the program since its inception 20 years ago." DIA told the CIA in a memorandum of May 10 (logged as received on May 16 in the CIA's chronology) that "any decision on declassification actions regarding Project STAR GATE should be made by the CIA" and that it had "no objection to a declassification of the 'fact of' a DIA program to employ paranormal phenomena for intelligence purposes"; DIA's log of the files, sent after a telephone call of October 10, counted 38 boxes transferred in July, where the CIA's papers counted 43 ([[1995 transfer of Star Gate to the CIA]]). The CIA contracted the [[American Institutes for Research]] in June ([[1995 AIR evaluation of Star Gate]]), whose report of September 29 it quoted in its management paper: "the information provided by remote viewing is vague and ambiguous, making it difficult if not impossible for the technique to yield information of sufficient quality and accuracy for actionable intelligence," and "it remains unclear whether the existence of a paranormal phenomenon, remote viewing, has been demonstrated." The paper recommended terminating both operations and research, adding that "this does not mean that research in parapsychology is not important or that it should not continue in the public domain," a declassification review of "at least five different programs including Star Gate, Grill Flame, Center Lane, Sun Streak, and SCANATE," some "43 document boxes," and, on the advice of the Directorate of Intelligence and the [[National Intelligence Council]], "no resources to the assessment of foreign developments in parapsychology": "we view developments in parapsychology as a relatively low threat to the United States," and "in none of this Russian research do we see credible evidence of developments that could significantly add to the threat that Russia currently poses."[^23][^25]
 ### Other Accounts
-Other operational sessions are known from the accounts of participants: Joe McMoneagle's 1979 description of a large submarine under construction at Severodvinsk, later identified as the Typhoon class; his and Mel Riley's "hourglass on its side" for a Chinese device at Lop Nor; Riley's "batlike flying-wing" in an operations security test on the B-2; Ken Bell's location of a crashed Navy aircraft on Bald Knob in [[Virginia]]; McMoneagle on Skylab's reentry; and the tracking of a Soviet T-72 tank. The same accounts give the original unit as McMoneagle, Riley, Bell, [[Nancy Stern]], [[Fernand Gauvin]], and [[Hartleigh Trent]], recruited by Captain [[Frederick Atwater]] of the Systems Exploitation Detachment, and a 1984 [[Jack Anderson]] column as the first public disclosure of the Grill Flame nickname.[^25] Anderson had written about the Army's psychic work before 1984. His Washington Post column of March 30, 1981 stated: "I've already reported on the Pentagon's $6-million-a-year research to develop ESP weapons."[^26] The Air War College's survey of his columns records a January 9, 1981 column on the subject, "Pentagon Invades Buck Rogers' Turf."[^27] Targ and Puthoff had published the SRI work in *Nature* in 1974 and in the *Proceedings of the IEEE* in 1976.[^28][^29]
+Other operational sessions are known from the accounts of participants: Joe McMoneagle's 1979 description of a large submarine under construction at Severodvinsk, later identified as the Typhoon class; his and Mel Riley's "hourglass on its side" for a Chinese device at Lop Nor; Riley's "batlike flying-wing" in an operations security test on the B-2; Ken Bell's location of a crashed Navy aircraft on Bald Knob in [[Virginia]]; McMoneagle on Skylab's reentry; and the tracking of a Soviet T-72 tank. The same accounts give the original unit as McMoneagle, Riley, Bell, [[Nancy Stern]], [[Fernand Gauvin]], and [[Hartleigh Trent]], recruited by Captain [[Frederick Atwater]] of the Systems Exploitation Detachment, and a 1984 [[Jack Anderson]] column as the first public disclosure of the Grill Flame nickname.[^26] Anderson had written about the Army's psychic work before 1984. His Washington Post column of March 30, 1981 stated: "I've already reported on the Pentagon's $6-million-a-year research to develop ESP weapons."[^27] The Air War College's survey of his columns records a January 9, 1981 column on the subject, "Pentagon Invades Buck Rogers' Turf."[^28] Targ and Puthoff had published the SRI work in *Nature* in 1974 and in the *Proceedings of the IEEE* in 1976.[^29][^30]
-On January 23, 1984 Time reported that the Pentagon denied any interest in parapsychology, and quoted retired Lieutenant General [[Daniel O. Graham]], a former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, who had been interviewed by the New York Times. Time wrote that Graham "indicated that the military had unquestionably been involved in psychic research," and that he considered the $6 million annual figure in Ronald McRae's forthcoming book Mind Wars to be an exaggeration, and said: "I wouldn't be surprised if the intelligence community were following this. They would be remiss if they didn't."[^30]
+On January 23, 1984 Time reported that the Pentagon denied any interest in parapsychology, and quoted retired Lieutenant General [[Daniel O. Graham]], a former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, who had been interviewed by the New York Times. Time wrote that Graham "indicated that the military had unquestionably been involved in psychic research," and that he considered the $6 million annual figure in Ronald McRae's forthcoming book Mind Wars to be an exaggeration, and said: "I wouldn't be surprised if the intelligence community were following this. They would be remiss if they didn't."[^31]
 ### Key Personnel
@ -146,31 +146,32 @@ Government officials and liaisons:
 [^1]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Proposed Star Gate Management Strategy," c. October 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100150002-0; Defense Intelligence Agency, "Declassification and Cooperation in Response to Congressionally Directed STAR GATE Program Review," May 10, 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100010001-6, and "Transfer of Project STAR GATE Files," October 10, 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200290001-5.
 [^2]: Kress, Kenneth A. "Parapsychology in Intelligence: A Personal Review and Conclusions," *Studies in Intelligence,* vol. 21, no. 4, winter 1977, declassified 2011, document NSA-RDP96X00790R000100010031-3. Brandwein, David S., Director, Office of Technical Service, memoranda "Stanford Research Institute Parapsychology Research," February 20, 1976 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200020001-9), and "OTS Support to Research in Parapsychology," October 7, 1976 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200020016-3); memorandum for the record, "Briefing for House Permanent Select Committee re OTS Involvement in ESP Research," OTS memo 287-77, November 17, 1977 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200020020-8); memorandum for the record, "Discussions with OTS on the SRI Project," June 22, 1974 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000700110016-8).
-[^3]: Puthoff, H. E., and L. A. Lavelle, "Project Grill Flame Operational Tasks," SRI International for DIA/DT-5A, 1983, CIA-RDP96-00788R001100340001-3. Puthoff, H. E. "CIA-Initiated Remote Viewing Program at Stanford Research Institute," *Journal of Scientific Exploration,* vol. 10, no. 1, 1996, pp. 63-76.
+[^3]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Technical Service, Memorandum for the Record, OTS/BAB Memo #287-77, "Briefing for House Permanent Select Committee re OTS Involvement in ESP Research," November 17, 1977, CIA-RDP96-00787R000500170001-0. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00787r000500170001-0
-[^4]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Summary RV URDF-3 Experiment," c. 1974-75, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100500001-2. Kress cites Strand, W. T., memorandum for the Director of OTS, "Evaluation of Data on Semipalatinsk Unidentified R&D Facility No. 5, USSR," August 20, 1974, and Stillman, D., Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, "An Analysis of a Remote Viewing Experiment of URDF-3," December 4, 1975 (CIA-RDP96-00791R000200240001-0).
+[^4]: Puthoff, H. E., and L. A. Lavelle, "Project Grill Flame Operational Tasks," SRI International for DIA/DT-5A, 1983, CIA-RDP96-00788R001100340001-3. Puthoff, H. E. "CIA-Initiated Remote Viewing Program at Stanford Research Institute," *Journal of Scientific Exploration,* vol. 10, no. 1, 1996, pp. 63-76.
-[^5]: Defense Intelligence Agency, "FY 1995 Congressional Budget - Star Gate," March 15, 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000300010003-2.
+[^5]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Summary RV URDF-3 Experiment," c. 1974-75, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100500001-2. Kress cites Strand, W. T., memorandum for the Director of OTS, "Evaluation of Data on Semipalatinsk Unidentified R&D Facility No. 5, USSR," August 20, 1974, and Stillman, D., Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, "An Analysis of a Remote Viewing Experiment of URDF-3," December 4, 1975 (CIA-RDP96-00791R000200240001-0).
-[^6]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, "Briefing - Project Center Lane," c. 1984, CIA document CIA-RDP96-00789R002100180002-8.
+[^6]: Defense Intelligence Agency, "FY 1995 Congressional Budget - Star Gate," March 15, 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000300010003-2.
-[^7]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, "The US Army's Interest in Psychoenergetics," undated, CIA-RDP96-00788R001100370005-6. US Army Intelligence and Security Command, "INSCOM Project Grill Flame: Progress Report #1," memorandum for the record, February 21, 1979, CIA-RDP96-00788R001100070001-3. US Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity, "Project Grill Flame AMSAA Phase I Efforts," Interim Note No. 15, July 1979, CIA-RDP96-00788R001100080005-8. "Human Use Review of Project Grill Flame," memoranda of 1979 to 1980, CIA-RDP96-00788R001100440028-3; Defense Intelligence Agency, "Grill Flame - Action Memorandum," December 11, 1981, with the Grill Flame memorandum of understanding and the memorandum of Major General E. R. Thompson of May 8, 1981, CIA-RDP96-00788R001100240001-4.
+[^7]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, "Briefing - Project Center Lane," c. 1984, CIA document CIA-RDP96-00789R002100180002-8.
-[^8]: "Iran Hostage Situation Grill Flame RV Session CC12, Viewer 27.5," c. 1980, CIA-RDP96-00788R000800070001-7, one of 147 documents in the collection that contain the phrase "hostage situation in," among more than 400 Grill Flame session-report documents. Buzby, Brian, Lieutenant Colonel, "Purpose: To Provide an Overview of Center Lane," May 4, 1984, with the summary of information on the Buckley case and the CIA memorandum "Comments on Recent CENTER LANE Experience," May 1, 1984, CIA-RDP96-00788R001700220003-8; "Request for Administrative Review of INSCOM Grill Flame Protocol," c. 1981-83, CIA-RDP96-00788R001100200005-4.
+[^8]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, "The US Army's Interest in Psychoenergetics," undated, CIA-RDP96-00788R001100370005-6. US Army Intelligence and Security Command, "INSCOM Project Grill Flame: Progress Report #1," memorandum for the record, February 21, 1979, CIA-RDP96-00788R001100070001-3. US Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity, "Project Grill Flame AMSAA Phase I Efforts," Interim Note No. 15, July 1979, CIA-RDP96-00788R001100080005-8. "Human Use Review of Project Grill Flame," memoranda of 1979 to 1980, CIA-RDP96-00788R001100440028-3; Defense Intelligence Agency, "Grill Flame - Action Memorandum," December 11, 1981, with the Grill Flame memorandum of understanding and the memorandum of Major General E. R. Thompson of May 8, 1981, CIA-RDP96-00788R001100240001-4.
-[^9]: Defense Intelligence Agency, "Special Intelligence Support Relating to the Kidnapping of BG Dozier," information memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, December 1981, CIA-RDP96-00788R000700130001-1; "1983 Briefing Papers - Use of Center Lane, Relocation of BG Dozier in Italy," CIA-RDP96-00788R001700370002-3. "Conversation with BG Dozier," February 22, 1982, CIA-RDP96-00788R000700130019-2, and "Debriefing, B.G. Dozier, Tape 1102, Grill Flame," February 9, 1982, CIA-RDP96-00788R000100250014-0.
+[^9]: "Iran Hostage Situation Grill Flame RV Session CC12, Viewer 27.5," c. 1980, CIA-RDP96-00788R000800070001-7, one of 147 documents in the collection that contain the phrase "hostage situation in," among more than 400 Grill Flame session-report documents. Buzby, Brian, Lieutenant Colonel, "Purpose: To Provide an Overview of Center Lane," May 4, 1984, with the summary of information on the Buckley case and the CIA memorandum "Comments on Recent CENTER LANE Experience," May 1, 1984, CIA-RDP96-00788R001700220003-8; "Request for Administrative Review of INSCOM Grill Flame Protocol," c. 1981-83, CIA-RDP96-00788R001100200005-4.
-[^10]: Defense Intelligence Agency, Directorate for Scientific and Technical Intelligence, "Grill Flame Project Report," October 19, 1983, CIA-RDP96-00788R001000410001-6; "Grill Flame - Activity," memoranda of November 21 to December 4, 1984, CIA-RDP96-00788R001800070002-5.
+[^10]: Defense Intelligence Agency, "Special Intelligence Support Relating to the Kidnapping of BG Dozier," information memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, December 1981, CIA-RDP96-00788R000700130001-1; "1983 Briefing Papers - Use of Center Lane, Relocation of BG Dozier in Italy," CIA-RDP96-00788R001700370002-3. "Conversation with BG Dozier," February 22, 1982, CIA-RDP96-00788R000700130019-2, and "Debriefing, B.G. Dozier, Tape 1102, Grill Flame," February 9, 1982, CIA-RDP96-00788R000100250014-0.
-[^11]: Defense Intelligence Agency, "Minutes of the Meeting of the DoD Committee on Remote Viewing Activities," August 24, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000140009-7; Vorona to the Army assistant chief of staff for intelligence, S-1862/DT-1, September 6, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200410015-9; Commander, Naval Intelligence Command, to DIA, September 14, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200410025-8; DIA to the 902d Military Intelligence Group, September 22, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000140015-0; James L. Brown, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, to Vorona, September 29, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200410026-7; Army ACSI (DAMI-ISH) to Vorona, October 4, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200410024-9. "Request for Funding, FY 79, Re: Parapsychology - Feasibility for a Hard Copy Remote Viewing Machine," draft, principal investigator E. H. Walker, July 7, 1978, DAMI-ISH, CIA-RDP96-00788R001100080003-0.
+[^11]: Defense Intelligence Agency, Directorate for Scientific and Technical Intelligence, "Grill Flame Project Report," October 19, 1983, CIA-RDP96-00788R001000410001-6; "Grill Flame - Activity," memoranda of November 21 to December 4, 1984, CIA-RDP96-00788R001800070002-5.
-[^12]: Davis, Ruth M., Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (Research and Advanced Technology), memorandum for Dr. Jack Vorona, "'Remote Viewing' Project," November 20, 1978, with the letter of Charlie Rose, Chairman, Subcommittee on Evaluation, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to Davis, October 25, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00787R000500240017-5. *Report by the Grill Flame Scientific Evaluation Committee,* December 1979, Manfred Gale, chairman, CIA-RDP96-00788R001300120001-5. Defense Intelligence Agency, "Minutes of the DoD Grill Flame Committee Meeting, 27 November 1979," S-1168/DT-1, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000130015-1, and "Minutes of the DoD Grill Flame Committee Meeting, 10 January 1980," S-1008/DT-1, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000100009-1, both signed Jack Vorona, chairman.
+[^12]: Defense Intelligence Agency, "Minutes of the Meeting of the DoD Committee on Remote Viewing Activities," August 24, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000140009-7; Vorona to the Army assistant chief of staff for intelligence, S-1862/DT-1, September 6, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200410015-9; Commander, Naval Intelligence Command, to DIA, September 14, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200410025-8; DIA to the 902d Military Intelligence Group, September 22, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000140015-0; James L. Brown, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, to Vorona, September 29, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200410026-7; Army ACSI (DAMI-ISH) to Vorona, October 4, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200410024-9. "Request for Funding, FY 79, Re: Parapsychology - Feasibility for a Hard Copy Remote Viewing Machine," draft, principal investigator E. H. Walker, July 7, 1978, DAMI-ISH, CIA-RDP96-00788R001100080003-0.
-[^13]: Defense Intelligence Agency, S-1004/DT-1, "Minutes of the Meeting, DoD Grill Flame Committee," November 28, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000140013-2; Watt, Murray B., "Summary of Working Group Meeting, DoD Committee on Special Sensors (C), 28 Nov 78," November 29, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200240006-8.
+[^13]: Davis, Ruth M., Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (Research and Advanced Technology), memorandum for Dr. Jack Vorona, "'Remote Viewing' Project," November 20, 1978, with the letter of Charlie Rose, Chairman, Subcommittee on Evaluation, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to Davis, October 25, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00787R000500240017-5. *Report by the Grill Flame Scientific Evaluation Committee,* December 1979, Manfred Gale, chairman, CIA-RDP96-00788R001300120001-5. Defense Intelligence Agency, "Minutes of the DoD Grill Flame Committee Meeting, 27 November 1979," S-1168/DT-1, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000130015-1, and "Minutes of the DoD Grill Flame Committee Meeting, 10 January 1980," S-1008/DT-1, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000100009-1, both signed Jack Vorona, chairman.
-[^14]: Defense Intelligence Agency, "Senate Appropriations Committee Congressionally Directed Action, Star Gate," retrospective review, technical analysis and declassification status, with transmittal memorandum signed Letitia A. Long, Director, DMI Staff, faxed March 15, 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000300010002-3, -003-2 and -004-1, and CIA-RDP96-00791R000100040003-1.
+[^14]: Defense Intelligence Agency, S-1004/DT-1, "Minutes of the Meeting, DoD Grill Flame Committee," November 28, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000140013-2; Watt, Murray B., "Summary of Working Group Meeting, DoD Committee on Special Sensors (C), 28 Nov 78," November 29, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200240006-8.
-[^15]: Grill Flame security agreements, volunteer consent statements, participant counseling statements, "Information About Remote Viewing for Participants" forms, and DIA Sun Streak access forms, 1977 to 1988, CIA-RDP96-00789R002100150005-8 to R002100150079-7; names as printed in the item titles.
+[^15]: Defense Intelligence Agency, "Senate Appropriations Committee Congressionally Directed Action, Star Gate," retrospective review, technical analysis and declassification status, with transmittal memorandum signed Letitia A. Long, Director, DMI Staff, faxed March 15, 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000300010002-3, -003-2 and -004-1, and CIA-RDP96-00791R000100040003-1.
-[^16]: Louis F. Maire III and J. D. LaMothe, "Soviet and Czechoslovakian Parapsychology Research," Defense Intelligence Agency, DST-1810S-387-75, September 1975, DIA task PT-1810-12-75, CIA-RDP96-00792R000600350001-3, cover page and table of contents.
+[^16]: Grill Flame security agreements, volunteer consent statements, participant counseling statements, "Information About Remote Viewing for Participants" forms, and DIA Sun Streak access forms, 1977 to 1988, CIA-RDP96-00789R002100150005-8 to R002100150079-7; names as printed in the item titles.
-[^17]: Harold E. Puthoff, Russell Targ, Edwin C. May and Ingo Swann, "Advanced Threat Technique Assessment," SRI International final report, October 1978, references, CIA-RDP96-00787R000500150001-2.
+[^17]: Louis F. Maire III and J. D. LaMothe, "Soviet and Czechoslovakian Parapsychology Research," Defense Intelligence Agency, DST-1810S-387-75, September 1975, DIA task PT-1810-12-75, CIA-RDP96-00792R000600350001-3, cover page and table of contents.
-[^18]: Buzby, Brian, Lieutenant Colonel, "Purpose: To Provide an Overview of Center Lane," May 4, 1984, with the summary of information on the Buckley case and the CIA memorandum "Comments on Recent CENTER LANE Experience," May 1, 1984, CIA-RDP96-00788R001700220003-8; "Request for Administrative Review of INSCOM Grill Flame Protocol," c. 1981-83, CIA-RDP96-00788R001100200005-4.
+[^18]: Harold E. Puthoff, Russell Targ, Edwin C. May and Ingo Swann, "Advanced Threat Technique Assessment," SRI International final report, October 1978, references, CIA-RDP96-00787R000500150001-2.
-[^19]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, "List of Events from September 1977 to January 1986," CIA-RDP96-00788R001100020001-8. *Report by the Grill Flame Scientific Evaluation Committee,* December 1979, Manfred Gale, chairman, CIA-RDP96-00788R001300120001-5; Vorona, J., "Comments on 'Report By: The GRILLFLAME Scientific Evaluation Committee,'" memorandum of the Grill Flame Working Group, CIA-RDP96-00788R001300060001-2. Buzby, Brian, memorandum "Briefing to Senator Wallop, 5 October 1983," October 14, 1983, CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270015-0.
+[^19]: Buzby, Brian, Lieutenant Colonel, "Purpose: To Provide an Overview of Center Lane," May 4, 1984, with the summary of information on the Buckley case and the CIA memorandum "Comments on Recent CENTER LANE Experience," May 1, 1984, CIA-RDP96-00788R001700220003-8; "Request for Administrative Review of INSCOM Grill Flame Protocol," c. 1981-83, CIA-RDP96-00788R001100200005-4.
-[^20]: "Science Panel Report: SRI Studies in Remote Viewing: A Program Review," March 1, 1984, signed by W. Ross Adey, Donald M. Kerr, and F. Zachariasen, reproduced as appendix B of Defense Intelligence Agency, "Star Gate Project: An Overview," DTI-S-1056-SL, April 30, 1993, CIA-RDP96-00789R002800180001-2.
+[^20]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, "List of Events from September 1977 to January 1986," CIA-RDP96-00788R001100020001-8. *Report by the Grill Flame Scientific Evaluation Committee,* December 1979, Manfred Gale, chairman, CIA-RDP96-00788R001300120001-5; Vorona, J., "Comments on 'Report By: The GRILLFLAME Scientific Evaluation Committee,'" memorandum of the Grill Flame Working Group, CIA-RDP96-00788R001300060001-2. Buzby, Brian, memorandum "Briefing to Senator Wallop, 5 October 1983," October 14, 1983, CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270015-0.
-[^21]: Defense Intelligence Agency, "FY 1995 Congressional Budget - Star Gate," March 15, 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000300010003-2. Defense Intelligence Agency, "Star Gate Project: An Overview," April 30, 1993, CIA-RDP96-00789R002800180001-2.
+[^21]: "Science Panel Report: SRI Studies in Remote Viewing: A Program Review," March 1, 1984, signed by W. Ross Adey, Donald M. Kerr, and F. Zachariasen, reproduced as appendix B of Defense Intelligence Agency, "Star Gate Project: An Overview," DTI-S-1056-SL, April 30, 1993, CIA-RDP96-00789R002800180001-2.
-[^22]: Defense Intelligence Agency, "Star Gate Project: An Overview," April 30, 1993, CIA-RDP96-00789R002800180001-2. Defense Intelligence Agency, "FY 1995 Congressional Budget - Star Gate," March 15, 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000300010003-2.
+[^22]: Defense Intelligence Agency, "FY 1995 Congressional Budget - Star Gate," March 15, 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000300010003-2. Defense Intelligence Agency, "Star Gate Project: An Overview," April 30, 1993, CIA-RDP96-00789R002800180001-2.
-[^23]: "Summary Report. Star Gate Operational Tasking and Evaluation (An Extract)," 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200300002-2. The same report is printed as appendix D of the [[1995 AIR evaluation of Star Gate|AIR evaluation]], CIA-RDP96-00791R000200180006-4.
+[^23]: Defense Intelligence Agency, "Star Gate Project: An Overview," April 30, 1993, CIA-RDP96-00789R002800180001-2. Defense Intelligence Agency, "FY 1995 Congressional Budget - Star Gate," March 15, 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000300010003-2.
-[^24]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Proposed Star Gate Management Strategy," c. October 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100150002-0; Defense Intelligence Agency, "Declassification and Cooperation in Response to Congressionally Directed STAR GATE Program Review," May 10, 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100010001-6, and "Transfer of Project STAR GATE Files," October 10, 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200290001-5.
+[^24]: "Summary Report. Star Gate Operational Tasking and Evaluation (An Extract)," 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200300002-2. The same report is printed as appendix D of the [[1995 AIR evaluation of Star Gate|AIR evaluation]], CIA-RDP96-00791R000200180006-4.
-[^25]: Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), memorandum for record, "Recent Jack Anderson 'GRILL FLAME' Articles," May 17, 1984, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200030001-6. cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R001200030001-6.pdf; memorandum, "BG Soyster Presentation 12 December 1985," CIA-RDP96-00788R001700030003-9. cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R001700030003-9.pdf
+[^25]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Proposed Star Gate Management Strategy," c. October 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100150002-0; Defense Intelligence Agency, "Declassification and Cooperation in Response to Congressionally Directed STAR GATE Program Review," May 10, 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100010001-6, and "Transfer of Project STAR GATE Files," October 10, 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200290001-5.
-[^26]: Jack Anderson, "CIA Toys with Extrasensory Weapons," *The Washington Post*, March 30, 1981, p. B13, CIA-RDP96-00788R001700360003-3. cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R001700360003-3.pdf
+[^26]: Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), memorandum for record, "Recent Jack Anderson 'GRILL FLAME' Articles," May 17, 1984, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200030001-6. cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R001200030001-6.pdf; memorandum, "BG Soyster Presentation 12 December 1985," CIA-RDP96-00788R001700030003-9. cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R001700030003-9.pdf
-[^27]: Jack Anderson, "Pentagon Invades Buck Rogers' Turf," *The Washington Post*, January 9, 1981, p. D16, as cited in Air War College research paper on psychic research, CIA-RDP96-00789R001001420001-3. cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00789R001001420001-3.pdf
+[^27]: Jack Anderson, "CIA Toys with Extrasensory Weapons," *The Washington Post*, March 30, 1981, p. B13, CIA-RDP96-00788R001700360003-3. cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R001700360003-3.pdf
-[^28]: Schnabel, Jim. *Remote Viewers: The Secret History of America's Psychic Spies.* Dell, 1997; Jacobsen, Annie. *Phenomena: The Secret History of the U.S. Government's Investigations into Extrasensory Perception and Psychokinesis.* Little, Brown, 2017; McMoneagle, Joseph. *The Stargate Chronicles.* Hampton Roads, 2002.
+[^28]: Jack Anderson, "Pentagon Invades Buck Rogers' Turf," *The Washington Post*, January 9, 1981, p. D16, as cited in Air War College research paper on psychic research, CIA-RDP96-00789R001001420001-3. cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00789R001001420001-3.pdf
-[^29]: Targ, Russell, and Harold Puthoff. "Information Transfer under Conditions of Sensory Shielding," *Nature,* vol. 251, October 18, 1974, pp. 602-607; Puthoff, Harold E., and Russell Targ. "A Perceptual Channel for Information Transfer over Kilometer Distances," *Proceedings of the IEEE,* vol. 64, no. 3, March 1976, pp. 329-354.
+[^29]: Schnabel, Jim. *Remote Viewers: The Secret History of America's Psychic Spies.* Dell, 1997; Jacobsen, Annie. *Phenomena: The Secret History of the U.S. Government's Investigations into Extrasensory Perception and Psychokinesis.* Little, Brown, 2017; McMoneagle, Joseph. *The Stargate Chronicles.* Hampton Roads, 2002.
-[^30]: "An E.S.P. Gap: Exploring psychic weapons," *Time*, January 23, 1984, p. 17, CIA reading room, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200230025-5. Quotations are as Time reported them from Graham's interview with the New York Times. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00791r000200230025-5
+[^30]: Targ, Russell, and Harold Puthoff. "Information Transfer under Conditions of Sensory Shielding," *Nature,* vol. 251, October 18, 1974, pp. 602-607; Puthoff, Harold E., and Russell Targ. "A Perceptual Channel for Information Transfer over Kilometer Distances," *Proceedings of the IEEE,* vol. 64, no. 3, March 1976, pp. 329-354.
 [^31]: "An E.S.P. Gap: Exploring psychic weapons," *Time*, January 23, 1984, p. 17, CIA reading room, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200230025-5. Quotations are as Time reported them from Graham's interview with the New York Times. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00791r000200230025-5
--- a/EVENTS/MAJOR_CONFLICTS/Yom
+++ b/EVENTS/MAJOR_CONFLICTS/Yom
@ -127,13 +127,13 @@ On October 24, 1973, [[Leonid Brezhnev]] sent Nixon a letter threatening unilate
 The Washington Special Actions Group principals met in the night of October 24 and 25 and decided to set DEFCON III. Admiral Moorer's record of the meeting lists the actions taken: the carrier [[USS John F. Kennedy]] was moved from west of [[Gibraltar]] into the Mediterranean, the Roosevelt was moved from the vicinity of [[Sicily]], the [[82nd Airborne Division]] was alerted, and 75 B-52s were recalled from [[Guam]].[^27] Kissinger recalled that the group decided DEFCON III would not be noted quickly enough by Soviet decisionmakers, so at 12:20 a.m. the 82nd Airborne was alerted for possible movement and at 12:25 a.m. the carriers were ordered to the Mediterranean.[^28] The alert was leaked at about 3 a.m. on October 25.[^27] At 1:03 a.m. Kissinger told the British ambassador, [[Cromer]], "Well, don't say the Americans have gone crazy."[^27]
-The participants in the rump session were Kissinger, Schlesinger, Moorer, [[Alexander Haig]], [[Brent Scowcroft]] and Colby. Nixon remained upstairs in the White House, and Kissinger conferred with him by telephone before the decision.[^7] The CIA's 2013 history of the episode states that "many questioned, then and later, whether the decision for DEFCON III was based on legitimate alarms or whether it was an overreaction," and that "there has also been speculation that the decision may have been politically motivated" by the needs of a [[Watergate]]-beleaguered White House.[^7] It records the view of [[Ray Cline]] that Kissinger "knew what he wanted to do all along" and that the meeting was "a kind of shell game, a superficial exercise."[^7] Cline's October 26 memorandum to Kissinger, quoted in a footnote to the minutes, stated that "the technical intelligence evidence available in INR did not support such a Soviet intention."[^27]
+According to Kissinger's Record of Schedule, the participants in the rump session on the night of October 24 to 25, 1973 were Kissinger, Schlesinger, Moorer, [[Alexander Haig]], [[Brent Scowcroft]], Colby and [[Jonathan Howe]].[^29] Kissinger later noted that the White House described the meeting as an NSC meeting while State Department records called it a WSAG "meeting of principals," and [[Ray Cline]] called it a "curious little rump NSC meeting."[^29] Nixon remained upstairs in the White House, and Kissinger conferred with him by telephone before the decision.[^7] The CIA's 2013 history of the episode states that "many questioned, then and later, whether the decision for DEFCON III was based on legitimate alarms or whether it was an overreaction," and that "there has also been speculation that the decision may have been politically motivated" by the needs of a [[Watergate]]-beleaguered White House.[^7] It records the view of Ray Cline that Kissinger "knew what he wanted to do all along" and that the meeting was "a kind of shell game, a superficial exercise."[^7] Cline's October 26 memorandum to Kissinger, quoted in a footnote to the minutes, stated that "the technical intelligence evidence available in INR did not support such a Soviet intention."[^27]
 A CIA document dated October 30, 1973, titled "Soviet Nuclear Weapons in Egypt?," reported Scud-associated equipment at two locations in Egypt and stated that the confirmation "adds seriousness to the evidence that Moscow introduced nuclear weapons into the Middle East."[^7] A December 20, 1973 CIA assessment, "The Impact of the 24 October US Alert on the Soviet Leadership," judged that Brezhnev and his colleagues "appear to have reacted with greater concern and annoyance to President Nixon's statements of 26 October than they did to the alert itself."[^7]
 ### Aftermath
-Marwan died in June 2007 after falling from the balcony of his apartment in [[London]]. A coroner's inquest was held to determine whether he died by suicide, accident or foul play.[^29] Coroner [[William Dolman]] handed down an open verdict on July 14, 2010, and said there was no evidence to support a verdict of either suicide or unlawful killing.[^29] Dolman described claims about the death as belonging to "the murky and secretive world of espionage."[^29] Marwan's widow, [[Mona Nasser]], told the inquest that her husband had never spoken of suicide but had expressed fears that he might be killed.[^29] Historians and intelligence agents have accused Marwan of being an Israeli spy who passed on vital information before the 1973 war, or of being a double agent loyal to Egypt.[^29]
+Marwan died in June 2007 after falling from the balcony of his apartment in [[London]]. A coroner's inquest was held to determine whether he died by suicide, accident or foul play.[^30] Coroner [[William Dolman]] handed down an open verdict on July 14, 2010, and said there was no evidence to support a verdict of either suicide or unlawful killing.[^30] Dolman described claims about the death as belonging to "the murky and secretive world of espionage."[^30] Marwan's widow, [[Mona Nasser]], told the inquest that her husband had never spoken of suicide but had expressed fears that he might be killed.[^30] Historians and intelligence agents have accused Marwan of being an Israeli spy who passed on vital information before the 1973 war, or of being a double agent loyal to Egypt.[^30]
 ### Footnotes
@ -165,4 +165,5 @@ Marwan died in June 2007 after falling from the balcony of his apartment in [[Lo
 [^26]: Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (1982), pages 583 to 584, as quoted in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXV, Document 268, note 3, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25
 [^27]: Memorandum for the Record, CJCS Memo M-88-73, NSC/JCS meeting of October 24 and 25, 1973, from the records of Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXV, Document 269, including notes 11 and 13, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25
 [^28]: Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (1982), pages 588 to 589, as quoted in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXV, Document 269, note 10, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25
-[^29]: "Inquest: Egyptian spy suspect's death unexplained," report of the British coroner's ruling of July 14, 2010, reprinted at The Herald (heraldnet.com), https://www.heraldnet.com/?p=177620, and ynetnews, https://www.ynetnews.com/article/3919938
+[^29]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, Document 269, memorandum for the record by Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, October 26, 1973, Washington, October 24/25, 1973, 10:30 p.m. to 3:30 a.m., editorial notes (Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, pp. 586-587; Cline, "Policy Without Intelligence," *Foreign Policy*, no. 17, Winter 1974-1975, p. 128). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25/d269
 [^30]: "Inquest: Egyptian spy suspect's death unexplained," report of the British coroner's ruling of July 14, 2010, reprinted at The Herald (heraldnet.com), https://www.heraldnet.com/?p=177620, and ynetnews, https://www.ynetnews.com/article/3919938
--- a/PLACES/MILITARY_INSTALLATIONS/Ilopango
+++ b/PLACES/MILITARY_INSTALLATIONS/Ilopango
@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ aliases:
  - Ilopango Air Force Base
  - Ilopango
 created: 2026-05-17
-updated: 2026-10-08
+updated: 2026-10-12
 category: "Military Installation"
 tags:
  - Geography
@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ The operation was run openly. The assistant regional security officer for the U.
 Gary Webb wrote that [[Central Intelligence Agency]] records showed Hangar No. 4 was used by the Agency for covert Contra operations until it was turned over in 1985 to the National Security Council and Oliver North's illegal arms network, "The Enterprise." CIA agent Felix Rodriguez also used Hangar No. 4 for his helicopter-based counterinsurgency program. The adjoining Hangar No. 5 continued to be used by the CIA in support of the Contra project.[^1] The CIA Inspector General's report gives a different sequence. In 1984 the CIA occupied a newly constructed warehouse and hangar, Hangar 5, and moved to it activities that had been conducted in the smaller Hangar 4. The report states that "After CIA had moved out of Hangar 4, it was used in 1985 and 1986 by NHAO and the Private Benefactors in support of their Contra-related operations."[^6]
-Webb wrote that in March 1986 a cable from the Costa Rican [[DEA]] office reported that a pilot named Carlos Amador intended to fly into Ilopango, pick up cocaine at Hangar No. 4, and transport it to [[Miami]]. The Inspector General's report describes a cable of April 1986 that reported a March 18, 1986 DEA report that Amador had recently flown from Costa Rica to San Salvador, where he had access to Hangar 4.[^7] The report also records that the drafter of one 1986 cable was not certain of the nature or affiliation of another entity that had operated from Hangar 4, and surmised that it "may have been associated either with Oliver North, the Private Benefactors, or the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office (NHAO)."[^8] Amador had been working with the CIA for years, flying missions for the Costa Rican Contras. The CIA had collected information for at least a year indicating Amador was also flying drug planes between [[Costa Rica]], [[Panama]], Belize, and Miami for a pair of major cocaine traffickers, the Sarcovic brothers, at the same time he was flying for the [[White House]].[^1]
+Webb wrote that in March 1986 a cable from the Costa Rican [[DEA]] office reported that a pilot named Carlos Amador intended to fly into Ilopango, pick up cocaine at Hangar No. 4, and transport it to [[Miami]]. The Justice Department Inspector General quotes a DEA Costa Rica cable dated March 20, 1986, which reported that a source said Amador intended to fly cocaine from Costa Rica through El Salvador to Miami, possibly picking it up at Hangar No. 4.[^7] The CIA Inspector General's report describes a cable of April 1986 that reported a March 18, 1986 DEA report that Amador had recently flown from Costa Rica to San Salvador, where he had access to Hangar 4.[^8] The report also records that the drafter of one 1986 cable was not certain of the nature or affiliation of another entity that had operated from Hangar 4, and surmised that it "may have been associated either with Oliver North, the Private Benefactors, or the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office (NHAO)."[^9] Amador had been working with the CIA for years, flying missions for the Costa Rican Contras. The CIA had collected information for at least a year indicating Amador was also flying drug planes between [[Costa Rica]], [[Panama]], Belize, and Miami for a pair of major cocaine traffickers, the Sarcovic brothers, at the same time he was flying for the [[White House]].[^1]
 ### Drug Trafficking
@ -46,21 +46,23 @@ DEA agent [[Celerino Castillo]]'s informant Murga, who wrote flight plans for pr
 Former Meneses aide [[Enrique Miranda]] testified at the 1991 Nicaraguan trial that cocaine from [[Colombia]] arrived at various Costa Rican airstrips, including one on CIA operative [[John Hull]]'s farm, and was placed aboard Contra planes flown into Ilopango. There, according to Miranda, Aguado and Meneses supervised loading the cocaine onto U.S.-bound aircraft owned by the Salvadoran Air Force and, on occasion, the Miami-based CIA contractor [[Southern Air Transport]]. Miranda said Meneses told him U.S. military hardware stockpiled at Ilopango was loaded onto Salvadoran transport planes and flown south, where guns were traded for cocaine and flown back.[^1]
-In February and March 1988 a CIA station cable reported that the Guatemalan suspected trafficker Reyner Veliz Cruz flew into Ilopango with Aguado in a twin-engine aircraft, the second time after customs officers had left, and that customs personnel at Ilopango "assume that Aguado has connections with drug trafficking."[^9]
+In February and March 1988 a CIA station cable reported that the Guatemalan suspected trafficker Reyner Veliz Cruz flew into Ilopango with Aguado in a twin-engine aircraft, the second time after customs officers had left, and that customs personnel at Ilopango "assume that Aguado has connections with drug trafficking."[^10]
-The Justice Department Inspector General reports that on December 14, 1988 Bustillo met DEA agent Celerino Castillo to discuss Castillo's suspicions that Salvadoran Air Force officers were using Ilopango for drug trafficking; Castillo named, among others, Air School Director Lieutenant Colonel Manfredo Koenigsberg, and according to a State Department cable of January 3, 1989, Bustillo said he would investigate and seek to transfer the officer. After DEA agent Richard deTriquet was detailed to Guatemala in 1989, he and Castillo went to El Salvador to investigate reports that cocaine moved through hangar five; a Salvadoran security officer denied them access, and the CIA chief of station told them there was no drug activity associated with hangar five.[^10]
+The Justice Department Inspector General reports that on December 14, 1988 Bustillo met DEA agent Celerino Castillo to discuss Castillo's suspicions that Salvadoran Air Force officers were using Ilopango for drug trafficking; Castillo named, among others, Air School Director Lieutenant Colonel Manfredo Koenigsberg, and according to a State Department cable of January 3, 1989, Bustillo said he would investigate and seek to transfer the officer. In 1989 Castillo and DEA Group Supervisor [[Thomas deTriquet]] went to Ilopango about an allegation concerning Hangar 5. A Salvadoran security officer denied them access, and a CIA officer told them they could not enter Ilopango for that purpose. At the embassy the CIA chief of station assured them there was no drug activity associated with Hangar 5.[^11][^12]
 The Inspector General reports that in February 1989 the CIA station in El Salvador sent the DEA a cable describing the Panamanian Miguel Antonio Rodriguez, a suspected trafficker, using Ilopango to repair his aircraft, which the station said was suspicious given the high cost of repairs in El Salvador. Stia's memorandum later said that the Guatemala office could not develop the most important information on Ilopango, which related to the allegations and intelligence about the air base, and that he intended to have Castillo and deTriquet request access again.[^12]
 ### CIA Obstruction of Investigations
-When Celerino Castillo's investigation began probing the hangars, the CIA sent an April 1986 cable from its El Salvador station to the Costa Rican office asking if the DEA could be persuaded to back off: "El Salvador Station would appreciate Costa Rica Station advising DEA not to make any inquiries into anyone re: Hangar No. 4 at Ilopango since only legitimate CIA supported operations were conducted from this facility." The CIA official who wrote that cable later conceded "the language in the cable could be read to suggest a meaning he did not intend" but acknowledged that was the effect it had.[^1]
+When Celerino Castillo's investigation began probing the hangars, the CIA El Salvador station sent a cable on April 25, 1986, in reply to a Costa Rica station cable of April 23 about Amador: "Based on that information, [El Salvador] Station would appreciate [Costa Rica] Station advising [DEA] not to make any inquiries to anyone re: hangar no. 4 at Ilopango since only legitimate [CIA] supported operations were conducted from this facility."[^7] The same cable stated that station air operations had moved from Hangar 4 into Hangar 5, which the station still occupied.[^7] The CIA official who wrote that cable later conceded "the language in the cable could be read to suggest a meaning he did not intend" but acknowledged that was the effect it had.[^1]
-U.S. Ambassador Edwin Corr sent a secret "back channel" cable to the State Department requesting an internal DEA review of Castillo's allegations. The DEA informed Corr that Castillo's information was "totally inaccurate" and Castillo was told to close his investigation. When he continued, Corr personally ordered him to "stop the witch hunt." Three years later, when Castillo opened another investigation into drug trafficking at Hangar No. 5, the CIA refused to allow him on the base.[^1]
+U.S. Ambassador Edwin Corr sent a secret "back channel" cable to the State Department requesting an internal DEA review of Castillo's allegations. Webb's account has the DEA telling Corr that Castillo's information was "totally inaccurate," Castillo being told to close his investigation, and Corr personally ordering him to "stop the witch hunt." Corr told the Justice Department Inspector General that DEA headquarters replied that the Grasheim case would be closed, and that he told Castillo he would have to stop the "witch hunt" if he had no evidence.[^1][^13] Webb wrote that three years later, when Castillo opened another investigation into drug trafficking at Hangar No. 5, the CIA refused to allow him on the base.[^1]
-[[Alan Fiers|Alan Fiers Jr.]], the former CIA official who headed the Contra program from 1984 to 1988, acknowledged: "We had a capability and indeed a responsibility for reporting what had been happening at Ilopango." The DEA later claimed under FOIA that it had no reports from Castillo about drug trafficking at Ilopango, a claim the [[Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General|Justice Department Inspector General]] exposed as false, having found and quoted from the reports liberally.[^1]
+[[Alan Fiers|Alan Fiers Jr.]], the former CIA official who headed the Contra program from 1984 to 1988, testified in *United States v. George* on July 31, 1992, in testimony Webb quotes: "We had a capability and indeed a responsibility for reporting what had been happening at Ilopango."[^1] Webb wrote that the DEA claimed under the Freedom of Information Act that it had no reports from Castillo about drug trafficking at Ilopango, and that the Inspector General located and quoted from them.[^14]
 ### Bombs from the Airport Battalion, 1992
-Five 500-pound bombs were taken from a battalion at the San Salvador airport on February 26, 1992. [[Semana]] reported on April 12, 1992 that the arrested men, among them a Salvadoran army colonel, [[Roberto Antonio Leiva Jacobo]], confessed that members of the [[Cali Drug Cartel|Cali cartel]] had hired them and paid four million dollars for the bombs, and that the bombs were meant for a plan to kill [[Pablo Escobar]] in the [[Envigado]] prison.[^11]
+Five 500-pound bombs were taken from a battalion at the San Salvador airport on February 26, 1992. [[Semana]] reported on April 12, 1992 that the arrested men, among them a Salvadoran army colonel, [[Roberto Antonio Leiva Jacobo]], confessed that members of the [[Cali Drug Cartel|Cali cartel]] had hired them and paid four million dollars for the bombs, and that the bombs were meant for a plan to kill [[Pablo Escobar]] in the [[Envigado]] prison.[^15]
 ### Footnotes
@ -70,8 +72,12 @@ Five 500-pound bombs were taken from a battalion at the San Salvador airport on
 [^4]: "Salvador airport said to be transfer point for arms to contras," *Christian Science Monitor*, October 10, 1986, https://proof.csmonitor.com/1986/1010/omerc.html
 [^5]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy*, S. Prt. 100-165 (December 1988), pp. 37, 50 to 52, https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
 [^6]: CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation on allegations of connections between CIA and the Contras in cocaine trafficking, para. 1023. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06974497
-[^7]: CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation, para. 447. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06974497
+[^7]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.2 (Carlos Amador: DEA Costa Rica cable of March 20, 1986; CIA cables of April 23 and April 25, 1986). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
-[^8]: CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation, para. 453. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06974497
+[^8]: CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation, para. 447. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06974497
-[^9]: CIA Inspector General, *Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States*, Volume II (October 8, 1998), Marcos Antonio Aguado section and the pilots chapter (March 23, 1988 cable on Reyner Veliz Cruz), https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine2/south.html and https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine2/pilots.html
+[^9]: CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation, para. 453. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06974497
-[^10]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter X, sections D and E, https://irp.fas.org/agency/doj/oig/c4rpt/ch10p3.htm
+[^10]: CIA Inspector General, *Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States*, Volume II (October 8, 1998), Marcos Antonio Aguado section and the pilots chapter (March 23, 1988 cable on Reyner Veliz Cruz), https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine2/south.html and https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine2/pilots.html
-[^11]: "¿Bombas contra Escobar?", *Semana*, April 12, 1992, https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/bombas-contra-escobar/17208-3. The Cali cartel buyers are Semana's report of the arrested men's confessions and of an unnamed Salvadoran government source.
+[^11]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter X, sections D and E, https://irp.fas.org/agency/doj/oig/c4rpt/ch10p3.htm
 [^12]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 3, section E (Castillo's later interactions with Salvadoran personnel, the deTriquet interview, the Stia memorandum). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p3.htm
 [^13]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.1.b(2) (interview of Edwin Corr). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
 [^14]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance*, chapter 13; U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 4, section I, and part 2, section C.1.a. https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p4.htm
 [^15]: "¿Bombas contra Escobar?", *Semana*, April 12, 1992, https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/bombas-contra-escobar/17208-3. The Cali cartel buyers are Semana's report of the arrested men's confessions and of an unnamed Salvadoran government source.
--- a/DISPATCHES/2026-10-12
+++ b/DISPATCHES/2026-10-12
@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
 ---
 title: "See Appendix A"
 date: 2026-10-12
 status: published
 summary: "The State Department published Lieutenant General Leonard Perroots's Able Archer memorandum in 2021, and after the CIA won the right to withhold it, the volume was republished fourteen pages shorter."
 entities:
  - "[[National Security Archive]]"
  - "[[Leonard Perroots]]"
  - "[[Able Archer 83]]"
  - "[[Central Intelligence Agency]]"
  - "[[President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board]]"
  - "[[Defense Intelligence Agency]]"
 tags:
  - AbleArcher
  - FRUS
  - FOIA
  - ColdWar
 ---
 # See Appendix A
 In February 2021 the [[U.S. Department of State|State Department]] published *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981-1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983-March 1985*. Its preface stated that the volume "presents selective documentation related to the 1983 Soviet 'War Scare' and the November 1983 NATO nuclear exercise, Able Archer (see Appendix A)." Appendix A, an editorial note running from page 1420, described the 1990 [[President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board]] report "The Soviet 'War Scare'" and then printed the January 1989 "End of Tour Report Addendum" of Lieutenant General [[Leonard Perroots]], who had been the Air Force's intelligence chief in Europe during [[Able Archer 83]]. Perroots wrote that the exercise began on the morning of November 3, 1983, and that at 2100Z on November 4 the [[NSA]] issued report G/00/3083-83, "Soviet Air Forces, GSFG, Placed on Heightened Readiness, 2 November 1983." The appendix also printed a [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] memorandum answering him and the PFIAB's finding that the officers in charge "acted correctly out of instinct, not informed guidance." The volume ran to 1,493 pages.[^1]
 Six months later the [[National Security Archive]] asked the CIA for the memorandum under FOIA, and in October 2021 it sued. The CIA released a completely redacted copy. The district court granted the CIA summary judgment on October 4, 2022, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed on June 7, 2024, holding that the publication in the State Department volume had not waived the CIA's exemptions.[^2]
 The copy of the volume on the State Department's site captured on February 2, 2025 runs to 1,479 pages and does not contain the name Perroots. Its preface reads "the November 1983 NATO nuclear exercise, Able Archer (see Document 135)." The current copy is the same.[^3]
 [^1]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981-1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983-March 1985* (2021), preface and Appendix A, pp. 1420-1435, PDF as captured March 18, 2021. https://web.archive.org/web/20210318061535/https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1981-88v04/pdf/frus1981-88v04.pdf
 [^2]: National Security Archive v. Central Intelligence Agency, No. 23-5017 (D.C. Cir. June 7, 2024), affirming No. 1:21-cv-02857 (D.D.C. Oct. 4, 2022). https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/opinions/docs/2024/06/23-5017-2058350.pdf
 [^3]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981-1988, Volume IV*, PDF as captured February 2, 2025, and as served October 12, 2026. https://web.archive.org/web/20250202104840/https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1981-88v04/pdf/frus1981-88v04.pdf and https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1981-88v04/pdf/frus1981-88v04.pdf