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@ -65,23 +65,25 @@ The special counsel Nicholas Bua, in his 1993 report on the Inslaw affair, rejec
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### Claims about Robert Maxwell
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Ben-Menashe alleged that the publisher Robert Maxwell and Nicholas Davies were long-time assets of Israeli intelligence and that Maxwell had close ties to the prime minister's office.[^3] One specific claim concerned the 1986 case of the nuclear technician [[Mordechai Vanunu]], whose account of [[Dimona]] reached the Maxwell-owned [[Sunday Mirror]]; Ben-Menashe said Davies alerted Israeli intelligence to the approach and introduced him to Vanunu's intermediary [[Oscar Guerrero]], and that a Vanunu photograph published by the Sunday Mirror had been flown in from Israel, although the photograph in question had in fact been taken by the [[Sunday Times]] journalist [[Peter Hounam]], undercutting that detail.[^21] Hersh's 1991 book and the parliamentary statements that followed brought the Maxwell allegations into the open shortly before Maxwell's death, and Maxwell sued Hersh for libel before the action lapsed.[^15] No declassified material has confirmed the allegations.[^4]
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Ben-Menashe alleged that the publisher Robert Maxwell and Nicholas Davies were long-time assets of Israeli intelligence and that Maxwell had close ties to the prime minister's office.[^3] One specific claim concerned the 1986 case of the nuclear technician [[Mordechai Vanunu]], whose account of [[Dimona]] reached the Maxwell-owned [[Sunday Mirror]]; Ben-Menashe said Davies alerted Israeli intelligence to the approach and introduced him to Vanunu's intermediary [[Oscar Guerrero]], and that a Vanunu photograph published by the Sunday Mirror had been flown in from Israel, although the photograph in question had in fact been taken by the [[Sunday Times]] journalist [[Peter Hounam]], undercutting that detail.[^21] Hersh's 1991 book and the parliamentary statements that followed brought the Maxwell allegations into the open shortly before Maxwell's death, and Maxwell sued Hersh for libel.[^15] No declassified material has confirmed the allegations.[^4]
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Seymour Hersh's 1991 book *The Samson Option* states that Ben-Menashe first contacted the author in mid-1990, that interviews began in early 1991, and that Ben-Menashe agreed "as no other Israeli would" to be directly quoted on nuclear issues. The author's note adds that Ben-Menashe left the United States for exile in Australia in June 1991, and that his allegations about Iran arms sales had been strongly denied in Washington and Jerusalem and were still under congressional review in the summer of 1991.[^22] The book's account of the Davies arms firm, Ora Limited, and of Vanunu's 1986 compromise is attributed in the text to Ben-Menashe's account.[^23]
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### Epstein and Maxwell Allegations
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Beginning in 2019, Ben-Menashe gave interviews, including to the journalist [[Whitney Webb]] of MintPress News and to the outlet Narativ, in which he claimed that he had met Jeffrey Epstein and [[Ghislaine Maxwell]] in the 1980s, that he had seen Epstein in Robert Maxwell's offices, and that Maxwell had recruited Epstein for Israeli intelligence and introduced him as pre-approved by figures in Aman.[^22] He characterized the later Epstein operation as a "honeytrap" that gathered sexual blackmail material on powerful figures for Israeli intelligence.[^22]
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Beginning in 2019, Ben-Menashe gave interviews, including to the journalist [[Whitney Webb]] of MintPress News and to the outlet Narativ, in which he claimed that he had met Jeffrey Epstein and [[Ghislaine Maxwell]] in the 1980s, that he had seen Epstein in Robert Maxwell's offices, and that Maxwell had recruited Epstein for Israeli intelligence and introduced him as pre-approved by figures in Aman.[^24] He characterized the later Epstein operation as a "honeytrap" that gathered sexual blackmail material on powerful figures for Israeli intelligence.[^24]
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No corroborating witness, document, or official admission has been produced to support these specific claims, and reviewers have noted that they rest solely on his own assertions against a documented record of unreliability.[^4][^23] His account also conflicts with the established chronology of Epstein's career, since Epstein's documented entry into Ghislaine Maxwell's circle is generally dated to the period after Robert Maxwell's 1991 death rather than to the 1980s meetings Ben-Menashe described.[^23] He has continued to make related claims, including a 2025 assertion that [[Benjamin Netanyahu]] held Epstein-related files, that likewise remain unverified.[^23]
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No corroborating witness, document, or official admission has been produced to support these specific claims, and reviewers have noted that they rest solely on his own assertions against a documented record of unreliability.[^4][^25] His account also conflicts with the established chronology of Epstein's career, since Epstein's documented entry into Ghislaine Maxwell's circle is generally dated to the period after Robert Maxwell's 1991 death rather than to the 1980s meetings Ben-Menashe described.[^25] He has continued to make related claims, including a 2025 assertion that [[Benjamin Netanyahu]] held Epstein-related files, that likewise remain unverified.[^25]
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### Lobbying and Consulting
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After his intelligence-related notoriety, Ben-Menashe built a lobbying and consulting practice through the [[Montreal]]-based firm [[Dickens & Madson]], representing controversial governments and figures.[^24] His involvement with the government of [[Robert Mugabe]] in [[Zimbabwe]] featured in the treason prosecution of the opposition leader [[Morgan Tsvangirai]], built on a videotape in which prosecutors said Tsvangirai discussed the "elimination" of Mugabe with Ben-Menashe; Tsvangirai was acquitted of high treason on October 14, 2004, by Judge [[Paddington Garwe]] of the Harare High Court, who found no proof of the alleged request, ruled that Ben-Menashe's testimony had to be treated with caution, and called some of it clearly false.[^25]
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After his intelligence-related notoriety, Ben-Menashe built a lobbying and consulting practice through the [[Montreal]]-based firm [[Dickens & Madson]], representing controversial governments and figures.[^26] His involvement with the government of [[Robert Mugabe]] in [[Zimbabwe]] featured in the treason prosecution of the opposition leader [[Morgan Tsvangirai]], built on a videotape in which prosecutors said Tsvangirai discussed the "elimination" of Mugabe with Ben-Menashe; Tsvangirai was acquitted of high treason on October 14, 2004, by Judge [[Paddington Garwe]] of the Harare High Court, who found no proof of the alleged request, ruled that Ben-Menashe's testimony had to be treated with caution, and called some of it clearly false.[^27]
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He later registered a 2 million dollar contract in March 2021 to lobby for the [[Myanmar]] military junta after its coup, agreeing to advise on evading United States sanctions, and took on engagements connected to [[Sudan]] and its militia leader [[Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo]], a roughly 12 million dollar Zimbabwe land transaction funded by the criminal financier [[Paul Le Roux]] in 2007 and 2008 in which the promised farmland was never delivered, a reported 1 million dollar arrangement with [[Kyrgyzstan]], and work tied to [[Libya]], the [[Republic of the Congo]], [[Venezuela]], and the [[Tigray]] conflict in [[Ethiopia]].[^24][^26] Washington figures quoted in profiles of his career described his reputation as "poisonous."[^24]
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He later registered a 2 million dollar contract in March 2021 to lobby for the [[Myanmar]] military junta after its coup, agreeing to advise on evading United States sanctions, and took on engagements connected to [[Sudan]] and its militia leader [[Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo]], a roughly 12 million dollar Zimbabwe land transaction funded by the criminal financier [[Paul Le Roux]] in 2007 and 2008 in which the promised farmland was never delivered, a reported 1 million dollar arrangement with [[Kyrgyzstan]], and work tied to [[Libya]], the [[Republic of the Congo]], [[Venezuela]], and the [[Tigray]] conflict in [[Ethiopia]].[^26][^28] Washington figures quoted in profiles of his career described his reputation as "poisonous."[^26]
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### The McFarlane Libel Suit
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The former national security adviser Robert McFarlane sued Ben-Menashe and the publisher of Profits of War, Sheridan Square Press, for libel over passages that linked McFarlane to the covert dealings Ben-Menashe described.[^27] The case, McFarlane v. Sheridan Square Press, reached the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which ruled in 1996. Applying the [[actual malice]] standard required for a public figure, the court held that McFarlane could not show the publisher had acted with reckless disregard for the truth merely because Ben-Menashe was a doubtful source, and it affirmed dismissal of the suit. The outcome turned on the high bar a public-figure plaintiff must clear rather than on any finding that Ben-Menashe's account was true.[^27]
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The former national security adviser Robert McFarlane sued Ben-Menashe and the publisher of Profits of War, Sheridan Square Press, for libel over passages that linked McFarlane to the covert dealings Ben-Menashe described.[^29] The case, McFarlane v. Sheridan Square Press, reached the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which ruled in 1996. Applying the [[actual malice]] standard required for a public figure, the court held that McFarlane could not show the publisher had acted with reckless disregard for the truth merely because Ben-Menashe was a doubtful source, and it affirmed dismissal of the suit. The outcome turned on the high bar a public-figure plaintiff must clear rather than on any finding that Ben-Menashe's account was true.[^29]
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### Footnotes
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@ -106,9 +108,11 @@ The former national security adviser Robert McFarlane sued Ben-Menashe and the p
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[^19]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence*, S. Exec. Rept. 102-19 (October 24, 1991), sections 4 and 5, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-10219.pdf (PDF pages 185 to 187).
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[^20]: "No wrong-doing in Inslaw affair, report says," *UPI,* 1993. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1993/06/17/No-wrong-doing-in-Inslaw-affair-report-says/5482740289600/
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[^21]: "The Vanunu affair and the Sunday Mirror photograph," contemporaneous press reporting noting the photograph was taken by Sunday Times journalist Peter Hounam, undercutting Ben-Menashe's account.
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[^22]: "Former Israeli Spy Ari Ben-Menashe on Israel's Relationship with Epstein," *MintPress News,* 2019. https://www.mintpressnews.com/ari-ben-menashe-israel-relationship-jeffrey-epstein/263465/
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[^23]: "What did Ari Ben-Menashe claim about Jeffrey Epstein," *Factually,* 2025. https://factually.co/fact-checks/media/ari-ben-menashe-claims-jeffrey-epstein-mossad-d56c30
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[^24]: "The Man of Mystery Hustling Myanmar," *Washington Monthly,* 2021. https://washingtonmonthly.com/2021/03/13/the-man-of-mystery-hustling-myanmar/
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[^25]: "Tsvangirai acquitted of treason in Zimbabwe," *The Globe and Mail,* 2004. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/tsvangirai-acquitted-of-treason-in-zimbabwe/article18275151/
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[^26]: "The Curious Case of Bishkek's $1 Million Deal With Ex-Israeli Intelligence Worker," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,* 2021. https://www.rferl.org/a/the-curious-case-of-bishkek-s-1-million-deal-with-ex-israeli-intelligence-worker-/31033365.html
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[^27]: McFarlane v. Sheridan Square Press, Inc., 91 F.3d 1501 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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[^22]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991, Author's Note, pp. ix-x, and the note on Ben-Menashe at p. 260.
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[^23]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991, pp. 309-310.
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[^24]: "Former Israeli Spy Ari Ben-Menashe on Israel's Relationship with Epstein," *MintPress News,* 2019. https://www.mintpressnews.com/ari-ben-menashe-israel-relationship-jeffrey-epstein/263465/
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[^25]: "What did Ari Ben-Menashe claim about Jeffrey Epstein," *Factually,* 2025. https://factually.co/fact-checks/media/ari-ben-menashe-claims-jeffrey-epstein-mossad-d56c30
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[^26]: "The Man of Mystery Hustling Myanmar," *Washington Monthly,* 2021. https://washingtonmonthly.com/2021/03/13/the-man-of-mystery-hustling-myanmar/
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[^27]: "Tsvangirai acquitted of treason in Zimbabwe," *The Globe and Mail,* 2004. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/tsvangirai-acquitted-of-treason-in-zimbabwe/article18275151/
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[^28]: "The Curious Case of Bishkek's $1 Million Deal With Ex-Israeli Intelligence Worker," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,* 2021. https://www.rferl.org/a/the-curious-case-of-bishkek-s-1-million-deal-with-ex-israeli-intelligence-worker-/31033365.html
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[^29]: McFarlane v. Sheridan Square Press, Inc., 91 F.3d 1501 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ tags:
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summary: "INSLAW's bankruptcy counsel who told the House Judiciary Committee that in July 1987 the former bankruptcy judge Roger Whelan threatened to organize opposition to Judge Bason's reappointment over an unpaid fee petition."
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location: "Washington, D.C."
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created: 2026-09-22
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updated: 2026-09-22
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updated: 2026-10-09
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---
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Charles A. Docter, of the Washington firm Docter, Docter and Salus, was bankruptcy counsel to [[INSLAW]] as debtor in possession in its Chapter 11 case in the [[United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia]], No. 85-00070, alongside [[Charles R. Work]] of McDermott, Will and Emery. His partner Stanley Salus handled the company's complaint to the United States Trustee, [[William White]], after the [[Jack Rugh]] telephone call to [[Gregory McKain]] in February 1985.[^1]
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@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ Charles A. Docter, of the Washington firm Docter, Docter and Salus, was bankrupt
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Docter told the [[House Committee on the Judiciary]] that in July 1987, two months before Bankruptcy Judge [[George Francis Bason, Jr.|George Bason]] ruled that the [[Department of Justice]] had taken [[PROMIS]] by fraud, [[Roger Whelan]], the bankruptcy judge Bason had succeeded and by then a practicing attorney with a fee application pending before Bason in the [[United Press International|UPI]] bankruptcy, came to his office and threatened to oppose Bason's reappointment because Bason had not ruled on the petition, saying that Senior District Judge Irwin Gasch would organize the opposition. Docter told Bason of the conversation and recommended that he act promptly; Bason ruled on the fee application on July 17, 1987. Docter gave his account to the committee in private session. When the special counsel [[Nicholas J. Bua]] sought more, "Docter referred us to his testimony before the House Committee, but refused to provide us any additional information." Whelan denied to Bua that he had ever spoken to Docter about the UPI case or tried to pressure Bason, while acknowledging his friendship with Gasch and his frustration at the delay. Bua wrote that he had "not attempted to resolve this seeming disagreement," which bore only tangentially on whether the department had influenced the merit selection panel, but added that "the possibility of concerted opposition to Bason by district court judges or others might explain why he was not reappointed." The panel, chaired by Judge [[Norma H. Johnson]], had received the transcript of Bason's ruling from [[Royce Lamberth]].[^1]
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The Bua report introduces this account with the name "Charles Deeter, an attorney for Inslaw," and refers to Docter in the sentences that follow; the account attributed to each name (Whelan's July 1987 visit, the UPI fee petition and Judge Gasch) is the same, and the records found do not establish whether the report's "Deeter" is a misspelling of Docter or a different person.[^1]
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### Footnotes
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[^1]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.,* March 1993, pp. 169-170, 211-214. https://archive.org/details/InslawPROMISBuaReport (which spells the name Docter throughout; "Deeter" in later accounts is a transcription error). The firm's role as counsel of record appears in the reporter listings for *In re INSLAW, Inc.,* 97 B.R. 685 and 106 B.R. 331 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1989).
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[^1]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.,* March 1993, pp. 169-170, 211-214. https://archive.org/details/InslawPROMISBuaReport(the report first names the attorney as "Charles Deeter, an attorney for Inslaw," and thereafter as Docter). The firm's role as counsel of record appears in the reporter listings for *In re INSLAW, Inc.,* 97 B.R. 685 and 106 B.R. 331 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1989).
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@ -9,10 +9,24 @@ summary: "Cornelius Blackshear was a U.S."
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Cornelius Blackshear was a U.S. Trustee in the [[U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York|Southern District of New York]] who later became a U.S. Bankruptcy Court Judge for the Southern District of New York. He became a key figure in the allegations surrounding the attempted conversion of [[INSLAW|Inslaw]]'s bankruptcy case and a subsequent alleged cover-up.
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Blackshear initially testified in a deposition on March 25, 1987, that [[William White]], the U.S. Trustee for the District of Columbia, had told him that [[Thomas Stanton]], Director of the Executive Office of U.S. Trustees (EOUST), had tried to pressure White to convert [[INSLAW]]'s Chapter 11 reorganization to a Chapter 7 liquidation and to have [[Harry Jones]] assigned to White to effect the conversion. Blackshear also stated that Stanton had never contacted him about detailing Jones, but he thought Stanton might have approached Jones directly. This testimony supported Inslaw's primary allegation of a plot to liquidate the company. However, after speaking with White, Blackshear realized he was mistaken and had confused Inslaw with the UPI case, about which White had told him the IRS had pressured him to join a motion to convert. Blackshear then prepared and signed an affidavit recanting his deposition testimony, stating that he had confused the cases. He also gave a second deposition repeating his new recollections. During the [[Office of Professional Responsibility]] (OPR) investigation, Blackshear essentially repeated his recanting statements, maintaining that White had not told him Stanton pressured him to convert Inslaw, and that he had confused Inslaw with UPI. He did, however, disagree with White regarding a conversation about the possible assignment of Harry Jones to Washington, believing White had told him Stanton planned to bring Jones to Washington, while White maintained Blackshear told this to White. Blackshear also denied discussing with [[Anthony Pasciuto]] at a social gathering that he was sorry for his conduct or had given false testimony in his recantation to avoid hurting people.[^1]
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Blackshear initially testified in a deposition on March 25, 1987, that [[William White]], the U.S. Trustee for the District of Columbia, had told him that [[Thomas Stanton]], Director of the Executive Office of U.S. Trustees (EOUST), had tried to pressure White to convert INSLAW's Chapter 11 reorganization to a Chapter 7 liquidation and to have [[Harry Jones]] assigned to White to effect the conversion. Blackshear also stated that Stanton had never contacted him about detailing Jones, but he thought Stanton might have approached Jones directly. This testimony supported Inslaw's primary allegation of a plot to liquidate the company. However, after speaking with White, Blackshear realized he was mistaken and had confused Inslaw with the UPI case, about which White had told him the IRS had pressured him to join a motion to convert. Blackshear then prepared and signed, with the assistance of his attorney (an Assistant United States Attorney in the Civil Division of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, named in the report as [[James Garrity]]), an affidavit recanting his deposition testimony, stating that he had confused the cases. He also gave a second deposition repeating his new recollections. During the [[Office of Professional Responsibility]] (OPR) investigation, Blackshear essentially repeated his recanting statements, maintaining that White had not told him Stanton pressured him to convert Inslaw, and that he had confused Inslaw with UPI. He did, however, disagree with White regarding a conversation about the possible assignment of Harry Jones to Washington, believing White had told him Stanton planned to bring Jones to Washington, while White maintained Blackshear told this to White. Blackshear also denied discussing with [[Anthony Pasciuto]] at a social gathering that he was sorry for his conduct or had given false testimony in his recantation to avoid hurting people.[^1]
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### The recantation
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Blackshear first swore on March 25, 1987, that White told him Stanton wanted the Inslaw case converted. The House Judiciary Committee reported that Judge [[Jane Solomon]] told its investigators that on March 18, 1987, Blackshear gave her an identical account, and that Pasciuto swore to the committee that Blackshear described Stanton's attempt to pressure him at a January 1987 luncheon.[^2] The Bua report states that Blackshear and the other luncheon guest, Judge [[Lawrence Pierce]], do not remember anything being said about Inslaw.[^3]
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White had been deposed shortly before Blackshear and had testified that Stanton exerted no pressure. When White learned that Blackshear had testified differently he telephoned him and told him he was mistaken. The Bua report states that James Garrity, then an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Southern District of New York, represented Blackshear and accompanied him to the deposition. The next day Garrity received a call from [[Roger M. Cooper]], the DOJ trial attorney defending the Independent Handling claims, who said he believed Blackshear's testimony was wrong and that DOJ was concerned that something should be done to correct the error; Cooper did not suggest what the correct testimony would be. Garrity spoke to Blackshear, who said that after speaking with White he had become convinced he had made a mistake, and the two prepared the recanting affidavit, which Garrity sent to Cooper.[^4] The House committee dated the affidavit March 26, 1987, and wrote that it was "highly questionable how the Department could ethically represent both itself and Judge Blackshear in the INSLAW litigation," because Garrity was a Department attorney at the same time as he represented a key witness for the plaintiff.[^2] The Bua report wrote that these facts indicated conduct consistent with the good faith effort expected of attorneys.[^4]
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What the recantation left standing: Blackshear continued to maintain that White told him the IRS pressured White to move to convert the UPI case, and he disagreed with White about a conversation concerning the assignment of Harry Jones to Washington. In a sworn statement to House investigators on January 25, 1991, he said his earlier information was hearsay, largely from Pasciuto, and said of the choice between his account and White's: "it would become a credibility question." The House committee headed that part of its report "Judge Blackshear's statement to committee lacks credibility."[^2] Pasciuto claimed that Blackshear had admitted giving false testimony in the recantation to avoid hurting people; Blackshear denied it.[^3]
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Bason accepted Blackshear's original testimony as true and found the recantation an honest mistake; in January 1991 he filed a complaint with the Judicial Council of the Second Circuit stating that Blackshear recanted "not because of an honest mistake but because he made a conscious choice to testify falsely."[^5] DOJ's Office of Professional Responsibility, in a report of March 31, 1989, credited the recantation. The Bua report wrote that "[t]his series of contradictory statements can only be described as troubling," that "[a]t best, it reveals a rather malleable witness," and that "there simply is not sufficient evidence to prove (by any standard) that Blackshear lied when he recanted his deposition testimony."[^3]
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Bankruptcy Judge Bason, in his findings, chose to believe Blackshear's original testimony and found his recantation to be the result of an "honest mistake." However, several years later, in January 1991, Bason filed a complaint against Blackshear with the Judicial Council of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, stating that he now believed Blackshear recanted not due to an honest mistake but because he made a conscious choice to testify falsely. The OPR, however, credited Blackshear's recantation, noting that he had no apparent motive to lie about the matter. The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI) found Blackshear's recantation implausible, noting that he had stated on four occasions prior to his recantation that White told him about pressure from Stanton to convert the Inslaw case. The PSI also found no evidence to support Blackshear's explanation that he had confused Inslaw with the UPI case. The Special Counsel's investigation concluded that there was insufficient evidence to prove that Blackshear lied when he recanted his deposition testimony. The report acknowledged the confusion arising from Blackshear's various statements but attributed it to poor memory rather than intentional misstatements. The Special Counsel found no reason why Blackshear, a sitting bankruptcy judge, would commit perjury and jeopardize his career.[^1]
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### Footnotes
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[^1]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993.
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[^1]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 192-194, 195-197, 209-210 and 215-231.
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[^2]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. *The INSLAW Affair.* H. Rept. 102-857, 102d Cong., 2d sess., September 10, 1992, Part V, pp. 73-77 (affidavit of March 26, 1987; Garrity; January 25, 1991 statement; heading of section V.B).
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[^3]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 192-194, 195-196, 209, 215-223. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
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[^4]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 229-230. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
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[^5]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. *The INSLAW Affair.* H. Rept. 102-857, 102d Cong., 2d sess., September 10, 1992, Part V.D, p. 78 (Bason's complaint of January 2, 1991).
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@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ aliases:
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- Danny Casolaro
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- Joseph Daniel Casolaro
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created: 2024-04-25
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updated: 2026-10-08
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updated: 2026-10-09
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category: "Authors & Journalists"
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tags:
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- KeyFigure
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@ -65,7 +65,9 @@ In 2024, Martinsburg police released records under a Freedom of Information Act
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The [[House Committee on the Judiciary|House Judiciary Committee]]'s September 1992 report noted that Casolaro had "encountered dangerous individuals associated with organized crime and the world of covert intelligence operations" and recommended further investigation into the circumstances of his death. The committee found no evidence that DOJ had sought to influence the local West Virginia investigation.[^2]
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The Bua Report, completed in March 1993, concluded that the physical evidence "strongly supported" the suicide finding, that DOJ had not influenced the local investigation, and that Casolaro had possessed "ample reason to commit suicide," being unemployed, financially dependent on family, facing a balloon mortgage, and unable to sell his book.[^5]
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The Bua Report, completed in March 1993, stated that "the physical evidence in Casolaro's hotel room strongly supports the conclusion of the local authorities that the death was a suicide," found no DOJ influence on the local investigation, and stated that "there was ample reason to believe Casolaro had a motive to commit suicide," noting that he had been unemployed for months, was dependent on family for support, faced a balloon mortgage, and had been told by a prospective publisher shortly before his death that it would not advance him money on his proposed book about the "Octopus."[^5]
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The Bua report listed the tests it relied on: handwriting analysis confirming that Casolaro wrote the note found in the room; fingerprint analysis finding his prints and none other except a single print on an ash tray; hair and fiber analysis; an analysis of the bloodstains by Dr. Lee of the Connecticut State Police Forensic Science Laboratory consistent with suicide; and an autopsy finding hemorrhage from the wrist wounds as the cause of death and no evidence that he was unconscious or debilitated when cut. It addressed criticisms that the room was not sealed, that notification of next of kin was delayed while the body was embalmed, and that Martinsburg authorities discounted suspicions about his "sources," stating that "no credible evidence suggested that any of Casolaro's 'sources' played any role in his death." The report also records that Michael Riconosciuto, in a lawsuit against Bua, alleged that one of the FBI agents assigned to the investigation had murdered Casolaro; the district court dismissed the suit as patently frivolous (*Riconosciuto v. Bua*, No. 92 C 6217, N.D. Ill.).[^6]
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FBI task force members assigned to examine Casolaro's death privately "questioned the conclusion of suicide" and recommended further investigation; expressing doubt about the ruling reportedly "risked one's career" within the Bureau as of December 1992. FBI documents related to Casolaro remain partially withheld from public release under national security exemptions, while the Bureau simultaneously claims the files are missing - a contradiction noted by MuckRock journalists who filed FOIA requests.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -77,9 +79,9 @@ Casolaro's investigation intersected with the drug-trafficking networks document
|
|||
|
||||
### The research files
|
||||
|
||||
Casolaro's research files, photographed by [[Christian Hansen]] at the Missouri State Historical Society and published on the Internet Archive, include a folder labelled "Promotional Material" of corporate and weapons literature, hand-numbered "BD|AI|PM-01" onward. Its items are a brochure for the Inter-Probe modular energy transfer catalyzer (PM-01), a printed page numbered 207 on fuel air munitions (PM-02), a [[Brunswick Corporation]] defense division cover sheet and drawing for the Rifleman's Assault Weapon for urban warfare dated October 1976 (PM-03), a sales sheet of the defense division of the Chilean firm [[Industrias Cardoen]] (PM-04) and a fax of the resumes of the associates of [[Counter Terrorism Consultants, Inc.]], whose fax counters run 141 P01 to 141 P12 (PM-05) and whose page headers carry the date June 20, 1990 and times from 16:53 to 17:01.[^6] In the order of the photographs the folder runs PM-04, PM-02, PM-03, PM-05, PM-01.[^6] The packet names [[Carter Cornick]], [[Eugene Propper]], [[E. Lawrence Barcella, Jr.|E. Lawrence Barcella]], [[Francis J. McNeil]], [[James B. Motley]] (a vice president of [[Wackenhut Advanced Technologies Corporation]]), [[Mayer Nudell]] and a former CIA counterterrorism chief whose entry carries no name.[^6] The files also contain a folder of 1980s newspaper and magazine material on [[Frank Terpil]] and [[Edwin Wilson]], folders of Wackenhut annual reports, correspondence, profiles and newsletters, and, in a folder of Department of Defense publications, a magazine article by David Corn on Barcella and the Pan Am 103 bombing.[^7]
|
||||
Casolaro's research files, photographed by [[Christian Hansen]] at the Missouri State Historical Society and published on the Internet Archive, include a folder labelled "Promotional Material" of corporate and weapons literature, hand-numbered "BD|AI|PM-01" onward. Its items are a brochure for the Inter-Probe modular energy transfer catalyzer (PM-01), a printed page numbered 207 on fuel air munitions (PM-02), a [[Brunswick Corporation]] defense division cover sheet and drawing for the Rifleman's Assault Weapon for urban warfare dated October 1976 (PM-03), a sales sheet of the defense division of the Chilean firm [[Industrias Cardoen]] (PM-04) and a fax of the resumes of the associates of [[Counter Terrorism Consultants, Inc.]], whose fax counters run 141 P01 to 141 P12 (PM-05) and whose page headers carry the date June 20, 1990 and times from 16:53 to 17:01.[^7] In the order of the photographs the folder runs PM-04, PM-02, PM-03, PM-05, PM-01.[^7] The packet names [[Carter Cornick]], [[Eugene Propper]], [[E. Lawrence Barcella, Jr.|E. Lawrence Barcella]], [[Francis J. McNeil]], [[James B. Motley]] (a vice president of [[Wackenhut Advanced Technologies Corporation]]), [[Mayer Nudell]] and a former CIA counterterrorism chief whose entry carries no name.[^7] The files also contain a folder of 1980s newspaper and magazine material on [[Frank Terpil]] and [[Edwin Wilson]], folders of Wackenhut annual reports, correspondence, profiles and newsletters, and, in a folder of Department of Defense publications, a magazine article by David Corn on Barcella and the Pan Am 103 bombing.[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
The INSLAW folder of the research files includes a *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* report of February 19, 1991 that names Industrias Cardoen and its owner [[Carlos Cardoen]]. It states that [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], in an affidavit filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia, said that Cardoen told him in January 1989 that Cardoen had brokered a deal between Earl Brian and an Iraqi military intelligence representative for the use of PROMIS, and that the sale was consummated in Santiago, Chile.[^8] Brian called the allegations "nonsense," according to the report.[^8] The report of Special Counsel [[Nicholas J. Bua]] dates the affidavit February 17, 1991.[^9]
|
||||
The INSLAW folder of the research files includes a *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* report of February 19, 1991 that names Industrias Cardoen and its owner [[Carlos Cardoen]]. It states that [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], in an affidavit filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia, said that Cardoen told him in January 1989 that Cardoen had brokered a deal between Earl Brian and an Iraqi military intelligence representative for the use of PROMIS, and that the sale was consummated in Santiago, Chile.[^9] Brian called the allegations "nonsense," according to the report.[^9] The report of Special Counsel [[Nicholas J. Bua]] dates the affidavit February 17, 1991.[^10]
|
||||
|
||||
### Bibliography
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -90,9 +92,10 @@ The INSLAW folder of the research files includes a *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* rep
|
|||
[^1]: Ridgeway, James, and Doug Vaughan. "The Last Days of Danny Casolaro." *Village Voice*, October 15, 1991; West Virginia Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, Second Autopsy Report, Dr. Frost, January 1992; Martinsburg Police Department records released under FOIA to Zachary Treitz and Christian Hansen, 2024; "FBI Cites Mystery FOIA Exemption to Withhold Danny Casolaro Death Video," *MuckRock*, February 2018.
|
||||
[^2]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. *The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report.* House Report 102-857, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, September 10, 1992.
|
||||
[^3]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 6: "They were doing their patriotic duty."
|
||||
[^4]: Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General regarding the allegations of INSLAW, Inc. (U.S. Department of Justice, March 1993), pp. 137 (August 7, 1991 call, August 17, 1991 letter, later interview), 146 (September 1990 agent meeting; "part-time author"), 148 to 149 (December 1990 New York meetings) and 154 (his account of Casolaro's state of mind). https://archive.org/details/InslawPROMISBuaReport.
|
||||
[^5]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993.
|
||||
[^6]: Danny Casolaro papers, folder "Promotional Material," Internet Archive items casolaro-notebooks (PromotionalMaterial.pdf) and PromotionalMaterial, https://archive.org/details/casolaro-notebooks.
|
||||
[^7]: Danny Casolaro papers, folders "CIA Frank Terpil Renegades," "Wackenhut - Newsletters" and "DOD PUBLICATIONS," https://archive.org/details/ddosecrets_casolaro_files (the Corn item is headed "SPECIAL EDITION - TERRORISM / Did It Blow Up Flight 103?").
|
||||
[^8]: *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, February 19, 1991, "Stolen Software Scattered: Affidavits Allege Sales To Iraqis And Israelis," clipping in the INSLAW folder, https://archive.org/download/casolaro-notebooks/InslawIi_djvu.txt.
|
||||
[^9]: Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General regarding the allegations of INSLAW, Inc. (March 1993), pp. 73-74.
|
||||
[^4]: U.S. Department of Justice, *Report of the United States Department of Justice on the Review of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua's Report on the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc.*, September 27, 1994, p. 9 (Summary item 4) and pp. 107-168 (Section V), at pp. 137 (August 7, 1991 call, August 17, 1991 letter, later interview), 146 (September 1990 agent meeting; "part-time author"), 148 to 149 (December 1990 New York meetings) and 154 (his account of Casolaro's state of mind). https://archive.org/details/InslawPROMISBuaReport.
|
||||
[^5]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 246-250 ("B. The Death of Joseph Daniel Casolaro").
|
||||
[^6]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 246-250 and p. 69. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^7]: Danny Casolaro papers, folder "Promotional Material," Internet Archive items casolaro-notebooks (PromotionalMaterial.pdf) and PromotionalMaterial, https://archive.org/details/casolaro-notebooks.
|
||||
[^8]: Danny Casolaro papers, folders "CIA Frank Terpil Renegades," "Wackenhut - Newsletters" and "DOD PUBLICATIONS," https://archive.org/details/ddosecrets_casolaro_files (the Corn item is headed "SPECIAL EDITION - TERRORISM / Did It Blow Up Flight 103?").
|
||||
[^9]: *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, February 19, 1991, "Stolen Software Scattered: Affidavits Allege Sales To Iraqis And Israelis," clipping in the INSLAW folder, https://archive.org/download/casolaro-notebooks/InslawIi_djvu.txt.
|
||||
[^10]: Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General regarding the allegations of INSLAW, Inc. (March 1993), pp. 73-74.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -9,19 +9,30 @@ tags:
|
|||
- OfficeOfTechnicalService
|
||||
- RemoteViewing
|
||||
- SCANATE
|
||||
summary: "Director of the CIA's Office of Technical Service who ended its funding of the SRI parapsychology research in 1976, refused to resume it, and briefed the House intelligence committee on the work in 1977 and 1978."
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Office of Technical Service]]"
|
||||
start: 1974-07
|
||||
end: 1980-06
|
||||
role: "Director of the Office of Technical Service; wrote on February 20, 1976 that he had directed termination of OTS support to the SRI parapsychology work"
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
summary: "Director of the CIA's Office of Technical Service who ended its funding of the SRI parapsychology research in 1976, refused to resume it, and briefed the House intelligence committee in 1977 and 1978."
|
||||
location: "Langley, Virginia"
|
||||
created: 2026-09-21
|
||||
updated: 2026-09-21
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
David S. Brandwein was director of the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]'s [[CIA Office of Technical Service|Office of Technical Service]] in the middle 1970s, the office that had funded the remote-viewing research at [[Stanford Research Institute]] since 1972. On February 20, 1976, he sent the director of research and development "two reports summarizing the final work by SRI for OTS, together with a memorandum discussing the status of the parapsychology program. As you are no doubt aware, I directed that OTS support of this effort be terminated. I continue to believe that it would be inappropriate for us to continue it; however, if ORD desires to pick it up, be my guest." On October 7, 1976, having read the minutes of the twelfth meeting of the research and development subcommittee of the Human Resources Committee, at which OTS officers had briefed on the work and it was recorded that "enough empirical evidence existed to warrant further research in this area," he wrote to the Intelligence Community Staff: "I think you know my position on this, but just in case there is some confusion I want to make myself clear. OTS will not support any further research in parapsychology."[^1]
|
||||
David S. Brandwein was director of the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]'s [[CIA Office of Technical Service|Office of Technical Service]] from July 1974 to June 1980, the office that had funded the remote-viewing research at [[Stanford Research Institute]] since 1972.[^1] On February 20, 1976, he sent the director of research and development "two reports summarizing the final work by SRI for OTS, together with a memorandum discussing the status of the parapsychology program. As you are no doubt aware, I directed that OTS support of this effort be terminated. I continue to believe that it would be inappropriate for us to continue it; however, if ORD desires to pick it up, be my guest." On October 7, 1976, having read the minutes of the twelfth meeting of the research and development subcommittee of the Human Resources Committee, at which OTS officers had briefed on the work and it was recorded that "enough empirical evidence existed to warrant further research in this area," he wrote to the Intelligence Community Staff: "I think you know my position on this, but just in case there is some confusion I want to make myself clear. OTS will not support any further research in parapsychology."[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### Congress
|
||||
|
||||
After the *Washington Post*'s Parade section published "Psychic Spying" on August 7, 1977, the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence]] asked for a briefing. Brandwein gave it to three staff members on November 16, 1977, from ten to eleven: "A short oral history of OTS efforts in the field, dating back to 1961, was presented. All three staffers asked very pertinent questions and were given frank and in-depth replies." Since the officers "could speak only for OTS," one was asked to find out whether any other component was sponsoring such research, and the staff were left "a written outline of OTS work on ESP, classified SECRET, the IEEE article covering the unclassified portions of the work done by SRI and a brief article on Mr. [[Pat Price]]." On February 9, 1978, the OTS briefing for Representative [[Charlie Rose]] "was largely handled by the Chief of OTS, Mr. David S. Brandwein."[^1][^2]
|
||||
After the *Washington Post* published "Psychic Spying?" by [[John L. Wilhelm]], a former *Time* science correspondent, on August 7, 1977, the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence]] asked for a briefing. Brandwein attended the briefing of three staff members on November 16, 1977, from ten to eleven: "A short oral history of OTS efforts in the field, dating back to 1961, was presented. All three staffers asked very pertinent questions and were given frank and in-depth replies." Since the officers "could speak only for OTS," one was asked to find out whether any other component was sponsoring such research, and the staff were left "a written outline of OTS work on ESP, classified SECRET, the IEEE article covering the unclassified portions of the work done by SRI and a brief article on Mr. [[Pat Price]]." On February 9, 1978, the OTS briefing for Representative [[Charlie Rose]] "was largely handled by the Chief of OTS, Mr. David S. Brandwein."[^2][^3]
|
||||
|
||||
On June 22, 1977 Brandwein signed, as Director of the Office of Technical Service, the memorandum to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, "Request for Guidance on Handling Recently Located MKULTRA Material," reporting that additional MKULTRA documents had been found in the retired records of the OTS Budget and Fiscal Section.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Brandwein, David S., Director, Office of Technical Service, memoranda "Stanford Research Institute Parapsychology Research," February 20, 1976 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200020001-9), and "OTS Support to Research in Parapsychology," October 7, 1976 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200020016-3); memorandum for the record, "Briefing for House Permanent Select Committee re OTS Involvement in ESP Research," OTS memo 287-77, November 17, 1977 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200020020-8); memorandum for the record, "Discussions with OTS on the SRI Project," June 22, 1974 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000700110016-8). Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^2]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Legislative Counsel, "Briefing of Representative Charles Rose," February 9, 1978, OLC 78-0576, CIA-RDP81M00980R000600250087-4.
|
||||
[^1]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Office of Technical Service: 50 Years Supporting Operations," 2001, CIA Reading Room document 0001225679, "Directors of the Office of Technical Service" (John N. McMahon, May 1973 to July 1974; David S. Brandwein, July 1974 to June 1980).
|
||||
[^2]: Brandwein, David S., Director, Office of Technical Service, memoranda "Stanford Research Institute Parapsychology Research," February 20, 1976 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200090005-8), and "OTS Support to Research in Parapsychology," October 7, 1976 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200020016-3); memorandum for the record, "Briefing for House Permanent Select Committee re OTS Involvement in ESP Research," OTS memo 287-77, November 17, 1977 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200020020-8); memorandum for the record, "Discussions with OTS on the SRI Project," June 22, 1974 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000700110016-8).
|
||||
[^3]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Legislative Counsel, "Briefing of Representative Charles Rose," February 9, 1978, OLC 78-0576, CIA-RDP81M00980R000600250087-4.
|
||||
[^4]: Joint hearing, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research, August 3, 1977, *Project MKULTRA, the CIA's Program of Research in Behavioral Modification*, Appendix B, pp. 103-104. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/hearings/95mkultra.pdf
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -4,12 +4,14 @@ tags:
|
|||
- Person
|
||||
- Military
|
||||
summary: "Fair met with Michael Riconosciuto and Robert Frye of Wackenhut Services, Inc. in May 1981 at Picatinny Arsenal."
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-08
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
---
|
||||
[[Dr. Harry Fair]] was the Chief of Propulsion Technology, Applied Sciences Division, at [[ARRADCOM]] (U.S. Army Armament Research & Development Command, Large Caliber Weapons Systems Laboratory) at [[Picatinny Arsenal]] in Dover, [[New Jersey]]. He was involved in the Railgun Project.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Fair met with [[Michael Riconosciuto]] and [[Robert Frye]] (president of Wackenhut Services, Inc., a subsidiary of the [[Wackenhut Corporation]])[^2] in May 1981 at Picatinny Arsenal. Riconosciuto conducted an extensive and highly technical theoretical blackboard exercise on a Railgun for Army personnel. Fair commented that he was extremely impressed with Riconosciuto's scientific and technical knowledge and termed him a "potential national resource," despite being apprised by [[Dr. John Philip Nichols]] that Riconosciuto had been convicted and served time for stabbing a [[DEA|DEA]] agent.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
The Bua report states that [[Peter Zokosky]] and the other people from the joint venture travelled to the Picatinny Arsenal, which houses the U.S. Army Armament Research and Development Command's Large Caliber Weapon Systems Laboratory, to meet Fair and an Army project officer named R. Scott Westley, both of whom Zokosky knew from his time at Armtec. The meetings were set up to discuss the technical and administrative challenges of establishing a second-source combustible cartridge production facility on the Cabazon reservation. Frye recalled meeting Riconosciuto on a trip to the Arsenal that he believed took place in May 1981; Zokosky agreed there was a May 1981 trip but believed Riconosciuto was not on it and that Frye met Riconosciuto on a second trip in October 1981. Westley told Bua's team he was not at the September 10, 1981 weapons demonstration at Lake Cahuilla.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
Dr. John Philip Nichols also addressed a letter to Dr. Harry Fair on January 20, 1983, on Wackenhut/[[Cabazon Indian Reservation|Cabazon]] letterhead, stating that he would be forwarding a "unique list of agents and production techniques related to biological warfare." The letter mentioned that the [[Storemont Laboratories]] business plan Nichols mailed to Fair was to prepare him for what was to be sent in the area of biological warfare, noting that these products could be used in "small countries bordering [[Albania]] or large countries bordering the [[Soviet Union]]."[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Robert Booth Nichols]] also wrote a letter to [[Joseph F. Preloznik]] on April 13, 1983, recapitulating the same weapons proposal outlined by Dr. John Philip Nichols to Dr. Harry Fair. Robert Booth Nichols also mentioned Fair in a February 10, 1984, letter on [[Meridian Arms]] letterhead, referring to the Wackenhut Corporation visit to Picatinny Arsenal in May 1981 and Riconosciuto's demonstration of electrostatic heat transfer augmentation.[^1]
|
||||
|
|
@ -19,3 +21,4 @@ Dr. John Philip Nichols also addressed a letter to Dr. Harry Fair on January 20,
|
|||
|
||||
[^1]: Seymour, Cheri. *The Last Circle: Danny Casolaro’s Investigation into the Octopus and the PROMIS Software Scandal*. First Edition. TrineDay, 2010.
|
||||
[^2]: United States Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, report of Judge Nicholas J. Bua on the INSLAW matter (1993), printed pp. 42 to 43 and 55 to 58, footnote 35. Official finding, placed as the position of the body that issued it. https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/nsa/DOJ-OIP-INSLAW_1993.pdf
|
||||
[^3]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 57-58 and 65. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
---
|
||||
created: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
title: Frank Church
|
||||
aliases:
|
||||
- Frank Church
|
||||
|
|
@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ tags:
|
|||
- ColdWar
|
||||
- 1970s
|
||||
- 1980s
|
||||
summary: "Frank Church was a Democratic senator from Idaho who chaired the 1975-1976 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities that documented COINTELPRO, Operation CHAOS, assassination plots against foreign leaders, and illegal domestic surveillance by the CIA, FBI, and NSA."
|
||||
summary: "Democratic senator from Idaho who chaired the 1975-1976 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, which documented COINTELPRO, Operation CHAOS, assassination plots against foreign leaders and illegal domestic surveillance by the CIA, FBI and NSA."
|
||||
born: 1924-07-25
|
||||
died: 1984-04-07
|
||||
location: "Boise, Idaho"
|
||||
|
|
@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ Church was born in Boise, Idaho. He served in U.S. Army Military Intelligence du
|
|||
|
||||
### The Church Committee
|
||||
|
||||
In January 1975, the Senate created the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities in the aftermath of Seymour Hersh's December 1974 New York Times reporting on [[Operation CHAOS]]. Church was appointed chairman. The committee ran through April 1976 and produced a final report (S. Rept. 94-755) and fourteen volumes of supplementary staff reports documenting:
|
||||
In January 1975, the Senate created the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities in the aftermath of Seymour Hersh's December 1974 New York Times reporting on [[Operation CHAOS]]. Church was appointed chairman. The committee ran through April 1976 and produced an interim report on assassination plots (S. Rept. 94-465, November 20, 1975), a six-book final report (S. Rept. 94-755, April 26, 1976, Books I to VI) and seven volumes of hearings, documenting:[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
- Operation CHAOS: the CIA's domestic surveillance program targeting antiwar organizations, found to be unlawful
|
||||
- [[COINTELPRO]]: the FBI's systematic campaign against political organizations, including programs resulting in the death of activists such as [[Fred Hampton]]
|
||||
|
|
@ -48,3 +48,4 @@ Church ran for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1976, entering the prim
|
|||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, S. Rept. 94-755, April 26, 1976. Olmsted, Kathryn S. *Challenging the Secret Government: The Post-Watergate Investigations of the CIA and FBI*. University of North Carolina Press, 1996.
|
||||
[^2]: Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Final Report*, Book I, S. Rept. 94-755, April 26, 1976, title page; *Hearings*, vols. 1 to 7, "Senate Resolution 21." https://archive.org/details/ChurchCommittee
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
---
|
||||
created: 2026-05-15
|
||||
updated: 2026-05-16
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
title: Larry Devlin
|
||||
aliases:
|
||||
- Lawrence Devlin
|
||||
|
|
@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ tags:
|
|||
- Assassination
|
||||
- 1960s
|
||||
category: "Intelligence & Government"
|
||||
summary: "Larry Devlin was the CIA Station Chief in Leopoldville from 1960 to 1967 who received assassination orders against Patrice Lumumba including poison delivered by Sidney Gottlieb, claims he refused to execute the order, and became the primary CIA sponsor of Mobutu Sese Seko's rise to power."
|
||||
summary: "CIA Station Chief in Leopoldville from 1960 to 1967 who received orders against Patrice Lumumba, including poison delivered by Sidney Gottlieb, said he refused to execute them, and sponsored Mobutu Sese Seko's rise to power."
|
||||
born: 1922
|
||||
died: 2008
|
||||
location: "Leopoldville (Kinshasa), Democratic Republic of Congo"
|
||||
|
|
@ -27,17 +27,17 @@ Devlin arrived in Leopoldville in 1960, the year of Congolese independence from
|
|||
|
||||
When Lumumba, the Congo's first elected Prime Minister, sought [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] military assistance during the [[Katanga]] secession crisis, CIA Director [[Allen Dulles]] characterized him as a potential African [[Fidel Castro]] and authorized assassination planning. Devlin received cables from CIA headquarters authorizing action to "eliminate" Lumumba. In September 1960, Sidney Gottlieb - the CIA's chief of Technical Services who had developed assassination materials for other targets under the [[ZR RIFLE]] program - personally traveled to Leopoldville and delivered to Devlin a kit containing biological materials intended to poison Lumumba.
|
||||
|
||||
Devlin testified to the [[Church Committee]] in 1975 that he never used the materials and eventually disposed of them by throwing the poison into the [[Congo River]]. His testimony acknowledged he had understood the orders but claimed moral and practical objections to carrying them out.[^1]
|
||||
Devlin testified to the [[Church Committee]] in 1975 that he never used the materials and eventually disposed of them by throwing the poison into the [[Congo River]]. His testimony acknowledged he had understood the orders but claimed moral and practical objections to carrying them out.[^1] The committee's interim report calls the Leopoldville station officer "Hedgman." The scientist it calls "Joseph Scheider" testified on October 7 and 9, 1975 that he destroyed the viability of the biological material and disposed of it in the Congo River before leaving the Congo on October 5, 1960, and the station officer testified on August 21, 1975 that he locked the material in the bottom drawer of his safe and disposed of it months later; each recalled disposing of it in the Congo River, alone. The station officer's October 7, 1960 cable to [[Bronson Tweedy]] said that "certain items of continuing usefulness" had been left.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### Lumumba's Death
|
||||
|
||||
Despite Devlin's claimed refusal of the assassination order, Lumumba was captured, transferred to [[Katanga]], and killed on January 17, 1961, by Katangese forces under [[Moise Tshombe]] with Belgian officers present. The precise extent of CIA foreknowledge or facilitation of this transfer - as opposed to the separate biological assassination plan Devlin received - has not been fully resolved by the documentary record.
|
||||
Despite Devlin's claimed refusal of the assassination order, Lumumba was captured, transferred to Katanga, and killed on January 17, 1961, by Katangese forces under [[Moise Tshombe]] with Belgian officers present. The precise extent of CIA foreknowledge or facilitation of this transfer - as opposed to the separate biological assassination plan Devlin received - has not been fully resolved by the documentary record.
|
||||
|
||||
Devlin acknowledged to the Church Committee that the CIA was aware of Lumumba's transfer to Katanga and that this transfer made his survival unlikely. A 2001 Belgian parliamentary inquiry found Belgian government and intelligence officers directly involved in the killing. The question of whether CIA officers encouraged or facilitated the handover remained contested.[^2]
|
||||
Devlin acknowledged to the Church Committee that the CIA was aware of Lumumba's transfer to Katanga and that this transfer made his survival unlikely. A 2001 Belgian parliamentary inquiry found Belgian government and intelligence officers directly involved in the killing. The question of whether CIA officers encouraged or facilitated the handover remained contested.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
### Mobutu and the Congo's Political Future
|
||||
|
||||
Devlin's most consequential operational role was his cultivation of [[Joseph Kasavubu|Joseph]] Mobutu - at the time known as Joseph-Desire Mobutu, later renamed Mobutu Sese Seko - the Congolese Army chief of staff. Devlin developed a close personal relationship with Mobutu and provided financial support and intelligence backing during the 1960 political crisis. Mobutu's September 1960 "neutralization" of both President [[Joseph Kasavubu]] and Prime Minister Lumumba - temporarily removing both from power - was executed with CIA awareness and support.
|
||||
Devlin's most consequential operational role was his cultivation of [[Joseph Kasavubu|Joseph]] Mobutu - at the time known as Joseph-Desire Mobutu, later renamed Mobutu Sese Seko - the Congolese Army chief of staff. Devlin developed a close personal relationship with Mobutu and provided financial support and intelligence backing during the 1960 political crisis. Mobutu's September 1960 "neutralization" of both President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba - temporarily removing both from power - was executed with CIA awareness and support.
|
||||
|
||||
Mobutu consolidated power definitively in November 1965 in a coup of which Devlin had advance knowledge. Devlin's sponsorship of Mobutu established the foundation for a CIA-Mobutu relationship that continued until the [[Cold War]]'s end, during which the [[United States]] supported Mobutu's government while he looted an estimated $5 billion from the Congolese economy. Mobutu remained a critical CIA partner particularly for covert operations in neighboring [[Angola]] during the mid-1970s.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -50,4 +50,5 @@ In 2007, one year before his death, Devlin published *Chief of Station, Congo: F
|
|||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Devlin, Lawrence. *Chief of Station, Congo: Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone.* Public Affairs, 2007. Church Committee (U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities). *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders.* Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975.
|
||||
[^2]: Kalb, Madeleine G. *The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa from Eisenhower to Kennedy.* Macmillan, 1982. De Witte, Ludo. *The Assassination of Lumumba.* Verso, 2001.
|
||||
[^2]: Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report*, S. Rept. 94-465, November 20, 1975, pp. 24 to 31 (Scheider, October 7 and 9, 1975; Hedgman, August 21, 1975, pp. 48 to 49 and 84 to 85). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
|
||||
[^3]: Kalb, Madeleine G. *The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa from Eisenhower to Kennedy.* Macmillan, 1982. De Witte, Ludo. *The Assassination of Lumumba.* Verso, 2001.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -11,9 +11,16 @@ tags:
|
|||
- FARC
|
||||
- 1980s
|
||||
- 2000s
|
||||
summary: "Monzer al-Kassar was a Syrian arms dealer who received $1.2 million from Richard Secord during Iran-Contra to facilitate weapons transfers to the Contras, operated from Marbella Spain with connections to Syrian intelligence and multiple intelligence services, and was convicted in 2008 in US federal court on charges of conspiring to provide material support to FARC terrorists."
|
||||
summary: "Syrian arms dealer based in Marbella, Spain, paid $500,000 by the Iran-Contra Enterprise in July 1986 for Contra weapons, and convicted in 2008 in US federal court of conspiring to support FARC."
|
||||
born: 1945
|
||||
location: "al-Nabk, Syria"
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: funded
|
||||
with: "[[Richard Secord]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "Enterprise run by Secord and Hakim paid 500,000 dollars for contra weapons, July 1986"
|
||||
start: 1986-07
|
||||
fn: 3
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Monzer al-Kassar was born in 1945 in al-Nabk, a town in the Qalamoun region of Syria north of Damascus. He became one of the most extensively documented international arms dealers of the late twentieth century, conducting weapons transfers across multiple conflicts while maintaining relationships with intelligence services in the [[United States]], [[Israel]], [[Spain]], [[Syria]], and elsewhere. He lived for decades in Marbella, Spain, where he owned a substantial villa and was a prominent figure in the expatriate community, and held a passport from multiple countries. He was convicted in US federal court in 2008 following a [[DEA]] sting operation.[^1]
|
||||
|
|
@ -28,21 +35,23 @@ Al-Kassar reportedly developed relationships with Western intelligence services
|
|||
|
||||
### Iran-Contra Connection
|
||||
|
||||
The [[Tower Commission]]'s investigation and [[Lawrence Walsh]]'s Independent Counsel investigation documented that al-Kassar received approximately $1.2 million from [[Richard Secord]] - General [[Oliver North]]'s co-director of [[The Enterprise (Iran-Contra)|the Enterprise]] - to facilitate the movement of weapons from [[Israel]] to the Nicaraguan [[Contras]]. The payment, made through the Enterprise's Swiss account structure - specifically [[Albert Hakim]]'s Lake Resources S.A. - was for al-Kassar's services in arranging weapons transfers through Eastern European intermediaries and logistics networks that could not be traced directly to the United States.[^1]
|
||||
In July 1986 the Enterprise run by [[Richard Secord]] and [[Albert Hakim]] paid the Portuguese supplier Defex 2.6 million dollars and paid al-Kassar 500,000 dollars for contra weapons; in late July a shipment of arms left Portugal.[^3] The Independent Counsel left the 500,000 dollar purchase out of his 3.6 million dollar estimate of the Iran-to-contra diversion because al-Kassar "was not available to testify."[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
This relationship gave al-Kassar the operational profile of a contractor to American covert operations during the period, complicating subsequent US government efforts to prosecute him for other activities. [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] officials who later sought to prevent his use in post-9/11 operations cited his Iran-Contra role as evidence that he had been protected despite his involvement in terrorist-adjacent activities.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### Pan Am 103 Allegations
|
||||
|
||||
Following the December 21, 1988, bombing of [[Pan Am Flight 103]] over [[Lockerbie]], Scotland, allegations circulated that al-Kassar had a connection to the attack. The private investigative firm Interfor, hired by Pan Am's insurance companies, produced a report alleging that the bomb had been planted in a suitcase belonging to a [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] drug mule - part of an alleged CIA-protected narcotics pipeline out of the Middle East - and that al-Kassar was involved in a scheme in which the [[PFLP-GC|Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command]] substituted an explosive device for the drug consignment. These allegations were disputed by US government investigators, and al-Kassar was not charged in connection with Lockerbie. The Interfor report's claims were treated skeptically by most intelligence analysts.[^3]
|
||||
Following the December 21, 1988, bombing of [[Pan Am Flight 103]] over [[Lockerbie]], Scotland, allegations circulated that al-Kassar had a connection to the attack. The private investigative firm Interfor, hired by Pan Am's insurance companies, produced a report alleging that the bomb had been planted in a suitcase belonging to a CIA drug mule - part of an alleged CIA-protected narcotics pipeline out of the Middle East - and that al-Kassar was involved in a scheme in which the [[PFLP-GC|Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command]] substituted an explosive device for the drug consignment. These allegations were disputed by US government investigators, and al-Kassar was not charged in connection with Lockerbie. The Interfor report's claims were treated skeptically by most intelligence analysts.[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
### 2008 Conviction
|
||||
|
||||
In 2007, the US [[DEA|Drug Enforcement Administration]] conducted a sting operation in which undercover agents posed as representatives of the [[FARC|Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)]] seeking weapons to kill Americans in Colombia. Al-Kassar and a co-conspirator agreed to provide weapons including anti-aircraft missiles. He was arrested in Spain in June 2007 on a US warrant and extradited. Tried in the [[U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York|Southern District of New York]] before [[Jed Rakoff|Judge Jed Rakoff]], al-Kassar was convicted in November 2008 on charges of conspiracy to provide material support to a designated terrorist organization and conspiracy to kill Americans. He was sentenced to 30 years in prison. The conviction was the result of straightforward recorded evidence from the [[DEA]]'s sting, with al-Kassar's own statements providing the primary evidence against him.[^4]
|
||||
In 2007, the US Drug Enforcement Administration conducted a sting operation in which undercover agents posed as representatives of the [[FARC|Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)]] seeking weapons to kill Americans in Colombia. Al-Kassar and a co-conspirator agreed to provide weapons including anti-aircraft missiles. He was arrested in Spain in June 2007 on a US warrant and extradited. Tried in the [[U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York|Southern District of New York]] before [[Jed Rakoff|Judge Jed Rakoff]], al-Kassar was convicted in November 2008 on charges of conspiracy to provide material support to a designated terrorist organization and conspiracy to kill Americans. He was sentenced to 30 years in prison. The conviction was the result of straightforward recorded evidence from the DEA's sting, with al-Kassar's own statements providing the primary evidence against him.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Walsh, Lawrence E. *Iran-Contra: The Final Report.* Random House, 1994. Tower Commission Report. *The Tower Commission Report.* Bantam Books/Times Books, 1987.
|
||||
[^2]: Farah, Douglas, and Stephen Braun. *Merchant of Death: Money, Guns, Planes, and the Man Who Makes War Possible.* Wiley, 2007 (on al-Kassar's intelligence service connections and relationship to the Viktor Bout network).
|
||||
[^3]: Henderson, Ian. *The Lockerbie Trial: A Documentary History.* Palgrave Macmillan, 2001 (covers the competing theories including the Interfor allegations).
|
||||
[^4]: *United States v. Monzer al-Kassar and Luis Felipe Moreno Godoy,* S.D.N.Y., Case No. 07 Cr. 354 (JSR), Verdict November 2008. Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, Southern District of New York, November 21, 2008.
|
||||
[^3]: Lawrence E. Walsh, Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters, vol. I, pt. V, ch. 8, "The Enterprise and Its Finances," pp. 159-172, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_08.htm.
|
||||
[^4]: Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, ch. 8, n. 51, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_08.htm.
|
||||
[^5]: Henderson, Ian. *The Lockerbie Trial: A Documentary History.* Palgrave Macmillan, 2001 (covers the competing theories including the Interfor allegations).
|
||||
[^6]: *United States v. Monzer al-Kassar and Luis Felipe Moreno Godoy,* S.D.N.Y., Case No. 07 Cr. 354 (JSR), Verdict November 2008. Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, Southern District of New York, November 21, 2008.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ tags:
|
|||
- Vanunu
|
||||
summary: "Foreign editor of the Daily Mirror under Robert Maxwell, accused by Seymour Hersh in 1991 of working for the Mossad and dealing arms with Ari Ben-Menashe, and dismissed that October."
|
||||
created: 2026-05-14
|
||||
updated: 2026-09-21
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
died: 2016-01
|
||||
location: "London, United Kingdom"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
@ -24,16 +24,18 @@ In 1991, investigative journalist [[Seymour Hersh]] published *The Samson Option
|
|||
|
||||
Ben-Menashe stated that Davies and he became business partners in an international arms firm, [[Ora Group|Ora Limited]], operating out of Davies's home in London beginning in 1983. The firm allegedly functioned to facilitate the flow of Israeli arms to Iran during the [[Iran-Iraq War]], a channel that ran parallel to the operations later associated with the [[Iran-Contra Affair]]. Ben-Menashe claimed Davies made more than $1.5 million from a single arms transaction.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
The most specific allegation was that Davies passed [[Mordecai Vanunu|Mordechai Vanunu]]'s location to Mossad operatives, enabling the 1986 honey-trap operation in Rome that led to Vanunu's abduction and return to Israel for trial on nuclear secrets charges.[^3]
|
||||
In the book, Ben-Menashe is quoted saying that Davies "was my main backup on all the Iran arms sales." He recalled that "Nick had a friend in the Mossad" and a casual meeting in London. Hersh wrote that Davies then accepted an invitation to visit Israel.[^3] Hersh also wrote, in his own narrative voice, that Vanunu had been compromised to the Israelis by Davies, and that Davies's contact in the matter was Ben-Menashe.[^3] The book gives Davies's response: reached by telephone, he acknowledged that he knew Ben-Menashe, denied any involvement in arms sales, and said Ben-Menashe was only a news source.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
The most specific allegation was that Davies passed [[Mordecai Vanunu|Mordechai Vanunu]]'s location to Mossad operatives, enabling the 1986 honey-trap operation in Rome that led to Vanunu's abduction and return to Israel for trial on nuclear secrets charges.[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
### In Parliament
|
||||
Hersh's book went on sale in [[United Kingdom|Britain]] on October 20, 1991. Two members of the [[House of Commons]] raised it under privilege and put down motions. That of [[George Galloway]] stated that Davies "has been involved in substantial arms sales of Israeli equipment to [[Iran]] and other countries over the last 10 years, is a longstanding and highly-paid Israeli Intelligence asset and that he betrayed the whereabouts in a hotel in [[London]] of Mordechai Vanunu to Mossad," and called on Robert Maxwell to appoint an independent tribunal to establish "the extent of foreign intelligence penetration of Mirror Group newspapers." That of [[Rupert Allason]], who wrote on intelligence as [[Nigel West]], stated that the Daily Mirror and its proprietor "have maintained a close relationship with the Israeli Intelligence Service," that Davies in 1983 "entered into a business partnership with an Israeli citizen, Mr Ari Ben-Menashe, and based a company incorporated as [[Ora Limited]] at 41 Becmead Avenue, London S.E.15, and 1 Trafalgar Avenue, London S.W.16," that the company "negotiated the sale of 4,000 TOW anti-tank missiles to Iran," and that it "allegedly conspired in September 1986 to supply information regarding the whereabouts in London of Mr Mordechai Vanunu to the [[Embassy of Israel, London|Israeli Embassy]]." It asked the [[Department of Trade and Industry]] to investigate a breach of the arms embargo and the [[Foreign and Commonwealth Office|Foreign Office]] to suspend the access of Mirror Group staff to its confidential briefings.[^4]
|
||||
Hersh's book went on sale in [[United Kingdom|Britain]] on Monday, October 21, 1991. Two members of the [[House of Commons]] raised it under privilege and put down motions. That of [[George Galloway]] stated that Davies "has been involved in substantial arms sales of Israeli equipment to [[Iran]] and other countries over the last 10 years, is a longstanding and highly-paid Israeli Intelligence asset and that he betrayed the whereabouts in a hotel in [[London]] of Mordechai Vanunu to Mossad," and called on Robert Maxwell to appoint an independent tribunal to establish "the extent of foreign intelligence penetration of Mirror Group newspapers." That of [[Rupert Allason]], who wrote on intelligence as [[Nigel West]], stated that the Daily Mirror and its proprietor "have maintained a close relationship with the Israeli Intelligence Service," that Davies in 1983 "entered into a business partnership with an Israeli citizen, Mr Ari Ben-Menashe, and based a company incorporated as [[Ora Limited]] at 41 Becmead Avenue, London S.E.15, and 1 Trafalgar Avenue, London S.W.16," that the company "negotiated the sale of 4,000 TOW anti-tank missiles to Iran," and that it "allegedly conspired in September 1986 to supply information regarding the whereabouts in London of Mr Mordechai Vanunu to the [[Embassy of Israel, London|Israeli Embassy]]." It asked the [[Department of Trade and Industry]] to investigate a breach of the arms embargo and the [[Foreign and Commonwealth Office|Foreign Office]] to suspend the access of Mirror Group staff to its confidential briefings.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
Davies, who was in [[Harare]] covering the Commonwealth conference, said: "The allegations are a complete and total lie. I reject them in every respect." Maxwell, in [[New York City|New York]], called them "ludicrous, a total invention," issued writs against [[Faber and Faber]], and sought an injunction against distribution of the book. The Mirror's front page said the two members had "as much honor as a pair of jackals scavenging in a rubbish heap." Asked in November 1986 whether information on Vanunu's presence in Britain had passed from government sources to [[Israel]], Prime Minister [[Margaret Thatcher]] had answered: "No."[^5][^6]
|
||||
Davies, who was in [[Harare]] covering the Commonwealth conference, said: "The allegations are a complete and total lie. I reject them in every respect." Maxwell, in [[New York City|New York]], called them "ludicrous, a total invention," issued writs against [[Faber and Faber]], and sought an injunction against distribution of the book. The Mirror's front page said the two members had "as much honor as a pair of jackals scavenging in a rubbish heap." Asked in November 1986 whether information on Vanunu's presence in Britain had passed from government sources to [[Israel]], Prime Minister [[Margaret Thatcher]] had answered: "No."[^7][^8]
|
||||
|
||||
### Libel Litigation and Resolution
|
||||
|
||||
Maxwell and Davies began libel proceedings against Hersh and his British publisher, Faber and Faber, which sued in turn. Maxwell died on November 5, 1991. In August 1994 Mirror Group Newspapers apologized "unreservedly" in a London court for its articles of October 1991, acknowledged that its "attempts to impugn" Hersh's integrity had been "entirely improper," and agreed to pay him and Faber "substantial damages" and their costs.[^7]
|
||||
Maxwell and Davies began libel proceedings against Hersh and his British publisher, Faber and Faber, which sued in turn. Maxwell died on November 5, 1991. In August 1994 Mirror Group Newspapers apologized "unreservedly" in a London court for its articles of October 1991, acknowledged that its "attempts to impugn" Hersh's integrity had been "entirely improper," and agreed to pay him and Faber "substantial damages" and their costs.[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
Sources in Britain and Israel publicly disputed Ben-Menashe's reliability as a witness, and no subsequent independent evidence emerged to corroborate the specific allegations about Davies's intelligence role or his involvement in the Vanunu affair.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -41,8 +43,10 @@ Sources in Britain and Israel publicly disputed Ben-Menashe's reliability as a w
|
|||
|
||||
[^1]: "Daily Mirror fires foreign editor," United Press International, October 29, 1991. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1991/10/29/Daily-Mirror-fires-foreign-editor/6711688712400/ ; Association of Mirror Pensioners, "Nick Davies," February 3, 2016. https://www.mirrorpensioners.co.uk/obituary/nick-davies/
|
||||
[^2]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy.* Random House, 1991.
|
||||
[^3]: UK Parliament Early Day Motion 2134, "Mirror Group Newspapers and Israeli Intelligence," 1992. https://edm.parliament.uk/early-day-motion/2134/mirror-group-newspapers-and-israeli-intelligence
|
||||
[^4]: House of Commons, Early Day Motion 2134, "Mirror Group Newspapers and Israeli Intelligence," and Early Day Motion 2136, "Arms Sales," October 1991. https://edm.parliament.uk/early-day-motion/2136/arms-sales
|
||||
[^5]: United Press International, "Maxwell to seek injunction against book," London, October 23, 1991.
|
||||
[^6]: House of Commons, written answers, November 27, 1986, vol. 106, col. 299W, "Mr. Mordechai Vanunu."
|
||||
[^7]: "Hersh Wins Apology From British Papers," *The Washington Post,* August 19, 1994; "Writer wins damages, apology in libel suit," *Deseret News,* August 20, 1994.
|
||||
[^3]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991, pp. 309-310.
|
||||
[^4]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991, pp. 310-311.
|
||||
[^5]: UK Parliament Early Day Motion 2134, "Mirror Group Newspapers and Israeli Intelligence," 1992. https://edm.parliament.uk/early-day-motion/2134/mirror-group-newspapers-and-israeli-intelligence
|
||||
[^6]: House of Commons, Early Day Motion 2134, "Mirror Group Newspapers and Israeli Intelligence," and Early Day Motion 2136, "Arms Sales," October 1991. https://edm.parliament.uk/early-day-motion/2136/arms-sales
|
||||
[^7]: United Press International, "Maxwell to seek injunction against book," London, October 23, 1991.
|
||||
[^8]: House of Commons, written answers, November 27, 1986, vol. 106, col. 299W, "Mr. Mordechai Vanunu."
|
||||
[^9]: "Hersh Wins Apology From British Papers," *The Washington Post,* August 19, 1994; "Writer wins damages, apology in libel suit," *Deseret News,* August 20, 1994.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,20 +1,325 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
category: "Law Enforcement & Legal"
|
||||
created: 2024-04-25
|
||||
updated: 2026-05-01
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- Person
|
||||
- PROMIS
|
||||
- DoJ
|
||||
- Lawyer
|
||||
- INSLAW
|
||||
summary: "Special Counsel appointed in 1991 to investigate the Inslaw/PROMIS allegations, whose 1993 report found no credible evidence of criminal wrongdoing."
|
||||
- SpecialCounsel
|
||||
- FederalJudge
|
||||
aliases:
|
||||
- Nicholas J. Bua
|
||||
- Nicholas Bua
|
||||
- Nicholas John Bua
|
||||
- Judge Bua
|
||||
- Judge Nicholas J. Bua
|
||||
summary: "Federal judge appointed Special Counsel in the INSLAW matter in November 1991, whose March 1993 report found no credible evidence of a conspiracy to steal PROMIS."
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: appointed
|
||||
with: "[[Jimmy Carter]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 1977-07-19
|
||||
role: "Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois"
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
- type: appointed
|
||||
with: "[[William Barr]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 1991-11-07
|
||||
role: "Special Counsel for the INSLAW matter"
|
||||
fn: 5
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[Burke, Weaver & Prell]]"
|
||||
start: 1991
|
||||
role: "Private practice after leaving the bench"
|
||||
fn: 3
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[Holland & Knight]]"
|
||||
start: 2000
|
||||
role: "Of counsel"
|
||||
fn: 3
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[Earl Brian]]"
|
||||
start: 1991-11-07
|
||||
end: 1993-03
|
||||
role: "Allegation of a conspiracy with DOJ to steal PROMIS"
|
||||
fn: 2
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[Michael Riconosciuto]]"
|
||||
start: 1991-11-07
|
||||
end: 1993-03
|
||||
role: "Principal source for the PROMIS conspiracy allegations"
|
||||
fn: 23
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[Ari Ben-Menashe]]"
|
||||
start: 1991-11-07
|
||||
end: 1993-03
|
||||
role: "Affidavits alleging international distribution of PROMIS"
|
||||
fn: 37
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[Cornelius Blackshear]]"
|
||||
start: 1991-11-07
|
||||
end: 1993-03
|
||||
role: "Recantation of deposition testimony in the Independent Handling proceeding"
|
||||
fn: 69
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[Danny Casolaro]]"
|
||||
start: 1991-11-07
|
||||
end: 1993-03
|
||||
role: "Review of the West Virginia investigation of Casolaro's death"
|
||||
fn: 82
|
||||
- type: reported_to
|
||||
with: "[[Janet Reno]]"
|
||||
start: 1993-03
|
||||
role: "Report of Special Counsel delivered to the Attorney General"
|
||||
fn: 11
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Nicholas J. Bua was appointed Special Counsel by Attorney General [[William Barr]] on November 7, 1991, to investigate all allegations of wrongdoing in connection with the [[PROMIS Software Scandal|Inslaw matter]]. His mandate was to conduct a complete and thorough investigation to determine if there had been any misconduct by individuals inside or outside the [[Department of Justice|DOJ]]. Bua was assured of complete independence and full cooperation from all DOJ employees. He selected six Assistant United States Attorneys and two FBI agents to assist him, all of whom reported solely to him to maintain the investigation's independence. The investigation devoted considerable resources to the myriad allegations, which ranged from murder and international espionage to simple incompetence. Bua's report, submitted in March 1993 to newly appointed Attorney General [[Janet Reno]], concluded that there was no credible evidence of any criminal wrongdoing by any past or present DOJ employee.[^1]
|
||||
Nicholas John Bua (February 9, 1925 to November 1, 2002) was a judge of the [[United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois]] from 1977 to 1991. In November 1991 Attorney General [[William Barr]] appointed him Special Counsel for the [[PROMIS Software Scandal|INSLAW matter]], and his report to Attorney General [[Janet Reno]] in March 1993 found no credible evidence that [[Department of Justice|DOJ]] employees conspired to steal the [[PROMIS]] software from [[INSLAW]].[^1][^2]
|
||||
|
||||
Bua's report concluded that there was no credible evidence to support the allegation of a conspiracy between DOJ members and [[Earl Brian]] to obtain or distribute [[PROMIS]] software, stating that the overwhelming evidence showed no connection between Brian and anything related to [[INSLAW]] or PROMIS. The report also found insufficient evidence to support the allegation that the DOJ obtained an enhanced version of PROMIS through fraud, trickery, and deceit, or that it wrongfully distributed PROMIS. Instead, it concluded that DOJ employees acted in what they genuinely believed were the best legitimate interests of the government. Furthermore, the report found no credible evidence that DOJ employees improperly influenced the selection process that resulted in Bankruptcy Judge Bason's non-reappointment, nor that DOJ employees attempted to improperly influence the U.S. Trustee to convert the Inslaw bankruptcy case or committed perjury to hide such obstruction. Finally, the report found no evidence that DOJ employees destroyed any documents related to Inslaw or otherwise acted improperly to obstruct Congressional investigations.[^1]
|
||||
### Early career
|
||||
|
||||
Bua was born in [[Chicago]]. He served in the [[United States Army]] as an infantryman in [[World War II]] and took his J.D. from [[DePaul University College of Law]] in 1953 on the G.I. Bill.[^3] He practiced privately in Chicago from 1953 to 1963. He was presiding judge of the [[Melrose Park, Illinois|Melrose Park]] Village Court in 1963, an associate judge of the [[Circuit Court of Cook County]] from 1964 to 1971, and a judge of that court from 1971 to 1976. From 1976 to 1977 he sat on the [[Illinois Appellate Court]], First District; the Chicago Tribune recorded that his 1976 election drew a total of 1,139,183 votes in Cook County.[^1][^3]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Jimmy Carter]] nominated him on July 19, 1977, to a seat on the Northern District of Illinois vacated by [[William J. Lynch]]. The Senate confirmed him on October 7, 1977, and his commission issued October 11, 1977. On September 10, 1980, Carter nominated him to the [[United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit]]; the Senate took no vote.[^1] In the district court he was assigned the suit brought by the attorney [[Michael Shakman]] against patronage hiring by the Chicago Democratic organization; he entered a summary judgment in 1979 that the city's patronage practices violated civil and voting rights and a consent judgment in 1983 that blocked the city and county from hiring most employees for political reasons.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
His federal service ended on November 4, 1991, by retirement.[^1] He joined the law firm of [[Burke, Weaver & Prell]] and in 2000 became of counsel at [[Holland & Knight]].[^3] The Federal Judicial Center gives his death as November 1, 2002, in Melrose Park, Illinois.[^1] The Chicago Tribune reported that he died of leukemia that day at Gottlieb Memorial Hospital in Melrose Park, at age 77, and quoted Chief Judge [[Charles P. Kocoras]] of the Northern District of Illinois: "Our court has never had a better colleague."[^3][^4]
|
||||
|
||||
### Appointment and scope
|
||||
|
||||
The report's introduction states that Barr appointed Bua on November 7, 1991, to investigate "all allegations of wrongdoing in connection with" the INSLAW matter. The Attorney General asked for "a complete and thorough investigation" to determine whether any individual inside or outside the Department had engaged in misconduct. Bua wrote that the Attorney General told him the investigation should be completely independent and assured him that he would demand complete cooperation from all DOJ employees. Bua selected six Assistant United States Attorneys, all with significant criminal prosecution experience, and one of his law partners, and the team chose two FBI Special Agents as investigators. The Assistant United States Attorneys and the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] agents reported solely to him and to no one else within the Department. One of the original six left the staff on appointment as Chief of the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division, and [[Thomas M. Durkin]], the former First Assistant United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, left in February 1993 to enter private practice.[^5] The report characterizes the allegations as ranging "from charges of murder and international espionage to claims of simple incompetence." Bua's team subpoenaed several third-party witnesses before a grand jury in the Northern District of Illinois, and passages of the published text are omitted under Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
The report distinguishes two kinds of INSLAW allegation: the theory that the contract disputes were driven by the personal bias of the project manager [[C. Madison Brewer]], who had been fired years earlier by INSLAW's president [[Bill Hamilton|William Hamilton]], and the theory of a wider conspiracy to appropriate the software for the benefit of [[Earl Brian]], a businessman alleged to have ties to officials of the [[Ronald Reagan]] administration.[^7]
|
||||
|
||||
The [[House Committee on the Judiciary]] gave the appointment date as November 13, 1991, and wrote that at that time the Attorney General had not empowered Bua to subpoena witnesses, convene a grand jury or compel the Department to produce key documents. After a meeting on January 28, 1992, Barr granted him that authority, including the power to subpoena witnesses and convene special grand juries. The committee wrote that INSLAW officials feared that a Special Counsel without independent counsel status would be unable to draw Department employees forward, and quoted Deputy Assistant Attorney General [[Roger M. Cooper]] in an interview with Government Computer News: "The judge (Bua) will do as the attorney general wants him to do, and that's fine. I think all of us in the department would like to get it [the INSLAW matter] behind us. It's sort of an albatross."[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
Bua told INSLAW's counsel, [[Elliot Richardson]], in a letter of July 7, 1992, that he had decided to "retain my own expert to conduct the examination necessary to compare the software." That examination concerned the claim that the [[FOIMS]] system used by the FBI was derived from PROMIS.[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
The report's title page lists [[Helene B. Greenwald]], [[Joseph H. Hartzler]], [[Charles D. Knight]], [[Dean J. Polales]] and [[David S. Rosenbloom]] alongside Bua.[^10] In March 1993 Bua and his staff submitted the report, the product of a sixteen-month investigation, to the newly appointed Attorney General, Janet Reno.[^11]
|
||||
|
||||
### The report's findings
|
||||
|
||||
The report's summary of conclusions opens with the central finding: "There is no credible evidence to support the allegation that members of DOJ conspired with Earl Brian to obtain or distribute PROMIS software. The overwhelming weight of the evidence is that there was absolutely no connection between Earl Brian and anything related to Inslaw or PROMIS software."[^2] The report found "woefully insufficient evidence" that DOJ obtained an enhanced version of PROMIS "through fraud, trickery, and deceit," or that DOJ wrongfully distributed PROMIS inside or outside the Department. It stated that DOJ employees acted on what "they genuinely believed were in the best legitimate interests of the government," and that DOJ conducted itself properly after it became involved in litigation with Inslaw.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
On the bankruptcy questions the report found "no credible evidence that DOJ employees sought to improperly influence the selection process that resulted in the decision not to reappoint Bankruptcy Judge [[George Francis Bason, Jr.|Bason]]." It found insufficient evidence that DOJ employees tried to influence the [[United States Trustee]] to convert the Inslaw case or committed perjury to hide such an effort. It found no evidence that DOJ employees destroyed Inslaw documents or obstructed Congressional inquiries.[^12]
|
||||
|
||||
The conclusions section restates the finding in compact form: "there is no credible evidence to support either the allegation that there was a scheme to defraud Inslaw, or the allegation that DOJ employees conspired with Earl Brian to steal Inslaw's software." The authors wrote that they were "convinced that these employees genuinely believed that they were acting within DOJ's rights under the contract." They wrote that they did not share Bason's view of Brewer "as a man consumed with hatred and out to destroy Inslaw," and that the "ever-expanding allegations of widespread criminal conduct" were not supported by "credible evidence."[^13] The report counted at least five formal investigations of the claim of a DOJ conspiracy to steal PROMIS for the benefit of Brian (the Office of Professional Responsibility, the Criminal Division, the [[Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations]], the House Judiciary Committee and Bua's own), and wrote: "Not one investigation has concluded that such a conspiracy existed." It added that William Hamilton's statements and assertions "do not withstand scrutiny" and that witnesses "in a very credible way" denied making statements he attributed to them, and it found "no basis for initiating any criminal charges or disciplinary action against any past or present DOJ employees."[^14]
|
||||
|
||||
### The implementation contract
|
||||
|
||||
The report's historical account treats part of the dispute as settled by concession. Old PROMIS, the 1979 Pilot Project version and the five [[Bureau of Justice Statistics]] enhancements were publicly funded, and Inslaw conceded during the bankruptcy litigation that they were in the public domain.[^15] The 1982 implementation contract was signed on March 12, 1982, and Brewer was hired to oversee installation at the [[Executive Office for United States Attorneys]].[^16] On January 26, 1983, the contracting officer [[Peter Videnieks]] wrote Inslaw that DOJ considered its April 1982 line of credit at the [[Bank of Bethesda]] a violation of the contract's assignment prohibition, a letter that led to the advance payments dispute.[^17]
|
||||
|
||||
In 1983 Inslaw submitted a methodology for demonstrating which of its enhancements were privately funded. On June 10, 1983, Videnieks wrote that the methodology was unacceptable and that as to Inslaw's request for approval or revisions, "[t]he Government is in a position to do neither." Videnieks and [[Jack Rugh]], Brewer's deputy, had considered proposing an acceptable methodology and decided to reject Inslaw's and say nothing more; Rugh told the investigators he believed Inslaw did not keep sufficient records to support any methodology. The report wrote that this was "not a response we would have recommended" and that it would have been preferable for DOJ to articulate its reasons, and it found no evidence that Videnieks and Rugh acted in bad faith with the intent to obtain Inslaw's property.[^18][^19]
|
||||
|
||||
### The conspiracy allegation
|
||||
|
||||
The report describes the conspiracy claim as the most serious allegation. Inslaw alleged that high-level DOJ employees, including Attorney General [[Edwin Meese]], conspired with Brian to steal Inslaw's software and destroy the company, to benefit [[Hadron]], Inc., in which Brian had a direct and indirect financial interest. The theory originated in an affidavit by William Hamilton, under which DOJ would force Inslaw into liquidation so that Hadron could buy its assets and receive a "massive sweetheart contract." The report notes that the theory "has evolved over time," and that Inslaw later presented witnesses who claimed DOJ employees delivered copies of the software to Brian and Hadron before the bankruptcy as a reward for a covert role in the "October surprise" conspiracy.[^20] The report describes Brian as a physician by training and a combat surgeon in [[Vietnam War|Vietnam]], later on the faculty of the [[University of Southern California]] and California's Secretary of Health and Welfare under Governor Reagan in the early 1970s, who founded an investment company called [[Biotech Capital Corporation]], later [[Infotechnology]], Inc.; Brian and Biotech both owned Hadron stock in the early 1980s.[^20] It records that the [[House October Surprise Task Force]] and the Senate Special Counsel on the 1980 hostage allegations had each found no credible evidence that members of the 1980 Reagan campaign negotiated to delay the release of the American hostages in Iran.[^20]
|
||||
|
||||
The report noted that the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations staff had concluded in September 1989 that it could find "no proof of any connection between Brian or Hadron and the Department with regard to the INSLAW contract." It quoted the House committee's 1992 report as calling the Brian allegations "intriguing . . . but without the requisite degree of causation and factual convergence necessary to draw conclusions at this time into potential wrongdoing in the Inslaw matter," and wrote that the House committee had not provided its evidentiary material to Bua's team. Bua's team reviewed the evidence independently and sorted Inslaw's evidence into "direct proof" from witnesses who claimed personal knowledge of Brian's role and "indirect proof" from witnesses who did not claim such knowledge.[^21]
|
||||
|
||||
The report's Hadron section states that there is "no credible evidence that Hadron ever tried to acquire Inslaw or PROMIS," apart from Hamilton's claim about a conversation with [[Dominic Laiti]] and related claims that [[Jonathan Ben Cnaan]] had relayed.[^22]
|
||||
|
||||
### Riconosciuto and the Cabazon venture
|
||||
|
||||
[[Michael Riconosciuto]] was the report's principal source for the PROMIS conspiracy claims. The report states that he "can fairly be described as the key witness against Brian." It identified four occasions on which Riconosciuto had made statements about Inslaw and PROMIS that could be established with accuracy: three under oath and transcribed, and one recorded in notes made by William Hamilton.[^23] His March 21, 1991, affidavit described a 1981 to 1984 role as Director of Research for a joint venture between [[Wackenhut Corporation]] and the [[Cabazon Indian Reservation]] near Indio, California.[^24] The report found that Riconosciuto was in fact in Indio during the early 1980s, that he worked with [[Dr. John Philip Nichols|John Philip Nichols]] and the Cabazons, and that the Cabazons entered into a joint venture with Wackenhut. "That is where the truth in Riconosciuto's story stops."[^25]
|
||||
|
||||
The report describes Nichols as a non-Indian tribal administrator who managed the tribe's business affairs. It records that Cabazon Security Corporation, formed in early 1981, solicited capabilities statements from security firms. [[Robert Frye|A. Robert Frye]], then president of [[Wackenhut Services]], responded for Wackenhut, and in April 1981 signed the joint venture agreement with [[Arthur Welmas|Art Welmas]], the tribal chairman, signing for the Cabazon side. The agreement stated a primary purpose of qualifying for, bidding on and obtaining government guard service contracts; the venture bid on two and won neither. Nichols wanted the venture to sell night vision goggles and rifle scopes to foreign governments, and Wackenhut's files showed efforts to market them to representatives of the governments of Guatemala and Honduras. The report records that Nichols took the view that the Cabazons, as a sovereign nation, were not subject to the usual export and import controls, that Wackenhut personnel wrote internal memoranda that sales would need State Department approval, and that no sales were made. The report states that the firms Riconosciuto described in a call to the Hamiltons, Wackenhut Research, Inc. and Wackenhut Security, Inc., do not exist.[^26]
|
||||
|
||||
The Cabazons were introduced to combustible cartridge casing work by [[Peter Zokosky]], former president of [[Armtec Defense Products]], who became an advisor to Nichols and the venture. Zokosky first met Riconosciuto in July 1981 at Nichols's office in Indio. Zokosky and others from the joint venture travelled to [[Picatinny Arsenal]] to meet [[Dr. Harry Fair]] and an Army project officer, R. Scott Westley, whom Zokosky knew from his time at Armtec, to discuss establishing a second-source combustible cartridge production facility on the Cabazon reservation. Frye recalled first meeting Riconosciuto on a trip to the Arsenal in May 1981; Zokosky recalled that Frye met Riconosciuto on a second trip in October 1981.[^27] The report states that neither Nichols nor Zokosky was an employee of the joint venture, which had no employees, and that it found no evidence supporting Riconosciuto's claim that he and Brian were employed by Wackenhut or the joint venture.[^28]
|
||||
|
||||
Welmas and his wife told investigators that they never saw or met Earl Brian at the reservation and never heard the name mentioned by Nichols, Riconosciuto or others. [[Sam Cross]], the Indio police chief during those years, said that he had been in the mobile trailer behind the Cabazon casino, that there was never any computer equipment in it, and that he never heard the name Earl Brian. Frye and Zokosky both said they never saw Riconosciuto conducting computer operations.[^29]
|
||||
|
||||
The report reconstructs a September 10, 1981, weapons demonstration at the Lake Cahuilla gun range in Indio, held to test night vision equipment. The House committee had been aware of a Riverside, California, police report that named Brian among 16 people present. The report states that Bua's team located the document, a four-page "Special Operations Report" titled "Nicaraguans and Earl Brian at Lake Cahuilla - 9/10/81," carrying a typing date of "10/10/91," ten years after the event.[^30] It was prepared by Gene Gilbert, an investigator for the Riverside County District Attorney's Office, after he interviewed Riconosciuto in jail in 1991 about an unsolved 1981 murder in Indio; the report states that everything in it except the license plate numbers and registrations, which came from the former Indio police officer Dave Baird, came from Riconosciuto.[^31] Gilbert later produced a second report saying that Baird had identified Brian from a photograph. Baird told investigators that the photograph was a poor-quality photocopy from a magazine and that the most he could say was that the person had the same general physical characteristics as the occupant of [[Wayne Reeder]]'s Rolls-Royce. Baird's handwritten registration notes referred only to Reeder.[^32] Zokosky, Nichols and Welmas, who were present, said Brian was not there, and Westley, whom Riconosciuto had placed there, denied attending.[^33]
|
||||
|
||||
The report also addresses Riconosciuto's prosecution. "We are convinced beyond all doubt that there was absolutely no connection between Riconosciuto's prosecution and his allegations in the Inslaw matter," the report stated. It described a case that began as a Washington State drug investigation, in which the [[Drug Enforcement Administration|DEA]] recorded Riconosciuto delivering methamphetamine on videotape.[^34] The report records that Riconosciuto, with two others, filed a lawsuit challenging the authority of the investigation, alleging among other things that Bua was involved in organized crime murders and that one of the FBI agents assigned to the case had murdered the journalist [[Danny Casolaro]], and that Bua's staff had threatened to kill him; the report states that the district court dismissed the suit, Riconosciuto v. Bua, No. 92 C 6217 (N.D. Ill.), as patently frivolous.[^35]
|
||||
|
||||
In its conclusion on Riconosciuto, the report found him "a totally unreliable witness in connection with the allegations he has made about the alleged theft of PROMIS software." It wrote that his account "reminds us of a historical novel; a tale of total fiction woven against the background of accurate historical facts." The report found "no credible witness who could confirm" his claims of CIA work, a radio detonator used in Chile, handling of October Surprise payments, or persuading organized crime members associated with [[Tony Accardo]] not to commit a murder.[^36]
|
||||
|
||||
### Ben-Menashe and Eitan
|
||||
|
||||
[[Ari Ben-Menashe]] signed two affidavits for Inslaw. The first, dated February 17, 1991, claimed that he attended a 1987 meeting of the Israel Defense Forces External Relations Department at which Brian presented PROMIS, stated that Brian said he owned the rights to PROMIS and had allowed the CIA, the NSA, DOJ and the "Israeli intelligence communities" to use it since 1982, and stated that in 1989 in [[Chile]] [[Carlos Cardoen]] told him that Cardoen had brokered a sale of PROMIS by Brian to a representative of Iraqi Military Intelligence. The second, dated March 21, 1991, described a December 1982 meeting in the Tel Aviv office of [[Rafael Eitan]], who in the affidavit said that he had received PROMIS from Brian and [[Robert McFarlane]] for limited use by an Israeli signals intelligence unit.[^37]
|
||||
|
||||
The report cites the House October Surprise Task Force's examination of Ben-Menashe's allegations. According to the Task Force as quoted in the report, Ben-Menashe worked for the External Relations Department of Israeli Military Intelligence between 1977 and 1987 "as a translator of materials of relative insignificance and low levels of classification," and the Task Force described his testimony as "a total fabrication." The Israeli government examined Eitan at the Task Force's request, and according to the Task Force Eitan stated that he did not know Ben-Menashe, had never met him, and heard of him only after Ben-Menashe began making his allegations in 1991.[^38] Brian, under oath, and McFarlane, in a telephone interview, told Bua's investigators that they "strenuously denied" the entirety of the allegations.[^39]
|
||||
|
||||
The report said the investigation of the claimed international distribution of PROMIS "has not proceeded past the preliminary stages. We do not believe that it needs to." It added: "We were not disposed to conduct an international search of foreign governments and intelligence operatives on the basis of Ben-Menashe's allegations."[^38][^40] The report noted that Ben-Menashe's story places a PROMIS transfer to Israel in or before December 1982, while DOJ held only public domain versions. Inslaw did not deliver an allegedly enhanced version until April 1983.[^40][^41]
|
||||
|
||||
The report concluded that Ben-Menashe's story was "too incredible to rest on so small a foundation," and it wrote: "We have good reason to doubt the word of a man who implies that he allowed the use of his plainly misleading affidavits in order to promote his book's sale." It concluded that Ben-Menashe "offers no support for the allegation that DOJ and Earl Brian conspired to steal and distribute the software in which Inslaw claims proprietary rights."[^41]
|
||||
|
||||
### Hayes and the NSA database
|
||||
|
||||
The report notes that the [[National Security Agency]] informed Bua's team that it used a commercial off-the-shelf package purchased from [[Computer Corporation of America]] and that, in 1974 and 1975, six years before Inslaw was incorporated, it had developed a database in the M204 language called PROMIS, an acronym for "Product Related on-line Management Information System." The NSA said its database had no relationship to Inslaw's PROMIS, which was written in COBOL, and that the shared name was coincidental; its General Counsel's office said many personnel knew of the NSA system and had moved to other agencies and private employers.[^42]
|
||||
|
||||
The report's section on [[Charles Hayes]], a Kentucky salvage dealer whom William Hamilton contacted after Hayes's disputes with DOJ were reported in the press, is largely omitted under Rule 6(e); it states that Hayes made a variety of allegations about distribution of Inslaw's enhanced PROMIS to Hamilton and to House committee investigators.[^43] In the later Court of Federal Claims proceedings Hamilton said of Hayes: "I said they took him seriously enough that they brought him to Chicago to testify before the Grand Jury, and everything he said is deleted from the [Bua] report."[^44]
|
||||
|
||||
### Hadron and the circumstantial claims
|
||||
|
||||
The report examined the claim that [[53rd Street Ventures]] and its principals linked Brian to Inslaw. William Hamilton's affidavit attributed to [[Richard D'Amore]] of [[Hambro International Equity Partners]], whose firm invested approximately $400,000 in Inslaw in 1983 as lead investor and placed him on Inslaw's board, a statement that [[Patricia Cloherty]] had told him she "knew all about" Brian's role in the INSLAW matter. D'Amore told investigators that Cloherty never made such a statement to him and that he never told Hamilton or anyone else that she did. Cloherty, who worked at [[Patricof and Company]] from about 1970 until her appointment by President Carter as Deputy Administrator of the [[Small Business Administration]] in about 1977, then ran Tessler & Cloherty with her husband [[Daniel Tessler]] and returned to Patricof in February 1988, likewise denied saying so. Tessler told investigators that he did not know Brian, Edwin Meese, Laiti or [[Lowell Jensen]], and that to his knowledge his wife had no knowledge of Brian. Cloherty said she did know Brian, whom she met in the 1980s on the board of the National Association of Small Business Investment Companies, and that in 1990 Brian contacted Patricof and Company with a proposal concerning [[United Press International|UPI]], which the firm did not pursue; she said she did not know Laiti, Meese or Jensen.[^45]
|
||||
|
||||
The Hadron section also examines the claimed Videnieks and Hadron connection, the [[Accumenics]] contract award, and a claimed purchase attempt by [[SCT]].[^46]
|
||||
|
||||
### Jensen, Richard and the Criminal Division
|
||||
|
||||
The report examined claims from a confidential source who spoke to [[Ronald LeGrand]], then chief investigator of the Senate Judiciary Committee. As set out in a December 1989 affidavit by Hamilton, the source, described as a senior career official in DOJ, said that the "INSLAW case was a lot dirtier for the Department of Justice than Watergate was," and that Jensen "engineered INSLAW's problems right from the start," relying principally on three senior officials, [[Miles Matthews]], [[James Knapp]] and [[James Johnston]]. The source named [[John Keeney]], [[Mark M. Richard|Mark Richards]] and [[Philip White]] as knowing "all about" Jensen's conduct. LeGrand told Bua's team that he would relay his source's information but not disclose the source's identity.[^47]
|
||||
|
||||
Lowell Jensen, by then a federal district judge in San Francisco, denied that he had engineered any contract dispute with Inslaw or directed any DOJ action to hurt the company. He said he might once have met Brian in Sacramento in the 1970s and denied any involvement with Brian during or after his DOJ service. He denied any financial interest in any company controlled by Brian, including Biotech, Hadron, Accumenics and [[Simeon]], and denied any involvement in awarding contracts for Project Eagle, a program to automate the DOJ litigating divisions whose request for proposals issued in May 1986, the month before his appointment to the bench.[^48] Matthews said he never stated or thought that Jensen wanted to get Inslaw "out of the way" and give the business to friends; Knapp and Johnston denied knowledge of or participation in any such scheme; and Keeney, Richard and White each told investigators he had no knowledge of wrongdoing by Jensen.[^49]
|
||||
|
||||
### Bason's reappointment and Lamberth
|
||||
|
||||
George Bason, a bankruptcy judge, ruled from the bench on September 28, 1987, that DOJ had taken PROMIS by trickery, fraud and deceit. A merit selection panel of the district court, chaired by [[Norma H. Johnson]], considered his reappointment. The panel's members were invited in the first week of August 1987, just as the testimony in the Inslaw case before Bason was concluding. The report states that there was no suggestion that the timing was other than coincidence.[^50]
|
||||
|
||||
The report states that Johnson initially recalled that one of the district judges had recommended she obtain a copy of Bason's ruling. Johnson later identified the judge as [[Royce Lamberth]], whom the report spells "Lambreth." On September 28, 1987, Lamberth was Chief of the Civil Division of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, and the report states that he was confirmed for the federal bench on November 13, 1987, and sworn in on November 16, 1987.[^51][^52] After Johnson contacted Lamberth at the investigators' request she recalled that he handed her a copy of the transcript and said something to the effect of "You ought to see this"; Lamberth could not recall whether he delivered the transcript or referred her to it.[^53] According to the report, Lamberth brought the ruling to Johnson's attention because he wanted to avoid "blindsiding" the other judges and expected to join the court and make known his opposition to Bason's reappointment; he erroneously believed that district judges would make the selection. He had also asked the Assistant U.S. Attorney Patricia Froman for her views of Bason, and she told him the government would be better off if Bason were not reappointed.[^54]
|
||||
|
||||
Johnson circulated the ruling to the panel, and according to three panel members the panel found nothing untoward about it. The panel held a hearing on November 11, 1987, at which sixteen lawyers appeared, among them Inslaw's attorney Charles Work; DOJ declined to appear.[^55][^56] The report concluded: "we find nothing untoward in the fact that Royce Lambreth brought that ruling to the attention of Judge Johnson." It also wrote that Lamberth "had every reason to try to influence the selection process to select a bankruptcy judge in whom he had confidence," that such an approach by a government attorney was proper, and that his conduct "bespeaks restraint, not a campaign to unseat Bason in retaliation for the Inslaw ruling."[^57] The report states that Johnson told the Senate subcommittee that she had no contacts with DOJ regarding Bason and received no negative input from DOJ on the Inslaw case, and that so far as the investigators could tell she told the House committee the same.[^58]
|
||||
|
||||
The former bankruptcy judge [[Roger Whelan]] had commented negatively about Bason to the panel. The report said it did not mean to suggest that Whelan "singlehandedly derailed" Bason's reappointment, and recorded that Inslaw's attorney [[Charles Docter|Charles Deeter]] reported to the House committee that in July 1987 Whelan threatened to oppose Bason's reappointment because Bason had not ruled on a fee petition Whelan had filed in the UPI case.[^59]
|
||||
|
||||
### Other individuals named in the report
|
||||
|
||||
[[Lois Battistoni]] told investigators that a DOJ attorney had told her Hadron was connected to a DOJ official through a California relationship with Meese. She also said that [[Floyd Bankson]] told her in 1989 that DOJ intended to "bury Inslaw." Bankson denied the statements attributed to him. [[Garnett Taylor]] and [[Charles Trombetta]] were the other sources Battistoni named.[^60]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Anthony Moscato]], then Acting Director of the Executive Office for United States Attorneys, told investigators that he "had nothing whatsoever to do with the selection of bankruptcy judges." Hamilton had written that Taylor, a former DOJ security officer, knew that Moscato played an affirmative role in the denial of Bason's reappointment; Hamilton did not identify the "senior U.S. Government official" who was the source and said the source declined to permit disclosure of his name, and the Hamiltons, through their attorney, declined to meet Bua's team, preferring to deal directly with the new Attorney General. Moscato said he did not know Johnson, did not know a merit selection panel existed, and was not even a social friend of Taylor.[^61]
|
||||
|
||||
### Blackshear and Pasciuto
|
||||
|
||||
[[Thomas Stanton]], director of the Executive Office for U.S. Trustees, was alleged to have pressured the U.S. Trustee [[William White]] to convert the Inslaw case from chapter 11 to chapter 7 and to have considered detailing the Assistant U.S. Trustee [[Harry Jones]] to Washington for that purpose. The allegation arose from a private conversation between the Hamiltons and [[Anthony Pasciuto]], then Deputy Director of the Executive Office for U.S. Trustees, on March 17, 1987.[^62][^63] The report examines the allegation, the Videnieks notes of a February 1985 conversation with Rugh, and the proposal to detail Jones.[^64][^65][^66]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Cornelius Blackshear]], then a U.S. Trustee and later a bankruptcy judge in the Southern District of New York, was deposed by Inslaw's attorneys on March 25, 1987, and swore that White had called him and said that Stanton wanted the Inslaw case converted and wanted a particular attorney from Blackshear's office assigned to handle it. The House committee reported that the New York judge [[Jane Solomon]] told its investigators that on March 18, 1987, Blackshear gave her an identical account, and that Pasciuto swore to committee investigators that Blackshear described Stanton's attempt to pressure him at a January 1987 luncheon attended by the Second Circuit judge [[Lawrence Pierce]]; the report states that Blackshear and Pierce do not remember anything being said about Inslaw at that meeting.[^62][^63][^67][^68]
|
||||
|
||||
Blackshear then submitted an affidavit recanting that testimony and asserting that he had mistaken the Inslaw case for the UPI case. The report records the sequence: White, deposed shortly before Blackshear, had testified that Stanton exerted no pressure; when White learned that Blackshear had testified differently, White telephoned him and told him he was mistaken; Blackshear says that after the conversation he realized he had confused Inslaw with the UPI case; and he prepared and signed the recanting affidavit with the assistance of his attorney, an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Civil Division of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York. He repeated the new account in a second deposition and to the Office of Professional Responsibility.[^69] The House committee dated the affidavit March 26, 1987.[^63] Inslaw alleged that DOJ procured a perjurious recantation to cover up its plot to liquidate Inslaw.[^70]
|
||||
|
||||
The report identifies the attorney as [[James Garrity]], then an Assistant U.S. Attorney, later a bankruptcy judge in the Southern District of New York, who accompanied Blackshear to his first deposition. The next day Garrity received a call from the DOJ attorney [[Dean Cooper]], the trial attorney defending the Independent Handling claims. Cooper told Garrity that he believed Blackshear's testimony was wrong and that DOJ was concerned that something should be done to correct the error, and did not suggest what the corrected testimony would be. Garrity then spoke to Blackshear, who also said his testimony was wrong; Garrity and Blackshear prepared the recantation affidavit, and Garrity sent a copy to Cooper.[^71] The report wrote that these facts indicated conduct consistent with the good faith effort expected of attorneys. The House committee wrote that "it is highly questionable how the Department could ethically represent both itself and Judge Blackshear in the INSLAW litigation," because one of its attorneys, Garrity, was at the same time representing a key witness for the plaintiff.[^63]
|
||||
|
||||
Bason, in the bankruptcy court, accepted "as true Judge Blackshear's original testimony" and held "that his recantation is the result of an honest mistake on his part." In January 1991 Bason filed a complaint with the Judicial Council of the Second Circuit stating that he had "regretfully concluded" that Blackshear recanted "not because of an honest mistake but because he made a conscious choice to testify falsely."[^72][^73] DOJ's Office of Professional Responsibility, in a report of March 31, 1989, concluded that Bason's findings were "clearly erroneous" and credited Blackshear's recantation for a variety of reasons.[^74]
|
||||
|
||||
Blackshear gave the House committee investigators a sworn statement on January 25, 1991, that the information in his earlier depositions was not based on personal knowledge but on hearsay, much of it from Pasciuto, and that he had never discussed the conversion issue with White. The House committee headed this part of its report "Judge Blackshear's statement to committee lacks credibility." Blackshear told the committee investigators: "My mind changed after having talked to Bill White," and said of the choice between his account and White's: "it would become a credibility question." The report records that on January 16, 1991, he gave Bua's team a document titled "Response of the Hon. Cornelius Blackshear Re Inslaw" stating that he believed it reflected his best recollection, and that he continued to maintain that White told him the IRS had pressured White to move to convert the UPI case. He disagreed with White about a conversation concerning the assignment of Harry Jones to Washington. He also denied Pasciuto's account of a conversation in which Blackshear allegedly admitted that he had given false testimony in his recantation to avoid hurting people.[^63][^75]
|
||||
|
||||
The report assessed the matter in its own terms. It wrote that Blackshear's pre-deposition statements and first deposition "do provide some support for Inslaw's allegations" but were not based on direct personal knowledge, that "[t]his series of contradictory statements can only be described as troubling," and wrote: "At best, it reveals a rather malleable witness who has difficulty recalling certain conversations and events. At worst, it shows a lack of truthfulness on at least one occasion." It attributed the confusion to poor memory rather than intentional misstatement, wrote that if Blackshear was lying there was insufficient evidence to determine on which occasion, and that "there simply is not sufficient evidence to prove (by any standard) that Blackshear lied when he recanted his deposition testimony."[^76] It added that the recantations of Pasciuto and Blackshear "do not convince us that there is any reason to credit their original testimony," and that "their recantations convince us that we cannot rely upon any of their testimony to resolve this issue."[^77] The House committee had criticized DOJ for seeking Pasciuto's dismissal while not prosecuting Blackshear for perjury; the report replied that Blackshear "has always maintained that at the time he made the statements in his first deposition, he believed them to be true."[^78]
|
||||
|
||||
Pasciuto had admitted under oath in the Independent Handling proceeding that he may have exaggerated or falsified what he told the Hamiltons in order to hurt Stanton. The Office of Professional Responsibility recommended in December 1987 that his employment be terminated, and after that recommendation Pasciuto stated that his statements to the Hamiltons were true. Inslaw alleged that he was fired for whistleblowing; the report found DOJ's conduct in seeking his termination "entirely appropriate."[^74][^79][^80]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Gregory McKain]]'s testimony concerns a conversation on or about February 21, 1985, shortly after Inslaw had filed for protection under the Bankruptcy Code. The report discusses his testimony among the pieces of circumstantial evidence for the conversion theory and wrote that it "provides some support to the conversion theory, but not enough to satisfy us that the theory is true."[^81] Rugh and Videnieks rejected Inslaw's proposed methodology for the proprietary-cost submissions in 1983 without offering an alternative, and the report found no evidence of bad faith in that decision.[^19]
|
||||
|
||||
### Casolaro's death
|
||||
|
||||
Danny Casolaro, a self-styled free-lance author and investigative reporter, investigated Inslaw's claims. The report describes his interest in what he called "the Octopus," a supposed secret intelligence organization with links to international arms dealing, covert operations and perhaps organized crime. His body was found in the bathroom of his hotel room at the Sheraton Inn in [[Martinsburg, West Virginia]] on August 10, 1991; he died in the bathtub, both wrists slashed several times with a razor blade, and local authorities ruled his death a suicide.[^82]
|
||||
|
||||
The report found "nothing unusual" in DOJ's decision not to investigate a private citizen's death, which it described as a state or local matter. It found no evidence of federal government influence on the local investigation. "[T]he physical evidence in Casolaro's hotel room strongly supports the conclusion of the local authorities that the death was a suicide." That evidence included no sign of forced entry or struggle, a note found in the room, and the absence of footprints or other evidence that others were present when the wrists were slashed.[^83] The tests and analyses cited were handwriting analysis confirming that Casolaro wrote the note; fingerprint analysis finding his prints and no others except a single print on an ash tray; hair and fiber analysis; a blood analysis by Dr. Lee of the Connecticut State Police Forensic Science Laboratory consistent with suicide; and an autopsy that found hemorrhage from the wrist wounds as the cause of death and no evidence that he was unconscious or debilitated when cut.[^84]
|
||||
|
||||
The report stated, as the fifth of its points, that "there was ample reason to believe Casolaro had a motive to commit suicide." It noted that he had been unemployed for months, was dependent on financial assistance from his family, faced a balloon mortgage on his home, and had been told shortly before his death by a prospective publisher that it would not advance him any money on his proposed book about the "Octopus."[^85] The report also noted that [[James E. Starr]], a professor of law and forensic sciences at George Washington University, reportedly reached the same opinion in an independent review of the autopsy. It addressed criticisms that the room was not sealed, that notification of next of kin was delayed while the body was embalmed, and that Martinsburg authorities gave insufficient weight to suspicions about Casolaro's "sources," and stated that "no credible evidence suggested that any of Casolaro's 'sources' played any role in his death."[^86]
|
||||
|
||||
### House Judiciary Committee report, 1992
|
||||
|
||||
The House Committee on the Judiciary issued "The INSLAW Affair" as House Report 102-857 on September 10, 1992, under Chairman [[Jack Brooks]].[^87] The committee's report described the Department's handling of the matter in terms that stand against the Bua report's conclusions. It wrote that Attorneys General Meese and [[Dick Thornburgh]] "blocked or restricted congressional inquiries into the matter, ignored the findings of two courts and refused to ask for the appointment of an independent counsel."[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
The committee wrote that it had "no reason to doubt the commitment of Judge Bua or Attorney General Barr to do a thorough investigation of this matter," but that "as long as the investigation of wrongdoing by former and current high level Justice officials remains under the control of the Department, there will always be serious doubt about the objectivity and thoroughness of the work." The committee's position was that "the only way the INSLAW allegations can be adequately and fully investigated is by the appointment of an independent counsel," and that the independent counsel should investigate all matters related to the allegations, "including Mr. Casolaro's death and its possible link to individuals associated with organized crime."[^8] On Casolaro, the committee wrote that it had not included the death in its formal investigation, that local authorities had ruled it a suicide a second time on January 25, 1992, after more than 1,000 man-hours, and that the controversy continued to be discussed in the press and the Martinsburg Police Department's investigation had been criticized.[^88]
|
||||
|
||||
### DOJ review, September 1994
|
||||
|
||||
Reno ordered a senior-level Justice Department review of Bua's report and of INSLAW's analysis of it, including INSLAW's July 12, 1993, "Analysis and Rebuttal of the Bua Report" and its February 14, 1994, Addendum. The review was issued on September 27, 1994, with the Bua report attached as Addendum A.[^89] Its summary recommended that the Attorney General "adopt the Special Counsel's report in its entirety," along with specified conclusions that the review described as "fully supported by the available evidence."[^90]
|
||||
|
||||
The review restated that there was no credible evidence of a conspiracy with anyone to steal PROMIS or to injure Inslaw. It found no credible evidence that the [[Office of Special Investigations]] was engaged in covert intelligence activities, in illegal trafficking of PROMIS software, or in the death of Casolaro. It stated that the Martinsburg conclusion that Casolaro's death was a suicide "is fully supported by the facts surrounding his death," and that there was "no credible evidence that Mr. Casolaro was murdered."[^90] The review devoted pp. 107 to 168 to Casolaro's death, covering the death scene, hotel employees, coroner, embalming, notification of next of kin, autopsy, further police investigation and the review's own interviews.[^91]
|
||||
|
||||
The review found "no basis for the appointment of an independent prosecutor" and recommended against waiving statutory time bars on INSLAW's monetary claims. It recommended that the Attorney General "take those steps necessary to bring this entire affair to closure from the Department's perspective," and wrote that the Special Counsel concluded, and the review concurred, that virtually all of the allegations "were based on nothing more than uncorroborated conjecture, on hearsay information from anonymous sources or on information received from patently unreliable sources."[^92]
|
||||
|
||||
On the Johnson contact, the review wrote that Johnson had at first failed to recall the contact with Lamberth. It stated that Lamberth had already been nominated to the federal bench when he was sworn in on November 16, 1987, and it concurred "with the opinion of the Special Counsel that there is no evidence of any effort by the Justice Department to improperly influence the bankruptcy judge selection process."[^93]
|
||||
|
||||
On May 3, 1995, by S. Res. 114, the Senate referred S. 740, a bill for the relief of INSLAW, to the Chief Judge of the Court of Federal Claims as Congressional Reference No. 95-338X, and Hearing Officer [[Christine Odell Cook Miller|Christine Cook Miller]] described the two Justice Department inquiries as the "Bua and Dwyer investigations": Bua's investigation on behalf of Barr, and a second investigation, in response to INSLAW's criticisms of Bua's report, that Reno asked the Assistant Associate Attorney General to undertake.[^44] Miller's report of July 31, 1997, was reviewed by a panel of the court, whose report is dated May 11, 1998.[^94]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993.
|
||||
[^1]: Federal Judicial Center. "Bua, Nicholas John." *Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges.* https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/bua-nicholas-john
|
||||
[^2]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 13. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^3]: "Nicholas J. Bua, 77." *Chicago Tribune*, November 2, 2002. https://www.chicagotribune.com/2002/11/02/nicholas-j-bua-77/
|
||||
[^4]: "Bua, Hon. Nicholas J." Paid death notice, *Chicago Tribune*, November 2, 2002. https://www.chicagotribune.com/2002/11/02/bua-hon-nicholas-j-2/
|
||||
[^5]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 1. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^6]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 2. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^7]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 3. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^8]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. *The INSLAW Affair.* H. Rept. 102-857, 102d Cong., 2d sess., September 10, 1992, pp. 109-110, Part IX, Conclusion.
|
||||
[^9]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. *The INSLAW Affair.* H. Rept. 102-857, 102d Cong., 2d sess., September 10, 1992, pp. 59-61, Part IV.B.6.
|
||||
[^10]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, title page. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^11]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of the United States Department of Justice on the Review of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua's Report on the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc.* September 27, 1994, pp. 2 and 4. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^12]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 13-14. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^13]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 264-265. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^14]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 266-267. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^15]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 15-21, IV. The Development of Inslaw's Claimed Proprietary Software. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^16]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 20. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^17]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 25, D. The Advance Payments Dispute. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^18]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 33-34. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^19]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 138-139. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^20]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 39. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^21]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 40-41. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^22]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 122. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^23]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 42. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^24]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 44, (ii) Riconosciuto's March 21, 1991 Affidavit. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^25]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 54. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^26]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 55-56, (i) The Wackenhut-Cabazon Joint Venture. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^27]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 57-58. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^28]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 58. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^29]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 59. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^30]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 61. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^31]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 62. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^32]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 63-65. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^33]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 65. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^34]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 67. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^35]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 69. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^36]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 72. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^37]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 73-74. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^38]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 79. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^39]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 79-80. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^40]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 151. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^41]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 81. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^42]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 80-81. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^43]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 81-82. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^44]: U.S. Court of Federal Claims. *INSLAW, Inc. v. United States*, Cong. Ref. No. 95-338X, Report of the Hearing Officer (Miller, J.), July 31, 1997, 39 Fed. Cl. 307. https://static.case.law/fed-cl/39/cases/0307-01.json
|
||||
[^45]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 92-96. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^46]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 97-106. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^47]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 113-114. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^48]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 118-119. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^49]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 119-120. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^50]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 156. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^51]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 157. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^52]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 161. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^53]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 160. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^54]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 161-162. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^55]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 162-163. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^56]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 167-168. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^57]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 163-165. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^58]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 166. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^59]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 166-169. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^60]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 106-112, 9. The Lois Battistoni Allegations. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^61]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 186-187. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^62]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 192. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^63]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. *The INSLAW Affair.* H. Rept. 102-857, 102d Cong., 2d sess., September 10, 1992, pp. 73-77, Part V.
|
||||
[^64]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 204. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^65]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 211. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^66]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 224-228. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^67]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 215. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^68]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 209. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^69]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 215-217. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^70]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 194. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^71]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 229-230. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^72]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 195-196. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^73]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. *The INSLAW Affair.* H. Rept. 102-857, 102d Cong., 2d sess., September 10, 1992, p. 78, Part V.D.
|
||||
[^74]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 197. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^75]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 217-219. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^76]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 221-223. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^77]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 229. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^78]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 210. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^79]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 209-210. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^80]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 230-231. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^81]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 211-214. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^82]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 246. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^83]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 247. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^84]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 247-248. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^85]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 248. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^86]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 249-250. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^87]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. *The INSLAW Affair.* H. Rept. 102-857, 102d Cong., 2d sess., September 10, 1992, title page.
|
||||
[^88]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. *The INSLAW Affair.* H. Rept. 102-857, 102d Cong., 2d sess., September 10, 1992, pp. 69-72, Part IV.C.1.
|
||||
[^89]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of the United States Department of Justice on the Review of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua's Report on the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc.* September 27, 1994, pp. 1-4. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^90]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of the United States Department of Justice on the Review of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua's Report on the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc.* September 27, 1994, pp. 7-9, III. Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^91]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of the United States Department of Justice on the Review of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua's Report on the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc.* September 27, 1994, pp. 107-168, V. The Weight of the Evidence Indicates That J. Daniel Casolaro Committed Suicide. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^92]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of the United States Department of Justice on the Review of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua's Report on the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc.* September 27, 1994, pp. 9-10, III. Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^93]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of the United States Department of Justice on the Review of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua's Report on the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc.* September 27, 1994, pp. 101-102. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^94]: U.S. Court of Federal Claims. *INSLAW, Inc. v. United States*, No. 95-338X, Report of the Review Panel, May 11, 1998, 40 Fed. Cl. 843. https://static.case.law/fed-cl/40/cases/0843-01.json
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ tags:
|
|||
- Arms
|
||||
summary: "Richard Babayan is an Iranian national, arms broker and INSLAW affiant whose 1992 testimony on 1980 meetings between William Casey and Iranian officials the House October Surprise Task Force rejected."
|
||||
created: 2026-05-14
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-07
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
location: "Florida"
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
|
|
@ -84,6 +84,6 @@ Ben-Menashe alleged that in 1987 the flow of funds from PROMIS sales extended to
|
|||
[^9]: Walter Pincus, Washington Post, November 24, 1992, report on the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee special counsel's preliminary conclusions (reprinted by American Cybercasting). https://stuff.mit.edu/afs/net/user/tytso/usenet/americast/wpost/1645
|
||||
[^10]: Joint Report, note 415, citing letter from Terry O'Connor, inspector in charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Hon. Lee Hamilton, October 27, 1992, and App. at 574 to 580. https://archive.org/details/6199732-Joint-Report-of-the-October-Surprise-Task-Force
|
||||
[^11]: INSLAW, Inc., Third Supplemental Submission of INSLAW in Support of Its Motion to Take Limited Discovery, United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia, Case No. 85-00070 (Chapter 11), Adversary Proceeding No. 86-0069, undated, footnote on page 7 (affidavit and Palm Beach passage). Refers to February 1991 events. https://archive.org/details/InslawAffairInBriefSupportingDocs. Pages 6 and 7 and footnote 1 on page 7.
|
||||
[^12]: Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc., March 1993, conclusions on Hadron and international distribution, Ben-Menashe affidavits, and the Michael Riconosciuto section (begins p. 42). https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^12]: Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc., March 1993, pp. 73-74 (Ben-Menashe affidavits of February 17, 1991 and March 21, 1991), 79 ("We were not disposed to conduct an international search of foreign governments and intelligence operatives on the basis of Ben-Menashe's allegations"), 122 (Hadron: "no credible evidence that Hadron ever tried to acquire Inslaw or PROMIS") and 151 (international distribution: "has not proceeded past the preliminary stages"). https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^13]: "New Report Finds No Credible Basis for INSLAW Case," Department of Justice release, September 27, 1994. https://irp.fas.org/news/1994/940927-555.htm
|
||||
[^14]: Ari Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network* (Sheridan Square Press, 1992; TrineDay reprint, 2015).
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
---
|
||||
created: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
title: Sidney Gottlieb
|
||||
aliases:
|
||||
- Sidney Gottlieb
|
||||
|
|
@ -18,10 +18,17 @@ tags:
|
|||
- 1960s
|
||||
- 1970s
|
||||
category: "Intelligence & Government"
|
||||
summary: "Sidney Gottlieb was the CIA's Technical Services Division chief who created and directed Project MKULTRA, ran Operation Midnight Climax and the Ewen Cameron subprojects, carried biological assassination materials to the Congo targeting Patrice Lumumba, and ordered destruction of nearly all MKULTRA records before congressional investigation."
|
||||
summary: "CIA Technical Services Division chief who directed Project MKULTRA and Operation Midnight Climax, carried biological materials to the Congo for use against Patrice Lumumba, and ordered destruction of nearly all MKULTRA records before congressional investigation."
|
||||
born: 1918-08-03
|
||||
died: 1999-03-07
|
||||
location: "Bronx, New York / Washington, D.C."
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Office of Technical Service]]"
|
||||
start: 1966-03
|
||||
end: 1973-05
|
||||
role: "chief of the Technical Services Division; retired 1973"
|
||||
fn: 2
|
||||
---
|
||||
Sidney Gottlieb (August 3, 1918 - March 7, 1999) was a [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] chemist and the chief of the agency's [[Technical Services Division]] (TSD) who created, directed, and ultimately destroyed the records of [[Project MKUltra]] - the CIA's two-decade program of human behavioral experimentation using [[LSD]], hypnosis, sensory deprivation, electroconvulsive therapy, and other methods on subjects who had not consented. Gottlieb authorized experiments that killed at least one CIA officer, institutionalized thousands of psychiatric patients in [[Canada]] and the [[United States]], and used brothels as operational platforms for dosing unwitting men. He personally carried biological assassination materials to [[Congo]] in 1960 intending to poison [[Patrice Lumumba]], and in January 1973 ordered the destruction of nearly all MKULTRA documentation before congressional investigators could examine it.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -29,13 +36,13 @@ Sidney Gottlieb (August 3, 1918 - March 7, 1999) was a [[Central Intelligence Ag
|
|||
|
||||
Gottlieb was born in the Bronx to Jewish immigrant parents. He was born with a club foot that produced a distinctive limp, and he had a pronounced stutter throughout his life - conditions that disqualified him from military service during [[World War II]] and shaped his compensatory academic drive. He earned a doctorate in chemistry from the [[California Institute of Technology]] in 1943 and worked in agricultural chemistry before being recruited by the CIA around 1951.
|
||||
|
||||
He joined the CIA's Technical Services Staff (later Technical Services Division), the agency's scientific and technical operations unit responsible for developing disguises, forgeries, surveillance equipment, and chemical and biological materials for operational use. He rose to become chief of the Chemical Division and, subsequently, director of the TSD itself. His cover name was "Joseph Scheider."
|
||||
He joined the CIA's Technical Services Staff (later Technical Services Division), the agency's scientific and technical operations unit responsible for developing disguises, forgeries, surveillance equipment, and chemical and biological materials for operational use. He rose to become chief of the Chemical Division and, subsequently, director of the TSD itself. The CIA's history of the office gives Gottlieb's tenure as chief of the Technical Services Division as March 1966 to May 1973, succeeding Seymour Russell (August 1962 to March 1966).[^2] Before that he headed the Chemical Division of the Technical Services Staff; a letter of February 12, 1954 from [[Allen Dulles]] addressed him as "Chief of the Chemical Division of the Technical Services Staff" and criticized him for recommending the "unwitting application of the drug" because the proposal "did not give sufficient emphasis for medical collaboration and for the proper consideration of the rights of the individual to whom it was being administered."[^3] Dulles sent a separate letter the same day to the Chief of Technical Operations of the Technical Services Staff, who had approved the experiment, criticizing his "poor judgment."[^3] His cover name was "Joseph Scheider."
|
||||
|
||||
Alongside his professional life - which included managing some of the most extreme covert programs in American government history - Gottlieb was known for practicing folk dancing, playing the recorder, keeping a goat farm in rural [[Virginia]], and working as a hospice volunteer late in life. His biographer Stephen Kinzer characterized the contrast as reflecting a genuine internal split rather than deliberate irony.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### MKULTRA Authorization and Scope
|
||||
|
||||
On April 3, 1953, Richard Helms, a senior Clandestine Services officer and Gottlieb's longtime patron, formally proposed a program for the "covert use of biological and chemical materials" to be run under Gottlieb; on April 13, 1953, CIA Director [[Allen Dulles]] approved it as Project MKULTRA with an initial $300,000 budget exempt from normal financial controls, payable blindly on the signatures of Gottlieb and TSS chief [[Willis Gibbons]]. The program's stated rationale was defensive: Soviet and Chinese interrogation techniques, apparently effective in producing false confessions from American prisoners during the [[Korean War]], suggested an enemy capability in "brain warfare" that the United States needed to match and counter. Gottlieb used this framing to obtain authorization for an extraordinarily broad research mandate covering drugs, hypnosis, sensory deprivation, electroshock, surgery, and psychological manipulation.
|
||||
On April 3, 1953, Richard Helms, a senior Clandestine Services officer and Gottlieb's longtime patron, formally proposed a program for the "covert use of biological and chemical materials" to be run under Gottlieb; on April 13, 1953, CIA Director Allen Dulles approved it as Project MKULTRA with an initial $300,000 budget exempt from normal financial controls, payable blindly on the signatures of Gottlieb and TSS chief [[Willis Gibbons]]. The program's stated rationale was defensive: Soviet and Chinese interrogation techniques, apparently effective in producing false confessions from American prisoners during the [[Korean War]], suggested an enemy capability in "brain warfare" that the United States needed to match and counter. Gottlieb used this framing to obtain authorization for an extraordinarily broad research mandate covering drugs, hypnosis, sensory deprivation, electroshock, surgery, and psychological manipulation.
|
||||
|
||||
MKULTRA was divided into approximately 150 research subprojects funded through cut-out academic and private institutions, primarily the [[Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology]] (a CIA front foundation) and the [[Josiah Macy Jr. Foundation]]. The use of cutouts was deliberate: it distributed the research across enough institutions that no single investigator could piece together the program's full scope, and it provided a layer of deniability between CIA funding and individual experiments.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -49,7 +56,7 @@ White recruited prostitutes to bring men to the safe houses under the pretext of
|
|||
|
||||
White operated the safe houses with CIA-provided funds and reported directly to Gottlieb. He described the program in his own diaries (later discovered by Marks) with considerable enthusiasm. The San Francisco operation ran for approximately eight years; the New York operation ran concurrently. Together they represent the most sustained use of unwitting American civilian subjects in the program's history.
|
||||
|
||||
The program was illegal under constitutional protections against unreasonable search and seizure and under the Nuremberg Code on human experimentation, both of which require informed consent.[^2]
|
||||
The program was illegal under constitutional protections against unreasonable search and seizure and under the Nuremberg Code on human experimentation, both of which require informed consent.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
### Ewen Cameron and the Canadian Subprojects
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -76,7 +83,7 @@ CIA Director Allen Dulles was briefed on the circumstances and the program was c
|
|||
|
||||
In 1994, Olson's son Eric had his father's body exhumed. Forensic examination by James Starrs of [[George Washington University]] found a hematoma on Olson's skull inconsistent with the fall - suggesting he had been struck before going through the window. The New York District Attorney reopened the case as a possible homicide; it was never prosecuted due to insufficient surviving evidence. Gottlieb died in March 1999; he had been under investigation for Olson's death.
|
||||
|
||||
Olson's son maintained until his own death that his father was murdered because he had developed doubts about the CIA's biological weapons programs and CIA interrogation methods - doubts that made him a security risk.[^3]
|
||||
Olson's son maintained until his own death that his father was murdered because he had developed doubts about the CIA's biological weapons programs and CIA interrogation methods - doubts that made him a security risk.[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
### Congo: Biological Assassination Materials
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -88,11 +95,11 @@ Lumumba was subsequently captured by Congolese security forces loyal to [[Mobutu
|
|||
|
||||
### Assassination Schemes and MKSEARCH
|
||||
|
||||
Beyond the Congo, Gottlieb's office devised an array of methods to kill foreign leaders in the tradition of [[Stanley Lovell]]'s wartime OSS schemes, targeting [[Fidel Castro]], [[Kwame Nkrumah]] of [[Ghana]], and others. Against Castro his team developed an LSD-laced aerosol for his radio station, a thallium compound to make his beard fall out before a public appearance, botulinum-toxin cigars (one batch of which retained 94 percent of its toxicity when tested seven years later), and a ballpoint pen concealing a hypodermic needle. For U-2 pilot [[Francis Gary Powers]] and other agents at risk of capture, Gottlieb designed a suicide device: a hollowed silver dollar concealing a needle coated with saxitoxin, a paralytic shellfish poison. The lethal agents for these operations came from the [[Special Operations Division]] at Fort Detrick under the CIA-Army project [[MKNAOMI]]. When MKULTRA's paperwork grew unwieldy, Gottlieb carried its work on under the successor program [[MKSEARCH]] (chartered 1964), which he terminated in June 1972 on the conclusion that the materials and techniques were "too unpredictable in their effect on individual human beings ... to be operationally useful." All told he presided over funding for some 80 institutions, including 44 colleges and universities, and 185 private researchers.[^4]
|
||||
Beyond the Congo, Gottlieb's office devised an array of methods to kill foreign leaders in the tradition of [[Stanley Lovell]]'s wartime OSS schemes, targeting [[Fidel Castro]], [[Kwame Nkrumah]] of [[Ghana]], and others. Against Castro his team developed an LSD-laced aerosol for his radio station, a thallium compound to make his beard fall out before a public appearance, botulinum-toxin cigars (one batch of which retained 94 percent of its toxicity when tested seven years later), and a ballpoint pen concealing a hypodermic needle. For U-2 pilot [[Francis Gary Powers]] and other agents at risk of capture, Gottlieb designed a suicide device: a hollowed silver dollar concealing a needle coated with saxitoxin, a paralytic shellfish poison. The lethal agents for these operations came from the [[Special Operations Division]] at Fort Detrick under the CIA-Army project [[MKNAOMI]]. When MKULTRA's paperwork grew unwieldy, Gottlieb carried its work on under the successor program [[MKSEARCH]] (chartered 1964), which he terminated in June 1972 on the conclusion that the materials and techniques were "too unpredictable in their effect on individual human beings ... to be operationally useful." All told he presided over funding for some 80 institutions, including 44 colleges and universities, and 185 private researchers.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### Records Destruction
|
||||
|
||||
In January 1973, with Watergate investigations expanding and congressional scrutiny of CIA activities intensifying, Gottlieb ordered the destruction of essentially all MKULTRA records. He was about to retire, and the destruction was carried out with Director [[Richard Helms]]'s knowledge and implied authorization. Helms was simultaneously ordering the destruction of [[Operation CHAOS]] operational records.
|
||||
In January 1973, with Watergate investigations expanding and congressional scrutiny of CIA activities intensifying, Gottlieb ordered the destruction of essentially all MKULTRA records. He was about to retire, and the destruction was carried out with Director [[Richard Helms]]'s knowledge and implied authorization. Helms was simultaneously ordering the destruction of [[Operation CHAOS]] operational records. The Church Committee report records that in January 1973 MKULTRA records were destroyed by Technical Services Division personnel acting on Gottlieb's verbal orders, that Gottlieb testified he was carrying out the verbal order of Helms, and that Helms confirmed it.[^7] Helms told the committee that Gottlieb "came to me and said that he was retiring and that I was retiring and he thought it would be a good idea if these files were destroyed." Helms also said that the files would be sensitive because of "relationships with outsiders in government agencies and other organizations," and that since the program was over they "would just get rid of the files." The destruction rested on a waiver of CSI 70-10, the regulation governing the retirement of inactive records. At least one assistant to Gottlieb protested the destruction on the grounds that the program could not be reconstructed without the documents.[^7] An OTS memorandum of June 22, 1977, signed by David S. Brandwein, states that "Dr. Gottlieb retrieved and destroyed all the MKULTRA documents he was able to locate."[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
The destruction was comprehensive. File boxes from facilities across the country were collected and shredded or burned. The intention was to eliminate any documentary record of the program before investigators could subpoena it. The destruction succeeded in eliminating the core operational files.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -104,7 +111,7 @@ Gottlieb testified before the Church Committee in 1975 and before the Senate Hea
|
|||
|
||||
He confirmed under oath that he had personally administered LSD to unconsenting subjects, that the Midnight Climax safe houses had operated as described, and that he had ordered the records destruction with his superior's knowledge.
|
||||
|
||||
In his October 1975 Church Committee sessions (under the staff alias "Joseph Scheider") and his 1977 immunized testimony, Gottlieb disclosed two military LSD interrogation operations run alongside MKULTRA, [[Operation DERBY HAT]] and [[Operation THIRD CHANCE]]; acknowledged administering LSD to CIA employees for "defensive pharmacology"; and described his role on the [[Health Alteration Committee]] that authorized plots against foreign leaders, including the botulinum cigar scheme. He also gave a 174-page deposition in *Orlikow v. United States* (May 17, 1983) that evaded most specific questions about Cameron's experiments. The full transcripts of his 1975 testimony, classified Top Secret at the time, were released through FOIA and published by the [[National Security Archive]] in October 2025.[^4]
|
||||
In his October 1975 Church Committee sessions (under the staff alias "Joseph Scheider") and his 1977 immunized testimony, Gottlieb disclosed two military LSD interrogation operations run alongside MKULTRA, [[Operation DERBY HAT]] and [[Operation THIRD CHANCE]]; acknowledged administering LSD to CIA employees for "defensive pharmacology"; and described his role on the [[Health Alteration Committee]] that authorized plots against foreign leaders, including the botulinum cigar scheme. He also gave a 174-page deposition in *Orlikow v. United States* (May 17, 1983) that evaded most specific questions about Cameron's experiments. The full transcripts of his 1975 testimony, classified Top Secret at the time, were released through FOIA and published by the [[National Security Archive]] in October 2025.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### Post-CIA Life and Death
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -117,6 +124,10 @@ Stephen Kinzer's biography *Poisoner in Chief* (2019) provides the most comprehe
|
|||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Kinzer, Stephen. *Poisoner in Chief: Sidney Gottlieb and the CIA Search for Mind Control.* Henry Holt and Company, 2019 (the essential biography). Marks, John. *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate: The CIA and Mind Control.* Times Books, 1979 (uses surviving MKULTRA documents; the foundational investigative account). Church Committee (U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities). Final Report, Book I ("Foreign and Military Intelligence"), S. Rept. 94-755, April 26, 1976.
|
||||
[^2]: "Project MKULTRA, the CIA's Program of Research in Behavioral Modification." Joint Hearing before the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research of the Committee on Human Resources, United States Senate, 95th Congress, 1st Session, August 3, 1977. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. Available: intelligence.senate.gov.
|
||||
[^3]: Starrs, James E. Report of forensic examination, Olson exhumation, 1994. New York County District Attorney investigation files (partial public record). Albarelli, H.P. *A Terrible Mistake: The Murder of Frank Olson and the CIA's Secret Cold War Experiments.* Trine Day, 2009.
|
||||
[^4]: Kinzer, Stephen. *Poisoner in Chief: Sidney Gottlieb and the CIA Search for Mind Control*. Henry Holt, 2019; John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*, Chapter 4; National Security Archive, "Top Secret Testimony of CIA's MKULTRA Chief, 50 Years Later," October 30, 2025; Deposition of Sidney Gottlieb, *Orlikow v. United States*, Civil Action No. 80-3163, May 17, 1983.
|
||||
[^2]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Office of Technical Service: 50 Years Supporting Operations," CIA Reading Room document 0001225679, chronology of directors.
|
||||
[^3]: U.S. Senate, *Final Report*, Book I, S. Rept. 94-755 (1976), p. 398 and nn. 54-55 (memoranda from the DCI to the Chief, Technical Operations, TSS, and to Sidney Gottlieb, both dated 2/12/54).
|
||||
[^4]: "Project MKULTRA, the CIA's Program of Research in Behavioral Modification." Joint Hearing before the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research of the Committee on Human Resources, United States Senate, 95th Congress, 1st Session, August 3, 1977. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. Available: intelligence.senate.gov.
|
||||
[^5]: Starrs, James E. Report of forensic examination, Olson exhumation, 1994. New York County District Attorney investigation files (partial public record). Albarelli, H.P. *A Terrible Mistake: The Murder of Frank Olson and the CIA's Secret Cold War Experiments.* Trine Day, 2009.
|
||||
[^6]: Kinzer, Stephen. *Poisoner in Chief: Sidney Gottlieb and the CIA Search for Mind Control*. Henry Holt, 2019; John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*, Chapter 4; National Security Archive, "Top Secret Testimony of CIA's MKULTRA Chief, 50 Years Later," October 30, 2025; Deposition of Sidney Gottlieb, *Orlikow v. United States*, Civil Action No. 80-3163, May 17, 1983.
|
||||
[^7]: U.S. Senate, *Final Report*, Book I, S. Rept. 94-755 (1976), p. 389 (January 1973 destruction; Gottlieb's testimony and Helms's confirmation) and pp. 403-404 and nn. 75-76 (Helms's account; CSI 70-10; the assistant's protest).
|
||||
[^8]: Joint hearing, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research, August 3, 1977, *Project MKULTRA, the CIA's Program of Research in Behavioral Modification*, Appendix B, pp. 103-104: the OTS memorandum of June 22, 1977 states that "Dr. Gottlieb retrieved and destroyed all the MKULTRA documents he was able to locate." https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/hearings/95mkultra.pdf
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ aliases:
|
|||
- Tom Clines
|
||||
- Thomas G. Clines
|
||||
created: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-09-21
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
category: "Intelligence & Government"
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- Person
|
||||
|
|
@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ tags:
|
|||
- Vietnam
|
||||
- 1970s
|
||||
- 1980s
|
||||
summary: "CIA officer under Ted Shackley at JMWAVE, in Laos, and in the Western Hemisphere Division, later of the Safari Club and Iran-Contra Enterprise network, convicted in 1993 of underreporting Iran-Contra income."
|
||||
summary: "CIA officer under Ted Shackley at JMWAVE, in Laos, and in the Western Hemisphere Division, later of the Safari Club and Iran-Contra Enterprise network, convicted in 1990 of underreporting Iran-Contra income."
|
||||
location: "United States"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -30,15 +30,17 @@ After Laos, Clines continued in CIA operations roles in Southeast Asia and [[Lat
|
|||
|
||||
After leaving CIA, Clines became involved in the arms and intelligence consulting business that grew around the network of former CIA officers associated with Shackley. One significant connection was to [[Edwin Wilson]], the former CIA officer who was selling arms and providing paramilitary training to Libya's Muammar Qaddafi. Clines, like [[Richard Secord]], had documented contacts with Wilson during the period Wilson was running the Libya operations. Congressional investigations into Wilson's activities examined Clines's role, and while Clines was not charged in the Wilson case, the investigation contributed to the end of his government career.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
The congressional report states that in 1982 Clines became a target of a Justice Department investigation of fraudulent overbilling of the government by the Egyptian American Transport Company (EATSCO), 49 percent of which he owned; EATSCO pleaded guilty to criminal and civil overbilling charges two months after Secord's May 1983 retirement, and Clines, on behalf of the entity holding his interest, paid a 10,000 dollar criminal fine and a 100,000 dollar civil fine; the Justice Department closed the case in July 1984.[^2] In 1984, when Clines needed 33,000 dollars toward the civil fine, Secord lent him the sum through a cashier's check carried by [[Glenn Robinette]].[^2] The Wall Street Journal reported in October 1982 that EATSCO was set up in August 1979 by Clines and the Egyptian businessman [[Hussein Salem|Hussein K. Salem]], that the Treasury had by then paid it 71.4 million dollars, and that in January 1979 Wilson arranged a 500,000 dollar loan for Clines.[^3] Secord testified in 1987 that Clines "had some problems in the EATSCO affair. I believe he was treated unfairly there. The Justice Department did not convict him. They went for a technical charge instead."[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
### Wackenhut, 1976
|
||||
|
||||
A [[Domestic Contact Service]] cable of June 22, 1976, records a request from the Latin America Division for contact with [[Bruce Berckmans]], director of international operations of the [[Wackenhut Corporation]] in [[Miami]], "a former staff agent under the LPGLOBE program" who "was asked to resign from the Agency in 1970." He had asked, "through an LA Division officer, Tom Clines," to see an agency representative about information believed to concern "political developments in [[Jamaica]]," and "the name of Tom Clines may be used to facilitate contact." A week later Berckmans told the Miami officer that "after consultations with his attorney he has decided not to sue the Agency."[^2]
|
||||
A [[Domestic Contact Service]] cable of June 22, 1976, records a request from the Latin America Division for contact with [[Bruce Berckmans]], director of international operations of the [[Wackenhut Corporation]] in [[Miami]], "a former staff agent under the LPGLOBE program" who "was asked to resign from the Agency in 1970." He had asked, "through an LA Division officer, Tom Clines," to see an agency representative about information believed to concern "political developments in [[Jamaica]]," and "the name of Tom Clines may be used to facilitate contact." A week later Berckmans told the Miami officer that "after consultations with his attorney he has decided not to sue the Agency."[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
### Iran-Contra Enterprise
|
||||
|
||||
Clines became an operational participant in the Enterprise, the private covert network directed by Secord and [[Albert Hakim]] that executed the Iran arms sales and Contra funding operations. His primary role was in the logistics and transportation aspects of the Enterprise's weapons movements - specifically managing air freight and cargo operations for weapons shipments.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
In 1993, Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh's prosecution resulted in Clines's conviction on four counts of tax-related offenses: specifically, underreporting income from transactions connected to the Enterprise. The prosecution established that Clines had received income from Enterprise operations that he failed to report on his tax returns. He was sentenced to sixteen months in prison and fined.[^3]
|
||||
Clines was indicted in February 1990 after the guilty pleas and cooperation of Richard Secord and Albert Hakim, and on September 18, 1990 a jury in U.S. District Court in Baltimore, before Judge Norman P. Ramsey, convicted him of four income-tax-related felonies; on December 13, 1990 Ramsey sentenced him to 16 months in prison and a 40,000 dollar fine. The Fourth Circuit affirmed and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.[^6] Secord and Willard Zucker were the central prosecution witnesses; Secord testified under a cooperation agreement.[^6] The prosecution established that Clines had received income from Enterprise operations that he failed to report on his tax returns.[^7]
|
||||
|
||||
### Shackley Network
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -47,5 +49,9 @@ Clines's career illustrates the structural feature of the Shackley network: offi
|
|||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Corn, David, and Jeff Goldberg. "The Old Boy Network." *Mother Jones*, October 1994. Trento, Joseph. *Prelude to Terror: The Rogue CIA and the Legacy of America's Private Intelligence Network*. Carroll & Graf, 2005.
|
||||
[^2]: Central Intelligence Agency, Domestic Collection Division, case file 65805, "Wackenhut Corp.," JFK Assassination Records Collection, record 104-10291-10017, released 2023. https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2023/104-10291-10017.pdf, pp. 19-22.
|
||||
[^3]: Walsh, Lawrence E. *Iran-Contra: The Final Report*. Random House, 1994. Walsh, Lawrence E. *Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-Up*. W.W. Norton, 1997.
|
||||
[^2]: Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, H. Rept. 100-433 / S. Rept. 100-216 (1987), ch. 21, pp. 326-327 and n. 30, https://archive.org/details/reportofcongress87unit.
|
||||
[^3]: Edward T. Pound and Walter S. Mossberg, "Weapons Windfall," Wall Street Journal, Oct. 1, 1982, pp. 1, 18, CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP09S00048R000100020015-5, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp09s00048r000100020015-5.
|
||||
[^4]: Testimony of Richard V. Secord, Iran-Contra Investigation: Joint Hearings, 100th Cong., 1st sess., Hearings 100-1, p. 303, https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152829_0342.
|
||||
[^5]: Central Intelligence Agency, Domestic Collection Division, case file 65805, "Wackenhut Corp.," JFK Assassination Records Collection, record 104-10291-10017, released 2023. https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2023/104-10291-10017.pdf, pp. 19-22.
|
||||
[^6]: Lawrence E. Walsh, Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters, vol. I, pt. V, ch. 11, "United States v. Thomas G. Clines," pp. 181-184, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_11.htm.
|
||||
[^7]: Walsh, Lawrence E. *Iran-Contra: The Final Report*. Random House, 1994. Walsh, Lawrence E. *Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-Up*. W.W. Norton, 1997.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ title: Albert Hakim
|
|||
aliases:
|
||||
- Albert Hakim
|
||||
created: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
category: "Arms Dealers & Brokers"
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- Person
|
||||
|
|
@ -16,6 +16,17 @@ summary: "Iranian-American businessman who co-directed the Iran-Contra Enterpris
|
|||
born: 1930-01-01
|
||||
died: 2003-01-01
|
||||
location: "San Jose, California"
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: partner_of
|
||||
with: "[[Richard Secord]]"
|
||||
role: "equal partner in Stanford Technology Trading Group International; co-directed the Enterprise"
|
||||
start: 1983
|
||||
fn: 3
|
||||
- type: founded
|
||||
with: "[[Stanford Technology Trading Group International]]"
|
||||
role: "co-founded with Secord in 1983; chairman"
|
||||
start: 1983
|
||||
fn: 7
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Albert Hakim was an Iranian-American businessman who co-directed the private covert operations network known as the Enterprise with retired Air Force Major General [[Richard Secord]] during the [[Iran-Contra Affair]]. Hakim's Iranian business background and contacts within the Iranian defense community under the Shah made him the Enterprise's primary financial architect and a key negotiator with Iranian officials. He pleaded guilty in November 1989 and cooperated with Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh's investigation.[^1]
|
||||
|
|
@ -24,23 +35,39 @@ Albert Hakim was an Iranian-American businessman who co-directed the private cov
|
|||
|
||||
Hakim was born in Iran in the 1930s. He built a substantial business importing and exporting technology and defense-related goods to Iran during the Shah's era, establishing relationships with Iranian military and government procurement officials that would later prove central to the Iran-Contra arms sales. He became a U.S. citizen and settled in California. After the 1979 Iranian Revolution ended his Iran business, Hakim continued in international arms and technology trading, which brought him into contact with Secord.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Secord testified that he met Hakim in 1976 or 1977 in Iran, when Hakim was selling electronic intelligence systems to the Iranian Air Force and the Air Force mission recommended discontinuing a 23 million dollar project as redundant to another program; Hakim came to Secord's office to protest.[^2] The congressional report states that Hakim's Iranian operations included an effort to sell electronic intelligence systems to the Iranian government and payoffs to Iranian Air Force and Army generals through "bearer letters" and numbered Swiss accounts.[^3] The Los Angeles Times reported that in a 1983 deposition in Connecticut Hakim admitted using Swiss bank accounts to funnel millions of dollars in payoffs to Iranian military officers.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
According to CIA files cited in the congressional report, in August 1976 [[Ted Shackley]] tried to arrange for Secord to assist Hakim in obtaining security contracts with the Iranian government in return for Hakim providing intelligence to the CIA, with [[Tom Clines]] to introduce Hakim to Secord; a CIA official rebuffed the proposal in part because Hakim had sold the Iranians "unneeded over sophisticated equipment at exorbitant price[s]." Hakim testified that [[Edwin Wilson]] introduced him to Clines and Shackley and that the meeting never occurred.[^5] In a May 22, 1987 deposition Hakim said that Wilson had infiltrated his organization through his associate [[Frank Terpil]] and that he removed both in 1976 or 1977.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
Secord testified that in 1980 he gave Hakim's name, among several Iranian names, to U.S. intelligence personnel for vetting and possible use in the operation to rescue the American hostages in Iran, and that Hakim was contacted, vetted and volunteered his services.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### Enterprise Financial Structure
|
||||
|
||||
Hakim was the financial architect of the Enterprise. He established Lake Resources S.A., a Swiss financial entity that served as the central account through which Enterprise revenues and disbursements were channeled. The structure was designed to obscure the money's origins and movements from congressional oversight and government auditing. Enterprise funds received markups from weapons sales to Iran, CIA operational funds, and later additional transfers from various sources. Hakim later testified that the Enterprise had generated approximately $48 million in revenues, of which approximately $3.8 million was applied to Contra operations, with the remainder retained by the Enterprise or disbursed to its principals.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Hakim and Secord operated Stanford Technology Trading Group International (STTGI) as the nominal business vehicle for Enterprise arms transactions. STTGI purchased weapons from U.S. and Israeli suppliers at government-approved prices and sold them to Iranian buyers at prices substantially above cost, with the markup profit flowing to Lake Resources.[^2]
|
||||
Hakim and Secord operated Stanford Technology Trading Group International (STTGI) as the nominal business vehicle for Enterprise arms transactions. In the direct sales of United States weapons to Iran that began early in 1986, Walsh wrote, the Enterprise "acted as agent, a front, for the true owner of the arms, the United States"; in 1986 it received 30.3 million dollars from the sale of that property to Iran and for replacement TOW missiles to Israel, and only 12.2 million dollars was returned to the United States. In the contra sales that began in late 1984 Secord and Hakim acted as brokers, buying weapons from other arms dealers.[^7]
|
||||
|
||||
Hakim tried to recruit Secord in 1983 to revive his security-sales company, Expantrade, by offering security systems to foreign governments; Secord joined him in May 1983 as an equal partner in Stanford Technology Trading Group International (STTGI).[^3] Hakim was STTGI's chairman and Secord its president, and the two wholly controlled it; STTGI was distinct from Stanford Technology Corporation, which Hakim founded in 1974. Walsh wrote that "by 1986, the business of STTGI was the Enterprise."[^7] [[Lake Resources S.A.|Lake Resources Inc.]], "the company controlled by Hakim to launder the Enterprise's money flow," pleaded guilty to the corporate felony of theft of government property; Hakim pleaded guilty on November 21, 1989 to a misdemeanor count of supplementing the salary of North.[^8][^9] In 1985 and 1986 Hakim received 2.06 million dollars from the Enterprise and 550,249 dollars in cash, of which 478,508 dollars went for unknown purposes.[^9] After his plea Hakim agreed to accept 1.7 million dollars of about 9 million dollars frozen in the Swiss accounts and to waive the remainder, and later refused to carry out the agreement; Secord filed a claim in the Swiss courts for the money while the agreement was under negotiation.[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
### Iran Negotiations
|
||||
|
||||
Hakim served as a direct negotiator with Iranian officials. In October 1986 - weeks before the Enterprise was exposed by the Hasenfus shootdown - Hakim met in Geneva with an Iranian representative identified as Mehdi Najjar or "the Relative" (a nephew of Iranian Parliament Speaker [[Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani|Rafsanjani]]) to negotiate terms for continued arms sales and the potential release of American hostages held in Lebanon. The Nine-Point Plan that Hakim negotiated with Najjar included detailed commitments about future arms deliveries, arrangements for hostage releases, and political terms that exceeded what [[Oliver North]] and other American officials had authorized. The plan was later criticized by North and others as an unauthorized expansion of U.S. commitments to Iran.[^2]
|
||||
Hakim served as a direct negotiator with Iranian officials. In October 1986 - weeks before the Enterprise was exposed by the Hasenfus shootdown - Hakim met in Geneva with an Iranian representative identified as Mehdi Najjar or "the Relative" (a nephew of Iranian Parliament Speaker [[Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani|Rafsanjani]]) to negotiate terms for continued arms sales and the potential release of American hostages held in Lebanon. The Nine-Point Plan that Hakim negotiated with Najjar included detailed commitments about future arms deliveries, arrangements for hostage releases, and political terms that exceeded what [[Oliver North]] and other American officials had authorized. The plan was later criticized by North and others as an unauthorized expansion of U.S. commitments to Iran.[^10]
|
||||
|
||||
### Criminal Proceedings
|
||||
|
||||
The Enterprise was exposed in October 1986 following the shootdown of a Contra resupply aircraft over Nicaragua. Hakim cooperated with the subsequent congressional and independent counsel investigations. In November 1989, he pleaded guilty to a single misdemeanor count of illegally supplementing the salary of a government employee (specifically, Oliver North, to whom Hakim had provided access to an Enterprise account for personal use). Hakim's cooperation provided detailed documentation of the Enterprise's financial accounts and operations that was central to Walsh's broader reconstruction of Iran-Contra.[^2]
|
||||
The Enterprise was exposed in October 1986 following the shootdown of a Contra resupply aircraft over Nicaragua. Hakim cooperated with the subsequent congressional and independent counsel investigations. In November 1989, he pleaded guilty to a single misdemeanor count of illegally supplementing the salary of a government employee (specifically, Oliver North, to whom Hakim had provided access to an Enterprise account for personal use). Hakim's cooperation provided detailed documentation of the Enterprise's financial accounts and operations that was central to Walsh's broader reconstruction of Iran-Contra.[^10]
|
||||
|
||||
Hakim died in 2003. His cooperation with Walsh, unlike the defiant posture of some other Iran-Contra defendants, was considered a significant contribution to the public record of the affair.[^2]
|
||||
Hakim died in 2003. His cooperation with Walsh, unlike the defiant posture of some other Iran-Contra defendants, was considered a significant contribution to the public record of the affair.[^10]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Walsh, Lawrence E. *Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-Up*. W.W. Norton, 1997, pp. 178-192. Tower Commission Report (President's Special Review Board). *The Tower Commission Report*. Bantam Books/Times Books, 1987.
|
||||
[^2]: U.S. Congress, Joint Committees on Iran-Contra. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*. 100th Congress, 1st Session, 1987. Walsh, Lawrence E. *Iran-Contra: The Final Report*. Random House, 1994.
|
||||
[^2]: Testimony of Richard V. Secord, Iran-Contra Investigation: Joint Hearings, 100th Cong., 1st sess., Hearings 100-1, May 5-8, 1987, p. 47, https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152829_0342.
|
||||
[^3]: Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, H. Rept. 100-433 / S. Rept. 100-216 (1987), ch. 21, pp. 326-327, https://archive.org/details/reportofcongress87unit.
|
||||
[^4]: Los Angeles Times, March 29, 1987, "Secord: A Specialist in Covert Deals," CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP90-00965R000201700001-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000201700001-4.
|
||||
[^5]: H. Rept. 100-433, ch. 21, n. 23 (CIA files C7 147-59; Shackley deposition, Sept. 21, 1987, at 284-300; Hakim deposition, May 31, 1987, at 229-33).
|
||||
[^6]: H. Rept. 100-433, ch. 21, n. 20 (Hakim deposition, May 22, 1987, at 28-29, 32).
|
||||
[^7]: Lawrence E. Walsh, Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters, vol. I, pt. V, ch. 8, pp. 159-172, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_08.htm.
|
||||
[^8]: Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, "Executive Summary," pp. xiii ff., https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/execsum.htm.
|
||||
[^9]: Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, pt. V, ch. 10, "United States v. Albert Hakim," pp. 179-180, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_10.htm.
|
||||
[^10]: U.S. Congress, Joint Committees on Iran-Contra. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*. 100th Congress, 1st Session, 1987. Walsh, Lawrence E. *Iran-Contra: The Final Report*. Random House, 1994.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -10,12 +10,12 @@ tags:
|
|||
- INSLAW
|
||||
- DOJ
|
||||
- EOUSA
|
||||
summary: "Career Justice Department administrator, acting director of the Executive Office for United States Attorneys during the Bua inquiry, whom Bill Hamilton accused of helping deny Judge Bason's reappointment; he told the special counsel he had nothing to do with it."
|
||||
summary: "Career Justice Department administrator, acting head of the Executive Office for United States Attorneys during the Bua inquiry, accused by Bill Hamilton of helping deny Judge Bason's reappointment; he denied any part."
|
||||
born: 1945-09-04
|
||||
died: 2026-06-12
|
||||
location: "Fairfax, Virginia"
|
||||
created: 2026-09-22
|
||||
updated: 2026-09-22
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Anthony Charles Moscato (September 4, 1945, [[New York City]], to June 12, 2026, Fairfax, [[Virginia]]) spent his career in the administrative offices of the [[Department of Justice]]. Raised in Washington Heights, he took a degree in government at [[Columbia University]] in 1967 and a law degree at [[George Washington University]] in 1970, joined the department's Tax Division as a trial attorney in 1976, and moved the next year to the Justice Management Division as special assistant to the assistant attorney general for administration. Over the following two decades he served as deputy assistant attorney general for administration, acting inspector general of the department, director of the [[Executive Office for United States Attorneys]] and director of the [[Executive Office for Immigration Review]]. In 1999 the attorney general named him a member of the Board of Immigration Appeals, from which he retired in 2006.[^1]
|
||||
|
|
@ -24,7 +24,10 @@ Anthony Charles Moscato (September 4, 1945, [[New York City]], to June 12, 2026,
|
|||
|
||||
His name entered the [[PROMIS Software Scandal|INSLAW affair]] through [[Bill Hamilton]], who told the special counsel [[Nicholas J. Bua]] that a former department security officer, [[Garnett Taylor]], knew that "Anthony Moscato, who is now Acting Director of EOUSA, played an affirmative role on behalf of DOJ in denying Judge Bason's reappointment," and asked that Taylor be subpoenaed before a grand jury. [[George Francis Bason, Jr.|George Bason]], the bankruptcy judge who had found in 1987 that the department took [[INSLAW]]'s [[PROMIS]] software by fraud, was not reappointed by the merit selection panel of the district court chaired by Judge [[Norma H. Johnson]]. Bua's report records Moscato's answer: "he had nothing whatsoever to do with the selection of bankruptcy judges. He convincingly stated that he is not familiar with Judge Norma Johnson, did not know that she chaired a selection panel, and did not even know there was a Merit Selection Panel. He stated that he spoke to no one about Bason's qualifications for reappointment. He cannot explain why his and Garnett Taylor's names would be used in the same sentence as Bankruptcy Judge Bason. Taylor and he are not even social friends, much less confidants." At the time of the 1987 non-reappointment he held other administrative posts in the department; the transcript of Bason's ruling had reached the panel from [[Royce Lamberth]], then chief of the civil division of the [[U.S. Attorney's office]].[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
The report records that Hamilton declined to identify the "senior U.S. Government official" who was the source of the Taylor information, and wrote that the source declined to permit disclosure of his name. The Hamiltons, through their attorney, told Bua's team they would not meet with them, preferring to deal directly with the new Attorney General. Moscato told the investigators that he did not know Johnson, did not know a Merit Selection Panel existed, spoke to no one about Bason's qualifications, could not explain why his and Taylor's names would be used in the same sentence as Bason's, and was not even a social friend of Taylor.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: "Anthony (Tony) Charles Moscato," obituary, Fairfax Memorial Funeral Home, June 2026. https://www.fairfaxmemorialfuneralhome.com/obituaries/Anthony-Charles-Moscato?obId=48707990
|
||||
[^2]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.,* March 1993, pp. 185-186 (the report's own pagination). https://archive.org/details/InslawPROMISBuaReport
|
||||
[^2]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.,* March 1993, pp. 186-187. https://archive.org/details/InslawPROMISBuaReport
|
||||
[^3]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 186-187. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -16,16 +16,16 @@ summary: "Judge of the Court of Federal Claims who, as hearing officer on the Se
|
|||
born: 1944
|
||||
location: "Oakland, California"
|
||||
created: 2026-09-22
|
||||
updated: 2026-09-22
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Christine Odell Cook Miller (born 1944, Oakland, [[California]]), who served under the name Christine Cook Nettesheim until September 10, 1994, is a judge of the [[United States Court of Federal Claims]]. She took a degree at [[Stanford University]] in 1966 and a law degree at the University of Utah in 1969, clerked for Judge David T. Lewis of the Tenth Circuit, was a trial attorney in the Civil Division of the [[Department of Justice]] from 1970 to 1972 and at the [[Federal Trade Commission]] from 1972 to 1974, practiced in Washington, and served as special counsel to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and assistant general counsel of the U.S. Railway Association. [[Ronald Reagan]] nominated her to the Claims Court on November 23, 1982; the Senate confirmed her on December 10. [[Bill Clinton]] gave her a recess appointment to the same seat on December 10, 1997, and the Senate confirmed her again on February 3, 1998. She took senior status on February 4, 2013, and retired on March 1.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### The INSLAW Referral
|
||||
|
||||
In May 1995 the Senate referred [[INSLAW]]'s remaining claims against the government to the Court of Federal Claims for an advisory opinion, after the [[House Committee on the Judiciary]]'s 1992 report had endorsed Bankruptcy Judge [[George Francis Bason, Jr.|George Bason]]'s finding that the department took [[PROMIS]] by fraud and the special counsel [[Nicholas J. Bua]] had rejected it in 1993. As hearing officer, Miller ruled on July 31, 1997, that all versions of PROMIS were in the public domain and that the government had always been entitled to use the software as it wished, so that INSLAW was owed no compensation. A three-judge review panel of the court upheld the ruling in August 1998. The Justice Department announced the decision in a press release.[^2]
|
||||
On May 3, 1995, by S. Res. 114 of the 104th Congress, the Senate referred S. 740, a bill for the relief of [[INSLAW]] (Senator Orrin Hatch's floor statement is at 141 Cong. Rec. 5910, May 1, 1995), to the Chief Judge of the Court of Federal Claims for an advisory opinion (Cong. Ref. No. 95-338X), after the [[House Committee on the Judiciary]]'s 1992 report had endorsed Bankruptcy Judge [[George Francis Bason, Jr.|George Bason]]'s finding that the department took [[PROMIS]] by fraud and the special counsel [[Nicholas J. Bua]] had rejected it in 1993. As hearing officer, Miller ruled on July 31, 1997, that all versions of PROMIS were in the public domain and that the government had always been entitled to use the software as it wished, so that INSLAW was owed no compensation. A three-judge review panel of the court upheld the ruling in a per curiam report dated May 11, 1998. The Justice Department announced the decision in a press release.[^2] In the hearing officer's report Miller described the Justice Department's two inquiries as the "Bua and Dwyer investigations": Nicholas Bua's investigation on behalf of Attorney General [[William Barr]], and a second investigation, in response to INSLAW's criticisms of Bua's report, that Attorney General [[Janet Reno]] asked the Assistant Associate Attorney General to undertake. A footnote in the report quotes [[Bill Hamilton]] on [[Charles Hayes]]: "I said they took him seriously enough that they brought him to Chicago to testify before the Grand Jury, and everything he said is deleted from the [Bua] report."[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Federal Judicial Center, "U.S. Court of Federal Claims: Miller, Christine Odell Cook," Biographical Directory. https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/u.s.-court-federal-claims-miller-christine-odell-cook
|
||||
[^2]: See [[INSLAW]] and [[PROMIS Software Scandal]] and the Department of Justice press release of August 1997 cited there.
|
||||
[^2]: U.S. Court of Federal Claims, *INSLAW, Inc. v. United States*, Cong. Ref. No. 95-338X, Report of the Hearing Officer, July 31, 1997, 39 Fed. Cl. 307, https://static.case.law/fed-cl/39/cases/0307-01.json; Report of the Review Panel, May 11, 1998, 40 Fed. Cl. 843, https://static.case.law/fed-cl/40/cases/0843-01.json; Department of Justice press release of August 1997.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -65,6 +65,12 @@ relations:
|
|||
with: "[[Watergate Special Prosecution Force]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
fn: 2
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[Office of Technical Service]]"
|
||||
start: 1971-07
|
||||
end: 1971-08
|
||||
role: "technical services supplied a disguise and alias documents as George F. Leonard before the Fielding entry"
|
||||
fn: 14
|
||||
created: 2026-10-01
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
@ -87,57 +93,59 @@ Attorney General Mitchell testified in 1973 that when Liddy was brought to him i
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[[John W. Dean]], testifying in 1973, said that he learned through [[Jack Caulfield]] that Liddy had a falling out with Rossides at Treasury and that [[Egil Krogh]] "waded into the middle of the dispute by hiring Liddy and bringing him into the White House."[^11] The Senate committee's final report stated that the Plumbers unit, under Krogh and David Young, added Liddy and [[Howard Hunt]] in July 1971, both being known to the White House as persons with investigative experience; the court of appeals dated the formation of the unit to the summer of 1971, after publication of the [[Pentagon Papers]].[^12][^13] The court of appeals recorded that Liddy was hired by Krogh with the approval of [[John Ehrlichman]] to investigate leaks of classified information.[^2]
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Before the Fielding entry, Howard Hunt brought Liddy to the CIA's technical services. In July or August 1971 the technical officers secured for him a disguise (a wig and glasses) and alias documents in the name "George F. Leonard," in a set of contacts that Hunt had arranged through an unlisted number.[^14] The House special subcommittee recorded the agency's decision to stop the assistance on August 27, 1971.[^14] The staff report appended to Senator [[Howard Baker]]'s views in the Senate Watergate Committee's final report states that a technician of the Technical Services Division testified that Hunt told him early in August 1971 that he would be introducing a second man, whereas CIA officials had said Hunt introduced Liddy unannounced late in August.[^15]
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After Ellsberg's psychiatrist, Dr. [[Lewis Fielding]], declined to be interviewed by FBI agents, the unit proposed a covert entry into his [[Beverly Hills, California|Beverly Hills]] office. Hunt traveled to Miami in mid-August 1971 to recruit [[Bernard Barker]], who had worked under him in the [[Bay of Pigs]] operation, and Barker recruited [[Eugenio Martinez]] and [[Felipe de Diego]]. On August 25, 1971 Liddy gained entry to Fielding's office by misrepresenting his identity to a cleaning woman in order to take reconnaissance photographs; he purchased supplies for the operation. Hunt and Liddy met the three Miami men at a Beverly Hills hotel on September 2, 1971. On the night of September 3 Barker, Martinez and de Diego entered the office and forced a file cabinet, and Liddy kept a lookout nearby. The file on Ellsberg was not found.[^2][^13]
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California indicted Liddy on September 4, 1973 for the break-in. At the request of Special Prosecutor [[Leon Jaworski]], and over Liddy's objection, the California prosecution was dismissed on March 11, 1974, four days after a federal grand jury indicted Liddy, Ehrlichman, Barker, Martinez and de Diego on March 7, 1974 for conspiring to violate Fielding's Fourth Amendment rights.[^2][^13] The jury convicted Liddy on July 12, 1974, and on July 31, 1974 Judge [[Gerhard Gesell]] sentenced him to one to three years, to run concurrently with his Watergate sentence. The court of appeals affirmed on May 17, 1976 in an opinion that rejected claims that the indictment was defective, that the California dismissal violated his speedy trial and due process rights, and that the trial court had erred in refusing to enforce two subpoenas duces tecum.[^2]
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On the same day the court of appeals reversed the convictions of Barker and Martinez, who had been sentenced to probation, in a per curiam opinion accompanied by separate opinions of Judges Wilkey and Merhige and a partial dissent by Judge Leventhal.[^14] At a hearing on February 22, 1979, Chief Judge William B. Bryant ruled that the "Barker-Martinez defense," which the court described as reasonable reliance on the authority of superiors, was available to the former FBI officials [[W. Mark Felt]] and [[Edward S. Miller]], who had been indicted in April 1978 on charges of conspiring to deprive relatives and acquaintances of [[Weather Underground]] fugitives of their rights through surreptitious entries; the Justice Department at the time was headed by Attorney General [[Griffin Bell]].[^15]
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On the same day the court of appeals reversed the convictions of Barker and Martinez, who had been sentenced to probation, in a per curiam opinion accompanied by separate opinions of Judges Wilkey and Merhige and a partial dissent by Judge Leventhal.[^16] At a hearing on February 22, 1979, Chief Judge William B. Bryant ruled that the "Barker-Martinez defense," which the court described as reasonable reliance on the authority of superiors, was available to the former FBI officials [[W. Mark Felt]] and [[Edward S. Miller]], who had been indicted in April 1978 on charges of conspiring to deprive relatives and acquaintances of [[Weather Underground]] fugitives of their rights through surreptitious entries; the Justice Department at the time was headed by Attorney General [[Griffin Bell]].[^17]
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### General Counsel to the Reelection Committee
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According to the court of appeals, Liddy was hired by the reelection committee in late 1971 as general counsel; in January 1972 he agreed to organize an intelligence gathering operation; and in March 1972 he moved to the Finance Committee to Re-elect the President as its counsel while continuing the intelligence assignment.[^1] Dean testified that Krogh suggested Liddy for the general counsel post, that Krogh obtained Ehrlichman's approval, and that Dean arranged an interview with Mitchell on November 24, 1971, for which Liddy prepared an agenda. Dean described it as a general job interview with virtually no discussion of intelligence plans; on December 8 [[Jeb Stuart Magruder]] interviewed Liddy briefly and asked him to start work as soon as possible.[^16] Mitchell testified that Krogh brought Liddy to his office on December 8 on a drug abuse law enforcement program, and that he did not then know Liddy worked for Krogh as one of the Plumbers.[^10]
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According to the court of appeals, Liddy was hired by the reelection committee in late 1971 as general counsel; in January 1972 he agreed to organize an intelligence gathering operation; and in March 1972 he moved to the Finance Committee to Re-elect the President as its counsel while continuing the intelligence assignment.[^1] Dean testified that Krogh suggested Liddy for the general counsel post, that Krogh obtained Ehrlichman's approval, and that Dean arranged an interview with Mitchell on November 24, 1971, for which Liddy prepared an agenda. Dean described it as a general job interview with virtually no discussion of intelligence plans; on December 8 [[Jeb Stuart Magruder]] interviewed Liddy briefly and asked him to start work as soon as possible.[^18] Mitchell testified that Krogh brought Liddy to his office on December 8 on a drug abuse law enforcement program, and that he did not then know Liddy worked for Krogh as one of the Plumbers.[^10]
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Magruder testified that during Liddy's first week Liddy told him he had discussed a broad intelligence plan with members of the White House staff, mentioning Dean in particular, and had been told he would have a budget of about $1 million. Dean testified that he had not encouraged Liddy's plans and had told Liddy that he would not discuss them.[^17][^18] Hunt testified that in late November 1971 Liddy told him that Attorney General Mitchell had proposed the establishment of a large-scale intelligence and counterintelligence program with Liddy as its chief, and that he and Liddy designed a budget for it under the code name Gemstone. Hunt added that in April 1972 Liddy told him the Watergate operation would be undertaken as part of Gemstone, on information, from what Hunt understood to be a government agency, that the Cuban government was supplying funds to the [[Democratic Party]] campaign, and that entries were made on May 27 and June 17, 1972.[^19]
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Magruder testified that during Liddy's first week Liddy told him he had discussed a broad intelligence plan with members of the White House staff, mentioning Dean in particular, and had been told he would have a budget of about $1 million. Dean testified that he had not encouraged Liddy's plans and had told Liddy that he would not discuss them.[^19][^20] Hunt testified that in late November 1971 Liddy told him that Attorney General Mitchell had proposed the establishment of a large-scale intelligence and counterintelligence program with Liddy as its chief, and that he and Liddy designed a budget for it under the code name Gemstone. Hunt added that in April 1972 Liddy told him the Watergate operation would be undertaken as part of Gemstone, on information, from what Hunt understood to be a government agency, that the Cuban government was supplying funds to the [[Democratic Party]] campaign, and that entries were made on May 27 and June 17, 1972.[^21]
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Magruder, Dean and Mitchell each testified about the meetings in the Attorney General's office on January 27 and February 4, 1972, at which Liddy presented charts and a plan with a budget of about $1 million, later scaled down. Magruder testified that the projects included wiretapping, photography, the abduction of radical leaders to Mexico during the [[San Diego]] convention, and call girls; Dean testified that the plan also included mugging squads and that Liddy described interception of communications between ground facilities and aircraft; Mitchell testified that he told Liddy "to go burn the charts" and described the presentation as "a complete horror story."[^20][^21][^22] Magruder testified that Mitchell approved a revised $250,000 plan on March 30 at [[Key Biscayne, Florida|Key Biscayne]]; Mitchell denied it and testified that the plan was rejected for the third time. The court of appeals affirming the convictions of Mitchell, Haldeman and Ehrlichman summarized the evidence at that trial as showing that Mitchell gave approval on that date.[^23][^24][^25]
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Magruder, Dean and Mitchell each testified about the meetings in the Attorney General's office on January 27 and February 4, 1972, at which Liddy presented charts and a plan with a budget of about $1 million, later scaled down. Magruder testified that the projects included wiretapping, photography, the abduction of radical leaders to Mexico during the [[San Diego]] convention, and call girls; Dean testified that the plan also included mugging squads and that Liddy described interception of communications between ground facilities and aircraft; Mitchell testified that he told Liddy "to go burn the charts" and described the presentation as "a complete horror story."[^22][^23][^24] Magruder testified that Mitchell approved a revised $250,000 plan on March 30 at [[Key Biscayne, Florida|Key Biscayne]]; Mitchell denied it and testified that the plan was rejected for the third time. The court of appeals affirming the convictions of Mitchell, Haldeman and Ehrlichman summarized the evidence at that trial as showing that Mitchell gave approval on that date.[^25][^26][^27]
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Money for the operation passed through the Finance Committee. [[Hugh Sloan]], its treasurer, testified that in April 1972 Liddy consulted him about four checks drawn on a Mexican bank, payable to and endorsed by [[Manuel Ogarrio]], and the two agreed to convert them into cash with the help of Liddy's friends around the country. These checks and a check of $114,000 payable to a member of the finance committee were deposited in a Miami bank account by Barker and Martinez on April 20, 1972, and most of the funds were withdrawn by Barker within two weeks. Liddy returned $111,500 in $100 bills to Sloan, and Sloan testified that he turned over to Liddy a total of $199,000 in cash, mostly in $100 bills, which Liddy gave to [[James McCord]], the committee's security chief. Bills of that denomination were later found in sequence on McCord and the four other men arrested in the [[Democratic National Committee]] offices on June 17.[^1] In his questioning of Mitchell, committee counsel stated that Sloan had testified that Liddy asked for an initial payment of $83,000 on a $250,000 budget.[^26]
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Money for the operation passed through the Finance Committee. [[Hugh Sloan]], its treasurer, testified that in April 1972 Liddy consulted him about four checks drawn on a Mexican bank, payable to and endorsed by [[Manuel Ogarrio]], and the two agreed to convert them into cash with the help of Liddy's friends around the country. These checks and a check of $114,000 payable to a member of the finance committee were deposited in a Miami bank account by Barker and Martinez on April 20, 1972, and most of the funds were withdrawn by Barker within two weeks. Liddy returned $111,500 in $100 bills to Sloan, and Sloan testified that he turned over to Liddy a total of $199,000 in cash, mostly in $100 bills, which Liddy gave to [[James McCord]], the committee's security chief. Bills of that denomination were later found in sequence on McCord and the four other men arrested in the [[Democratic National Committee]] offices on June 17.[^1] In his questioning of Mitchell, committee counsel stated that Sloan had testified that Liddy asked for an initial payment of $83,000 on a $250,000 budget.[^28]
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### The Arrests and the Silence
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The court of appeals summarized the evidence on the arrests. Liddy telephoned Barker before the Miami men traveled to Washington in May and June 1972; six of the defendants using aliases checked into a Washington hotel on May 22 and rented rooms at the [[Watergate complex|Watergate Hotel]] until May 29; and [[Alfred Baldwin]], a former FBI agent hired by McCord, monitored the Democratic National Committee telephones from rooms 419 and 723 of the [[Howard Johnson Motel]] across the street. Baldwin testified that Hunt and Liddy visited room 419 on May 26 and that the two later surveyed the DNC offices from the balcony of room 723.[^1] On June 17, 1972 Baldwin saw two men leave an alleyway near the building after police arrived, identified one as Hunt and said the other was wearing a suit he recognized as Liddy's. Attorney [[Douglas Caddy]] testified that Hunt telephoned Liddy at about 5 a.m. from Caddy's apartment, and that a few days later Liddy directed Caddy to pay $2,500 of the cash Hunt had given him to the criminal lawyer retained for the five men. Sloan testified that Liddy met him in a hallway that morning and said, "my boys got caught last night; I made a mistake; I used somebody from here which I said I'd never do. I'm afraid I am going to lose my job." Liddy later asked about the committee's largest shredding machine and was seen with a large stack of papers at the shredder.[^1]
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[[Richard Kleindienst]], the new Attorney General, testified that on Saturday, June 17, Liddy and [[Powell Moore]] came to the [[Burning Tree Club]], where Kleindienst was playing in a tournament; that Liddy appeared agitated, said that he had been asked to report on the Watergate break-in and that some of those arrested might be employed by the White House or the reelection committee, and (in Kleindienst's less precise recollection) said that Mitchell had asked him to come; that Kleindienst telephoned Assistant Attorney General [[Henry Petersen]] to instruct that those arrested receive no special treatment; and that he told Liddy to leave.[^27] Mitchell testified that from February 4 until June 15, 1972, when Liddy came to his office about a letter to the *[[The Washington Post|Washington Post]]*, he had no conversation with Liddy.[^28]
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[[Richard Kleindienst]], the new Attorney General, testified that on Saturday, June 17, Liddy and [[Powell Moore]] came to the [[Burning Tree Club]], where Kleindienst was playing in a tournament; that Liddy appeared agitated, said that he had been asked to report on the Watergate break-in and that some of those arrested might be employed by the White House or the reelection committee, and (in Kleindienst's less precise recollection) said that Mitchell had asked him to come; that Kleindienst telephoned Assistant Attorney General [[Henry Petersen]] to instruct that those arrested receive no special treatment; and that he told Liddy to leave.[^29] Mitchell testified that from February 4 until June 15, 1972, when Liddy came to his office about a letter to the *[[The Washington Post|Washington Post]]*, he had no conversation with Liddy.[^30]
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Dean testified that after the arrests he asked Liddy to meet him and that, shortly before noon, they walked down 17th Street toward the [[Corcoran Gallery of Art|Corcoran Gallery]]; Mitchell placed Dean's first debriefing of Liddy on June 19. Dean said Liddy told him the arrested men were his men, that Magruder had pressed him into the operation because the committee was not getting good information from an earlier bug, that Liddy had used McCord because Magruder had cut his budget, that the men were friends of Hunt, and that no one at the White House was involved.[^28][^29] [[Robert Bennett]], Hunt's employer, testified at trial that on July 2 Liddy told him he had lost his job at the committee for failing to cooperate fully with the FBI.[^1]
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Dean testified that after the arrests he asked Liddy to meet him and that, shortly before noon, they walked down 17th Street toward the [[Corcoran Gallery of Art|Corcoran Gallery]]; Mitchell placed Dean's first debriefing of Liddy on June 19. Dean said Liddy told him the arrested men were his men, that Magruder had pressed him into the operation because the committee was not getting good information from an earlier bug, that Liddy had used McCord because Magruder had cut his budget, that the men were friends of Hunt, and that no one at the White House was involved.[^30][^31] [[Robert Bennett]], Hunt's employer, testified at trial that on July 2 Liddy told him he had lost his job at the committee for failing to cooperate fully with the FBI.[^1]
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### Conviction, Sentence and Refusal to Testify
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On January 8, 1973 jury selection began before Chief Judge [[John Sirica|John J. Sirica]]; five defendants changed their pleas to guilty, and on January 30, 1973 the jury found Liddy and McCord guilty. Liddy was convicted of conspiracy, two counts of burglary, and three counts of endeavoring to intercept and intercepting communications. He did not testify. On March 23, 1973 Sirica sentenced him to a total of not less than six years and eight months and not more than 20 years, with a $40,000 fine. The appellate caption lists the alias George F. Leonard. The en banc court of appeals affirmed on November 8, 1974.[^1]
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The [[Senate Watergate Committee]]'s final report stated that its knowledge of Liddy's activities came from sources other than Liddy, who refused to testify at an executive session on June 4, 1973 even after being instructed to do so upon the conferral of use immunity under a court order. The report stated that Liddy's role in Gemstone was detailed through the testimony of McCord, Magruder, Dean, Mitchell and Hunt.[^30] Dean had testified that he "never understood how the Liddy plan had been approved" and that Magruder had indicated to him that there had been White House pressure to get the plan moving.[^31]
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The [[Senate Watergate Committee]]'s final report stated that its knowledge of Liddy's activities came from sources other than Liddy, who refused to testify at an executive session on June 4, 1973 even after being instructed to do so upon the conferral of use immunity under a court order. The report stated that Liddy's role in Gemstone was detailed through the testimony of McCord, Magruder, Dean, Mitchell and Hunt.[^32] Dean had testified that he "never understood how the Liddy plan had been approved" and that Magruder had indicated to him that there had been White House pressure to get the plan moving.[^33]
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### Commutation and Release
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On April 12, 1977 President Carter signed an order commuting Liddy's sentence from 20 years to eight years, making him eligible for parole on July 9, 1977 and fixing a mandatory release date, with good time, of September 30, 1980. The order recited that Liddy had begun serving his sentence on January 30, 1973, was confined at the [[Federal Prison Camp, Allenwood|Federal Prison Camp at Allenwood]], Pennsylvania, and had not paid the $40,000 fine, which remained in effect. The order was countersigned by Attorney General Griffin Bell, and the White House announcement stated that the President took the action "in the interest of equity and fairness based on a comparison of Mr. Liddy's sentence with those of all others convicted in Watergate related prosecutions."[^3] The Justice Department official biography of Bell records that he was sworn in as Attorney General on January 26, 1977.[^32] The *[[The New York Times|New York Times]]*, reporting on Liddy's memoir in April 1980, stated that he left prison in September 1977 after serving 52 months, longer than any other Watergate defendant.[^33]
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On April 12, 1977 President Carter signed an order commuting Liddy's sentence from 20 years to eight years, making him eligible for parole on July 9, 1977 and fixing a mandatory release date, with good time, of September 30, 1980. The order recited that Liddy had begun serving his sentence on January 30, 1973, was confined at the [[Federal Prison Camp, Allenwood|Federal Prison Camp at Allenwood]], Pennsylvania, and had not paid the $40,000 fine, which remained in effect. The order was countersigned by Attorney General Griffin Bell, and the White House announcement stated that the President took the action "in the interest of equity and fairness based on a comparison of Mr. Liddy's sentence with those of all others convicted in Watergate related prosecutions."[^3] The Justice Department official biography of Bell records that he was sworn in as Attorney General on January 26, 1977.[^34] The *[[The New York Times|New York Times]]*, reporting on Liddy's memoir in April 1980, stated that he left prison in September 1977 after serving 52 months, longer than any other Watergate defendant.[^35]
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### Writing, Speaking and Private Security Work
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Liddy published a novel, *Out of Control* ([[St. Martin's Press|St. Martin's]], 1979), reviewed in *[[Newsweek]]* on October 15, 1979, and an autobiography, *Will* (St. Martin's, 1980).[^33][^34] In October 1981 he spoke to a standing-room audience at the [[University of Texas at Austin|University of Texas]] on a national campus tour; the *[[Austin American-Statesman]]* reported that he said the Central Intelligence Agency had been weakened by "illusions" and that the assassination of President [[Anwar Sadat]] earlier that day might have been anticipated by a strong covert intelligence service, and that he told the audience he had been in nine different prisons.[^35] In 1985 the [[United States Tax Court]], in a dispute with the [[Internal Revenue Service]] over more than $150,000 in claimed back taxes and penalties, heard Liddy describe how he spent more than $340,000 as director of covert activities for the 1972 campaign, including $30,000 for a room bugging device, $2,270 for prostitutes at the Miami convention, $500 for [[Donald Segretti]]'s work against Senator [[Edmund Muskie]], and $300 for cartoons of Senator [[Edward Kennedy]] drawn by a CIA artist, according to [[United Press International]]; Judge [[Samuel Sterrett]] accepted Liddy's testimony in part, finding tax due on $45,430 rather than the IRS's $174,800 and rescinding a $51,766 fraud penalty.[^36]
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Liddy published a novel, *Out of Control* ([[St. Martin's Press|St. Martin's]], 1979), reviewed in *[[Newsweek]]* on October 15, 1979, and an autobiography, *Will* (St. Martin's, 1980).[^35][^36] In October 1981 he spoke to a standing-room audience at the [[University of Texas at Austin|University of Texas]] on a national campus tour; the *[[Austin American-Statesman]]* reported that he said the Central Intelligence Agency had been weakened by "illusions" and that the assassination of President [[Anwar Sadat]] earlier that day might have been anticipated by a strong covert intelligence service, and that he told the audience he had been in nine different prisons.[^37] In 1985 the [[United States Tax Court]], in a dispute with the [[Internal Revenue Service]] over more than $150,000 in claimed back taxes and penalties, heard Liddy describe how he spent more than $340,000 as director of covert activities for the 1972 campaign, including $30,000 for a room bugging device, $2,270 for prostitutes at the Miami convention, $500 for [[Donald Segretti]]'s work against Senator [[Edmund Muskie]], and $300 for cartoons of Senator [[Edward Kennedy]] drawn by a CIA artist, according to [[United Press International]]; Judge [[Samuel Sterrett]] accepted Liddy's testimony in part, finding tax due on $45,430 rather than the IRS's $174,800 and rescinding a $51,766 fraud penalty.[^38]
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On March 18, 1987 the [[Associated Press]] reported from [[Santa Ana, California]] that Liddy had opened a school, the Academy of Corporate Security and Private Investigation, charging $1,500 a week and bringing classes to students, and that he also operated a security company offering drug investigations and detection of illegal surveillance.[^37] In an October 1986 interview with *[[USA Today]]*, according to United Press International, Liddy said he ran the G. Gordon Liddy Academy of Corporate Security in Florida and commanded the "Hurricane Force," a group of professional soldiers "organized to perform extraction missions (in Third World countries) for private parties."[^38]
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On March 18, 1987 the [[Associated Press]] reported from [[Santa Ana, California]] that Liddy had opened a school, the Academy of Corporate Security and Private Investigation, charging $1,500 a week and bringing classes to students, and that he also operated a security company offering drug investigations and detection of illegal surveillance.[^39] In an October 1986 interview with *[[USA Today]]*, according to United Press International, Liddy said he ran the G. Gordon Liddy Academy of Corporate Security in Florida and commanded the "Hurricane Force," a group of professional soldiers "organized to perform extraction missions (in Third World countries) for private parties."[^40]
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Liddy hosted a syndicated radio program for two decades, with a career at [[Radio America (United States)|Radio America]] that ended with his retirement in 2012, and appeared in television roles including an episode of *[[Miami Vice]]*.[^4][^39]
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Liddy hosted a syndicated radio program for two decades, with a career at [[Radio America (United States)|Radio America]] that ended with his retirement in 2012, and appeared in television roles including an episode of *[[Miami Vice]]*.[^4][^41]
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### Statements About Plots to Kill Jack Anderson and Howard Hunt
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The *New York Times* reported on April 14, 1980, summarizing excerpts from *Will* published in *[[Time (magazine)|Time]]*, that Liddy wrote that a plan to kill the columnist [[Jack Anderson]] arose over lunch in Washington with Hunt and a CIA operative, was suggested because an Anderson column had supposedly compromised an American agent abroad, and preceded the Watergate burglary. According to the excerpts, a plan to kill Anderson with LSD was dismissed as impractical, and Liddy then volunteered to kill him on a Washington street but was advised by Hunt to "forget" it. The same report stated that Liddy wrote that he had been prepared to participate in a project to poison Hunt in prison for cooperating with prosecutors and that he had arranged for Hunt's food to be poisoned if a coded message arrived, which, he wrote, never came.[^33]
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The *New York Times* reported on April 14, 1980, summarizing excerpts from *Will* published in *[[Time (magazine)|Time]]*, that Liddy wrote that a plan to kill the columnist [[Jack Anderson]] arose over lunch in Washington with Hunt and a CIA operative, was suggested because an Anderson column had supposedly compromised an American agent abroad, and preceded the Watergate burglary. According to the excerpts, a plan to kill Anderson with LSD was dismissed as impractical, and Liddy then volunteered to kill him on a Washington street but was advised by Hunt to "forget" it. The same report stated that Liddy wrote that he had been prepared to participate in a project to poison Hunt in prison for cooperating with prosecutors and that he had arranged for Hunt's food to be poisoned if a coded message arrived, which, he wrote, never came.[^35]
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The New York *Daily News* reported on April 18, 1980 that Liddy said on two network television programs that Anderson was "a pain in the butt" to the Nixon White House and that assassinating him would have been "justifiable homicide," that he had made the recommendation at a White House meeting at which Hunt first suggested drugging Anderson with LSD, and that Anderson's columns had compromised an intelligence agent who was unmasked, tortured and killed. Anderson, meeting Liddy on the program, said that neither Liddy nor anyone else could name a CIA agent tortured or killed as a result of his columns: "It never happened." Liddy answered that he had not said CIA agent. Hunt declined to appear on the second program; the report stated that Hunt said he never discussed with Liddy a need to kill Anderson, that they considered how to discredit Anderson with LSD, and that they dropped the matter when a retired CIA doctor said attempts of that kind overseas had been unsuccessful.[^40]
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The New York *Daily News* reported on April 18, 1980 that Liddy said on two network television programs that Anderson was "a pain in the butt" to the Nixon White House and that assassinating him would have been "justifiable homicide," that he had made the recommendation at a White House meeting at which Hunt first suggested drugging Anderson with LSD, and that Anderson's columns had compromised an intelligence agent who was unmasked, tortured and killed. Anderson, meeting Liddy on the program, said that neither Liddy nor anyone else could name a CIA agent tortured or killed as a result of his columns: "It never happened." Liddy answered that he had not said CIA agent. Hunt declined to appear on the second program; the report stated that Hunt said he never discussed with Liddy a need to kill Anderson, that they considered how to discredit Anderson with LSD, and that they dropped the matter when a retired CIA doctor said attempts of that kind overseas had been unsuccessful.[^42]
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In an interview recorded for [[Mark Feldstein]]'s 2010 book *Poisoning the Press*, Hunt said before his death that [[Charles Colson]] had ordered him and Liddy to examine Anderson's home from the outside for vulnerabilities, and that Liddy had an idea involving poison wiped on a man's wrist.[^41] Colson's spokeswoman told NBC that Colson "believes everyone has debunked this story a long time ago and he has nothing to add to it."[^41] Feldstein's book also describes a lunch in March 1972 at the [[Hay-Adams Hotel]] with a recently retired CIA poison specialist.[^41]
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In an interview recorded for [[Mark Feldstein]]'s 2010 book *Poisoning the Press*, Hunt said before his death that [[Charles Colson]] had ordered him and Liddy to examine Anderson's home from the outside for vulnerabilities, and that Liddy had an idea involving poison wiped on a man's wrist.[^43] Colson's spokeswoman told NBC that Colson "believes everyone has debunked this story a long time ago and he has nothing to add to it."[^43] Feldstein's book also describes a lunch in March 1972 at the [[Hay-Adams Hotel]] with a recently retired CIA poison specialist.[^43]
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United Press International reported on October 31, 1986 that Liddy told *USA Today* that he would have killed Anderson and Hunt if ordered to do so, that the decision had to be taken "from a much higher level than I was," that he had been ordered to discuss the Anderson problem with "[[Edward Gunn|Dr. Edward Gunn]] of the CIA," whom he described as "the CIA's assassination expert," and that "it was not until an Anderson column caused the death of one of our intelligence people posted abroad that that thought was even entertained." The report added that published reports in 1975 had said that a senior official in the Nixon White House ordered Anderson killed and the death made to look accidental.[^38]
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United Press International reported on October 31, 1986 that Liddy told *USA Today* that he would have killed Anderson and Hunt if ordered to do so, that the decision had to be taken "from a much higher level than I was," that he had been ordered to discuss the Anderson problem with "[[Edward Gunn|Dr. Edward Gunn]] of the CIA," whom he described as "the CIA's assassination expert," and that "it was not until an Anderson column caused the death of one of our intelligence people posted abroad that that thought was even entertained." The report added that published reports in 1975 had said that a senior official in the Nixon White House ordered Anderson killed and the death made to look accidental.[^40]
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### Footnotes
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@ -154,31 +162,33 @@ United Press International reported on October 31, 1986 that Liddy told *USA Tod
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[^11]: Senate Watergate hearings, Book 3 (1973), testimony of John W. Dean III, p. 920. https://archive.org/details/presidentialcamp03unit
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[^12]: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, *The Final Report* (1974; Dell paperback edition, *The Senate Watergate Report*), p. 63. https://archive.org/details/senatewatergater01unit
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[^13]: *United States v. Ehrlichman*, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (No. 74-1882), decided May 17, 1976, Part I. https://static.case.law/f2d/546/cases/0910-01.json
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[^14]: *United States v. Barker*, 546 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Nos. 74-1883, 74-1884), decided May 17, 1976. https://static.case.law/f2d/546/cases/0940-01.json
|
||||
[^15]: *United States v. Felt*, 491 F. Supp. 179 (D.D.C. 1979) (Crim. No. 78-00179) (Bryant, C.J.), decided December 21, 1979; *Gray v. Bell*, 712 F.2d 490, 493-494 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (indictment of Gray, Felt and Miller, April 1978). https://static.case.law/f-supp/491/cases/0179-01.json and https://static.case.law/f2d/712/cases/0490-01.json
|
||||
[^16]: Senate Watergate hearings, Book 3, testimony of John W. Dean III, pp. 927-928. https://archive.org/details/presidentialcamp03unit
|
||||
[^17]: Senate Watergate hearings, Book 2 (1973), testimony of Jeb Stuart Magruder, pp. 786-787. https://archive.org/details/presidentialcamp02unit
|
||||
[^18]: Senate Watergate hearings, Book 3, testimony of John W. Dean III, pp. 930-931. https://archive.org/details/presidentialcamp03unit
|
||||
[^19]: Senate Watergate hearings, Book 9 (1973), testimony of E. Howard Hunt, p. 3663. https://archive.org/details/presidentialcamp09unit
|
||||
[^20]: Senate Watergate hearings, Book 2, testimony of Jeb Stuart Magruder, pp. 787-788. https://archive.org/details/presidentialcamp02unit
|
||||
[^21]: Senate Watergate hearings, Book 3, testimony of John W. Dean III, pp. 929-931. https://archive.org/details/presidentialcamp03unit
|
||||
[^22]: Senate Watergate hearings, Book 4, testimony of John N. Mitchell, July 10, 1973, pp. 1610-1611. https://archive.org/details/presidentialcamp04unit
|
||||
[^23]: Senate Watergate hearings, Book 2, testimony of Jeb Stuart Magruder, pp. 794-795. https://archive.org/details/presidentialcamp02unit
|
||||
[^24]: Senate Watergate hearings, Book 4, testimony of John N. Mitchell, July 10, 1973, pp. 1615-1616. https://archive.org/details/presidentialcamp04unit
|
||||
[^25]: *United States v. Haldeman*, 559 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc), Part I.A. https://law.resource.org/pub/us/case/reporter/F2/559/559.F2d.31.6.8.12.23.75-1384.html
|
||||
[^26]: Senate Watergate hearings, Book 4, testimony of John N. Mitchell, July 10, 1973, p. 1616 (question of committee counsel Samuel Dash). https://archive.org/details/presidentialcamp04unit
|
||||
[^27]: Senate Watergate hearings, Book 9, testimony of Richard G. Kleindienst, August 7, 1973, pp. 3560-3562. https://archive.org/details/presidentialcamp09unit
|
||||
[^28]: Senate Watergate hearings, Book 4, testimony of John N. Mitchell, July 10, 1973, pp. 1619-1620. https://archive.org/details/presidentialcamp04unit
|
||||
[^29]: Senate Watergate hearings, Book 3, testimony of John W. Dean III, p. 932. https://archive.org/details/presidentialcamp03unit
|
||||
[^30]: *The Final Report* (Dell paperback edition, *The Senate Watergate Report*), p. 74, citing Liddy executive session, June 4, 1973. https://archive.org/details/senatewatergater01unit
|
||||
[^31]: Senate Watergate hearings, Book 3, testimony of John W. Dean III, p. 956. https://archive.org/details/presidentialcamp03unit
|
||||
[^32]: U.S. Department of Justice, "Griffin Boyette Bell," Attorneys General biographies. https://www.justice.gov/ag/bio/bell-griffin-boyette
|
||||
[^33]: "Assassination Plots Described by Liddy," *New York Times*, April 14, 1980, as reproduced in CIA Reading Room document CIA-RDP90-00552R000403710021-5. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00552r000403710021-5
|
||||
[^34]: Peter S. Prescott, "From Liddy with Love," review of *Out of Control*, *Newsweek*, October 15, 1979, in CIA Reading Room document CIA-RDP88-01350R000200160018-8. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp88-01350r000200160018-8
|
||||
[^35]: "Liddy Says 'Illusions' Weakened Spy Agency," *Austin American-Statesman*, October 7, 1981, in CIA Reading Room document CIA-RDP90-00552R000403710012-5. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00552r000403710012-5
|
||||
[^36]: "Liddy Spills Watergate-Era Tricks to Tax Court," United Press International, August 17, 1985, in CIA Reading Room document CIA-RDP90-00552R000403710004-4. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00552r000403710004-4
|
||||
[^37]: "Liddy Opens School for Private Security," Associated Press, in *New York Times*, March 19, 1987, in CIA Reading Room document CIA-RDP90-00552R000403710006-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00552r000403710006-2
|
||||
[^38]: "Liddy Says He Would Have Killed If Ordered," United Press International, October 31, 1986, in CIA Reading Room document CIA-RDP90-00552R000403710003-5. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00552r000403710003-5
|
||||
[^39]: Eddie Scarry, "G. Gordon Liddy Ends 20-year Radio Run," *Adweek*, September 20, 2012. https://www.adweek.com/performance-marketing/gordon-liddy-retirement-marsha-blackburn/
|
||||
[^40]: Thomas Raftery and Donald Singleton, "Liddy: Murder Was Rx for Our Pain in Papers," *New York Daily News*, April 18, 1980, in CIA Reading Room document CIA-RDP90-00552R000403710019-8. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00552r000403710019-8
|
||||
[^41]: Michael Isikoff, "Nixon plot against newspaper columnist detailed," NBC News, September 13, 2010, reporting on Mark Feldstein, *Poisoning the Press* (2010), and on an interview with Howard Hunt provided to NBC. https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna39157420
|
||||
[^14]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Special Subcommittee on Intelligence, *Inquiry into the Alleged Involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Watergate and Ellsberg Matters*, 93rd Cong., statement of Dr. James R. Schlesinger, May 11, 1973, pp. 1-3 (the Hunt narrative is on pp. 2-3), and testimony of General Robert E. Cushman, Jr. https://archive.org/details/InquiryIntoTheAllegedInvolvementOfCIAInTheWatergateAndEllsbergMatters
|
||||
[^15]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, *Final Report*, S. Rept. 93-981 (June 1974), "Appendix to Views of Senator Baker," pp. 1135-1138. https://archive.org/details/WatergateErvinCommitteeReport
|
||||
[^16]: *United States v. Barker*, 546 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Nos. 74-1883, 74-1884), decided May 17, 1976. https://static.case.law/f2d/546/cases/0940-01.json
|
||||
[^17]: *United States v. Felt*, 491 F. Supp. 179 (D.D.C. 1979) (Crim. No. 78-00179) (Bryant, C.J.), decided December 21, 1979; *Gray v. Bell*, 712 F.2d 490, 493-494 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (indictment of Gray, Felt and Miller, April 1978). https://static.case.law/f-supp/491/cases/0179-01.json and https://static.case.law/f2d/712/cases/0490-01.json
|
||||
[^18]: Senate Watergate hearings, Book 3, testimony of John W. Dean III, pp. 927-928. https://archive.org/details/presidentialcamp03unit
|
||||
[^19]: Senate Watergate hearings, Book 2 (1973), testimony of Jeb Stuart Magruder, pp. 786-787. https://archive.org/details/presidentialcamp02unit
|
||||
[^20]: Senate Watergate hearings, Book 3, testimony of John W. Dean III, pp. 930-931. https://archive.org/details/presidentialcamp03unit
|
||||
[^21]: Senate Watergate hearings, Book 9 (1973), testimony of E. Howard Hunt, p. 3663. https://archive.org/details/presidentialcamp09unit
|
||||
[^22]: Senate Watergate hearings, Book 2, testimony of Jeb Stuart Magruder, pp. 787-788. https://archive.org/details/presidentialcamp02unit
|
||||
[^23]: Senate Watergate hearings, Book 3, testimony of John W. Dean III, pp. 929-931. https://archive.org/details/presidentialcamp03unit
|
||||
[^24]: Senate Watergate hearings, Book 4, testimony of John N. Mitchell, July 10, 1973, pp. 1610-1611. https://archive.org/details/presidentialcamp04unit
|
||||
[^25]: Senate Watergate hearings, Book 2, testimony of Jeb Stuart Magruder, pp. 794-795. https://archive.org/details/presidentialcamp02unit
|
||||
[^26]: Senate Watergate hearings, Book 4, testimony of John N. Mitchell, July 10, 1973, pp. 1615-1616. https://archive.org/details/presidentialcamp04unit
|
||||
[^27]: *United States v. Haldeman*, 559 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc), Part I.A. https://law.resource.org/pub/us/case/reporter/F2/559/559.F2d.31.6.8.12.23.75-1384.html
|
||||
[^28]: Senate Watergate hearings, Book 4, testimony of John N. Mitchell, July 10, 1973, p. 1616 (question of committee counsel Samuel Dash). https://archive.org/details/presidentialcamp04unit
|
||||
[^29]: Senate Watergate hearings, Book 9, testimony of Richard G. Kleindienst, August 7, 1973, pp. 3560-3562. https://archive.org/details/presidentialcamp09unit
|
||||
[^30]: Senate Watergate hearings, Book 4, testimony of John N. Mitchell, July 10, 1973, pp. 1619-1620. https://archive.org/details/presidentialcamp04unit
|
||||
[^31]: Senate Watergate hearings, Book 3, testimony of John W. Dean III, p. 932. https://archive.org/details/presidentialcamp03unit
|
||||
[^32]: *The Final Report* (Dell paperback edition, *The Senate Watergate Report*), p. 74, citing Liddy executive session, June 4, 1973. https://archive.org/details/senatewatergater01unit
|
||||
[^33]: Senate Watergate hearings, Book 3, testimony of John W. Dean III, p. 956. https://archive.org/details/presidentialcamp03unit
|
||||
[^34]: U.S. Department of Justice, "Griffin Boyette Bell," Attorneys General biographies. https://www.justice.gov/ag/bio/bell-griffin-boyette
|
||||
[^35]: "Assassination Plots Described by Liddy," *New York Times*, April 14, 1980, as reproduced in CIA Reading Room document CIA-RDP90-00552R000403710021-5. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00552r000403710021-5
|
||||
[^36]: Peter S. Prescott, "From Liddy with Love," review of *Out of Control*, *Newsweek*, October 15, 1979, in CIA Reading Room document CIA-RDP88-01350R000200160018-8. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp88-01350r000200160018-8
|
||||
[^37]: "Liddy Says 'Illusions' Weakened Spy Agency," *Austin American-Statesman*, October 7, 1981, in CIA Reading Room document CIA-RDP90-00552R000403710012-5. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00552r000403710012-5
|
||||
[^38]: "Liddy Spills Watergate-Era Tricks to Tax Court," United Press International, August 17, 1985, in CIA Reading Room document CIA-RDP90-00552R000403710004-4. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00552r000403710004-4
|
||||
[^39]: "Liddy Opens School for Private Security," Associated Press, in *New York Times*, March 19, 1987, in CIA Reading Room document CIA-RDP90-00552R000403710006-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00552r000403710006-2
|
||||
[^40]: "Liddy Says He Would Have Killed If Ordered," United Press International, October 31, 1986, in CIA Reading Room document CIA-RDP90-00552R000403710003-5. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00552r000403710003-5
|
||||
[^41]: Eddie Scarry, "G. Gordon Liddy Ends 20-year Radio Run," *Adweek*, September 20, 2012. https://www.adweek.com/performance-marketing/gordon-liddy-retirement-marsha-blackburn/
|
||||
[^42]: Thomas Raftery and Donald Singleton, "Liddy: Murder Was Rx for Our Pain in Papers," *New York Daily News*, April 18, 1980, in CIA Reading Room document CIA-RDP90-00552R000403710019-8. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00552r000403710019-8
|
||||
[^43]: Michael Isikoff, "Nixon plot against newspaper columnist detailed," NBC News, September 13, 2010, reporting on Mark Feldstein, *Poisoning the Press* (2010), and on an interview with Howard Hunt provided to NBC. https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna39157420
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
created: 2026-05-15
|
||||
updated: 2026-09-21
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
title: Howard Hunt
|
||||
aliases:
|
||||
- E. Howard Hunt
|
||||
|
|
@ -24,6 +24,13 @@ summary: "CIA officer who ran propaganda for the 1954 Guatemala coup and politic
|
|||
born: 1918-10-09
|
||||
died: 2007-01-23
|
||||
location: "Washington, D.C."
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[Office of Technical Service]]"
|
||||
start: 1971-07
|
||||
end: 1971-08
|
||||
role: "the Technical Services Division supplied alias documents, disguise materials, a tape recorder and a Tessina camera; assistance stopped August 27, 1971"
|
||||
fn: 7
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Everette Howard Hunt Jr. (October 9, 1918 - January 23, 2007) was a [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] officer and prolific spy novelist who participated in two of the most significant CIA covert operations of the Cold War era - the 1954 [[Guatemala]]n coup ([[Operation PBSUCCESS]]) and the 1961 [[Bay of Pigs]] invasion - before his involvement in the [[Watergate]] burglary of June 1972 made him one of the most publicly known CIA officers in American history.[^1]
|
||||
|
|
@ -62,13 +69,15 @@ In March 1972, at the direction of [[Charles Colson]], he flew to [[Denver]] in
|
|||
|
||||
By 1971, Hunt had been nominally retired from the CIA and was working as a consultant to the White House under Charles Colson, a senior aide to President [[Richard Nixon]]. Nixon's "plumbers" unit - tasked with plugging information leaks and conducting political intelligence operations - recruited Hunt for various activities, including the burglary of [[Daniel Ellsberg]]'s psychiatrist's office in September 1971.
|
||||
|
||||
In July and August 1971, while working for the White House, Hunt went to the CIA's technical services for help with an operation. On July 22, 1971 he met the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General [[Robert E. Cushman Jr.]], who directed the technical service to help him. On July 23 he received alias documents in the name "Edward Joseph Warren," a wig, glasses and a speech alteration device. He then obtained a tape recorder in a typewriter case and a Tessina camera disguised in a tobacco pouch. The technical officers became concerned at the escalation of his requests, and on August 27, 1971 Cushman told [[John Ehrlichman]] that further assistance could not be given. The camera was returned that day as unsuitable. The Technical Services Division had no further association with Hunt after August 1971.[^7] The staff report appended to Senator [[Howard Baker]]'s views in the Senate Watergate Committee's final report states that a TSD memorandum of August 27, 1971 showed Hunt's request for a New York telephone answering service about to be implemented, that the CIA kept a file on Hunt's activities entitled "Mr. Edward" outside its normal filing system, and that testimony indicated film the TSD developed for Hunt and Liddy was of Lewis Fielding's office.[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
On the night of June 17, 1972, Hunt organized and directed the team that broke into the [[Democratic National Committee]] headquarters at the [[Watergate complex]] in Washington - the burglary that produced five arrests, triggered the Senate investigation and Special Prosecutor investigation, and ultimately led to Nixon's resignation in August 1974.
|
||||
|
||||
Hunt was convicted of conspiracy, burglary, and wiretapping and sentenced to 35 years, subsequently reduced. He served approximately 33 months in federal prison. His wife Dorothy died in a plane crash in December 1972, with some researchers suggesting the crash was not accidental; the official ruling was that it was an accident.[^7]
|
||||
Hunt was convicted of conspiracy, burglary, and wiretapping and sentenced to 35 years, subsequently reduced. He served approximately 33 months in federal prison. His wife Dorothy died in a plane crash in December 1972, with some researchers suggesting the crash was not accidental; the official ruling was that it was an accident.[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
The [[CIA Office of Security|Office of Security]] reported to the inspector general on May 22, 1975, for the [[Church Committee]], that in November 1963 Hunt "was assigned to DDP/CA Staff, Office of the Chief, Headquarters; however, apparently Mr. Hunt had collateral duties with DDP/Domestic Operations Division/Facilities Branch," from November 1961 to February 1965, and that "neither Mr. Hunt nor Mr. McCord were in charge of Mexican operations at the time of the Kennedy assassination."[^8]
|
||||
The [[CIA Office of Security|Office of Security]] reported to the inspector general on May 22, 1975, for the [[Church Committee]], that in November 1963 Hunt "was assigned to DDP/CA Staff, Office of the Chief, Headquarters; however, apparently Mr. Hunt had collateral duties with DDP/Domestic Operations Division/Facilities Branch," from November 1961 to February 1965, and that "neither Mr. Hunt nor Mr. McCord were in charge of Mexican operations at the time of the Kennedy assassination."[^10]
|
||||
|
||||
Helms's secretary [[Elizabeth Dunlevy]] testified in 1974 that Hunt "had always been grateful to her for arranging a loan in connection with the terrible financial strain involving his daughter"; the agency's observer noted that Helms had placed the call that produced a loan of about 12,000 dollars.[^9]
|
||||
Helms's secretary [[Elizabeth Dunlevy]] testified in 1974 that Hunt "had always been grateful to her for arranging a loan in connection with the terrible financial strain involving his daughter"; the agency's observer noted that Helms had placed the call that produced a loan of about 12,000 dollars.[^11]
|
||||
|
||||
### Kennedy Assassination Statements
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -86,6 +95,8 @@ Hunt died of pneumonia on January 23, 2007, in [[Miami, Florida|Miami]].[^1]
|
|||
[^4]: West, Ashley. "Unknowing Ray Horsch, Episode 1: Youth," *The Rialto Report,* Podcast 171, September 13, 2026, audio at 18:34 to 22:49; Central Intelligence Agency, "Wackenhut Corporation, SF# 493 364," memorandum for the record, July 28, 1975, JFK Assassination Records Collection, record 104-10130-10454.
|
||||
[^5]: "E. Howard Hunt: Utilization by Central Cover Staff," 1970, CIA Reading Room document C00660613; Gahagen, Robert D., "Request for CSA concerning E. Howard Hunt," June 3, 1970, C00297384; "Letter of Recommendation Written by Mr. Helms," July 20, 1973, C00609297.
|
||||
[^6]: House Committee on Armed Services, Special Subcommittee on Intelligence, *Inquiry into the Alleged Involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Watergate and Ellsberg Matters,* 93rd Cong., 1973; Ruth, Henry S., Jr., letter to John S. Warner, July 26, 1973, C01482382; "Inquiry Regarding Possible ITT Association with CIA and Robert R. Mullen and Company," August 7, 1973, C01367838.
|
||||
[^7]: Summers, Anthony. *The Arrogance of Power: The Secret World of Richard Nixon.* Viking, 2000. Hougan, Jim. *Secret Agenda: Watergate, Deep Throat, and the CIA.* Random House, 1984.
|
||||
[^8]: Kane, Charles W., Director of Security. Memorandum for the Inspector General, "Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Operations, Request," May 22, 1975, JFK record 104-10106-10619.
|
||||
[^9]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Legislative Counsel, memorandum for the record, "Select Committee Testimony of 6 February 1974," OLC 74-0197, February 6, 1974. CIA Reading Room, document 01474420.
|
||||
[^7]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Special Subcommittee on Intelligence, *Inquiry into the Alleged Involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Watergate and Ellsberg Matters*, 93rd Cong., statement of Dr. James R. Schlesinger, May 11, 1973, pp. 1-3 (the Hunt narrative is on pp. 2-3), and testimony of General Robert E. Cushman, Jr. The hearing index also lists Hunt's testimony at p. 471. https://archive.org/details/InquiryIntoTheAllegedInvolvementOfCIAInTheWatergateAndEllsbergMatters
|
||||
[^8]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, *Final Report*, S. Rept. 93-981 (June 1974), "Appendix to Views of Senator Baker," pp. 1135-1141, and p. 119. https://archive.org/details/WatergateErvinCommitteeReport
|
||||
[^9]: Summers, Anthony. *The Arrogance of Power: The Secret World of Richard Nixon.* Viking, 2000. Hougan, Jim. *Secret Agenda: Watergate, Deep Throat, and the CIA.* Random House, 1984.
|
||||
[^10]: Kane, Charles W., Director of Security. Memorandum for the Inspector General, "Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Operations, Request," May 22, 1975, JFK record 104-10106-10619.
|
||||
[^11]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Legislative Counsel, memorandum for the record, "Select Committee Testimony of 6 February 1974," OLC 74-0197, February 6, 1974. CIA Reading Room, document 01474420.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -9,13 +9,22 @@ tags:
|
|||
summary: "McMahon, along with Norm Everheart, had been involved in psychic spying experiments since the early days of the CIA-sponsored work at SRI."
|
||||
born: 1929-07-03
|
||||
location: "East Norwalk, Connecticut"
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Office of Technical Service]]"
|
||||
start: 1973-05
|
||||
end: 1974-07
|
||||
role: "Director of the Office of Technical Service"
|
||||
fn: 2
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
[[John McMahon]] was the Deputy Director for Operations at the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]. He also served as the head of the [[Office of Technical Service|Office of Technical Service]] (OTS), indicating his significant role in technical and covert operations, including those involving psychic intelligence.[^1]
|
||||
[[John McMahon]] was the Deputy Director for Operations at the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]].[^1] McMahon was Director of the [[Office of Technical Service]] (OTS) from May 1973 to July 1974, after the Technical Services Division was renamed and moved from the Directorate of Plans to the Directorate of Science and Technology.[^2] As OTS director he signed, with Sayre Stevens, Director of the Office of Research and Development, an undated memorandum to the Deputy Director for Science and Technology (a companion version of DD/S&T 3697-73, which carries an approval block for [[William Colby]] as Director and a December 5, 1973 stamp) recommending that the paranormal perception investigation at Stanford Research Institute be jointly funded by the two offices.[^3] The CIA's history of the office lists him as "Former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Deputy Director for Operations and Director of Technical Service," and a later passage calls him "the first OTS Director."[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
McMahon, along with [[Norm Everheart]], had been involved in psychic spying experiments since the early days of the CIA-sponsored work at [[Stanford Research Institute|SRI]]. They were willing to give remote viewing a try in operational situations. McMahon was the superior of Norm Everheart, who served as the chief coordinator for [[Stargate Project|Grill Flame]] taskings from the CIA's Operations Directorate.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Schnabel, Jim. *Remote Viewers*. Dell, 1997.
|
||||
[^1]: Schnabel, Jim. *Remote Viewers*. Dell, 1997.
|
||||
[^2]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Office of Technical Service: 50 Years Supporting Operations," 2001, CIA Reading Room document 0001225679, "Directors of the Office of Technical Service," the anniversary program and p. 18 (the 1973 reorganization).
|
||||
[^3]: Memorandum, McMahon and Stevens to the Deputy Director for Science and Technology, "Office of Research and Development and Office of Technical Service Paranormal Perception Research Project," CIA-RDP96-00787R000200200031-6 (companion version of DD/S&T 3697-73, CIA-RDP96-00787R000200210003-6).
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
created: 2026-05-15
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-08
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
title: Richard Helms
|
||||
aliases:
|
||||
- Richard McGarrah Helms
|
||||
|
|
@ -43,11 +43,11 @@ When the Warren Commission was established in November 1963 to investigate Kenne
|
|||
|
||||
In August 1967, Helms received President Johnson's instruction to determine whether foreign powers were directing the American antiwar movement. He tasked [[James Jesus Angleton|James Angleton]]'s Counterintelligence Staff with establishing the Special Operations Group that became MHCHAOS. He subsequently expanded the program under President Nixon's administration, approving Project MERRIMAC (domestic infiltration of antiwar organizations) and [[Project RESISTANCE]] (coordination with campus administrators and local police to compile dossiers on student organizations).
|
||||
|
||||
In December 1972, knowing that Watergate-related congressional investigations were expanding, Helms ordered the operational records of MHCHAOS destroyed. A partial cache of budget and administrative documents survived only because it had been misfiled in a different location. In the same period, he ordered the destruction of records related to MKULTRA, the CIA's two-decade human experimentation program using LSD and other substances on unwitting subjects. The Church Committee found that these records destructions had permanently deprived investigators of a complete documentary record of both programs.[^1]
|
||||
In December 1972, knowing that Watergate-related congressional investigations were expanding, Helms ordered the operational records of MHCHAOS destroyed. A partial cache of budget and administrative documents survived only because it had been misfiled in a different location. The records of MKULTRA, the CIA's two-decade human experimentation program using LSD and other substances on unwitting subjects, were destroyed in January 1973. Technical Services Division personnel destroyed them on the verbal orders of [[Sidney Gottlieb]]. Gottlieb testified that he was carrying out a verbal order from Helms in doing so, and Helms confirmed that the order was his.[^3] The Church Committee found that these records destructions had permanently deprived investigators of a complete documentary record of both programs.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### Proposing and Protecting MKULTRA
|
||||
|
||||
Helms was the program's originator as much as its protector. On April 3, 1953 he formally proposed to Director [[Allen Dulles]] a program under [[Sidney Gottlieb]] for the "covert use of biological and chemical materials," arguing that "the development of a comprehensive capability in this field gives us a thorough knowledge of the enemy's theoretical potential" against "a foe who might not be as restrained ... as we are"; Dulles approved it as MKULTRA ten days later. Helms nurtured Gottlieb as his personal specialist and, bypassing the layers of command between them, dealt with him directly, embodying the conviction he later voiced in Senate testimony, that a clandestine operator "can't count on the honesty of your agent ... unless you own him body and soul." When the program needed a new charter in 1964 he agreed to rename it [[MKSEARCH]] on the condition that its substance remain the same.[^3]
|
||||
Helms was the program's originator as much as its protector. On April 3, 1953 he formally proposed to Director [[Allen Dulles]] a program under Sidney Gottlieb for the "covert use of biological and chemical materials," arguing that "the development of a comprehensive capability in this field gives us a thorough knowledge of the enemy's theoretical potential" against "a foe who might not be as restrained ... as we are"; Dulles approved it as MKULTRA ten days later. Helms nurtured Gottlieb as his personal specialist and, bypassing the layers of command between them, dealt with him directly, embodying the conviction he later voiced in Senate testimony, that a clandestine operator "can't count on the honesty of your agent ... unless you own him body and soul." When the program needed a new charter in 1964 he agreed to rename it [[MKSEARCH]] on the condition that its substance remain the same.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
### MKULTRA Continuation and Psychic Research
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -65,19 +65,19 @@ In February 1973, when Helms testified before the [[Senate Foreign Relations Com
|
|||
|
||||
### The Israeli estimate and the June 1967 warning
|
||||
|
||||
On May 25, 1967, Helms had the [[Office of National Estimates]] appraise an Israeli intelligence estimate within five hours. The appraisal stated: "We do not believe that the Israeli appreciation . . . was a serious estimate of the sort they would submit to their own high officials. We think it is probably a gambit intended to influence the US to do one or more of the following: (a) provide military supplies, (b) make more public commitments to Israel, (c) approve Israeli military initiatives, and (d) put more pressure on Nasser." [[David S. Robarge]], the CIA's chief historian, describes the Israeli paper as a [[Mossad]] estimate and writes that the Israelis may have been exploiting their special relationship with James Jesus Angleton.[^4][^5]
|
||||
On May 25, 1967, Helms had the [[Office of National Estimates]] appraise an Israeli intelligence estimate within five hours. The appraisal stated: "We do not believe that the Israeli appreciation . . . was a serious estimate of the sort they would submit to their own high officials. We think it is probably a gambit intended to influence the US to do one or more of the following: (a) provide military supplies, (b) make more public commitments to Israel, (c) approve Israeli military initiatives, and (d) put more pressure on Nasser." [[David S. Robarge]], the CIA's chief historian, describes the Israeli paper as a [[Mossad]] estimate and writes that the Israelis may have been exploiting their special relationship with James Jesus Angleton.[^5][^6]
|
||||
|
||||
On June 1, 1967, Helms's deputy, Vice Admiral [[Rufus Taylor]], wrote the memorandum of the conversation between Major General [[Meir Amit]] and Secretary of Defense [[Robert S. McNamara]], captioned "Personal and Eyes Only for the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence."[^6] Robarge writes that Helms met a senior Israeli official on June 1 who hinted that Israel could no longer avoid a decision, that the official left the United States on June 2, and that that morning Helms wrote an "Eyes Only" letter to President Johnson forewarning that Israel probably would start a war within a few days.[^7] Helms was awakened at 3:00 a.m. on June 5 by a call from the CIA Operations Center. He recalled that "in the midst of one meeting" during the war Johnson asked how accurate his intelligence on the progress of the war was, and that he answered: "It's accurate just as long as the Israelis are winning."[^5]
|
||||
On June 1, 1967, Helms's deputy, Vice Admiral [[Rufus Taylor]], wrote the memorandum of the conversation between Major General [[Meir Amit]] and Secretary of Defense [[Robert S. McNamara]], captioned "Personal and Eyes Only for the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence."[^7] Robarge writes that Helms met a senior Israeli official on June 1 who hinted that Israel could no longer avoid a decision, that the official left the United States on June 2, and that that morning Helms wrote an "Eyes Only" letter to President Johnson forewarning that Israel probably would start a war within a few days.[^8] Helms was awakened at 3:00 a.m. on June 5 by a call from the CIA Operations Center. He recalled that "in the midst of one meeting" during the war Johnson asked how accurate his intelligence on the progress of the war was, and that he answered: "It's accurate just as long as the Israelis are winning."[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### NUMEC letter, April 1968
|
||||
|
||||
On April 2, 1968, Helms wrote to Attorney General [[Ramsey Clark]] asking that the FBI "initiate a discreet intelligence investigation of an all source nature of Dr. Shapiro in order to establish the nature and extent of his relationship with the Government of Israel," and asked that the letter be returned to him once the Attorney General had acted, because the subject matter was "so sensitive for obvious reasons." A twelve-line passage before the request remains redacted.[^8] The subject was [[Zalman Mordecai Shapiro]] of the [[Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation]].
|
||||
On April 2, 1968, Helms wrote to Attorney General [[Ramsey Clark]] asking that the FBI "initiate a discreet intelligence investigation of an all source nature of Dr. Shapiro in order to establish the nature and extent of his relationship with the Government of Israel," and asked that the letter be returned to him once the Attorney General had acted, because the subject matter was "so sensitive for obvious reasons." A twelve-line passage before the request remains redacted.[^9] The subject was [[Zalman Mordecai Shapiro]] of the [[Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation]].
|
||||
|
||||
### Israel: The "Open Pipeline" Assessment
|
||||
|
||||
Helms developed a personal conviction, disclosed to his deputies, that Israel was providing American satellite intelligence to the [[Soviet Union]] as part of an undisclosed intelligence exchange - characterizing Israel as "an open pipeline for pumping intelligence to Moscow." He never officially reported this assessment or commissioned a formal investigation, and he took no documented action on it. His reluctance reflected both the sensitivity of accusing an ally and the particular weight of any assessment that ran against the interests managed by Angleton's [[KK MOUNTAIN]] Israeli liaison program.
|
||||
|
||||
When President Johnson sought an intelligence assessment of whether Israel had manufactured nuclear weapons, Helms provided the estimate (four warheads) and then obeyed Johnson's instruction that the finding be buried rather than formally reported. Johnson did not want intelligence conclusions that would require him to act on them politically. Helms's willingness to suppress an accurate intelligence product at presidential direction exemplified the institutional failure the Church Committee later documented.[^9]
|
||||
When President Johnson sought an intelligence assessment of whether Israel had manufactured nuclear weapons, Helms provided the estimate (four warheads) and then obeyed Johnson's instruction that the finding be buried rather than formally reported. Johnson did not want intelligence conclusions that would require him to act on them politically. Helms's willingness to suppress an accurate intelligence product at presidential direction exemplified the institutional failure the Church Committee later documented.[^10]
|
||||
|
||||
### Iran, Retirement, and Memoirs
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -89,10 +89,11 @@ He published his memoirs, *A Look Over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intell
|
|||
|
||||
[^1]: Powers, Thomas. *The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA.* Knopf, 1979 (the essential biography, based on extensive interviews). Church Committee (Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities). Final Report, S. Rept. 94-755, April 26, 1976.
|
||||
[^2]: Church Committee. "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders." Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975 (documents ZR/RIFLE and the failure to disclose to Warren Commission). Jacobsen, Annie. *Phenomena: The Secret History of the U.S. Government's Investigations into Extrasensory Perception and Psychokinesis.* Little, Brown, 2017.
|
||||
[^3]: John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*. Times Books, 1979, Chapters 1, 4, 12.
|
||||
[^4]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 61, Memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson, May 25, 1967, with attached CIA appraisal. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d61
|
||||
[^5]: Robarge, David S. "Getting it Right: CIA Analysis of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War." *Studies in Intelligence* 49, no. 1 (March 2005). https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/static/CIA-Analysis-1967-War.pdf
|
||||
[^6]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 124, Memorandum for the Record by Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor, June 1, 1967 (prepared June 2). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d124
|
||||
[^7]: Robarge, David S. "Getting it Right: CIA Analysis of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War." *Studies in Intelligence* 49, no. 1 (March 2005). https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/static/CIA-Analysis-1967-War.pdf For the June 1 to 2 meeting Robarge relies on published accounts, among them Michael B. Oren's, which rest on Amit's interviews and writings.
|
||||
[^8]: National Security Archive, "The NUMEC Affair: Did Highly Enriched Uranium from the U.S. Aid Israel's Nuclear Weapons Program?" (November 2, 2016), Document 8, Letter from Richard Helms to Ramsey Clark, April 2, 1968 (ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-062). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2016-11-02/numec-affair-did-highly-enriched-uranium-us-aid-israels-nuclear-weapons-program
|
||||
[^9]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy.* Random House, 1991. Chapters 11, 14, 16.
|
||||
[^3]: Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Final Report*, Book I, S. Rept. 94-755, April 26, 1976, p. 389 (MKULTRA records destroyed January 1973 on Gottlieb's verbal orders; Gottlieb testifying that he carried out Helms's verbal order; Helms confirming).
|
||||
[^4]: John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*. Times Books, 1979, Chapters 1, 4, 12.
|
||||
[^5]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 61, Memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson, May 25, 1967, with attached CIA appraisal. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d61
|
||||
[^6]: Robarge, David S. "Getting it Right: CIA Analysis of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War." *Studies in Intelligence* 49, no. 1 (March 2005). https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/static/CIA-Analysis-1967-War.pdf
|
||||
[^7]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 124, Memorandum for the Record by Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor, June 1, 1967 (prepared June 2). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d124
|
||||
[^8]: Robarge, David S. "Getting it Right: CIA Analysis of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War." *Studies in Intelligence* 49, no. 1 (March 2005). https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/static/CIA-Analysis-1967-War.pdf For the June 1 to 2 meeting Robarge relies on published accounts, among them Michael B. Oren's, which rest on Amit's interviews and writings.
|
||||
[^9]: National Security Archive, "The NUMEC Affair: Did Highly Enriched Uranium from the U.S. Aid Israel's Nuclear Weapons Program?" (November 2, 2016), Document 8, Letter from Richard Helms to Ramsey Clark, April 2, 1968 (ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-062). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2016-11-02/numec-affair-did-highly-enriched-uranium-us-aid-israels-nuclear-weapons-program
|
||||
[^10]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy.* Random House, 1991. Chapters 11, 14, 16.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ born: 1923-06-10
|
|||
died: 1991-11-05
|
||||
location: "London, United Kingdom"
|
||||
created: 2024-04-25
|
||||
updated: 2026-09-25
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: founded
|
||||
with: "[[Pergamon Press]]"
|
||||
|
|
@ -93,29 +93,31 @@ Three pathologists examining the body reached differing conclusions, one favorin
|
|||
|
||||
### Intelligence Allegations
|
||||
|
||||
Allegations that Maxwell worked for Israeli intelligence were aired publicly in October 1991, shortly before his death, when [[Seymour Hersh]] discussed his book [[The Samson Option]] at a London press conference, asserting that Maxwell and his Daily Mirror foreign editor [[Nicholas Davies]] had links to Israeli intelligence and that Davies was involved in Israeli arms dealing.[^17] Hersh further alleged that Maxwell had relayed information to the Israeli embassy in London that led to the capture of the nuclear whistleblower [[Mordechai Vanunu]], a claim Maxwell denounced as a total invention.[^17] Labour MP [[George Galloway]] and Conservative MP [[Rupert Allason]] raised the espionage claims in the [[House of Commons]] under parliamentary privilege on October 21, 1991, and Maxwell sued Hersh and his British publisher for libel; after Maxwell's death the action lapsed, and the Mirror Group later apologized to Hersh and paid damages.[^17] The allegations against Davies were also the subject of an Early Day Motion in the Commons, EDM 2134, "Mirror Group Newspapers and Israeli Intelligence."[^18] Galloway used parliamentary privilege again in January 1996, in a debate on [[Saudi Arabia]], to allege that commissions on the [[Al-Yamamah]] arms sales had been paid through middlemen including [[Mark Thatcher]] and the defense contractor [[Douglas Leese]], whom [[Steven Hoffenberg]] later credited with introducing him to Jeffrey Epstein.[^19][^20]
|
||||
Allegations that Maxwell worked for Israeli intelligence were aired publicly in October 1991, shortly before his death, when [[Seymour Hersh]] discussed his book [[The Samson Option]] at a London press conference, asserting that Maxwell and his Daily Mirror foreign editor [[Nicholas Davies]] had links to Israeli intelligence and that Davies was involved in Israeli arms dealing.[^17] Hersh further alleged that Maxwell had relayed information to the Israeli embassy in London that led to the capture of the nuclear whistleblower [[Mordechai Vanunu]], a claim Maxwell denounced as a total invention.[^17] Labour MP [[George Galloway]] and Conservative MP [[Rupert Allason]] raised the espionage claims in the [[House of Commons]] under parliamentary privilege on October 22, 1991, and Maxwell sued Hersh and his British publisher for libel; the Mirror Group later apologized to Hersh and paid damages.[^17] The allegations against Davies were also the subject of an Early Day Motion in the Commons, EDM 2134, "Mirror Group Newspapers and Israeli Intelligence."[^18] Galloway used parliamentary privilege again in January 1996, in a debate on [[Saudi Arabia]], to allege that commissions on the [[Al-Yamamah]] arms sales had been paid through middlemen including [[Mark Thatcher]] and the defense contractor [[Douglas Leese]], whom [[Steven Hoffenberg]] later credited with introducing him to Jeffrey Epstein.[^19][^20]
|
||||
|
||||
The most detailed espionage account came from [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], a self-described former employee of the Israeli [[Military Intelligence Directorate (Israel)|Military Intelligence Directorate]], who claimed in his 1992 book [[Profits of War]] that Maxwell and Davies were long-time [[Mossad]] assets, and that Davies had tipped him to Vanunu's 1986 approach to the [[Sunday Mirror]] over the photographs Vanunu had taken at [[Dimona]], introducing him to Vanunu's intermediary [[Oscar Guerrero]]; Vanunu was subsequently lured from London to [[Rome]], seized by Israeli operatives, and convicted in Israel.[^21][^22]
|
||||
Seymour Hersh's book *The Samson Option* was published in Britain on Monday, October 21, 1991, and on the following day the MPs George Galloway and Rupert Allason repeated its allegations about Maxwell and Nicholas Davies in the House of Commons under parliamentary privilege.[^21] On October 23, 1991, Maxwell, then in New York, sought an injunction against distribution of the book, and Mirror Group Newspapers said libel writs were being issued against [[Faber and Faber]]. Maxwell said, "The accusations against me are ludicrous, a total invention."[^22] Newsweek reported on November 4, 1991 that Maxwell had sued, Davies had sued, and Faber and Faber had sued back.[^23] On Thursday, August 18, 1994, Mirror Group Newspapers apologized "unreservedly" in court for a series of October 1991 articles attacking Hersh and Faber and Faber, acknowledged that its attacks were "entirely improper," and agreed to pay Hersh and his publisher "substantial damages and meet their legal costs."[^24]
|
||||
|
||||
The Welsh author Gordon Thomas, in [[Gideon's Spies]] (1999) and the later book Robert Maxwell, Israel's Superspy (2002), drew partly on Ben-Menashe and on the Israeli operative [[Rafi Eitan]] to allege that Maxwell helped distribute a version of the [[PROMIS]] case-management software that Israeli technicians had fitted with a hidden "trapdoor," enabling Israel to monitor the foreign agencies that bought it, marketing it through the [[Tel Aviv]] firm [[Degem|Degem Computers]].[^7][^23] In these accounts Maxwell received a flat fee of about 8 million dollars plus a percentage of revenues, and the agencies said to have received the software through his network included those of the [[United Kingdom]], Australia, Canada, South Korea, Poland, the [[Soviet Union]], [[South Africa]], Jordan, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Nicaragua, with an abridged version said to have been sold to [[Credit Suisse]] in 1985 and a Soviet sale in the late 1980s facilitated by the lifting of [[IBM]] export restrictions.[^7][^21] [[INSLAW]] separately alleged that Maxwell contributed 600,000 dollars from a joint U.S.-Israeli intelligence slush fund to secure the removal of its lead litigation counsel [[Leigh Ratiner]], and that the former senator [[John Tower]] had approached Maxwell in 1984 on behalf of a [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]-connected group to formalize his role as the PROMIS marketing intermediary; the [[Nicholas J. Bua|Bua Report]] found no credible evidence for these claims.[^21][^24]
|
||||
The most detailed espionage account came from [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], a self-described former employee of the Israeli [[Military Intelligence Directorate (Israel)|Military Intelligence Directorate]], who claimed in his 1992 book [[Profits of War]] that Maxwell and Davies were long-time [[Mossad]] assets, and that Davies had tipped him to Vanunu's 1986 approach to the [[Sunday Mirror]] over the photographs Vanunu had taken at [[Dimona]], introducing him to Vanunu's intermediary [[Oscar Guerrero]]; Vanunu was subsequently lured from London to [[Rome]], seized by Israeli operatives, and convicted in Israel.[^25][^26]
|
||||
|
||||
Ben-Menashe's reliability has been repeatedly questioned, including by a 1993 congressional task force, and no declassified record has substantiated the PROMIS-distribution or recruitment allegations; an Israeli prime minister's spokesman dismissed Thomas's claims as "unmitigated drivel."[^7][^25] In February 1994 INSLAW argued that twenty pages the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] had released under the [[Freedom of Information Act]] showed its Albuquerque office had run a foreign counterintelligence investigation of Maxwell and one of his companies, and that this must concern a PROMIS sale to a defense installation in [[New Mexico]]; the [[Department of Justice|Justice Department]]'s reviewers, having read the unredacted documents, called the inference "a remarkable leap" and wrote that "none of the documents in question even mentioned INSLAW or PROMIS... In short, there is nothing of which we are aware that links Mr. Maxwell to PROMIS."[^26] Maxwell was also long rumored to have had contacts with British intelligence and, given his Eastern European origins and trading ties, with the Soviet [[KGB]], though these characterizations rest on journalistic sourcing rather than disclosed files, and no archive of any of the three services has been released that confirms a formal agent relationship.[^2][^7]
|
||||
The Welsh author Gordon Thomas, in [[Gideon's Spies]] (1999) and the later book Robert Maxwell, Israel's Superspy (2002), drew partly on Ben-Menashe and on the Israeli operative [[Rafi Eitan]] to allege that Maxwell helped distribute a version of the [[PROMIS]] case-management software that Israeli technicians had fitted with a hidden "trapdoor," enabling Israel to monitor the foreign agencies that bought it, marketing it through the [[Tel Aviv]] firm [[Degem|Degem Computers]].[^7][^27] In these accounts Maxwell received a flat fee of about 8 million dollars plus a percentage of revenues, and the agencies said to have received the software through his network included those of the [[United Kingdom]], Australia, Canada, South Korea, Poland, the [[Soviet Union]], [[South Africa]], Jordan, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Nicaragua, with an abridged version said to have been sold to [[Credit Suisse]] in 1985 and a Soviet sale in the late 1980s facilitated by the lifting of [[IBM]] export restrictions.[^7][^25] [[INSLAW]] separately alleged that Maxwell contributed 600,000 dollars from a joint U.S.-Israeli intelligence slush fund to secure the removal of its lead litigation counsel [[Leigh Ratiner]], and that the former senator [[John Tower]] had approached Maxwell in 1984 on behalf of a [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]-connected group to formalize his role as the PROMIS marketing intermediary; the [[Nicholas J. Bua|Bua Report]] found no credible evidence for these claims.[^25][^28]
|
||||
|
||||
Ben-Menashe's reliability has been repeatedly questioned, including by a 1993 congressional task force, and no declassified record has substantiated the PROMIS-distribution or recruitment allegations; an Israeli prime minister's spokesman dismissed Thomas's claims as "unmitigated drivel."[^7][^29] In February 1994 INSLAW argued that twenty pages the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] had released under the [[Freedom of Information Act]] showed its Albuquerque office had run a foreign counterintelligence investigation of Maxwell and one of his companies, and that this must concern a PROMIS sale to a defense installation in [[New Mexico]]; the [[Department of Justice|Justice Department]]'s reviewers, having read the unredacted documents, called the inference "a remarkable leap" and wrote that "none of the documents in question even mentioned INSLAW or PROMIS... In short, there is nothing of which we are aware that links Mr. Maxwell to PROMIS."[^30] Maxwell was also long rumored to have had contacts with British intelligence and, given his Eastern European origins and trading ties, with the Soviet [[KGB]], though these characterizations rest on journalistic sourcing rather than disclosed files, and no archive of any of the three services has been released that confirms a formal agent relationship.[^2][^7]
|
||||
|
||||
### Murder Allegations
|
||||
|
||||
Two former Israeli intelligence figures alleged that Maxwell was killed on Mossad orders. The former case officer [[Victor Ostrovsky]], in his 1994 memoir *The Other Side of Deception*, wrote that Maxwell had become a liability once his empire began collapsing and had threatened to expose Mossad operations unless the agency rescued him financially, ending the passage with the line, "On that cold night Mossad's problems with Robert Maxwell were over."[^27] Gordon Thomas and Martin Dillon, in *Robert Maxwell, Israel's Superspy* (2002), identified [[Rafael Eitan|Rafi Eitan]] as having overseen an assassination and named the operative they said carried it out only by the pseudonym "Efraim," describing the killing as having occurred on the aft deck of the Lady Ghislaine before the body entered the water.[^23] Maxwell's family and the Spanish judicial finding rejected all foul-play theories, and no official inquiry has substantiated them; the proximity of Maxwell's death to that of the journalist [[Danny Casolaro]] 87 days earlier, whose "[[The Octopus]]" investigation had encompassed the PROMIS distribution network, was noted by INSLAW and congressional investigators.[^7][^24]
|
||||
Two former Israeli intelligence figures alleged that Maxwell was killed on Mossad orders. The former case officer [[Victor Ostrovsky]], in his 1994 memoir *The Other Side of Deception*, wrote that Maxwell had become a liability once his empire began collapsing and had threatened to expose Mossad operations unless the agency rescued him financially, ending the passage with the line, "On that cold night Mossad's problems with Robert Maxwell were over."[^31] Gordon Thomas and Martin Dillon, in *Robert Maxwell, Israel's Superspy* (2002), identified [[Rafael Eitan|Rafi Eitan]] as having overseen an assassination and named the operative they said carried it out only by the pseudonym "Efraim," describing the killing as having occurred on the aft deck of the Lady Ghislaine before the body entered the water.[^27] Maxwell's family and the Spanish judicial finding rejected all foul-play theories, and no official inquiry has substantiated them; the proximity of Maxwell's death to that of the journalist [[Danny Casolaro]] 87 days earlier, whose "[[The Octopus]]" investigation had encompassed the PROMIS distribution network, was noted by INSLAW and congressional investigators.[^7][^28]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Allegations in JPMorgan's Files and Epstein's Email
|
||||
|
||||
The Mossad allegations entered the compliance record of [[JPMorgan Chase|JPMorgan]]. On December 6, 2013 the Reputation Risk Committee of the bank's asset management division met in the office of its chair, John Duffy, to review the account of Ghislaine Maxwell, which the summary said had been "originally referred to the PB by Jes Staley," referring to [[Jes Staley]] and the private bank. The summary described her as "the daughter of the late Robert Maxwell," recounted the collapse of his companies and the theft from their pension funds, and stated: "Shortly before Maxwell's death, a former employee of Israel's [[Aman|Military Intelligence Directorate]] intelligence agency Ari Ben-Menashe, had approached a number of news organizations in Britain and the United States with the allegation that Maxwell and the Daily Mirror's foreign editor, Nicholas [surname omitted in the document] were both long-time agents for Mossad. Ben-Menashe also claimed that in 1986 Maxwell had told the Israeli Embassy in London that [[Mordecai Vanunu|Mordechai Vanunu]] had given information about Israel's nuclear capability to [[The Sunday Times]], then to the Daily Mirror. Vanunu was subsequently kidnapped by Mossad and smuggled to Israel, convicted of treason and imprisoned for 18 years." Under negative news it listed 2011 reports "alleging Maxwell solicited young girls for then boyfriend Jeffrey Epstein" and noted that Epstein "is currently being exited from the Bank." The committee's decision was "Exit client," for the reason "Negative media."[^28] The summary was filed as an exhibit in the [[United States Virgin Islands]]' 2023 suit against the bank.[^28]
|
||||
The Mossad allegations entered the compliance record of [[JPMorgan Chase|JPMorgan]]. On December 6, 2013 the Reputation Risk Committee of the bank's asset management division met in the office of its chair, John Duffy, to review the account of Ghislaine Maxwell, which the summary said had been "originally referred to the PB by Jes Staley," referring to [[Jes Staley]] and the private bank. The summary described her as "the daughter of the late Robert Maxwell," recounted the collapse of his companies and the theft from their pension funds, and stated: "Shortly before Maxwell's death, a former employee of Israel's [[Aman|Military Intelligence Directorate]] intelligence agency Ari Ben-Menashe, had approached a number of news organizations in Britain and the United States with the allegation that Maxwell and the Daily Mirror's foreign editor, Nicholas [surname omitted in the document] were both long-time agents for Mossad. Ben-Menashe also claimed that in 1986 Maxwell had told the Israeli Embassy in London that [[Mordecai Vanunu|Mordechai Vanunu]] had given information about Israel's nuclear capability to [[The Sunday Times]], then to the Daily Mirror. Vanunu was subsequently kidnapped by Mossad and smuggled to Israel, convicted of treason and imprisoned for 18 years." Under negative news it listed 2011 reports "alleging Maxwell solicited young girls for then boyfriend Jeffrey Epstein" and noted that Epstein "is currently being exited from the Bank." The committee's decision was "Exit client," for the reason "Negative media."[^32] The summary was filed as an exhibit in the [[United States Virgin Islands]]' 2023 suit against the bank.[^32]
|
||||
|
||||
On March 15, 2018 Epstein sent an email with the subject line "he was passed away" to a recipient whose name is redacted. It consisted of quoted passages, their source not shown, stating that "Robert Maxwell 'threatened Mossad," that he told the agency "unless they gave him £400million to save his crumbling empire, he would expose all he had done for them," that "he had free access to [[Margaret Thatcher]]'s Downing Street, to [[Ronald Reagan]]'s [[White House]], to the Kremlin and to the corridors of power throughout Europe," that "Maxwell passed on all the secrets he learned to Mossad in Tel Aviv," and that "He appointed himself as Israel's unofficial ambassador to the Soviet Bloc."[^29]
|
||||
On March 15, 2018 Epstein sent an email with the subject line "he was passed away" to a recipient whose name is redacted. It consisted of quoted passages, their source not shown, stating that "Robert Maxwell 'threatened Mossad," that he told the agency "unless they gave him £400million to save his crumbling empire, he would expose all he had done for them," that "he had free access to [[Margaret Thatcher]]'s Downing Street, to [[Ronald Reagan]]'s [[White House]], to the Kremlin and to the corridors of power throughout Europe," that "Maxwell passed on all the secrets he learned to Mossad in Tel Aviv," and that "He appointed himself as Israel's unofficial ambassador to the Soviet Bloc."[^33]
|
||||
|
||||
### Funeral in Jerusalem
|
||||
|
||||
Maxwell's body was flown to Israel, and on November 10, 1991, he was given a state-style funeral and buried on the [[Mount of Olives]] in [[Jerusalem]], one of Judaism's most revered burial grounds.[^30] The ceremony at Jerusalem's convention center drew President [[Chaim Herzog]], Prime Minister [[Yitzhak Shamir]], and much of the Israeli political establishment, with reporting that at least six serving and former heads of Israeli intelligence were present.[^7][^30] His friend and longtime attorney [[Samuel Pisar]], a Holocaust survivor, recited the Kaddish.[^1]
|
||||
Maxwell's body was flown to Israel, and on November 10, 1991, he was given a state-style funeral and buried on the [[Mount of Olives]] in [[Jerusalem]], one of Judaism's most revered burial grounds.[^34] The ceremony at Jerusalem's convention center drew President [[Chaim Herzog]], Prime Minister [[Yitzhak Shamir]], and much of the Israeli political establishment, with reporting that at least six serving and former heads of Israeli intelligence were present.[^7][^34] His friend and longtime attorney [[Samuel Pisar]], a Holocaust survivor, recited the Kaddish.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Herzog eulogized him with the words, "He scaled the heights of human endeavor. Kings and princes waited on him."[^30] Shamir praised the connections and investment Maxwell had brought to Israel during the 1980s, reportedly saying that Maxwell had done more for Israel than could then be told.[^31] The scale of the official Israeli observance was later cited by writers who argued it reflected an intelligence relationship, though attendance at a prominent Jewish philanthropist's funeral is not itself evidence of espionage, and no Israeli official has confirmed that Maxwell was an agent.[^7][^30]
|
||||
Herzog eulogized him with the words, "He scaled the heights of human endeavor. Kings and princes waited on him."[^34] Shamir praised the connections and investment Maxwell had brought to Israel during the 1980s, reportedly saying that Maxwell had done more for Israel than could then be told.[^35] The scale of the official Israeli observance was later cited by writers who argued it reflected an intelligence relationship, though attendance at a prominent Jewish philanthropist's funeral is not itself evidence of espionage, and no Israeli official has confirmed that Maxwell was an agent.[^7][^34]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -139,14 +141,18 @@ Herzog eulogized him with the words, "He scaled the heights of human endeavor. K
|
|||
[^18]: UK Parliament, Early Day Motion 2134, "Mirror Group Newspapers and Israeli Intelligence." https://edm.parliament.uk/early-day-motion/2134/mirror-group-newspapers-and-israeli-intelligence
|
||||
[^19]: House of Commons, *Hansard,* HC Deb 24 January 1996, vol 270, cc453-462, "Saudi Arabia" (George Galloway). https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1996/jan/24/saudi-arabia
|
||||
[^20]: Ward, Vicky. "The Talented Mr. Epstein." *Vanity Fair,* March 2003. https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2003/03/jeffrey-epstein-200303
|
||||
[^21]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network.* Sheridan Square Press, 1992.
|
||||
[^22]: Contemporaneous press reporting on the 1986 Mordechai Vanunu affair and the Sunday Mirror's handling of his Dimona account, on which Ben-Menashe's claims about Nicholas Davies and Oscar Guerrero rest.
|
||||
[^23]: Thomas, Gordon, and Martin Dillon. *Robert Maxwell, Israel's Superspy: The Life and Murder of a Media Mogul.* Carroll & Graf, 2002.
|
||||
[^24]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, on the rejection of the Leigh Ratiner and PROMIS-distribution allegations and the proximity of the Casolaro and Maxwell deaths.
|
||||
[^25]: "Probe by House finds no 'October surprise,'" *The Baltimore Sun,* 1993. https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1993-01-13-1993013111-story.html
|
||||
[^26]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report on the Review of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua's Report on the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc.,* September 27, 1994, section on the INSLAW addendum of February 1994. https://archive.org/details/InslawPROMISBuaReport
|
||||
[^27]: Ostrovsky, Victor. *The Other Side of Deception: A Rogue Agent Exposes the Mossad's Secret Agenda.* HarperCollins, 1994, on the alleged Mossad motive to eliminate Maxwell as a collapsing liability.
|
||||
[^28]: U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Library, EFTA02816127, Court Records, Government of the United States Virgin Islands v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 22-cv-10904 (S.D.N.Y.), ECF No. 285-12, Exhibit 55, filed August 15, 2023, "AM Reputation Risk Committee Meeting Summary," meeting of December 6, 2013. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/Court%20Records/Government%20of%20the%20United%20States%20Virgin%20Islands%20v.%20JPMorgan%20Chase%20Bank%2C%20N.A.%2C%20No.%20122-cv-10904%20(S.D.N.Y.%202022)/EFTA02816127.pdf
|
||||
[^29]: U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Library, EFTA02507843, DataSet 11, email from Jeffrey Epstein, "he was passed away," March 15, 2018. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2011/EFTA02507843.pdf
|
||||
[^30]: "Maxwell, Colossus Even in Death, Laid to Rest on Mount of Olives," *Jewish Telegraphic Agency,* 1991. https://www.jta.org/archive/maxwell-colossus-even-in-death-laid-to-rest-on-mount-of-olives
|
||||
[^31]: "Maxwell buried on Mount of Olives," *UPI,* 1991. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1991/11/10/Maxwell-buried-on-Mount-of-Olives/4340689749200/
|
||||
[^21]: "Mirrorgate: Spies, Arms Dealers and Secrets," The Sunday Times (London), October 27, 1991, reproduced at https://peterhounam.com/?p=4257.
|
||||
[^22]: United Press International, "Maxwell to seek injunction against book," October 23, 1991, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1991/10/23/Maxwell-to-seek-injunction-against-book/9254688190400/.
|
||||
[^23]: "One Man, Many Tales," Newsweek, November 4, 1991, https://www.newsweek.com/one-man-many-tales-201744.
|
||||
[^24]: Associated Press, "Writer wins damages, apology in libel suit," Deseret News, August 20, 1994, https://www.deseret.com/1994/8/20/19125977/writer-wins-damages-apology-in-libel-suit.
|
||||
[^25]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network.* Sheridan Square Press, 1992.
|
||||
[^26]: Contemporaneous press reporting on the 1986 Mordechai Vanunu affair and the Sunday Mirror's handling of his Dimona account, on which Ben-Menashe's claims about Nicholas Davies and Oscar Guerrero rest.
|
||||
[^27]: Thomas, Gordon, and Martin Dillon. *Robert Maxwell, Israel's Superspy: The Life and Murder of a Media Mogul.* Carroll & Graf, 2002.
|
||||
[^28]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, on the rejection of the Leigh Ratiner and PROMIS-distribution allegations and the proximity of the Casolaro and Maxwell deaths.
|
||||
[^29]: "Probe by House finds no 'October surprise,'" *The Baltimore Sun,* 1993. https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1993-01-13-1993013111-story.html
|
||||
[^30]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report on the Review of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua's Report on the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc.,* September 27, 1994, section on the INSLAW addendum of February 1994. https://archive.org/details/InslawPROMISBuaReport
|
||||
[^31]: Ostrovsky, Victor. *The Other Side of Deception: A Rogue Agent Exposes the Mossad's Secret Agenda.* HarperCollins, 1994, on the alleged Mossad motive to eliminate Maxwell as a collapsing liability.
|
||||
[^32]: U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Library, EFTA02816127, Court Records, Government of the United States Virgin Islands v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 22-cv-10904 (S.D.N.Y.), ECF No. 285-12, Exhibit 55, filed August 15, 2023, "AM Reputation Risk Committee Meeting Summary," meeting of December 6, 2013. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/Court%20Records/Government%20of%20the%20United%20States%20Virgin%20Islands%20v.%20JPMorgan%20Chase%20Bank%2C%20N.A.%2C%20No.%20122-cv-10904%20(S.D.N.Y.%202022)/EFTA02816127.pdf
|
||||
[^33]: U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Library, EFTA02507843, DataSet 11, email from Jeffrey Epstein, "he was passed away," March 15, 2018. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2011/EFTA02507843.pdf
|
||||
[^34]: "Maxwell, Colossus Even in Death, Laid to Rest on Mount of Olives," *Jewish Telegraphic Agency,* 1991. https://www.jta.org/archive/maxwell-colossus-even-in-death-laid-to-rest-on-mount-of-olives
|
||||
[^35]: "Maxwell buried on Mount of Olives," *UPI,* 1991. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1991/11/10/Maxwell-buried-on-Mount-of-Olives/4340689749200/
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -11,18 +11,20 @@ tags:
|
|||
- FISACourt
|
||||
- DOJ
|
||||
- Judiciary
|
||||
summary: "Chief of the civil division of the U.S. Attorney's office in Washington who, weeks before taking the federal bench in 1987, delivered Judge Bason's INSLAW ruling to the judge chairing the panel on Bason's reappointment; later presiding judge of the FISA court."
|
||||
summary: "Washington U.S. Attorney's civil chief who, weeks before joining the federal bench in 1987, delivered Judge Bason's INSLAW ruling to the judge chairing the reappointment panel; later presiding judge of the FISA court."
|
||||
born: 1943
|
||||
location: "San Antonio, Texas"
|
||||
created: 2026-09-22
|
||||
updated: 2026-09-22
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Royce C. Lamberth (born 1943, San Antonio, [[Texas]]) is a judge of the [[United States District Court for the District of Columbia]], appointed by [[Ronald Reagan]] in 1987 after thirteen years in the [[U.S. Attorney's office]] for the District, where from 1978 he was chief of the civil division. He took his law degree at the [[University of Texas School of Law]] in 1967 and served as a captain in the Army Judge Advocate General's Corps until 1974. He presided over the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court from 1995 to 2002, was chief judge of the district court from 2008 to 2013, and took senior status on July 15, 2013.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Bason Reappointment
|
||||
|
||||
On September 28, 1987, Bankruptcy Judge [[George Francis Bason, Jr.|George Bason]] ruled from the bench that the [[Department of Justice]] had taken [[INSLAW]]'s [[PROMIS]] software "by trickery, fraud, and deceit." Bason's term was then before a merit selection panel of the district court chaired by Judge [[Norma H. Johnson]], which did not recommend his reappointment. Johnson told the special counsel [[Nicholas J. Bua]] that she had received a transcript of Bason's oral ruling from Lamberth, "who at the time was the Chief of the Civil Division for the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia"; she had at first failed to recall the contact. Bua's report noted that when Lamberth brought the ruling to Johnson's attention he was still employed at the U.S. Attorney's office but "had, in fact, already been nominated to the federal bench," Reagan having named him on March 19, 1987, "and was sworn in shortly thereafter, on November 16, 1987." The Senate had confirmed him on November 13. Bua concluded that no Justice Department official had improperly influenced the selection panel, that the contact was the only evidence found of any department contact with the reappointment process, and that the episode did not call Johnson's credibility into doubt.[^1][^2]
|
||||
On September 28, 1987, Bankruptcy Judge [[George Francis Bason, Jr.|George Bason]] ruled from the bench that the [[Department of Justice]] had taken [[INSLAW]]'s [[PROMIS]] software "by trickery, fraud, and deceit." Bason's term was then before a merit selection panel of the district court chaired by Judge [[Norma H. Johnson]], which did not recommend his reappointment. Johnson told the special counsel [[Nicholas J. Bua]] that she had received a transcript of Bason's oral ruling from Lamberth, "who at the time was the Chief of the Civil Division for the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia." The report states that Johnson first recalled that a different district judge told her to get the transcript, and on contacting that judge found she was mistaken; it was Lamberth. After contacting Lamberth at the investigators' request she recalled that he handed her a copy and said something to the effect of "You ought to see this"; Lamberth could not recall whether he delivered it or referred her to it. Reagan named Lamberth to the district court on March 19, 1987. Bua's report states that he "was confirmed for the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on November 13, 1987," and "was not sworn in until November 16, 1987."[^2] The Justice Department's September 27, 1994 review of the report wrote that when Lamberth brought the ruling to Johnson's attention he "had, in fact, already been nominated to the federal bench" and "was sworn in shortly thereafter, on November 16, 1987."[^3] Bua concluded that no Justice Department official had improperly influenced the selection panel, that the contact was the only evidence found of any department contact with the reappointment process, and that the episode did not call Johnson's credibility into doubt.[^1][^2]
|
||||
|
||||
The report states that Lamberth brought the ruling to Johnson's attention because he wanted to avoid "blindsiding" the other judges on the committee he imagined would vote on Bason's reappointment; he correctly assumed he would be confirmed and sworn in before a bankruptcy judge was selected and erroneously believed that the district judges would make the selection. He had also asked the Assistant U.S. Attorney [[Patricia Froman]], who handled most bankruptcy cases for the government in the District, for her views of Bason, and she told him the government would be better off if Bason were not reappointed. The report wrote that Lamberth "had every reason to try to influence the selection process to select a bankruptcy judge in whom he had confidence," that his approach to the panel's chair was proper "even if he did so solely as a government attorney interested in opposing the appointment of a judge whom he regarded as unfair to the government," and that his conduct "bespeaks restraint, not a campaign to unseat Bason in retaliation for the Inslaw ruling." The report states that Johnson told the Senate subcommittee that she had no contacts with DOJ regarding Bason and received no negative input from DOJ on the Inslaw case, and that she appeared to have told the House committee the same.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### Later Career
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -31,4 +33,5 @@ Lamberth's [[Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court]] service ran from 1995 to
|
|||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Federal Judicial Center, "Lamberth, Royce C.," Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges. https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/lamberth-royce-c
|
||||
[^2]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.,* March 1993, pp. 156-157, 165-166 (the report's own pagination). https://archive.org/details/InslawPROMISBuaReport
|
||||
[^2]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 156-157, 160-165. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^3]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of the United States Department of Justice on the Review of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua's Report on the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc.* September 27, 1994, pp. 101-102. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -2,21 +2,209 @@
|
|||
category: "Authors & Journalists"
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- Person
|
||||
- Journalist
|
||||
- Nuclear
|
||||
- Israel
|
||||
summary: "Hersh conducted extensive research for *The Samson Option*, interviewing many senior American officials, most of whom spoke for the first time about their knowledge of Israel's nuclear arsenal."
|
||||
- Media
|
||||
- Pulitzer
|
||||
- MyLai
|
||||
- OperationCHAOS
|
||||
- Azorian
|
||||
- Holystone
|
||||
- ChurchCommittee
|
||||
- SamsonOption
|
||||
- Chile
|
||||
- AbuGhraib
|
||||
- AriBenMenashe
|
||||
- RobertMaxwell
|
||||
aliases:
|
||||
- Seymour M. Hersh
|
||||
- Sy Hersh
|
||||
- Seymour Hersch
|
||||
summary: "Seymour M. Hersh is an investigative journalist whose reporting on My Lai, CIA domestic surveillance, Israel's nuclear program and Abu Ghraib drew responses from the governments concerned."
|
||||
born: 1937-04-08
|
||||
location: "Chicago, Illinois, USA"
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[City News Bureau of Chicago]]"
|
||||
start: 1959
|
||||
end: 1960
|
||||
role: police reporter
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[Associated Press]]"
|
||||
start: 1963
|
||||
end: 1967
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[Eugene McCarthy]]"
|
||||
start: 1968
|
||||
end: 1968
|
||||
role: press secretary, presidential campaign
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[Dispatch News Service]]"
|
||||
start: 1969
|
||||
end: 1970
|
||||
role: reporter, My Lai Massacre
|
||||
fn: 4
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[New York Times]]"
|
||||
start: 1972
|
||||
end: 1979
|
||||
role: Washington and New York reporter
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[The New Yorker]]"
|
||||
start: 1992
|
||||
role: contributor
|
||||
fn: 2
|
||||
- type: subject_of
|
||||
with: "[[Department of Justice]]"
|
||||
start: 1975
|
||||
end: 1975
|
||||
role: proposed leak inquiry, May-June 1975
|
||||
fn: 24
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
[[Seymour Hersh]] is an [[United States|American]] investigative journalist and author. His book, *The [[Samson Option]]: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*, published in 1991, details how [[Israel]] secretly became a nuclear power and how this secret was largely ignored or sanctioned by top U.S. officials since the [[Dwight D. Eisenhower|Eisenhower]] years.[^1][^2]
|
||||
[[Seymour Hersh]] (born April 8, 1937, in [[Chicago, Illinois]]) is an [[United States|American]] investigative journalist and author. He won the 1970 [[Pulitzer Prize]] in International Reporting for his account of the [[My Lai Massacre]], reported for the [[New York Times]] in the 1970s, and has written books on [[Israel]]'s nuclear program, [[Henry A. Kissinger]] and [[John F. Kennedy]]. Several of his stories drew formal responses from the agencies and governments they named, and those responses are recorded in the files described below.
|
||||
|
||||
Hersh conducted extensive research for *The Samson Option*, interviewing many senior American officials, most of whom spoke for the first time about their knowledge of [[Israel]]'s nuclear arsenal. He chose not to conduct research in [[Israel]] due to the country's censorship laws, which require journalists to submit all material to military censors who can make changes or deletions if they perceive a threat to national security.[^2]
|
||||
### Early career
|
||||
|
||||
Hersh's book, along with [[Gary Sick|Gary Sick's]] *October Surprise*, quoted [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] as a prominent source. This led to an intense and prolonged barrage of media attacks seeking to discredit [[Ari Ben-Menashe|Ben-Menashe]].[^1]
|
||||
Hersh was a police reporter for the [[City News Bureau of Chicago]] from 1959 to 1960.[^1] He then worked for [[United Press International]], which sent him to [[Pierre, South Dakota]]. In 1963 the [[Associated Press]] hired him in Chicago, and by 1964 he was working for the agency in Washington. He left the AP in 1967.[^1] His first book, *Chemical and Biological Warfare: America's Hidden Arsenal*, was published by [[Bobbs-Merrill]] in 1968.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Robert Maxwell|Maxwell]] and the [[Mirror Newspaper Group]] sued [[Seymour Hersh|Hersh]] and his publishers over the allegations in *The [[Samson Option]]*. However, some of the critical denials in the *Mirror* articles were shown to be false, and [[Seymour Hersh|Hersh]] and his publishers filed a countersuit against [[Robert Maxwell|Maxwell]], [[Nicholas Davies]], and the [[Mirror Newspaper Group]].[^1]
|
||||
In 1968 Hersh was press secretary to Senator [[Eugene McCarthy]] during the antiwar Democrat's presidential primary campaign. He left politics after McCarthy lost the 1968 primaries.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### My Lai and the 1970 Pulitzer Prize
|
||||
|
||||
In November 1969 Hersh published his account of the My Lai Massacre through the [[Dispatch News Service]], a Washington agency that sold stories to newspapers. Under a directive of November 26, 1969, the [[U.S. Army]] had Lieutenant General [[William R. Peers]] investigate the original Army investigation of the events of March 16 to 19, 1968 in Son My Village, [[Quang Ngai Province]]. Peers's final report is dated March 14, 1970.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
The 1970 Pulitzer Prize in International Reporting went to Hersh, listed under the Dispatch News Service in Washington, for his reporting on My Lai.[^4] [[Random House]] published his books *My Lai 4: A Report on the Massacre and Its Aftermath* in 1970 and *Cover-Up: The Army's Secret Investigation of the Massacre at My Lai 4* in 1972.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### Indochina reporting and the CIA, 1972
|
||||
|
||||
On July 3, 1972, the New York Times ran Hersh's article reporting that the United States had been secretly seeding clouds over North Vietnam, Laos and South Vietnam for military purposes. Government sources, civilian and military, told him the [[U.S. Air Force]] program had most recently been aimed at hindering the movement of North Vietnamese troops. A former [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] agent was quoted saying that the agency first used the technique over Hue in about August 1963, when the [[Ngo Dinh Diem|Diem]] regime was facing Buddhist demonstrations.[^5] On July 5, 1972, John Goldsmith of the [[Senate Armed Services Committee]] staff called the CIA's legislative counsel, John M. Maury, to say that the story was attracting considerable interest and would no doubt be the subject of formal inquiry in upcoming Senate deliberations. Goldsmith said he was preparing a note for Chairman [[John Stennis]] suggesting that Stennis be briefed.[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
On November 30, 1972, Representative [[Lucien Nedzi]], chairman of the House Armed Services intelligence subcommittee, told the CIA's legislative counsel of an earlier conversation that day with Hersh. Nedzi relayed three allegations that he said Hersh had raised: that narcotics were coming out of Indochina on Continental Air Lines flights; that the CIA had conducted surveillance of foreign embassies in the United States, in one instance over the objection of the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]]; and that the Agency had used pressure to get an American traveling to China to cooperate in supplying information. The memorandum records that the third allegation concerned Nedzi most, and that the legislative counsel offered a briefing on the [[Domestic Contact Service]].[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### Chile, 1974
|
||||
|
||||
On September 8, 1974, the New York Times published Hersh's report that [[William Colby]], the Director of Central Intelligence, had told Congress that the Nixon administration authorized more than $8 million in covert activities by the CIA in [[Chile]] between 1970 and 1973 to make it impossible for [[Salvador Allende]] to govern. Colby testified at a top-secret hearing in April 1974 that the aim was to "destabilize" the Marxist government. The article also reported that the agency first intervened against Allende in 1964, when he was a presidential candidate.[^7]
|
||||
|
||||
### Operation CHAOS and the 1975 inquiries
|
||||
|
||||
On December 20, 1974, Colby met Hersh at CIA headquarters. In his memoir, Colby wrote that Hersh told him he had learned from several sources of a "massive" operation against the antiwar movement involving wiretaps, break-ins, mail intercepts and surveillance of American citizens, and that Colby told him the story had merged two separate matters: an operation to determine whether foreign powers were manipulating the antiwar movement, which Colby said had been terminated, and mail intercepts, wiretaps and surveillance that he said had nothing to do with the antiwar movement.[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
Hersh's article in the New York Times of December 22, 1974, on page one and datelined December 21, reported from "well-placed Government sources" that the CIA had conducted a massive illegal domestic intelligence operation against the antiwar movement and other dissident groups during the Nixon administration. It reported that intelligence files on at least 10,000 American citizens were kept by a special unit of the CIA reporting directly to [[Richard Helms]], then Ambassador to [[Iran]]. An unnamed official was quoted saying, "This is explosive, it could destroy the agency."[^9] According to the editors of the *Foreign Relations of the United States* volume, the article named [[James Jesus Angleton]] as overseer of the operations and [[Richard Ober]] as the official who assembled a large staff, and reported on mail opening and on surveillance of antiwar activists, journalists and former employees, including [[Victor Marchetti]]. It also reported that a check of CIA files ordered by [[James R. Schlesinger]] had produced evidence of dozens of other illegal activities inside the United States beginning in the 1950s.[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
The Department of Justice announced on December 23 that it would investigate the charges. Senators [[John Sparkman]] and Stennis and Representative Nedzi announced hearings for January. Colby telephoned President [[Gerald Ford]] aboard Air Force One and told him that nothing comparable to the article's allegations was going on in the Agency. On December 23, Henry A. Kissinger telephoned White House Chief of Staff [[Donald Rumsfeld]], who was in Vail. Kissinger told him, "I do know that Sy Hersh is a son-of-a-bitch," and recommended asking Colby for a written report on the body of fact to which the article referred.[^8] The White House had not been briefed on the catalogue of CIA misdeeds that Schlesinger had commissioned the year before, known as the [[CIA Family Jewels]].[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
CIA records carry the program as [[Operation CHAOS]], MHCHAOS. The first piece of official correspondence in the Agency's chronology is an August 15, 1967 memorandum from [[Thomas Karamessines]], Deputy Director for Plans, to the Chief of the Counter Intelligence Staff, which named Harry Rositzke and Dick Ober as candidates to run it.[^10] The [[Rockefeller Commission 1975|Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States]] reported that the operation compiled some 13,000 different files, including files on 7,200 American citizens, with the names of more than 300,000 persons and organizations entered in a computerized index, and that the Agency terminated it on March 15, 1974.[^11] The [[Church Committee]] reported the same figures and that the program was not terminated until March 1974.[^12]
|
||||
|
||||
In January 1975 the Rockefeller Commission was constituted under Vice President [[Nelson Rockefeller]].[^13] On January 27, 1975, the Senate created the Church Committee, the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, chaired by [[Frank Church]]. Its final report was issued on April 26, 1976.[^14]
|
||||
|
||||
Hersh also appears in the Church Committee's own findings. In 1971 the computer of the Justice Department's Interdivisional Information Unit included data on prominent persons, among them Seymour Hersh, [[Ralph Abernathy]] and [[Cesar Chavez]]; the unit's subject list, when provided to the CIA, contained records of approximately ten to twelve thousand individuals.[^15][^16]
|
||||
|
||||
### Glomar Explorer and Colby's requests to delay
|
||||
|
||||
Hersh had been investigating the [[Hughes Glomar Explorer]], the CIA vessel built to raise a sunken Soviet submarine, since as early as January 1974. A note to the March 19, 1975 memorandum of conversation in the *Foreign Relations of the United States* volume, citing the CIA Executive Registry files, states that Colby urged Hersh to delay publication in conversations on February 1, 1974 and February 10, 1975.[^17] The volume's editorial note states that Colby had held meetings with journalists, including Hersh, to persuade them to delay stories about the operation. Syndicated columnist [[Jack Anderson]] mentioned the ship on his radio program on March 18, 1975. The next day the [[Los Angeles Times]], the [[Washington Post]] and the New York Times published front-page stories on the vessel. Hersh's March 19 article in the New York Times gave the operation's purpose, a cost estimated at more than $250 million, the technology and the results.[^18]
|
||||
|
||||
On March 28, 1975, Colby argued that a second mission was inadvisable after the exposure. The [[40 Committee]] concluded on June 5 that the program should end, and Ford approved that recommendation on June 16. The ship was mothballed on August 30, 1976.[^18]
|
||||
|
||||
### The submarine intercept story and the May 1975 prosecution deliberations
|
||||
|
||||
The prosecution deliberations in the Ford files concern a different Hersh article. The New York Times published it on May 25, 1975, and it described intercept missions by American submarines in Soviet waters, under the codeword Holystone. President Ford convened a meeting on Tuesday, May 27, 1975, from 5:00 to 5:55 p.m. in the Cabinet Room, with Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, Colby, Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of State [[Robert Ingersoll]] and [[Brent Scowcroft]]. The memorandum of the meeting records Ford saying, "Somehow someone must be made an example of," and Schlesinger calling the disclosure "a flagrant violation of the law." Schlesinger said he had spoken to the Attorney General the month before, that there was some indication Hersh held files of signals intelligence material, and asked "How about a search warrant to get them?" Colby said a June 1974 New York Times article had been similar but without detail and had seemed to come from the Marchetti book, that the Supreme Court's refusal to review the Marchetti case was good news, and that although publication under Section 798 of the Espionage Act was a crime, there had been only one conviction under it, on a guilty plea. Scowcroft said the real problem was the people leaking the material.[^19]
|
||||
|
||||
Ford said an internal investigation was needed, at least internally and perhaps by the Bureau. Schlesinger suggested that the FBI do it, and the memorandum records, in brackets, "The President decided to go the FBI route." Ford said a communication to Justice ought to ask for action and for recommendations under the law ("prosecution of Hersh and the New York Times"). Rumsfeld proposed formal notice to the New York Times that the matter was being taken seriously. Schlesinger said that if the mission were turned off, a search warrant should be considered, adding that the material "could also be given to a grand jury." Ford closed: "Let's get the best people in Phil's [Buchen's] office and Justice going on it. Also, Justice should look into the alternatives of getting at Hersh and the New York Times."[^19]
|
||||
|
||||
On May 30, 1975, Rumsfeld cabled [[Dick Cheney]] from Brussels asking to be told whether the operation would continue, saying the FBI investigation should begin soon unless it would adversely affect the operation, and directing that it not be initiated if it would.[^20] A memorandum of the same date from [[Robert McFarlane|Bud McFarlane]] of the National Security Council staff to Cheney, marked Holystone, reports the Defense Department position: that the Navy's tentative view was that planning for continuation should go forward, that an investigation was "considered a bad idea" to the extent it could generate publicity leading to a Soviet reaction, and that Schlesinger concurred.[^21] Cheney relayed this to Rumsfeld, recommended that no investigation be launched for the time being, and set out three options: continue the operation and take no action against those responsible for the story; continue it and take limited action such as private discussions with publishers; or discontinue the operation and enforce the laws against unauthorized disclosure.[^22]
|
||||
|
||||
A May 31, 1975 memorandum in the same folder reports a meeting at 11:00 a.m. that Saturday with McFarlane, Colby, Attorney General [[Edward Levi]], Admiral [[Bobby Ray Inman]], the Director of Naval Intelligence, and others. It states that Levi had instructed the Criminal Division and the FBI to prepare a specific proposal for an investigation into possible violations of the criminal code; that the FBI investigation would not begin until the plan was approved; that the Hersh story "has not created any great amount of interest"; and that Levi felt any FBI investigation must have sound legal justification, so that, in the memorandum's words, "we should not have an FBI investigation if there is no intention to prosecute." It adds that the Navy's intelligence director found the story's sources probably were ex-government employees and the Marchetti court file, and that the use of the outdated codename Holystone was a telling indicator.[^23]
|
||||
|
||||
On June 2, 1975, the Office of the Deputy Attorney General wrote to Colby with eleven questions that it said had to be answered to move ahead with the first steps necessary for a prosecution and for a determination whether a prosecution should be undertaken, including which statements in the May 25 article were classified and whether the data came from a specific document.[^24] An undated memorandum to the Attorney General from Assistant Attorney General [[Rex E. Lee]] and Acting Assistant Attorney General John C. Keeney of the Criminal Division described the investigative steps for a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. sections 793 and 798, for contempt proceedings in the Eastern District of Virginia over a protective order in the Marchetti case, and for a civil contempt action. It identified an interview with Hersh as the initial FBI step, noted that a similar article had appeared under the byline of Laurence Stern in the Washington Post on January 4, 1974, and stated that grand jury subpoenas to Hersh and Stern could follow, with a grant of immunity if they invoked the Fifth Amendment.[^25]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Price of Power (1983)
|
||||
|
||||
*The Price of Power: Kissinger in Nixon's White House* was published by [[Summit Books]] in 1983. An excerpt ran in the [[Atlantic Monthly]] in December 1982 in two installments under the title "Kissinger, Nixon, and Chile." The second installment opens with a Navy enlisted man assigned as confidential aide and secretary to Rear Admiral [[Rembrandt Robinson|Rembrandt C. Robinson]] on the National Security Council staff in September 1970, and describes the White House handling of its most highly classified documents, including intelligence material, in that office.[^26] In February 1981 the Times ran a front-page article by Hersh headlined "New Evidence Backs Ex-Envoy on His Role in Chile," concerning the former ambassador [[Edward Korry]].[^27]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Samson Option (1991)
|
||||
|
||||
*The [[Samson Option]]: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* was published by Random House in 1991, with a British edition from [[Faber and Faber]]. Hersh wrote that he interviewed many senior American officials, most of whom spoke for the first time about their knowledge of Israel's nuclear arsenal, and that he did not do research in Israel, where journalists must submit material to military censors who can make changes or deletions. The book describes how Israel became a nuclear power in secret and how that secret was shared, sanctioned and at times willfully ignored by top American officials since the [[Dwight D. Eisenhower|Eisenhower]] years.[^28]
|
||||
|
||||
Hersh's account of Israeli intelligence in the Maxwell and Davies episode rests on [[Ari Ben-Menashe]]. Hersh wrote that Ben-Menashe first contacted him in mid-1990, that interviews began in early 1991, and that Ben-Menashe agreed, in Hersh's words, "as no other Israeli would," to be directly quoted on nuclear issues. Ben-Menashe left the United States for exile in Australia in June 1991. Hersh added that Ben-Menashe's allegations about Iran arms sales had been strongly denied in Washington and Jerusalem and were still under congressional review in the summer of 1991.[^29] Ben-Menashe's account is that the book, together with [[Gary Sick]]'s *October Surprise*, which also quoted him as a prominent source, led to an intense and prolonged barrage of media attacks seeking to discredit him.[^30]
|
||||
|
||||
The book's account of [[Nicholas Davies]], foreign editor of the [[Daily Mirror]], comes from Ben-Menashe. Ben-Menashe is quoted saying that he and Davies had been partners in an arms sales firm, [[Ora Limited]], which operated from Davies's London home from 1983, and that "Davies was my main backup on all the Iran arms sales." He recalled that "Nick had a friend in the Mossad" and a casual meeting in London. Hersh wrote that Davies then accepted an invitation to visit Israel. Hersh also wrote that [[Mordechai Vanunu]] had been compromised to the Israelis by Davies, and that Davies's contact in the matter was Ben-Menashe.[^31] The book cites a 1987 cable to Ayatollah [[Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani]] offering four thousand TOW missiles at $13,800 each, which stated that a British citizen named Nicholas Davies would have authority to sign contracts in Iran on behalf of Ora Limited. Davies, reached by telephone, acknowledged that he knew Ben-Menashe, denied any involvement in arms sales, and said Ben-Menashe was only a news source. Hersh also quoted Davies's second wife, the actress [[Janet Fielding]], as saying she knew Davies was selling arms in partnership with Ben-Menashe while he was foreign editor of the Mirror.[^32]
|
||||
|
||||
The book was published in Britain on Monday, October 21, 1991. Two members of the [[House of Commons]], [[George Galloway]] and [[Rupert Allason]], raised its claims in the chamber the next day under parliamentary privilege.[^33] On October 23, 1991, [[Robert Maxwell]], the proprietor of the Mirror group, who was in New York, sought an injunction against distribution of the book, and the Mirror Group said libel writs were being issued against Faber and Faber. Davies said, "The allegations are a complete and total lie." Maxwell called the accusations "ludicrous, a total invention."[^34]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Newsweek]] reported on November 4, 1991 that Maxwell had sued, Davies had sued, and Faber and Faber had sued back. It reported that Hersh insisted he had independent verification for much of what Ben-Menashe said, that the Mirror had announced an internal investigation into one aspect of Davies's story, and that the former KGB head Viktor Chebrikov, whom Ben-Menashe named as having agreed to write a foreword for a planned book, told the magazine he was not writing anything and had never heard of Ben-Menashe.[^35] The Sunday Times of October 27, 1991 reported that its reporter Peter Hounam, who had handled Vanunu's story in 1986, had himself taken the photograph of Vanunu that Ben-Menashe said was flown from Israel to Davies, and had given it to Vanunu's agent. It reported that Hounam concluded none of Hersh's account of Ben-Menashe's dealings over the Vanunu affair had been verified from any other source, and that Hounam gave his opinion at a meeting with lawyers that Hersh had been hoaxed. Hersh argued that he had checked his facts, and Faber decided to go ahead. The same article quoted [[ABC News]] investigations producer Christopher Isham as saying that on a scale of unreliability from hero to minus eight, Ben-Menashe recorded minus eight or minus seven on every major question in a polygraph examination, and reported that Hersh believed such tests were unreliable.[^33]
|
||||
|
||||
Maxwell died in November 1991.[^36] In Ben-Menashe's account, Hersh and his publishers filed a countersuit against Maxwell, Davies and the Mirror Group, and some of the critical denials in the Mirror articles were shown to be false.[^30] On Thursday, August 18, 1994, [[Mirror Group Newspapers]] apologized "unreservedly" in court for a series of articles in October 1991 that attacked Hersh and Faber and Faber, acknowledged that its attacks had been "entirely improper," and agreed to pay Hersh and his publisher "substantial damages and meet their legal costs." Hersh had sued over suggestions that his book made false allegations about Maxwell and Davies.[^36] In his 2018 memoir *Reporter*, Hersh wrote that the newspaper issued "a very abject apology."[^37]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Dark Side of Camelot (1997)
|
||||
|
||||
*The Dark Side of Camelot* was published by [[Little, Brown]] in 1997. It examines John F. Kennedy's private conduct and his ties to organized crime.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### Abu Ghraib
|
||||
|
||||
Hersh published "Torture at Abu Ghraib" in [[The New Yorker]] on May 10, 2004, "Chain of Command" on May 17, and "The Gray Zone" on May 24; [[HarperCollins]] published *Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib* later that year.[^2] "The Gray Zone" attributed the origins of the [[Abu Ghraib]] abuses to a [[Pentagon]] operation, known inside the intelligence community by several code words including Copper Green, that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld approved in 2003 for expansion to the interrogation of prisoners. The article named [[Stephen Cambone]], the Under-Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and Major General [[Geoffrey Miller]], the commander at Guantanamo who was summoned to Baghdad in late August 2003, as central figures. It cited the internal Army report on the abuse charges, written by Major General [[Antonio Taguba]] in February, as showing that Miller urged commanders in Baghdad to place military intelligence in charge of the prison, and quoted the report as saying that "detention operations must act as an enabler for interrogation."[^38]
|
||||
|
||||
The former intelligence official quoted in the article said he was not alleging that Rumsfeld or General [[Richard Myers]] knew that atrocities were committed, but that "it was their permission granted to do the sap, generically, and there was enough ambiguity, which permitted the abuses." Asked for comment, a Pentagon spokesman said, "I will not discuss any covert programs; however, Dr. Cambone did not assume his position as the Under-Secretary of Defense for Intelligence until March 7, 2003, and had no involvement in the decision-making process regarding interrogation procedures in Iraq or anywhere else."[^38]
|
||||
|
||||
The Taguba report records that Lieutenant General [[Ricardo Sanchez]] asked on January 19, 2004 for an investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, citing detainee abuse, escapes and accountability lapses that he said indicated systemic problems.[^39] It describes a team led by Miller that visited the headquarters of Combined Joint Task Force Seven from August 31 to September 9, 2003, using Guantanamo procedures as baselines, and states that its executive summary said detention operations must act as an enabler for interrogation.[^40] The investigating officer commented that the Miller team's recommendation that the guard force be actively engaged in setting the conditions for exploitation of internees would appear to conflict with the recommendations of Major General Donald Ryder's team and Army Regulation 190-8.[^41] Taguba's finding of fact was that between October and December 2003 numerous incidents of "sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses" were inflicted on detainees in Tier 1-A at Abu Ghraib, intentionally perpetrated by several members of the military police guard force, and that members of the 325th Military Intelligence Battalion and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade also committed abuses.[^42]
|
||||
|
||||
### The killing of bin Laden and Nord Stream
|
||||
|
||||
Hersh's essay "The Killing of Osama bin Laden" appeared in the [[London Review of Books]] in the issue of May 21, 2015. It names as its major American source a retired senior intelligence official knowledgeable about the initial intelligence on [[Osama bin Laden]] in Abbottabad, with two other American sources who were longtime consultants to the Special Operations Command, and information from inside [[Pakistan]]. It states that bin Laden had been a prisoner of Pakistan's intelligence service at the Abbottabad compound since 2006, and that senior Pakistani military leaders knew of the raid in advance.[^43] On May 11, 2015, White House National Security Council spokesman [[Ned Price|Edward Price]] rejected the account: "This was a US operation through and through," he said, and "The notion that the operation was anything but a unilateral US mission is patently false."[^44]
|
||||
|
||||
On February 8, 2023, Hersh published "How America Took Out The Nord Stream Pipeline" on his [[Substack]] page, with the subtitle that the New York Times had called the attack a mystery but that the United States executed a covert sea operation that was kept secret until now.[^45] According to Newsweek's summary, Hersh wrote that President [[Joe Biden]] ordered specialized Navy divers to destroy the pipelines after the national security community debated the plan for nine months. The explosions had occurred on September 26, 2022, in the economic zones of Sweden and Denmark. White House National Security Council spokesperson [[Adrienne Watson]] said, according to Reuters, "This is utterly false and complete fiction," and spokespeople for the CIA and the State Department also denied the account.[^46]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
[^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
|
||||
[^2]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991.
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: EBSCO Research Starters, "Seymour M. Hersh," https://ebsco.com/research-starters/biography/seymour-m-hersh.
|
||||
[^2]: Daniel C. Tsang, "Selective Bibliography: Seymour M. Hersh," UC Irvine Libraries, November 13, 2007 (books, including *Chemical and Biological Warfare* (Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), *My Lai 4* (Random House, 1970), *Cover-Up* (Random House, 1972), *The Dark Side of Camelot* (Little, Brown, 1997) and *Chain of Command* (HarperCollins, 2004); New Yorker articles of May 10, May 17 and May 24, 2004; New Yorker articles from December 14, 1992).
|
||||
[^3]: Lieutenant General W. R. Peers, transmittal of the final report of investigation, March 14, 1970, in Department of the Army, *Report of the Department of the Army Review of the Preliminary Investigations into the My Lai Incident*, vol. I, 1970, https://archive.org/details/army-report-on-my-lai. The transmittal states that it follows the directive of November 26, 1969.
|
||||
[^4]: The Pulitzer Prizes, 1970 International Reporting, https://www.pulitzer.org/prize-winners-by-year/1970.
|
||||
[^5]: Memorandum for the record, OLC 72-0768, "Senate Armed Services Committee Interest in Hersh Story re 'Rainmaking,'" July 5, 1972, with attached copy of Seymour M. Hersh, "Cloud Seeding in Indochina Confirmed," *New York Times*, July 3, 1972, CIA-RDP75B00380R000100030115-5, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75b00380r000100030115-5.
|
||||
[^6]: Memorandum for the record, OLC 72-1162, "Representative Nedzi's Conversation of Today with Seymour Hersh of the New York Times," November 30, 1972, CIA-RDP75B00380R000100030019-2, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75b00380r000100030019-2.
|
||||
[^7]: Seymour M. Hersh, "C.I.A. Chief Tells House of $8-Million Campaign Against Allende in '70-73," *New York Times*, September 8, 1974 (dateline September 7), as reprinted in CIA reading room item CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020130-9, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp09t00207r001000020130-9.
|
||||
[^8]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, vol. XXXVIII, Part 2, Document 17, Editorial Note, quoting William E. Colby and Peter Forbath, *Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA* (Simon and Schuster, 1978), pp. 389-393, and a December 23, 1974 Kissinger telephone transcript (Department of State, Kissinger Telephone Transcripts), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v38p2/d17.
|
||||
[^9]: Seymour M. Hersh, "Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U.S. Against Antiwar Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years," *New York Times*, December 22, 1974, p. 1, as reprinted in CIA, *News, Views and Issues*, No. 21, December 27, 1974, CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340001-9, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp77-00432r000100340001-9.
|
||||
[^10]: CIA, "Chronology of Significant MHCHAOS Correspondence," item 1, approved for release January 18, 2017, CIA reading room document C01481988, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01481988.
|
||||
[^11]: Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, *Report to the President* (June 1975), ch. 11, "Special Operations Group, 'Operation CHAOS,'" pp. 130 and 148.
|
||||
[^12]: Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Final Report*, S. Rept. 94-755, Book II, "Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans," April 26, 1976, pp. 7 and 103.
|
||||
[^13]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, vol. XXXVIII, Part 2, Persons list (Rockefeller, Nelson A., Chairman of the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, January-June 1975), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v38p2.
|
||||
[^14]: Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Final Report*, S. Rept. 94-755, Book I, "Foreign and Military Intelligence," April 26, 1976, Letter of Transmittal (Senate established the Select Committee on January 27, 1975, by S. Res. 21).
|
||||
[^15]: Church Committee, *Final Report*, Book II, "Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans," April 26, 1976, p. 82.
|
||||
[^16]: Church Committee, *Final Report*, Book III, "Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans," April 26, 1976, pp. 503-504 (Justice Department Interdivisional Information Unit, citing Statement of Deputy Attorney General Laurence H. Silberman, January 14, 1975).
|
||||
[^17]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, vol. XXXV, Document 197, Memorandum of Conversation, March 19, 1975, editors' note citing CIA, Executive Registry, Job 80M01048A, Box 7, Seymour Hersh, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v35/d197.
|
||||
[^18]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, vol. XXXV, Document 183, Editorial Note, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v35/d183.
|
||||
[^19]: Memorandum of conversation, May 27, 1975, Ford, Schlesinger, Colby, Rumsfeld, Ingersoll, Scowcroft, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 12, https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1553088.pdf, pp. 1-3. The released text is declassified in part.
|
||||
[^20]: Cable from Rumsfeld, Brussels, to Cheney, May 30, 1975, Richard B. Cheney Files, Box 6, folder "Intelligence - New York Times Articles by Seymour Hersh (2)," Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0005/7288231.pdf.
|
||||
[^21]: Memorandum, Bud McFarlane to Dick Cheney, "Holystone," May 30, 1975, Cheney Files, Box 6, https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0005/7288231.pdf.
|
||||
[^22]: Memorandum, Cheney to Rumsfeld, May 30, 1975, Cheney Files, Box 6, https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0005/7288231.pdf.
|
||||
[^23]: Memorandum of May 31, 1975, Cheney Files, Box 6, https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0005/7288231.pdf, pp. 1-3.
|
||||
[^24]: Letter, Office of the Deputy Attorney General to W. E. Colby, June 2, 1975, Cheney Files, Box 6, https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0005/7288231.pdf.
|
||||
[^25]: Memorandum, Rex E. Lee and John C. Keeney to the Attorney General, "Recent Disclosure of Classified Information in New York Times Article," undated, Cheney Files, Box 6, https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0005/7288231.pdf, pp. 1-9.
|
||||
[^26]: Seymour M. Hersh, "Kissinger, Nixon, and Chile," *Atlantic Monthly*, December 1982, second of two installments, CIA reading room item CIA-RDP90-00965R000402830023-3, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000402830023-3. Book: *The Price of Power: Kissinger in Nixon's White House* (Summit Books, 1983).
|
||||
[^27]: Seymour M. Hersh, "New Evidence Backs Ex-Envoy on His Role in Chile," *New York Times*, February 1981, CIA reading room item CIA-RDP90-00965R000402830047-7, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000402830047-7.
|
||||
[^28]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (Random House, 1991), Author's Note, pp. ix-xi.
|
||||
[^29]: Hersh, *The Samson Option* (1991), note on Ben-Menashe at p. 260.
|
||||
[^30]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
|
||||
[^31]: Hersh, *The Samson Option* (1991), pp. 309-310.
|
||||
[^32]: Hersh, *The Samson Option* (1991), pp. 310-311.
|
||||
[^33]: "Mirrorgate: Spies, Arms Dealers and Secrets," *The Sunday Times* (London), October 27, 1991, reproduced at https://peterhounam.com/?p=4257.
|
||||
[^34]: United Press International, "Maxwell to seek injunction against book," October 23, 1991, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1991/10/23/Maxwell-to-seek-injunction-against-book/9254688190400/.
|
||||
[^35]: "One Man, Many Tales," *Newsweek*, November 4, 1991, https://www.newsweek.com/one-man-many-tales-201744.
|
||||
[^36]: Associated Press, "Writer wins damages, apology in libel suit," *Deseret News*, August 20, 1994, https://www.deseret.com/1994/8/20/19125977/writer-wins-damages-apology-in-libel-suit.
|
||||
[^37]: Seymour M. Hersh, *Reporter: A Memoir* (Allen Lane, 2018), as quoted in John Newsinger, review, *Lobster* 76, https://www.lobster-magazine.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/lob76-reporter-memoir.pdf.
|
||||
[^38]: Seymour M. Hersh, "The Gray Zone," *The New Yorker*, May 24, 2004, pp. 38-44, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/05/24/the-gray-zone.
|
||||
[^39]: Department of the Army, *Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade* (Taguba report), 2004, Background, para. 1, p. 6, https://hrlibrary.law.umn.edu/OathBetrayed/Taguba-Report.pdf.
|
||||
[^40]: Taguba report, Background, para. 6, p. 7, and Part One, Assessment of DoD Counter-Terrorism Interrogation and Detention Operations in Iraq (MG Miller's Assessment), para. 1, p. 8.
|
||||
[^41]: Taguba report, IO Comments on MG Miller's Assessment, para. 2, p. 9.
|
||||
[^42]: Taguba report, Findings of Fact, para. 5, p. 16.
|
||||
[^43]: Seymour M. Hersh, "The Killing of Osama bin Laden," *London Review of Books*, vol. 37, no. 10, May 21, 2015, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v37/n10/seymour-m.-hersh/the-killing-of-osama-bin-laden.
|
||||
[^44]: Agence France-Presse, "White House Rebuts Journalist's Claim on OBL Raid," *Defense News*, May 11, 2015, https://www.defensenews.com/global/mideast-africa/2015/05/11/white-house-rebuts-journalist-s-claim-on-obl-raid/.
|
||||
[^45]: Seymour M. Hersh, "How America Took Out The Nord Stream Pipeline," Substack, February 8, 2023, https://seymourhersh.substack.com/p/how-america-took-out-the-nord-stream.
|
||||
[^46]: Jon Jackson, "Did Biden Order an Attack on Russia's Nord Stream Pipelines? What We Know," *Newsweek*, February 8, 2023, https://www.newsweek.com/0-1779948.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
created: 2026-05-15
|
||||
updated: 2026-05-15
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
title: Stanley Levison
|
||||
aliases:
|
||||
- Stanley David Levison
|
||||
|
|
@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ tags:
|
|||
- ColdWar
|
||||
- 1960s
|
||||
category: "Activists & Advocates"
|
||||
summary: "Stanley Levison was a New York attorney and businessman who was one of Martin Luther King Jr.'s closest advisors and who had Communist Party USA ties in the early 1950s - providing the FBI's legal justification for wiretapping King and the SCLC beginning in 1962, despite the FBI's own evidence that Levison had severed his Communist Party ties before he became associated with King."
|
||||
summary: "New York attorney and businessman, one of Martin Luther King Jr.'s closest advisors, whose Communist Party USA ties in the early 1950s were the FBI's stated basis for wiretapping King and the SCLC from 1962."
|
||||
born: 1912-05-02
|
||||
died: 1979-09-12
|
||||
location: "New York, New York"
|
||||
|
|
@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ The FBI's wiretap authorization, granted by Robert Kennedy in October 1963, cove
|
|||
|
||||
The [[Church Committee]] investigated the FBI's surveillance of King and found that the Levison justification was inadequate to support the scope of surveillance actually conducted. The committee found that the FBI had information undermining the claim that Levison remained an active communist by the time the surveillance was authorized, and that the surveillance had extended far beyond any legitimate counterintelligence purpose into pure political harassment and disruption under [[COINTELPRO]].
|
||||
|
||||
The committee documented that [[William Sullivan]], head of the FBI's Domestic Intelligence Division, had personally prepared the anonymous "suicide letter" sent to King - a letter whose contents had nothing to do with any alleged Levison-communist connection and everything to do with destroying King's public reputation.
|
||||
[[William Sullivan]], head of the FBI's Domestic Intelligence Division, testified to the committee on November 1, 1975 that he did not recall ever having seen the anonymous letter to King that the FBI gave the committee, which he said it was "possible" he had something to do with and which he suggested might have been "planted" in his files.[^3] The case study's account of the surveillance of King's "Adviser A" records a microphone in Adviser A's office on March 16, 1962, a wiretap on his office telephone on March 20, 1962 and a wiretap on his home telephone authorized by the Attorney General in November 1962, and states that the information from the continued coverage "appears to have related solely to his advice to Dr. King concerning the civil rights movement and not at all to the alleged Communist Party origins of that advice."[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
### Later Life
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -48,4 +48,6 @@ After King's assassination in April 1968, Levison remained active in civil right
|
|||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Garrow, David. *The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr.* Norton, 1981. Levison's FBI file, released under the Freedom of Information Act, documents the surveillance history.
|
||||
[^2]: Church Committee (U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities). *Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans.* Book II, Senate Report No. 94-755, 1976. Branch, Taylor. *Parting the Waters: America in the King Years 1954-1963.* Simon & Schuster, 1988.
|
||||
[^2]: Church Committee (U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities). *Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans.* Book III, "Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Case Study," pp. 81 to 184, Senate Report No. 94-755, 1976. Branch, Taylor. *Parting the Waters: America in the King Years 1954-1963.* Simon & Schuster, 1988.
|
||||
[^3]: Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Final Report*, Book III, S. Rept. 94-755, April 26, 1976, "Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Case Study," pp. 158 to 161 (Sullivan, November 1, 1975).
|
||||
[^4]: Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Final Report*, Book III, S. Rept. 94-755, April 26, 1976, "Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Case Study," pp. 81 to 184, at pp. 88 to 89 (Adviser A surveillance).
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -5,12 +5,12 @@ tags:
|
|||
- CIA
|
||||
- BlackPrograms
|
||||
- Whistleblower
|
||||
summary: "Former CIA special assistant who co-authored The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, the first book ever censored by the US government, and revealed that mind control black programs continued after the 1977 congressional ban, only better hidden."
|
||||
summary: "Former CIA special assistant who co-authored The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, the first book censored by the US government, and said mind control black programs continued after the 1977 congressional ban."
|
||||
born: 1929-12-23
|
||||
died: 2018-10-19
|
||||
location: Ashburn, Virginia
|
||||
created: 2026-06-03
|
||||
updated: 2026-06-03
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
---
|
||||
Victor Marchetti was born December 23, 1929, in [[Hazleton]], [[Pennsylvania]], and joined the [[CIA]] in October 1955. He served as an analyst in the Office of Research and Reports and the Office of National Estimates before moving to the Office of Planning, Programming, and Budgeting in 1966. From July 1968 to 1969, Marchetti served as special assistant to CIA Deputy Director [[Rufus Taylor]], giving him access to the agency's highest-level operations and budget allocations. He resigned from the CIA in September 1969, disillusioned with the agency's culture of secrecy and extralegal activities.[^1][^2]
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ Victor Marchetti was born December 23, 1929, in [[Hazleton]], [[Pennsylvania]],
|
|||
|
||||
In 1974, Marchetti co-authored *[[The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence]]* with [[John D. Marks]], a former State Department intelligence officer. The book was the first manuscript ever subjected to prior review and censorship by the [[United States]] government under the intelligence employment secrecy agreement. The CIA initially demanded deletion of 339 passages; after legal proceedings, 168 deletions were enforced. The published book, with its prominent blank spaces where censored material had been removed, became a symbol of government overreach on secrecy and actually drew more attention to the redacted material than the original text would have. The legal fight established important precedents for government employees' First Amendment rights and the public's right to know about intelligence operations.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
Hersh's December 22, 1974 New York Times article on CIA domestic activities listed Marchetti among the former employees placed under surveillance.[^3] When Hersh's New York Times article of May 25, 1975 described American submarine intercept operations, the Department of Justice, the CIA and the White House examined whether its content came from papers filed with the court in the *Marchetti* case. A May 31, 1975 memorandum in the Cheney files states, "We believe the Hersh story of May 25 is based on papers filed with the court in the Marchetti case." An undated memorandum from Assistant Attorney General [[Rex E. Lee]] and Acting Assistant Attorney General [[John C. Keeney]] set out a possible criminal contempt proceeding in the Eastern District of Virginia over a protective order in the case, and recorded that a document quoted in the article had been available to plaintiffs Marchetti and John Marks, their counsel and their expert witness [[Morton Halperin]].[^4] At the May 27, 1975 meeting President [[Gerald Ford]] and his advisers discussed the Supreme Court's refusal to review the case, and William Colby said the Agency had taken up with Justice that day the possibility of a contempt citation against the Marchetti lawyers.[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
### Revelations About Continuing Black Programs
|
||||
|
||||
Marchetti revealed that despite the 1977 congressional ban on mind control research imposed after the [[Church Committee]] investigations, so-called "black programs" working with mind control still existed, only now they were better hidden. His disclosure was significant because it came from an insider with direct knowledge of the agency's operations and budget structures, contradicting the official narrative that all [[MKULTRA]]-related behavioral modification programs had been terminated. Marchetti's understanding of the CIA's budget and planning apparatus gave his claims particular weight, as he understood how programs could be concealed within opaque funding streams.[^1]
|
||||
|
|
@ -34,3 +36,6 @@ Marchetti continued to write and speak about intelligence community abuses. He p
|
|||
|
||||
[^1]: Curt Rowlett, "Project Mind Kontrol: Did the U.S. Government Actually Create Programmed Assassins?," Steamshovel Press #16, 1998.
|
||||
[^2]: Marchetti, Victor, and John D. Marks. *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*. Alfred A. Knopf, 1974. (First book censored by the U.S. government prior to publication; 168 passages excised by court order); "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," First Amendment Encyclopedia, Middle Tennessee State University. https://firstamendment.mtsu.edu/article/the-cia-and-the-cult-of-intelligence/
|
||||
[^3]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, vol. XXXVIII, Part 2, Document 17, Editorial Note, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v38p2/d17.
|
||||
[^4]: Richard B. Cheney Files, Box 6, folder "Intelligence - New York Times Articles by Seymour Hersh (2)," Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0005/7288231.pdf (memorandum of May 31, 1975, para. 6; Lee and Keeney memorandum, pp. 1 and 6).
|
||||
[^5]: Memorandum of conversation, May 27, 1975, Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 12, https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1553088.pdf, p. 2.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ tags:
|
|||
summary: "Chilean Army commander who led the September 11, 1973 coup against Salvador Allende and ruled Chile until 1990, with the Letelier assassination and Operation Condor documented in declassified US records."
|
||||
location: "Valparaiso, Chile"
|
||||
created: 2026-05-14
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-08
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
born: 1915-11-25
|
||||
died: 2006-12-10
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
|
|
@ -51,19 +51,19 @@ relations:
|
|||
with: "[[Letelier-Moffitt assassination]]"
|
||||
start: 1976-09-21
|
||||
role: "a 1987 CIA assessment concluded that he personally ordered the murders of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt"
|
||||
fn: 11
|
||||
fn: 12
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[Federal Bureau of Investigation]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 2000-04
|
||||
end: 2000-05
|
||||
role: "formal FBI investigation into his guilt for the Letelier-Moffitt murders, as described in the 2016 release of CIA records"
|
||||
fn: 11
|
||||
fn: 12
|
||||
- type: subject_of
|
||||
with: "[[Riggs Bank]]"
|
||||
start: 1985
|
||||
role: "customer whose accounts the 2004 Senate subcommittee report found the bank helped conceal from regulators and courts"
|
||||
fn: 25
|
||||
fn: 26
|
||||
- type: subject_of
|
||||
with: "[[House of Lords]]"
|
||||
start: 1998-10-16
|
||||
|
|
@ -76,116 +76,117 @@ Augusto José Ramón Pinochet Ugarte was born on November 25, 1915, in [[Valpara
|
|||
|
||||
### Track II and the killing of René Schneider
|
||||
|
||||
On September 15, 1970, President [[Richard Nixon]] directed the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] to organize a military coup in Chile to prevent the inauguration of Allende. The [[Church Committee]], whose successor body was the [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]], wrote that the CIA was to take this action "without coordination with the Departments of State or Defense and without informing the U.S. Ambassador." The Committee's account of the meeting cites the handwritten notes of CIA director [[Richard Helms]], which contain the words "Make the economy scream."[^3][^4]
|
||||
On September 15, 1970, President [[Richard Nixon]] directed the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] to organize a military coup in Chile to prevent the inauguration of Allende. The [[Church Committee]], whose successor body was the [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]], wrote that the CIA was to take this action "without coordination with the Departments of State or Defense and without informing the U.S. Ambassador." The Committee's account of the meeting cites the handwritten notes of CIA director [[Richard Helms]], which contain the words "Make the economy scream." The notes were read into the record of the committee's Covert Action hearings on December 4, 1975, and are printed as an exhibit to that volume.[^3][^4][^5]
|
||||
|
||||
On October 16, 1970, CIA deputy director of plans [[Thomas Karamessines]] cabled the Santiago station chief, [[Henry Hecksher]], conveying [[Henry Kissinger]]'s orders: "It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup." The cable directed that the operations be run so as to hide the "American hand," and that the station ignore orders to the contrary from Ambassador [[Edward Korry]], who had not been told of the operations.[^4] A memorandum of an October 15, 1970 meeting of Kissinger, Karamessines and [[Alexander Haig]] records a discussion of promoting a coup, known as [[Track II]], and the possibility that the plot of Chilean officer [[Roberto Viaux]] might fail with "unfortunate repercussions."[^4] Between October 5 and October 20, 1970, the CIA made 21 contacts with key Chilean military and Carabinero officials.[^5] Henry Hecksher and other operatives were in contact with coup plotters including Pinochet and General [[Gustavo Leigh]].
|
||||
On October 16, 1970, CIA deputy director of plans [[Thomas Karamessines]] cabled the Santiago station chief, [[Henry Hecksher]], conveying [[Henry Kissinger]]'s orders: "It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup." The cable directed that the operations be run so as to hide the "American hand," and that the station ignore orders to the contrary from Ambassador [[Edward Korry]], who had not been told of the operations.[^4] A memorandum of an October 15, 1970 meeting of Kissinger, Karamessines and [[Alexander Haig]] records a discussion of promoting a coup, known as [[Track II]], and the possibility that the plot of Chilean officer [[Roberto Viaux]] might fail with "unfortunate repercussions."[^4] Between October 5 and October 20, 1970, the CIA made 21 contacts with key Chilean military and Carabinero officials.[^6] Henry Hecksher and other operatives were in contact with coup plotters including Pinochet and General [[Gustavo Leigh]].
|
||||
|
||||
The Church Committee's interim report on assassination plots records that the removal of the Army commander-in-chief, General [[Rene Schneider]], who insisted that the constitutional process be followed, became a necessary ingredient in the plans of the Chilean conspirators, and that the conspirators decided to kidnap him. It records unsuccessful attempts on October 19 and 20, 1970, a delivery of three submachine guns and ammunition by a CIA attache on October 22, 1970, and a third attempt that day in which Schneider was shot; he died on October 25.[^5] The report states that the guns used were "in all probability" not those supplied by the CIA, that the Chilean military court found Schneider had been shot with handguns, and that the Committee could not determine whether the machine gun at the scene was one of the three the CIA supplied.[^5] The Committee also records that a station cable of October 22, 1970 said the station had instructed the attache to "hand over $50,000 if Gen. Valenzuela requests."[^5]
|
||||
The Church Committee's interim report on assassination plots records that the removal of the Army commander-in-chief, General [[Rene Schneider]], who insisted that the constitutional process be followed, became a necessary ingredient in the plans of the Chilean conspirators, and that the conspirators decided to kidnap him. It records unsuccessful attempts on October 19 and 20, 1970, a delivery of three submachine guns and ammunition by a CIA attache on October 22, 1970, and a third attempt that day in which Schneider was shot; he died on October 25.[^6] The report states that the guns used were "in all probability" not those supplied by the CIA, that the Chilean military court found Schneider had been shot with handguns, and that the Committee could not determine whether the machine gun at the scene was one of the three the CIA supplied.[^6] The Committee also records that a station cable of October 22, 1970 said the station had instructed the attache to "hand over $50,000 if Gen. Valenzuela requests."[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
The National Security Archive's description of the October 1970 cables states that the CIA supplied a group of officers led by General [[Camilo Valenzuela]] with "sterile" weapons for the operation, which was to be blamed on Allende supporters, and that Schneider was killed by another group the CIA had been collaborating with, led by retired General Roberto Viaux.[^4] The CIA's 2000 report on its Chile activities, prepared under the Hinchey amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2000, states that the Viaux group acted "independently of the CIA at that time" on October 22, that the three submachine guns, ammunition and tear gas grenades given to the Valenzuela group were "later returned unused to the Station," and that Valenzuela's representative insisted his group had nothing to do with Schneider's killing.[^6] The Church Committee also records that Kissinger and Haig testified that the White House stood down the CIA effort on October 15, 1970, while CIA officials, especially Karamessines, testified that they acted with White House knowledge and approval before and after that date.[^5]
|
||||
The National Security Archive's description of the October 1970 cables states that the CIA supplied a group of officers led by General [[Camilo Valenzuela]] with "sterile" weapons for the operation, which was to be blamed on Allende supporters, and that Schneider was killed by another group the CIA had been collaborating with, led by retired General Roberto Viaux.[^4] The CIA's 2000 report on its Chile activities, prepared under the Hinchey amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2000, states that the Viaux group acted "independently of the CIA at that time" on October 22, that the three submachine guns, ammunition and tear gas grenades given to the Valenzuela group were "later returned unused to the Station," and that Valenzuela's representative insisted his group had nothing to do with Schneider's killing.[^7] The Church Committee also records that Kissinger and Haig testified that the White House stood down the CIA effort on October 15, 1970, while CIA officials, especially Karamessines, testified that they acted with White House knowledge and approval before and after that date.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
The 2000 report states that in November 1970 a member of the Viaux group who had avoided capture recontacted the CIA and requested financial assistance on behalf of the group. The report continues: "Although the Agency had no obligation to the group because it acted on its own, in an effort to keep the prior contact secret, maintain the good will of the group, and for humanitarian reasons, $35,000 was passed."[^6] The National Security Archive describes the payment as one made to a group of coup plotters after that group had murdered Schneider, and states that it was apparently withheld in 1975 from the Senate committee investigating CIA involvement in assassinations.[^7]
|
||||
The 2000 report states that in November 1970 a member of the Viaux group who had avoided capture recontacted the CIA and requested financial assistance on behalf of the group. The report continues: "Although the Agency had no obligation to the group because it acted on its own, in an effort to keep the prior contact secret, maintain the good will of the group, and for humanitarian reasons, $35,000 was passed."[^7] The National Security Archive describes the payment as one made to a group of coup plotters after that group had murdered Schneider, and states that it was apparently withheld in 1975 from the Senate committee investigating CIA involvement in assassinations.[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
### The 1973 coup and US knowledge
|
||||
|
||||
On September 11, 1973, the Chilean military, led by Pinochet, Gustavo Leigh and Admiral [[Jose Merino]], launched a coordinated coup. The presidential palace, [[La Moneda]], was bombed by [[Chilean Air Force]] jets. Allende died during the assault; the CIA's 2000 report describes La Moneda as under bombardment from tanks and airplanes and states that Allende took his own life.[^6] The junta, composed of Pinochet, Leigh, Merino and [[Carabineros of Chile|Carabinero]] chief General [[Cesar Mendoza]], was sworn in on the evening of September 11, 1973, and Pinochet was designated its first president; the report states that the CIA actively supported the junta but did not assist Pinochet to assume the presidency.[^6] By June 1974 Pinochet had become the dominant figure and head of state.[^3]
|
||||
On September 11, 1973, the Chilean military, led by Pinochet, Gustavo Leigh and Admiral [[Jose Merino]], launched a coordinated coup. The presidential palace, [[La Moneda]], was bombed by [[Chilean Air Force]] jets. Allende died during the assault; the CIA's 2000 report describes La Moneda as under bombardment from tanks and airplanes and states that Allende took his own life.[^7] The junta, composed of Pinochet, Leigh, Merino and [[Carabineros of Chile|Carabinero]] chief General [[Cesar Mendoza]], was sworn in on the evening of September 11, 1973, and Pinochet was designated its first president; the report states that the CIA actively supported the junta but did not assist Pinochet to assume the presidency.[^7] By June 1974 Pinochet had become the dominant figure and head of state.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
A State Department cable of September 13, 1973, titled "USG Attitude Toward Junta," states that the "US government wishes to make clear its desire to cooperate with the military Junta and to assist in any appropriate way."[^2] A [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] biographic profile of Pinochet, dated August or September 1973, survives in a version with heavy deletions.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
A November 1973 State Department memorandum on executions, sent to the Secretary of State by [[Jack Kubisch]], records that summary executions in the nineteen days after the coup totaled 320, more than three times the publicly acknowledged figure.[^2] A CIA intelligence report of October 27, 1973 records that 13,500 prisoners had been registered as detained by the armed forces between September 11 and October 10, 1973, and estimates 1,600 civilian deaths from the coup.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
The 2000 report states that within a year after the coup the CIA and other US agencies were aware of bilateral cooperation among regional intelligence services to track the activities of and, in at least a few cases, kill political opponents, which it calls the precursor to Operation Condor.[^6] After Pinochet's arrest in London in October 1998, the Clinton administration released a collection of about 24,000 declassified records.[^2]
|
||||
The 2000 report states that within a year after the coup the CIA and other US agencies were aware of bilateral cooperation among regional intelligence services to track the activities of and, in at least a few cases, kill political opponents, which it calls the precursor to Operation Condor.[^7] After Pinochet's arrest in London in October 1998, the Clinton administration released a collection of about 24,000 declassified records.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### DINA and Manuel Contreras
|
||||
|
||||
A Defense Intelligence Agency report of April 15, 1975 describes the [[DINA]] as "the sole responsible agency for internal subversive matters." It states that the head of DINA, Colonel [[Manuel Contreras]], "has reported exclusively to, and received orders only from, President Pinochet."[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
The CIA's 2000 report states that between 1974 and 1977 the CIA maintained contact with Contreras, and that the policy community approved the contact despite concerns that it might lay the agency open to charges of aiding internal political repression. It records that in December 1974 the CIA concluded that Contreras was not going to improve his human rights performance, and that by April 1975 intelligence reporting showed that he was "the principal obstacle to a reasonable human rights policy within the Junta," but that an interagency committee directed the CIA to continue the relationship.[^6] In August 1975, with interagency approval, Contreras met Deputy Director of Central Intelligence [[Vernon Walters]] in Washington.[^6]
|
||||
The CIA's 2000 report states that between 1974 and 1977 the CIA maintained contact with Contreras, and that the policy community approved the contact despite concerns that it might lay the agency open to charges of aiding internal political repression. It records that in December 1974 the CIA concluded that Contreras was not going to improve his human rights performance, and that by April 1975 intelligence reporting showed that he was "the principal obstacle to a reasonable human rights policy within the Junta," but that an interagency committee directed the CIA to continue the relationship.[^7] In August 1975, with interagency approval, Contreras met Deputy Director of Central Intelligence [[Vernon Walters]] in Washington.[^7]
|
||||
|
||||
On the payment, the report states: "In May and June 1975, elements within the CIA recommended establishing a paid relationship with Contreras to obtain intelligence based on his unique position and access to Pinochet." It continues that the proposal was overruled, citing US policy on clandestine relations with the head of an intelligence service notorious for human rights abuses, and that "given miscommunications in the timing of this exchange, a one-time payment was given to Contreras."[^6] The National Security Archive's summary of the report states that the CIA made Contreras a paid asset only several months after concluding that he was the principal obstacle to a reasonable human rights policy.[^7]
|
||||
On the payment, the report states: "In May and June 1975, elements within the CIA recommended establishing a paid relationship with Contreras to obtain intelligence based on his unique position and access to Pinochet." It continues that the proposal was overruled, citing US policy on clandestine relations with the head of an intelligence service notorious for human rights abuses, and that "given miscommunications in the timing of this exchange, a one-time payment was given to Contreras."[^7] The National Security Archive's summary of the report states that the CIA made Contreras a paid asset only several months after concluding that he was the principal obstacle to a reasonable human rights policy.[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
The report records that the CIA sought information from Contreras on Operation Condor, that by October 1976 the CIA decided to approach him on the matter, and that he confirmed Condor's existence as an intelligence-sharing network but denied that it had a role in extra-judicial killings. It states that during October 1976 "Contreras' possible role in the Letelier assassination became an issue," that the CIA met him about half a dozen times during 1977 (three of them to request information on the Letelier assassination), and that on November 3, 1977 Contreras was transferred to a function unrelated to intelligence and the CIA severed all contact.[^6]
|
||||
The report records that the CIA sought information from Contreras on Operation Condor, that by October 1976 the CIA decided to approach him on the matter, and that he confirmed Condor's existence as an intelligence-sharing network but denied that it had a role in extra-judicial killings. It states that during October 1976 "Contreras' possible role in the Letelier assassination became an issue," that the CIA met him about half a dozen times during 1977 (three of them to request information on the Letelier assassination), and that on November 3, 1977 Contreras was transferred to a function unrelated to intelligence and the CIA severed all contact.[^7]
|
||||
|
||||
### Operation Condor
|
||||
|
||||
The 2000 report describes Operation Condor as an intelligence-sharing arrangement among Chile, [[Argentina]], [[Brazil]], [[Paraguay]] and [[Uruguay]] established in 1975.[^6] A cable of September 28, 1976 from the FBI legal attache in [[Buenos Aires]], [[Robert Scherrer]], reports information from a "confidential source abroad" that Operation Condor was the code name for the collection, exchange and storage of intelligence on "leftists," communists and Marxists, recently established between cooperating intelligence services in South America "in order to eliminate Marxist terrorist activities in the area." The cable states that Chile is the center for Operation Condor and that its members include Argentina, [[Bolivia]], Paraguay and Uruguay, with Brazil tentatively agreed to supply intelligence input; that Argentina, Uruguay and Chile had engaged in joint operations, primarily in Argentina; and that a third and most secret phase involves special teams from member countries who are "to travel anywhere in the world to non-member countries to carry out sanctions up to assassination against terrorists or supporters of terrorist organizations." France and Portugal are named as European countries specifically mentioned for possible third-phase operations. The cable states that no information had been developed indicating that third-phase sanctions were planned for the United States, and adds: "however, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that the recent assassination of Orlando Letelier in Washington, D.C. may have been carried out as a third phase action of 'Operation Condor.'" Several passages about the special teams are excised.[^4]
|
||||
The 2000 report describes Operation Condor as an intelligence-sharing arrangement among Chile, [[Argentina]], [[Brazil]], [[Paraguay]] and [[Uruguay]] established in 1975.[^7] A cable of September 28, 1976 from the FBI legal attache in [[Buenos Aires]], [[Robert Scherrer]], reports information from a "confidential source abroad" that Operation Condor was the code name for the collection, exchange and storage of intelligence on "leftists," communists and Marxists, recently established between cooperating intelligence services in South America "in order to eliminate Marxist terrorist activities in the area." The cable states that Chile is the center for Operation Condor and that its members include Argentina, [[Bolivia]], Paraguay and Uruguay, with Brazil tentatively agreed to supply intelligence input; that Argentina, Uruguay and Chile had engaged in joint operations, primarily in Argentina; and that a third and most secret phase involves special teams from member countries who are "to travel anywhere in the world to non-member countries to carry out sanctions up to assassination against terrorists or supporters of terrorist organizations." France and Portugal are named as European countries specifically mentioned for possible third-phase operations. The cable states that no information had been developed indicating that third-phase sanctions were planned for the United States, and adds: "however, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that the recent assassination of Orlando Letelier in Washington, D.C. may have been carried out as a third phase action of 'Operation Condor.'" Several passages about the special teams are excised.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
Scherrer also wrote to Chilean General [[Ernesto Baeza]] on June 6, 1975, reporting intelligence obtained through the interrogation of a captured Chilean leftist, Jorge Isaac Fuentes, who the National Security Archive states was detained through Operation Condor.[^4] An FBI summary dated January 21, 1982 of letters written from prison by [[Michael Townley]] reports, among other things, meetings between Pinochet and Italian terrorists and spies.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
The Archives of Terror, the Paraguayan police files from the dictatorship of [[Alfredo Stroessner]], are listed in the UNESCO Memory of the World register. The register entry states that on December 23 and 24, 1991, judges José Agustín Fernández and Luis María Benítez Riera searched and seized the files of the production department of the police in Asunción and the technical section of the Ministry of the Interior, following the investigation of the human rights defender Martín Almada; it dates the documents from 1927 to February 1989 and states that the files provide evidence of Operation Condor.[^8]
|
||||
The Archives of Terror, the Paraguayan police files from the dictatorship of [[Alfredo Stroessner]], are listed in the UNESCO Memory of the World register. The register entry states that on December 23 and 24, 1991, judges José Agustín Fernández and Luis María Benítez Riera searched and seized the files of the production department of the police in Asunción and the technical section of the Ministry of the Interior, following the investigation of the human rights defender Martín Almada; it dates the documents from 1927 to February 1989 and states that the files provide evidence of Operation Condor.[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
### Letelier and Moffitt
|
||||
|
||||
On September 21, 1976, a car bomb in [[Washington, D.C.]] killed the former Chilean ambassador [[Orlando Letelier]] and his American colleague [[Ronni Moffitt]].[^9] According to the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the government's principal witness, Michael Townley, a United States citizen who entered the employ of DINA in 1974, admitted his complicity in the killings and struck a plea bargain with the government in return for his testimony.[^9]
|
||||
On September 21, 1976, a car bomb in [[Washington, D.C.]] killed the former Chilean ambassador [[Orlando Letelier]] and his American colleague [[Ronni Moffitt]].[^10] According to the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the government's principal witness, Michael Townley, a United States citizen who entered the employ of DINA in 1974, admitted his complicity in the killings and struck a plea bargain with the government in return for his testimony.[^10]
|
||||
|
||||
A CIA cable of October 6, 1976 reports that its source "believes that the Chilean government is directly involved in Letelier's death and feels that investigation into the incident will so indicate."[^2] The 2000 CIA report states that this was the CIA's first intelligence report containing the allegation.[^6] The indictments of August 1, 1978 named [[Guillermo Novo Sampol]], Alvin Ross Diaz, Juan Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, Pedro Espinoza Bravo, [[Armando Fernandez Larios]], [[Jose Dionisio Suarez Esquivel]] and [[Virgilio Paz Romero]]. Guillermo Novo, Ross and Ignacio Novo Sampol were tried by jury beginning January 8, 1979, and were found guilty on February 14, 1979. The Court of Appeals decided the appeal on September 15, 1980 (rehearing denied December 9, 1980) and reversed the convictions of Guillermo Novo and Ross, because informant testimony was inadmissible under the Supreme Court's decision of June 16, 1980 in [[United States v. Henry]], and remanded for retrial.[^9] The killing was carried out by the DINA, under Contreras, and was a rare Condor operation on American soil. On May 30, 1995, the Chilean Supreme Court upheld the prison sentences of Contreras (seven years) and Espinoza (six years) for ordering the assassination.[^10]
|
||||
A CIA cable of October 6, 1976 reports that its source "believes that the Chilean government is directly involved in Letelier's death and feels that investigation into the incident will so indicate."[^2] The 2000 CIA report states that this was the CIA's first intelligence report containing the allegation.[^7] The indictments of August 1, 1978 named [[Guillermo Novo Sampol]], Alvin Ross Diaz, Juan Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, Pedro Espinoza Bravo, [[Armando Fernandez Larios]], [[Jose Dionisio Suarez Esquivel]] and [[Virgilio Paz Romero]]. Guillermo Novo, Ross and Ignacio Novo Sampol were tried by jury beginning January 8, 1979, and were found guilty on February 14, 1979. The Court of Appeals decided the appeal on September 15, 1980 (rehearing denied December 9, 1980) and reversed the convictions of Guillermo Novo and Ross, because informant testimony was inadmissible under the Supreme Court's decision of June 16, 1980 in [[United States v. Henry]], and remanded for retrial.[^10] The killing was carried out by the DINA, under Contreras, and was a rare Condor operation on American soil. On May 30, 1995, the Chilean Supreme Court upheld the prison sentences of Contreras (seven years) and Espinoza (six years) for ordering the assassination.[^11]
|
||||
|
||||
A CIA special intelligence assessment dated 1987 concluded that there was "convincing evidence that President Pinochet personally ordered his intelligence chief to carry out the murder." The assessment added that Pinochet later "decided to stonewall on the case to hide his involvement and, ultimately, to protect his hold on the presidency."[^11] A memorandum from [[George Shultz]] to [[Ronald Reagan]] dated October 6, 1987 reported the CIA conclusion to the president as part of an effort to terminate US support for the regime.[^12] The assessment and related documents were handed to Chilean President [[Michelle Bachelet]] by Deputy Secretary of State [[Heather Higginbottom]] on September 23, 2016. The National Security Archive states that the Justice Department had identified the intelligence records as evidence during a formal FBI investigation into Pinochet's guilt in April and May 2000, and that the FBI reportedly concluded there was enough circumstantial evidence to indict Pinochet.[^11]
|
||||
A CIA special intelligence assessment dated 1987 concluded that there was "convincing evidence that President Pinochet personally ordered his intelligence chief to carry out the murder." The assessment added that Pinochet later "decided to stonewall on the case to hide his involvement and, ultimately, to protect his hold on the presidency."[^12] A memorandum from [[George Shultz]] to [[Ronald Reagan]] dated October 6, 1987 reported the CIA conclusion to the president as part of an effort to terminate US support for the regime.[^13] The assessment and related documents were handed to Chilean President [[Michelle Bachelet]] by Deputy Secretary of State [[Heather Higginbottom]] on September 23, 2016. The National Security Archive states that the Justice Department had identified the intelligence records as evidence during a formal FBI investigation into Pinochet's guilt in April and May 2000, and that the FBI reportedly concluded there was enough circumstantial evidence to indict Pinochet.[^12]
|
||||
|
||||
The CIA's 1978 intelligence report on Pinochet's strategy, as summarized by the National Security Archive, describes a four-point plan to protect Contreras from successful prosecution, stonewall US requests for evidence, prevent the Chilean Supreme Court from honoring US extradition requests, and persuade Chileans that the investigation was a politically motivated tool against the regime.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### Colonia Dignidad
|
||||
|
||||
A 2017 motion of the German [[Bundestag]] describes the [[Colonia Dignidad]] settlement in southern Chile, founded by the German [[Paul Schaefer]], as the scene of systematic, serious human rights violations during the Pinochet dictatorship, committed in part together with DINA.[^13] The crimes it lists include unlawful deprivation of liberty, enforced disappearance, forced labour and slavery, child abuse, and bodily harm.[^13] The motion records that Schaefer was arrested in 2005.[^13]
|
||||
A 2017 motion of the German [[Bundestag]] describes the [[Colonia Dignidad]] settlement in southern Chile, founded by the German [[Paul Schaefer]], as the scene of systematic, serious human rights violations during the Pinochet dictatorship, committed in part together with DINA.[^14] The crimes it lists include unlawful deprivation of liberty, enforced disappearance, forced labour and slavery, child abuse, and bodily harm.[^14] The motion records that Schaefer was arrested in 2005.[^14]
|
||||
|
||||
In 1987 the Green Party group in the Bundestag asked the federal government what it knew of cooperation between the colony and DINA, and whether Contreras visited West Germany in the winter of 1975 and 1976, including stops in Augsburg, Wiesbaden, Nuremberg and Cologne.[^14]
|
||||
In 1987 the Green Party group in the Bundestag asked the federal government what it knew of cooperation between the colony and DINA, and whether Contreras visited West Germany in the winter of 1975 and 1976, including stops in Augsburg, Wiesbaden, Nuremberg and Cologne.[^15]
|
||||
|
||||
In April 2016 the then German Foreign Minister, [[Frank-Walter Steinmeier]], stated on behalf of the whole [[Auswärtiges Amt]] that German diplomats had clearly done too little to protect their compatriots in the colony; he said the ministry was not to blame for the military coup or the seventeen years of dictatorship and bore no responsibility for the colony's activities, but that it should have more decisively given Germans counsel and assistance. The Foreign Office states that political prisoners were tortured and murdered in the colony during the Pinochet dictatorship, that since 2018 the Bundestag and the federal government have worked in a joint commission to help victims, and that a victims' aid concept was presented in May 2019.[^15]
|
||||
In April 2016 the then German Foreign Minister, [[Frank-Walter Steinmeier]], stated on behalf of the whole [[Auswärtiges Amt]] that German diplomats had clearly done too little to protect their compatriots in the colony; he said the ministry was not to blame for the military coup or the seventeen years of dictatorship and bore no responsibility for the colony's activities, but that it should have more decisively given Germans counsel and assistance. The Foreign Office states that political prisoners were tortured and murdered in the colony during the Pinochet dictatorship, that since 2018 the Bundestag and the federal government have worked in a joint commission to help victims, and that a victims' aid concept was presented in May 2019.[^16]
|
||||
|
||||
### Carlos Cardoen and Iraq
|
||||
|
||||
[[Carlos Cardoen]], a Chilean arms manufacturer who returned to Santiago after the 1973 coup to work for the government-owned [[Chilean Mining Corporation]], is described by [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] as selling cluster bombs to [[Iraq]] by 1985 with the help of individuals connected to the CIA, and as having been charged in Miami in April 1992 by the US Customs Service.[^16] A federal grand jury in the Southern District of Florida returned a twenty-one count indictment against Cardoen and [[Industrias Cardoen]] on May 26, 1993.[^17] [[Alan Friedman]] reports that Cardoen's plant at [[Iquique]] produced about a thousand cluster bombs a month, with a first shipment worth 21 million dollars reaching Iraq early in 1984 during the [[Iran-Iraq War]]; a former CIA contractor described Cardoen to Friedman as "an all-purpose asset, designed to be one of those offshore stockpilers of military equipment who could be used by the CIA to ship arms to the Afghan rebels, to the boys in Angola, or anywhere the U.S. needed some help." The White House said in July 1991 that there "never were any sales, overt or covert, to Iraq or Iran through a third country." The British journalist [[Jonathan Moyle]], who was inquiring into Cardoen's helicopter project, was found dead in a Santiago hotel on March 31, 1990.[^18]
|
||||
[[Carlos Cardoen]], a Chilean arms manufacturer who returned to Santiago after the 1973 coup to work for the government-owned [[Chilean Mining Corporation]], is described by [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] as selling cluster bombs to [[Iraq]] by 1985 with the help of individuals connected to the CIA, and as having been charged in Miami in April 1992 by the US Customs Service.[^17] A federal grand jury in the Southern District of Florida returned a twenty-one count indictment against Cardoen and [[Industrias Cardoen]] on May 26, 1993.[^18] [[Alan Friedman]] reports that Cardoen's plant at [[Iquique]] produced about a thousand cluster bombs a month, with a first shipment worth 21 million dollars reaching Iraq early in 1984 during the [[Iran-Iraq War]]; a former CIA contractor described Cardoen to Friedman as "an all-purpose asset, designed to be one of those offshore stockpilers of military equipment who could be used by the CIA to ship arms to the Afghan rebels, to the boys in Angola, or anywhere the U.S. needed some help." The White House said in July 1991 that there "never were any sales, overt or covert, to Iraq or Iran through a third country." The British journalist [[Jonathan Moyle]], who was inquiring into Cardoen's helicopter project, was found dead in a Santiago hotel on March 31, 1990.[^19]
|
||||
|
||||
### Reagan administration reassessment, 1984 to 1985
|
||||
|
||||
The United States ambassador in Santiago from March 1982 to August 2, 1985 was [[James D. Theberge]], a political appointee who had succeeded [[George Landau|George W. Landau]].[^19] A Central Intelligence Agency talking-points memorandum prepared for a January 28, 1985 meeting with Theberge, dated January 23, 1985, describes the visit as "primarily a personal visit." It lists as a point Theberge might raise the continuation in office of Pinochet, with a ninety-day state of siege that the memorandum records as "declared 6 November 1984" to assist the military government in combating a wave of terrorist incidents.[^20] The New York Times of December 16, 1984 also gives the state of siege as imposed on November 6; the same article reports that Theberge was present at a meeting of Representative [[Bill Richardson]] and two other members of the House Hispanic Caucus with Pinochet, which Richardson called "brutally frank and heated."[^21] An Associated Press dispatch from January 1985 by George Gedda, citing unnamed officials, reports that "Pinochet believes the CIA is out to overthrow him," in the words of one senior official, and that the Reagan administration planned to replace Theberge with [[Harry Barnes]], then ambassador in India, as the first step in a reassessment of its policy. The same dispatch dates the imposition of the state of siege to "Nov. 4."[^22]
|
||||
The United States ambassador in Santiago from March 1982 to August 2, 1985 was [[James D. Theberge]], a political appointee who had succeeded [[George Landau|George W. Landau]].[^20] A Central Intelligence Agency talking-points memorandum prepared for a January 28, 1985 meeting with Theberge, dated January 23, 1985, describes the visit as "primarily a personal visit." It lists as a point Theberge might raise the continuation in office of Pinochet, with a ninety-day state of siege that the memorandum records as "declared 6 November 1984" to assist the military government in combating a wave of terrorist incidents.[^21] The New York Times of December 16, 1984 also gives the state of siege as imposed on November 6; the same article reports that Theberge was present at a meeting of Representative [[Bill Richardson]] and two other members of the House Hispanic Caucus with Pinochet, which Richardson called "brutally frank and heated."[^22] An Associated Press dispatch from January 1985 by George Gedda, citing unnamed officials, reports that "Pinochet believes the CIA is out to overthrow him," in the words of one senior official, and that the Reagan administration planned to replace Theberge with [[Harry Barnes]], then ambassador in India, as the first step in a reassessment of its policy. The same dispatch dates the imposition of the state of siege to "Nov. 4."[^23]
|
||||
|
||||
### London arrest and the House of Lords
|
||||
|
||||
Pinochet landed at Heathrow on September 22, 1998, and underwent back surgery in [[London]]. On October 16, 1998 a Spanish warrant was issued by judge [[Baltasar Garzon]] and a London magistrate issued a provisional warrant the same day. The Lords judgment states that Pinochet was arrested in a London hospital on October 17, 1998; Home Secretary [[Jack Straw]] told the House of Commons that he was arrested "that evening" after the Bow Street warrant was issued on October 16.[^1][^23] On October 28, 1998 the Divisional Court quashed both provisional warrants, on the ground for the second that Pinochet was entitled to state immunity as former head of state.[^1]
|
||||
Pinochet landed at Heathrow on September 22, 1998, and underwent back surgery in [[London]]. On October 16, 1998 a Spanish warrant was issued by judge [[Baltasar Garzon]] and a London magistrate issued a provisional warrant the same day. The Lords judgment states that Pinochet was arrested in a London hospital on October 17, 1998; Home Secretary [[Jack Straw]] told the House of Commons that he was arrested "that evening" after the Bow Street warrant was issued on October 16.[^1][^24] On October 28, 1998 the Divisional Court quashed both provisional warrants, on the ground for the second that Pinochet was entitled to state immunity as former head of state.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
The House of Lords first ruled on November 25, 1998, by majority that Pinochet was not immune for crimes under international law. That judgment was set aside on January 15, 1999, because the committee that heard it was not properly constituted, and the appeal was reheard from January 18, 1999.[^1] In the judgment of March 24, 1999, [[Lord Browne-Wilkinson]] wrote: "I do not consider that torture committed outside the United Kingdom before 29 September 1988 was a crime under U.K. law." He would allow the appeal "so as to permit the extradition proceedings to proceed on the allegation that torture in pursuance of a conspiracy to commit torture, including the single act of torture which is alleged in charge 30, was being committed by Senator Pinochet after 8 December 1988 when he lost his immunity."[^1] Straw described the key majority finding of the second Lords hearing as being that torture was an international crime over which parties to the torture convention had universal jurisdiction and that a former head of state did not have immunity from such crimes.[^23]
|
||||
The House of Lords first ruled on November 25, 1998, by majority that Pinochet was not immune for crimes under international law. That judgment was set aside on January 15, 1999, because the committee that heard it was not properly constituted, and the appeal was reheard from January 18, 1999.[^1] In the judgment of March 24, 1999, [[Lord Browne-Wilkinson]] wrote: "I do not consider that torture committed outside the United Kingdom before 29 September 1988 was a crime under U.K. law." He would allow the appeal "so as to permit the extradition proceedings to proceed on the allegation that torture in pursuance of a conspiracy to commit torture, including the single act of torture which is alleged in charge 30, was being committed by Senator Pinochet after 8 December 1988 when he lost his immunity."[^1] Straw described the key majority finding of the second Lords hearing as being that torture was an international crime over which parties to the torture convention had universal jurisdiction and that a former head of state did not have immunity from such crimes.[^24]
|
||||
|
||||
Straw issued a second authority to proceed on April 14, 1999; on October 8, 1999 a Bow Street magistrate committed Pinochet to await the Home Secretary's decision. On October 14, 1999 the Chilean embassy made representations supported by medical reports, and Straw commissioned an examination by Professor Sir John Grimley Evans, Professor Andrew Lees and Dr. Michael Denham, joined by the neuropsychologist Dr. Maria Wyke. Straw informed the interested parties on January 11, 2000 that he was minded to conclude that no purpose would be served by continuing the Spanish extradition request, and on January 25, 2000 Belgium and [[Amnesty International]] applied for judicial review of the refusal to disclose the medical report.[^23]
|
||||
Straw issued a second authority to proceed on April 14, 1999; on October 8, 1999 a Bow Street magistrate committed Pinochet to await the Home Secretary's decision. On October 14, 1999 the Chilean embassy made representations supported by medical reports, and Straw commissioned an examination by Professor Sir John Grimley Evans, Professor Andrew Lees and Dr. Michael Denham, joined by the neuropsychologist Dr. Maria Wyke. Straw informed the interested parties on January 11, 2000 that he was minded to conclude that no purpose would be served by continuing the Spanish extradition request, and on January 25, 2000 Belgium and [[Amnesty International]] applied for judicial review of the refusal to disclose the medical report.[^24]
|
||||
|
||||
On March 2, 2000, Straw told the Commons that he had discharged Pinochet from the Spanish request "on the grounds that he was unfit to stand trial and that no significant improvement in his condition could be expected," and that he would not issue an authority to proceed on the Belgian, French and Swiss requests because none disclosed an extradition crime. He stated: "All the decisions which I have taken have been mine alone, and have not been decisions of Her Majesty's Government." A plane provided by the Chilean government carrying Pinochet left RAF Waddington at about 1.10 pm that day.[^23] The Solicitor-General stated in a written answer of the same date, on the advice of the Director of Public Prosecutions, that there was no realistic prospect of convicting Pinochet in England and Wales and that no court there would allow a trial of Pinochet to take place.[^23] A 35-page Home Office statement handed out in London set out reasons for the conclusion that Pinochet was not mentally or physically fit to stand trial in Britain or anywhere else.[^24] He returned to Chile, where he faced numerous criminal and civil charges until his death.
|
||||
On March 2, 2000, Straw told the Commons that he had discharged Pinochet from the Spanish request "on the grounds that he was unfit to stand trial and that no significant improvement in his condition could be expected," and that he would not issue an authority to proceed on the Belgian, French and Swiss requests because none disclosed an extradition crime. He stated: "All the decisions which I have taken have been mine alone, and have not been decisions of Her Majesty's Government." A plane provided by the Chilean government carrying Pinochet left RAF Waddington at about 1.10 pm that day.[^24] The Solicitor-General stated in a written answer of the same date, on the advice of the Director of Public Prosecutions, that there was no realistic prospect of convicting Pinochet in England and Wales and that no court there would allow a trial of Pinochet to take place.[^24] A 35-page Home Office statement handed out in London set out reasons for the conclusion that Pinochet was not mentally or physically fit to stand trial in Britain or anywhere else.[^25] He returned to Chile, where he faced numerous criminal and civil charges until his death.
|
||||
|
||||
### Riggs Bank accounts
|
||||
|
||||
The minority staff of the Senate [[Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations]] released its report on [[Riggs Bank]] with a hearing on July 15, 2004. The report's title is "Money Laundering and Foreign Corruption: Enforcement and Effectiveness of the Patriot Act, Case Study Involving Riggs Bank." Its first finding states that Riggs "assisted Augusto Pinochet, former president of Chile, to evade legal proceedings related to his Riggs bank accounts and resisted OCC oversight of these accounts."[^25]
|
||||
The minority staff of the Senate [[Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations]] released its report on [[Riggs Bank]] with a hearing on July 15, 2004. The report's title is "Money Laundering and Foreign Corruption: Enforcement and Effectiveness of the Patriot Act, Case Study Involving Riggs Bank." Its first finding states that Riggs "assisted Augusto Pinochet, former president of Chile, to evade legal proceedings related to his Riggs bank accounts and resisted OCC oversight of these accounts."[^26]
|
||||
|
||||
The report finds that Pinochet was a Riggs customer for at least eight years, with total deposits that varied from about $4 million to $8 million. In July 1996 a Spanish indictment charged him with crimes against humanity. In 1996 and again in 1998, Riggs helped him set up two Bahamian shell companies, Ashburton Company Ltd. and Althorp Investment Co., Ltd., listed as nominal owners of accounts and certificates of deposit benefiting him and his family.[^25] The report also states that the bank delivered over $1.9 million in cashier's checks to Pinochet in Chile.[^25]
|
||||
The report finds that Pinochet was a Riggs customer for at least eight years, with total deposits that varied from about $4 million to $8 million. In July 1996 a Spanish indictment charged him with crimes against humanity. In 1996 and again in 1998, Riggs helped him set up two Bahamian shell companies, Ashburton Company Ltd. and Althorp Investment Co., Ltd., listed as nominal owners of accounts and certificates of deposit benefiting him and his family.[^26] The report also states that the bank delivered over $1.9 million in cashier's checks to Pinochet in Chile.[^26]
|
||||
|
||||
### Carlos Prats and Enrique Arancibia Clavel
|
||||
|
||||
On September 30, 1974, a car bomb in Buenos Aires killed the exiled Chilean general [[Carlos Prats]] and his wife, [[Sofía Cuthbert]].[^26] Kornbluh's 2024 compilation states that Pinochet met Contreras in June 1974 and ordered him to eliminate Prats. The task first went to the DINA station chief in Argentina, [[Enrique Arancibia Clavel]], and then to DINA deputy director [[Pedro Espinoza]], who gave it to Townley, who constructed, placed and detonated the bomb.[^26]
|
||||
On September 30, 1974, a car bomb in Buenos Aires killed the exiled Chilean general [[Carlos Prats]] and his wife, [[Sofía Cuthbert]].[^27] Kornbluh's 2024 compilation states that Pinochet met Contreras in June 1974 and ordered him to eliminate Prats. The task first went to the DINA station chief in Argentina, [[Enrique Arancibia Clavel]], and then to DINA deputy director [[Pedro Espinoza]], who gave it to Townley, who constructed, placed and detonated the bomb.[^27]
|
||||
|
||||
On August 24, 2004, the [[Supreme Court of Argentina]] upheld the life sentence that a federal tribunal had imposed on Arancibia Clavel for association and necessary participation in the double aggravated homicide of Prats and Cuthbert. The court held that the crimes could not be time-barred, because crimes against humanity are imprescriptible.[^27]
|
||||
On August 24, 2004, the [[Supreme Court of Argentina]] upheld the life sentence that a federal tribunal had imposed on Arancibia Clavel for association and necessary participation in the double aggravated homicide of Prats and Cuthbert. The court held that the crimes could not be time-barred, because crimes against humanity are imprescriptible.[^28]
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: *Regina v. Evans and Another and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others, Ex Parte Pinochet (No. 3)* [1999] UKHL 17 (24 March 1999), speech of Lord Browne-Wilkinson, paras. 7-12 (facts, warrants of October 16, 17, 18 and 22, 1998, Divisional Court of October 28, 1998, Lords judgments of November 25, 1998, set aside January 15, 1999, rehearing January 18, 1999) and conclusion. https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1999/17.html
|
||||
[^2]: National Security Archive, "Pinochet: A Declassified Documentary Obit," Electronic Briefing Book No. 212, Peter Kornbluh and Yvette White, posted December 12, 2006, with descriptions of documents including the September 13, 1973 State Department cable, the November 1973 "Chilean Executions" memorandum, the October 27, 1973 CIA report, the October 6, 1976 CIA cable, and the June 23, 1978 CIA report. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB212/index.htm
|
||||
[^3]: United States Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, "Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973" (staff report, 1975), section "2. Track II" and the chronology. https://archive.org/details/Covert-Action-In-Chile-1963-1973
|
||||
[^4]: National Security Archive, "Chile and the United States: Declassified Documents Relating to the Military Coup, September 11, 1973," Electronic Briefing Book No. 8, Peter Kornbluh, 1998, document descriptions including the September 15, 1970 Helms notes, the October 15 and 16, 1970 CIA records, the October 18, 1970 cables on the Schneider plot, the April 15, 1975 DIA report, the June 6, 1975 FBI letter and the January 21, 1982 FBI report on Townley; and FBI Buenos Aires cable to the Director, September 28, 1976 (reproduced in the briefing book as document 23, pp. 1-4). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/nsaebb8.htm and https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/docs/doc23.pdf
|
||||
[^5]: United States Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, Interim Report, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), Chile chapter beginning at p. 225 (Schneider sections, including the findings and the discussion of the shooting of General Schneider and CIA/White House communication during Track II). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf
|
||||
[^6]: Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA Activities in Chile," September 18, 2000 (report under Section 311 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, the Hinchey Amendment), sections "Relationship with Contreras," "The Schneider Assassination," "Accession of General Augusto Pinochet to the Presidency," "Knowledge of 'Operation Condor'" and "Knowledge of Human Rights Violations." https://permanent.fdlp.gov/websites/www.cia.gov/www.cia.gov/cia/reports/chile/index.html
|
||||
[^7]: National Security Archive, "CIA Acknowledges Ties to Pinochet's Repression," Chile Documentation Project, September 19, 2000, summary of the Hinchey report. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/news/20000919/index.html
|
||||
[^8]: UNESCO, Memory of the World Regional Register for Latin America and the Caribbean, "Archives of Terror, XXth Century" (Paraguay, registration ID 66/2011; institution: Centro de Documentación y Archivos para la defensa de los derechos humanos, Corte Suprema de Justicia). https://www.unesco.org/en/memory-world/lac/archives-terror-xxth-century
|
||||
[^9]: *United States v. Sampol*, 636 F.2d 621 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per curiam), argued June 10, 1980, decided September 15, 1980, rehearing denied December 9, 1980. https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/u-s-v-sampol-886429361
|
||||
[^10]: "Chile Officers To Go To Prison For '76 Murder," Los Angeles Times, reprinted in The Spokesman-Review (Spokane), May 31, 1995. https://www.spokesman.com/stories/1995/may/31/chile-officers-to-go-to-prison-for-76-murder/
|
||||
[^11]: National Security Archive, "CIA: 'Pinochet personally ordered' Letelier bombing," Electronic Briefing Book No. 560, September 23, 2016, quoting the CIA special intelligence assessment of 1987. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/node/3081
|
||||
[^12]: National Security Archive, "The Pinochet File: U.S. Declassifies Missing Documents in the Letelier-Moffitt Case," Electronic Briefing Book No. 532, October 8, 2015, describing the October 6, 1987 Shultz memorandum to Reagan. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/node/2899
|
||||
[^13]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 18/12943 (2017), motion on Colonia Dignidad (German; paraphrased). https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/18/129/1812943.pdf
|
||||
[^14]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 11/1409 (1987), minor interpellation of the Green Party group on Colonia Dignidad (German; paraphrased). https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/11/014/1101409.pdf
|
||||
[^15]: Auswärtiges Amt, "'Colonia Dignidad': Bilanzbericht der Gemeinsamen Kommission," September 21, 2021 (German; paraphrased), including the account of Steinmeier's April 2016 statement. https://auswaertiges-amt.de/de/aussenpolitik/laender/chile-node/bilanzbericht-colonia-dignidad/2483426
|
||||
[^16]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
|
||||
[^17]: *United States v. Cardoen*, 898 F. Supp. 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1995), No. 93-241-CR, https://static.case.law/f-supp/898/cases/1563-01.json.
|
||||
[^18]: Friedman, Alan. *Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq*. Bantam, 1993, pp. 46-54, 64.
|
||||
[^19]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, "James Daniel Theberge (1930-1988)," https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/theberge-james-daniel; "Nomination of James Daniel Theberge To Be United States Ambassador to Chile," Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, November 6, 1981, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/11681a
|
||||
[^20]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Talking points for 28 January 1985 meeting with James D. Theberge, United States Ambassador to Chile," January 23, 1985, CREST document CIA-RDP87M00539R000801050046-5. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp87m00539r000801050046-5
|
||||
[^21]: Lydia Chavez, "Congressman Reports Tough Talk From Pinochet," *The New York Times*, December 16, 1984, section 1, page 20. https://www.nytimes.com/1984/12/16/world/congressman-reports-tough-talk-from-pinochet.html
|
||||
[^22]: George Gedda, Associated Press, "Pinochet fears CIA coup, officials say," January 1985, CREST document CIA-RDP90-00965R000302230009-6. Attributed to unnamed officials. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302230009-6
|
||||
[^23]: UK House of Commons, *Hansard*, "Senator Pinochet," HC Deb 02 March 2000 vol 345 cc571-88 (statement of the Home Secretary, Jack Straw), and written answer of the Solicitor-General, HC Deb 02 March 2000 vol 345 cc336-7W. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/2000/mar/02/senator-pinochet and https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written_answers/2000/mar/02/senator-pinochet
|
||||
[^24]: CNN, transcript of March 2, 2000 (report on Home Secretary Jack Straw's decision and the 35-page statement). https://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0003/02/nd.03.html
|
||||
[^25]: United States Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, minority staff, "Money Laundering and Foreign Corruption: Enforcement and Effectiveness of the Patriot Act, Case Study Involving Riggs Bank" (report released with the July 15, 2004 hearing), Finding 1 (p. 7) and Section B (p. 18). https://archive.org/details/SenateSubcommitteeReportOnMoneyLaunderingAndRiggsBank
|
||||
[^26]: National Security Archive, "The Pinochet Regime at 50: The Assassination of General Carlos Prats and Sofía Cuthbert," Electronic Briefing Book, Peter Kornbluh, October 1, 2024, narrative and CIA and DINA documents. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/chile/2024-10-01/pinochet-regime-50-assassination-general-carlos-prats-and-sofia
|
||||
[^27]: Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nacion (Argentina), *Arancibia Clavel, Enrique Lautaro s/ homicidio calificado y asociacion ilicita y otros*, recurso de hecho, Buenos Aires, August 24, 2004. https://www.cancilleria.gob.ar/userfiles/ut/fallo_arancibia_clavel_2004_01.pdf
|
||||
[^5]: Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Hearings*, vol. 7, "Covert Action," December 4 and 5, 1975, statement of Gregory Treverton, p. 14 (Helms's handwritten notes quoted, including "Make the economy scream."), and Exhibit 2, p. 96 (handwritten notes by Richard Helms taken during the meeting of September 15, 1970 with President Nixon).
|
||||
[^6]: United States Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, Interim Report, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), Chile chapter beginning at p. 225 (Schneider sections, including the findings and the discussion of the shooting of General Schneider and CIA/White House communication during Track II). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf
|
||||
[^7]: Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA Activities in Chile," September 18, 2000 (report under Section 311 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, the Hinchey Amendment), sections "Relationship with Contreras," "The Schneider Assassination," "Accession of General Augusto Pinochet to the Presidency," "Knowledge of 'Operation Condor'" and "Knowledge of Human Rights Violations." https://permanent.fdlp.gov/websites/www.cia.gov/www.cia.gov/cia/reports/chile/index.html
|
||||
[^8]: National Security Archive, "CIA Acknowledges Ties to Pinochet's Repression," Chile Documentation Project, September 19, 2000, summary of the Hinchey report. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/news/20000919/index.html
|
||||
[^9]: UNESCO, Memory of the World Regional Register for Latin America and the Caribbean, "Archives of Terror, XXth Century" (Paraguay, registration ID 66/2011; institution: Centro de Documentación y Archivos para la defensa de los derechos humanos, Corte Suprema de Justicia). https://www.unesco.org/en/memory-world/lac/archives-terror-xxth-century
|
||||
[^10]: *United States v. Sampol*, 636 F.2d 621 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per curiam), argued June 10, 1980, decided September 15, 1980, rehearing denied December 9, 1980. https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/u-s-v-sampol-886429361
|
||||
[^11]: "Chile Officers To Go To Prison For '76 Murder," Los Angeles Times, reprinted in The Spokesman-Review (Spokane), May 31, 1995. https://www.spokesman.com/stories/1995/may/31/chile-officers-to-go-to-prison-for-76-murder/
|
||||
[^12]: National Security Archive, "CIA: 'Pinochet personally ordered' Letelier bombing," Electronic Briefing Book No. 560, September 23, 2016, quoting the CIA special intelligence assessment of 1987. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/node/3081
|
||||
[^13]: National Security Archive, "The Pinochet File: U.S. Declassifies Missing Documents in the Letelier-Moffitt Case," Electronic Briefing Book No. 532, October 8, 2015, describing the October 6, 1987 Shultz memorandum to Reagan. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/node/2899
|
||||
[^14]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 18/12943 (2017), motion on Colonia Dignidad (German; paraphrased). https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/18/129/1812943.pdf
|
||||
[^15]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 11/1409 (1987), minor interpellation of the Green Party group on Colonia Dignidad (German; paraphrased). https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/11/014/1101409.pdf
|
||||
[^16]: Auswärtiges Amt, "'Colonia Dignidad': Bilanzbericht der Gemeinsamen Kommission," September 21, 2021 (German; paraphrased), including the account of Steinmeier's April 2016 statement. https://auswaertiges-amt.de/de/aussenpolitik/laender/chile-node/bilanzbericht-colonia-dignidad/2483426
|
||||
[^17]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
|
||||
[^18]: *United States v. Cardoen*, 898 F. Supp. 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1995), No. 93-241-CR, https://static.case.law/f-supp/898/cases/1563-01.json.
|
||||
[^19]: Friedman, Alan. *Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq*. Bantam, 1993, pp. 46-54, 64.
|
||||
[^20]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, "James Daniel Theberge (1930-1988)," https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/theberge-james-daniel; "Nomination of James Daniel Theberge To Be United States Ambassador to Chile," Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, November 6, 1981, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/11681a
|
||||
[^21]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Talking points for 28 January 1985 meeting with James D. Theberge, United States Ambassador to Chile," January 23, 1985, CREST document CIA-RDP87M00539R000801050046-5. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp87m00539r000801050046-5
|
||||
[^22]: Lydia Chavez, "Congressman Reports Tough Talk From Pinochet," *The New York Times*, December 16, 1984, section 1, page 20. https://www.nytimes.com/1984/12/16/world/congressman-reports-tough-talk-from-pinochet.html
|
||||
[^23]: George Gedda, Associated Press, "Pinochet fears CIA coup, officials say," January 1985, CREST document CIA-RDP90-00965R000302230009-6. Attributed to unnamed officials. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302230009-6
|
||||
[^24]: UK House of Commons, *Hansard*, "Senator Pinochet," HC Deb 02 March 2000 vol 345 cc571-88 (statement of the Home Secretary, Jack Straw), and written answer of the Solicitor-General, HC Deb 02 March 2000 vol 345 cc336-7W. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/2000/mar/02/senator-pinochet and https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written_answers/2000/mar/02/senator-pinochet
|
||||
[^25]: CNN, transcript of March 2, 2000 (report on Home Secretary Jack Straw's decision and the 35-page statement). https://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0003/02/nd.03.html
|
||||
[^26]: United States Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, minority staff, "Money Laundering and Foreign Corruption: Enforcement and Effectiveness of the Patriot Act, Case Study Involving Riggs Bank" (report released with the July 15, 2004 hearing), Finding 1 (p. 7) and Section B (p. 18). https://archive.org/details/SenateSubcommitteeReportOnMoneyLaunderingAndRiggsBank
|
||||
[^27]: National Security Archive, "The Pinochet Regime at 50: The Assassination of General Carlos Prats and Sofía Cuthbert," Electronic Briefing Book, Peter Kornbluh, October 1, 2024, narrative and CIA and DINA documents. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/chile/2024-10-01/pinochet-regime-50-assassination-general-carlos-prats-and-sofia
|
||||
[^28]: Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nacion (Argentina), *Arancibia Clavel, Enrique Lautaro s/ homicidio calificado y asociacion ilicita y otros*, recurso de hecho, Buenos Aires, August 24, 2004. https://www.cancilleria.gob.ar/userfiles/ut/fallo_arancibia_clavel_2004_01.pdf
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -12,12 +12,12 @@ tags:
|
|||
- ColdWar
|
||||
- NATO
|
||||
- Interrogation
|
||||
summary: "US Navy clinical psychologist stationed in Naples who disclosed at a 1975 NATO conference in Oslo that the Navy had trained 'combat psychopaths' as assassins through a three-phase audio-visual desensitization program, triggering a brief international scandal before retracting the most specific of his claims under institutional pressure."
|
||||
summary: "US Navy clinical psychologist in Naples who told a 1975 NATO conference in Oslo that the Navy trained 'combat psychopaths' as assassins, then retracted the most specific claims under institutional pressure."
|
||||
born: 1935
|
||||
died: 1994-04-19
|
||||
location: Naples, Italy
|
||||
created: 2026-06-04
|
||||
updated: 2026-06-04
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
---
|
||||
Thomas E. Narut was a [[U.S. Navy]] clinical psychologist stationed at the US Naval Regional Medical Center in [[Naples]], [[Italy]], who in June or July 1975 disclosed in private conversation at a [[NATO]] conference in [[Oslo]] that the Navy operated a program to select, condition, and deploy personnel as covert assassins. The disclosure appeared in the [[London]] [[The Sunday Times|Sunday Times]] on July 6, 1975, under the headline "The Strange Tale of Commander Narut," authored by Peter Watson, the paper's science correspondent. It was denied the same day by the Pentagon, and Narut partially retracted his most specific claim within days under institutional pressure. Watson never retracted the story.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -59,8 +59,9 @@ After his London press conference, Narut returned to Naples and continued at the
|
|||
|
||||
### Absence of Congressional Investigation
|
||||
|
||||
No congressional investigation specifically addressed Narut's claims. The [[Church Committee]] was active in 1975 and in November of that year issued its interim report on CIA assassination plots, documenting programs targeting Fidel Castro, Patrice Lumumba, Rafael Trujillo, Ngo Dinh Diem, and [[Rene Schneider|René Schneider]], but the committee's focus was on CIA operations rather than Navy psychological conditioning programs. In January 1976 the committee did examine a CIA assassination unit designated PB/7, a parallel to Narut's claims involving a different agency. President Ford issued Executive Order 11905 in February 1976 banning US government-sanctioned assassinations of foreign leaders. The absence of specific congressional pursuit of Narut's disclosures, despite their timing during the Church Committee investigation, remains one of the unresolved gaps in the record.[^1]
|
||||
No congressional investigation specifically addressed Narut's claims. The [[Church Committee]] was active in 1975 and in November of that year issued its interim report on CIA assassination plots, documenting programs targeting Fidel Castro, Patrice Lumumba, Rafael Trujillo, Ngo Dinh Diem, and [[Rene Schneider|René Schneider]], but the committee's focus was on CIA operations rather than Navy psychological conditioning programs. In January 1976 the committee did examine a CIA assassination unit designated PB/7, a parallel to Narut's claims involving a different agency. The final report's Book IV describes Program Branch 7 (PB/7), headed in the early years of the CIA by Army Colonel [[Boris Pash]], as a "special operations" unit within the [[Office of Policy Coordination]] with jurisdiction over assassinations and kidnappings. The staff stated that it found no evidence that the unit carried out any such operation.[^2] President Ford issued Executive Order 11905 in February 1976 banning US government-sanctioned assassinations of foreign leaders. The absence of specific congressional pursuit of Narut's disclosures, despite their timing during the Church Committee investigation, remains one of the unresolved gaps in the record.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Peter Watson, "The Strange Tale of Commander Narut," *Sunday Times* (London), July 6, 1975; Reuters wire service denial, July 6-7, 1975; Peter Watson, *War on the Mind: The Military Uses and Abuses of Psychology*. Basic Books, 1978. pp. 248-250 (Ch. 14); Walter Bowart, *Operation Mind Control*. Dell, 1978; Jeffrey Kaye, "UK Sunday Times: US Navy Placed 'Hit Men' in Overseas Embassies," Substack, kayej.substack.com.
|
||||
[^2]: Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Final Report*, Book IV, "Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Foreign and Military Intelligence," S. Rept. 94-755, April 26, 1976, pp. 128 to 129 (section II, "The 'Special Operations' Unit"; subsection A, "Program Branch 7: A Special Operations Unit with Assassination Jurisdiction"; the staff's sources include a CIA letter to the committee of January 16, 1976 and an Office of Policy Coordination planning memorandum of January 1, 1976).
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ relations:
|
|||
role: "Kress was the CIA project officer for the SRI work and for the personal services contract, according to Kress and to Schnabel"
|
||||
fn: 16
|
||||
created: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-05
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Patrick Harold Price was born on December 8, 1918, and died in [[Las Vegas]] on July 14, 1975. A Patrick Price sat on the [[Burbank City Council]] in 1950-1953 according to the city's photograph archive, and [[Hal Puthoff]] and [[Russell Targ]] later described the remote viewer as a former police commissioner and vice-mayor of [[Burbank, California|Burbank]]. He was subject S1 in the [[Stanford Research Institute]] (SRI) work for the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] from June 1973 until the autumn of 1974. He then worked under a personal services contract for the CIA's [[Office of Technical Service]] until his death.[^1]
|
||||
|
|
@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ SRI's report on the SCANATE project introduces him without a surname: "As a back
|
|||
|
||||
Kress gave a different weighting of the same episode in his 1977 article for the CIA's journal *[[Studies in Intelligence]]*. In his account an officer of the CIA's [[Office of Scientific Intelligence]] passed only geographic coordinates of a vacation property in the eastern United States to the SRI physicists, who passed them to two subjects, one of them Price; both "talked about a military-like facility," and the correlation of the two descriptions led the officer to drive to the site, where he found a sensitive government installation a few miles from the vacation property. Price, asked for the interior, "provided a list of project titles associated with current and past activities including one of extreme sensitivity" and the codename of the site; "other information concerning the physical layout of the site was accurate. Some information, such as the names of the people at the site, proved incorrect." Kress's summary was that "the evaluation was, as usual, mixed."[^7]
|
||||
|
||||
Schnabel's account of the origin of the coordinates uses two pseudonyms: "[[Richard Kennett]]," an analyst in the CIA's Office of Scientific Intelligence, asked a colleague he calls "[[Bill O'Donnell]]" for coordinates of a place on the East Coast that O'Donnell could later recognize from a drawing or photograph, and telephoned the figures to Puthoff. Schnabel identified the target as the [[Naval Security Group Activity]] base at [[Sugar Grove]], [[West Virginia]]. He added that he could find no record, in the Army, Air Force or Marines, of the three officers Price had named, that the coordinates actually given to Swann and Price described a place about ten miles southwest of Sugar Grove on Bullpasture Mountain in [[Virginia]], and that Swann had told him the names, project code words and coordinates in SRI's reports were later changed to protect the site, which Puthoff denied.[^8] The Snyders' evaluation of 1979 added: "It is alleged, although unverified by the authors, that Price had once worked for the organization that had control over that particular site."[^9] Kress's 1977 article, by contrast, says Price "had no military or intelligence background."[^4]
|
||||
Schnabel's account of the origin of the coordinates uses two pseudonyms: "[[Richard Kennett]]," an analyst in the CIA's Office of Scientific Intelligence, asked a colleague he calls "[[Bill O'Donnell]]" for coordinates of a place on the East Coast that O'Donnell could later recognize from a drawing or photograph, and telephoned the figures to Puthoff. Schnabel identified the target as the [[Naval Security Group Activity]] base at [[Sugar Grove]], West Virginia. He added that he could find no record, in the Army, Air Force or Marines, of the three officers Price had named, that the coordinates actually given to Swann and Price described a place about ten miles southwest of Sugar Grove on Bullpasture Mountain in [[Virginia]], and that Swann had told him the names, project code words and coordinates in SRI's reports were later changed to protect the site, which Puthoff denied.[^8] The Snyders' evaluation of 1979 added: "It is alleged, although unverified by the authors, that Price had once worked for the organization that had control over that particular site."[^9] Kress's 1977 article, by contrast, says Price "had no military or intelligence background."[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
### SRI sessions, 1973 and 1974
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -118,38 +118,46 @@ Schnabel's account of the end of the trip is the fullest. In mid-July 1975 Price
|
|||
|
||||
Schnabel wrote that when "Richard Kennett" and others tried to find out what had happened, they learned that no autopsy had been performed, although autopsies were normal for out-of-town deaths outside hospitals; they were told that a friend of Price, not Alvarez, had arrived with a briefcase of his medical records, which with the emergency-room physician's statements led Las Vegas officials to waive the autopsy. Kennett could not identify the man with the briefcase. Schnabel recorded the rumors that followed: that the man was from the CIA, that Price had been murdered by the Soviets, that he was alive under a new identity, and that a friend had a vision in which Price's ghost said he had been poisoned. He recorded the view of those who knew of Price's heart disease that "there was no real mystery," and that a CIA official who worked with Price told him the Agency "had no connection with any of the events surrounding Price's death, including the (alleged) appearance of the mysterious man with the medical records." As late as 1994, Schnabel wrote, Targ told him: "I don't know how Pat Price died."[^24]
|
||||
|
||||
In late summer 1977, Schnabel wrote, a few weeks after the Parade section of [[The Washington Post]] of August 7, 1977 carried an article headed "Psychic Spying," [[Stansfield Turner]], the Director of Central Intelligence, was asked about the subject at a meeting with reporters and, "clearly referring to Pat Price," said that the CIA had once worked with a man who seemed to have some psychic ability, whose drawings of foreign targets he had not seen were reasonably accurate but rudimentary: "he died, and we haven't heard from him since." When the Office of Technical Service briefed the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence]] on November 16, 1977, a briefing the Agency's memorandum of November 17 says "was occasioned by" the Parade article, it left with the staff "a brief article on Mr. Pat Price."[^25] A [[Defense Intelligence College]] thesis of 1992 quotes Turner at a breakfast for journalists in 1977 as saying the CIA "had an individual who from time to time was able to draw very elementary sketches of street scenes in foreign countries where he had never been," and that "this subject died in 1975, and we haven't heard from him since."[^26]
|
||||
In late summer 1977, Schnabel wrote, a few weeks after [[The Washington Post]] of August 7, 1977 carried an article headed "Psychic Spying?" by [[John L. Wilhelm]], [[Stansfield Turner]], the Director of Central Intelligence, was asked about the subject at a meeting with reporters and, "clearly referring to Pat Price," said that the CIA had once worked with a man who seemed to have some psychic ability, whose drawings of foreign targets he had not seen were reasonably accurate but rudimentary: "he died, and we haven't heard from him since." When the Office of Technical Service briefed the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence]] on November 16, 1977, a briefing the Agency's memorandum of November 17 says "was occasioned by" the article (the memorandum places it in "the Parade Section of the Washington Post"), it left with the staff "a brief article on Mr. Pat Price."[^25] A [[Defense Intelligence College]] thesis of 1992 quotes Turner at a breakfast for journalists in 1977 as saying the CIA "had an individual who from time to time was able to draw very elementary sketches of street scenes in foreign countries where he had never been," and that "this subject died in 1975, and we haven't heard from him since."[^26]
|
||||
|
||||
The CIA's files record the death as follows. Kress, writing in the CIA's journal in the Winter 1977 issue, wrote of the second Libyan requirements list passed to Price: "Price died of a heart attack a few days later, and the program stopped."[^27] An OTS chronology attached to the memorandum of November 17, 1977 has an undated entry reading "Before a meeting can be set up, however, Mr. Price dies of a heart attack," followed by entries for September 1975 and October 1975, the latter reading "Mr. Price's death effectively ends all official OTS involvement in ESP research."[^28] John L. Wilhelm, a former national science correspondent for Time, wrote in the Washington Post of August 7, 1977 that "Pat Price, who died two years ago, also was a high-level 'Operating Thetan.'"[^29] An information paper of April 13, 1979 (DAMI-ISH) states: "In July 1975, Libyan coordinates were provided to Price, who came back with a description of a guerrilla training site," and that "the same month Price tragically died of a heart attack."[^30] A history of government-sponsored psychoenergetics research of February 1989 states of the Libyan requests: "Two days later, however, Price died of a heart attack."[^31] A memorandum of July 16, 1986 from the Assistant for Coordination and Strategy of the Office of Research and Development to the Director of Research and Development, about a request from SRI and the Defense Intelligence Agency for Price's data, says, of a meeting of June 12, 1986 with SRI's principal investigator: "Since Pat died in 1977, and I had personally worked with him, they wanted to debrief me on my recollections of him and his procedures."[^32]
|
||||
|
||||
### The 1995 review
|
||||
|
||||
The American Institutes for Research report of September 29, 1995 described the Semipalatinsk work as the third reported operational success, in which "the viewer was provided with only the geographic coordinates of the site." It noted that a government official who reviewed that work had concluded "there was no way the remote viewer could have drawn the large gantry crane unless 'he actually saw it through remote viewing, or he was informed of what to draw by someone knowledgeable of [the site],'" and that the same analyst judged the experiment unsuccessful because the positive evidence "was far outweighed by the large amount of negative evidence." The report added that "there is no way to know with certainty that the subject did not speak with someone who had knowledge of the site, however unlikely that possibility may appear," and that it was unknown to what degree the results in the reports "were selectively chosen because they were correct."[^27]
|
||||
The American Institutes for Research report of September 29, 1995 described the Semipalatinsk work as the third reported operational success, in which "the viewer was provided with only the geographic coordinates of the site." It noted that a government official who reviewed that work had concluded "there was no way the remote viewer could have drawn the large gantry crane unless 'he actually saw it through remote viewing, or he was informed of what to draw by someone knowledgeable of [the site],'" and that the same analyst judged the experiment unsuccessful because the positive evidence "was far outweighed by the large amount of negative evidence." The report added that "there is no way to know with certainty that the subject did not speak with someone who had knowledge of the site, however unlikely that possibility may appear," and that it was unknown to what degree the results in the reports "were selectively chosen because they were correct."[^33]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: "1950-1953: Councilman - Patrick Price," photograph by Paul E. Wolfe, note on print "Patrick Price, Council 1950-1953," City Council Image Collection, identifier cco00655, Burbank Public Library, Burbank in Focus Office (physical copy held by the City Clerk's Office). https://burbankinfocus.org/islandora/object/islandora:90/ The collection record does not state that this councilman and the remote viewer are the same man; Targ and Puthoff and Schnabel both place the remote viewer's Burbank service in the same period. For the SRI period and the OTS contract see Kress, Kenneth A., "Parapsychology in Intelligence: A Personal Review and Conclusions," *Studies in Intelligence,* vol. 21, no. 4, Winter 1977, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200030040-0, read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^1]: "1950-1953: Councilman - Patrick Price," photograph by Paul E. Wolfe, note on print "Patrick Price, Council 1950-1953," City Council Image Collection, identifier cco00655, Burbank Public Library, Burbank in Focus Office (physical copy held by the City Clerk's Office). https://burbankinfocus.org/islandora/object/islandora:90/ The collection record does not state that this councilman and the remote viewer are the same man; Targ and Puthoff and Schnabel both place the remote viewer's Burbank service in the same period. For the SRI period and the OTS contract see Kress, Kenneth A., "Parapsychology in Intelligence: A Personal Review and Conclusions," *Studies in Intelligence,* vol. 21, no. 4, Winter 1977, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200030040-0.
|
||||
[^2]: Carosa, Chris. "Patrick H. Price: Savior, Savant, or Sacrifice?," May 3, 2022, quoting "Story of Crime Questioned," Los Angeles Evening Citizen News, April 30, 1952. https://chriscarosa.com/2022/05/patrick-h-price-savior-savant-or-sacrifice/ The newspaper text is quoted from this web article.
|
||||
[^3]: Targ, Russell, and Harold Puthoff. *Mind-Reach: Scientists Look at Psychic Abilities.* New York: Delacorte Press, 1977, chapter "Pat Price: A Man for All Seasons," read in the archive.org full-text copy of the 2005 reprint, https://archive.org/details/mind-reach-scientists-look-at-psychic-abilities-2005-russell-targ-harold-e.-puth
|
||||
[^4]: Kress, "Parapsychology in Intelligence," *Studies in Intelligence,* Winter 1977, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200030040-0.
|
||||
[^5]: Schnabel, Jim. *Remote Viewers: The Secret History of America's Psychic Spies.* New York: Dell, 1997, chapters on the SRI work and "The Shamans," and the discussion of Scientology, read in the archive.org full-text copy, https://archive.org/details/jim-schnabel-remote-viewers-the-secret-history-of-americas-psychic-spies_2 Schnabel's own notes state that "The anecdote about Price and the police dispatcher comes from Targ 1996"; he does not give a source for the Lockheed and Alaska details.
|
||||
[^6]: Stanford Research Institute, "Project SCANATE, Exploratory Research in Remote Viewing," 1973, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100480002-4. Puthoff, Harold E., and Russell Targ. *Perceptual Augmentation Techniques,* final report, part two, research report, December 1, 1975, SRI Project 3183, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100410001-2, and part one, executive summary, covering January 1974 to February 1975, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100420001-1. The report codes its subjects; S3 and S1 are identified as Swann and Price by matching their responses to the named sessions in the SCANATE report. All read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^6]: Stanford Research Institute, "Project SCANATE, Exploratory Research in Remote Viewing," 1973, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100480002-4. Puthoff, Harold E., and Russell Targ. *Perceptual Augmentation Techniques,* final report, part two, research report, December 1, 1975, SRI Project 3183, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100410001-2, and part one, executive summary, covering January 1974 to February 1975, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100420001-1. The report codes its subjects; S3 and S1 are identified as Swann and Price by matching their responses to the named sessions in the SCANATE report. All.
|
||||
[^7]: Kress, "Parapsychology in Intelligence," *Studies in Intelligence,* Winter 1977, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200030040-0, section on summer 1973.
|
||||
[^8]: Schnabel, *Remote Viewers,* 1997, chapter text and notes to the chapter on Sugar Grove; pseudonyms are listed in the book's "Pseudonyms" page (which includes Richard Kennett, Bill O'Donnell, Peter Maris, Norm Everheart, Ed Rogers, Nick Clancy and Bill and Judy Alvarez). https://archive.org/details/jim-schnabel-remote-viewers-the-secret-history-of-americas-psychic-spies_2
|
||||
[^9]: Snyder, Harry L., and Arlene G. Snyder. *Summary and Critical Evaluation of Research in Remote Viewing,* Report RV-79-1, final technical report, contract 77F104420, Systemetrics, Inc., Blacksburg, Virginia, June 1, 1979, parts 1 and 2, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100440001-9 and CIA-RDP96-00787R000100260003-2. The sponsor of the contract is not named in the report. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^10]: Transcripts of remote viewing experiments with Pat Price, October 4, 1973 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200130011-6), October 24, 1973 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200130012-5) and October 26, 1973 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200130010-7). Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^9]: Snyder, Harry L., and Arlene G. Snyder. *Summary and Critical Evaluation of Research in Remote Viewing,* Report RV-79-1, final technical report, contract 77F104420, Systemetrics, Inc., Blacksburg, Virginia, June 1, 1979, parts 1 and 2, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100440001-9 and CIA-RDP96-00787R000100260003-2.
|
||||
[^10]: Transcripts of remote viewing experiments with Pat Price, October 4, 1973 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200130011-6), October 24, 1973 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200130012-5) and October 26, 1973 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200130010-7).
|
||||
[^11]: Targ, Russell, and Harold Puthoff. "Information Transmission under Conditions of Sensory Shielding," *Nature,* vol. 251, October 18, 1974, pp. 602-607, read in the CIA Reading Room copy CIA-RDP96-00787R000100220001-8 on archive.org.
|
||||
[^12]: Schnabel, *Remote Viewers,* 1997, chapter on the SRI series; his notes cite Puthoff and Targ 1973, 1975 and 1977 for the SRI side.
|
||||
[^13]: Marks, David, and Richard Kammann. "Information transmission in remote viewing experiments." *Nature,* vol. 274, August 17, 1978, pp. 680-681. https://www.nature.com/articles/274680a0 Marks, David F. "Remote Viewing Revisited." *Skeptical Inquirer,* vol. 6, no. 4, Summer 1982, pp. 18-29. https://cdn.centerforinquiry.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/29/1982/07/22165420/p20.pdf Puthoff, H. E., and Russell Targ, "Information Transmission in Remote Viewing Experiments: II," and Tart, Charles T., "Reanalysis of SRI Remote Viewing Experiments," January 1979, CIA-RDP96-00787R000200090017-5; published as Tart, Puthoff and Targ, *Nature,* vol. 284, 1980, p. 191. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^13]: Marks, David, and Richard Kammann. "Information transmission in remote viewing experiments." *Nature,* vol. 274, August 17, 1978, pp. 680-681. https://www.nature.com/articles/274680a0 Marks, David F. "Remote Viewing Revisited." *Skeptical Inquirer,* vol. 6, no. 4, Summer 1982, pp. 18-29. https://cdn.centerforinquiry.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/29/1982/07/22165420/p20.pdf Puthoff, H. E., and Russell Targ, "Information Transmission in Remote Viewing Experiments: II," and Tart, Charles T., "Reanalysis of SRI Remote Viewing Experiments," January 1979, CIA-RDP96-00787R000200090017-5; published as Tart, Puthoff and Targ, *Nature,* vol. 284, 1980, p. 191.
|
||||
[^14]: Schnabel, *Remote Viewers,* 1997, the Patricia Hearst section of the chapter on Price.
|
||||
[^15]: Memorandum for the record, "Operational Use of Paranormals in Police Activities," undated, author redacted, Office of Technical Service, CIA-RDP96-00787R000200130013-4. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^15]: Memorandum for the record, "Operational Use of Paranormals in Police Activities," undated, author redacted, Office of Technical Service, CIA-RDP96-00787R000200130013-4.
|
||||
[^16]: Kress, "Parapsychology in Intelligence," *Studies in Intelligence,* Winter 1977, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200030040-0, with footnotes there to W. T. Strand, memorandum for the Director, Office of Technical Service, "Evaluation of Data on Semipalatinsk Unidentified R&D Facility No. 3, USSR," August 20, 1974; C/AOB/OTS memorandum for the record, April 20, 1976; and Directorate of Operations memoranda of December 12, 1974, and January 14, 24, 31 and February 5, 1975 on "Perceptual Augmentation Testing" and the Libyan desk requirement.
|
||||
[^17]: Schnabel, *Remote Viewers,* 1997, chapter on the Semipalatinsk session; "Peter Maris" is on the book's pseudonym list. Schnabel's account is based on interviews and on the SRI reports.
|
||||
[^18]: Memorandum for the record, "Discussions About SRI Performance," August 5, 1974, CIA-RDP96-00787R000200200017-2. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^19]: Puthoff, Harold E., and Russell Targ. *Perceptual Augmentation Techniques,* final report, part two, December 1, 1975, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100410001-2. "An Analysis of a Remote Viewing Experiment of URDF-3," report of the four sessions of July 9 to 15, 1974, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200240001-0, with other copies at CIA-RDP96-00791R000100500001-2 and CIA-RDP96-00791R000200040002-1, cited by Kress as the work of a Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory nuclear analyst and dated in one copy December 4, 1975. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^18]: Memorandum for the record, "Discussions About SRI Performance," August 5, 1974, CIA-RDP96-00787R000200200017-2.
|
||||
[^19]: Puthoff, Harold E., and Russell Targ. *Perceptual Augmentation Techniques,* final report, part two, December 1, 1975, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100410001-2. "An Analysis of a Remote Viewing Experiment of URDF-3," report of the four sessions of July 9 to 15, 1974, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200240001-0, with other copies at CIA-RDP96-00791R000100500001-2 and CIA-RDP96-00791R000200040002-1, cited by Kress as the work of a Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory nuclear analyst and dated in one copy December 4, 1975.
|
||||
[^20]: Targ, Russell. "Remote Viewing at Stanford Research Institute in the 1970s: A Memoir," *Journal of Scientific Exploration,* vol. 10, no. 1, 1996, pp. 77-88, read in a Wayback Machine copy of the journal's PDF.
|
||||
[^21]: "Review of Perceptual Augmentation Techniques," unsigned review of SRI progress reports 1 to 3, c. August 1974, CIA-RDP96-00787R000200230001-6. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^21]: "Review of Perceptual Augmentation Techniques," unsigned review of SRI progress reports 1 to 3, c. August 1974, CIA-RDP96-00787R000200230001-6.
|
||||
[^22]: Schnabel, *Remote Viewers,* 1997, chapter on Swann's return and Price's departure.
|
||||
[^23]: Schnabel, *Remote Viewers,* 1997, chapter on the embassy tests; pseudonyms as listed in the book.
|
||||
[^24]: Schnabel, *Remote Viewers,* 1997, chapter "The Shamans" and its footnotes, including the footnote recording the statement by a CIA official who worked with Price. The pseudonym list in the same book includes Bill and Judy Alvarez and Richard Kennett.
|
||||
[^25]: Schnabel, *Remote Viewers,* 1997, chapter on the summer of 1977, on Turner's remark; OTS/BAB Memo #287-77, November 17, 1977 (CIA-RDP79-00999A000400050014-1), on the Parade article "Psychic Spying," Washington Post, August 7, 1977; reading notes on John L. Wilhelm's book *The Search for Superman* are in CIA-RDP96-00788R001100040006-1. Brandwein, David S., Director, Office of Technical Service, memoranda "Stanford Research Institute Parapsychology Research," February 20, 1976 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200020001-9), and "OTS Support to Research in Parapsychology," October 7, 1976 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200020016-3); memorandum for the record, "Briefing for House Permanent Select Committee re OTS Involvement in ESP Research," OTS memo 287-77, November 17, 1977 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200020020-8), at which OTS left with the committee staff "a brief article on Mr. Pat Price." Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^26]: Zarbo, Michael E. (Captain, U.S. Army), *Remote Viewing: Parapsychological Potential for Intelligence Collection?,* master's thesis, Defense Intelligence College, November 1992, CIA-RDP96-00789R002600250001-6, quoting Turner. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^27]: Mumford, Michael D., Andrew M. Rose, and David A. Goslin. *An Evaluation of Remote Viewing: Research and Applications.* American Institutes for Research, September 29, 1995, chapter 3, p. 3-77 and following, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200180005-5, read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^25]: Schnabel, *Remote Viewers,* 1997, chapter on the summer of 1977, on Turner's remark; OTS/BAB Memo #287-77, November 17, 1977 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000500170001-0), on the article "Psychic Spying," Washington Post, August 7, 1977; reading notes on John L. Wilhelm's book *The Search for Superman* are in CIA-RDP96-00788R001100040006-1. Brandwein, David S., Director, Office of Technical Service, memoranda "Stanford Research Institute Parapsychology Research," February 20, 1976 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200090005-8), and "OTS Support to Research in Parapsychology," October 7, 1976 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200020016-3); memorandum for the record, "Briefing for House Permanent Select Committee re OTS Involvement in ESP Research," OTS memo 287-77, November 17, 1977 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200020020-8), at which OTS left with the committee staff "a brief article on Mr. Pat Price.".
|
||||
[^26]: Zarbo, Michael E. (Captain, U.S. Army), *Remote Viewing: Parapsychological Potential for Intelligence Collection?,* master's thesis, Defense Intelligence College, November 1992, CIA-RDP96-00789R002600250001-6, quoting Turner.
|
||||
[^27]: Kress, Kenneth A., "Parapsychology in Intelligence: A Personal Review and Conclusions," *Studies in Intelligence*, vol. 21, no. 4, Winter 1977, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200030040-0.
|
||||
[^28]: Memorandum for the record, OTS/BAB Memo #287-77, November 17, 1977, CIA-RDP96-00787R000500170001-0, attached chronology "OTS Involvement in ESP Research," p. 4 (the death entry precedes the entry dated 9/75; the date field of the death entry is blank in the release).
|
||||
[^29]: Wilhelm, John L., "Psychic Spying? The CIA, the Pentagon and the Russians Probe the Military Potential of Parapsychology," *Washington Post*, August 7, 1977, Outlook section, enclosure to CIA-RDP96-00788R001700360003-3.
|
||||
[^30]: Information paper, DAMI-ISH, "GRILL FLAME (U)," April 13, 1979, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200210002-5, para. 1(7)-(8).
|
||||
[^31]: "Government-Sponsored Research in Psychoenergetics (S)," February 1989, CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9.
|
||||
[^32]: Memorandum ORD-0733-86, ACS/ORD to the Director of Research and Development, "SRI/DIA Request for Parapsychological Data," July 16, 1986, CIA-RDP96-00787R000200020040-6.
|
||||
[^33]: Mumford, Michael D., Andrew M. Rose, and David A. Goslin. *An Evaluation of Remote Viewing: Research and Applications.* American Institutes for Research, September 29, 1995, chapter 3, p. 3-77 and following, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200180005-5.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ aliases:
|
|||
- Dick Ober
|
||||
- Richard Ober
|
||||
created: 2026-05-15
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-05
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
summary: "CIA counterintelligence officer who headed the Special Operations Group that ran Operation CHAOS from August 1967, later Director for Intelligence Coordination at the National Security Council (1974 to 1976)."
|
||||
born: 1921
|
||||
died: 2001
|
||||
|
|
@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ The Church Committee wrote that Ober had taken on the duties of coordinating the
|
|||
|
||||
### Deborah Davis and Deep Throat, 1979 to 1983
|
||||
|
||||
In *Katharine the Great* (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979), [[Deborah Davis]] wrote that Ober was "Angleton's deputy" and "one of the few" men in the CIA whom [[Richard Nixon]] trusted; that Ober "was given a small office inside the White House, where he was known only to Nixon, [[H. R. Haldeman]], [[John Ehrlichman]], and possibly [[Henry Kissinger]]"; and that his name was never recorded in White House logs. The passage is quoted in a biographical note on Ober published by the Spartacus Educational website. X[^2][^3]
|
||||
In *Katharine the Great* (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979), Deborah Davis wrote that Ober was "Angleton's deputy" and "one of the few" men in the CIA whom [[Richard Nixon]] trusted; that Ober "was given a small office inside the White House, where he was known only to Nixon, [[H. R. Haldeman]], [[John Ehrlichman]], and possibly [[Henry Kissinger]]"; and that his name was never recorded in White House logs. The passage is quoted in a biographical note on Ober published by the Spartacus Educational website.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
Davis also wrote that Ober was Deep Throat, the [[Washington Post]] source of [[Bob Woodward]] and [[Carl Bernstein]] on [[Watergate]]. According to a 1983 account by Eve Pell in *The Nation* (clipped in CIA files), a lawyer for Ober wrote on the November 6, 1979 publication day that references to his client were "defamatory and libelous," called Davis's theory that Ober was involved in Watergate dirty tricks a "complete fabrication," and branded as false her assertion that he had been involved with the "Plumbers" group headed by [[E. Howard Hunt]] and [[G. Gordon Liddy]] or had helped plan the break-in at the office of [[Daniel Ellsberg]]'s psychiatrist. Davis agreed to delete the allegations about Watergate involvement; because the lawyer did not deny her claim that Ober was Deep Throat, she let that stand. [[Ben Bradlee]] separately wrote to her editor that she had made thirty-nine errors on thirty-nine pages where his name appeared. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich withdrew as publisher in early 1980, and in October 1983 paid Davis $100,000 to settle her breach-of-contract suit.[^7] The Hoover finding aid describes Davis as having "mistakenly named Ober as Deep Throat" and lists a potential legal case in which Ober figured as a potential plaintiff.[^1][^7]
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -92,6 +92,8 @@ Davis also wrote that Ober was Deep Throat, the [[Washington Post]] source of [[
|
|||
|
||||
After CHAOS was reported by [[Seymour Hersh]] in the [[New York Times]] on December 22, 1974, Ober was seconded to the National Security Council as its senior staff member for intelligence matters (Director for Intelligence Coordination, 1974 to 1976). The finding aid states that the publicity prompted the Agency to seek severance of his employment, that he resisted, and that he was retired in 1980.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Hersh's December 22, 1974 article reported that the unit's liaison with Helms was conducted by Ober, and quoted Ober, reached by telephone, as saying "There's nothing I can say about this."[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
### Testimony, lawsuits and papers
|
||||
|
||||
Ober testified to the Rockefeller Commission on March 28, 1975, and to the Church Committee on October 28 and 30, 1975.[^2] The Hoover finding aid lists the Rockefeller Commission, [[Murphy Commission]], Church Committee and [[Pike Committee]] files, a Justice Department report file on the mail-opening component, and a legal-cases file concerning civil suits in which Ober was a defendant in all but one. The collection (Richard Ober Papers, 1942 to 2001, acquired by Hoover in 2018) also holds his Army, CIA and National Security Council personnel files.[^1]
|
||||
|
|
@ -99,9 +101,10 @@ Ober testified to the Rockefeller Commission on March 28, 1975, and to the Churc
|
|||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: "Ober (Richard) papers, 1942-2001," finding aid (biographical note, scope and contents), Hoover Institution Library & Archives, Online Archive of California, ark:/13030/c81z4b3g, prepared by Dale Reed. https://oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/c81z4b3g
|
||||
[^2]: Church Committee, *Final Report*, Book III, "CIA Intelligence Collection About Americans: CHAOS and the Office of Security," S. Rept. 94-755, April 26, 1976, pp. 679 to 730 (citing Ober testimony, October 28 and 30, 1975; Ober before the Rockefeller Commission, March 28, 1975; Eatinger testimony, October 14, 1975; Memorandum from Karamessines to Angleton, August 15, 1967). https://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/book3/pdf/ChurchB3_9_CHAOS.pdf
|
||||
[^2]: Church Committee, *Final Report*, Book III, "CIA Intelligence Collection About Americans: CHAOS and the Office of Security," S. Rept. 94-755, April 26, 1976, pp. 679 to 732 (citing Ober testimony, October 28 and 30, 1975; Ober before the Rockefeller Commission, March 28, 1975; Eatinger testimony, October 14, 1975; Memorandum from Karamessines to Angleton, August 15, 1967). https://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/book3/pdf/ChurchB3_9_CHAOS.pdf
|
||||
[^3]: Rockefeller Commission, *Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States* (June 1975), Chapter 11, "Special Operations Group, 'Operation CHAOS,'" pp. 130 to 151, discussion of compartmentation and supervision. https://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/rockcomm/pdf/RockComm_Chap11_CHAOS.pdf
|
||||
[^4]: Richard Ober, Memorandum for the Record, "Procedures for Restricted Handling of RYBAT MHCHAOS Traffic," May 29, 1969, CIA Reading Room doc. C01475738. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01475738
|
||||
[^5]: CIA cable from Richard Ober, September 10, 1971, "RYBAT MHCHAOS," CIA Reading Room doc. C01482292. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01482292
|
||||
[^6]: Deborah Davis, *Katharine the Great: Katharine Graham and Her Washington Post Empire* (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979), as quoted in "Richard Ober," Spartacus Educational. https://spartacus-educational.com/JFKober.htm
|
||||
[^7]: Eve Pell, "Private Censorship: Killing 'Katharine the Great,'" *The Nation*, November 12, 1983, as clipped in CIA-RDP90-00845R000201250018-9. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP90-00845R000201250018-9
|
||||
[^8]: Seymour M. Hersh, "Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U.S. Against Antiwar Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years," *New York Times*, December 22, 1974, p. 1 (continued p. 26).
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -3,49 +3,276 @@ title: Richard Secord
|
|||
aliases:
|
||||
- Richard Secord
|
||||
- Richard V. Secord
|
||||
- Richard Vernon Secord
|
||||
- Dick Secord
|
||||
- General Secord
|
||||
created: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
category: "Military"
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- Person
|
||||
- IranContra
|
||||
- Enterprise
|
||||
- CIA
|
||||
- AirForce
|
||||
- Laos
|
||||
- Iran
|
||||
- AWACS
|
||||
- PROMIS
|
||||
- 1980s
|
||||
summary: "Major General who co-directed the Iran-Contra Enterprise with Albert Hakim, purchasing weapons for Iran through Israeli intermediaries and channeling profits to fund the Nicaraguan Contras outside congressional appropriations before pleading guilty in 1989 to making false statements to Congress."
|
||||
summary: "Air Force major general who co-directed the Iran-Contra Enterprise with Albert Hakim and, after pleading guilty in 1989 to lying to Congress about Enterprise money going to Oliver North, was sentenced to two years' probation."
|
||||
born: 1932-07-06
|
||||
died: 2024-10-15
|
||||
location: "LaRue, Ohio"
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[U.S. Air Force]]"
|
||||
role: "commissioned 1955; major general (May 1980); retired May 1983"
|
||||
start: 1955
|
||||
end: 1983-05
|
||||
fn: 28
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[Department of Defense]]"
|
||||
role: "deputy assistant secretary of defense (international security affairs; Middle East, Africa and southern Asia), 1981 to 1983"
|
||||
start: 1981
|
||||
end: 1983-05
|
||||
fn: 4
|
||||
- type: founded
|
||||
with: "[[Stanford Technology Trading Group International]]"
|
||||
role: "co-founded with Albert Hakim in 1983; Secord was president"
|
||||
start: 1983
|
||||
fn: 29
|
||||
- type: partner_of
|
||||
with: "[[Albert Hakim]]"
|
||||
role: "co-directed the Enterprise; equal partner in Stanford Technology Trading Group International"
|
||||
start: 1983
|
||||
fn: 12
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[The Enterprise (Iran-Contra)]]"
|
||||
role: "operational director with Albert Hakim"
|
||||
start: 1985
|
||||
end: 1986
|
||||
fn: 29
|
||||
- type: partner_of
|
||||
with: "[[Tom Clines]]"
|
||||
role: "served together in Laos in the late 1960s; Clines oversaw Enterprise arms logistics"
|
||||
start: 1968
|
||||
fn: 7
|
||||
- type: funded
|
||||
with: "[[Oliver North]]"
|
||||
role: "paid for a home security system for North and set up a 200,000 dollar Swiss account for North's family; both were charged as illegal gratuities"
|
||||
start: 1986
|
||||
fn: 53
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[Department of Justice]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "conflict-of-interest and bribery inquiry of Secord and Clines arising from their relationship with Edwin Wilson, 1981; closed January 1986 without indictments"
|
||||
start: 1981
|
||||
end: 1986-01
|
||||
fn: 9
|
||||
- type: subject_of
|
||||
with: "[[Edwin Wilson]]"
|
||||
role: "relationship with Wilson was the subject of the 1981 Justice Department inquiry and a 1982 Pentagon suspension of three months"
|
||||
start: 1981
|
||||
end: 1986-01
|
||||
fn: 8
|
||||
- type: prosecuted
|
||||
with: "[[Lawrence Walsh]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "indicted March 16, 1988 with Poindexter, North and Hakim; pleaded guilty November 8, 1989 to one count of false statements to Congress; sentenced January 24, 1990"
|
||||
start: 1988-03-16
|
||||
end: 1990-01-24
|
||||
fn: 5
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[Iran-Contra Affair]]"
|
||||
role: "operational participant; first witness before the joint committees, May 5 to 8, 1987"
|
||||
start: 1984
|
||||
fn: 4
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[Southern Air Transport]]"
|
||||
role: "Enterprise paid the company 1,935,596 dollars for contra-related services in 1985 and 1986"
|
||||
start: 1985
|
||||
end: 1986
|
||||
fn: 31
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Air Commando Association]]"
|
||||
role: "president"
|
||||
fn: 2
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Richard Vernon Secord was born July 6, 1932, in LaRue, Ohio. He died October 15, 2024. He served as a [[United States Air Force]] officer, rising to Major General, before retiring under a cloud of controversy and becoming the operational director of the private covert network known as the Enterprise that was at the center of the [[Iran-Contra Affair]].[^1]
|
||||
Richard Vernon Secord was born July 6, 1932, in LaRue, Ohio.[^1] He died October 15, 2024, at a nursing home in Port Orange, Florida, at the age of 92.[^2] He graduated from the [[United States Military Academy|West Point]] in 1955, received a commission in the [[U.S. Air Force]] and retired in May 1983 as a major general.[^3] He co-directed the private covert network known as the [[The Enterprise (Iran-Contra)|Enterprise]] with [[Albert Hakim]], which sold U.S. weapons to Iran and bought and resold weapons for the [[Contras]] during the [[Iran-Contra Affair]].[^4] In 1989 he pleaded guilty to one felony count of making false statements to Congress, and in 1990 he was sentenced to two years' probation.[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
### Military Career and Edwin Wilson
|
||||
### West Point, the Air Commandos and Laos
|
||||
|
||||
Secord’s Air Force career included extensive special operations and counterinsurgency assignments. He served in Southeast Asia during the [[Vietnam War]] era in roles involving air operations in Laos and Vietnam. During the 1970s he served in the Pentagon in special operations planning and was involved in programs coordinating with CIA paramilitary networks, a role that brought him into contact with [[Ted Shackley]]’s network of CIA officers.[^1]
|
||||
Secord was appointed to West Point in 1951 from the twelfth district of Ohio and was commissioned in the Air Force on graduating in 1955.[^3] He ranked 193rd in a class of 470, and the tactical officer of his company was Capt. [[Alexander Haig]].[^1] After flight school he served three years as a single-engine jet instructor in Texas and in 1959 was posted to [[Tinker Air Force Base]] in Oklahoma. In August 1961 he volunteered for a special tactical group forming at [[Hurlburt Field]] in Florida and became an Air Commando, with tours in South Vietnam and Iran over the next four years.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
In the late 1970s, Secord came under investigation for his relationship with [[Edwin Wilson]], a former CIA officer who had gone into private arms dealing and was selling weapons and training services to Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi - transactions that were illegal and represented a serious counterintelligence problem. Wilson was eventually arrested, convicted in 1983, and sentenced to 52 years in prison. Secord was a central figure in congressional investigations of Wilson’s Libya operations because of documented contacts between them; Secord was not criminally charged but the investigation effectively ended his military career advancement. He retired from the Air Force in 1983.[^1]
|
||||
In less than a year he flew more than 200 missions in AT-28 fighters in South Vietnam while serving officially as an adviser to Vietnamese pilots, and Pentagon records show at least four combat air medals in 1962.[^1] The Independent Counsel [[Lawrence Walsh]] counted 285 combat missions in Southeast Asia during the 1960s.[^4] In November 1964, according to a study published in 1980 by the [[National Defense University]], Secord was assigned to help fly Belgian paratroopers to [[Stanleyville]] in the Congo for the hostage rescue, and he made an emergency landing in a C-130 after a wing panel opened and an inflated life raft fouled the tail controls.[^1] He received a Distinguished Flying Cross for the mission.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
Secord had also been assigned to help plan the April 1980 Iran hostage rescue operation (Operation Eagle Claw), which ended in disaster at the Desert One staging area in Iran with eight Americans killed and five aircraft destroyed. He was not responsible for the operational failure but was among the senior military planners involved in the operation’s preparation.[^1]
|
||||
In 1965 he attended the Air Force's Air Command and Staff College in Montgomery, Alabama. In August 1966 he returned to Saigon and was then assigned to a classified CIA unit at [[Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base]] in [[Thailand]]. For two years he coordinated clandestine flights by [[Air America]] and other CIA airlines to dozens of remote airfields in [[Laos]], and a former CIA officer who worked with him said: "He was responsible for the air sector."[^1] In September 1968 he returned to Hurlburt Field and commanded the 603rd Special Operations Squadron there until he left Florida in 1971.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Enterprise
|
||||
In his 1987 testimony he said he served in [[Vietnam War|Vietnam]] and in Laos over quite a number of years throughout the 1960s.[^3] He said he first met [[Tom Clines]] in 1968 and that the two "served together in Laos in combat for a several year period."[^7] The [[The Wall Street Journal|Wall Street Journal]] reported in 1982 that Clines and Secord had been close friends since both served in covert operations in Southeast Asia in 1967.[^8] The joint congressional report places both men at the CIA station in Laos in the late 1960s.[^9] Asked in 1987 whether he was aware that the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] had contracted Air America before and during the war to place supplies inside Vietnam, Secord answered that he "used to be in charge of a major section of it," and he called Air America "a government proprietary."[^10]
|
||||
|
||||
After leaving the Air Force, Secord formed a business partnership with [[Albert Hakim]], an Iranian-American arms dealer and businessman who had extensive contacts in the Iranian military and defense community dating to the Shah’s era. Together they established Stanford Technology Trading Group International (STTGI), which they used as the vehicle for arms transactions. The partnership also operated through Lake Resources S.A., a Swiss financial account maintained by Hakim, into which profits from arms deals were deposited.[^2]
|
||||
### Naval War College and the Pentagon
|
||||
|
||||
The Enterprise became the private infrastructure for the Iran-Contra operations when National Security Council staff member [[Oliver North]] recruited Secord and Hakim to execute what North and CIA Director [[William J. Casey]] had conceived as a "self-financing" covert program: sell U.S.-approved weapons to Iran through Israeli intermediaries, charge prices substantially above the American government’s cost, and funnel the markup profits to the Nicaraguan Contras, who had been cut off from direct U.S. military assistance by the Boland Amendment.[^2]
|
||||
From 1971 to 1972 Secord attended a one-year George Washington University graduate program at the [[Naval War College]] in Newport, Rhode Island, one of 16 Air Force officers in a class of 203.[^1] His 1972 master's thesis, "Unconventional warfare/covert operations as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy," was directed by the CIA adviser to the head of the college. In the first pages of its 55 pages he wrote that the CIA should be given "the authority" to run such operations and that the Pentagon should be "removed from the chain of command."[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
The operations ran primarily from 1985 to 1986. Israeli arms dealers Ya’acov Nimrodi and Al Schwimmer provided the initial Israeli connection; Iranian intermediary [[Manucher Ghorbanifar]] was the primary conduit to Iranian buyers. Secord and Hakim managed the logistics, finance, and some direct negotiations. The Enterprise also maintained the Contra air resupply operation at [[Ilopango Airbase|Ilopango Air Base]] in El Salvador through aircraft managed by [[Felix Rodriguez]] and others. [[Monzer Al-Kassar]], a Syrian arms dealer, was paid approximately $1.2 million to move weapons from Israel to Contra forces, documented by the Tower Commission.[^2]
|
||||
Promoted to colonel in 1972, he became the Pentagon desk officer for Southeast Asia, and in 1973 he became aide to the director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency, which manages foreign military sales and assistance.[^1] The joint congressional report states that when Secord returned from Laos and was stationed at the Pentagon, Clines introduced him to a number of Clines's CIA associates, including [[Rafael Quintero]], and to [[Edwin Wilson]].[^9] [[Newsweek]] reported that Secord received his first general's star at the age of 43.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### Exposure and Criminal Proceedings
|
||||
### Iran, 1975 to 1978
|
||||
|
||||
The Enterprise was exposed in October 1986 when a Contra resupply aircraft was shot down over Nicaragua and its crew member, Eugene Hasenfus, was captured by the Sandinistas. Hasenfus described the operation’s infrastructure, and the subsequent unraveling revealed the Iran arms sales as well. The Iran-Contra Affair became the major domestic political crisis of Reagan’s second term.[^2]
|
||||
From September 1975 to July 1978 Secord was chief of the Air Force section of the U.S. [[Military Assistance Advisory Group]] in [[Iran]].[^4] He told the committees that he commanded the Air Force mission to Iran during the Shah's rule and spent a total of four and a half years in the country.[^3] The [[Los Angeles Times]] reported that he was chief Air Force salesman to the Shah, whose air force was being built to about 500 combat aircraft, and that he helped negotiate the sale of AWACS aircraft, F-4, F-5 and F-14 aircraft; the [[Washington Post]] obituary states that he arranged 17 billion dollars in arms deals for the Shah.[^1][^2] The joint report says that in the mid-1970s he "exercised substantial influence over purchasing decisions of the Iranian Air Force."[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh indicted Secord in 1987. In November 1989, Secord pleaded guilty to one count of making false statements to Congress regarding his knowledge of North’s diversion of Iran arms sale profits to the Contras, and to related false testimony. He received a two-year suspended sentence and was not imprisoned.[^2]
|
||||
Secord testified that he met Albert Hakim in 1976 or 1977 when Hakim, an Iranian businessman selling electronic intelligence systems to the Iranian Air Force, came to his office to protest the Air Force mission's recommendation to discontinue a 23 million dollar project that duplicated a U.S.-Iranian program called IBEX.[^11] The joint report states that Hakim and Secord claimed that they first met on unfriendly terms in 1976 or 1977, when Secord recommended against a contract that Hakim proposed to the Iranian government.[^9] The same report states that Hakim's Iranian operations included payoffs to Iranian Air Force and Army generals through "bearer letters" and numbered Swiss accounts, and that in a May 1987 deposition Hakim said Edwin Wilson had infiltrated his organization through Hakim's associate [[Frank Terpil]], and that he removed both from it in 1976 or 1977.[^12] According to CIA files cited in the report, in August 1976 [[Ted Shackley]] tried to arrange for Secord to assist Hakim in obtaining security contracts with the Iranian government in return for Hakim providing intelligence to the CIA, with Clines to introduce Hakim to Secord; a CIA official rebuffed the proposal in part because Hakim had sold the Iranians "unneeded over sophisticated equipment at exorbitant price[s]."[^13] The Los Angeles Times reported that in a 1983 deposition in Connecticut Hakim admitted using Swiss bank accounts to funnel millions of dollars in payoffs to Iranian military officers in this period.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Secord later published a memoir, *Honored and Betrayed: Irangate, Covert Affairs, and the Secret War in Laos* (Wiley, 1992), in which he characterized himself as a loyal officer carrying out administration policy who was abandoned when the operations became politically untenable.[^1]
|
||||
### The Hostage Rescue Task Force
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
Walsh found that Secord was promoted to major general in May 1980 and was the ranking Air Force officer in charge of rescue efforts for the American hostages held in Iran during 1980 and 1981.[^4] Secord testified in 1987 that he served as deputy commander of the hostage rescue task force established after the failed April 1980 attempt ([[Operation Eagle Claw]]) at [[Desert One]], that the force was combat ready by August 1980, and that in October 1980 an intelligence briefing he called the "Eureka Briefing" claimed to have located the hostages; he said the CIA refused to disclose its sources and methods, and that the location was later shown to be wrong when the hostages were debriefed in 1981.[^14] He testified that his role ended in December 1980.[^15] Maj. Gen. [[James Vaught]], the Delta Force commander planning the mission, told the Los Angeles Times: "He was my deputy."[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Secord, Richard, with Jay Wurts. *Honored and Betrayed: Irangate, Covert Affairs, and the Secret War in Laos*. John Wiley & Sons, 1992.
|
||||
[^2]: Walsh, Lawrence E. *Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-Up*. W.W. Norton, 1997. Tower Commission Report (President’s Special Review Board). *The Tower Commission Report*. Bantam Books/Times Books, 1987.
|
||||
Secord also testified that in 1980 he gave Hakim's name, among a number of Iranian names, to U.S. intelligence personnel for vetting and possible use in the rescue operation, and that Hakim was contacted, vetted and volunteered his services.[^11]
|
||||
|
||||
### Deputy Assistant Secretary and the AWACS Sale
|
||||
|
||||
From 1978 to 1981 Secord headed the Air Force International Programs Office in the Pentagon, directing Air Force security assistance programs and foreign military sales worldwide; the Los Angeles Times described a business of 30 billion dollars in programs in about 60 countries.[^1][^11] In April 1981 he was appointed deputy assistant secretary of defense. Walsh gives the post as deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs from 1981 to 1983; the Los Angeles Times gives it as the Near East, Africa and South Asia, about 40 countries; and Secord testified that his responsibility was the Middle East, Africa and southern Asia.[^1][^4][^11] The City Club of Cleveland's forum listing for October 9, 1981 gives the title as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, for his appearance on the debate over selling [[Airborne Warning and Control System|AWACS]] aircraft to [[Saudi Arabia]]. The listing reports that he argued the sale would make a significant contribution to U.S. security and the security of its allies, and that this was the president's central reason for approving it.[^16]
|
||||
|
||||
Secord told the committees that he was the senior Pentagon representative on the interagency group charged with shepherding the proposed AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia through Congress, and that "this project consumed most of 1981."[^17] He said his first recollection of meeting [[Oliver North]] came in 1981, when North was on the [[National Security Council]] staff and was involved in scheduling the group's meetings.[^17] Secord later testified that he was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal "at the request of the President" after the Senate narrowly approved the sale, and Newsweek reported that he and North had teamed up to lobby Congress for the approval.[^1][^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### Edwin Wilson, the Justice Department Inquiry and EATSCO
|
||||
|
||||
Called by Wilson's lawyers at Wilson's trial over the shipment of C-4 explosives to Libya, on February 3, 1985, Secord testified that he had first met Wilson in 1971, then twice in [[Tehran]] in 1976 and 1977 and twice in [[Brussels]] in 1979 and 1980, and that at one meeting Wilson offered to provide a Soviet MiG-25: "I was interested," Secord said, according to the transcript.[^1] Prosecutors said Secord had visited Wilson's [[Mount Airy Farms]] estate in Virginia several times, frequently borrowed his private plane and sold him a house in Fairfax County, Virginia.[^1] The joint report states that Wilson provided Secord with nearly exclusive use of a private plane for almost a year, and that Clines arranged for Wilson to buy a townhouse that Clines had originally sold to Secord, so that Secord could recover his investment.[^18]
|
||||
|
||||
The Wall Street Journal reported in October 1982 that Secord bought the townhouse from Clines for 56,500 dollars in 1977 while an adviser in Iran and that Wilson took it for 69,000 dollars in September 1978; that Secord piloted a twin-engine Beechcraft that Wilson had bought, from the fall of 1978 until mid-1979, paying for fuel but not for the aircraft's use; and that in January 1979, around the time Wilson arranged a 500,000 dollar loan for Clines, Secord and the Pentagon arms-sales chief [[Erich von Marbod]] dined in [[London]] with Wilson. Sources close to Secord told the Journal that the dinner was purely social, and Secord's lawyer [[Thomas Green]] said the house transactions were innocent and that his client had not profited from them.[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
The joint report states that in 1981 Secord and Clines became subjects of a Justice Department conflict-of-interest and bribery investigation stemming from their relationship with Wilson, a former CIA officer later convicted of smuggling arms to [[Libya]], and that in 1982 Clines became a target of a separate investigation into fraudulent overbilling of the government by the [[Egyptian American Transport Company]] (EATSCO), 49 percent of which he owned.[^9] The Wall Street Journal reported that a grand jury in Alexandria, Virginia, was studying how EATSCO won Pentagon approval and whether its billing was proper, and that prosecutors were examining the conduct of Secord and von Marbod, who had helped oversee the Egyptian sales; it reported, citing a Pentagon official, that Secord had been suspended for three months in 1982 after the Pentagon learned of his ties to Wilson and was reinstated after he agreed to a lie-detector test of his assertions of innocence, a test never given.[^8] A Washington Post report of the same year stated that prosecutors investigating Wilson had received allegations that Wilson may have held an option to invest in EATSCO through other companies owned by Clines; Clines's lawyer said Wilson had never had any interest in it.[^19]
|
||||
|
||||
In November 1981 [[Douglas Schlacter]], a former Wilson aide, told [[CBS News]] that Secord had shared profits from Wilson's illegal arms sales, and the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] opened an investigation.[^1] Secord sued Schlacter for libel and slander, and in April 1983 a federal judge in Washington awarded him 2 million dollars in a default judgment; Schlacter had entered the federal witness protection program and neither contested the suit nor paid. At the hearing Secord testified: "No matter what I have done, I can't get rid of this shadow that's been hanging over me."[^1] Newsweek reported that Wilson claimed he had taught Secord about turning government experience into private profit, and that Wilson claimed Secord, Shackley and von Marbod were silent partners in EATSCO; all of them denied it.[^6] Wilson and his secretary also claimed that Secord was a silent partner in EATSCO, and Secord denied any improper ties.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Secord retired from the Air Force in May 1983, and the joint report states that he did so because "the Wilson story and the ongoing Justice Department investigation had placed a cloud over his military career."[^9] The Air Force pension was 3,800 dollars a month, and he remained on an Air Force advisory panel on unconventional warfare policy until August 1986.[^1] Two months after his retirement EATSCO pleaded guilty to criminal and civil overbilling charges; the Los Angeles Times put the overcharge to the Pentagon at 8 million dollars. Clines, on behalf of the corporate entity that held his interest, paid a 10,000 dollar criminal fine and a 100,000 dollar civil fine. The Justice Department closed the EATSCO case in July 1984 and closed the Secord and Clines inquiry in January 1986, and the joint report states that no indictments or other prosecutorial action followed.[^1][^9] In 1984, when Clines needed 33,000 dollars toward the civil fine, Secord lent him 33,000 dollars through a cashier's check carried by [[Glenn Robinette]].[^20]
|
||||
|
||||
In May 1987 Secord told the committees that he had been investigated for almost three years, was cleared, and was given a letter by Justice; Senator [[David Boren]] answered that the finding was that he had not broken the law and that it was not a certification that the use of the plane of a person like Wilson was appropriate.[^21] The Washington Post obituary states, of the Wilson association, that Secord "was never charged with any wrongdoing."[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
Wilson was convicted in 1983 in the Eastern District of Virginia of exporting firearms, in the Southern District of Texas of plastic explosives offenses and in the Southern District of New York of conspiracy to murder federal witnesses, as Boren put the record to Secord in 1987.[^22] The Fourth Circuit's 1983 opinion describes the Virginia conviction by jury of seven offenses involving the export of an M-16 rifle and four revolvers.[^23] The Los Angeles Times reported in March 1987 that Wilson was serving a 52-year federal prison sentence.[^1] In 2003 Judge [[Lynn Hughes]] of the Southern District of Texas, in an opinion on the Texas conviction, recorded sentences of 17 years in Texas (imposed February 18, 1983), 10 years in the Eastern District of Virginia and 25 years in the Southern District of New York to run consecutively, and wrote that the conviction would be vacated because the government had knowingly used false evidence against Wilson and suppressed favorable evidence.[^24]
|
||||
|
||||
### Nugan Hand, the Christic Institute Suit and INSLAW
|
||||
|
||||
The Christic Institute filed a 22 million dollar federal suit in [[Miami]] in May 1986 alleging that Secord and 27 others took part in a worldwide scheme of assassinations, terrorism, embezzlement and drug smuggling, and in December 1986 its lawyer [[Daniel Sheehan]] filed an affidavit saying Secord "secretly smuggled . . . large suitcases" of money from opium sales in Laos to an Australian bank. Secord denied all the charges in the suit.[^1] The joint report states that the lawsuit brought by the journalists [[Tony Avirgan]] and [[Martha Honey]] named Secord.[^25]
|
||||
|
||||
The [[New York Times]] reported in March 1987 that the Australian Commonwealth-New South Wales Joint Task Force on Drug Trafficking, in a report completed in March 1983, named Secord, Shackley, Clines and Quintero as men close to [[Michael Hand]], a co-founder of the [[Nugan Hand Bank]] who served in Laos in the late 1960s with Air America in the period when, the Times wrote, Secord played a large role in directing Air America's operations. The Times wrote that the study does not demonstrate that Secord and the others smuggled weapons or narcotics, and that a 1985 Australian royal commission disputed some of the task force's conclusions. According to the report as the Times described it, a witness stated that in April, when a travel case left at Wilson's [[Geneva]] office by Nugan Hand's [[Bernie Houghton]] was opened in the presence of Clines and Quintero, Secord's name was mentioned and Clines said: "We've got to keep Dick's name out of this."[^26]
|
||||
|
||||
INSLAW's Third Supplemental Submission in its bankruptcy-court litigation states that an affidavit by [[Richard Babayan]] recounted the alleged involvement of Secord in the Iraqi acquisition of the [[PROMIS]] software.[^27]
|
||||
|
||||
### Stanford Technology Trading Group International
|
||||
|
||||
Hakim, who had kept in touch with Secord after Secord left Iran, tried to recruit him to revive Hakim's security-sales company, Expantrade, by offering security systems to foreign governments; Hakim said that by doing so "you have a deep penetration in that government and therefore you can do a lot of business." Secord joined Hakim in May 1983 as an equal partner.[^9] Secord testified that he went into business as president of Stanford Technology Trading Group with Hakim as an equal shareholder, 50 percent each, headquartered in Vienna, Virginia.[^28]
|
||||
|
||||
Secord and Hakim founded [[Stanford Technology Trading Group International]] (STTGI) in 1983. Hakim was chairman, Secord was president, and the company was wholly controlled by the two of them.[^29] It was distinct from Stanford Technology Corporation, which Hakim had founded in 1974. The partners formed further shell companies in Switzerland with related names, including StanTech Services S.A. and Scitech S.A.[^29] The Geneva fiduciary [[Compagnie de Services Fiduciaires]] (CSF), controlled by the American tax lawyer [[Willard Zucker]], managed the Enterprise's money. Zucker had provided Hakim with financial services since the mid-1970s.[^29] Walsh wrote that "by 1986, the business of STTGI was the Enterprise."[^29] In mid-1984 the partners represented Marwais Steel Company of Larkspur, California, in pursuit of a 100 million dollar aircraft-shelter contract from the United Arab Emirates, which an Italian company won.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Enterprise: Contra Supply
|
||||
|
||||
Secord testified that in January or February 1984, after he retired, a mutual friend asked him to join a visit to North, and that in about July 1984 North telephoned him and named retired General [[John Singlaub]] among the others he was approaching.[^17] After the [[Boland Amendment]] barred CIA aid to the contras in October 1984, [[William J. Casey|CIA Director William J. Casey]] was instrumental in pairing North with Secord as a contra-support team, according to the Independent Counsel, who also found that Casey supported the North-Secord combination in the Iran arms sales despite deep reservations about Secord within the CIA hierarchy.[^30] In the fall of 1984 North introduced Secord to the Contra leader [[Adolfo Calero]], to help Calero buy arms with money from Saudi Arabia. The Saudis gave 32 million dollars for the contras during the period when the Boland Amendment barred U.S. aid.[^29]
|
||||
|
||||
Secord's first contra sale was arranged late in 1984 through the Canadian firm TransWorld Arms, headed by Emanuel Weigensberg, whose supplier was the Portuguese arms firm Defex; Defex arranged the purchase of a shipload of weapons from the People's Republic of China, which reached Central America in April 1985. The contras paid 2.3 million dollars; of 720,400 dollars in profit, Weigensberg and the Washington lawyer Thomas Green, who had introduced Secord to the firm, each received a third, and Secord and Hakim split the remainder.[^29] Secord then recruited Clines and Rafael Quintero for a second order, filled from Defex [[Portugal]] in January and March 1985 with air transport arranged through [[Richard Gadd]], a former subordinate of Secord in the Air Force, who enlisted the Miami charter company [[Southern Air Transport]]. The contras paid 1.235 million dollars, with profits of 310,840 dollars divided 40 percent each to Secord and Hakim and 20 percent to Clines. A third shipment, carried on the Danish freighter Erria and delivered in June 1985, cost the contras 6.407 million dollars and produced profits of 1.5 million dollars on the same terms.[^29] The profit draws from the contra sales between April 1985 and September 1986 totaled 4.579 million dollars.[^29]
|
||||
|
||||
In late June 1985, North and Secord told Calero and the contra commander [[Enrique Bermudez]] in Miami that private donors would pay the Enterprise directly for weapons. In July 1985 CSF created a Liberian shell company named Defex S.A., whose name resembled the supplier's, so that the Enterprise's markups would appear to have been paid to the supplier. Walsh wrote that the account's purpose was to hide the Enterprise's profits. That summer the partners also created Lake Resources, into which the funds from Energy Resources International were transferred. Walsh wrote that "after Lake was formed, all Enterprise receipts were effectively commingled in that account, regardless of their origin."[^29]
|
||||
|
||||
The resupply operation that flew arms to the contras from [[Ilopango Airbase]] in [[El Salvador]] drew much of its aircraft and maintenance through Southern Air Transport, a Miami charter company used in both the contra and Iran operations. The Enterprise paid Southern Air Transport 1,935,596 dollars for contra-related services in 1985 and 1986, and paid it 200,000 dollars for a Jetstar aircraft that Secord and others used for contra travel.[^31] In the spring of 1986 Secord asked [[Robert Dutton]], who had replaced Gadd as manager of the resupply operation, to prepare a description of Enterprise assets for possible sale to the CIA. Dutton valued the assets at 4.089 million dollars, listed 25 salaried employees, gave Ilopango the code name "Cincinnati," and proposed that the CIA either buy the assets or lease them for 311,500 dollars a month.[^32] According to Dutton, the purpose of a later reorganization of the operation was to disguise the roles of Secord and North, because the Avirgan and Honey lawsuit had named Secord, and North and Secord were concerned that [[Felix Rodriguez]], who had become disaffected, was giving information about the operation to the plaintiffs. Dutton also stated that Rodriguez and his associate Ramon Medina coordinated with the Ilopango commander and oversaw the local fuel account.[^33]
|
||||
|
||||
On October 5, 1986, a resupply aircraft was shot down over [[Nicaragua]] and [[Eugene Hasenfus]] was captured. Walsh wrote that the Enterprise had effectively ceased its Central American activities after the shootdown.[^4] Before it, Secord and Hakim at North's request had three checks issued to pay outstanding contra grocery bills. Afterward Secord told Quintero to set aside a second check for 75,000 dollars and a third for 50,000 dollars to establish a defense fund for Hasenfus.[^31]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Enterprise: The HAWK Shipment of November 1985
|
||||
|
||||
A letter dated November 19, 1985, which North signed with his own name for the national security adviser [[Robert McFarlane]], asked Secord, described as a retired U.S. Air Force general officer, to proceed to a third-country transit point and arrange the transfer of "sensitive materiel" being shipped from Israel.[^34] The Tower Commission recorded that [[Dewey Clarridge|Duane Clarridge]] of the CIA told the U.S. official trying to obtain flight clearance to be in touch with a man named "Copp," whom Clarridge was told was an alias for Secord, and that a CIA field officer attributed the failure of the arrangements to the amateurish way in which Secord and his associates approached officials in the government from which landing clearance was needed.[^35][^36] The Israelis transferred 1 million dollars on November 20, 1985 to the Enterprise's Lake Resources account to pay for airlifting the missiles; after 18 HAWKs were delivered and the Iranians rejected them, about 870,000 dollars remained in Lake Resources, commingled with other funds and used for the contras and other purposes.[^37] Clines accompanied Secord to Europe in late November 1985 to facilitate the shipment.[^38] Secord testified that the Israelis did not ask for the money back, and that North told him "we could use it for whatever purpose we wanted. We actually expended it on the Contra project."[^39] Secord quickly chartered a jet to fly the 18 HAWKs to Iran under cover of a humanitarian mission, according to the Los Angeles Times.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Enterprise: Iran Arms Sales and Swiss Accounts
|
||||
|
||||
More than 47.6 million dollars from the Iran and contra operations flowed into the Enterprise's Swiss accounts. The largest share went to Lake Resources Inc. (31.5 million), with Energy Resources International (11.3 million) and Hyde Park Square Corporation (4.8 million) receiving the rest.[^29] Lake Resources was controlled by Hakim and later pleaded guilty to the corporate felony of theft of government property for diverting the proceeds of the arms sales.[^30] The Enterprise transferred 12.2 million dollars to a CIA Swiss account for weapons sold to Iran.[^29]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Manucher Ghorbanifar]], an Iranian exile and former CIA informant whom the agency had discredited as a fabricator, was a driving force behind the proposals to sell arms to Iran.[^40] On January 17, 1986, President Reagan signed a covert-action Finding that authorized direct U.S. sales to Iran, with Secord acting as an agent of the CIA. Under the Finding, Secord was to collect payment in advance and deposit the Defense Department's cost in a CIA account.[^40] In January 1986 North and Secord negotiated on behalf of the United States the sale of 4,000 TOW missiles to Iran, at 10,000 dollars per missile for an initial 1,000. In February 1986 [[Adnan Khashoggi]] deposited 10 million dollars into Lake Resources to finance the first sale; on February 10 and 11, 3.7 million dollars went from Lake to a CIA account, and the surplus on the sale was 5.6 million dollars.[^40] In February 1986 Secord, using the alias Major General Adams, requested alias documentation from North, and on February 20 he met Ghorbanifar in [[Frankfurt]] with North, [[Amiram Nir]] and a CIA officer.[^41] In May 1986 about 16.7 million dollars in Iranian and Israeli payments for HAWK parts and TOW replenishment went into Lake Resources, leaving a surplus of 9.2 million dollars.[^40] When Robert McFarlane flew to Tehran on May 25, 1986, Secord and one communicator remained in [[Tel Aviv]].[^42] A further 500 TOW missiles were sold in October 1986, and the Enterprise cleared 1.463 million dollars on that sale.[^40]
|
||||
|
||||
Walsh's trial-proof estimate of the diversion of arms-sale proceeds to the contras was 3.6 million dollars, and he judged the figure to be at least 1.1 million dollars low. Walsh wrote that North pressed Secord to send money from the Iran operation to the contra operation, and that Secord "claimed he did not view this as a diversion."[^43] In July 1986 the Enterprise paid Defex Portugal 2.6 million dollars and paid the Syrian arms dealer [[Monzer Al-Kassar]] 500,000 dollars for contra weapons; Walsh left the Al-Kassar payment out of his diversion estimate because Al-Kassar "was not available to testify."[^44]
|
||||
|
||||
### Secord's Personal Receipts
|
||||
|
||||
Walsh found that Secord personally received 1.037 million dollars in cash from the Enterprise in 1985 and 1986, of which about 34,000 dollars was accounted for as legitimate expenses or withdrawals from his profits. Three payments totaling 796,000 dollars were unaccounted for. Secord said he gave two cash payments, of 225,000 and 260,000 dollars received on May 15 and 21, 1986, to the Israeli official Amiram Nir, and a further 311,000 dollars in July 1986 to the Iranian arms dealer Ghorbanifar. He produced no documentation for any of them, and Ghorbanifar denied receiving the 311,000 dollars. The Independent Counsel stated that Nir had died and that the Israelis denied their government ever received the funds.[^45]
|
||||
|
||||
Walsh found that in July 1985 Secord had CSF delete his name from the Enterprise profit accounts, and that his profit distributions, totaling 1,457,568 dollars, were credited to a shell company, Korel Assets, whose documents he signed on September 20, 1985. Withdrawals from the Korel account paid for a small private airplane, a Porsche and a stay at a German weight-reduction spa. Walsh concluded that Secord personally received at least 2 million dollars from the Enterprise in 1985 and 1986. His 1985 return reported adjusted gross income of 147,000 dollars and answered "no" when asked about foreign financial accounts, and Walsh did not charge him with a tax offense because the Swiss records could not be used in a tax case.[^46] Hakim received 2.06 million dollars from the Enterprise in the same years.[^47]
|
||||
|
||||
### Congressional Testimony, May 1987
|
||||
|
||||
In December 1986 Secord was subpoenaed by the intelligence committees and refused to testify, invoking the Fifth Amendment. In February 1987 he refused to testify before the grand jury, and in March 1987 he appeared before Chief U.S. District Judge Aubrey E. Robinson Jr. in response to a corporate subpoena and denied having custody of Enterprise records. In late April 1987 he agreed to testify voluntarily.[^48] He was the first witness before the joint House and Senate committees, testifying from May 5 to May 8, 1987, without immunity. He was recalled and deposed in June 1987.[^2][^48] Newsweek wrote on May 5, 1987 that committee chairman Senator [[Daniel Inouye]] said Secord "feels sincerely that he has nothing to hide."[^6] Walsh's assessment was that Secord "provided an enormous amount of largely truthful information regarding the Enterprise's operational workings," but that his "responses to questions about its financial activities were much less candid."[^48]
|
||||
|
||||
On the first day Secord testified, according to the New York Times, that about 3.5 million dollars of 12 million dollars in profits from the sale of arms to Iran was spent on behalf of the contras, that more than half of the money was kept by his partner Hakim, and that part of the rest was used for a secret project unrelated to Iran or Nicaragua that he did not identify; he said: "We believed our conduct was in the furtherance of the President's policies," and "I also understood that this Administration knew of my conduct and approved it."[^49] In his testimony Secord said that North told him several times that he had mentioned to President Reagan that it was "very ironic" that "some of the ayatollah's money was being used to support the contras"; Secord said, "Whether he actually said this to the president, or whether he was joking with me, I'm not sure," and that it was "not said to me in a way that I took it as a joke."[^50] He said he had no direct knowledge of what the president knew, and that he had spoken to officials including Casey, McFarlane and [[John Poindexter]], some of whom told him the president was aware of what he was doing with the contras. He said that a White House aide told him on November 25, 1986 that "they'd already built a wall around the president," and that [[Edwin Meese]]'s remarks that day "betrayed all of us, and it's unforgivable."[^50] On the third day he acknowledged that the Enterprise had amassed 12 million dollars in cash and assets in about two years, said the money was intended for future operations, and agreed that it had been set up at the request of Poindexter and North.[^51]
|
||||
|
||||
Walsh listed the statements on which the 1989 charges were based. Secord testified that he had waived all interest in Enterprise profits after July 1985, that Korel was not his company, that he had received no money from the Iran sales beyond his salary, that Defex was set up to hide the source of Enterprise funds from arms dealers, and that he held no beneficial interest in foreign accounts other than a British checking account. Walsh found each of these statements false. Walsh also found that the 500,000 dollars STTGI received from CSF was not a loan, as Secord had testified, and that STTGI in fact received at least 700,000 dollars. Walsh described Hakim, who had received limited use immunity from Congress, as the committees' chief source for Enterprise financial information.[^48]
|
||||
|
||||
### Indictment, Plea and Sentence
|
||||
|
||||
The Independent Counsel indicted Secord on March 16, 1988, together with Poindexter, North and Hakim, in a 23-count indictment whose first count charged conspiracy to defraud the United States; Secord was named in six felony counts that included conspiracy and theft and three counts of illegal gratuities paid to North.[^5][^30] The conspiracy and theft charges were dismissed because of problems with classified information, and the trials of the four defendants were severed. On May 11, 1989 a second indictment charged Secord with nine counts of obstruction, perjury and false statements.[^5][^48]
|
||||
|
||||
On November 8, 1989, five days before he was to stand trial on twelve felony charges, Secord pleaded guilty to one felony count of making false statements to Congress, admitting that he lied when he denied that North had received personal benefits from the Enterprise.[^48] The Deseret News reported that the plea was taken before Chief U.S. District Judge Aubrey E. Robinson Jr.; that Secord told the judge he had answered "no" "in a misguided effort to prevent further criticism" of North and himself; that the offense carried up to five years in prison; and that Walsh's chief prosecutor in the Secord case, [[Reid Weingarten]] told the judge the government was prepared to prove that Secord provided North with a home security system costing almost 14,000 dollars and a Swiss bank account containing 200,000 dollars funded by arms profits.[^52] Under the plea Secord agreed to cooperate in the pending trials and the Independent Counsel's investigation.[^48]
|
||||
|
||||
The gratuities concerned a 16,000 dollar security system installed at North's home in Great Falls, Virginia, after Secord introduced North to Glenn A. Robinette in the spring of 1986, and a 200,000 dollar Swiss account, the "B. Button" account, set up in 1986 to help educate North's children; Walsh wrote that the Independent Counsel could not prove that North accepted or received any of the money in that account.[^53] A 1989 conviction of North on the gratuity charge was later overturned on appeal.[^53]
|
||||
|
||||
Robinson sentenced Secord on January 24, 1990, to two years' probation.[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
Thomas Clines was indicted in February 1990 following the cooperation of Secord and Hakim, and was convicted in September 1990 of four tax felonies after a two-week jury trial in U.S. District Court in Baltimore. Secord, compelled to testify under a cooperation agreement, was a central prosecution witness; he admitted there that the Korel account was his own investment account, a fact he had denied before his plea.[^38][^46]
|
||||
|
||||
### Later Activity and the Memoir
|
||||
|
||||
Secord published the memoir *Honored and Betrayed: Irangate, Covert Affairs, and the Secret War in Laos*, written with [[Jay Wurts]] and published by John Wiley & Sons in 1992.[^54] The Washington Post obituary says that in the memoir he maintained he joined the operation out of what he saw as patriotic duty, and that later disclosures suggested financial motives "played no small role."[^2] In a 1987 interview with [[Playboy]] he said: "I feel I was betrayed."[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
After leaving the Air Force, Secord was a top executive at Computerized Thermal Imaging, a computer imaging firm, and was president of the Air Commando Association.[^2] He and his wife had formed Secord Associates in 1983 and bought three houses near their McLean, Virginia, home.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Los Angeles Times, March 29, 1987, "Secord: A Specialist in Covert Deals" ("Skilled Secret Soldier"), CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP90-00965R000201700001-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000201700001-4.
|
||||
[^2]: Bill Hewitt, "Richard V. Secord, general embroiled in Iran-contra affair, dies at 92," *Washington Post*, Oct. 16, 2024, text reprinted by the National Security Archive, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/media/32473/ocr.
|
||||
[^3]: Testimony of Richard V. Secord, *Iran-Contra Investigation: Joint Hearings*, 100th Cong., 1st sess., May 5-8, 1987 (Hearings 100-1), p. 46, https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152829_0342.
|
||||
[^4]: Lawrence E. Walsh, *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters*, vol. I (1993), pt. V, ch. 9, "United States v. Richard V. Secord," pp. 173-178, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_09.htm.
|
||||
[^5]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, "Summary of Prosecutions," entry for Richard V. Secord (indicted March 16, 1988; second indictment May 11, 1989; plea November 8, 1989; sentenced January 24, 1990 by Chief Judge Aubrey E. Robinson Jr. to two years' probation), pp. xxiii ff., https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/summpros.htm.
|
||||
[^6]: "The Secret World of General Secord," *Newsweek*, May 5, 1987, CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP90-00965R000605790003-5, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000605790003-5.
|
||||
[^7]: Secord testimony, Hearings 100-1, p. 303.
|
||||
[^8]: Edward T. Pound and Walter S. Mossberg, "Weapons Windfall: Obscure New Shipping Company Profited Handsomely From U.S. Arms Sales to Egypt," *Wall Street Journal*, Oct. 1, 1982, pp. 1, 18, CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP09S00048R000100020015-5, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp09s00048r000100020015-5.
|
||||
[^9]: *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, H. Rept. 100-433 and S. Rept. 100-216 (1987), ch. 21, "The Enterprise," pp. 326-327, https://archive.org/details/reportofcongress87unit.
|
||||
[^10]: Secord testimony, Hearings 100-1, p. 343 (questions by Rep. Courter).
|
||||
[^11]: Secord testimony, Hearings 100-1, p. 47.
|
||||
[^12]: H. Rept. 100-433, ch. 21, pp. 327-328.
|
||||
[^13]: H. Rept. 100-433, ch. 21, n. 23, citing CIA files (C7 147-59) and Shackley deposition, Sept. 21, 1987, at 284-300.
|
||||
[^14]: Secord testimony, Hearings 100-1, pp. 148-149.
|
||||
[^15]: Secord testimony, Hearings 100-1, p. 318.
|
||||
[^16]: City Club of Cleveland, "Major General Richard Secord," forum of October 9, 1981, https://www.cityclub.org/events/major-general-richard-secord.
|
||||
[^17]: Secord testimony, Hearings 100-1, p. 48.
|
||||
[^18]: H. Rept. 100-433, ch. 21, n. 24, citing FBI report on Wilson's aircraft used by Secord, FB393, 389-90.
|
||||
[^19]: Al Kamen and Scott Armstrong, "Cost of Transporting Arms to Egypt Probed by Justice," *Washington Post*, 1982, CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP09S00048R000100020016-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp09s00048r000100020016-4.
|
||||
[^20]: H. Rept. 100-433, ch. 21, n. 30, citing Senate committee staff memorandum on the EATSCO fine, Oct. 12, 1987, and Robinette testimony, Hearings 100-6, June 23, 1987, at 27-29.
|
||||
[^21]: Secord testimony, Hearings 100-1, pp. 213-214 (aircraft and appointment exchange) and p. 214 (investigation and Justice letter).
|
||||
[^22]: Secord testimony, Hearings 100-1, pp. 212-213 (questions by Sen. Boren).
|
||||
[^23]: *United States v. Wilson*, 721 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1983), https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/427533/united-states-v-edwin-paul-wilson/.
|
||||
[^24]: *United States v. Wilson*, 289 F. Supp. 2d 801 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2003) (Hughes, J.), https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2430886/united-states-v-wilson/.
|
||||
[^25]: H. Rept. 100-433, ch. 3, p. 67.
|
||||
[^26]: Keith Schneider, "North's Aides Linked to Australia Study," *New York Times*, Mar. 8, 1987, CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP90-00965R000605740024-7, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000605740024-7.
|
||||
[^27]: INSLAW, Inc., Third Supplemental Submission in Support of Its Motion to Take Limited Discovery, U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia, Case No. 85-00070, Adv. Proc. No. 86-0069, summarizing the Babayan affidavit (Exhibit 3), https://archive.org/details/InslawAffairInBriefSupportingDocs.
|
||||
[^28]: Secord testimony, Hearings 100-1, pp. 47-48.
|
||||
[^29]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, pt. V, ch. 8, "The Enterprise and Its Finances," pp. 159-172, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_08.htm.
|
||||
[^30]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, "Executive Summary," pp. xiii ff., https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/execsum.htm.
|
||||
[^31]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172 (Southern Air Transport, Jetstar and Hasenfus defense-fund passages).
|
||||
[^32]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172 (Dutton outline of the resupply operation, dated July 21, 1986).
|
||||
[^33]: H. Rept. 100-433, ch. 3, pp. 66-67.
|
||||
[^34]: *The Tower Commission Report* (Bantam/Times Books, 1987), p. 32, https://archive.org/details/towercommission00unit.
|
||||
[^35]: *The Tower Commission Report*, p. 162.
|
||||
[^36]: *The Tower Commission Report*, p. 73.
|
||||
[^37]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172 (Phase IV and November 1985 HAWK shipment), citing the Israeli Financial Chronology, Apr. 26, 1987.
|
||||
[^38]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, pt. V, ch. 11, "United States v. Thomas G. Clines," pp. 181-184, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_11.htm.
|
||||
[^39]: Secord testimony, Hearings 100-1, p. 95; cited in Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, n. 32.
|
||||
[^40]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172 (Direct U.S. Arms Sales to Iran; February 1986, May-August 1986 and October-November 1986 sections).
|
||||
[^41]: *The Tower Commission Report*, pp. 248-249.
|
||||
[^42]: *The Tower Commission Report*, p. 296.
|
||||
[^43]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172 (The Iran/Contra Diversion), citing Secord, FBI 302, Mar. 12, 1988, p. 4.
|
||||
[^44]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172, and n. 51.
|
||||
[^45]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 9, pp. 173-178 (Secord's Finances), citing Secord, OIC Interview, Mar. 9, 1988, pp. 106-07, Secord, Grand Jury, Jan. 22, 1988, pp. 150-51, and Ghorbanifar, OIC Deposition, Dec. 10, 1987, p. 94.
|
||||
[^46]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 9, pp. 173-178 (Secord's Finances; Korel perjury charge; Secord, Clines Trial Testimony, Sept. 5, 1990, p. 193).
|
||||
[^47]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, pt. V, ch. 10, "United States v. Albert Hakim," pp. 179-180, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_10.htm.
|
||||
[^48]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 9, pp. 173-178 (Secord's Testimony to Congress and Independent Counsel; Secord Indicted; Obstruction, Perjury and False Statements).
|
||||
[^49]: David E. Rosenbaum, "Secord Says High Officials Helped Him Supply Contras Despite Ban on U.S. Arms Aid," *New York Times*, dateline May 5, 1987, CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP90-00965R000605580005-6, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000605580005-6.
|
||||
[^50]: "North Said He Mentioned Diversion to Reagan, Secord Says," *Washington Post*, May 7, 1987, CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP90-00965R000504550012-3, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000504550012-3.
|
||||
[^51]: Dan Morgan and Walter Pincus, "Secord Testifies Unspent Money Was for Future Operations, Not His Use," *Washington Post*, May 1987, CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP90-00965R000504550011-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000504550011-4.
|
||||
[^52]: "Secord guilty of lying to Congress," *Deseret News*, Nov. 8, 1989, https://www.deseret.com/1989/11/8/18831419/secord-guilty-of-lying-to-congress/.
|
||||
[^53]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 9, pp. 173-178 (Gratuities to North: The Basis for the Guilty Plea; The North Security Fence; The "B. Button" Account; n. 13).
|
||||
[^54]: Richard V. Secord, with Jay Wurts, *Honored and Betrayed: Irangate, Covert Affairs, and the Secret War in Laos* (John Wiley & Sons, 1992), ISBN 0471573280, https://archive.org/details/honoredbetrayedi0000seco.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
---
|
||||
created: 2026-05-15
|
||||
updated: 2026-05-16
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
title: William Sullivan
|
||||
aliases:
|
||||
- William C. Sullivan
|
||||
|
|
@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ tags:
|
|||
- 1960s
|
||||
- 1970s
|
||||
category: "Law Enforcement & Legal"
|
||||
summary: "William C. Sullivan was the FBI's Assistant Director for Domestic Intelligence who architected COINTELPRO, drafted the 1964 anonymous 'suicide letter' to Martin Luther King Jr., was fired by Hoover in 1971, and was shot in a ruled hunting accident on November 9, 1977, the day before he was to testify to congressional investigators."
|
||||
summary: "FBI domestic intelligence chief who ran COINTELPRO, was named in FBI records as preparing the 1964 anonymous letter to Martin Luther King Jr., was fired in 1971, and died in a 1977 hunting accident."
|
||||
born: 1912-05-12
|
||||
died: 1977-11-09
|
||||
location: "Sugar Hill, New Hampshire"
|
||||
|
|
@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ Sullivan was known within the FBI as intellectually aggressive and willing to pu
|
|||
|
||||
### COINTELPRO and King
|
||||
|
||||
As head of Domestic Intelligence, Sullivan was the senior FBI official responsible for COINTELPRO operations targeting the [[Southern Christian Leadership Conference]] and King personally. Following the announcement that King would receive the Nobel Peace Prize in October 1964, Sullivan supervised the preparation of an anonymous package containing a tape recording from a King hotel room accompanied by a letter characterizing King as a fraud and implicitly encouraging him to commit suicide before the Nobel ceremony. The letter was mailed to King's home in [[Atlanta, Georgia|Atlanta]], where his wife Coretta opened it.
|
||||
As head of Domestic Intelligence, Sullivan was the senior FBI official responsible for COINTELPRO operations targeting the [[Southern Christian Leadership Conference]] and King personally. Following the announcement that King would receive the Nobel Peace Prize in October 1964, Sullivan supervised the preparation of an anonymous package containing a tape recording from a King hotel room accompanied by a letter characterizing King as a fraud and implicitly encouraging him to commit suicide before the Nobel ceremony. The package was addressed to King and mailed from a post office near the Miami airport on or about November 21, 1964, and was received at the Southern Christian Leadership Conference office in [[Atlanta, Georgia|Atlanta]], which stored it and later sent it to King's home with other tapes.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
The [[Church Committee]] confirmed in 1975-1976 that Sullivan's division had prepared and sent this letter. The letter was the most extreme documented example of the FBI's COINTELPRO effort to neutralize King as a civil rights leader, and it appeared in the Church Committee's final report as evidence of one of the most egregious abuses of the program.
|
||||
The [[Church Committee]] recorded that Sullivan testified on November 1, 1975 that [[Alan Belmont]] told him Hoover wanted a King tape mailed to [[Coretta Scott King]], that he sent an agent to Tampa to mail a package, and that he did not recall ever having seen the letter given to the committee by the FBI, which he said it was "possible" he had something to do with and which he suggested might have been "planted" in his files.[^2] In his 1979 memoir Sullivan wrote that his division prepared the letter.[^3] The letter was the most extreme documented example of the FBI's COINTELPRO effort to neutralize King as a civil rights leader, and it appeared in the Church Committee's final report as evidence of one of the most egregious abuses of the program.
|
||||
|
||||
Sullivan also supervised the wiretapping of King's phones and hotel rooms, the infiltration of SCLC chapters with informants, and the dissemination of derogatory information about King to news organizations and government officials including the [[White House]] and [[Department of Justice]].[^2]
|
||||
Sullivan also supervised the wiretapping of King's phones and hotel rooms, the infiltration of SCLC chapters with informants, and the dissemination of derogatory information about King to news organizations and government officials including the [[White House]] and [[Department of Justice]].[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
### Break with Hoover
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -55,4 +55,6 @@ The timing of Sullivan's death - the day before planned congressional testimony,
|
|||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Sullivan, William C. *The Bureau: My Thirty Years in Hoover's FBI.* Norton, 1979. Church Committee (U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities). *Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans.* Book II, Senate Report No. 94-755, 1976.
|
||||
[^2]: Garrow, David. *The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr.* Norton, 1981. O'Reilly, Kenneth. *"Racial Matters": The FBI's Secret File on Black America, 1960-1972.* Free Press, 1989.
|
||||
[^2]: Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Final Report*, Book III, S. Rept. 94-755, April 26, 1976, King case study, pp. 158 to 161 (Sullivan, November 1, 1975, pp. 104 to 106 and 112; Young, February 19, 1976).
|
||||
[^3]: William C. Sullivan, *The Bureau: My Thirty Years in Hoover's FBI* (Norton, 1979).
|
||||
[^4]: Garrow, David. *The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr.* Norton, 1981. O'Reilly, Kenneth. *"Racial Matters": The FBI's Secret File on Black America, 1960-1972.* Free Press, 1989.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -50,15 +50,19 @@ The Australian Joint Task Force on Drug Trafficking's report on Nugan Hand, as s
|
|||
|
||||
### Arrest, Trial, and Conviction
|
||||
|
||||
Wilson was arrested in 1982 after being lured from Libya through an intermediary and traveling to the Dominican Republic, where he was apprehended. He was tried and convicted in multiple proceedings, culminating in a 1983 conviction on charges of illegally transferring arms and explosives to Libya. He received a combined sentence of 52 years.[^1]
|
||||
Wilson was arrested in 1982 after being lured from Libya through an intermediary and traveling to the Dominican Republic, where he was apprehended. He was tried and convicted in multiple proceedings, culminating in a 1983 conviction on charges of illegally transferring arms and explosives to Libya. He was sentenced on February 18, 1983 in the Southern District of Texas to 17 years and a fine of 145,000 dollars; the Eastern District of Virginia convicted him of exporting firearms to Libya and sentenced him to 10 years; and the Southern District of New York sentenced him to 25 years, consecutive, for attempted murder, criminal solicitation, obstruction of justice and witness tampering and retaliation, a total of 52 years.[^4] A Fourth Circuit opinion of November 4, 1983 records the Virginia jury conviction on seven counts concerning the export of an M-16 rifle and four revolvers.[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
At trial, the government presented an affidavit from CIA's director of operations stating that CIA records showed Wilson had had no relationship with the agency after 1971. Wilson maintained that this was false and that he had continued to act under CIA authorization. His attorneys were unable to establish his CIA connections to the jury's satisfaction, and he was convicted.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### Overturned Conviction
|
||||
|
||||
While imprisoned, Wilson continued to challenge his conviction based on the government's affidavit. In 2003, Federal Judge Lynn Hughes in Houston reviewed documents obtained through Freedom of Information Act requests and found that the CIA's 1983 affidavit had been materially false: CIA records showed approximately 80 contacts between Wilson and CIA officers after 1971, not zero as the affidavit stated. The court found that the government had presented false evidence to obtain the conviction and that Wilson had been denied a fair trial.[^4]
|
||||
While imprisoned, Wilson continued to challenge his conviction based on the government's affidavit. In 2003, Federal Judge Lynn Hughes in Houston reviewed documents obtained through Freedom of Information Act requests and found that the CIA's 1983 affidavit had been materially false: CIA records showed more than 80 contacts between Wilson and CIA officers after 1971, not zero as the affidavit stated. The court found that the government had presented false evidence to obtain the conviction and that Wilson had been denied a fair trial.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
Judge Hughes vacated Wilson's conviction in October 2003, finding that "the government had misrepresented to the court, the jury, and Wilson himself" the nature of his CIA relationship. Wilson was released after 22 years in federal prison. The case became a significant precedent in discussions of government disclosure obligations in criminal cases involving intelligence community defendants.[^4]
|
||||
Judge Hughes vacated Wilson's conviction in October 2003, finding that "the government had misrepresented to the court, the jury, and Wilson himself" the nature of his CIA relationship. Wilson was released after 22 years in federal prison. The case became a significant precedent in discussions of government disclosure obligations in criminal cases involving intelligence community defendants.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### Secord, Clines and EATSCO
|
||||
|
||||
[[Richard Secord]] testified at Wilson's February 1985 trial over the shipment of C-4 explosives to Libya that he had first met Wilson in 1971, twice in Tehran in 1976 and 1977 and twice in Brussels in 1979 and 1980, and that Wilson at one meeting offered to provide a Soviet MiG-25.[^7] The Wall Street Journal reported in October 1982 that Secord bought a town house from Tom Clines for 56,500 dollars in 1977 and that in September 1978 Clines arranged for Wilson to take it for 69,000 dollars; that Secord piloted a Beechcraft Wilson had bought from the fall of 1978 until mid-1979; that in January 1979, around the time Wilson arranged a 500,000 dollar loan for Clines (funneled through Bermuda, according to a source close to Clines), Secord and the Pentagon arms-sales chief [[Erich von Marbod]] dined in London with Wilson; and that Secord was suspended for three months in 1982 after the Pentagon learned of his ties to Wilson.[^8] The congressional report states that in 1981 Secord and Clines became subjects of a Justice Department conflict-of-interest and bribery investigation stemming from their relationship with Wilson, that Clines had introduced Secord to Wilson after Secord returned from Laos, and that the investigation was closed in January 1986 with no indictments; it states that Secord retired in May 1983 because the Wilson story and the investigation "had placed a cloud over his military career."[^9] Newsweek reported in 1987 that Wilson told it, "If I wasn't in jail, I'd have headed up this operation," and that Wilson claimed Secord, Ted Shackley and von Marbod were silent partners in EATSCO, which all denied.[^10] A former Wilson aide, [[Douglas Schlacter]], told CBS News in November 1981 that Secord shared profits from Wilson's illegal arms sales; Secord won a 2 million dollar default judgment against him for libel in April 1983.[^7]
|
||||
|
||||
### Network Context
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -69,4 +73,10 @@ Wilson's case illustrated the structural ambiguities of former-CIA officer netwo
|
|||
[^1]: Corn, David. *Blond Ghost: Ted Shackley and the CIA's Crusades*. Simon & Schuster, 1994, pp. 298-330. Mahon, Gigi. "Edwin Wilson's Strange World of Spooks and Hoods." *New York Times Magazine*, March 13, 1983.
|
||||
[^2]: "Dispatches: Australia: The Nugan Hand Investigation." The Nation, March 3, 1984. CIA CREST, CIA-RDP90-00806R000200820008-1. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP90-00806R000200820008-1
|
||||
[^3]: Schneider, Keith. "North's Aides Linked to Australia Study." New York Times, March 8, 1987. CIA CREST, CIA-RDP90-00965R000605740024-7. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000605740024-7
|
||||
[^4]: *United States v. Wilson*, No. H-82-139, U.S. District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division, Order of Judgment of Acquittal, October 29, 2003. (Judge Lynn Hughes ruling.)
|
||||
[^4]: United States v. Wilson, 289 F. Supp. 2d 801 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2003) (Hughes, J.), https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2430886/united-states-v-wilson/. Los Angeles Times, March 29, 1987 (CIA-RDP90-00965R000201700001-4): "serving a 52-year federal prison sentence."
|
||||
[^5]: United States v. Wilson, 721 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1983), https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/427533/united-states-v-edwin-paul-wilson/.
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[^6]: *United States v. Wilson*, No. H-82-139, U.S. District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division, Order of Judgment of Acquittal, October 29, 2003. (Judge Lynn Hughes ruling.) The opinion published at 289 F. Supp. 2d 801 (S.D. Tex.) bears the date October 27, 2003.
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[^7]: Los Angeles Times, March 29, 1987, "Secord: A Specialist in Covert Deals," CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP90-00965R000201700001-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000201700001-4.
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[^8]: Edward T. Pound and Walter S. Mossberg, "Weapons Windfall," Wall Street Journal, Oct. 1, 1982, pp. 1, 18, CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP09S00048R000100020015-5, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp09s00048r000100020015-5.
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[^9]: Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, H. Rept. 100-433 / S. Rept. 100-216 (1987), ch. 21, pp. 326-327 and nn. 24, 25, 27, https://archive.org/details/reportofcongress87unit.
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[^10]: "The Secret World of General Secord," Newsweek, May 5, 1987, CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP90-00965R000605790003-5, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000605790003-5.
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@ -36,9 +36,9 @@ relations:
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- type: employed_by
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with: "[[Science 80]]"
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role: "managing editor, after Time"
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fn: 11
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fn: 12
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created: 2026-05-15
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updated: 2026-10-05
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updated: 2026-10-09
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---
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John Lenhart Wilhelm III graduated from [[Princeton University]] in 1959, served as an aviation intelligence officer in the [[U.S. Navy]] (planning bombing raids during the Cuban Missile Crisis, according to his obituary), and joined [[Time]] in 1961. At Time he became National Science Correspondent and reported on manned and unmanned space flights, the Vietnam War battle of Hamburger Hill, the 1968 B-52 crash at [[Thule Air Base]] in Greenland, the Kent State shootings, the [[Pentagon Papers]] and the arrest of [[Daniel Ellsberg]], and wrote the magazine's first cover story on environmental pollution.[^1] His name appears among the correspondents on the masthead of the March 4, 1974 issue of Time, which carried the cover story "Boom Times on the Psychic Frontier" by [[Stefan Kanfer]].[^2]
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@ -57,24 +57,25 @@ In the *Humanist* review of Targ and Puthoff's *Mind-Reach*, [[Ray Hyman]] quote
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### "Psychic Spying?" and the House committee, 1977
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On August 7, 1977 the [[Washington Post]] published Wilhelm's article "Psychic Spying? The CIA, the Pentagon and the Russians Probe the Military Potential of Parapsychology."[^8] [[Annie Jacobsen]] reports that the article centered on [[Samuel Koslov]], described there as the Navy's top scientist, who publicly expressed outrage about the SRI work on extrasensory perception and said he had demanded that it stop. According to Jacobsen, Koslov told Wilhelm: "If you ask me, 'Do you think it's a pile of crap?' I do, and you can quote me," and the article appeared when the details of the [[Moscow Signal]] and [[Project Pandora]] had only recently become public.[^9]
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On August 7, 1977 the [[Washington Post]] published Wilhelm's article "Psychic Spying? The CIA, the Pentagon and the Russians Probe the Military Potential of Parapsychology."[^8] The article ran in the Post's Outlook section, pp. 1-5, and its author line identifies Wilhelm as "a former national science correspondent for Time magazine" whose book on psychic research, "The Search for Superman," "was published last year."[^9] In the article Wilhelm wrote that Harold Puthoff "is a high-ranking Scientologist," that Pat Price, "who died two years ago, also was a high-level 'Operating Thetan,'" and that "the involvement of Scientologists in the tests at SRI partially accounts for at least two government agencies pulling back from funding further work there."[^9] [[Annie Jacobsen]] reports that the article centered on [[Samuel Koslov]], described there as the Navy's top scientist, who publicly expressed outrage about the SRI work on extrasensory perception and said he had demanded that it stop. According to Jacobsen, Koslov told Wilhelm (the remark appears in the article itself): "If you ask me, 'Do you think it's a pile of crap?' I do, and you can quote me," and the article appeared when the details of the [[Moscow Signal]] and [[Project Pandora]] had only recently become public.[^10]
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A CIA memorandum of November 17, 1977 (OTS/BAB Memo 287-77) records that "the Committee's interest was occasioned by the article 'Psychic Spying' which appeared in the Parade Section of the Washington Post on 7 August 1977." In response to a request from the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence]], the Director of the [[Office of Technical Service]], David Brandwein, and other OTS officers briefed committee staff, among them Michael O'Neil and Pat Long, from about 1000 to 1100 hours on November 16, 1977, in the committee's offices. The staffers "asked very pertinent questions and were given frank and in-depth replies" to a short oral history of OTS work in the field dating to 1961. An OTS officer was asked to find out whether any other agency component was sponsoring ESP research. OTS left with the committee a written outline of its ESP work (classified SECRET), the IEEE article covering the unclassified portions of the SRI work, and a brief article on Pat Price; the committee declined additional information.[^10]
|
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A CIA memorandum of November 17, 1977 (OTS/BAB Memo 287-77) records that "the Committee's interest was occasioned by the article 'Psychic Spying' which appeared in the Parade Section of the Washington Post on 7 August 1977." In response to a request from the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence]], the Director of the [[Office of Technical Service]], David Brandwein, and other OTS officers briefed committee staff, among them Michael O'Neil and Pat Long, from about 1000 to 1100 hours on November 16, 1977, in the committee's offices. The staffers "asked very pertinent questions and were given frank and in-depth replies" to a short oral history of OTS work in the field dating to 1961. An OTS officer was asked to find out whether any other agency component was sponsoring ESP research. OTS left with the committee a written outline of its ESP work (classified SECRET), the IEEE article covering the unclassified portions of the SRI work, and a brief article on Pat Price; the committee declined additional information.[^11]
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### Later career and death
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After Time, Wilhelm was managing editor of the American Association for the Advancement of Science magazine *Science 80*, then a freelance science writer, with an early profile of [[Stephen Hawking]] among his pieces. He became a television producer, and was Emmy-nominated as executive producer of the [[PBS]] documentary *Comet Halley*, narrated by [[James Earl Jones]]. His other productions included *Planet Earth*, *My Heart, Your Heart* with [[Jim Lehrer]], *Two Cheers for the CIA*, and *Triumph at Carville: A Tale of Leprosy in America*, the last co-produced with his wife, Sally Squires Wilhelm. The obituary was published by the [[Association of Former Intelligence Officers]], of which he was a longtime member. He died at his home in Washington, D.C. on August 21, 2025, aged 87, of pancreatic cancer.[^11]
|
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After Time, Wilhelm was managing editor of the American Association for the Advancement of Science magazine *Science 80*, then a freelance science writer, with an early profile of [[Stephen Hawking]] among his pieces. He became a television producer, and was Emmy-nominated as executive producer of the [[PBS]] documentary *Comet Halley*, narrated by [[James Earl Jones]]. His other productions included *Planet Earth*, *My Heart, Your Heart* with [[Jim Lehrer]], *Two Cheers for the CIA*, and *Triumph at Carville: A Tale of Leprosy in America*, the last co-produced with his wife, Sally Squires Wilhelm. The obituary was published by the [[Association of Former Intelligence Officers]], of which he was a longtime member. He died at his home in Washington, D.C. on August 21, 2025, aged 87, of pancreatic cancer.[^12]
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### Footnotes
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[^1]: "John Wilhelm, Longtime AFIO Member and Journalist," obituary, Association of Former Intelligence Officers, October 17, 2025. https://www.afio.com/obituaries/2025/10/17/john-wilhelm-longtime-afio-member-and-journalist/
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[^2]: "Boom Times on the Psychic Frontier," *Time,* March 4, 1974, cover story, with the issue's Publisher's Letter (which names Associate Editor Stefan Kanfer as writer of the cover story) and masthead, CIA-RDP96-00787R000700030001-3. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00787r000700030001-3
|
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[^3]: Memorandum for the Record, "Request for Information about Stanford Research Institute (SRI) Paranormal Research Project by Mr. Wilhelm former Time Reporter," April 16, 1974, CIA-RDP96-00787R000200200023-5 (a second copy is CIA-RDP96-00787R000700090018-9). Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
|
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[^2]: "Boom Times on the Psychic Frontier," *Time,* March 4, 1974, cover story, with the issue's Publisher's Letter (which names Associate Editor Stefan Kanfer as writer of the cover story) and masthead, CIA-RDP96-00787R000700030001-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00787r000700030001-3
|
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[^3]: Memorandum for the Record, "Request for Information about Stanford Research Institute (SRI) Paranormal Research Project by Mr. Wilhelm former Time Reporter," April 16, 1974, CIA-RDP96-00787R000200200023-5 (a second copy is CIA-RDP96-00787R000700090018-9).
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[^4]: Wilhelm, John. *The Search for Superman: An Extraordinary Journey of Psychic Exploration.* Pocket Books, 1976; publication year and publisher as given in Hanlon, Joseph, "Spoon-bending science," *New Scientist,* 1977, CIA-RDP96-00787R000200080018-5, and in the AFIO obituary cited above.
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[^5]: "The Search for Superman by John L. Wilhelm," typed outline, in "1978-80 SRI Misc. Papers," CIA-RDP96-00788R001100040006-1. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
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[^6]: Hanlon, Joseph. "Spoon-bending science," *New Scientist,* 1977, CIA-RDP96-00787R000200080018-5. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
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[^7]: Hyman, Ray. "Psychics and Scientists: 'Mind-Reach' and Remote Viewing," review of Russell Targ and Harold Puthoff, *Mind-Reach* (Delacorte, 1977), CIA-RDP96-00787R000200080037-4. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
|
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[^5]: "The Search for Superman by John L. Wilhelm," typed outline, in "1978-80 SRI Misc. Papers," CIA-RDP96-00788R001100040006-1.
|
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[^6]: Hanlon, Joseph. "Spoon-bending science," *New Scientist,* 1977, CIA-RDP96-00787R000200080018-5.
|
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[^7]: Hyman, Ray. "Psychics and Scientists: 'Mind-Reach' and Remote Viewing," review of Russell Targ and Harold Puthoff, *Mind-Reach* (Delacorte, 1977), CIA-RDP96-00787R000200080037-4.
|
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[^8]: Wilhelm, John L. "Psychic Spying? The Central Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon and the Russians Probe the Military Potential of Parapsychology," *Washington Post,* August 7, 1977 (title and date as given in Jacobsen and in the CIA memorandum cited at note 10).
|
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[^9]: Jacobsen, Annie. *Phenomena: The Secret History of the U.S. Government's Investigations into Extrasensory Perception and Psychokinesis.* Little, Brown and Company, 2017.
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[^10]: OTS/BAB Memo 287-77, "Briefing for House Permanent Select Committee re OTS Involvement in ESP Research," November 17, 1977, CIA-RDP96-00787R000200020020-8 and sanitized copy CIA-RDP96-00787R000500170001-0. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
|
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[^11]: "John Wilhelm, Longtime AFIO Member and Journalist," Association of Former Intelligence Officers, October 17, 2025. https://www.afio.com/obituaries/2025/10/17/john-wilhelm-longtime-afio-member-and-journalist/
|
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[^9]: Wilhelm, John L., "Psychic Spying? The CIA, the Pentagon and the Russians Probe the Military Potential of Parapsychology," *Washington Post*, August 7, 1977, Outlook section, pp. 1-5; copy in the CIA STARGATE collection as an enclosure, CIA-RDP96-00788R001700360003-3 (Scientology passage and Koslov quotation on the pages headed "The Scientology Link" and "'Scanate' or 'Bullpasture?'"). The section is given as Outlook in the bibliographies of Kress (CIA-RDP96-00791R000200030040-0) and May (CIA-RDP96-00787R000100250012-3); OTS/BAB Memo #287-77 gives "the Parade Section of the Washington Post."
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[^10]: Jacobsen, Annie. *Phenomena: The Secret History of the U.S. Government's Investigations into Extrasensory Perception and Psychokinesis.* Little, Brown and Company, 2017.
|
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[^11]: OTS/BAB Memo 287-77, "Briefing for House Permanent Select Committee re OTS Involvement in ESP Research," November 17, 1977, CIA-RDP96-00787R000200020020-8 and sanitized copy CIA-RDP96-00787R000500170001-0.
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[^12]: "John Wilhelm, Longtime AFIO Member and Journalist," Association of Former Intelligence Officers, October 17, 2025. https://www.afio.com/obituaries/2025/10/17/john-wilhelm-longtime-afio-member-and-journalist/
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