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@ -65,23 +65,25 @@ The special counsel Nicholas Bua, in his 1993 report on the Inslaw affair, rejec
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### Claims about Robert Maxwell
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Ben-Menashe alleged that the publisher Robert Maxwell and Nicholas Davies were long-time assets of Israeli intelligence and that Maxwell had close ties to the prime minister's office.[^3] One specific claim concerned the 1986 case of the nuclear technician [[Mordechai Vanunu]], whose account of [[Dimona]] reached the Maxwell-owned [[Sunday Mirror]]; Ben-Menashe said Davies alerted Israeli intelligence to the approach and introduced him to Vanunu's intermediary [[Oscar Guerrero]], and that a Vanunu photograph published by the Sunday Mirror had been flown in from Israel, although the photograph in question had in fact been taken by the [[Sunday Times]] journalist [[Peter Hounam]], undercutting that detail.[^21] Hersh's 1991 book and the parliamentary statements that followed brought the Maxwell allegations into the open shortly before Maxwell's death, and Maxwell sued Hersh for libel before the action lapsed.[^15] No declassified material has confirmed the allegations.[^4]
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Ben-Menashe alleged that the publisher Robert Maxwell and Nicholas Davies were long-time assets of Israeli intelligence and that Maxwell had close ties to the prime minister's office.[^3] One specific claim concerned the 1986 case of the nuclear technician [[Mordechai Vanunu]], whose account of [[Dimona]] reached the Maxwell-owned [[Sunday Mirror]]; Ben-Menashe said Davies alerted Israeli intelligence to the approach and introduced him to Vanunu's intermediary [[Oscar Guerrero]], and that a Vanunu photograph published by the Sunday Mirror had been flown in from Israel, although the photograph in question had in fact been taken by the [[Sunday Times]] journalist [[Peter Hounam]], undercutting that detail.[^21] Hersh's 1991 book and the parliamentary statements that followed brought the Maxwell allegations into the open shortly before Maxwell's death, and Maxwell sued Hersh for libel.[^15] No declassified material has confirmed the allegations.[^4]
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Seymour Hersh's 1991 book *The Samson Option* states that Ben-Menashe first contacted the author in mid-1990, that interviews began in early 1991, and that Ben-Menashe agreed "as no other Israeli would" to be directly quoted on nuclear issues. The author's note adds that Ben-Menashe left the United States for exile in Australia in June 1991, and that his allegations about Iran arms sales had been strongly denied in Washington and Jerusalem and were still under congressional review in the summer of 1991.[^22] The book's account of the Davies arms firm, Ora Limited, and of Vanunu's 1986 compromise is attributed in the text to Ben-Menashe's account.[^23]
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### Epstein and Maxwell Allegations
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Beginning in 2019, Ben-Menashe gave interviews, including to the journalist [[Whitney Webb]] of MintPress News and to the outlet Narativ, in which he claimed that he had met Jeffrey Epstein and [[Ghislaine Maxwell]] in the 1980s, that he had seen Epstein in Robert Maxwell's offices, and that Maxwell had recruited Epstein for Israeli intelligence and introduced him as pre-approved by figures in Aman.[^22] He characterized the later Epstein operation as a "honeytrap" that gathered sexual blackmail material on powerful figures for Israeli intelligence.[^22]
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Beginning in 2019, Ben-Menashe gave interviews, including to the journalist [[Whitney Webb]] of MintPress News and to the outlet Narativ, in which he claimed that he had met Jeffrey Epstein and [[Ghislaine Maxwell]] in the 1980s, that he had seen Epstein in Robert Maxwell's offices, and that Maxwell had recruited Epstein for Israeli intelligence and introduced him as pre-approved by figures in Aman.[^24] He characterized the later Epstein operation as a "honeytrap" that gathered sexual blackmail material on powerful figures for Israeli intelligence.[^24]
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No corroborating witness, document, or official admission has been produced to support these specific claims, and reviewers have noted that they rest solely on his own assertions against a documented record of unreliability.[^4][^23] His account also conflicts with the established chronology of Epstein's career, since Epstein's documented entry into Ghislaine Maxwell's circle is generally dated to the period after Robert Maxwell's 1991 death rather than to the 1980s meetings Ben-Menashe described.[^23] He has continued to make related claims, including a 2025 assertion that [[Benjamin Netanyahu]] held Epstein-related files, that likewise remain unverified.[^23]
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No corroborating witness, document, or official admission has been produced to support these specific claims, and reviewers have noted that they rest solely on his own assertions against a documented record of unreliability.[^4][^25] His account also conflicts with the established chronology of Epstein's career, since Epstein's documented entry into Ghislaine Maxwell's circle is generally dated to the period after Robert Maxwell's 1991 death rather than to the 1980s meetings Ben-Menashe described.[^25] He has continued to make related claims, including a 2025 assertion that [[Benjamin Netanyahu]] held Epstein-related files, that likewise remain unverified.[^25]
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### Lobbying and Consulting
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After his intelligence-related notoriety, Ben-Menashe built a lobbying and consulting practice through the [[Montreal]]-based firm [[Dickens & Madson]], representing controversial governments and figures.[^24] His involvement with the government of [[Robert Mugabe]] in [[Zimbabwe]] featured in the treason prosecution of the opposition leader [[Morgan Tsvangirai]], built on a videotape in which prosecutors said Tsvangirai discussed the "elimination" of Mugabe with Ben-Menashe; Tsvangirai was acquitted of high treason on October 14, 2004, by Judge [[Paddington Garwe]] of the Harare High Court, who found no proof of the alleged request, ruled that Ben-Menashe's testimony had to be treated with caution, and called some of it clearly false.[^25]
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After his intelligence-related notoriety, Ben-Menashe built a lobbying and consulting practice through the [[Montreal]]-based firm [[Dickens & Madson]], representing controversial governments and figures.[^26] His involvement with the government of [[Robert Mugabe]] in [[Zimbabwe]] featured in the treason prosecution of the opposition leader [[Morgan Tsvangirai]], built on a videotape in which prosecutors said Tsvangirai discussed the "elimination" of Mugabe with Ben-Menashe; Tsvangirai was acquitted of high treason on October 14, 2004, by Judge [[Paddington Garwe]] of the Harare High Court, who found no proof of the alleged request, ruled that Ben-Menashe's testimony had to be treated with caution, and called some of it clearly false.[^27]
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He later registered a 2 million dollar contract in March 2021 to lobby for the [[Myanmar]] military junta after its coup, agreeing to advise on evading United States sanctions, and took on engagements connected to [[Sudan]] and its militia leader [[Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo]], a roughly 12 million dollar Zimbabwe land transaction funded by the criminal financier [[Paul Le Roux]] in 2007 and 2008 in which the promised farmland was never delivered, a reported 1 million dollar arrangement with [[Kyrgyzstan]], and work tied to [[Libya]], the [[Republic of the Congo]], [[Venezuela]], and the [[Tigray]] conflict in [[Ethiopia]].[^24][^26] Washington figures quoted in profiles of his career described his reputation as "poisonous."[^24]
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He later registered a 2 million dollar contract in March 2021 to lobby for the [[Myanmar]] military junta after its coup, agreeing to advise on evading United States sanctions, and took on engagements connected to [[Sudan]] and its militia leader [[Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo]], a roughly 12 million dollar Zimbabwe land transaction funded by the criminal financier [[Paul Le Roux]] in 2007 and 2008 in which the promised farmland was never delivered, a reported 1 million dollar arrangement with [[Kyrgyzstan]], and work tied to [[Libya]], the [[Republic of the Congo]], [[Venezuela]], and the [[Tigray]] conflict in [[Ethiopia]].[^26][^28] Washington figures quoted in profiles of his career described his reputation as "poisonous."[^26]
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### The McFarlane Libel Suit
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The former national security adviser Robert McFarlane sued Ben-Menashe and the publisher of Profits of War, Sheridan Square Press, for libel over passages that linked McFarlane to the covert dealings Ben-Menashe described.[^27] The case, McFarlane v. Sheridan Square Press, reached the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which ruled in 1996. Applying the [[actual malice]] standard required for a public figure, the court held that McFarlane could not show the publisher had acted with reckless disregard for the truth merely because Ben-Menashe was a doubtful source, and it affirmed dismissal of the suit. The outcome turned on the high bar a public-figure plaintiff must clear rather than on any finding that Ben-Menashe's account was true.[^27]
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The former national security adviser Robert McFarlane sued Ben-Menashe and the publisher of Profits of War, Sheridan Square Press, for libel over passages that linked McFarlane to the covert dealings Ben-Menashe described.[^29] The case, McFarlane v. Sheridan Square Press, reached the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which ruled in 1996. Applying the [[actual malice]] standard required for a public figure, the court held that McFarlane could not show the publisher had acted with reckless disregard for the truth merely because Ben-Menashe was a doubtful source, and it affirmed dismissal of the suit. The outcome turned on the high bar a public-figure plaintiff must clear rather than on any finding that Ben-Menashe's account was true.[^29]
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### Footnotes
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@ -106,9 +108,11 @@ The former national security adviser Robert McFarlane sued Ben-Menashe and the p
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[^19]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence*, S. Exec. Rept. 102-19 (October 24, 1991), sections 4 and 5, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-10219.pdf (PDF pages 185 to 187).
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[^20]: "No wrong-doing in Inslaw affair, report says," *UPI,* 1993. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1993/06/17/No-wrong-doing-in-Inslaw-affair-report-says/5482740289600/
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[^21]: "The Vanunu affair and the Sunday Mirror photograph," contemporaneous press reporting noting the photograph was taken by Sunday Times journalist Peter Hounam, undercutting Ben-Menashe's account.
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[^22]: "Former Israeli Spy Ari Ben-Menashe on Israel's Relationship with Epstein," *MintPress News,* 2019. https://www.mintpressnews.com/ari-ben-menashe-israel-relationship-jeffrey-epstein/263465/
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[^23]: "What did Ari Ben-Menashe claim about Jeffrey Epstein," *Factually,* 2025. https://factually.co/fact-checks/media/ari-ben-menashe-claims-jeffrey-epstein-mossad-d56c30
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[^24]: "The Man of Mystery Hustling Myanmar," *Washington Monthly,* 2021. https://washingtonmonthly.com/2021/03/13/the-man-of-mystery-hustling-myanmar/
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[^25]: "Tsvangirai acquitted of treason in Zimbabwe," *The Globe and Mail,* 2004. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/tsvangirai-acquitted-of-treason-in-zimbabwe/article18275151/
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[^26]: "The Curious Case of Bishkek's $1 Million Deal With Ex-Israeli Intelligence Worker," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,* 2021. https://www.rferl.org/a/the-curious-case-of-bishkek-s-1-million-deal-with-ex-israeli-intelligence-worker-/31033365.html
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[^27]: McFarlane v. Sheridan Square Press, Inc., 91 F.3d 1501 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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[^22]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991, Author's Note, pp. ix-x, and the note on Ben-Menashe at p. 260.
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[^23]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991, pp. 309-310.
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[^24]: "Former Israeli Spy Ari Ben-Menashe on Israel's Relationship with Epstein," *MintPress News,* 2019. https://www.mintpressnews.com/ari-ben-menashe-israel-relationship-jeffrey-epstein/263465/
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[^25]: "What did Ari Ben-Menashe claim about Jeffrey Epstein," *Factually,* 2025. https://factually.co/fact-checks/media/ari-ben-menashe-claims-jeffrey-epstein-mossad-d56c30
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[^26]: "The Man of Mystery Hustling Myanmar," *Washington Monthly,* 2021. https://washingtonmonthly.com/2021/03/13/the-man-of-mystery-hustling-myanmar/
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[^27]: "Tsvangirai acquitted of treason in Zimbabwe," *The Globe and Mail,* 2004. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/tsvangirai-acquitted-of-treason-in-zimbabwe/article18275151/
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[^28]: "The Curious Case of Bishkek's $1 Million Deal With Ex-Israeli Intelligence Worker," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,* 2021. https://www.rferl.org/a/the-curious-case-of-bishkek-s-1-million-deal-with-ex-israeli-intelligence-worker-/31033365.html
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[^29]: McFarlane v. Sheridan Square Press, Inc., 91 F.3d 1501 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ tags:
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summary: "INSLAW's bankruptcy counsel who told the House Judiciary Committee that in July 1987 the former bankruptcy judge Roger Whelan threatened to organize opposition to Judge Bason's reappointment over an unpaid fee petition."
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location: "Washington, D.C."
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created: 2026-09-22
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updated: 2026-09-22
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updated: 2026-10-09
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---
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Charles A. Docter, of the Washington firm Docter, Docter and Salus, was bankruptcy counsel to [[INSLAW]] as debtor in possession in its Chapter 11 case in the [[United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia]], No. 85-00070, alongside [[Charles R. Work]] of McDermott, Will and Emery. His partner Stanley Salus handled the company's complaint to the United States Trustee, [[William White]], after the [[Jack Rugh]] telephone call to [[Gregory McKain]] in February 1985.[^1]
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@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ Charles A. Docter, of the Washington firm Docter, Docter and Salus, was bankrupt
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Docter told the [[House Committee on the Judiciary]] that in July 1987, two months before Bankruptcy Judge [[George Francis Bason, Jr.|George Bason]] ruled that the [[Department of Justice]] had taken [[PROMIS]] by fraud, [[Roger Whelan]], the bankruptcy judge Bason had succeeded and by then a practicing attorney with a fee application pending before Bason in the [[United Press International|UPI]] bankruptcy, came to his office and threatened to oppose Bason's reappointment because Bason had not ruled on the petition, saying that Senior District Judge Irwin Gasch would organize the opposition. Docter told Bason of the conversation and recommended that he act promptly; Bason ruled on the fee application on July 17, 1987. Docter gave his account to the committee in private session. When the special counsel [[Nicholas J. Bua]] sought more, "Docter referred us to his testimony before the House Committee, but refused to provide us any additional information." Whelan denied to Bua that he had ever spoken to Docter about the UPI case or tried to pressure Bason, while acknowledging his friendship with Gasch and his frustration at the delay. Bua wrote that he had "not attempted to resolve this seeming disagreement," which bore only tangentially on whether the department had influenced the merit selection panel, but added that "the possibility of concerted opposition to Bason by district court judges or others might explain why he was not reappointed." The panel, chaired by Judge [[Norma H. Johnson]], had received the transcript of Bason's ruling from [[Royce Lamberth]].[^1]
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The Bua report introduces this account with the name "Charles Deeter, an attorney for Inslaw," and refers to Docter in the sentences that follow; the account attributed to each name (Whelan's July 1987 visit, the UPI fee petition and Judge Gasch) is the same, and the records found do not establish whether the report's "Deeter" is a misspelling of Docter or a different person.[^1]
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### Footnotes
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[^1]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.,* March 1993, pp. 169-170, 211-214. https://archive.org/details/InslawPROMISBuaReport (which spells the name Docter throughout; "Deeter" in later accounts is a transcription error). The firm's role as counsel of record appears in the reporter listings for *In re INSLAW, Inc.,* 97 B.R. 685 and 106 B.R. 331 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1989).
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[^1]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.,* March 1993, pp. 169-170, 211-214. https://archive.org/details/InslawPROMISBuaReport(the report first names the attorney as "Charles Deeter, an attorney for Inslaw," and thereafter as Docter). The firm's role as counsel of record appears in the reporter listings for *In re INSLAW, Inc.,* 97 B.R. 685 and 106 B.R. 331 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1989).
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@ -9,10 +9,24 @@ summary: "Cornelius Blackshear was a U.S."
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Cornelius Blackshear was a U.S. Trustee in the [[U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York|Southern District of New York]] who later became a U.S. Bankruptcy Court Judge for the Southern District of New York. He became a key figure in the allegations surrounding the attempted conversion of [[INSLAW|Inslaw]]'s bankruptcy case and a subsequent alleged cover-up.
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Blackshear initially testified in a deposition on March 25, 1987, that [[William White]], the U.S. Trustee for the District of Columbia, had told him that [[Thomas Stanton]], Director of the Executive Office of U.S. Trustees (EOUST), had tried to pressure White to convert [[INSLAW]]'s Chapter 11 reorganization to a Chapter 7 liquidation and to have [[Harry Jones]] assigned to White to effect the conversion. Blackshear also stated that Stanton had never contacted him about detailing Jones, but he thought Stanton might have approached Jones directly. This testimony supported Inslaw's primary allegation of a plot to liquidate the company. However, after speaking with White, Blackshear realized he was mistaken and had confused Inslaw with the UPI case, about which White had told him the IRS had pressured him to join a motion to convert. Blackshear then prepared and signed an affidavit recanting his deposition testimony, stating that he had confused the cases. He also gave a second deposition repeating his new recollections. During the [[Office of Professional Responsibility]] (OPR) investigation, Blackshear essentially repeated his recanting statements, maintaining that White had not told him Stanton pressured him to convert Inslaw, and that he had confused Inslaw with UPI. He did, however, disagree with White regarding a conversation about the possible assignment of Harry Jones to Washington, believing White had told him Stanton planned to bring Jones to Washington, while White maintained Blackshear told this to White. Blackshear also denied discussing with [[Anthony Pasciuto]] at a social gathering that he was sorry for his conduct or had given false testimony in his recantation to avoid hurting people.[^1]
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Blackshear initially testified in a deposition on March 25, 1987, that [[William White]], the U.S. Trustee for the District of Columbia, had told him that [[Thomas Stanton]], Director of the Executive Office of U.S. Trustees (EOUST), had tried to pressure White to convert INSLAW's Chapter 11 reorganization to a Chapter 7 liquidation and to have [[Harry Jones]] assigned to White to effect the conversion. Blackshear also stated that Stanton had never contacted him about detailing Jones, but he thought Stanton might have approached Jones directly. This testimony supported Inslaw's primary allegation of a plot to liquidate the company. However, after speaking with White, Blackshear realized he was mistaken and had confused Inslaw with the UPI case, about which White had told him the IRS had pressured him to join a motion to convert. Blackshear then prepared and signed, with the assistance of his attorney (an Assistant United States Attorney in the Civil Division of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, named in the report as [[James Garrity]]), an affidavit recanting his deposition testimony, stating that he had confused the cases. He also gave a second deposition repeating his new recollections. During the [[Office of Professional Responsibility]] (OPR) investigation, Blackshear essentially repeated his recanting statements, maintaining that White had not told him Stanton pressured him to convert Inslaw, and that he had confused Inslaw with UPI. He did, however, disagree with White regarding a conversation about the possible assignment of Harry Jones to Washington, believing White had told him Stanton planned to bring Jones to Washington, while White maintained Blackshear told this to White. Blackshear also denied discussing with [[Anthony Pasciuto]] at a social gathering that he was sorry for his conduct or had given false testimony in his recantation to avoid hurting people.[^1]
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### The recantation
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Blackshear first swore on March 25, 1987, that White told him Stanton wanted the Inslaw case converted. The House Judiciary Committee reported that Judge [[Jane Solomon]] told its investigators that on March 18, 1987, Blackshear gave her an identical account, and that Pasciuto swore to the committee that Blackshear described Stanton's attempt to pressure him at a January 1987 luncheon.[^2] The Bua report states that Blackshear and the other luncheon guest, Judge [[Lawrence Pierce]], do not remember anything being said about Inslaw.[^3]
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White had been deposed shortly before Blackshear and had testified that Stanton exerted no pressure. When White learned that Blackshear had testified differently he telephoned him and told him he was mistaken. The Bua report states that James Garrity, then an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Southern District of New York, represented Blackshear and accompanied him to the deposition. The next day Garrity received a call from [[Roger M. Cooper]], the DOJ trial attorney defending the Independent Handling claims, who said he believed Blackshear's testimony was wrong and that DOJ was concerned that something should be done to correct the error; Cooper did not suggest what the correct testimony would be. Garrity spoke to Blackshear, who said that after speaking with White he had become convinced he had made a mistake, and the two prepared the recanting affidavit, which Garrity sent to Cooper.[^4] The House committee dated the affidavit March 26, 1987, and wrote that it was "highly questionable how the Department could ethically represent both itself and Judge Blackshear in the INSLAW litigation," because Garrity was a Department attorney at the same time as he represented a key witness for the plaintiff.[^2] The Bua report wrote that these facts indicated conduct consistent with the good faith effort expected of attorneys.[^4]
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What the recantation left standing: Blackshear continued to maintain that White told him the IRS pressured White to move to convert the UPI case, and he disagreed with White about a conversation concerning the assignment of Harry Jones to Washington. In a sworn statement to House investigators on January 25, 1991, he said his earlier information was hearsay, largely from Pasciuto, and said of the choice between his account and White's: "it would become a credibility question." The House committee headed that part of its report "Judge Blackshear's statement to committee lacks credibility."[^2] Pasciuto claimed that Blackshear had admitted giving false testimony in the recantation to avoid hurting people; Blackshear denied it.[^3]
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Bason accepted Blackshear's original testimony as true and found the recantation an honest mistake; in January 1991 he filed a complaint with the Judicial Council of the Second Circuit stating that Blackshear recanted "not because of an honest mistake but because he made a conscious choice to testify falsely."[^5] DOJ's Office of Professional Responsibility, in a report of March 31, 1989, credited the recantation. The Bua report wrote that "[t]his series of contradictory statements can only be described as troubling," that "[a]t best, it reveals a rather malleable witness," and that "there simply is not sufficient evidence to prove (by any standard) that Blackshear lied when he recanted his deposition testimony."[^3]
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Bankruptcy Judge Bason, in his findings, chose to believe Blackshear's original testimony and found his recantation to be the result of an "honest mistake." However, several years later, in January 1991, Bason filed a complaint against Blackshear with the Judicial Council of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, stating that he now believed Blackshear recanted not due to an honest mistake but because he made a conscious choice to testify falsely. The OPR, however, credited Blackshear's recantation, noting that he had no apparent motive to lie about the matter. The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI) found Blackshear's recantation implausible, noting that he had stated on four occasions prior to his recantation that White told him about pressure from Stanton to convert the Inslaw case. The PSI also found no evidence to support Blackshear's explanation that he had confused Inslaw with the UPI case. The Special Counsel's investigation concluded that there was insufficient evidence to prove that Blackshear lied when he recanted his deposition testimony. The report acknowledged the confusion arising from Blackshear's various statements but attributed it to poor memory rather than intentional misstatements. The Special Counsel found no reason why Blackshear, a sitting bankruptcy judge, would commit perjury and jeopardize his career.[^1]
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### Footnotes
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[^1]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993.
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[^1]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 192-194, 195-197, 209-210 and 215-231.
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[^2]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. *The INSLAW Affair.* H. Rept. 102-857, 102d Cong., 2d sess., September 10, 1992, Part V, pp. 73-77 (affidavit of March 26, 1987; Garrity; January 25, 1991 statement; heading of section V.B).
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[^3]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 192-194, 195-196, 209, 215-223. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
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[^4]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 229-230. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
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[^5]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. *The INSLAW Affair.* H. Rept. 102-857, 102d Cong., 2d sess., September 10, 1992, Part V.D, p. 78 (Bason's complaint of January 2, 1991).
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@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ aliases:
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- Danny Casolaro
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- Joseph Daniel Casolaro
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created: 2024-04-25
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updated: 2026-10-08
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updated: 2026-10-09
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category: "Authors & Journalists"
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tags:
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- KeyFigure
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@ -65,7 +65,9 @@ In 2024, Martinsburg police released records under a Freedom of Information Act
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The [[House Committee on the Judiciary|House Judiciary Committee]]'s September 1992 report noted that Casolaro had "encountered dangerous individuals associated with organized crime and the world of covert intelligence operations" and recommended further investigation into the circumstances of his death. The committee found no evidence that DOJ had sought to influence the local West Virginia investigation.[^2]
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The Bua Report, completed in March 1993, concluded that the physical evidence "strongly supported" the suicide finding, that DOJ had not influenced the local investigation, and that Casolaro had possessed "ample reason to commit suicide," being unemployed, financially dependent on family, facing a balloon mortgage, and unable to sell his book.[^5]
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The Bua Report, completed in March 1993, stated that "the physical evidence in Casolaro's hotel room strongly supports the conclusion of the local authorities that the death was a suicide," found no DOJ influence on the local investigation, and stated that "there was ample reason to believe Casolaro had a motive to commit suicide," noting that he had been unemployed for months, was dependent on family for support, faced a balloon mortgage, and had been told by a prospective publisher shortly before his death that it would not advance him money on his proposed book about the "Octopus."[^5]
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The Bua report listed the tests it relied on: handwriting analysis confirming that Casolaro wrote the note found in the room; fingerprint analysis finding his prints and none other except a single print on an ash tray; hair and fiber analysis; an analysis of the bloodstains by Dr. Lee of the Connecticut State Police Forensic Science Laboratory consistent with suicide; and an autopsy finding hemorrhage from the wrist wounds as the cause of death and no evidence that he was unconscious or debilitated when cut. It addressed criticisms that the room was not sealed, that notification of next of kin was delayed while the body was embalmed, and that Martinsburg authorities discounted suspicions about his "sources," stating that "no credible evidence suggested that any of Casolaro's 'sources' played any role in his death." The report also records that Michael Riconosciuto, in a lawsuit against Bua, alleged that one of the FBI agents assigned to the investigation had murdered Casolaro; the district court dismissed the suit as patently frivolous (*Riconosciuto v. Bua*, No. 92 C 6217, N.D. Ill.).[^6]
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FBI task force members assigned to examine Casolaro's death privately "questioned the conclusion of suicide" and recommended further investigation; expressing doubt about the ruling reportedly "risked one's career" within the Bureau as of December 1992. FBI documents related to Casolaro remain partially withheld from public release under national security exemptions, while the Bureau simultaneously claims the files are missing - a contradiction noted by MuckRock journalists who filed FOIA requests.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -77,9 +79,9 @@ Casolaro's investigation intersected with the drug-trafficking networks document
|
|||
|
||||
### The research files
|
||||
|
||||
Casolaro's research files, photographed by [[Christian Hansen]] at the Missouri State Historical Society and published on the Internet Archive, include a folder labelled "Promotional Material" of corporate and weapons literature, hand-numbered "BD|AI|PM-01" onward. Its items are a brochure for the Inter-Probe modular energy transfer catalyzer (PM-01), a printed page numbered 207 on fuel air munitions (PM-02), a [[Brunswick Corporation]] defense division cover sheet and drawing for the Rifleman's Assault Weapon for urban warfare dated October 1976 (PM-03), a sales sheet of the defense division of the Chilean firm [[Industrias Cardoen]] (PM-04) and a fax of the resumes of the associates of [[Counter Terrorism Consultants, Inc.]], whose fax counters run 141 P01 to 141 P12 (PM-05) and whose page headers carry the date June 20, 1990 and times from 16:53 to 17:01.[^6] In the order of the photographs the folder runs PM-04, PM-02, PM-03, PM-05, PM-01.[^6] The packet names [[Carter Cornick]], [[Eugene Propper]], [[E. Lawrence Barcella, Jr.|E. Lawrence Barcella]], [[Francis J. McNeil]], [[James B. Motley]] (a vice president of [[Wackenhut Advanced Technologies Corporation]]), [[Mayer Nudell]] and a former CIA counterterrorism chief whose entry carries no name.[^6] The files also contain a folder of 1980s newspaper and magazine material on [[Frank Terpil]] and [[Edwin Wilson]], folders of Wackenhut annual reports, correspondence, profiles and newsletters, and, in a folder of Department of Defense publications, a magazine article by David Corn on Barcella and the Pan Am 103 bombing.[^7]
|
||||
Casolaro's research files, photographed by [[Christian Hansen]] at the Missouri State Historical Society and published on the Internet Archive, include a folder labelled "Promotional Material" of corporate and weapons literature, hand-numbered "BD|AI|PM-01" onward. Its items are a brochure for the Inter-Probe modular energy transfer catalyzer (PM-01), a printed page numbered 207 on fuel air munitions (PM-02), a [[Brunswick Corporation]] defense division cover sheet and drawing for the Rifleman's Assault Weapon for urban warfare dated October 1976 (PM-03), a sales sheet of the defense division of the Chilean firm [[Industrias Cardoen]] (PM-04) and a fax of the resumes of the associates of [[Counter Terrorism Consultants, Inc.]], whose fax counters run 141 P01 to 141 P12 (PM-05) and whose page headers carry the date June 20, 1990 and times from 16:53 to 17:01.[^7] In the order of the photographs the folder runs PM-04, PM-02, PM-03, PM-05, PM-01.[^7] The packet names [[Carter Cornick]], [[Eugene Propper]], [[E. Lawrence Barcella, Jr.|E. Lawrence Barcella]], [[Francis J. McNeil]], [[James B. Motley]] (a vice president of [[Wackenhut Advanced Technologies Corporation]]), [[Mayer Nudell]] and a former CIA counterterrorism chief whose entry carries no name.[^7] The files also contain a folder of 1980s newspaper and magazine material on [[Frank Terpil]] and [[Edwin Wilson]], folders of Wackenhut annual reports, correspondence, profiles and newsletters, and, in a folder of Department of Defense publications, a magazine article by David Corn on Barcella and the Pan Am 103 bombing.[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
The INSLAW folder of the research files includes a *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* report of February 19, 1991 that names Industrias Cardoen and its owner [[Carlos Cardoen]]. It states that [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], in an affidavit filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia, said that Cardoen told him in January 1989 that Cardoen had brokered a deal between Earl Brian and an Iraqi military intelligence representative for the use of PROMIS, and that the sale was consummated in Santiago, Chile.[^8] Brian called the allegations "nonsense," according to the report.[^8] The report of Special Counsel [[Nicholas J. Bua]] dates the affidavit February 17, 1991.[^9]
|
||||
The INSLAW folder of the research files includes a *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* report of February 19, 1991 that names Industrias Cardoen and its owner [[Carlos Cardoen]]. It states that [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], in an affidavit filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia, said that Cardoen told him in January 1989 that Cardoen had brokered a deal between Earl Brian and an Iraqi military intelligence representative for the use of PROMIS, and that the sale was consummated in Santiago, Chile.[^9] Brian called the allegations "nonsense," according to the report.[^9] The report of Special Counsel [[Nicholas J. Bua]] dates the affidavit February 17, 1991.[^10]
|
||||
|
||||
### Bibliography
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -90,9 +92,10 @@ The INSLAW folder of the research files includes a *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* rep
|
|||
[^1]: Ridgeway, James, and Doug Vaughan. "The Last Days of Danny Casolaro." *Village Voice*, October 15, 1991; West Virginia Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, Second Autopsy Report, Dr. Frost, January 1992; Martinsburg Police Department records released under FOIA to Zachary Treitz and Christian Hansen, 2024; "FBI Cites Mystery FOIA Exemption to Withhold Danny Casolaro Death Video," *MuckRock*, February 2018.
|
||||
[^2]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. *The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report.* House Report 102-857, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, September 10, 1992.
|
||||
[^3]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 6: "They were doing their patriotic duty."
|
||||
[^4]: Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General regarding the allegations of INSLAW, Inc. (U.S. Department of Justice, March 1993), pp. 137 (August 7, 1991 call, August 17, 1991 letter, later interview), 146 (September 1990 agent meeting; "part-time author"), 148 to 149 (December 1990 New York meetings) and 154 (his account of Casolaro's state of mind). https://archive.org/details/InslawPROMISBuaReport.
|
||||
[^5]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993.
|
||||
[^6]: Danny Casolaro papers, folder "Promotional Material," Internet Archive items casolaro-notebooks (PromotionalMaterial.pdf) and PromotionalMaterial, https://archive.org/details/casolaro-notebooks.
|
||||
[^7]: Danny Casolaro papers, folders "CIA Frank Terpil Renegades," "Wackenhut - Newsletters" and "DOD PUBLICATIONS," https://archive.org/details/ddosecrets_casolaro_files (the Corn item is headed "SPECIAL EDITION - TERRORISM / Did It Blow Up Flight 103?").
|
||||
[^8]: *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, February 19, 1991, "Stolen Software Scattered: Affidavits Allege Sales To Iraqis And Israelis," clipping in the INSLAW folder, https://archive.org/download/casolaro-notebooks/InslawIi_djvu.txt.
|
||||
[^9]: Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General regarding the allegations of INSLAW, Inc. (March 1993), pp. 73-74.
|
||||
[^4]: U.S. Department of Justice, *Report of the United States Department of Justice on the Review of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua's Report on the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc.*, September 27, 1994, p. 9 (Summary item 4) and pp. 107-168 (Section V), at pp. 137 (August 7, 1991 call, August 17, 1991 letter, later interview), 146 (September 1990 agent meeting; "part-time author"), 148 to 149 (December 1990 New York meetings) and 154 (his account of Casolaro's state of mind). https://archive.org/details/InslawPROMISBuaReport.
|
||||
[^5]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 246-250 ("B. The Death of Joseph Daniel Casolaro").
|
||||
[^6]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 246-250 and p. 69. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^7]: Danny Casolaro papers, folder "Promotional Material," Internet Archive items casolaro-notebooks (PromotionalMaterial.pdf) and PromotionalMaterial, https://archive.org/details/casolaro-notebooks.
|
||||
[^8]: Danny Casolaro papers, folders "CIA Frank Terpil Renegades," "Wackenhut - Newsletters" and "DOD PUBLICATIONS," https://archive.org/details/ddosecrets_casolaro_files (the Corn item is headed "SPECIAL EDITION - TERRORISM / Did It Blow Up Flight 103?").
|
||||
[^9]: *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, February 19, 1991, "Stolen Software Scattered: Affidavits Allege Sales To Iraqis And Israelis," clipping in the INSLAW folder, https://archive.org/download/casolaro-notebooks/InslawIi_djvu.txt.
|
||||
[^10]: Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General regarding the allegations of INSLAW, Inc. (March 1993), pp. 73-74.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -9,19 +9,30 @@ tags:
|
|||
- OfficeOfTechnicalService
|
||||
- RemoteViewing
|
||||
- SCANATE
|
||||
summary: "Director of the CIA's Office of Technical Service who ended its funding of the SRI parapsychology research in 1976, refused to resume it, and briefed the House intelligence committee on the work in 1977 and 1978."
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Office of Technical Service]]"
|
||||
start: 1974-07
|
||||
end: 1980-06
|
||||
role: "Director of the Office of Technical Service; wrote on February 20, 1976 that he had directed termination of OTS support to the SRI parapsychology work"
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
summary: "Director of the CIA's Office of Technical Service who ended its funding of the SRI parapsychology research in 1976, refused to resume it, and briefed the House intelligence committee in 1977 and 1978."
|
||||
location: "Langley, Virginia"
|
||||
created: 2026-09-21
|
||||
updated: 2026-09-21
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
David S. Brandwein was director of the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]'s [[CIA Office of Technical Service|Office of Technical Service]] in the middle 1970s, the office that had funded the remote-viewing research at [[Stanford Research Institute]] since 1972. On February 20, 1976, he sent the director of research and development "two reports summarizing the final work by SRI for OTS, together with a memorandum discussing the status of the parapsychology program. As you are no doubt aware, I directed that OTS support of this effort be terminated. I continue to believe that it would be inappropriate for us to continue it; however, if ORD desires to pick it up, be my guest." On October 7, 1976, having read the minutes of the twelfth meeting of the research and development subcommittee of the Human Resources Committee, at which OTS officers had briefed on the work and it was recorded that "enough empirical evidence existed to warrant further research in this area," he wrote to the Intelligence Community Staff: "I think you know my position on this, but just in case there is some confusion I want to make myself clear. OTS will not support any further research in parapsychology."[^1]
|
||||
David S. Brandwein was director of the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]'s [[CIA Office of Technical Service|Office of Technical Service]] from July 1974 to June 1980, the office that had funded the remote-viewing research at [[Stanford Research Institute]] since 1972.[^1] On February 20, 1976, he sent the director of research and development "two reports summarizing the final work by SRI for OTS, together with a memorandum discussing the status of the parapsychology program. As you are no doubt aware, I directed that OTS support of this effort be terminated. I continue to believe that it would be inappropriate for us to continue it; however, if ORD desires to pick it up, be my guest." On October 7, 1976, having read the minutes of the twelfth meeting of the research and development subcommittee of the Human Resources Committee, at which OTS officers had briefed on the work and it was recorded that "enough empirical evidence existed to warrant further research in this area," he wrote to the Intelligence Community Staff: "I think you know my position on this, but just in case there is some confusion I want to make myself clear. OTS will not support any further research in parapsychology."[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### Congress
|
||||
|
||||
After the *Washington Post*'s Parade section published "Psychic Spying" on August 7, 1977, the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence]] asked for a briefing. Brandwein gave it to three staff members on November 16, 1977, from ten to eleven: "A short oral history of OTS efforts in the field, dating back to 1961, was presented. All three staffers asked very pertinent questions and were given frank and in-depth replies." Since the officers "could speak only for OTS," one was asked to find out whether any other component was sponsoring such research, and the staff were left "a written outline of OTS work on ESP, classified SECRET, the IEEE article covering the unclassified portions of the work done by SRI and a brief article on Mr. [[Pat Price]]." On February 9, 1978, the OTS briefing for Representative [[Charlie Rose]] "was largely handled by the Chief of OTS, Mr. David S. Brandwein."[^1][^2]
|
||||
After the *Washington Post* published "Psychic Spying?" by [[John L. Wilhelm]], a former *Time* science correspondent, on August 7, 1977, the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence]] asked for a briefing. Brandwein attended the briefing of three staff members on November 16, 1977, from ten to eleven: "A short oral history of OTS efforts in the field, dating back to 1961, was presented. All three staffers asked very pertinent questions and were given frank and in-depth replies." Since the officers "could speak only for OTS," one was asked to find out whether any other component was sponsoring such research, and the staff were left "a written outline of OTS work on ESP, classified SECRET, the IEEE article covering the unclassified portions of the work done by SRI and a brief article on Mr. [[Pat Price]]." On February 9, 1978, the OTS briefing for Representative [[Charlie Rose]] "was largely handled by the Chief of OTS, Mr. David S. Brandwein."[^2][^3]
|
||||
|
||||
On June 22, 1977 Brandwein signed, as Director of the Office of Technical Service, the memorandum to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, "Request for Guidance on Handling Recently Located MKULTRA Material," reporting that additional MKULTRA documents had been found in the retired records of the OTS Budget and Fiscal Section.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Brandwein, David S., Director, Office of Technical Service, memoranda "Stanford Research Institute Parapsychology Research," February 20, 1976 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200020001-9), and "OTS Support to Research in Parapsychology," October 7, 1976 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200020016-3); memorandum for the record, "Briefing for House Permanent Select Committee re OTS Involvement in ESP Research," OTS memo 287-77, November 17, 1977 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200020020-8); memorandum for the record, "Discussions with OTS on the SRI Project," June 22, 1974 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000700110016-8). Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
|
||||
[^2]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Legislative Counsel, "Briefing of Representative Charles Rose," February 9, 1978, OLC 78-0576, CIA-RDP81M00980R000600250087-4.
|
||||
[^1]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Office of Technical Service: 50 Years Supporting Operations," 2001, CIA Reading Room document 0001225679, "Directors of the Office of Technical Service" (John N. McMahon, May 1973 to July 1974; David S. Brandwein, July 1974 to June 1980).
|
||||
[^2]: Brandwein, David S., Director, Office of Technical Service, memoranda "Stanford Research Institute Parapsychology Research," February 20, 1976 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200090005-8), and "OTS Support to Research in Parapsychology," October 7, 1976 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200020016-3); memorandum for the record, "Briefing for House Permanent Select Committee re OTS Involvement in ESP Research," OTS memo 287-77, November 17, 1977 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200020020-8); memorandum for the record, "Discussions with OTS on the SRI Project," June 22, 1974 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000700110016-8).
|
||||
[^3]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Legislative Counsel, "Briefing of Representative Charles Rose," February 9, 1978, OLC 78-0576, CIA-RDP81M00980R000600250087-4.
|
||||
[^4]: Joint hearing, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research, August 3, 1977, *Project MKULTRA, the CIA's Program of Research in Behavioral Modification*, Appendix B, pp. 103-104. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/hearings/95mkultra.pdf
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -4,12 +4,14 @@ tags:
|
|||
- Person
|
||||
- Military
|
||||
summary: "Fair met with Michael Riconosciuto and Robert Frye of Wackenhut Services, Inc. in May 1981 at Picatinny Arsenal."
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-08
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
---
|
||||
[[Dr. Harry Fair]] was the Chief of Propulsion Technology, Applied Sciences Division, at [[ARRADCOM]] (U.S. Army Armament Research & Development Command, Large Caliber Weapons Systems Laboratory) at [[Picatinny Arsenal]] in Dover, [[New Jersey]]. He was involved in the Railgun Project.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Fair met with [[Michael Riconosciuto]] and [[Robert Frye]] (president of Wackenhut Services, Inc., a subsidiary of the [[Wackenhut Corporation]])[^2] in May 1981 at Picatinny Arsenal. Riconosciuto conducted an extensive and highly technical theoretical blackboard exercise on a Railgun for Army personnel. Fair commented that he was extremely impressed with Riconosciuto's scientific and technical knowledge and termed him a "potential national resource," despite being apprised by [[Dr. John Philip Nichols]] that Riconosciuto had been convicted and served time for stabbing a [[DEA|DEA]] agent.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
The Bua report states that [[Peter Zokosky]] and the other people from the joint venture travelled to the Picatinny Arsenal, which houses the U.S. Army Armament Research and Development Command's Large Caliber Weapon Systems Laboratory, to meet Fair and an Army project officer named R. Scott Westley, both of whom Zokosky knew from his time at Armtec. The meetings were set up to discuss the technical and administrative challenges of establishing a second-source combustible cartridge production facility on the Cabazon reservation. Frye recalled meeting Riconosciuto on a trip to the Arsenal that he believed took place in May 1981; Zokosky agreed there was a May 1981 trip but believed Riconosciuto was not on it and that Frye met Riconosciuto on a second trip in October 1981. Westley told Bua's team he was not at the September 10, 1981 weapons demonstration at Lake Cahuilla.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
Dr. John Philip Nichols also addressed a letter to Dr. Harry Fair on January 20, 1983, on Wackenhut/[[Cabazon Indian Reservation|Cabazon]] letterhead, stating that he would be forwarding a "unique list of agents and production techniques related to biological warfare." The letter mentioned that the [[Storemont Laboratories]] business plan Nichols mailed to Fair was to prepare him for what was to be sent in the area of biological warfare, noting that these products could be used in "small countries bordering [[Albania]] or large countries bordering the [[Soviet Union]]."[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Robert Booth Nichols]] also wrote a letter to [[Joseph F. Preloznik]] on April 13, 1983, recapitulating the same weapons proposal outlined by Dr. John Philip Nichols to Dr. Harry Fair. Robert Booth Nichols also mentioned Fair in a February 10, 1984, letter on [[Meridian Arms]] letterhead, referring to the Wackenhut Corporation visit to Picatinny Arsenal in May 1981 and Riconosciuto's demonstration of electrostatic heat transfer augmentation.[^1]
|
||||
|
|
@ -19,3 +21,4 @@ Dr. John Philip Nichols also addressed a letter to Dr. Harry Fair on January 20,
|
|||
|
||||
[^1]: Seymour, Cheri. *The Last Circle: Danny Casolaro’s Investigation into the Octopus and the PROMIS Software Scandal*. First Edition. TrineDay, 2010.
|
||||
[^2]: United States Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, report of Judge Nicholas J. Bua on the INSLAW matter (1993), printed pp. 42 to 43 and 55 to 58, footnote 35. Official finding, placed as the position of the body that issued it. https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/nsa/DOJ-OIP-INSLAW_1993.pdf
|
||||
[^3]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 57-58 and 65. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
---
|
||||
created: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
title: Frank Church
|
||||
aliases:
|
||||
- Frank Church
|
||||
|
|
@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ tags:
|
|||
- ColdWar
|
||||
- 1970s
|
||||
- 1980s
|
||||
summary: "Frank Church was a Democratic senator from Idaho who chaired the 1975-1976 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities that documented COINTELPRO, Operation CHAOS, assassination plots against foreign leaders, and illegal domestic surveillance by the CIA, FBI, and NSA."
|
||||
summary: "Democratic senator from Idaho who chaired the 1975-1976 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, which documented COINTELPRO, Operation CHAOS, assassination plots against foreign leaders and illegal domestic surveillance by the CIA, FBI and NSA."
|
||||
born: 1924-07-25
|
||||
died: 1984-04-07
|
||||
location: "Boise, Idaho"
|
||||
|
|
@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ Church was born in Boise, Idaho. He served in U.S. Army Military Intelligence du
|
|||
|
||||
### The Church Committee
|
||||
|
||||
In January 1975, the Senate created the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities in the aftermath of Seymour Hersh's December 1974 New York Times reporting on [[Operation CHAOS]]. Church was appointed chairman. The committee ran through April 1976 and produced a final report (S. Rept. 94-755) and fourteen volumes of supplementary staff reports documenting:
|
||||
In January 1975, the Senate created the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities in the aftermath of Seymour Hersh's December 1974 New York Times reporting on [[Operation CHAOS]]. Church was appointed chairman. The committee ran through April 1976 and produced an interim report on assassination plots (S. Rept. 94-465, November 20, 1975), a six-book final report (S. Rept. 94-755, April 26, 1976, Books I to VI) and seven volumes of hearings, documenting:[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
- Operation CHAOS: the CIA's domestic surveillance program targeting antiwar organizations, found to be unlawful
|
||||
- [[COINTELPRO]]: the FBI's systematic campaign against political organizations, including programs resulting in the death of activists such as [[Fred Hampton]]
|
||||
|
|
@ -48,3 +48,4 @@ Church ran for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1976, entering the prim
|
|||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, S. Rept. 94-755, April 26, 1976. Olmsted, Kathryn S. *Challenging the Secret Government: The Post-Watergate Investigations of the CIA and FBI*. University of North Carolina Press, 1996.
|
||||
[^2]: Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Final Report*, Book I, S. Rept. 94-755, April 26, 1976, title page; *Hearings*, vols. 1 to 7, "Senate Resolution 21." https://archive.org/details/ChurchCommittee
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
---
|
||||
created: 2026-05-15
|
||||
updated: 2026-05-16
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
title: Larry Devlin
|
||||
aliases:
|
||||
- Lawrence Devlin
|
||||
|
|
@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ tags:
|
|||
- Assassination
|
||||
- 1960s
|
||||
category: "Intelligence & Government"
|
||||
summary: "Larry Devlin was the CIA Station Chief in Leopoldville from 1960 to 1967 who received assassination orders against Patrice Lumumba including poison delivered by Sidney Gottlieb, claims he refused to execute the order, and became the primary CIA sponsor of Mobutu Sese Seko's rise to power."
|
||||
summary: "CIA Station Chief in Leopoldville from 1960 to 1967 who received orders against Patrice Lumumba, including poison delivered by Sidney Gottlieb, said he refused to execute them, and sponsored Mobutu Sese Seko's rise to power."
|
||||
born: 1922
|
||||
died: 2008
|
||||
location: "Leopoldville (Kinshasa), Democratic Republic of Congo"
|
||||
|
|
@ -27,17 +27,17 @@ Devlin arrived in Leopoldville in 1960, the year of Congolese independence from
|
|||
|
||||
When Lumumba, the Congo's first elected Prime Minister, sought [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] military assistance during the [[Katanga]] secession crisis, CIA Director [[Allen Dulles]] characterized him as a potential African [[Fidel Castro]] and authorized assassination planning. Devlin received cables from CIA headquarters authorizing action to "eliminate" Lumumba. In September 1960, Sidney Gottlieb - the CIA's chief of Technical Services who had developed assassination materials for other targets under the [[ZR RIFLE]] program - personally traveled to Leopoldville and delivered to Devlin a kit containing biological materials intended to poison Lumumba.
|
||||
|
||||
Devlin testified to the [[Church Committee]] in 1975 that he never used the materials and eventually disposed of them by throwing the poison into the [[Congo River]]. His testimony acknowledged he had understood the orders but claimed moral and practical objections to carrying them out.[^1]
|
||||
Devlin testified to the [[Church Committee]] in 1975 that he never used the materials and eventually disposed of them by throwing the poison into the [[Congo River]]. His testimony acknowledged he had understood the orders but claimed moral and practical objections to carrying them out.[^1] The committee's interim report calls the Leopoldville station officer "Hedgman." The scientist it calls "Joseph Scheider" testified on October 7 and 9, 1975 that he destroyed the viability of the biological material and disposed of it in the Congo River before leaving the Congo on October 5, 1960, and the station officer testified on August 21, 1975 that he locked the material in the bottom drawer of his safe and disposed of it months later; each recalled disposing of it in the Congo River, alone. The station officer's October 7, 1960 cable to [[Bronson Tweedy]] said that "certain items of continuing usefulness" had been left.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### Lumumba's Death
|
||||
|
||||
Despite Devlin's claimed refusal of the assassination order, Lumumba was captured, transferred to [[Katanga]], and killed on January 17, 1961, by Katangese forces under [[Moise Tshombe]] with Belgian officers present. The precise extent of CIA foreknowledge or facilitation of this transfer - as opposed to the separate biological assassination plan Devlin received - has not been fully resolved by the documentary record.
|
||||
Despite Devlin's claimed refusal of the assassination order, Lumumba was captured, transferred to Katanga, and killed on January 17, 1961, by Katangese forces under [[Moise Tshombe]] with Belgian officers present. The precise extent of CIA foreknowledge or facilitation of this transfer - as opposed to the separate biological assassination plan Devlin received - has not been fully resolved by the documentary record.
|
||||
|
||||
Devlin acknowledged to the Church Committee that the CIA was aware of Lumumba's transfer to Katanga and that this transfer made his survival unlikely. A 2001 Belgian parliamentary inquiry found Belgian government and intelligence officers directly involved in the killing. The question of whether CIA officers encouraged or facilitated the handover remained contested.[^2]
|
||||
Devlin acknowledged to the Church Committee that the CIA was aware of Lumumba's transfer to Katanga and that this transfer made his survival unlikely. A 2001 Belgian parliamentary inquiry found Belgian government and intelligence officers directly involved in the killing. The question of whether CIA officers encouraged or facilitated the handover remained contested.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
### Mobutu and the Congo's Political Future
|
||||
|
||||
Devlin's most consequential operational role was his cultivation of [[Joseph Kasavubu|Joseph]] Mobutu - at the time known as Joseph-Desire Mobutu, later renamed Mobutu Sese Seko - the Congolese Army chief of staff. Devlin developed a close personal relationship with Mobutu and provided financial support and intelligence backing during the 1960 political crisis. Mobutu's September 1960 "neutralization" of both President [[Joseph Kasavubu]] and Prime Minister Lumumba - temporarily removing both from power - was executed with CIA awareness and support.
|
||||
Devlin's most consequential operational role was his cultivation of [[Joseph Kasavubu|Joseph]] Mobutu - at the time known as Joseph-Desire Mobutu, later renamed Mobutu Sese Seko - the Congolese Army chief of staff. Devlin developed a close personal relationship with Mobutu and provided financial support and intelligence backing during the 1960 political crisis. Mobutu's September 1960 "neutralization" of both President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba - temporarily removing both from power - was executed with CIA awareness and support.
|
||||
|
||||
Mobutu consolidated power definitively in November 1965 in a coup of which Devlin had advance knowledge. Devlin's sponsorship of Mobutu established the foundation for a CIA-Mobutu relationship that continued until the [[Cold War]]'s end, during which the [[United States]] supported Mobutu's government while he looted an estimated $5 billion from the Congolese economy. Mobutu remained a critical CIA partner particularly for covert operations in neighboring [[Angola]] during the mid-1970s.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -50,4 +50,5 @@ In 2007, one year before his death, Devlin published *Chief of Station, Congo: F
|
|||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Devlin, Lawrence. *Chief of Station, Congo: Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone.* Public Affairs, 2007. Church Committee (U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities). *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders.* Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975.
|
||||
[^2]: Kalb, Madeleine G. *The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa from Eisenhower to Kennedy.* Macmillan, 1982. De Witte, Ludo. *The Assassination of Lumumba.* Verso, 2001.
|
||||
[^2]: Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report*, S. Rept. 94-465, November 20, 1975, pp. 24 to 31 (Scheider, October 7 and 9, 1975; Hedgman, August 21, 1975, pp. 48 to 49 and 84 to 85). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
|
||||
[^3]: Kalb, Madeleine G. *The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa from Eisenhower to Kennedy.* Macmillan, 1982. De Witte, Ludo. *The Assassination of Lumumba.* Verso, 2001.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -11,9 +11,16 @@ tags:
|
|||
- FARC
|
||||
- 1980s
|
||||
- 2000s
|
||||
summary: "Monzer al-Kassar was a Syrian arms dealer who received $1.2 million from Richard Secord during Iran-Contra to facilitate weapons transfers to the Contras, operated from Marbella Spain with connections to Syrian intelligence and multiple intelligence services, and was convicted in 2008 in US federal court on charges of conspiring to provide material support to FARC terrorists."
|
||||
summary: "Syrian arms dealer based in Marbella, Spain, paid $500,000 by the Iran-Contra Enterprise in July 1986 for Contra weapons, and convicted in 2008 in US federal court of conspiring to support FARC."
|
||||
born: 1945
|
||||
location: "al-Nabk, Syria"
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: funded
|
||||
with: "[[Richard Secord]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "Enterprise run by Secord and Hakim paid 500,000 dollars for contra weapons, July 1986"
|
||||
start: 1986-07
|
||||
fn: 3
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Monzer al-Kassar was born in 1945 in al-Nabk, a town in the Qalamoun region of Syria north of Damascus. He became one of the most extensively documented international arms dealers of the late twentieth century, conducting weapons transfers across multiple conflicts while maintaining relationships with intelligence services in the [[United States]], [[Israel]], [[Spain]], [[Syria]], and elsewhere. He lived for decades in Marbella, Spain, where he owned a substantial villa and was a prominent figure in the expatriate community, and held a passport from multiple countries. He was convicted in US federal court in 2008 following a [[DEA]] sting operation.[^1]
|
||||
|
|
@ -28,21 +35,23 @@ Al-Kassar reportedly developed relationships with Western intelligence services
|
|||
|
||||
### Iran-Contra Connection
|
||||
|
||||
The [[Tower Commission]]'s investigation and [[Lawrence Walsh]]'s Independent Counsel investigation documented that al-Kassar received approximately $1.2 million from [[Richard Secord]] - General [[Oliver North]]'s co-director of [[The Enterprise (Iran-Contra)|the Enterprise]] - to facilitate the movement of weapons from [[Israel]] to the Nicaraguan [[Contras]]. The payment, made through the Enterprise's Swiss account structure - specifically [[Albert Hakim]]'s Lake Resources S.A. - was for al-Kassar's services in arranging weapons transfers through Eastern European intermediaries and logistics networks that could not be traced directly to the United States.[^1]
|
||||
In July 1986 the Enterprise run by [[Richard Secord]] and [[Albert Hakim]] paid the Portuguese supplier Defex 2.6 million dollars and paid al-Kassar 500,000 dollars for contra weapons; in late July a shipment of arms left Portugal.[^3] The Independent Counsel left the 500,000 dollar purchase out of his 3.6 million dollar estimate of the Iran-to-contra diversion because al-Kassar "was not available to testify."[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
This relationship gave al-Kassar the operational profile of a contractor to American covert operations during the period, complicating subsequent US government efforts to prosecute him for other activities. [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] officials who later sought to prevent his use in post-9/11 operations cited his Iran-Contra role as evidence that he had been protected despite his involvement in terrorist-adjacent activities.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### Pan Am 103 Allegations
|
||||
|
||||
Following the December 21, 1988, bombing of [[Pan Am Flight 103]] over [[Lockerbie]], Scotland, allegations circulated that al-Kassar had a connection to the attack. The private investigative firm Interfor, hired by Pan Am's insurance companies, produced a report alleging that the bomb had been planted in a suitcase belonging to a [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] drug mule - part of an alleged CIA-protected narcotics pipeline out of the Middle East - and that al-Kassar was involved in a scheme in which the [[PFLP-GC|Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command]] substituted an explosive device for the drug consignment. These allegations were disputed by US government investigators, and al-Kassar was not charged in connection with Lockerbie. The Interfor report's claims were treated skeptically by most intelligence analysts.[^3]
|
||||
Following the December 21, 1988, bombing of [[Pan Am Flight 103]] over [[Lockerbie]], Scotland, allegations circulated that al-Kassar had a connection to the attack. The private investigative firm Interfor, hired by Pan Am's insurance companies, produced a report alleging that the bomb had been planted in a suitcase belonging to a CIA drug mule - part of an alleged CIA-protected narcotics pipeline out of the Middle East - and that al-Kassar was involved in a scheme in which the [[PFLP-GC|Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command]] substituted an explosive device for the drug consignment. These allegations were disputed by US government investigators, and al-Kassar was not charged in connection with Lockerbie. The Interfor report's claims were treated skeptically by most intelligence analysts.[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
### 2008 Conviction
|
||||
|
||||
In 2007, the US [[DEA|Drug Enforcement Administration]] conducted a sting operation in which undercover agents posed as representatives of the [[FARC|Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)]] seeking weapons to kill Americans in Colombia. Al-Kassar and a co-conspirator agreed to provide weapons including anti-aircraft missiles. He was arrested in Spain in June 2007 on a US warrant and extradited. Tried in the [[U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York|Southern District of New York]] before [[Jed Rakoff|Judge Jed Rakoff]], al-Kassar was convicted in November 2008 on charges of conspiracy to provide material support to a designated terrorist organization and conspiracy to kill Americans. He was sentenced to 30 years in prison. The conviction was the result of straightforward recorded evidence from the [[DEA]]'s sting, with al-Kassar's own statements providing the primary evidence against him.[^4]
|
||||
In 2007, the US Drug Enforcement Administration conducted a sting operation in which undercover agents posed as representatives of the [[FARC|Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)]] seeking weapons to kill Americans in Colombia. Al-Kassar and a co-conspirator agreed to provide weapons including anti-aircraft missiles. He was arrested in Spain in June 2007 on a US warrant and extradited. Tried in the [[U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York|Southern District of New York]] before [[Jed Rakoff|Judge Jed Rakoff]], al-Kassar was convicted in November 2008 on charges of conspiracy to provide material support to a designated terrorist organization and conspiracy to kill Americans. He was sentenced to 30 years in prison. The conviction was the result of straightforward recorded evidence from the DEA's sting, with al-Kassar's own statements providing the primary evidence against him.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Walsh, Lawrence E. *Iran-Contra: The Final Report.* Random House, 1994. Tower Commission Report. *The Tower Commission Report.* Bantam Books/Times Books, 1987.
|
||||
[^2]: Farah, Douglas, and Stephen Braun. *Merchant of Death: Money, Guns, Planes, and the Man Who Makes War Possible.* Wiley, 2007 (on al-Kassar's intelligence service connections and relationship to the Viktor Bout network).
|
||||
[^3]: Henderson, Ian. *The Lockerbie Trial: A Documentary History.* Palgrave Macmillan, 2001 (covers the competing theories including the Interfor allegations).
|
||||
[^4]: *United States v. Monzer al-Kassar and Luis Felipe Moreno Godoy,* S.D.N.Y., Case No. 07 Cr. 354 (JSR), Verdict November 2008. Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, Southern District of New York, November 21, 2008.
|
||||
[^3]: Lawrence E. Walsh, Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters, vol. I, pt. V, ch. 8, "The Enterprise and Its Finances," pp. 159-172, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_08.htm.
|
||||
[^4]: Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, ch. 8, n. 51, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_08.htm.
|
||||
[^5]: Henderson, Ian. *The Lockerbie Trial: A Documentary History.* Palgrave Macmillan, 2001 (covers the competing theories including the Interfor allegations).
|
||||
[^6]: *United States v. Monzer al-Kassar and Luis Felipe Moreno Godoy,* S.D.N.Y., Case No. 07 Cr. 354 (JSR), Verdict November 2008. Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, Southern District of New York, November 21, 2008.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ tags:
|
|||
- Vanunu
|
||||
summary: "Foreign editor of the Daily Mirror under Robert Maxwell, accused by Seymour Hersh in 1991 of working for the Mossad and dealing arms with Ari Ben-Menashe, and dismissed that October."
|
||||
created: 2026-05-14
|
||||
updated: 2026-09-21
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
died: 2016-01
|
||||
location: "London, United Kingdom"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
@ -24,16 +24,18 @@ In 1991, investigative journalist [[Seymour Hersh]] published *The Samson Option
|
|||
|
||||
Ben-Menashe stated that Davies and he became business partners in an international arms firm, [[Ora Group|Ora Limited]], operating out of Davies's home in London beginning in 1983. The firm allegedly functioned to facilitate the flow of Israeli arms to Iran during the [[Iran-Iraq War]], a channel that ran parallel to the operations later associated with the [[Iran-Contra Affair]]. Ben-Menashe claimed Davies made more than $1.5 million from a single arms transaction.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
The most specific allegation was that Davies passed [[Mordecai Vanunu|Mordechai Vanunu]]'s location to Mossad operatives, enabling the 1986 honey-trap operation in Rome that led to Vanunu's abduction and return to Israel for trial on nuclear secrets charges.[^3]
|
||||
In the book, Ben-Menashe is quoted saying that Davies "was my main backup on all the Iran arms sales." He recalled that "Nick had a friend in the Mossad" and a casual meeting in London. Hersh wrote that Davies then accepted an invitation to visit Israel.[^3] Hersh also wrote, in his own narrative voice, that Vanunu had been compromised to the Israelis by Davies, and that Davies's contact in the matter was Ben-Menashe.[^3] The book gives Davies's response: reached by telephone, he acknowledged that he knew Ben-Menashe, denied any involvement in arms sales, and said Ben-Menashe was only a news source.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
The most specific allegation was that Davies passed [[Mordecai Vanunu|Mordechai Vanunu]]'s location to Mossad operatives, enabling the 1986 honey-trap operation in Rome that led to Vanunu's abduction and return to Israel for trial on nuclear secrets charges.[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
### In Parliament
|
||||
Hersh's book went on sale in [[United Kingdom|Britain]] on October 20, 1991. Two members of the [[House of Commons]] raised it under privilege and put down motions. That of [[George Galloway]] stated that Davies "has been involved in substantial arms sales of Israeli equipment to [[Iran]] and other countries over the last 10 years, is a longstanding and highly-paid Israeli Intelligence asset and that he betrayed the whereabouts in a hotel in [[London]] of Mordechai Vanunu to Mossad," and called on Robert Maxwell to appoint an independent tribunal to establish "the extent of foreign intelligence penetration of Mirror Group newspapers." That of [[Rupert Allason]], who wrote on intelligence as [[Nigel West]], stated that the Daily Mirror and its proprietor "have maintained a close relationship with the Israeli Intelligence Service," that Davies in 1983 "entered into a business partnership with an Israeli citizen, Mr Ari Ben-Menashe, and based a company incorporated as [[Ora Limited]] at 41 Becmead Avenue, London S.E.15, and 1 Trafalgar Avenue, London S.W.16," that the company "negotiated the sale of 4,000 TOW anti-tank missiles to Iran," and that it "allegedly conspired in September 1986 to supply information regarding the whereabouts in London of Mr Mordechai Vanunu to the [[Embassy of Israel, London|Israeli Embassy]]." It asked the [[Department of Trade and Industry]] to investigate a breach of the arms embargo and the [[Foreign and Commonwealth Office|Foreign Office]] to suspend the access of Mirror Group staff to its confidential briefings.[^4]
|
||||
Hersh's book went on sale in [[United Kingdom|Britain]] on Monday, October 21, 1991. Two members of the [[House of Commons]] raised it under privilege and put down motions. That of [[George Galloway]] stated that Davies "has been involved in substantial arms sales of Israeli equipment to [[Iran]] and other countries over the last 10 years, is a longstanding and highly-paid Israeli Intelligence asset and that he betrayed the whereabouts in a hotel in [[London]] of Mordechai Vanunu to Mossad," and called on Robert Maxwell to appoint an independent tribunal to establish "the extent of foreign intelligence penetration of Mirror Group newspapers." That of [[Rupert Allason]], who wrote on intelligence as [[Nigel West]], stated that the Daily Mirror and its proprietor "have maintained a close relationship with the Israeli Intelligence Service," that Davies in 1983 "entered into a business partnership with an Israeli citizen, Mr Ari Ben-Menashe, and based a company incorporated as [[Ora Limited]] at 41 Becmead Avenue, London S.E.15, and 1 Trafalgar Avenue, London S.W.16," that the company "negotiated the sale of 4,000 TOW anti-tank missiles to Iran," and that it "allegedly conspired in September 1986 to supply information regarding the whereabouts in London of Mr Mordechai Vanunu to the [[Embassy of Israel, London|Israeli Embassy]]." It asked the [[Department of Trade and Industry]] to investigate a breach of the arms embargo and the [[Foreign and Commonwealth Office|Foreign Office]] to suspend the access of Mirror Group staff to its confidential briefings.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
Davies, who was in [[Harare]] covering the Commonwealth conference, said: "The allegations are a complete and total lie. I reject them in every respect." Maxwell, in [[New York City|New York]], called them "ludicrous, a total invention," issued writs against [[Faber and Faber]], and sought an injunction against distribution of the book. The Mirror's front page said the two members had "as much honor as a pair of jackals scavenging in a rubbish heap." Asked in November 1986 whether information on Vanunu's presence in Britain had passed from government sources to [[Israel]], Prime Minister [[Margaret Thatcher]] had answered: "No."[^5][^6]
|
||||
Davies, who was in [[Harare]] covering the Commonwealth conference, said: "The allegations are a complete and total lie. I reject them in every respect." Maxwell, in [[New York City|New York]], called them "ludicrous, a total invention," issued writs against [[Faber and Faber]], and sought an injunction against distribution of the book. The Mirror's front page said the two members had "as much honor as a pair of jackals scavenging in a rubbish heap." Asked in November 1986 whether information on Vanunu's presence in Britain had passed from government sources to [[Israel]], Prime Minister [[Margaret Thatcher]] had answered: "No."[^7][^8]
|
||||
|
||||
### Libel Litigation and Resolution
|
||||
|
||||
Maxwell and Davies began libel proceedings against Hersh and his British publisher, Faber and Faber, which sued in turn. Maxwell died on November 5, 1991. In August 1994 Mirror Group Newspapers apologized "unreservedly" in a London court for its articles of October 1991, acknowledged that its "attempts to impugn" Hersh's integrity had been "entirely improper," and agreed to pay him and Faber "substantial damages" and their costs.[^7]
|
||||
Maxwell and Davies began libel proceedings against Hersh and his British publisher, Faber and Faber, which sued in turn. Maxwell died on November 5, 1991. In August 1994 Mirror Group Newspapers apologized "unreservedly" in a London court for its articles of October 1991, acknowledged that its "attempts to impugn" Hersh's integrity had been "entirely improper," and agreed to pay him and Faber "substantial damages" and their costs.[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
Sources in Britain and Israel publicly disputed Ben-Menashe's reliability as a witness, and no subsequent independent evidence emerged to corroborate the specific allegations about Davies's intelligence role or his involvement in the Vanunu affair.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -41,8 +43,10 @@ Sources in Britain and Israel publicly disputed Ben-Menashe's reliability as a w
|
|||
|
||||
[^1]: "Daily Mirror fires foreign editor," United Press International, October 29, 1991. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1991/10/29/Daily-Mirror-fires-foreign-editor/6711688712400/ ; Association of Mirror Pensioners, "Nick Davies," February 3, 2016. https://www.mirrorpensioners.co.uk/obituary/nick-davies/
|
||||
[^2]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy.* Random House, 1991.
|
||||
[^3]: UK Parliament Early Day Motion 2134, "Mirror Group Newspapers and Israeli Intelligence," 1992. https://edm.parliament.uk/early-day-motion/2134/mirror-group-newspapers-and-israeli-intelligence
|
||||
[^4]: House of Commons, Early Day Motion 2134, "Mirror Group Newspapers and Israeli Intelligence," and Early Day Motion 2136, "Arms Sales," October 1991. https://edm.parliament.uk/early-day-motion/2136/arms-sales
|
||||
[^5]: United Press International, "Maxwell to seek injunction against book," London, October 23, 1991.
|
||||
[^6]: House of Commons, written answers, November 27, 1986, vol. 106, col. 299W, "Mr. Mordechai Vanunu."
|
||||
[^7]: "Hersh Wins Apology From British Papers," *The Washington Post,* August 19, 1994; "Writer wins damages, apology in libel suit," *Deseret News,* August 20, 1994.
|
||||
[^3]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991, pp. 309-310.
|
||||
[^4]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991, pp. 310-311.
|
||||
[^5]: UK Parliament Early Day Motion 2134, "Mirror Group Newspapers and Israeli Intelligence," 1992. https://edm.parliament.uk/early-day-motion/2134/mirror-group-newspapers-and-israeli-intelligence
|
||||
[^6]: House of Commons, Early Day Motion 2134, "Mirror Group Newspapers and Israeli Intelligence," and Early Day Motion 2136, "Arms Sales," October 1991. https://edm.parliament.uk/early-day-motion/2136/arms-sales
|
||||
[^7]: United Press International, "Maxwell to seek injunction against book," London, October 23, 1991.
|
||||
[^8]: House of Commons, written answers, November 27, 1986, vol. 106, col. 299W, "Mr. Mordechai Vanunu."
|
||||
[^9]: "Hersh Wins Apology From British Papers," *The Washington Post,* August 19, 1994; "Writer wins damages, apology in libel suit," *Deseret News,* August 20, 1994.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,20 +1,325 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
category: "Law Enforcement & Legal"
|
||||
created: 2024-04-25
|
||||
updated: 2026-05-01
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- Person
|
||||
- PROMIS
|
||||
- DoJ
|
||||
- Lawyer
|
||||
- INSLAW
|
||||
summary: "Special Counsel appointed in 1991 to investigate the Inslaw/PROMIS allegations, whose 1993 report found no credible evidence of criminal wrongdoing."
|
||||
- SpecialCounsel
|
||||
- FederalJudge
|
||||
aliases:
|
||||
- Nicholas J. Bua
|
||||
- Nicholas Bua
|
||||
- Nicholas John Bua
|
||||
- Judge Bua
|
||||
- Judge Nicholas J. Bua
|
||||
summary: "Federal judge appointed Special Counsel in the INSLAW matter in November 1991, whose March 1993 report found no credible evidence of a conspiracy to steal PROMIS."
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: appointed
|
||||
with: "[[Jimmy Carter]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 1977-07-19
|
||||
role: "Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois"
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
- type: appointed
|
||||
with: "[[William Barr]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 1991-11-07
|
||||
role: "Special Counsel for the INSLAW matter"
|
||||
fn: 5
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[Burke, Weaver & Prell]]"
|
||||
start: 1991
|
||||
role: "Private practice after leaving the bench"
|
||||
fn: 3
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[Holland & Knight]]"
|
||||
start: 2000
|
||||
role: "Of counsel"
|
||||
fn: 3
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[Earl Brian]]"
|
||||
start: 1991-11-07
|
||||
end: 1993-03
|
||||
role: "Allegation of a conspiracy with DOJ to steal PROMIS"
|
||||
fn: 2
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[Michael Riconosciuto]]"
|
||||
start: 1991-11-07
|
||||
end: 1993-03
|
||||
role: "Principal source for the PROMIS conspiracy allegations"
|
||||
fn: 23
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[Ari Ben-Menashe]]"
|
||||
start: 1991-11-07
|
||||
end: 1993-03
|
||||
role: "Affidavits alleging international distribution of PROMIS"
|
||||
fn: 37
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[Cornelius Blackshear]]"
|
||||
start: 1991-11-07
|
||||
end: 1993-03
|
||||
role: "Recantation of deposition testimony in the Independent Handling proceeding"
|
||||
fn: 69
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[Danny Casolaro]]"
|
||||
start: 1991-11-07
|
||||
end: 1993-03
|
||||
role: "Review of the West Virginia investigation of Casolaro's death"
|
||||
fn: 82
|
||||
- type: reported_to
|
||||
with: "[[Janet Reno]]"
|
||||
start: 1993-03
|
||||
role: "Report of Special Counsel delivered to the Attorney General"
|
||||
fn: 11
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Nicholas J. Bua was appointed Special Counsel by Attorney General [[William Barr]] on November 7, 1991, to investigate all allegations of wrongdoing in connection with the [[PROMIS Software Scandal|Inslaw matter]]. His mandate was to conduct a complete and thorough investigation to determine if there had been any misconduct by individuals inside or outside the [[Department of Justice|DOJ]]. Bua was assured of complete independence and full cooperation from all DOJ employees. He selected six Assistant United States Attorneys and two FBI agents to assist him, all of whom reported solely to him to maintain the investigation's independence. The investigation devoted considerable resources to the myriad allegations, which ranged from murder and international espionage to simple incompetence. Bua's report, submitted in March 1993 to newly appointed Attorney General [[Janet Reno]], concluded that there was no credible evidence of any criminal wrongdoing by any past or present DOJ employee.[^1]
|
||||
Nicholas John Bua (February 9, 1925 to November 1, 2002) was a judge of the [[United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois]] from 1977 to 1991. In November 1991 Attorney General [[William Barr]] appointed him Special Counsel for the [[PROMIS Software Scandal|INSLAW matter]], and his report to Attorney General [[Janet Reno]] in March 1993 found no credible evidence that [[Department of Justice|DOJ]] employees conspired to steal the [[PROMIS]] software from [[INSLAW]].[^1][^2]
|
||||
|
||||
Bua's report concluded that there was no credible evidence to support the allegation of a conspiracy between DOJ members and [[Earl Brian]] to obtain or distribute [[PROMIS]] software, stating that the overwhelming evidence showed no connection between Brian and anything related to [[INSLAW]] or PROMIS. The report also found insufficient evidence to support the allegation that the DOJ obtained an enhanced version of PROMIS through fraud, trickery, and deceit, or that it wrongfully distributed PROMIS. Instead, it concluded that DOJ employees acted in what they genuinely believed were the best legitimate interests of the government. Furthermore, the report found no credible evidence that DOJ employees improperly influenced the selection process that resulted in Bankruptcy Judge Bason's non-reappointment, nor that DOJ employees attempted to improperly influence the U.S. Trustee to convert the Inslaw bankruptcy case or committed perjury to hide such obstruction. Finally, the report found no evidence that DOJ employees destroyed any documents related to Inslaw or otherwise acted improperly to obstruct Congressional investigations.[^1]
|
||||
### Early career
|
||||
|
||||
Bua was born in [[Chicago]]. He served in the [[United States Army]] as an infantryman in [[World War II]] and took his J.D. from [[DePaul University College of Law]] in 1953 on the G.I. Bill.[^3] He practiced privately in Chicago from 1953 to 1963. He was presiding judge of the [[Melrose Park, Illinois|Melrose Park]] Village Court in 1963, an associate judge of the [[Circuit Court of Cook County]] from 1964 to 1971, and a judge of that court from 1971 to 1976. From 1976 to 1977 he sat on the [[Illinois Appellate Court]], First District; the Chicago Tribune recorded that his 1976 election drew a total of 1,139,183 votes in Cook County.[^1][^3]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Jimmy Carter]] nominated him on July 19, 1977, to a seat on the Northern District of Illinois vacated by [[William J. Lynch]]. The Senate confirmed him on October 7, 1977, and his commission issued October 11, 1977. On September 10, 1980, Carter nominated him to the [[United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit]]; the Senate took no vote.[^1] In the district court he was assigned the suit brought by the attorney [[Michael Shakman]] against patronage hiring by the Chicago Democratic organization; he entered a summary judgment in 1979 that the city's patronage practices violated civil and voting rights and a consent judgment in 1983 that blocked the city and county from hiring most employees for political reasons.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
His federal service ended on November 4, 1991, by retirement.[^1] He joined the law firm of [[Burke, Weaver & Prell]] and in 2000 became of counsel at [[Holland & Knight]].[^3] The Federal Judicial Center gives his death as November 1, 2002, in Melrose Park, Illinois.[^1] The Chicago Tribune reported that he died of leukemia that day at Gottlieb Memorial Hospital in Melrose Park, at age 77, and quoted Chief Judge [[Charles P. Kocoras]] of the Northern District of Illinois: "Our court has never had a better colleague."[^3][^4]
|
||||
|
||||
### Appointment and scope
|
||||
|
||||
The report's introduction states that Barr appointed Bua on November 7, 1991, to investigate "all allegations of wrongdoing in connection with" the INSLAW matter. The Attorney General asked for "a complete and thorough investigation" to determine whether any individual inside or outside the Department had engaged in misconduct. Bua wrote that the Attorney General told him the investigation should be completely independent and assured him that he would demand complete cooperation from all DOJ employees. Bua selected six Assistant United States Attorneys, all with significant criminal prosecution experience, and one of his law partners, and the team chose two FBI Special Agents as investigators. The Assistant United States Attorneys and the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] agents reported solely to him and to no one else within the Department. One of the original six left the staff on appointment as Chief of the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division, and [[Thomas M. Durkin]], the former First Assistant United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, left in February 1993 to enter private practice.[^5] The report characterizes the allegations as ranging "from charges of murder and international espionage to claims of simple incompetence." Bua's team subpoenaed several third-party witnesses before a grand jury in the Northern District of Illinois, and passages of the published text are omitted under Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
The report distinguishes two kinds of INSLAW allegation: the theory that the contract disputes were driven by the personal bias of the project manager [[C. Madison Brewer]], who had been fired years earlier by INSLAW's president [[Bill Hamilton|William Hamilton]], and the theory of a wider conspiracy to appropriate the software for the benefit of [[Earl Brian]], a businessman alleged to have ties to officials of the [[Ronald Reagan]] administration.[^7]
|
||||
|
||||
The [[House Committee on the Judiciary]] gave the appointment date as November 13, 1991, and wrote that at that time the Attorney General had not empowered Bua to subpoena witnesses, convene a grand jury or compel the Department to produce key documents. After a meeting on January 28, 1992, Barr granted him that authority, including the power to subpoena witnesses and convene special grand juries. The committee wrote that INSLAW officials feared that a Special Counsel without independent counsel status would be unable to draw Department employees forward, and quoted Deputy Assistant Attorney General [[Roger M. Cooper]] in an interview with Government Computer News: "The judge (Bua) will do as the attorney general wants him to do, and that's fine. I think all of us in the department would like to get it [the INSLAW matter] behind us. It's sort of an albatross."[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
Bua told INSLAW's counsel, [[Elliot Richardson]], in a letter of July 7, 1992, that he had decided to "retain my own expert to conduct the examination necessary to compare the software." That examination concerned the claim that the [[FOIMS]] system used by the FBI was derived from PROMIS.[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
The report's title page lists [[Helene B. Greenwald]], [[Joseph H. Hartzler]], [[Charles D. Knight]], [[Dean J. Polales]] and [[David S. Rosenbloom]] alongside Bua.[^10] In March 1993 Bua and his staff submitted the report, the product of a sixteen-month investigation, to the newly appointed Attorney General, Janet Reno.[^11]
|
||||
|
||||
### The report's findings
|
||||
|
||||
The report's summary of conclusions opens with the central finding: "There is no credible evidence to support the allegation that members of DOJ conspired with Earl Brian to obtain or distribute PROMIS software. The overwhelming weight of the evidence is that there was absolutely no connection between Earl Brian and anything related to Inslaw or PROMIS software."[^2] The report found "woefully insufficient evidence" that DOJ obtained an enhanced version of PROMIS "through fraud, trickery, and deceit," or that DOJ wrongfully distributed PROMIS inside or outside the Department. It stated that DOJ employees acted on what "they genuinely believed were in the best legitimate interests of the government," and that DOJ conducted itself properly after it became involved in litigation with Inslaw.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
On the bankruptcy questions the report found "no credible evidence that DOJ employees sought to improperly influence the selection process that resulted in the decision not to reappoint Bankruptcy Judge [[George Francis Bason, Jr.|Bason]]." It found insufficient evidence that DOJ employees tried to influence the [[United States Trustee]] to convert the Inslaw case or committed perjury to hide such an effort. It found no evidence that DOJ employees destroyed Inslaw documents or obstructed Congressional inquiries.[^12]
|
||||
|
||||
The conclusions section restates the finding in compact form: "there is no credible evidence to support either the allegation that there was a scheme to defraud Inslaw, or the allegation that DOJ employees conspired with Earl Brian to steal Inslaw's software." The authors wrote that they were "convinced that these employees genuinely believed that they were acting within DOJ's rights under the contract." They wrote that they did not share Bason's view of Brewer "as a man consumed with hatred and out to destroy Inslaw," and that the "ever-expanding allegations of widespread criminal conduct" were not supported by "credible evidence."[^13] The report counted at least five formal investigations of the claim of a DOJ conspiracy to steal PROMIS for the benefit of Brian (the Office of Professional Responsibility, the Criminal Division, the [[Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations]], the House Judiciary Committee and Bua's own), and wrote: "Not one investigation has concluded that such a conspiracy existed." It added that William Hamilton's statements and assertions "do not withstand scrutiny" and that witnesses "in a very credible way" denied making statements he attributed to them, and it found "no basis for initiating any criminal charges or disciplinary action against any past or present DOJ employees."[^14]
|
||||
|
||||
### The implementation contract
|
||||
|
||||
The report's historical account treats part of the dispute as settled by concession. Old PROMIS, the 1979 Pilot Project version and the five [[Bureau of Justice Statistics]] enhancements were publicly funded, and Inslaw conceded during the bankruptcy litigation that they were in the public domain.[^15] The 1982 implementation contract was signed on March 12, 1982, and Brewer was hired to oversee installation at the [[Executive Office for United States Attorneys]].[^16] On January 26, 1983, the contracting officer [[Peter Videnieks]] wrote Inslaw that DOJ considered its April 1982 line of credit at the [[Bank of Bethesda]] a violation of the contract's assignment prohibition, a letter that led to the advance payments dispute.[^17]
|
||||
|
||||
In 1983 Inslaw submitted a methodology for demonstrating which of its enhancements were privately funded. On June 10, 1983, Videnieks wrote that the methodology was unacceptable and that as to Inslaw's request for approval or revisions, "[t]he Government is in a position to do neither." Videnieks and [[Jack Rugh]], Brewer's deputy, had considered proposing an acceptable methodology and decided to reject Inslaw's and say nothing more; Rugh told the investigators he believed Inslaw did not keep sufficient records to support any methodology. The report wrote that this was "not a response we would have recommended" and that it would have been preferable for DOJ to articulate its reasons, and it found no evidence that Videnieks and Rugh acted in bad faith with the intent to obtain Inslaw's property.[^18][^19]
|
||||
|
||||
### The conspiracy allegation
|
||||
|
||||
The report describes the conspiracy claim as the most serious allegation. Inslaw alleged that high-level DOJ employees, including Attorney General [[Edwin Meese]], conspired with Brian to steal Inslaw's software and destroy the company, to benefit [[Hadron]], Inc., in which Brian had a direct and indirect financial interest. The theory originated in an affidavit by William Hamilton, under which DOJ would force Inslaw into liquidation so that Hadron could buy its assets and receive a "massive sweetheart contract." The report notes that the theory "has evolved over time," and that Inslaw later presented witnesses who claimed DOJ employees delivered copies of the software to Brian and Hadron before the bankruptcy as a reward for a covert role in the "October surprise" conspiracy.[^20] The report describes Brian as a physician by training and a combat surgeon in [[Vietnam War|Vietnam]], later on the faculty of the [[University of Southern California]] and California's Secretary of Health and Welfare under Governor Reagan in the early 1970s, who founded an investment company called [[Biotech Capital Corporation]], later [[Infotechnology]], Inc.; Brian and Biotech both owned Hadron stock in the early 1980s.[^20] It records that the [[House October Surprise Task Force]] and the Senate Special Counsel on the 1980 hostage allegations had each found no credible evidence that members of the 1980 Reagan campaign negotiated to delay the release of the American hostages in Iran.[^20]
|
||||
|
||||
The report noted that the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations staff had concluded in September 1989 that it could find "no proof of any connection between Brian or Hadron and the Department with regard to the INSLAW contract." It quoted the House committee's 1992 report as calling the Brian allegations "intriguing . . . but without the requisite degree of causation and factual convergence necessary to draw conclusions at this time into potential wrongdoing in the Inslaw matter," and wrote that the House committee had not provided its evidentiary material to Bua's team. Bua's team reviewed the evidence independently and sorted Inslaw's evidence into "direct proof" from witnesses who claimed personal knowledge of Brian's role and "indirect proof" from witnesses who did not claim such knowledge.[^21]
|
||||
|
||||
The report's Hadron section states that there is "no credible evidence that Hadron ever tried to acquire Inslaw or PROMIS," apart from Hamilton's claim about a conversation with [[Dominic Laiti]] and related claims that [[Jonathan Ben Cnaan]] had relayed.[^22]
|
||||
|
||||
### Riconosciuto and the Cabazon venture
|
||||
|
||||
[[Michael Riconosciuto]] was the report's principal source for the PROMIS conspiracy claims. The report states that he "can fairly be described as the key witness against Brian." It identified four occasions on which Riconosciuto had made statements about Inslaw and PROMIS that could be established with accuracy: three under oath and transcribed, and one recorded in notes made by William Hamilton.[^23] His March 21, 1991, affidavit described a 1981 to 1984 role as Director of Research for a joint venture between [[Wackenhut Corporation]] and the [[Cabazon Indian Reservation]] near Indio, California.[^24] The report found that Riconosciuto was in fact in Indio during the early 1980s, that he worked with [[Dr. John Philip Nichols|John Philip Nichols]] and the Cabazons, and that the Cabazons entered into a joint venture with Wackenhut. "That is where the truth in Riconosciuto's story stops."[^25]
|
||||
|
||||
The report describes Nichols as a non-Indian tribal administrator who managed the tribe's business affairs. It records that Cabazon Security Corporation, formed in early 1981, solicited capabilities statements from security firms. [[Robert Frye|A. Robert Frye]], then president of [[Wackenhut Services]], responded for Wackenhut, and in April 1981 signed the joint venture agreement with [[Arthur Welmas|Art Welmas]], the tribal chairman, signing for the Cabazon side. The agreement stated a primary purpose of qualifying for, bidding on and obtaining government guard service contracts; the venture bid on two and won neither. Nichols wanted the venture to sell night vision goggles and rifle scopes to foreign governments, and Wackenhut's files showed efforts to market them to representatives of the governments of Guatemala and Honduras. The report records that Nichols took the view that the Cabazons, as a sovereign nation, were not subject to the usual export and import controls, that Wackenhut personnel wrote internal memoranda that sales would need State Department approval, and that no sales were made. The report states that the firms Riconosciuto described in a call to the Hamiltons, Wackenhut Research, Inc. and Wackenhut Security, Inc., do not exist.[^26]
|
||||
|
||||
The Cabazons were introduced to combustible cartridge casing work by [[Peter Zokosky]], former president of [[Armtec Defense Products]], who became an advisor to Nichols and the venture. Zokosky first met Riconosciuto in July 1981 at Nichols's office in Indio. Zokosky and others from the joint venture travelled to [[Picatinny Arsenal]] to meet [[Dr. Harry Fair]] and an Army project officer, R. Scott Westley, whom Zokosky knew from his time at Armtec, to discuss establishing a second-source combustible cartridge production facility on the Cabazon reservation. Frye recalled first meeting Riconosciuto on a trip to the Arsenal in May 1981; Zokosky recalled that Frye met Riconosciuto on a second trip in October 1981.[^27] The report states that neither Nichols nor Zokosky was an employee of the joint venture, which had no employees, and that it found no evidence supporting Riconosciuto's claim that he and Brian were employed by Wackenhut or the joint venture.[^28]
|
||||
|
||||
Welmas and his wife told investigators that they never saw or met Earl Brian at the reservation and never heard the name mentioned by Nichols, Riconosciuto or others. [[Sam Cross]], the Indio police chief during those years, said that he had been in the mobile trailer behind the Cabazon casino, that there was never any computer equipment in it, and that he never heard the name Earl Brian. Frye and Zokosky both said they never saw Riconosciuto conducting computer operations.[^29]
|
||||
|
||||
The report reconstructs a September 10, 1981, weapons demonstration at the Lake Cahuilla gun range in Indio, held to test night vision equipment. The House committee had been aware of a Riverside, California, police report that named Brian among 16 people present. The report states that Bua's team located the document, a four-page "Special Operations Report" titled "Nicaraguans and Earl Brian at Lake Cahuilla - 9/10/81," carrying a typing date of "10/10/91," ten years after the event.[^30] It was prepared by Gene Gilbert, an investigator for the Riverside County District Attorney's Office, after he interviewed Riconosciuto in jail in 1991 about an unsolved 1981 murder in Indio; the report states that everything in it except the license plate numbers and registrations, which came from the former Indio police officer Dave Baird, came from Riconosciuto.[^31] Gilbert later produced a second report saying that Baird had identified Brian from a photograph. Baird told investigators that the photograph was a poor-quality photocopy from a magazine and that the most he could say was that the person had the same general physical characteristics as the occupant of [[Wayne Reeder]]'s Rolls-Royce. Baird's handwritten registration notes referred only to Reeder.[^32] Zokosky, Nichols and Welmas, who were present, said Brian was not there, and Westley, whom Riconosciuto had placed there, denied attending.[^33]
|
||||
|
||||
The report also addresses Riconosciuto's prosecution. "We are convinced beyond all doubt that there was absolutely no connection between Riconosciuto's prosecution and his allegations in the Inslaw matter," the report stated. It described a case that began as a Washington State drug investigation, in which the [[Drug Enforcement Administration|DEA]] recorded Riconosciuto delivering methamphetamine on videotape.[^34] The report records that Riconosciuto, with two others, filed a lawsuit challenging the authority of the investigation, alleging among other things that Bua was involved in organized crime murders and that one of the FBI agents assigned to the case had murdered the journalist [[Danny Casolaro]], and that Bua's staff had threatened to kill him; the report states that the district court dismissed the suit, Riconosciuto v. Bua, No. 92 C 6217 (N.D. Ill.), as patently frivolous.[^35]
|
||||
|
||||
In its conclusion on Riconosciuto, the report found him "a totally unreliable witness in connection with the allegations he has made about the alleged theft of PROMIS software." It wrote that his account "reminds us of a historical novel; a tale of total fiction woven against the background of accurate historical facts." The report found "no credible witness who could confirm" his claims of CIA work, a radio detonator used in Chile, handling of October Surprise payments, or persuading organized crime members associated with [[Tony Accardo]] not to commit a murder.[^36]
|
||||
|
||||
### Ben-Menashe and Eitan
|
||||
|
||||
[[Ari Ben-Menashe]] signed two affidavits for Inslaw. The first, dated February 17, 1991, claimed that he attended a 1987 meeting of the Israel Defense Forces External Relations Department at which Brian presented PROMIS, stated that Brian said he owned the rights to PROMIS and had allowed the CIA, the NSA, DOJ and the "Israeli intelligence communities" to use it since 1982, and stated that in 1989 in [[Chile]] [[Carlos Cardoen]] told him that Cardoen had brokered a sale of PROMIS by Brian to a representative of Iraqi Military Intelligence. The second, dated March 21, 1991, described a December 1982 meeting in the Tel Aviv office of [[Rafael Eitan]], who in the affidavit said that he had received PROMIS from Brian and [[Robert McFarlane]] for limited use by an Israeli signals intelligence unit.[^37]
|
||||
|
||||
The report cites the House October Surprise Task Force's examination of Ben-Menashe's allegations. According to the Task Force as quoted in the report, Ben-Menashe worked for the External Relations Department of Israeli Military Intelligence between 1977 and 1987 "as a translator of materials of relative insignificance and low levels of classification," and the Task Force described his testimony as "a total fabrication." The Israeli government examined Eitan at the Task Force's request, and according to the Task Force Eitan stated that he did not know Ben-Menashe, had never met him, and heard of him only after Ben-Menashe began making his allegations in 1991.[^38] Brian, under oath, and McFarlane, in a telephone interview, told Bua's investigators that they "strenuously denied" the entirety of the allegations.[^39]
|
||||
|
||||
The report said the investigation of the claimed international distribution of PROMIS "has not proceeded past the preliminary stages. We do not believe that it needs to." It added: "We were not disposed to conduct an international search of foreign governments and intelligence operatives on the basis of Ben-Menashe's allegations."[^38][^40] The report noted that Ben-Menashe's story places a PROMIS transfer to Israel in or before December 1982, while DOJ held only public domain versions. Inslaw did not deliver an allegedly enhanced version until April 1983.[^40][^41]
|
||||
|
||||
The report concluded that Ben-Menashe's story was "too incredible to rest on so small a foundation," and it wrote: "We have good reason to doubt the word of a man who implies that he allowed the use of his plainly misleading affidavits in order to promote his book's sale." It concluded that Ben-Menashe "offers no support for the allegation that DOJ and Earl Brian conspired to steal and distribute the software in which Inslaw claims proprietary rights."[^41]
|
||||
|
||||
### Hayes and the NSA database
|
||||
|
||||
The report notes that the [[National Security Agency]] informed Bua's team that it used a commercial off-the-shelf package purchased from [[Computer Corporation of America]] and that, in 1974 and 1975, six years before Inslaw was incorporated, it had developed a database in the M204 language called PROMIS, an acronym for "Product Related on-line Management Information System." The NSA said its database had no relationship to Inslaw's PROMIS, which was written in COBOL, and that the shared name was coincidental; its General Counsel's office said many personnel knew of the NSA system and had moved to other agencies and private employers.[^42]
|
||||
|
||||
The report's section on [[Charles Hayes]], a Kentucky salvage dealer whom William Hamilton contacted after Hayes's disputes with DOJ were reported in the press, is largely omitted under Rule 6(e); it states that Hayes made a variety of allegations about distribution of Inslaw's enhanced PROMIS to Hamilton and to House committee investigators.[^43] In the later Court of Federal Claims proceedings Hamilton said of Hayes: "I said they took him seriously enough that they brought him to Chicago to testify before the Grand Jury, and everything he said is deleted from the [Bua] report."[^44]
|
||||
|
||||
### Hadron and the circumstantial claims
|
||||
|
||||
The report examined the claim that [[53rd Street Ventures]] and its principals linked Brian to Inslaw. William Hamilton's affidavit attributed to [[Richard D'Amore]] of [[Hambro International Equity Partners]], whose firm invested approximately $400,000 in Inslaw in 1983 as lead investor and placed him on Inslaw's board, a statement that [[Patricia Cloherty]] had told him she "knew all about" Brian's role in the INSLAW matter. D'Amore told investigators that Cloherty never made such a statement to him and that he never told Hamilton or anyone else that she did. Cloherty, who worked at [[Patricof and Company]] from about 1970 until her appointment by President Carter as Deputy Administrator of the [[Small Business Administration]] in about 1977, then ran Tessler & Cloherty with her husband [[Daniel Tessler]] and returned to Patricof in February 1988, likewise denied saying so. Tessler told investigators that he did not know Brian, Edwin Meese, Laiti or [[Lowell Jensen]], and that to his knowledge his wife had no knowledge of Brian. Cloherty said she did know Brian, whom she met in the 1980s on the board of the National Association of Small Business Investment Companies, and that in 1990 Brian contacted Patricof and Company with a proposal concerning [[United Press International|UPI]], which the firm did not pursue; she said she did not know Laiti, Meese or Jensen.[^45]
|
||||
|
||||
The Hadron section also examines the claimed Videnieks and Hadron connection, the [[Accumenics]] contract award, and a claimed purchase attempt by [[SCT]].[^46]
|
||||
|
||||
### Jensen, Richard and the Criminal Division
|
||||
|
||||
The report examined claims from a confidential source who spoke to [[Ronald LeGrand]], then chief investigator of the Senate Judiciary Committee. As set out in a December 1989 affidavit by Hamilton, the source, described as a senior career official in DOJ, said that the "INSLAW case was a lot dirtier for the Department of Justice than Watergate was," and that Jensen "engineered INSLAW's problems right from the start," relying principally on three senior officials, [[Miles Matthews]], [[James Knapp]] and [[James Johnston]]. The source named [[John Keeney]], [[Mark M. Richard|Mark Richards]] and [[Philip White]] as knowing "all about" Jensen's conduct. LeGrand told Bua's team that he would relay his source's information but not disclose the source's identity.[^47]
|
||||
|
||||
Lowell Jensen, by then a federal district judge in San Francisco, denied that he had engineered any contract dispute with Inslaw or directed any DOJ action to hurt the company. He said he might once have met Brian in Sacramento in the 1970s and denied any involvement with Brian during or after his DOJ service. He denied any financial interest in any company controlled by Brian, including Biotech, Hadron, Accumenics and [[Simeon]], and denied any involvement in awarding contracts for Project Eagle, a program to automate the DOJ litigating divisions whose request for proposals issued in May 1986, the month before his appointment to the bench.[^48] Matthews said he never stated or thought that Jensen wanted to get Inslaw "out of the way" and give the business to friends; Knapp and Johnston denied knowledge of or participation in any such scheme; and Keeney, Richard and White each told investigators he had no knowledge of wrongdoing by Jensen.[^49]
|
||||
|
||||
### Bason's reappointment and Lamberth
|
||||
|
||||
George Bason, a bankruptcy judge, ruled from the bench on September 28, 1987, that DOJ had taken PROMIS by trickery, fraud and deceit. A merit selection panel of the district court, chaired by [[Norma H. Johnson]], considered his reappointment. The panel's members were invited in the first week of August 1987, just as the testimony in the Inslaw case before Bason was concluding. The report states that there was no suggestion that the timing was other than coincidence.[^50]
|
||||
|
||||
The report states that Johnson initially recalled that one of the district judges had recommended she obtain a copy of Bason's ruling. Johnson later identified the judge as [[Royce Lamberth]], whom the report spells "Lambreth." On September 28, 1987, Lamberth was Chief of the Civil Division of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, and the report states that he was confirmed for the federal bench on November 13, 1987, and sworn in on November 16, 1987.[^51][^52] After Johnson contacted Lamberth at the investigators' request she recalled that he handed her a copy of the transcript and said something to the effect of "You ought to see this"; Lamberth could not recall whether he delivered the transcript or referred her to it.[^53] According to the report, Lamberth brought the ruling to Johnson's attention because he wanted to avoid "blindsiding" the other judges and expected to join the court and make known his opposition to Bason's reappointment; he erroneously believed that district judges would make the selection. He had also asked the Assistant U.S. Attorney Patricia Froman for her views of Bason, and she told him the government would be better off if Bason were not reappointed.[^54]
|
||||
|
||||
Johnson circulated the ruling to the panel, and according to three panel members the panel found nothing untoward about it. The panel held a hearing on November 11, 1987, at which sixteen lawyers appeared, among them Inslaw's attorney Charles Work; DOJ declined to appear.[^55][^56] The report concluded: "we find nothing untoward in the fact that Royce Lambreth brought that ruling to the attention of Judge Johnson." It also wrote that Lamberth "had every reason to try to influence the selection process to select a bankruptcy judge in whom he had confidence," that such an approach by a government attorney was proper, and that his conduct "bespeaks restraint, not a campaign to unseat Bason in retaliation for the Inslaw ruling."[^57] The report states that Johnson told the Senate subcommittee that she had no contacts with DOJ regarding Bason and received no negative input from DOJ on the Inslaw case, and that so far as the investigators could tell she told the House committee the same.[^58]
|
||||
|
||||
The former bankruptcy judge [[Roger Whelan]] had commented negatively about Bason to the panel. The report said it did not mean to suggest that Whelan "singlehandedly derailed" Bason's reappointment, and recorded that Inslaw's attorney [[Charles Docter|Charles Deeter]] reported to the House committee that in July 1987 Whelan threatened to oppose Bason's reappointment because Bason had not ruled on a fee petition Whelan had filed in the UPI case.[^59]
|
||||
|
||||
### Other individuals named in the report
|
||||
|
||||
[[Lois Battistoni]] told investigators that a DOJ attorney had told her Hadron was connected to a DOJ official through a California relationship with Meese. She also said that [[Floyd Bankson]] told her in 1989 that DOJ intended to "bury Inslaw." Bankson denied the statements attributed to him. [[Garnett Taylor]] and [[Charles Trombetta]] were the other sources Battistoni named.[^60]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Anthony Moscato]], then Acting Director of the Executive Office for United States Attorneys, told investigators that he "had nothing whatsoever to do with the selection of bankruptcy judges." Hamilton had written that Taylor, a former DOJ security officer, knew that Moscato played an affirmative role in the denial of Bason's reappointment; Hamilton did not identify the "senior U.S. Government official" who was the source and said the source declined to permit disclosure of his name, and the Hamiltons, through their attorney, declined to meet Bua's team, preferring to deal directly with the new Attorney General. Moscato said he did not know Johnson, did not know a merit selection panel existed, and was not even a social friend of Taylor.[^61]
|
||||
|
||||
### Blackshear and Pasciuto
|
||||
|
||||
[[Thomas Stanton]], director of the Executive Office for U.S. Trustees, was alleged to have pressured the U.S. Trustee [[William White]] to convert the Inslaw case from chapter 11 to chapter 7 and to have considered detailing the Assistant U.S. Trustee [[Harry Jones]] to Washington for that purpose. The allegation arose from a private conversation between the Hamiltons and [[Anthony Pasciuto]], then Deputy Director of the Executive Office for U.S. Trustees, on March 17, 1987.[^62][^63] The report examines the allegation, the Videnieks notes of a February 1985 conversation with Rugh, and the proposal to detail Jones.[^64][^65][^66]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Cornelius Blackshear]], then a U.S. Trustee and later a bankruptcy judge in the Southern District of New York, was deposed by Inslaw's attorneys on March 25, 1987, and swore that White had called him and said that Stanton wanted the Inslaw case converted and wanted a particular attorney from Blackshear's office assigned to handle it. The House committee reported that the New York judge [[Jane Solomon]] told its investigators that on March 18, 1987, Blackshear gave her an identical account, and that Pasciuto swore to committee investigators that Blackshear described Stanton's attempt to pressure him at a January 1987 luncheon attended by the Second Circuit judge [[Lawrence Pierce]]; the report states that Blackshear and Pierce do not remember anything being said about Inslaw at that meeting.[^62][^63][^67][^68]
|
||||
|
||||
Blackshear then submitted an affidavit recanting that testimony and asserting that he had mistaken the Inslaw case for the UPI case. The report records the sequence: White, deposed shortly before Blackshear, had testified that Stanton exerted no pressure; when White learned that Blackshear had testified differently, White telephoned him and told him he was mistaken; Blackshear says that after the conversation he realized he had confused Inslaw with the UPI case; and he prepared and signed the recanting affidavit with the assistance of his attorney, an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Civil Division of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York. He repeated the new account in a second deposition and to the Office of Professional Responsibility.[^69] The House committee dated the affidavit March 26, 1987.[^63] Inslaw alleged that DOJ procured a perjurious recantation to cover up its plot to liquidate Inslaw.[^70]
|
||||
|
||||
The report identifies the attorney as [[James Garrity]], then an Assistant U.S. Attorney, later a bankruptcy judge in the Southern District of New York, who accompanied Blackshear to his first deposition. The next day Garrity received a call from the DOJ attorney [[Dean Cooper]], the trial attorney defending the Independent Handling claims. Cooper told Garrity that he believed Blackshear's testimony was wrong and that DOJ was concerned that something should be done to correct the error, and did not suggest what the corrected testimony would be. Garrity then spoke to Blackshear, who also said his testimony was wrong; Garrity and Blackshear prepared the recantation affidavit, and Garrity sent a copy to Cooper.[^71] The report wrote that these facts indicated conduct consistent with the good faith effort expected of attorneys. The House committee wrote that "it is highly questionable how the Department could ethically represent both itself and Judge Blackshear in the INSLAW litigation," because one of its attorneys, Garrity, was at the same time representing a key witness for the plaintiff.[^63]
|
||||
|
||||
Bason, in the bankruptcy court, accepted "as true Judge Blackshear's original testimony" and held "that his recantation is the result of an honest mistake on his part." In January 1991 Bason filed a complaint with the Judicial Council of the Second Circuit stating that he had "regretfully concluded" that Blackshear recanted "not because of an honest mistake but because he made a conscious choice to testify falsely."[^72][^73] DOJ's Office of Professional Responsibility, in a report of March 31, 1989, concluded that Bason's findings were "clearly erroneous" and credited Blackshear's recantation for a variety of reasons.[^74]
|
||||
|
||||
Blackshear gave the House committee investigators a sworn statement on January 25, 1991, that the information in his earlier depositions was not based on personal knowledge but on hearsay, much of it from Pasciuto, and that he had never discussed the conversion issue with White. The House committee headed this part of its report "Judge Blackshear's statement to committee lacks credibility." Blackshear told the committee investigators: "My mind changed after having talked to Bill White," and said of the choice between his account and White's: "it would become a credibility question." The report records that on January 16, 1991, he gave Bua's team a document titled "Response of the Hon. Cornelius Blackshear Re Inslaw" stating that he believed it reflected his best recollection, and that he continued to maintain that White told him the IRS had pressured White to move to convert the UPI case. He disagreed with White about a conversation concerning the assignment of Harry Jones to Washington. He also denied Pasciuto's account of a conversation in which Blackshear allegedly admitted that he had given false testimony in his recantation to avoid hurting people.[^63][^75]
|
||||
|
||||
The report assessed the matter in its own terms. It wrote that Blackshear's pre-deposition statements and first deposition "do provide some support for Inslaw's allegations" but were not based on direct personal knowledge, that "[t]his series of contradictory statements can only be described as troubling," and wrote: "At best, it reveals a rather malleable witness who has difficulty recalling certain conversations and events. At worst, it shows a lack of truthfulness on at least one occasion." It attributed the confusion to poor memory rather than intentional misstatement, wrote that if Blackshear was lying there was insufficient evidence to determine on which occasion, and that "there simply is not sufficient evidence to prove (by any standard) that Blackshear lied when he recanted his deposition testimony."[^76] It added that the recantations of Pasciuto and Blackshear "do not convince us that there is any reason to credit their original testimony," and that "their recantations convince us that we cannot rely upon any of their testimony to resolve this issue."[^77] The House committee had criticized DOJ for seeking Pasciuto's dismissal while not prosecuting Blackshear for perjury; the report replied that Blackshear "has always maintained that at the time he made the statements in his first deposition, he believed them to be true."[^78]
|
||||
|
||||
Pasciuto had admitted under oath in the Independent Handling proceeding that he may have exaggerated or falsified what he told the Hamiltons in order to hurt Stanton. The Office of Professional Responsibility recommended in December 1987 that his employment be terminated, and after that recommendation Pasciuto stated that his statements to the Hamiltons were true. Inslaw alleged that he was fired for whistleblowing; the report found DOJ's conduct in seeking his termination "entirely appropriate."[^74][^79][^80]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Gregory McKain]]'s testimony concerns a conversation on or about February 21, 1985, shortly after Inslaw had filed for protection under the Bankruptcy Code. The report discusses his testimony among the pieces of circumstantial evidence for the conversion theory and wrote that it "provides some support to the conversion theory, but not enough to satisfy us that the theory is true."[^81] Rugh and Videnieks rejected Inslaw's proposed methodology for the proprietary-cost submissions in 1983 without offering an alternative, and the report found no evidence of bad faith in that decision.[^19]
|
||||
|
||||
### Casolaro's death
|
||||
|
||||
Danny Casolaro, a self-styled free-lance author and investigative reporter, investigated Inslaw's claims. The report describes his interest in what he called "the Octopus," a supposed secret intelligence organization with links to international arms dealing, covert operations and perhaps organized crime. His body was found in the bathroom of his hotel room at the Sheraton Inn in [[Martinsburg, West Virginia]] on August 10, 1991; he died in the bathtub, both wrists slashed several times with a razor blade, and local authorities ruled his death a suicide.[^82]
|
||||
|
||||
The report found "nothing unusual" in DOJ's decision not to investigate a private citizen's death, which it described as a state or local matter. It found no evidence of federal government influence on the local investigation. "[T]he physical evidence in Casolaro's hotel room strongly supports the conclusion of the local authorities that the death was a suicide." That evidence included no sign of forced entry or struggle, a note found in the room, and the absence of footprints or other evidence that others were present when the wrists were slashed.[^83] The tests and analyses cited were handwriting analysis confirming that Casolaro wrote the note; fingerprint analysis finding his prints and no others except a single print on an ash tray; hair and fiber analysis; a blood analysis by Dr. Lee of the Connecticut State Police Forensic Science Laboratory consistent with suicide; and an autopsy that found hemorrhage from the wrist wounds as the cause of death and no evidence that he was unconscious or debilitated when cut.[^84]
|
||||
|
||||
The report stated, as the fifth of its points, that "there was ample reason to believe Casolaro had a motive to commit suicide." It noted that he had been unemployed for months, was dependent on financial assistance from his family, faced a balloon mortgage on his home, and had been told shortly before his death by a prospective publisher that it would not advance him any money on his proposed book about the "Octopus."[^85] The report also noted that [[James E. Starr]], a professor of law and forensic sciences at George Washington University, reportedly reached the same opinion in an independent review of the autopsy. It addressed criticisms that the room was not sealed, that notification of next of kin was delayed while the body was embalmed, and that Martinsburg authorities gave insufficient weight to suspicions about Casolaro's "sources," and stated that "no credible evidence suggested that any of Casolaro's 'sources' played any role in his death."[^86]
|
||||
|
||||
### House Judiciary Committee report, 1992
|
||||
|
||||
The House Committee on the Judiciary issued "The INSLAW Affair" as House Report 102-857 on September 10, 1992, under Chairman [[Jack Brooks]].[^87] The committee's report described the Department's handling of the matter in terms that stand against the Bua report's conclusions. It wrote that Attorneys General Meese and [[Dick Thornburgh]] "blocked or restricted congressional inquiries into the matter, ignored the findings of two courts and refused to ask for the appointment of an independent counsel."[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
The committee wrote that it had "no reason to doubt the commitment of Judge Bua or Attorney General Barr to do a thorough investigation of this matter," but that "as long as the investigation of wrongdoing by former and current high level Justice officials remains under the control of the Department, there will always be serious doubt about the objectivity and thoroughness of the work." The committee's position was that "the only way the INSLAW allegations can be adequately and fully investigated is by the appointment of an independent counsel," and that the independent counsel should investigate all matters related to the allegations, "including Mr. Casolaro's death and its possible link to individuals associated with organized crime."[^8] On Casolaro, the committee wrote that it had not included the death in its formal investigation, that local authorities had ruled it a suicide a second time on January 25, 1992, after more than 1,000 man-hours, and that the controversy continued to be discussed in the press and the Martinsburg Police Department's investigation had been criticized.[^88]
|
||||
|
||||
### DOJ review, September 1994
|
||||
|
||||
Reno ordered a senior-level Justice Department review of Bua's report and of INSLAW's analysis of it, including INSLAW's July 12, 1993, "Analysis and Rebuttal of the Bua Report" and its February 14, 1994, Addendum. The review was issued on September 27, 1994, with the Bua report attached as Addendum A.[^89] Its summary recommended that the Attorney General "adopt the Special Counsel's report in its entirety," along with specified conclusions that the review described as "fully supported by the available evidence."[^90]
|
||||
|
||||
The review restated that there was no credible evidence of a conspiracy with anyone to steal PROMIS or to injure Inslaw. It found no credible evidence that the [[Office of Special Investigations]] was engaged in covert intelligence activities, in illegal trafficking of PROMIS software, or in the death of Casolaro. It stated that the Martinsburg conclusion that Casolaro's death was a suicide "is fully supported by the facts surrounding his death," and that there was "no credible evidence that Mr. Casolaro was murdered."[^90] The review devoted pp. 107 to 168 to Casolaro's death, covering the death scene, hotel employees, coroner, embalming, notification of next of kin, autopsy, further police investigation and the review's own interviews.[^91]
|
||||
|
||||
The review found "no basis for the appointment of an independent prosecutor" and recommended against waiving statutory time bars on INSLAW's monetary claims. It recommended that the Attorney General "take those steps necessary to bring this entire affair to closure from the Department's perspective," and wrote that the Special Counsel concluded, and the review concurred, that virtually all of the allegations "were based on nothing more than uncorroborated conjecture, on hearsay information from anonymous sources or on information received from patently unreliable sources."[^92]
|
||||
|
||||
On the Johnson contact, the review wrote that Johnson had at first failed to recall the contact with Lamberth. It stated that Lamberth had already been nominated to the federal bench when he was sworn in on November 16, 1987, and it concurred "with the opinion of the Special Counsel that there is no evidence of any effort by the Justice Department to improperly influence the bankruptcy judge selection process."[^93]
|
||||
|
||||
On May 3, 1995, by S. Res. 114, the Senate referred S. 740, a bill for the relief of INSLAW, to the Chief Judge of the Court of Federal Claims as Congressional Reference No. 95-338X, and Hearing Officer [[Christine Odell Cook Miller|Christine Cook Miller]] described the two Justice Department inquiries as the "Bua and Dwyer investigations": Bua's investigation on behalf of Barr, and a second investigation, in response to INSLAW's criticisms of Bua's report, that Reno asked the Assistant Associate Attorney General to undertake.[^44] Miller's report of July 31, 1997, was reviewed by a panel of the court, whose report is dated May 11, 1998.[^94]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993.
|
||||
[^1]: Federal Judicial Center. "Bua, Nicholas John." *Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges.* https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/bua-nicholas-john
|
||||
[^2]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 13. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^3]: "Nicholas J. Bua, 77." *Chicago Tribune*, November 2, 2002. https://www.chicagotribune.com/2002/11/02/nicholas-j-bua-77/
|
||||
[^4]: "Bua, Hon. Nicholas J." Paid death notice, *Chicago Tribune*, November 2, 2002. https://www.chicagotribune.com/2002/11/02/bua-hon-nicholas-j-2/
|
||||
[^5]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 1. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^6]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 2. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^7]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 3. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^8]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. *The INSLAW Affair.* H. Rept. 102-857, 102d Cong., 2d sess., September 10, 1992, pp. 109-110, Part IX, Conclusion.
|
||||
[^9]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. *The INSLAW Affair.* H. Rept. 102-857, 102d Cong., 2d sess., September 10, 1992, pp. 59-61, Part IV.B.6.
|
||||
[^10]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, title page. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^11]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of the United States Department of Justice on the Review of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua's Report on the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc.* September 27, 1994, pp. 2 and 4. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^12]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 13-14. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^13]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 264-265. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^14]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 266-267. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^15]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 15-21, IV. The Development of Inslaw's Claimed Proprietary Software. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^16]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 20. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^17]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 25, D. The Advance Payments Dispute. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^18]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 33-34. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^19]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 138-139. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^20]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 39. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^21]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 40-41. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^22]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 122. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^23]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 42. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^24]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 44, (ii) Riconosciuto's March 21, 1991 Affidavit. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^25]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 54. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^26]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 55-56, (i) The Wackenhut-Cabazon Joint Venture. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^27]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 57-58. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^28]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 58. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^29]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 59. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^30]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 61. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^31]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 62. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^32]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 63-65. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^33]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 65. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^34]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 67. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^35]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 69. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^36]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 72. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^37]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 73-74. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^38]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 79. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^39]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 79-80. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^40]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 151. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^41]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 81. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^42]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 80-81. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^43]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 81-82. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^44]: U.S. Court of Federal Claims. *INSLAW, Inc. v. United States*, Cong. Ref. No. 95-338X, Report of the Hearing Officer (Miller, J.), July 31, 1997, 39 Fed. Cl. 307. https://static.case.law/fed-cl/39/cases/0307-01.json
|
||||
[^45]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 92-96. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^46]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 97-106. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^47]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 113-114. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^48]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 118-119. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^49]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 119-120. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^50]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 156. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^51]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 157. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^52]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 161. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^53]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 160. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^54]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 161-162. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^55]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 162-163. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^56]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 167-168. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^57]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 163-165. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^58]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 166. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^59]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 166-169. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^60]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 106-112, 9. The Lois Battistoni Allegations. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^61]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 186-187. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^62]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 192. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^63]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. *The INSLAW Affair.* H. Rept. 102-857, 102d Cong., 2d sess., September 10, 1992, pp. 73-77, Part V.
|
||||
[^64]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 204. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^65]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 211. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^66]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 224-228. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^67]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 215. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^68]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 209. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^69]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 215-217. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^70]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 194. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^71]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 229-230. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^72]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 195-196. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^73]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. *The INSLAW Affair.* H. Rept. 102-857, 102d Cong., 2d sess., September 10, 1992, p. 78, Part V.D.
|
||||
[^74]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 197. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^75]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 217-219. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^76]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 221-223. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^77]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 229. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^78]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 210. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^79]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 209-210. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^80]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 230-231. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^81]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 211-214. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^82]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 246. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^83]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 247. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^84]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 247-248. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^85]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, p. 248. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^86]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 249-250. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^87]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. *The INSLAW Affair.* H. Rept. 102-857, 102d Cong., 2d sess., September 10, 1992, title page.
|
||||
[^88]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. *The INSLAW Affair.* H. Rept. 102-857, 102d Cong., 2d sess., September 10, 1992, pp. 69-72, Part IV.C.1.
|
||||
[^89]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of the United States Department of Justice on the Review of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua's Report on the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc.* September 27, 1994, pp. 1-4. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^90]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of the United States Department of Justice on the Review of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua's Report on the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc.* September 27, 1994, pp. 7-9, III. Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^91]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of the United States Department of Justice on the Review of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua's Report on the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc.* September 27, 1994, pp. 107-168, V. The Weight of the Evidence Indicates That J. Daniel Casolaro Committed Suicide. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^92]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of the United States Department of Justice on the Review of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua's Report on the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc.* September 27, 1994, pp. 9-10, III. Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^93]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of the United States Department of Justice on the Review of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua's Report on the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc.* September 27, 1994, pp. 101-102. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^94]: U.S. Court of Federal Claims. *INSLAW, Inc. v. United States*, No. 95-338X, Report of the Review Panel, May 11, 1998, 40 Fed. Cl. 843. https://static.case.law/fed-cl/40/cases/0843-01.json
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ tags:
|
|||
- Arms
|
||||
summary: "Richard Babayan is an Iranian national, arms broker and INSLAW affiant whose 1992 testimony on 1980 meetings between William Casey and Iranian officials the House October Surprise Task Force rejected."
|
||||
created: 2026-05-14
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-07
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
location: "Florida"
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
|
|
@ -84,6 +84,6 @@ Ben-Menashe alleged that in 1987 the flow of funds from PROMIS sales extended to
|
|||
[^9]: Walter Pincus, Washington Post, November 24, 1992, report on the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee special counsel's preliminary conclusions (reprinted by American Cybercasting). https://stuff.mit.edu/afs/net/user/tytso/usenet/americast/wpost/1645
|
||||
[^10]: Joint Report, note 415, citing letter from Terry O'Connor, inspector in charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Hon. Lee Hamilton, October 27, 1992, and App. at 574 to 580. https://archive.org/details/6199732-Joint-Report-of-the-October-Surprise-Task-Force
|
||||
[^11]: INSLAW, Inc., Third Supplemental Submission of INSLAW in Support of Its Motion to Take Limited Discovery, United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia, Case No. 85-00070 (Chapter 11), Adversary Proceeding No. 86-0069, undated, footnote on page 7 (affidavit and Palm Beach passage). Refers to February 1991 events. https://archive.org/details/InslawAffairInBriefSupportingDocs. Pages 6 and 7 and footnote 1 on page 7.
|
||||
[^12]: Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc., March 1993, conclusions on Hadron and international distribution, Ben-Menashe affidavits, and the Michael Riconosciuto section (begins p. 42). https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^12]: Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc., March 1993, pp. 73-74 (Ben-Menashe affidavits of February 17, 1991 and March 21, 1991), 79 ("We were not disposed to conduct an international search of foreign governments and intelligence operatives on the basis of Ben-Menashe's allegations"), 122 (Hadron: "no credible evidence that Hadron ever tried to acquire Inslaw or PROMIS") and 151 (international distribution: "has not proceeded past the preliminary stages"). https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
|
||||
[^13]: "New Report Finds No Credible Basis for INSLAW Case," Department of Justice release, September 27, 1994. https://irp.fas.org/news/1994/940927-555.htm
|
||||
[^14]: Ari Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network* (Sheridan Square Press, 1992; TrineDay reprint, 2015).
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
---
|
||||
created: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
title: Sidney Gottlieb
|
||||
aliases:
|
||||
- Sidney Gottlieb
|
||||
|
|
@ -18,10 +18,17 @@ tags:
|
|||
- 1960s
|
||||
- 1970s
|
||||
category: "Intelligence & Government"
|
||||
summary: "Sidney Gottlieb was the CIA's Technical Services Division chief who created and directed Project MKULTRA, ran Operation Midnight Climax and the Ewen Cameron subprojects, carried biological assassination materials to the Congo targeting Patrice Lumumba, and ordered destruction of nearly all MKULTRA records before congressional investigation."
|
||||
summary: "CIA Technical Services Division chief who directed Project MKULTRA and Operation Midnight Climax, carried biological materials to the Congo for use against Patrice Lumumba, and ordered destruction of nearly all MKULTRA records before congressional investigation."
|
||||
born: 1918-08-03
|
||||
died: 1999-03-07
|
||||
location: "Bronx, New York / Washington, D.C."
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Office of Technical Service]]"
|
||||
start: 1966-03
|
||||
end: 1973-05
|
||||
role: "chief of the Technical Services Division; retired 1973"
|
||||
fn: 2
|
||||
---
|
||||
Sidney Gottlieb (August 3, 1918 - March 7, 1999) was a [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] chemist and the chief of the agency's [[Technical Services Division]] (TSD) who created, directed, and ultimately destroyed the records of [[Project MKUltra]] - the CIA's two-decade program of human behavioral experimentation using [[LSD]], hypnosis, sensory deprivation, electroconvulsive therapy, and other methods on subjects who had not consented. Gottlieb authorized experiments that killed at least one CIA officer, institutionalized thousands of psychiatric patients in [[Canada]] and the [[United States]], and used brothels as operational platforms for dosing unwitting men. He personally carried biological assassination materials to [[Congo]] in 1960 intending to poison [[Patrice Lumumba]], and in January 1973 ordered the destruction of nearly all MKULTRA documentation before congressional investigators could examine it.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -29,13 +36,13 @@ Sidney Gottlieb (August 3, 1918 - March 7, 1999) was a [[Central Intelligence Ag
|
|||
|
||||
Gottlieb was born in the Bronx to Jewish immigrant parents. He was born with a club foot that produced a distinctive limp, and he had a pronounced stutter throughout his life - conditions that disqualified him from military service during [[World War II]] and shaped his compensatory academic drive. He earned a doctorate in chemistry from the [[California Institute of Technology]] in 1943 and worked in agricultural chemistry before being recruited by the CIA around 1951.
|
||||
|
||||
He joined the CIA's Technical Services Staff (later Technical Services Division), the agency's scientific and technical operations unit responsible for developing disguises, forgeries, surveillance equipment, and chemical and biological materials for operational use. He rose to become chief of the Chemical Division and, subsequently, director of the TSD itself. His cover name was "Joseph Scheider."
|
||||
He joined the CIA's Technical Services Staff (later Technical Services Division), the agency's scientific and technical operations unit responsible for developing disguises, forgeries, surveillance equipment, and chemical and biological materials for operational use. He rose to become chief of the Chemical Division and, subsequently, director of the TSD itself. The CIA's history of the office gives Gottlieb's tenure as chief of the Technical Services Division as March 1966 to May 1973, succeeding Seymour Russell (August 1962 to March 1966).[^2] Before that he headed the Chemical Division of the Technical Services Staff; a letter of February 12, 1954 from [[Allen Dulles]] addressed him as "Chief of the Chemical Division of the Technical Services Staff" and criticized him for recommending the "unwitting application of the drug" because the proposal "did not give sufficient emphasis for medical collaboration and for the proper consideration of the rights of the individual to whom it was being administered."[^3] Dulles sent a separate letter the same day to the Chief of Technical Operations of the Technical Services Staff, who had approved the experiment, criticizing his "poor judgment."[^3] His cover name was "Joseph Scheider."
|
||||
|
||||
Alongside his professional life - which included managing some of the most extreme covert programs in American government history - Gottlieb was known for practicing folk dancing, playing the recorder, keeping a goat farm in rural [[Virginia]], and working as a hospice volunteer late in life. His biographer Stephen Kinzer characterized the contrast as reflecting a genuine internal split rather than deliberate irony.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### MKULTRA Authorization and Scope
|
||||
|
||||
On April 3, 1953, Richard Helms, a senior Clandestine Services officer and Gottlieb's longtime patron, formally proposed a program for the "covert use of biological and chemical materials" to be run under Gottlieb; on April 13, 1953, CIA Director [[Allen Dulles]] approved it as Project MKULTRA with an initial $300,000 budget exempt from normal financial controls, payable blindly on the signatures of Gottlieb and TSS chief [[Willis Gibbons]]. The program's stated rationale was defensive: Soviet and Chinese interrogation techniques, apparently effective in producing false confessions from American prisoners during the [[Korean War]], suggested an enemy capability in "brain warfare" that the United States needed to match and counter. Gottlieb used this framing to obtain authorization for an extraordinarily broad research mandate covering drugs, hypnosis, sensory deprivation, electroshock, surgery, and psychological manipulation.
|
||||
On April 3, 1953, Richard Helms, a senior Clandestine Services officer and Gottlieb's longtime patron, formally proposed a program for the "covert use of biological and chemical materials" to be run under Gottlieb; on April 13, 1953, CIA Director Allen Dulles approved it as Project MKULTRA with an initial $300,000 budget exempt from normal financial controls, payable blindly on the signatures of Gottlieb and TSS chief [[Willis Gibbons]]. The program's stated rationale was defensive: Soviet and Chinese interrogation techniques, apparently effective in producing false confessions from American prisoners during the [[Korean War]], suggested an enemy capability in "brain warfare" that the United States needed to match and counter. Gottlieb used this framing to obtain authorization for an extraordinarily broad research mandate covering drugs, hypnosis, sensory deprivation, electroshock, surgery, and psychological manipulation.
|
||||
|
||||
MKULTRA was divided into approximately 150 research subprojects funded through cut-out academic and private institutions, primarily the [[Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology]] (a CIA front foundation) and the [[Josiah Macy Jr. Foundation]]. The use of cutouts was deliberate: it distributed the research across enough institutions that no single investigator could piece together the program's full scope, and it provided a layer of deniability between CIA funding and individual experiments.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -49,7 +56,7 @@ White recruited prostitutes to bring men to the safe houses under the pretext of
|
|||
|
||||
White operated the safe houses with CIA-provided funds and reported directly to Gottlieb. He described the program in his own diaries (later discovered by Marks) with considerable enthusiasm. The San Francisco operation ran for approximately eight years; the New York operation ran concurrently. Together they represent the most sustained use of unwitting American civilian subjects in the program's history.
|
||||
|
||||
The program was illegal under constitutional protections against unreasonable search and seizure and under the Nuremberg Code on human experimentation, both of which require informed consent.[^2]
|
||||
The program was illegal under constitutional protections against unreasonable search and seizure and under the Nuremberg Code on human experimentation, both of which require informed consent.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
### Ewen Cameron and the Canadian Subprojects
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -76,7 +83,7 @@ CIA Director Allen Dulles was briefed on the circumstances and the program was c
|
|||
|
||||
In 1994, Olson's son Eric had his father's body exhumed. Forensic examination by James Starrs of [[George Washington University]] found a hematoma on Olson's skull inconsistent with the fall - suggesting he had been struck before going through the window. The New York District Attorney reopened the case as a possible homicide; it was never prosecuted due to insufficient surviving evidence. Gottlieb died in March 1999; he had been under investigation for Olson's death.
|
||||
|
||||
Olson's son maintained until his own death that his father was murdered because he had developed doubts about the CIA's biological weapons programs and CIA interrogation methods - doubts that made him a security risk.[^3]
|
||||
Olson's son maintained until his own death that his father was murdered because he had developed doubts about the CIA's biological weapons programs and CIA interrogation methods - doubts that made him a security risk.[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
### Congo: Biological Assassination Materials
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -88,11 +95,11 @@ Lumumba was subsequently captured by Congolese security forces loyal to [[Mobutu
|
|||
|
||||
### Assassination Schemes and MKSEARCH
|
||||
|
||||
Beyond the Congo, Gottlieb's office devised an array of methods to kill foreign leaders in the tradition of [[Stanley Lovell]]'s wartime OSS schemes, targeting [[Fidel Castro]], [[Kwame Nkrumah]] of [[Ghana]], and others. Against Castro his team developed an LSD-laced aerosol for his radio station, a thallium compound to make his beard fall out before a public appearance, botulinum-toxin cigars (one batch of which retained 94 percent of its toxicity when tested seven years later), and a ballpoint pen concealing a hypodermic needle. For U-2 pilot [[Francis Gary Powers]] and other agents at risk of capture, Gottlieb designed a suicide device: a hollowed silver dollar concealing a needle coated with saxitoxin, a paralytic shellfish poison. The lethal agents for these operations came from the [[Special Operations Division]] at Fort Detrick under the CIA-Army project [[MKNAOMI]]. When MKULTRA's paperwork grew unwieldy, Gottlieb carried its work on under the successor program [[MKSEARCH]] (chartered 1964), which he terminated in June 1972 on the conclusion that the materials and techniques were "too unpredictable in their effect on individual human beings ... to be operationally useful." All told he presided over funding for some 80 institutions, including 44 colleges and universities, and 185 private researchers.[^4]
|
||||
Beyond the Congo, Gottlieb's office devised an array of methods to kill foreign leaders in the tradition of [[Stanley Lovell]]'s wartime OSS schemes, targeting [[Fidel Castro]], [[Kwame Nkrumah]] of [[Ghana]], and others. Against Castro his team developed an LSD-laced aerosol for his radio station, a thallium compound to make his beard fall out before a public appearance, botulinum-toxin cigars (one batch of which retained 94 percent of its toxicity when tested seven years later), and a ballpoint pen concealing a hypodermic needle. For U-2 pilot [[Francis Gary Powers]] and other agents at risk of capture, Gottlieb designed a suicide device: a hollowed silver dollar concealing a needle coated with saxitoxin, a paralytic shellfish poison. The lethal agents for these operations came from the [[Special Operations Division]] at Fort Detrick under the CIA-Army project [[MKNAOMI]]. When MKULTRA's paperwork grew unwieldy, Gottlieb carried its work on under the successor program [[MKSEARCH]] (chartered 1964), which he terminated in June 1972 on the conclusion that the materials and techniques were "too unpredictable in their effect on individual human beings ... to be operationally useful." All told he presided over funding for some 80 institutions, including 44 colleges and universities, and 185 private researchers.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### Records Destruction
|
||||
|
||||
In January 1973, with Watergate investigations expanding and congressional scrutiny of CIA activities intensifying, Gottlieb ordered the destruction of essentially all MKULTRA records. He was about to retire, and the destruction was carried out with Director [[Richard Helms]]'s knowledge and implied authorization. Helms was simultaneously ordering the destruction of [[Operation CHAOS]] operational records.
|
||||
In January 1973, with Watergate investigations expanding and congressional scrutiny of CIA activities intensifying, Gottlieb ordered the destruction of essentially all MKULTRA records. He was about to retire, and the destruction was carried out with Director [[Richard Helms]]'s knowledge and implied authorization. Helms was simultaneously ordering the destruction of [[Operation CHAOS]] operational records. The Church Committee report records that in January 1973 MKULTRA records were destroyed by Technical Services Division personnel acting on Gottlieb's verbal orders, that Gottlieb testified he was carrying out the verbal order of Helms, and that Helms confirmed it.[^7] Helms told the committee that Gottlieb "came to me and said that he was retiring and that I was retiring and he thought it would be a good idea if these files were destroyed." Helms also said that the files would be sensitive because of "relationships with outsiders in government agencies and other organizations," and that since the program was over they "would just get rid of the files." The destruction rested on a waiver of CSI 70-10, the regulation governing the retirement of inactive records. At least one assistant to Gottlieb protested the destruction on the grounds that the program could not be reconstructed without the documents.[^7] An OTS memorandum of June 22, 1977, signed by David S. Brandwein, states that "Dr. Gottlieb retrieved and destroyed all the MKULTRA documents he was able to locate."[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
The destruction was comprehensive. File boxes from facilities across the country were collected and shredded or burned. The intention was to eliminate any documentary record of the program before investigators could subpoena it. The destruction succeeded in eliminating the core operational files.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -104,7 +111,7 @@ Gottlieb testified before the Church Committee in 1975 and before the Senate Hea
|
|||
|
||||
He confirmed under oath that he had personally administered LSD to unconsenting subjects, that the Midnight Climax safe houses had operated as described, and that he had ordered the records destruction with his superior's knowledge.
|
||||
|
||||
In his October 1975 Church Committee sessions (under the staff alias "Joseph Scheider") and his 1977 immunized testimony, Gottlieb disclosed two military LSD interrogation operations run alongside MKULTRA, [[Operation DERBY HAT]] and [[Operation THIRD CHANCE]]; acknowledged administering LSD to CIA employees for "defensive pharmacology"; and described his role on the [[Health Alteration Committee]] that authorized plots against foreign leaders, including the botulinum cigar scheme. He also gave a 174-page deposition in *Orlikow v. United States* (May 17, 1983) that evaded most specific questions about Cameron's experiments. The full transcripts of his 1975 testimony, classified Top Secret at the time, were released through FOIA and published by the [[National Security Archive]] in October 2025.[^4]
|
||||
In his October 1975 Church Committee sessions (under the staff alias "Joseph Scheider") and his 1977 immunized testimony, Gottlieb disclosed two military LSD interrogation operations run alongside MKULTRA, [[Operation DERBY HAT]] and [[Operation THIRD CHANCE]]; acknowledged administering LSD to CIA employees for "defensive pharmacology"; and described his role on the [[Health Alteration Committee]] that authorized plots against foreign leaders, including the botulinum cigar scheme. He also gave a 174-page deposition in *Orlikow v. United States* (May 17, 1983) that evaded most specific questions about Cameron's experiments. The full transcripts of his 1975 testimony, classified Top Secret at the time, were released through FOIA and published by the [[National Security Archive]] in October 2025.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### Post-CIA Life and Death
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -117,6 +124,10 @@ Stephen Kinzer's biography *Poisoner in Chief* (2019) provides the most comprehe
|
|||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Kinzer, Stephen. *Poisoner in Chief: Sidney Gottlieb and the CIA Search for Mind Control.* Henry Holt and Company, 2019 (the essential biography). Marks, John. *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate: The CIA and Mind Control.* Times Books, 1979 (uses surviving MKULTRA documents; the foundational investigative account). Church Committee (U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities). Final Report, Book I ("Foreign and Military Intelligence"), S. Rept. 94-755, April 26, 1976.
|
||||
[^2]: "Project MKULTRA, the CIA's Program of Research in Behavioral Modification." Joint Hearing before the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research of the Committee on Human Resources, United States Senate, 95th Congress, 1st Session, August 3, 1977. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. Available: intelligence.senate.gov.
|
||||
[^3]: Starrs, James E. Report of forensic examination, Olson exhumation, 1994. New York County District Attorney investigation files (partial public record). Albarelli, H.P. *A Terrible Mistake: The Murder of Frank Olson and the CIA's Secret Cold War Experiments.* Trine Day, 2009.
|
||||
[^4]: Kinzer, Stephen. *Poisoner in Chief: Sidney Gottlieb and the CIA Search for Mind Control*. Henry Holt, 2019; John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*, Chapter 4; National Security Archive, "Top Secret Testimony of CIA's MKULTRA Chief, 50 Years Later," October 30, 2025; Deposition of Sidney Gottlieb, *Orlikow v. United States*, Civil Action No. 80-3163, May 17, 1983.
|
||||
[^2]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Office of Technical Service: 50 Years Supporting Operations," CIA Reading Room document 0001225679, chronology of directors.
|
||||
[^3]: U.S. Senate, *Final Report*, Book I, S. Rept. 94-755 (1976), p. 398 and nn. 54-55 (memoranda from the DCI to the Chief, Technical Operations, TSS, and to Sidney Gottlieb, both dated 2/12/54).
|
||||
[^4]: "Project MKULTRA, the CIA's Program of Research in Behavioral Modification." Joint Hearing before the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research of the Committee on Human Resources, United States Senate, 95th Congress, 1st Session, August 3, 1977. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. Available: intelligence.senate.gov.
|
||||
[^5]: Starrs, James E. Report of forensic examination, Olson exhumation, 1994. New York County District Attorney investigation files (partial public record). Albarelli, H.P. *A Terrible Mistake: The Murder of Frank Olson and the CIA's Secret Cold War Experiments.* Trine Day, 2009.
|
||||
[^6]: Kinzer, Stephen. *Poisoner in Chief: Sidney Gottlieb and the CIA Search for Mind Control*. Henry Holt, 2019; John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*, Chapter 4; National Security Archive, "Top Secret Testimony of CIA's MKULTRA Chief, 50 Years Later," October 30, 2025; Deposition of Sidney Gottlieb, *Orlikow v. United States*, Civil Action No. 80-3163, May 17, 1983.
|
||||
[^7]: U.S. Senate, *Final Report*, Book I, S. Rept. 94-755 (1976), p. 389 (January 1973 destruction; Gottlieb's testimony and Helms's confirmation) and pp. 403-404 and nn. 75-76 (Helms's account; CSI 70-10; the assistant's protest).
|
||||
[^8]: Joint hearing, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research, August 3, 1977, *Project MKULTRA, the CIA's Program of Research in Behavioral Modification*, Appendix B, pp. 103-104: the OTS memorandum of June 22, 1977 states that "Dr. Gottlieb retrieved and destroyed all the MKULTRA documents he was able to locate." https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/hearings/95mkultra.pdf
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ aliases:
|
|||
- Tom Clines
|
||||
- Thomas G. Clines
|
||||
created: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-09-21
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
category: "Intelligence & Government"
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- Person
|
||||
|
|
@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ tags:
|
|||
- Vietnam
|
||||
- 1970s
|
||||
- 1980s
|
||||
summary: "CIA officer under Ted Shackley at JMWAVE, in Laos, and in the Western Hemisphere Division, later of the Safari Club and Iran-Contra Enterprise network, convicted in 1993 of underreporting Iran-Contra income."
|
||||
summary: "CIA officer under Ted Shackley at JMWAVE, in Laos, and in the Western Hemisphere Division, later of the Safari Club and Iran-Contra Enterprise network, convicted in 1990 of underreporting Iran-Contra income."
|
||||
location: "United States"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -30,15 +30,17 @@ After Laos, Clines continued in CIA operations roles in Southeast Asia and [[Lat
|
|||
|
||||
After leaving CIA, Clines became involved in the arms and intelligence consulting business that grew around the network of former CIA officers associated with Shackley. One significant connection was to [[Edwin Wilson]], the former CIA officer who was selling arms and providing paramilitary training to Libya's Muammar Qaddafi. Clines, like [[Richard Secord]], had documented contacts with Wilson during the period Wilson was running the Libya operations. Congressional investigations into Wilson's activities examined Clines's role, and while Clines was not charged in the Wilson case, the investigation contributed to the end of his government career.[^1]
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The congressional report states that in 1982 Clines became a target of a Justice Department investigation of fraudulent overbilling of the government by the Egyptian American Transport Company (EATSCO), 49 percent of which he owned; EATSCO pleaded guilty to criminal and civil overbilling charges two months after Secord's May 1983 retirement, and Clines, on behalf of the entity holding his interest, paid a 10,000 dollar criminal fine and a 100,000 dollar civil fine; the Justice Department closed the case in July 1984.[^2] In 1984, when Clines needed 33,000 dollars toward the civil fine, Secord lent him the sum through a cashier's check carried by [[Glenn Robinette]].[^2] The Wall Street Journal reported in October 1982 that EATSCO was set up in August 1979 by Clines and the Egyptian businessman [[Hussein Salem|Hussein K. Salem]], that the Treasury had by then paid it 71.4 million dollars, and that in January 1979 Wilson arranged a 500,000 dollar loan for Clines.[^3] Secord testified in 1987 that Clines "had some problems in the EATSCO affair. I believe he was treated unfairly there. The Justice Department did not convict him. They went for a technical charge instead."[^4]
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### Wackenhut, 1976
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A [[Domestic Contact Service]] cable of June 22, 1976, records a request from the Latin America Division for contact with [[Bruce Berckmans]], director of international operations of the [[Wackenhut Corporation]] in [[Miami]], "a former staff agent under the LPGLOBE program" who "was asked to resign from the Agency in 1970." He had asked, "through an LA Division officer, Tom Clines," to see an agency representative about information believed to concern "political developments in [[Jamaica]]," and "the name of Tom Clines may be used to facilitate contact." A week later Berckmans told the Miami officer that "after consultations with his attorney he has decided not to sue the Agency."[^2]
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A [[Domestic Contact Service]] cable of June 22, 1976, records a request from the Latin America Division for contact with [[Bruce Berckmans]], director of international operations of the [[Wackenhut Corporation]] in [[Miami]], "a former staff agent under the LPGLOBE program" who "was asked to resign from the Agency in 1970." He had asked, "through an LA Division officer, Tom Clines," to see an agency representative about information believed to concern "political developments in [[Jamaica]]," and "the name of Tom Clines may be used to facilitate contact." A week later Berckmans told the Miami officer that "after consultations with his attorney he has decided not to sue the Agency."[^5]
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### Iran-Contra Enterprise
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Clines became an operational participant in the Enterprise, the private covert network directed by Secord and [[Albert Hakim]] that executed the Iran arms sales and Contra funding operations. His primary role was in the logistics and transportation aspects of the Enterprise's weapons movements - specifically managing air freight and cargo operations for weapons shipments.[^1]
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In 1993, Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh's prosecution resulted in Clines's conviction on four counts of tax-related offenses: specifically, underreporting income from transactions connected to the Enterprise. The prosecution established that Clines had received income from Enterprise operations that he failed to report on his tax returns. He was sentenced to sixteen months in prison and fined.[^3]
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Clines was indicted in February 1990 after the guilty pleas and cooperation of Richard Secord and Albert Hakim, and on September 18, 1990 a jury in U.S. District Court in Baltimore, before Judge Norman P. Ramsey, convicted him of four income-tax-related felonies; on December 13, 1990 Ramsey sentenced him to 16 months in prison and a 40,000 dollar fine. The Fourth Circuit affirmed and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.[^6] Secord and Willard Zucker were the central prosecution witnesses; Secord testified under a cooperation agreement.[^6] The prosecution established that Clines had received income from Enterprise operations that he failed to report on his tax returns.[^7]
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### Shackley Network
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@ -47,5 +49,9 @@ Clines's career illustrates the structural feature of the Shackley network: offi
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### Footnotes
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[^1]: Corn, David, and Jeff Goldberg. "The Old Boy Network." *Mother Jones*, October 1994. Trento, Joseph. *Prelude to Terror: The Rogue CIA and the Legacy of America's Private Intelligence Network*. Carroll & Graf, 2005.
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[^2]: Central Intelligence Agency, Domestic Collection Division, case file 65805, "Wackenhut Corp.," JFK Assassination Records Collection, record 104-10291-10017, released 2023. https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2023/104-10291-10017.pdf, pp. 19-22.
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[^3]: Walsh, Lawrence E. *Iran-Contra: The Final Report*. Random House, 1994. Walsh, Lawrence E. *Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-Up*. W.W. Norton, 1997.
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[^2]: Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, H. Rept. 100-433 / S. Rept. 100-216 (1987), ch. 21, pp. 326-327 and n. 30, https://archive.org/details/reportofcongress87unit.
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[^3]: Edward T. Pound and Walter S. Mossberg, "Weapons Windfall," Wall Street Journal, Oct. 1, 1982, pp. 1, 18, CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP09S00048R000100020015-5, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp09s00048r000100020015-5.
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[^4]: Testimony of Richard V. Secord, Iran-Contra Investigation: Joint Hearings, 100th Cong., 1st sess., Hearings 100-1, p. 303, https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152829_0342.
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[^5]: Central Intelligence Agency, Domestic Collection Division, case file 65805, "Wackenhut Corp.," JFK Assassination Records Collection, record 104-10291-10017, released 2023. https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2023/104-10291-10017.pdf, pp. 19-22.
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[^6]: Lawrence E. Walsh, Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters, vol. I, pt. V, ch. 11, "United States v. Thomas G. Clines," pp. 181-184, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_11.htm.
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[^7]: Walsh, Lawrence E. *Iran-Contra: The Final Report*. Random House, 1994. Walsh, Lawrence E. *Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-Up*. W.W. Norton, 1997.
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