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10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Augusto Pinochet.md
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@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ tags:
summary: "Chilean Army commander who led the September 11, 1973 coup against Salvador Allende and ruled Chile until 1990, with the Letelier assassination and Operation Condor documented in declassified US records."
location: "Valparaiso, Chile"
created: 2026-05-14
updated: 2026-10-08
updated: 2026-10-09
born: 1915-11-25
died: 2006-12-10
relations:
@ -51,19 +51,19 @@ relations:
with: "[[Letelier-Moffitt assassination]]"
start: 1976-09-21
role: "a 1987 CIA assessment concluded that he personally ordered the murders of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt"
fn: 11
fn: 12
- type: investigated
with: "[[Federal Bureau of Investigation]]"
reverse: true
start: 2000-04
end: 2000-05
role: "formal FBI investigation into his guilt for the Letelier-Moffitt murders, as described in the 2016 release of CIA records"
fn: 11
fn: 12
- type: subject_of
with: "[[Riggs Bank]]"
start: 1985
role: "customer whose accounts the 2004 Senate subcommittee report found the bank helped conceal from regulators and courts"
fn: 25
fn: 26
- type: subject_of
with: "[[House of Lords]]"
start: 1998-10-16
@ -76,116 +76,117 @@ Augusto José Ramón Pinochet Ugarte was born on November 25, 1915, in [[Valpara
### Track II and the killing of René Schneider
On September 15, 1970, President [[Richard Nixon]] directed the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] to organize a military coup in Chile to prevent the inauguration of Allende. The [[Church Committee]], whose successor body was the [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]], wrote that the CIA was to take this action "without coordination with the Departments of State or Defense and without informing the U.S. Ambassador." The Committee's account of the meeting cites the handwritten notes of CIA director [[Richard Helms]], which contain the words "Make the economy scream."[^3][^4]
On September 15, 1970, President [[Richard Nixon]] directed the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] to organize a military coup in Chile to prevent the inauguration of Allende. The [[Church Committee]], whose successor body was the [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]], wrote that the CIA was to take this action "without coordination with the Departments of State or Defense and without informing the U.S. Ambassador." The Committee's account of the meeting cites the handwritten notes of CIA director [[Richard Helms]], which contain the words "Make the economy scream." The notes were read into the record of the committee's Covert Action hearings on December 4, 1975, and are printed as an exhibit to that volume.[^3][^4][^5]
On October 16, 1970, CIA deputy director of plans [[Thomas Karamessines]] cabled the Santiago station chief, [[Henry Hecksher]], conveying [[Henry Kissinger]]'s orders: "It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup." The cable directed that the operations be run so as to hide the "American hand," and that the station ignore orders to the contrary from Ambassador [[Edward Korry]], who had not been told of the operations.[^4] A memorandum of an October 15, 1970 meeting of Kissinger, Karamessines and [[Alexander Haig]] records a discussion of promoting a coup, known as [[Track II]], and the possibility that the plot of Chilean officer [[Roberto Viaux]] might fail with "unfortunate repercussions."[^4] Between October 5 and October 20, 1970, the CIA made 21 contacts with key Chilean military and Carabinero officials.[^5] Henry Hecksher and other operatives were in contact with coup plotters including Pinochet and General [[Gustavo Leigh]].
On October 16, 1970, CIA deputy director of plans [[Thomas Karamessines]] cabled the Santiago station chief, [[Henry Hecksher]], conveying [[Henry Kissinger]]'s orders: "It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup." The cable directed that the operations be run so as to hide the "American hand," and that the station ignore orders to the contrary from Ambassador [[Edward Korry]], who had not been told of the operations.[^4] A memorandum of an October 15, 1970 meeting of Kissinger, Karamessines and [[Alexander Haig]] records a discussion of promoting a coup, known as [[Track II]], and the possibility that the plot of Chilean officer [[Roberto Viaux]] might fail with "unfortunate repercussions."[^4] Between October 5 and October 20, 1970, the CIA made 21 contacts with key Chilean military and Carabinero officials.[^6] Henry Hecksher and other operatives were in contact with coup plotters including Pinochet and General [[Gustavo Leigh]].
The Church Committee's interim report on assassination plots records that the removal of the Army commander-in-chief, General [[Rene Schneider]], who insisted that the constitutional process be followed, became a necessary ingredient in the plans of the Chilean conspirators, and that the conspirators decided to kidnap him. It records unsuccessful attempts on October 19 and 20, 1970, a delivery of three submachine guns and ammunition by a CIA attache on October 22, 1970, and a third attempt that day in which Schneider was shot; he died on October 25.[^5] The report states that the guns used were "in all probability" not those supplied by the CIA, that the Chilean military court found Schneider had been shot with handguns, and that the Committee could not determine whether the machine gun at the scene was one of the three the CIA supplied.[^5] The Committee also records that a station cable of October 22, 1970 said the station had instructed the attache to "hand over $50,000 if Gen. Valenzuela requests."[^5]
The Church Committee's interim report on assassination plots records that the removal of the Army commander-in-chief, General [[Rene Schneider]], who insisted that the constitutional process be followed, became a necessary ingredient in the plans of the Chilean conspirators, and that the conspirators decided to kidnap him. It records unsuccessful attempts on October 19 and 20, 1970, a delivery of three submachine guns and ammunition by a CIA attache on October 22, 1970, and a third attempt that day in which Schneider was shot; he died on October 25.[^6] The report states that the guns used were "in all probability" not those supplied by the CIA, that the Chilean military court found Schneider had been shot with handguns, and that the Committee could not determine whether the machine gun at the scene was one of the three the CIA supplied.[^6] The Committee also records that a station cable of October 22, 1970 said the station had instructed the attache to "hand over $50,000 if Gen. Valenzuela requests."[^6]
The National Security Archive's description of the October 1970 cables states that the CIA supplied a group of officers led by General [[Camilo Valenzuela]] with "sterile" weapons for the operation, which was to be blamed on Allende supporters, and that Schneider was killed by another group the CIA had been collaborating with, led by retired General Roberto Viaux.[^4] The CIA's 2000 report on its Chile activities, prepared under the Hinchey amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2000, states that the Viaux group acted "independently of the CIA at that time" on October 22, that the three submachine guns, ammunition and tear gas grenades given to the Valenzuela group were "later returned unused to the Station," and that Valenzuela's representative insisted his group had nothing to do with Schneider's killing.[^6] The Church Committee also records that Kissinger and Haig testified that the White House stood down the CIA effort on October 15, 1970, while CIA officials, especially Karamessines, testified that they acted with White House knowledge and approval before and after that date.[^5]
The National Security Archive's description of the October 1970 cables states that the CIA supplied a group of officers led by General [[Camilo Valenzuela]] with "sterile" weapons for the operation, which was to be blamed on Allende supporters, and that Schneider was killed by another group the CIA had been collaborating with, led by retired General Roberto Viaux.[^4] The CIA's 2000 report on its Chile activities, prepared under the Hinchey amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2000, states that the Viaux group acted "independently of the CIA at that time" on October 22, that the three submachine guns, ammunition and tear gas grenades given to the Valenzuela group were "later returned unused to the Station," and that Valenzuela's representative insisted his group had nothing to do with Schneider's killing.[^7] The Church Committee also records that Kissinger and Haig testified that the White House stood down the CIA effort on October 15, 1970, while CIA officials, especially Karamessines, testified that they acted with White House knowledge and approval before and after that date.[^6]
The 2000 report states that in November 1970 a member of the Viaux group who had avoided capture recontacted the CIA and requested financial assistance on behalf of the group. The report continues: "Although the Agency had no obligation to the group because it acted on its own, in an effort to keep the prior contact secret, maintain the good will of the group, and for humanitarian reasons, $35,000 was passed."[^6] The National Security Archive describes the payment as one made to a group of coup plotters after that group had murdered Schneider, and states that it was apparently withheld in 1975 from the Senate committee investigating CIA involvement in assassinations.[^7]
The 2000 report states that in November 1970 a member of the Viaux group who had avoided capture recontacted the CIA and requested financial assistance on behalf of the group. The report continues: "Although the Agency had no obligation to the group because it acted on its own, in an effort to keep the prior contact secret, maintain the good will of the group, and for humanitarian reasons, $35,000 was passed."[^7] The National Security Archive describes the payment as one made to a group of coup plotters after that group had murdered Schneider, and states that it was apparently withheld in 1975 from the Senate committee investigating CIA involvement in assassinations.[^8]
### The 1973 coup and US knowledge
On September 11, 1973, the Chilean military, led by Pinochet, Gustavo Leigh and Admiral [[Jose Merino]], launched a coordinated coup. The presidential palace, [[La Moneda]], was bombed by [[Chilean Air Force]] jets. Allende died during the assault; the CIA's 2000 report describes La Moneda as under bombardment from tanks and airplanes and states that Allende took his own life.[^6] The junta, composed of Pinochet, Leigh, Merino and [[Carabineros of Chile|Carabinero]] chief General [[Cesar Mendoza]], was sworn in on the evening of September 11, 1973, and Pinochet was designated its first president; the report states that the CIA actively supported the junta but did not assist Pinochet to assume the presidency.[^6] By June 1974 Pinochet had become the dominant figure and head of state.[^3]
On September 11, 1973, the Chilean military, led by Pinochet, Gustavo Leigh and Admiral [[Jose Merino]], launched a coordinated coup. The presidential palace, [[La Moneda]], was bombed by [[Chilean Air Force]] jets. Allende died during the assault; the CIA's 2000 report describes La Moneda as under bombardment from tanks and airplanes and states that Allende took his own life.[^7] The junta, composed of Pinochet, Leigh, Merino and [[Carabineros of Chile|Carabinero]] chief General [[Cesar Mendoza]], was sworn in on the evening of September 11, 1973, and Pinochet was designated its first president; the report states that the CIA actively supported the junta but did not assist Pinochet to assume the presidency.[^7] By June 1974 Pinochet had become the dominant figure and head of state.[^3]
A State Department cable of September 13, 1973, titled "USG Attitude Toward Junta," states that the "US government wishes to make clear its desire to cooperate with the military Junta and to assist in any appropriate way."[^2] A [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] biographic profile of Pinochet, dated August or September 1973, survives in a version with heavy deletions.[^4]
A November 1973 State Department memorandum on executions, sent to the Secretary of State by [[Jack Kubisch]], records that summary executions in the nineteen days after the coup totaled 320, more than three times the publicly acknowledged figure.[^2] A CIA intelligence report of October 27, 1973 records that 13,500 prisoners had been registered as detained by the armed forces between September 11 and October 10, 1973, and estimates 1,600 civilian deaths from the coup.[^2]
The 2000 report states that within a year after the coup the CIA and other US agencies were aware of bilateral cooperation among regional intelligence services to track the activities of and, in at least a few cases, kill political opponents, which it calls the precursor to Operation Condor.[^6] After Pinochet's arrest in London in October 1998, the Clinton administration released a collection of about 24,000 declassified records.[^2]
The 2000 report states that within a year after the coup the CIA and other US agencies were aware of bilateral cooperation among regional intelligence services to track the activities of and, in at least a few cases, kill political opponents, which it calls the precursor to Operation Condor.[^7] After Pinochet's arrest in London in October 1998, the Clinton administration released a collection of about 24,000 declassified records.[^2]
### DINA and Manuel Contreras
A Defense Intelligence Agency report of April 15, 1975 describes the [[DINA]] as "the sole responsible agency for internal subversive matters." It states that the head of DINA, Colonel [[Manuel Contreras]], "has reported exclusively to, and received orders only from, President Pinochet."[^4]
The CIA's 2000 report states that between 1974 and 1977 the CIA maintained contact with Contreras, and that the policy community approved the contact despite concerns that it might lay the agency open to charges of aiding internal political repression. It records that in December 1974 the CIA concluded that Contreras was not going to improve his human rights performance, and that by April 1975 intelligence reporting showed that he was "the principal obstacle to a reasonable human rights policy within the Junta," but that an interagency committee directed the CIA to continue the relationship.[^6] In August 1975, with interagency approval, Contreras met Deputy Director of Central Intelligence [[Vernon Walters]] in Washington.[^6]
The CIA's 2000 report states that between 1974 and 1977 the CIA maintained contact with Contreras, and that the policy community approved the contact despite concerns that it might lay the agency open to charges of aiding internal political repression. It records that in December 1974 the CIA concluded that Contreras was not going to improve his human rights performance, and that by April 1975 intelligence reporting showed that he was "the principal obstacle to a reasonable human rights policy within the Junta," but that an interagency committee directed the CIA to continue the relationship.[^7] In August 1975, with interagency approval, Contreras met Deputy Director of Central Intelligence [[Vernon Walters]] in Washington.[^7]
On the payment, the report states: "In May and June 1975, elements within the CIA recommended establishing a paid relationship with Contreras to obtain intelligence based on his unique position and access to Pinochet." It continues that the proposal was overruled, citing US policy on clandestine relations with the head of an intelligence service notorious for human rights abuses, and that "given miscommunications in the timing of this exchange, a one-time payment was given to Contreras."[^6] The National Security Archive's summary of the report states that the CIA made Contreras a paid asset only several months after concluding that he was the principal obstacle to a reasonable human rights policy.[^7]
On the payment, the report states: "In May and June 1975, elements within the CIA recommended establishing a paid relationship with Contreras to obtain intelligence based on his unique position and access to Pinochet." It continues that the proposal was overruled, citing US policy on clandestine relations with the head of an intelligence service notorious for human rights abuses, and that "given miscommunications in the timing of this exchange, a one-time payment was given to Contreras."[^7] The National Security Archive's summary of the report states that the CIA made Contreras a paid asset only several months after concluding that he was the principal obstacle to a reasonable human rights policy.[^8]
The report records that the CIA sought information from Contreras on Operation Condor, that by October 1976 the CIA decided to approach him on the matter, and that he confirmed Condor's existence as an intelligence-sharing network but denied that it had a role in extra-judicial killings. It states that during October 1976 "Contreras' possible role in the Letelier assassination became an issue," that the CIA met him about half a dozen times during 1977 (three of them to request information on the Letelier assassination), and that on November 3, 1977 Contreras was transferred to a function unrelated to intelligence and the CIA severed all contact.[^6]
The report records that the CIA sought information from Contreras on Operation Condor, that by October 1976 the CIA decided to approach him on the matter, and that he confirmed Condor's existence as an intelligence-sharing network but denied that it had a role in extra-judicial killings. It states that during October 1976 "Contreras' possible role in the Letelier assassination became an issue," that the CIA met him about half a dozen times during 1977 (three of them to request information on the Letelier assassination), and that on November 3, 1977 Contreras was transferred to a function unrelated to intelligence and the CIA severed all contact.[^7]
### Operation Condor
The 2000 report describes Operation Condor as an intelligence-sharing arrangement among Chile, [[Argentina]], [[Brazil]], [[Paraguay]] and [[Uruguay]] established in 1975.[^6] A cable of September 28, 1976 from the FBI legal attache in [[Buenos Aires]], [[Robert Scherrer]], reports information from a "confidential source abroad" that Operation Condor was the code name for the collection, exchange and storage of intelligence on "leftists," communists and Marxists, recently established between cooperating intelligence services in South America "in order to eliminate Marxist terrorist activities in the area." The cable states that Chile is the center for Operation Condor and that its members include Argentina, [[Bolivia]], Paraguay and Uruguay, with Brazil tentatively agreed to supply intelligence input; that Argentina, Uruguay and Chile had engaged in joint operations, primarily in Argentina; and that a third and most secret phase involves special teams from member countries who are "to travel anywhere in the world to non-member countries to carry out sanctions up to assassination against terrorists or supporters of terrorist organizations." France and Portugal are named as European countries specifically mentioned for possible third-phase operations. The cable states that no information had been developed indicating that third-phase sanctions were planned for the United States, and adds: "however, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that the recent assassination of Orlando Letelier in Washington, D.C. may have been carried out as a third phase action of 'Operation Condor.'" Several passages about the special teams are excised.[^4]
The 2000 report describes Operation Condor as an intelligence-sharing arrangement among Chile, [[Argentina]], [[Brazil]], [[Paraguay]] and [[Uruguay]] established in 1975.[^7] A cable of September 28, 1976 from the FBI legal attache in [[Buenos Aires]], [[Robert Scherrer]], reports information from a "confidential source abroad" that Operation Condor was the code name for the collection, exchange and storage of intelligence on "leftists," communists and Marxists, recently established between cooperating intelligence services in South America "in order to eliminate Marxist terrorist activities in the area." The cable states that Chile is the center for Operation Condor and that its members include Argentina, [[Bolivia]], Paraguay and Uruguay, with Brazil tentatively agreed to supply intelligence input; that Argentina, Uruguay and Chile had engaged in joint operations, primarily in Argentina; and that a third and most secret phase involves special teams from member countries who are "to travel anywhere in the world to non-member countries to carry out sanctions up to assassination against terrorists or supporters of terrorist organizations." France and Portugal are named as European countries specifically mentioned for possible third-phase operations. The cable states that no information had been developed indicating that third-phase sanctions were planned for the United States, and adds: "however, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that the recent assassination of Orlando Letelier in Washington, D.C. may have been carried out as a third phase action of 'Operation Condor.'" Several passages about the special teams are excised.[^4]
Scherrer also wrote to Chilean General [[Ernesto Baeza]] on June 6, 1975, reporting intelligence obtained through the interrogation of a captured Chilean leftist, Jorge Isaac Fuentes, who the National Security Archive states was detained through Operation Condor.[^4] An FBI summary dated January 21, 1982 of letters written from prison by [[Michael Townley]] reports, among other things, meetings between Pinochet and Italian terrorists and spies.[^4]
The Archives of Terror, the Paraguayan police files from the dictatorship of [[Alfredo Stroessner]], are listed in the UNESCO Memory of the World register. The register entry states that on December 23 and 24, 1991, judges José Agustín Fernández and Luis María Benítez Riera searched and seized the files of the production department of the police in Asunción and the technical section of the Ministry of the Interior, following the investigation of the human rights defender Martín Almada; it dates the documents from 1927 to February 1989 and states that the files provide evidence of Operation Condor.[^8]
The Archives of Terror, the Paraguayan police files from the dictatorship of [[Alfredo Stroessner]], are listed in the UNESCO Memory of the World register. The register entry states that on December 23 and 24, 1991, judges José Agustín Fernández and Luis María Benítez Riera searched and seized the files of the production department of the police in Asunción and the technical section of the Ministry of the Interior, following the investigation of the human rights defender Martín Almada; it dates the documents from 1927 to February 1989 and states that the files provide evidence of Operation Condor.[^9]
### Letelier and Moffitt
On September 21, 1976, a car bomb in [[Washington, D.C.]] killed the former Chilean ambassador [[Orlando Letelier]] and his American colleague [[Ronni Moffitt]].[^9] According to the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the government's principal witness, Michael Townley, a United States citizen who entered the employ of DINA in 1974, admitted his complicity in the killings and struck a plea bargain with the government in return for his testimony.[^9]
On September 21, 1976, a car bomb in [[Washington, D.C.]] killed the former Chilean ambassador [[Orlando Letelier]] and his American colleague [[Ronni Moffitt]].[^10] According to the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the government's principal witness, Michael Townley, a United States citizen who entered the employ of DINA in 1974, admitted his complicity in the killings and struck a plea bargain with the government in return for his testimony.[^10]
A CIA cable of October 6, 1976 reports that its source "believes that the Chilean government is directly involved in Letelier's death and feels that investigation into the incident will so indicate."[^2] The 2000 CIA report states that this was the CIA's first intelligence report containing the allegation.[^6] The indictments of August 1, 1978 named [[Guillermo Novo Sampol]], Alvin Ross Diaz, Juan Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, Pedro Espinoza Bravo, [[Armando Fernandez Larios]], [[Jose Dionisio Suarez Esquivel]] and [[Virgilio Paz Romero]]. Guillermo Novo, Ross and Ignacio Novo Sampol were tried by jury beginning January 8, 1979, and were found guilty on February 14, 1979. The Court of Appeals decided the appeal on September 15, 1980 (rehearing denied December 9, 1980) and reversed the convictions of Guillermo Novo and Ross, because informant testimony was inadmissible under the Supreme Court's decision of June 16, 1980 in [[United States v. Henry]], and remanded for retrial.[^9] The killing was carried out by the DINA, under Contreras, and was a rare Condor operation on American soil. On May 30, 1995, the Chilean Supreme Court upheld the prison sentences of Contreras (seven years) and Espinoza (six years) for ordering the assassination.[^10]
A CIA cable of October 6, 1976 reports that its source "believes that the Chilean government is directly involved in Letelier's death and feels that investigation into the incident will so indicate."[^2] The 2000 CIA report states that this was the CIA's first intelligence report containing the allegation.[^7] The indictments of August 1, 1978 named [[Guillermo Novo Sampol]], Alvin Ross Diaz, Juan Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, Pedro Espinoza Bravo, [[Armando Fernandez Larios]], [[Jose Dionisio Suarez Esquivel]] and [[Virgilio Paz Romero]]. Guillermo Novo, Ross and Ignacio Novo Sampol were tried by jury beginning January 8, 1979, and were found guilty on February 14, 1979. The Court of Appeals decided the appeal on September 15, 1980 (rehearing denied December 9, 1980) and reversed the convictions of Guillermo Novo and Ross, because informant testimony was inadmissible under the Supreme Court's decision of June 16, 1980 in [[United States v. Henry]], and remanded for retrial.[^10] The killing was carried out by the DINA, under Contreras, and was a rare Condor operation on American soil. On May 30, 1995, the Chilean Supreme Court upheld the prison sentences of Contreras (seven years) and Espinoza (six years) for ordering the assassination.[^11]
A CIA special intelligence assessment dated 1987 concluded that there was "convincing evidence that President Pinochet personally ordered his intelligence chief to carry out the murder." The assessment added that Pinochet later "decided to stonewall on the case to hide his involvement and, ultimately, to protect his hold on the presidency."[^11] A memorandum from [[George Shultz]] to [[Ronald Reagan]] dated October 6, 1987 reported the CIA conclusion to the president as part of an effort to terminate US support for the regime.[^12] The assessment and related documents were handed to Chilean President [[Michelle Bachelet]] by Deputy Secretary of State [[Heather Higginbottom]] on September 23, 2016. The National Security Archive states that the Justice Department had identified the intelligence records as evidence during a formal FBI investigation into Pinochet's guilt in April and May 2000, and that the FBI reportedly concluded there was enough circumstantial evidence to indict Pinochet.[^11]
A CIA special intelligence assessment dated 1987 concluded that there was "convincing evidence that President Pinochet personally ordered his intelligence chief to carry out the murder." The assessment added that Pinochet later "decided to stonewall on the case to hide his involvement and, ultimately, to protect his hold on the presidency."[^12] A memorandum from [[George Shultz]] to [[Ronald Reagan]] dated October 6, 1987 reported the CIA conclusion to the president as part of an effort to terminate US support for the regime.[^13] The assessment and related documents were handed to Chilean President [[Michelle Bachelet]] by Deputy Secretary of State [[Heather Higginbottom]] on September 23, 2016. The National Security Archive states that the Justice Department had identified the intelligence records as evidence during a formal FBI investigation into Pinochet's guilt in April and May 2000, and that the FBI reportedly concluded there was enough circumstantial evidence to indict Pinochet.[^12]
The CIA's 1978 intelligence report on Pinochet's strategy, as summarized by the National Security Archive, describes a four-point plan to protect Contreras from successful prosecution, stonewall US requests for evidence, prevent the Chilean Supreme Court from honoring US extradition requests, and persuade Chileans that the investigation was a politically motivated tool against the regime.[^2]
### Colonia Dignidad
A 2017 motion of the German [[Bundestag]] describes the [[Colonia Dignidad]] settlement in southern Chile, founded by the German [[Paul Schaefer]], as the scene of systematic, serious human rights violations during the Pinochet dictatorship, committed in part together with DINA.[^13] The crimes it lists include unlawful deprivation of liberty, enforced disappearance, forced labour and slavery, child abuse, and bodily harm.[^13] The motion records that Schaefer was arrested in 2005.[^13]
A 2017 motion of the German [[Bundestag]] describes the [[Colonia Dignidad]] settlement in southern Chile, founded by the German [[Paul Schaefer]], as the scene of systematic, serious human rights violations during the Pinochet dictatorship, committed in part together with DINA.[^14] The crimes it lists include unlawful deprivation of liberty, enforced disappearance, forced labour and slavery, child abuse, and bodily harm.[^14] The motion records that Schaefer was arrested in 2005.[^14]
In 1987 the Green Party group in the Bundestag asked the federal government what it knew of cooperation between the colony and DINA, and whether Contreras visited West Germany in the winter of 1975 and 1976, including stops in Augsburg, Wiesbaden, Nuremberg and Cologne.[^14]
In 1987 the Green Party group in the Bundestag asked the federal government what it knew of cooperation between the colony and DINA, and whether Contreras visited West Germany in the winter of 1975 and 1976, including stops in Augsburg, Wiesbaden, Nuremberg and Cologne.[^15]
In April 2016 the then German Foreign Minister, [[Frank-Walter Steinmeier]], stated on behalf of the whole [[Auswärtiges Amt]] that German diplomats had clearly done too little to protect their compatriots in the colony; he said the ministry was not to blame for the military coup or the seventeen years of dictatorship and bore no responsibility for the colony's activities, but that it should have more decisively given Germans counsel and assistance. The Foreign Office states that political prisoners were tortured and murdered in the colony during the Pinochet dictatorship, that since 2018 the Bundestag and the federal government have worked in a joint commission to help victims, and that a victims' aid concept was presented in May 2019.[^15]
In April 2016 the then German Foreign Minister, [[Frank-Walter Steinmeier]], stated on behalf of the whole [[Auswärtiges Amt]] that German diplomats had clearly done too little to protect their compatriots in the colony; he said the ministry was not to blame for the military coup or the seventeen years of dictatorship and bore no responsibility for the colony's activities, but that it should have more decisively given Germans counsel and assistance. The Foreign Office states that political prisoners were tortured and murdered in the colony during the Pinochet dictatorship, that since 2018 the Bundestag and the federal government have worked in a joint commission to help victims, and that a victims' aid concept was presented in May 2019.[^16]
### Carlos Cardoen and Iraq
[[Carlos Cardoen]], a Chilean arms manufacturer who returned to Santiago after the 1973 coup to work for the government-owned [[Chilean Mining Corporation]], is described by [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] as selling cluster bombs to [[Iraq]] by 1985 with the help of individuals connected to the CIA, and as having been charged in Miami in April 1992 by the US Customs Service.[^16] A federal grand jury in the Southern District of Florida returned a twenty-one count indictment against Cardoen and [[Industrias Cardoen]] on May 26, 1993.[^17] [[Alan Friedman]] reports that Cardoen's plant at [[Iquique]] produced about a thousand cluster bombs a month, with a first shipment worth 21 million dollars reaching Iraq early in 1984 during the [[Iran-Iraq War]]; a former CIA contractor described Cardoen to Friedman as "an all-purpose asset, designed to be one of those offshore stockpilers of military equipment who could be used by the CIA to ship arms to the Afghan rebels, to the boys in Angola, or anywhere the U.S. needed some help." The White House said in July 1991 that there "never were any sales, overt or covert, to Iraq or Iran through a third country." The British journalist [[Jonathan Moyle]], who was inquiring into Cardoen's helicopter project, was found dead in a Santiago hotel on March 31, 1990.[^18]
[[Carlos Cardoen]], a Chilean arms manufacturer who returned to Santiago after the 1973 coup to work for the government-owned [[Chilean Mining Corporation]], is described by [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] as selling cluster bombs to [[Iraq]] by 1985 with the help of individuals connected to the CIA, and as having been charged in Miami in April 1992 by the US Customs Service.[^17] A federal grand jury in the Southern District of Florida returned a twenty-one count indictment against Cardoen and [[Industrias Cardoen]] on May 26, 1993.[^18] [[Alan Friedman]] reports that Cardoen's plant at [[Iquique]] produced about a thousand cluster bombs a month, with a first shipment worth 21 million dollars reaching Iraq early in 1984 during the [[Iran-Iraq War]]; a former CIA contractor described Cardoen to Friedman as "an all-purpose asset, designed to be one of those offshore stockpilers of military equipment who could be used by the CIA to ship arms to the Afghan rebels, to the boys in Angola, or anywhere the U.S. needed some help." The White House said in July 1991 that there "never were any sales, overt or covert, to Iraq or Iran through a third country." The British journalist [[Jonathan Moyle]], who was inquiring into Cardoen's helicopter project, was found dead in a Santiago hotel on March 31, 1990.[^19]
### Reagan administration reassessment, 1984 to 1985
The United States ambassador in Santiago from March 1982 to August 2, 1985 was [[James D. Theberge]], a political appointee who had succeeded [[George Landau|George W. Landau]].[^19] A Central Intelligence Agency talking-points memorandum prepared for a January 28, 1985 meeting with Theberge, dated January 23, 1985, describes the visit as "primarily a personal visit." It lists as a point Theberge might raise the continuation in office of Pinochet, with a ninety-day state of siege that the memorandum records as "declared 6 November 1984" to assist the military government in combating a wave of terrorist incidents.[^20] The New York Times of December 16, 1984 also gives the state of siege as imposed on November 6; the same article reports that Theberge was present at a meeting of Representative [[Bill Richardson]] and two other members of the House Hispanic Caucus with Pinochet, which Richardson called "brutally frank and heated."[^21] An Associated Press dispatch from January 1985 by George Gedda, citing unnamed officials, reports that "Pinochet believes the CIA is out to overthrow him," in the words of one senior official, and that the Reagan administration planned to replace Theberge with [[Harry Barnes]], then ambassador in India, as the first step in a reassessment of its policy. The same dispatch dates the imposition of the state of siege to "Nov. 4."[^22]
The United States ambassador in Santiago from March 1982 to August 2, 1985 was [[James D. Theberge]], a political appointee who had succeeded [[George Landau|George W. Landau]].[^20] A Central Intelligence Agency talking-points memorandum prepared for a January 28, 1985 meeting with Theberge, dated January 23, 1985, describes the visit as "primarily a personal visit." It lists as a point Theberge might raise the continuation in office of Pinochet, with a ninety-day state of siege that the memorandum records as "declared 6 November 1984" to assist the military government in combating a wave of terrorist incidents.[^21] The New York Times of December 16, 1984 also gives the state of siege as imposed on November 6; the same article reports that Theberge was present at a meeting of Representative [[Bill Richardson]] and two other members of the House Hispanic Caucus with Pinochet, which Richardson called "brutally frank and heated."[^22] An Associated Press dispatch from January 1985 by George Gedda, citing unnamed officials, reports that "Pinochet believes the CIA is out to overthrow him," in the words of one senior official, and that the Reagan administration planned to replace Theberge with [[Harry Barnes]], then ambassador in India, as the first step in a reassessment of its policy. The same dispatch dates the imposition of the state of siege to "Nov. 4."[^23]
### London arrest and the House of Lords
Pinochet landed at Heathrow on September 22, 1998, and underwent back surgery in [[London]]. On October 16, 1998 a Spanish warrant was issued by judge [[Baltasar Garzon]] and a London magistrate issued a provisional warrant the same day. The Lords judgment states that Pinochet was arrested in a London hospital on October 17, 1998; Home Secretary [[Jack Straw]] told the House of Commons that he was arrested "that evening" after the Bow Street warrant was issued on October 16.[^1][^23] On October 28, 1998 the Divisional Court quashed both provisional warrants, on the ground for the second that Pinochet was entitled to state immunity as former head of state.[^1]
Pinochet landed at Heathrow on September 22, 1998, and underwent back surgery in [[London]]. On October 16, 1998 a Spanish warrant was issued by judge [[Baltasar Garzon]] and a London magistrate issued a provisional warrant the same day. The Lords judgment states that Pinochet was arrested in a London hospital on October 17, 1998; Home Secretary [[Jack Straw]] told the House of Commons that he was arrested "that evening" after the Bow Street warrant was issued on October 16.[^1][^24] On October 28, 1998 the Divisional Court quashed both provisional warrants, on the ground for the second that Pinochet was entitled to state immunity as former head of state.[^1]
The House of Lords first ruled on November 25, 1998, by majority that Pinochet was not immune for crimes under international law. That judgment was set aside on January 15, 1999, because the committee that heard it was not properly constituted, and the appeal was reheard from January 18, 1999.[^1] In the judgment of March 24, 1999, [[Lord Browne-Wilkinson]] wrote: "I do not consider that torture committed outside the United Kingdom before 29 September 1988 was a crime under U.K. law." He would allow the appeal "so as to permit the extradition proceedings to proceed on the allegation that torture in pursuance of a conspiracy to commit torture, including the single act of torture which is alleged in charge 30, was being committed by Senator Pinochet after 8 December 1988 when he lost his immunity."[^1] Straw described the key majority finding of the second Lords hearing as being that torture was an international crime over which parties to the torture convention had universal jurisdiction and that a former head of state did not have immunity from such crimes.[^23]
The House of Lords first ruled on November 25, 1998, by majority that Pinochet was not immune for crimes under international law. That judgment was set aside on January 15, 1999, because the committee that heard it was not properly constituted, and the appeal was reheard from January 18, 1999.[^1] In the judgment of March 24, 1999, [[Lord Browne-Wilkinson]] wrote: "I do not consider that torture committed outside the United Kingdom before 29 September 1988 was a crime under U.K. law." He would allow the appeal "so as to permit the extradition proceedings to proceed on the allegation that torture in pursuance of a conspiracy to commit torture, including the single act of torture which is alleged in charge 30, was being committed by Senator Pinochet after 8 December 1988 when he lost his immunity."[^1] Straw described the key majority finding of the second Lords hearing as being that torture was an international crime over which parties to the torture convention had universal jurisdiction and that a former head of state did not have immunity from such crimes.[^24]
Straw issued a second authority to proceed on April 14, 1999; on October 8, 1999 a Bow Street magistrate committed Pinochet to await the Home Secretary's decision. On October 14, 1999 the Chilean embassy made representations supported by medical reports, and Straw commissioned an examination by Professor Sir John Grimley Evans, Professor Andrew Lees and Dr. Michael Denham, joined by the neuropsychologist Dr. Maria Wyke. Straw informed the interested parties on January 11, 2000 that he was minded to conclude that no purpose would be served by continuing the Spanish extradition request, and on January 25, 2000 Belgium and [[Amnesty International]] applied for judicial review of the refusal to disclose the medical report.[^23]
Straw issued a second authority to proceed on April 14, 1999; on October 8, 1999 a Bow Street magistrate committed Pinochet to await the Home Secretary's decision. On October 14, 1999 the Chilean embassy made representations supported by medical reports, and Straw commissioned an examination by Professor Sir John Grimley Evans, Professor Andrew Lees and Dr. Michael Denham, joined by the neuropsychologist Dr. Maria Wyke. Straw informed the interested parties on January 11, 2000 that he was minded to conclude that no purpose would be served by continuing the Spanish extradition request, and on January 25, 2000 Belgium and [[Amnesty International]] applied for judicial review of the refusal to disclose the medical report.[^24]
On March 2, 2000, Straw told the Commons that he had discharged Pinochet from the Spanish request "on the grounds that he was unfit to stand trial and that no significant improvement in his condition could be expected," and that he would not issue an authority to proceed on the Belgian, French and Swiss requests because none disclosed an extradition crime. He stated: "All the decisions which I have taken have been mine alone, and have not been decisions of Her Majesty's Government." A plane provided by the Chilean government carrying Pinochet left RAF Waddington at about 1.10 pm that day.[^23] The Solicitor-General stated in a written answer of the same date, on the advice of the Director of Public Prosecutions, that there was no realistic prospect of convicting Pinochet in England and Wales and that no court there would allow a trial of Pinochet to take place.[^23] A 35-page Home Office statement handed out in London set out reasons for the conclusion that Pinochet was not mentally or physically fit to stand trial in Britain or anywhere else.[^24] He returned to Chile, where he faced numerous criminal and civil charges until his death.
On March 2, 2000, Straw told the Commons that he had discharged Pinochet from the Spanish request "on the grounds that he was unfit to stand trial and that no significant improvement in his condition could be expected," and that he would not issue an authority to proceed on the Belgian, French and Swiss requests because none disclosed an extradition crime. He stated: "All the decisions which I have taken have been mine alone, and have not been decisions of Her Majesty's Government." A plane provided by the Chilean government carrying Pinochet left RAF Waddington at about 1.10 pm that day.[^24] The Solicitor-General stated in a written answer of the same date, on the advice of the Director of Public Prosecutions, that there was no realistic prospect of convicting Pinochet in England and Wales and that no court there would allow a trial of Pinochet to take place.[^24] A 35-page Home Office statement handed out in London set out reasons for the conclusion that Pinochet was not mentally or physically fit to stand trial in Britain or anywhere else.[^25] He returned to Chile, where he faced numerous criminal and civil charges until his death.
### Riggs Bank accounts
The minority staff of the Senate [[Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations]] released its report on [[Riggs Bank]] with a hearing on July 15, 2004. The report's title is "Money Laundering and Foreign Corruption: Enforcement and Effectiveness of the Patriot Act, Case Study Involving Riggs Bank." Its first finding states that Riggs "assisted Augusto Pinochet, former president of Chile, to evade legal proceedings related to his Riggs bank accounts and resisted OCC oversight of these accounts."[^25]
The minority staff of the Senate [[Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations]] released its report on [[Riggs Bank]] with a hearing on July 15, 2004. The report's title is "Money Laundering and Foreign Corruption: Enforcement and Effectiveness of the Patriot Act, Case Study Involving Riggs Bank." Its first finding states that Riggs "assisted Augusto Pinochet, former president of Chile, to evade legal proceedings related to his Riggs bank accounts and resisted OCC oversight of these accounts."[^26]
The report finds that Pinochet was a Riggs customer for at least eight years, with total deposits that varied from about $4 million to $8 million. In July 1996 a Spanish indictment charged him with crimes against humanity. In 1996 and again in 1998, Riggs helped him set up two Bahamian shell companies, Ashburton Company Ltd. and Althorp Investment Co., Ltd., listed as nominal owners of accounts and certificates of deposit benefiting him and his family.[^25] The report also states that the bank delivered over $1.9 million in cashier's checks to Pinochet in Chile.[^25]
The report finds that Pinochet was a Riggs customer for at least eight years, with total deposits that varied from about $4 million to $8 million. In July 1996 a Spanish indictment charged him with crimes against humanity. In 1996 and again in 1998, Riggs helped him set up two Bahamian shell companies, Ashburton Company Ltd. and Althorp Investment Co., Ltd., listed as nominal owners of accounts and certificates of deposit benefiting him and his family.[^26] The report also states that the bank delivered over $1.9 million in cashier's checks to Pinochet in Chile.[^26]
### Carlos Prats and Enrique Arancibia Clavel
On September 30, 1974, a car bomb in Buenos Aires killed the exiled Chilean general [[Carlos Prats]] and his wife, [[Sofía Cuthbert]].[^26] Kornbluh's 2024 compilation states that Pinochet met Contreras in June 1974 and ordered him to eliminate Prats. The task first went to the DINA station chief in Argentina, [[Enrique Arancibia Clavel]], and then to DINA deputy director [[Pedro Espinoza]], who gave it to Townley, who constructed, placed and detonated the bomb.[^26]
On September 30, 1974, a car bomb in Buenos Aires killed the exiled Chilean general [[Carlos Prats]] and his wife, [[Sofía Cuthbert]].[^27] Kornbluh's 2024 compilation states that Pinochet met Contreras in June 1974 and ordered him to eliminate Prats. The task first went to the DINA station chief in Argentina, [[Enrique Arancibia Clavel]], and then to DINA deputy director [[Pedro Espinoza]], who gave it to Townley, who constructed, placed and detonated the bomb.[^27]
On August 24, 2004, the [[Supreme Court of Argentina]] upheld the life sentence that a federal tribunal had imposed on Arancibia Clavel for association and necessary participation in the double aggravated homicide of Prats and Cuthbert. The court held that the crimes could not be time-barred, because crimes against humanity are imprescriptible.[^27]
On August 24, 2004, the [[Supreme Court of Argentina]] upheld the life sentence that a federal tribunal had imposed on Arancibia Clavel for association and necessary participation in the double aggravated homicide of Prats and Cuthbert. The court held that the crimes could not be time-barred, because crimes against humanity are imprescriptible.[^28]
[^1]: *Regina v. Evans and Another and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others, Ex Parte Pinochet (No. 3)* [1999] UKHL 17 (24 March 1999), speech of Lord Browne-Wilkinson, paras. 7-12 (facts, warrants of October 16, 17, 18 and 22, 1998, Divisional Court of October 28, 1998, Lords judgments of November 25, 1998, set aside January 15, 1999, rehearing January 18, 1999) and conclusion. https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1999/17.html
[^2]: National Security Archive, "Pinochet: A Declassified Documentary Obit," Electronic Briefing Book No. 212, Peter Kornbluh and Yvette White, posted December 12, 2006, with descriptions of documents including the September 13, 1973 State Department cable, the November 1973 "Chilean Executions" memorandum, the October 27, 1973 CIA report, the October 6, 1976 CIA cable, and the June 23, 1978 CIA report. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB212/index.htm
[^3]: United States Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, "Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973" (staff report, 1975), section "2. Track II" and the chronology. https://archive.org/details/Covert-Action-In-Chile-1963-1973
[^4]: National Security Archive, "Chile and the United States: Declassified Documents Relating to the Military Coup, September 11, 1973," Electronic Briefing Book No. 8, Peter Kornbluh, 1998, document descriptions including the September 15, 1970 Helms notes, the October 15 and 16, 1970 CIA records, the October 18, 1970 cables on the Schneider plot, the April 15, 1975 DIA report, the June 6, 1975 FBI letter and the January 21, 1982 FBI report on Townley; and FBI Buenos Aires cable to the Director, September 28, 1976 (reproduced in the briefing book as document 23, pp. 1-4). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/nsaebb8.htm and https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/docs/doc23.pdf
[^5]: United States Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, Interim Report, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), Chile chapter beginning at p. 225 (Schneider sections, including the findings and the discussion of the shooting of General Schneider and CIA/White House communication during Track II). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf
[^6]: Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA Activities in Chile," September 18, 2000 (report under Section 311 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, the Hinchey Amendment), sections "Relationship with Contreras," "The Schneider Assassination," "Accession of General Augusto Pinochet to the Presidency," "Knowledge of 'Operation Condor'" and "Knowledge of Human Rights Violations." https://permanent.fdlp.gov/websites/www.cia.gov/www.cia.gov/cia/reports/chile/index.html
[^7]: National Security Archive, "CIA Acknowledges Ties to Pinochet's Repression," Chile Documentation Project, September 19, 2000, summary of the Hinchey report. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/news/20000919/index.html
[^8]: UNESCO, Memory of the World Regional Register for Latin America and the Caribbean, "Archives of Terror, XXth Century" (Paraguay, registration ID 66/2011; institution: Centro de Documentación y Archivos para la defensa de los derechos humanos, Corte Suprema de Justicia). https://www.unesco.org/en/memory-world/lac/archives-terror-xxth-century
[^9]: *United States v. Sampol*, 636 F.2d 621 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per curiam), argued June 10, 1980, decided September 15, 1980, rehearing denied December 9, 1980. https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/u-s-v-sampol-886429361
[^10]: "Chile Officers To Go To Prison For '76 Murder," Los Angeles Times, reprinted in The Spokesman-Review (Spokane), May 31, 1995. https://www.spokesman.com/stories/1995/may/31/chile-officers-to-go-to-prison-for-76-murder/
[^11]: National Security Archive, "CIA: 'Pinochet personally ordered' Letelier bombing," Electronic Briefing Book No. 560, September 23, 2016, quoting the CIA special intelligence assessment of 1987. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/node/3081
[^12]: National Security Archive, "The Pinochet File: U.S. Declassifies Missing Documents in the Letelier-Moffitt Case," Electronic Briefing Book No. 532, October 8, 2015, describing the October 6, 1987 Shultz memorandum to Reagan. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/node/2899
[^13]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 18/12943 (2017), motion on Colonia Dignidad (German; paraphrased). https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/18/129/1812943.pdf
[^14]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 11/1409 (1987), minor interpellation of the Green Party group on Colonia Dignidad (German; paraphrased). https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/11/014/1101409.pdf
[^15]: Auswärtiges Amt, "'Colonia Dignidad': Bilanzbericht der Gemeinsamen Kommission," September 21, 2021 (German; paraphrased), including the account of Steinmeier's April 2016 statement. https://auswaertiges-amt.de/de/aussenpolitik/laender/chile-node/bilanzbericht-colonia-dignidad/2483426
[^16]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
[^17]: *United States v. Cardoen*, 898 F. Supp. 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1995), No. 93-241-CR, https://static.case.law/f-supp/898/cases/1563-01.json.
[^18]: Friedman, Alan. *Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq*. Bantam, 1993, pp. 46-54, 64.
[^19]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, "James Daniel Theberge (1930-1988)," https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/theberge-james-daniel; "Nomination of James Daniel Theberge To Be United States Ambassador to Chile," Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, November 6, 1981, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/11681a
[^20]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Talking points for 28 January 1985 meeting with James D. Theberge, United States Ambassador to Chile," January 23, 1985, CREST document CIA-RDP87M00539R000801050046-5. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp87m00539r000801050046-5
[^21]: Lydia Chavez, "Congressman Reports Tough Talk From Pinochet," *The New York Times*, December 16, 1984, section 1, page 20. https://www.nytimes.com/1984/12/16/world/congressman-reports-tough-talk-from-pinochet.html
[^22]: George Gedda, Associated Press, "Pinochet fears CIA coup, officials say," January 1985, CREST document CIA-RDP90-00965R000302230009-6. Attributed to unnamed officials. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302230009-6
[^23]: UK House of Commons, *Hansard*, "Senator Pinochet," HC Deb 02 March 2000 vol 345 cc571-88 (statement of the Home Secretary, Jack Straw), and written answer of the Solicitor-General, HC Deb 02 March 2000 vol 345 cc336-7W. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/2000/mar/02/senator-pinochet and https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written_answers/2000/mar/02/senator-pinochet
[^24]: CNN, transcript of March 2, 2000 (report on Home Secretary Jack Straw's decision and the 35-page statement). https://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0003/02/nd.03.html
[^25]: United States Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, minority staff, "Money Laundering and Foreign Corruption: Enforcement and Effectiveness of the Patriot Act, Case Study Involving Riggs Bank" (report released with the July 15, 2004 hearing), Finding 1 (p. 7) and Section B (p. 18). https://archive.org/details/SenateSubcommitteeReportOnMoneyLaunderingAndRiggsBank
[^26]: National Security Archive, "The Pinochet Regime at 50: The Assassination of General Carlos Prats and Sofía Cuthbert," Electronic Briefing Book, Peter Kornbluh, October 1, 2024, narrative and CIA and DINA documents. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/chile/2024-10-01/pinochet-regime-50-assassination-general-carlos-prats-and-sofia
[^27]: Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nacion (Argentina), *Arancibia Clavel, Enrique Lautaro s/ homicidio calificado y asociacion ilicita y otros*, recurso de hecho, Buenos Aires, August 24, 2004. https://www.cancilleria.gob.ar/userfiles/ut/fallo_arancibia_clavel_2004_01.pdf
[^5]: Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Hearings*, vol. 7, "Covert Action," December 4 and 5, 1975, statement of Gregory Treverton, p. 14 (Helms's handwritten notes quoted, including "Make the economy scream."), and Exhibit 2, p. 96 (handwritten notes by Richard Helms taken during the meeting of September 15, 1970 with President Nixon).
[^6]: United States Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, Interim Report, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), Chile chapter beginning at p. 225 (Schneider sections, including the findings and the discussion of the shooting of General Schneider and CIA/White House communication during Track II). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf
[^7]: Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA Activities in Chile," September 18, 2000 (report under Section 311 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, the Hinchey Amendment), sections "Relationship with Contreras," "The Schneider Assassination," "Accession of General Augusto Pinochet to the Presidency," "Knowledge of 'Operation Condor'" and "Knowledge of Human Rights Violations." https://permanent.fdlp.gov/websites/www.cia.gov/www.cia.gov/cia/reports/chile/index.html
[^8]: National Security Archive, "CIA Acknowledges Ties to Pinochet's Repression," Chile Documentation Project, September 19, 2000, summary of the Hinchey report. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/news/20000919/index.html
[^9]: UNESCO, Memory of the World Regional Register for Latin America and the Caribbean, "Archives of Terror, XXth Century" (Paraguay, registration ID 66/2011; institution: Centro de Documentación y Archivos para la defensa de los derechos humanos, Corte Suprema de Justicia). https://www.unesco.org/en/memory-world/lac/archives-terror-xxth-century
[^10]: *United States v. Sampol*, 636 F.2d 621 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per curiam), argued June 10, 1980, decided September 15, 1980, rehearing denied December 9, 1980. https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/u-s-v-sampol-886429361
[^11]: "Chile Officers To Go To Prison For '76 Murder," Los Angeles Times, reprinted in The Spokesman-Review (Spokane), May 31, 1995. https://www.spokesman.com/stories/1995/may/31/chile-officers-to-go-to-prison-for-76-murder/
[^12]: National Security Archive, "CIA: 'Pinochet personally ordered' Letelier bombing," Electronic Briefing Book No. 560, September 23, 2016, quoting the CIA special intelligence assessment of 1987. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/node/3081
[^13]: National Security Archive, "The Pinochet File: U.S. Declassifies Missing Documents in the Letelier-Moffitt Case," Electronic Briefing Book No. 532, October 8, 2015, describing the October 6, 1987 Shultz memorandum to Reagan. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/node/2899
[^14]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 18/12943 (2017), motion on Colonia Dignidad (German; paraphrased). https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/18/129/1812943.pdf
[^15]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 11/1409 (1987), minor interpellation of the Green Party group on Colonia Dignidad (German; paraphrased). https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/11/014/1101409.pdf
[^16]: Auswärtiges Amt, "'Colonia Dignidad': Bilanzbericht der Gemeinsamen Kommission," September 21, 2021 (German; paraphrased), including the account of Steinmeier's April 2016 statement. https://auswaertiges-amt.de/de/aussenpolitik/laender/chile-node/bilanzbericht-colonia-dignidad/2483426
[^17]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
[^18]: *United States v. Cardoen*, 898 F. Supp. 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1995), No. 93-241-CR, https://static.case.law/f-supp/898/cases/1563-01.json.
[^19]: Friedman, Alan. *Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq*. Bantam, 1993, pp. 46-54, 64.
[^20]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, "James Daniel Theberge (1930-1988)," https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/theberge-james-daniel; "Nomination of James Daniel Theberge To Be United States Ambassador to Chile," Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, November 6, 1981, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/11681a
[^21]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Talking points for 28 January 1985 meeting with James D. Theberge, United States Ambassador to Chile," January 23, 1985, CREST document CIA-RDP87M00539R000801050046-5. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp87m00539r000801050046-5
[^22]: Lydia Chavez, "Congressman Reports Tough Talk From Pinochet," *The New York Times*, December 16, 1984, section 1, page 20. https://www.nytimes.com/1984/12/16/world/congressman-reports-tough-talk-from-pinochet.html
[^23]: George Gedda, Associated Press, "Pinochet fears CIA coup, officials say," January 1985, CREST document CIA-RDP90-00965R000302230009-6. Attributed to unnamed officials. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302230009-6
[^24]: UK House of Commons, *Hansard*, "Senator Pinochet," HC Deb 02 March 2000 vol 345 cc571-88 (statement of the Home Secretary, Jack Straw), and written answer of the Solicitor-General, HC Deb 02 March 2000 vol 345 cc336-7W. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/2000/mar/02/senator-pinochet and https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written_answers/2000/mar/02/senator-pinochet
[^25]: CNN, transcript of March 2, 2000 (report on Home Secretary Jack Straw's decision and the 35-page statement). https://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0003/02/nd.03.html
[^26]: United States Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, minority staff, "Money Laundering and Foreign Corruption: Enforcement and Effectiveness of the Patriot Act, Case Study Involving Riggs Bank" (report released with the July 15, 2004 hearing), Finding 1 (p. 7) and Section B (p. 18). https://archive.org/details/SenateSubcommitteeReportOnMoneyLaunderingAndRiggsBank
[^27]: National Security Archive, "The Pinochet Regime at 50: The Assassination of General Carlos Prats and Sofía Cuthbert," Electronic Briefing Book, Peter Kornbluh, October 1, 2024, narrative and CIA and DINA documents. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/chile/2024-10-01/pinochet-regime-50-assassination-general-carlos-prats-and-sofia
[^28]: Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nacion (Argentina), *Arancibia Clavel, Enrique Lautaro s/ homicidio calificado y asociacion ilicita y otros*, recurso de hecho, Buenos Aires, August 24, 2004. https://www.cancilleria.gob.ar/userfiles/ut/fallo_arancibia_clavel_2004_01.pdf

7
10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Commander Narut.md
View file

@ -12,12 +12,12 @@ tags:
- ColdWar
- NATO
- Interrogation
summary: "US Navy clinical psychologist stationed in Naples who disclosed at a 1975 NATO conference in Oslo that the Navy had trained 'combat psychopaths' as assassins through a three-phase audio-visual desensitization program, triggering a brief international scandal before retracting the most specific of his claims under institutional pressure."
summary: "US Navy clinical psychologist in Naples who told a 1975 NATO conference in Oslo that the Navy trained 'combat psychopaths' as assassins, then retracted the most specific claims under institutional pressure."
born: 1935
died: 1994-04-19
location: Naples, Italy
created: 2026-06-04
updated: 2026-06-04
updated: 2026-10-09
---
Thomas E. Narut was a [[U.S. Navy]] clinical psychologist stationed at the US Naval Regional Medical Center in [[Naples]], [[Italy]], who in June or July 1975 disclosed in private conversation at a [[NATO]] conference in [[Oslo]] that the Navy operated a program to select, condition, and deploy personnel as covert assassins. The disclosure appeared in the [[London]] [[The Sunday Times|Sunday Times]] on July 6, 1975, under the headline "The Strange Tale of Commander Narut," authored by Peter Watson, the paper's science correspondent. It was denied the same day by the Pentagon, and Narut partially retracted his most specific claim within days under institutional pressure. Watson never retracted the story.[^1]
@ -59,8 +59,9 @@ After his London press conference, Narut returned to Naples and continued at the
### Absence of Congressional Investigation
No congressional investigation specifically addressed Narut's claims. The [[Church Committee]] was active in 1975 and in November of that year issued its interim report on CIA assassination plots, documenting programs targeting Fidel Castro, Patrice Lumumba, Rafael Trujillo, Ngo Dinh Diem, and [[Rene Schneider|René Schneider]], but the committee's focus was on CIA operations rather than Navy psychological conditioning programs. In January 1976 the committee did examine a CIA assassination unit designated PB/7, a parallel to Narut's claims involving a different agency. President Ford issued Executive Order 11905 in February 1976 banning US government-sanctioned assassinations of foreign leaders. The absence of specific congressional pursuit of Narut's disclosures, despite their timing during the Church Committee investigation, remains one of the unresolved gaps in the record.[^1]
No congressional investigation specifically addressed Narut's claims. The [[Church Committee]] was active in 1975 and in November of that year issued its interim report on CIA assassination plots, documenting programs targeting Fidel Castro, Patrice Lumumba, Rafael Trujillo, Ngo Dinh Diem, and [[Rene Schneider|René Schneider]], but the committee's focus was on CIA operations rather than Navy psychological conditioning programs. In January 1976 the committee did examine a CIA assassination unit designated PB/7, a parallel to Narut's claims involving a different agency. The final report's Book IV describes Program Branch 7 (PB/7), headed in the early years of the CIA by Army Colonel [[Boris Pash]], as a "special operations" unit within the [[Office of Policy Coordination]] with jurisdiction over assassinations and kidnappings. The staff stated that it found no evidence that the unit carried out any such operation.[^2] President Ford issued Executive Order 11905 in February 1976 banning US government-sanctioned assassinations of foreign leaders. The absence of specific congressional pursuit of Narut's disclosures, despite their timing during the Church Committee investigation, remains one of the unresolved gaps in the record.[^1]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Peter Watson, "The Strange Tale of Commander Narut," *Sunday Times* (London), July 6, 1975; Reuters wire service denial, July 6-7, 1975; Peter Watson, *War on the Mind: The Military Uses and Abuses of Psychology*. Basic Books, 1978. pp. 248-250 (Ch. 14); Walter Bowart, *Operation Mind Control*. Dell, 1978; Jeffrey Kaye, "UK Sunday Times: US Navy Placed 'Hit Men' in Overseas Embassies," Substack, kayej.substack.com.
[^2]: Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Final Report*, Book IV, "Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Foreign and Military Intelligence," S. Rept. 94-755, April 26, 1976, pp. 128 to 129 (section II, "The 'Special Operations' Unit"; subsection A, "Program Branch 7: A Special Operations Unit with Assassination Jurisdiction"; the staff's sources include a CIA letter to the committee of January 16, 1976 and an Office of Policy Coordination planning memorandum of January 1, 1976).

40
10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Pat Price.md
View file

@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ relations:
role: "Kress was the CIA project officer for the SRI work and for the personal services contract, according to Kress and to Schnabel"
fn: 16
created: 2026-05-17
updated: 2026-10-05
updated: 2026-10-09
---
Patrick Harold Price was born on December 8, 1918, and died in [[Las Vegas]] on July 14, 1975. A Patrick Price sat on the [[Burbank City Council]] in 1950-1953 according to the city's photograph archive, and [[Hal Puthoff]] and [[Russell Targ]] later described the remote viewer as a former police commissioner and vice-mayor of [[Burbank, California|Burbank]]. He was subject S1 in the [[Stanford Research Institute]] (SRI) work for the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] from June 1973 until the autumn of 1974. He then worked under a personal services contract for the CIA's [[Office of Technical Service]] until his death.[^1]
@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ SRI's report on the SCANATE project introduces him without a surname: "As a back
Kress gave a different weighting of the same episode in his 1977 article for the CIA's journal *[[Studies in Intelligence]]*. In his account an officer of the CIA's [[Office of Scientific Intelligence]] passed only geographic coordinates of a vacation property in the eastern United States to the SRI physicists, who passed them to two subjects, one of them Price; both "talked about a military-like facility," and the correlation of the two descriptions led the officer to drive to the site, where he found a sensitive government installation a few miles from the vacation property. Price, asked for the interior, "provided a list of project titles associated with current and past activities including one of extreme sensitivity" and the codename of the site; "other information concerning the physical layout of the site was accurate. Some information, such as the names of the people at the site, proved incorrect." Kress's summary was that "the evaluation was, as usual, mixed."[^7]
Schnabel's account of the origin of the coordinates uses two pseudonyms: "[[Richard Kennett]]," an analyst in the CIA's Office of Scientific Intelligence, asked a colleague he calls "[[Bill O'Donnell]]" for coordinates of a place on the East Coast that O'Donnell could later recognize from a drawing or photograph, and telephoned the figures to Puthoff. Schnabel identified the target as the [[Naval Security Group Activity]] base at [[Sugar Grove]], [[West Virginia]]. He added that he could find no record, in the Army, Air Force or Marines, of the three officers Price had named, that the coordinates actually given to Swann and Price described a place about ten miles southwest of Sugar Grove on Bullpasture Mountain in [[Virginia]], and that Swann had told him the names, project code words and coordinates in SRI's reports were later changed to protect the site, which Puthoff denied.[^8] The Snyders' evaluation of 1979 added: "It is alleged, although unverified by the authors, that Price had once worked for the organization that had control over that particular site."[^9] Kress's 1977 article, by contrast, says Price "had no military or intelligence background."[^4]
Schnabel's account of the origin of the coordinates uses two pseudonyms: "[[Richard Kennett]]," an analyst in the CIA's Office of Scientific Intelligence, asked a colleague he calls "[[Bill O'Donnell]]" for coordinates of a place on the East Coast that O'Donnell could later recognize from a drawing or photograph, and telephoned the figures to Puthoff. Schnabel identified the target as the [[Naval Security Group Activity]] base at [[Sugar Grove]], West Virginia. He added that he could find no record, in the Army, Air Force or Marines, of the three officers Price had named, that the coordinates actually given to Swann and Price described a place about ten miles southwest of Sugar Grove on Bullpasture Mountain in [[Virginia]], and that Swann had told him the names, project code words and coordinates in SRI's reports were later changed to protect the site, which Puthoff denied.[^8] The Snyders' evaluation of 1979 added: "It is alleged, although unverified by the authors, that Price had once worked for the organization that had control over that particular site."[^9] Kress's 1977 article, by contrast, says Price "had no military or intelligence background."[^4]
### SRI sessions, 1973 and 1974
@ -118,38 +118,46 @@ Schnabel's account of the end of the trip is the fullest. In mid-July 1975 Price
Schnabel wrote that when "Richard Kennett" and others tried to find out what had happened, they learned that no autopsy had been performed, although autopsies were normal for out-of-town deaths outside hospitals; they were told that a friend of Price, not Alvarez, had arrived with a briefcase of his medical records, which with the emergency-room physician's statements led Las Vegas officials to waive the autopsy. Kennett could not identify the man with the briefcase. Schnabel recorded the rumors that followed: that the man was from the CIA, that Price had been murdered by the Soviets, that he was alive under a new identity, and that a friend had a vision in which Price's ghost said he had been poisoned. He recorded the view of those who knew of Price's heart disease that "there was no real mystery," and that a CIA official who worked with Price told him the Agency "had no connection with any of the events surrounding Price's death, including the (alleged) appearance of the mysterious man with the medical records." As late as 1994, Schnabel wrote, Targ told him: "I don't know how Pat Price died."[^24]
In late summer 1977, Schnabel wrote, a few weeks after the Parade section of [[The Washington Post]] of August 7, 1977 carried an article headed "Psychic Spying," [[Stansfield Turner]], the Director of Central Intelligence, was asked about the subject at a meeting with reporters and, "clearly referring to Pat Price," said that the CIA had once worked with a man who seemed to have some psychic ability, whose drawings of foreign targets he had not seen were reasonably accurate but rudimentary: "he died, and we haven't heard from him since." When the Office of Technical Service briefed the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence]] on November 16, 1977, a briefing the Agency's memorandum of November 17 says "was occasioned by" the Parade article, it left with the staff "a brief article on Mr. Pat Price."[^25] A [[Defense Intelligence College]] thesis of 1992 quotes Turner at a breakfast for journalists in 1977 as saying the CIA "had an individual who from time to time was able to draw very elementary sketches of street scenes in foreign countries where he had never been," and that "this subject died in 1975, and we haven't heard from him since."[^26]
In late summer 1977, Schnabel wrote, a few weeks after [[The Washington Post]] of August 7, 1977 carried an article headed "Psychic Spying?" by [[John L. Wilhelm]], [[Stansfield Turner]], the Director of Central Intelligence, was asked about the subject at a meeting with reporters and, "clearly referring to Pat Price," said that the CIA had once worked with a man who seemed to have some psychic ability, whose drawings of foreign targets he had not seen were reasonably accurate but rudimentary: "he died, and we haven't heard from him since." When the Office of Technical Service briefed the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence]] on November 16, 1977, a briefing the Agency's memorandum of November 17 says "was occasioned by" the article (the memorandum places it in "the Parade Section of the Washington Post"), it left with the staff "a brief article on Mr. Pat Price."[^25] A [[Defense Intelligence College]] thesis of 1992 quotes Turner at a breakfast for journalists in 1977 as saying the CIA "had an individual who from time to time was able to draw very elementary sketches of street scenes in foreign countries where he had never been," and that "this subject died in 1975, and we haven't heard from him since."[^26]
The CIA's files record the death as follows. Kress, writing in the CIA's journal in the Winter 1977 issue, wrote of the second Libyan requirements list passed to Price: "Price died of a heart attack a few days later, and the program stopped."[^27] An OTS chronology attached to the memorandum of November 17, 1977 has an undated entry reading "Before a meeting can be set up, however, Mr. Price dies of a heart attack," followed by entries for September 1975 and October 1975, the latter reading "Mr. Price's death effectively ends all official OTS involvement in ESP research."[^28] John L. Wilhelm, a former national science correspondent for Time, wrote in the Washington Post of August 7, 1977 that "Pat Price, who died two years ago, also was a high-level 'Operating Thetan.'"[^29] An information paper of April 13, 1979 (DAMI-ISH) states: "In July 1975, Libyan coordinates were provided to Price, who came back with a description of a guerrilla training site," and that "the same month Price tragically died of a heart attack."[^30] A history of government-sponsored psychoenergetics research of February 1989 states of the Libyan requests: "Two days later, however, Price died of a heart attack."[^31] A memorandum of July 16, 1986 from the Assistant for Coordination and Strategy of the Office of Research and Development to the Director of Research and Development, about a request from SRI and the Defense Intelligence Agency for Price's data, says, of a meeting of June 12, 1986 with SRI's principal investigator: "Since Pat died in 1977, and I had personally worked with him, they wanted to debrief me on my recollections of him and his procedures."[^32]
### The 1995 review
The American Institutes for Research report of September 29, 1995 described the Semipalatinsk work as the third reported operational success, in which "the viewer was provided with only the geographic coordinates of the site." It noted that a government official who reviewed that work had concluded "there was no way the remote viewer could have drawn the large gantry crane unless 'he actually saw it through remote viewing, or he was informed of what to draw by someone knowledgeable of [the site],'" and that the same analyst judged the experiment unsuccessful because the positive evidence "was far outweighed by the large amount of negative evidence." The report added that "there is no way to know with certainty that the subject did not speak with someone who had knowledge of the site, however unlikely that possibility may appear," and that it was unknown to what degree the results in the reports "were selectively chosen because they were correct."[^27]
The American Institutes for Research report of September 29, 1995 described the Semipalatinsk work as the third reported operational success, in which "the viewer was provided with only the geographic coordinates of the site." It noted that a government official who reviewed that work had concluded "there was no way the remote viewer could have drawn the large gantry crane unless 'he actually saw it through remote viewing, or he was informed of what to draw by someone knowledgeable of [the site],'" and that the same analyst judged the experiment unsuccessful because the positive evidence "was far outweighed by the large amount of negative evidence." The report added that "there is no way to know with certainty that the subject did not speak with someone who had knowledge of the site, however unlikely that possibility may appear," and that it was unknown to what degree the results in the reports "were selectively chosen because they were correct."[^33]
### Footnotes
[^1]: "1950-1953: Councilman - Patrick Price," photograph by Paul E. Wolfe, note on print "Patrick Price, Council 1950-1953," City Council Image Collection, identifier cco00655, Burbank Public Library, Burbank in Focus Office (physical copy held by the City Clerk's Office). https://burbankinfocus.org/islandora/object/islandora:90/ The collection record does not state that this councilman and the remote viewer are the same man; Targ and Puthoff and Schnabel both place the remote viewer's Burbank service in the same period. For the SRI period and the OTS contract see Kress, Kenneth A., "Parapsychology in Intelligence: A Personal Review and Conclusions," *Studies in Intelligence,* vol. 21, no. 4, Winter 1977, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200030040-0, read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
[^1]: "1950-1953: Councilman - Patrick Price," photograph by Paul E. Wolfe, note on print "Patrick Price, Council 1950-1953," City Council Image Collection, identifier cco00655, Burbank Public Library, Burbank in Focus Office (physical copy held by the City Clerk's Office). https://burbankinfocus.org/islandora/object/islandora:90/ The collection record does not state that this councilman and the remote viewer are the same man; Targ and Puthoff and Schnabel both place the remote viewer's Burbank service in the same period. For the SRI period and the OTS contract see Kress, Kenneth A., "Parapsychology in Intelligence: A Personal Review and Conclusions," *Studies in Intelligence,* vol. 21, no. 4, Winter 1977, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200030040-0.
[^2]: Carosa, Chris. "Patrick H. Price: Savior, Savant, or Sacrifice?," May 3, 2022, quoting "Story of Crime Questioned," Los Angeles Evening Citizen News, April 30, 1952. https://chriscarosa.com/2022/05/patrick-h-price-savior-savant-or-sacrifice/ The newspaper text is quoted from this web article.
[^3]: Targ, Russell, and Harold Puthoff. *Mind-Reach: Scientists Look at Psychic Abilities.* New York: Delacorte Press, 1977, chapter "Pat Price: A Man for All Seasons," read in the archive.org full-text copy of the 2005 reprint, https://archive.org/details/mind-reach-scientists-look-at-psychic-abilities-2005-russell-targ-harold-e.-puth
[^4]: Kress, "Parapsychology in Intelligence," *Studies in Intelligence,* Winter 1977, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200030040-0.
[^5]: Schnabel, Jim. *Remote Viewers: The Secret History of America's Psychic Spies.* New York: Dell, 1997, chapters on the SRI work and "The Shamans," and the discussion of Scientology, read in the archive.org full-text copy, https://archive.org/details/jim-schnabel-remote-viewers-the-secret-history-of-americas-psychic-spies_2 Schnabel's own notes state that "The anecdote about Price and the police dispatcher comes from Targ 1996"; he does not give a source for the Lockheed and Alaska details.
[^6]: Stanford Research Institute, "Project SCANATE, Exploratory Research in Remote Viewing," 1973, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100480002-4. Puthoff, Harold E., and Russell Targ. *Perceptual Augmentation Techniques,* final report, part two, research report, December 1, 1975, SRI Project 3183, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100410001-2, and part one, executive summary, covering January 1974 to February 1975, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100420001-1. The report codes its subjects; S3 and S1 are identified as Swann and Price by matching their responses to the named sessions in the SCANATE report. All read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
[^6]: Stanford Research Institute, "Project SCANATE, Exploratory Research in Remote Viewing," 1973, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100480002-4. Puthoff, Harold E., and Russell Targ. *Perceptual Augmentation Techniques,* final report, part two, research report, December 1, 1975, SRI Project 3183, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100410001-2, and part one, executive summary, covering January 1974 to February 1975, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100420001-1. The report codes its subjects; S3 and S1 are identified as Swann and Price by matching their responses to the named sessions in the SCANATE report. All.
[^7]: Kress, "Parapsychology in Intelligence," *Studies in Intelligence,* Winter 1977, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200030040-0, section on summer 1973.
[^8]: Schnabel, *Remote Viewers,* 1997, chapter text and notes to the chapter on Sugar Grove; pseudonyms are listed in the book's "Pseudonyms" page (which includes Richard Kennett, Bill O'Donnell, Peter Maris, Norm Everheart, Ed Rogers, Nick Clancy and Bill and Judy Alvarez). https://archive.org/details/jim-schnabel-remote-viewers-the-secret-history-of-americas-psychic-spies_2
[^9]: Snyder, Harry L., and Arlene G. Snyder. *Summary and Critical Evaluation of Research in Remote Viewing,* Report RV-79-1, final technical report, contract 77F104420, Systemetrics, Inc., Blacksburg, Virginia, June 1, 1979, parts 1 and 2, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100440001-9 and CIA-RDP96-00787R000100260003-2. The sponsor of the contract is not named in the report. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
[^10]: Transcripts of remote viewing experiments with Pat Price, October 4, 1973 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200130011-6), October 24, 1973 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200130012-5) and October 26, 1973 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200130010-7). Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
[^9]: Snyder, Harry L., and Arlene G. Snyder. *Summary and Critical Evaluation of Research in Remote Viewing,* Report RV-79-1, final technical report, contract 77F104420, Systemetrics, Inc., Blacksburg, Virginia, June 1, 1979, parts 1 and 2, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100440001-9 and CIA-RDP96-00787R000100260003-2.
[^10]: Transcripts of remote viewing experiments with Pat Price, October 4, 1973 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200130011-6), October 24, 1973 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200130012-5) and October 26, 1973 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200130010-7).
[^11]: Targ, Russell, and Harold Puthoff. "Information Transmission under Conditions of Sensory Shielding," *Nature,* vol. 251, October 18, 1974, pp. 602-607, read in the CIA Reading Room copy CIA-RDP96-00787R000100220001-8 on archive.org.
[^12]: Schnabel, *Remote Viewers,* 1997, chapter on the SRI series; his notes cite Puthoff and Targ 1973, 1975 and 1977 for the SRI side.
[^13]: Marks, David, and Richard Kammann. "Information transmission in remote viewing experiments." *Nature,* vol. 274, August 17, 1978, pp. 680-681. https://www.nature.com/articles/274680a0 Marks, David F. "Remote Viewing Revisited." *Skeptical Inquirer,* vol. 6, no. 4, Summer 1982, pp. 18-29. https://cdn.centerforinquiry.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/29/1982/07/22165420/p20.pdf Puthoff, H. E., and Russell Targ, "Information Transmission in Remote Viewing Experiments: II," and Tart, Charles T., "Reanalysis of SRI Remote Viewing Experiments," January 1979, CIA-RDP96-00787R000200090017-5; published as Tart, Puthoff and Targ, *Nature,* vol. 284, 1980, p. 191. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
[^13]: Marks, David, and Richard Kammann. "Information transmission in remote viewing experiments." *Nature,* vol. 274, August 17, 1978, pp. 680-681. https://www.nature.com/articles/274680a0 Marks, David F. "Remote Viewing Revisited." *Skeptical Inquirer,* vol. 6, no. 4, Summer 1982, pp. 18-29. https://cdn.centerforinquiry.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/29/1982/07/22165420/p20.pdf Puthoff, H. E., and Russell Targ, "Information Transmission in Remote Viewing Experiments: II," and Tart, Charles T., "Reanalysis of SRI Remote Viewing Experiments," January 1979, CIA-RDP96-00787R000200090017-5; published as Tart, Puthoff and Targ, *Nature,* vol. 284, 1980, p. 191.
[^14]: Schnabel, *Remote Viewers,* 1997, the Patricia Hearst section of the chapter on Price.
[^15]: Memorandum for the record, "Operational Use of Paranormals in Police Activities," undated, author redacted, Office of Technical Service, CIA-RDP96-00787R000200130013-4. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
[^15]: Memorandum for the record, "Operational Use of Paranormals in Police Activities," undated, author redacted, Office of Technical Service, CIA-RDP96-00787R000200130013-4.
[^16]: Kress, "Parapsychology in Intelligence," *Studies in Intelligence,* Winter 1977, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200030040-0, with footnotes there to W. T. Strand, memorandum for the Director, Office of Technical Service, "Evaluation of Data on Semipalatinsk Unidentified R&D Facility No. 3, USSR," August 20, 1974; C/AOB/OTS memorandum for the record, April 20, 1976; and Directorate of Operations memoranda of December 12, 1974, and January 14, 24, 31 and February 5, 1975 on "Perceptual Augmentation Testing" and the Libyan desk requirement.
[^17]: Schnabel, *Remote Viewers,* 1997, chapter on the Semipalatinsk session; "Peter Maris" is on the book's pseudonym list. Schnabel's account is based on interviews and on the SRI reports.
[^18]: Memorandum for the record, "Discussions About SRI Performance," August 5, 1974, CIA-RDP96-00787R000200200017-2. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
[^19]: Puthoff, Harold E., and Russell Targ. *Perceptual Augmentation Techniques,* final report, part two, December 1, 1975, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100410001-2. "An Analysis of a Remote Viewing Experiment of URDF-3," report of the four sessions of July 9 to 15, 1974, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200240001-0, with other copies at CIA-RDP96-00791R000100500001-2 and CIA-RDP96-00791R000200040002-1, cited by Kress as the work of a Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory nuclear analyst and dated in one copy December 4, 1975. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
[^18]: Memorandum for the record, "Discussions About SRI Performance," August 5, 1974, CIA-RDP96-00787R000200200017-2.
[^19]: Puthoff, Harold E., and Russell Targ. *Perceptual Augmentation Techniques,* final report, part two, December 1, 1975, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100410001-2. "An Analysis of a Remote Viewing Experiment of URDF-3," report of the four sessions of July 9 to 15, 1974, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200240001-0, with other copies at CIA-RDP96-00791R000100500001-2 and CIA-RDP96-00791R000200040002-1, cited by Kress as the work of a Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory nuclear analyst and dated in one copy December 4, 1975.
[^20]: Targ, Russell. "Remote Viewing at Stanford Research Institute in the 1970s: A Memoir," *Journal of Scientific Exploration,* vol. 10, no. 1, 1996, pp. 77-88, read in a Wayback Machine copy of the journal's PDF.
[^21]: "Review of Perceptual Augmentation Techniques," unsigned review of SRI progress reports 1 to 3, c. August 1974, CIA-RDP96-00787R000200230001-6. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
[^21]: "Review of Perceptual Augmentation Techniques," unsigned review of SRI progress reports 1 to 3, c. August 1974, CIA-RDP96-00787R000200230001-6.
[^22]: Schnabel, *Remote Viewers,* 1997, chapter on Swann's return and Price's departure.
[^23]: Schnabel, *Remote Viewers,* 1997, chapter on the embassy tests; pseudonyms as listed in the book.
[^24]: Schnabel, *Remote Viewers,* 1997, chapter "The Shamans" and its footnotes, including the footnote recording the statement by a CIA official who worked with Price. The pseudonym list in the same book includes Bill and Judy Alvarez and Richard Kennett.
[^25]: Schnabel, *Remote Viewers,* 1997, chapter on the summer of 1977, on Turner's remark; OTS/BAB Memo #287-77, November 17, 1977 (CIA-RDP79-00999A000400050014-1), on the Parade article "Psychic Spying," Washington Post, August 7, 1977; reading notes on John L. Wilhelm's book *The Search for Superman* are in CIA-RDP96-00788R001100040006-1. Brandwein, David S., Director, Office of Technical Service, memoranda "Stanford Research Institute Parapsychology Research," February 20, 1976 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200020001-9), and "OTS Support to Research in Parapsychology," October 7, 1976 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200020016-3); memorandum for the record, "Briefing for House Permanent Select Committee re OTS Involvement in ESP Research," OTS memo 287-77, November 17, 1977 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200020020-8), at which OTS left with the committee staff "a brief article on Mr. Pat Price." Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
[^26]: Zarbo, Michael E. (Captain, U.S. Army), *Remote Viewing: Parapsychological Potential for Intelligence Collection?,* master's thesis, Defense Intelligence College, November 1992, CIA-RDP96-00789R002600250001-6, quoting Turner. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
[^27]: Mumford, Michael D., Andrew M. Rose, and David A. Goslin. *An Evaluation of Remote Viewing: Research and Applications.* American Institutes for Research, September 29, 1995, chapter 3, p. 3-77 and following, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200180005-5, read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
[^25]: Schnabel, *Remote Viewers,* 1997, chapter on the summer of 1977, on Turner's remark; OTS/BAB Memo #287-77, November 17, 1977 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000500170001-0), on the article "Psychic Spying," Washington Post, August 7, 1977; reading notes on John L. Wilhelm's book *The Search for Superman* are in CIA-RDP96-00788R001100040006-1. Brandwein, David S., Director, Office of Technical Service, memoranda "Stanford Research Institute Parapsychology Research," February 20, 1976 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200090005-8), and "OTS Support to Research in Parapsychology," October 7, 1976 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200020016-3); memorandum for the record, "Briefing for House Permanent Select Committee re OTS Involvement in ESP Research," OTS memo 287-77, November 17, 1977 (CIA-RDP96-00787R000200020020-8), at which OTS left with the committee staff "a brief article on Mr. Pat Price.".
[^26]: Zarbo, Michael E. (Captain, U.S. Army), *Remote Viewing: Parapsychological Potential for Intelligence Collection?,* master's thesis, Defense Intelligence College, November 1992, CIA-RDP96-00789R002600250001-6, quoting Turner.
[^27]: Kress, Kenneth A., "Parapsychology in Intelligence: A Personal Review and Conclusions," *Studies in Intelligence*, vol. 21, no. 4, Winter 1977, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200030040-0.
[^28]: Memorandum for the record, OTS/BAB Memo #287-77, November 17, 1977, CIA-RDP96-00787R000500170001-0, attached chronology "OTS Involvement in ESP Research," p. 4 (the death entry precedes the entry dated 9/75; the date field of the death entry is blank in the release).
[^29]: Wilhelm, John L., "Psychic Spying? The CIA, the Pentagon and the Russians Probe the Military Potential of Parapsychology," *Washington Post*, August 7, 1977, Outlook section, enclosure to CIA-RDP96-00788R001700360003-3.
[^30]: Information paper, DAMI-ISH, "GRILL FLAME (U)," April 13, 1979, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200210002-5, para. 1(7)-(8).
[^31]: "Government-Sponsored Research in Psychoenergetics (S)," February 1989, CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9.
[^32]: Memorandum ORD-0733-86, ACS/ORD to the Director of Research and Development, "SRI/DIA Request for Parapsychological Data," July 16, 1986, CIA-RDP96-00787R000200020040-6.
[^33]: Mumford, Michael D., Andrew M. Rose, and David A. Goslin. *An Evaluation of Remote Viewing: Research and Applications.* American Institutes for Research, September 29, 1995, chapter 3, p. 3-77 and following, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200180005-5.

9
10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Richard Ober.md
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@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ aliases:
- Dick Ober
- Richard Ober
created: 2026-05-15
updated: 2026-10-05
updated: 2026-10-09
summary: "CIA counterintelligence officer who headed the Special Operations Group that ran Operation CHAOS from August 1967, later Director for Intelligence Coordination at the National Security Council (1974 to 1976)."
born: 1921
died: 2001
@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ The Church Committee wrote that Ober had taken on the duties of coordinating the
### Deborah Davis and Deep Throat, 1979 to 1983
In *Katharine the Great* (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979), [[Deborah Davis]] wrote that Ober was "Angleton's deputy" and "one of the few" men in the CIA whom [[Richard Nixon]] trusted; that Ober "was given a small office inside the White House, where he was known only to Nixon, [[H. R. Haldeman]], [[John Ehrlichman]], and possibly [[Henry Kissinger]]"; and that his name was never recorded in White House logs. The passage is quoted in a biographical note on Ober published by the Spartacus Educational website. X[^2][^3]
In *Katharine the Great* (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979), Deborah Davis wrote that Ober was "Angleton's deputy" and "one of the few" men in the CIA whom [[Richard Nixon]] trusted; that Ober "was given a small office inside the White House, where he was known only to Nixon, [[H. R. Haldeman]], [[John Ehrlichman]], and possibly [[Henry Kissinger]]"; and that his name was never recorded in White House logs. The passage is quoted in a biographical note on Ober published by the Spartacus Educational website.[^6]
Davis also wrote that Ober was Deep Throat, the [[Washington Post]] source of [[Bob Woodward]] and [[Carl Bernstein]] on [[Watergate]]. According to a 1983 account by Eve Pell in *The Nation* (clipped in CIA files), a lawyer for Ober wrote on the November 6, 1979 publication day that references to his client were "defamatory and libelous," called Davis's theory that Ober was involved in Watergate dirty tricks a "complete fabrication," and branded as false her assertion that he had been involved with the "Plumbers" group headed by [[E. Howard Hunt]] and [[G. Gordon Liddy]] or had helped plan the break-in at the office of [[Daniel Ellsberg]]'s psychiatrist. Davis agreed to delete the allegations about Watergate involvement; because the lawyer did not deny her claim that Ober was Deep Throat, she let that stand. [[Ben Bradlee]] separately wrote to her editor that she had made thirty-nine errors on thirty-nine pages where his name appeared. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich withdrew as publisher in early 1980, and in October 1983 paid Davis $100,000 to settle her breach-of-contract suit.[^7] The Hoover finding aid describes Davis as having "mistakenly named Ober as Deep Throat" and lists a potential legal case in which Ober figured as a potential plaintiff.[^1][^7]
@ -92,6 +92,8 @@ Davis also wrote that Ober was Deep Throat, the [[Washington Post]] source of [[
After CHAOS was reported by [[Seymour Hersh]] in the [[New York Times]] on December 22, 1974, Ober was seconded to the National Security Council as its senior staff member for intelligence matters (Director for Intelligence Coordination, 1974 to 1976). The finding aid states that the publicity prompted the Agency to seek severance of his employment, that he resisted, and that he was retired in 1980.[^1]
Hersh's December 22, 1974 article reported that the unit's liaison with Helms was conducted by Ober, and quoted Ober, reached by telephone, as saying "There's nothing I can say about this."[^8]
### Testimony, lawsuits and papers
Ober testified to the Rockefeller Commission on March 28, 1975, and to the Church Committee on October 28 and 30, 1975.[^2] The Hoover finding aid lists the Rockefeller Commission, [[Murphy Commission]], Church Committee and [[Pike Committee]] files, a Justice Department report file on the mail-opening component, and a legal-cases file concerning civil suits in which Ober was a defendant in all but one. The collection (Richard Ober Papers, 1942 to 2001, acquired by Hoover in 2018) also holds his Army, CIA and National Security Council personnel files.[^1]
@ -99,9 +101,10 @@ Ober testified to the Rockefeller Commission on March 28, 1975, and to the Churc
### Footnotes
[^1]: "Ober (Richard) papers, 1942-2001," finding aid (biographical note, scope and contents), Hoover Institution Library & Archives, Online Archive of California, ark:/13030/c81z4b3g, prepared by Dale Reed. https://oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/c81z4b3g
[^2]: Church Committee, *Final Report*, Book III, "CIA Intelligence Collection About Americans: CHAOS and the Office of Security," S. Rept. 94-755, April 26, 1976, pp. 679 to 730 (citing Ober testimony, October 28 and 30, 1975; Ober before the Rockefeller Commission, March 28, 1975; Eatinger testimony, October 14, 1975; Memorandum from Karamessines to Angleton, August 15, 1967). https://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/book3/pdf/ChurchB3_9_CHAOS.pdf
[^2]: Church Committee, *Final Report*, Book III, "CIA Intelligence Collection About Americans: CHAOS and the Office of Security," S. Rept. 94-755, April 26, 1976, pp. 679 to 732 (citing Ober testimony, October 28 and 30, 1975; Ober before the Rockefeller Commission, March 28, 1975; Eatinger testimony, October 14, 1975; Memorandum from Karamessines to Angleton, August 15, 1967). https://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/book3/pdf/ChurchB3_9_CHAOS.pdf
[^3]: Rockefeller Commission, *Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States* (June 1975), Chapter 11, "Special Operations Group, 'Operation CHAOS,'" pp. 130 to 151, discussion of compartmentation and supervision. https://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/rockcomm/pdf/RockComm_Chap11_CHAOS.pdf
[^4]: Richard Ober, Memorandum for the Record, "Procedures for Restricted Handling of RYBAT MHCHAOS Traffic," May 29, 1969, CIA Reading Room doc. C01475738. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01475738
[^5]: CIA cable from Richard Ober, September 10, 1971, "RYBAT MHCHAOS," CIA Reading Room doc. C01482292. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01482292
[^6]: Deborah Davis, *Katharine the Great: Katharine Graham and Her Washington Post Empire* (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979), as quoted in "Richard Ober," Spartacus Educational. https://spartacus-educational.com/JFKober.htm
[^7]: Eve Pell, "Private Censorship: Killing 'Katharine the Great,'" *The Nation*, November 12, 1983, as clipped in CIA-RDP90-00845R000201250018-9. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP90-00845R000201250018-9
[^8]: Seymour M. Hersh, "Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U.S. Against Antiwar Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years," *New York Times*, December 22, 1974, p. 1 (continued p. 26).

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10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Richard Secord.md
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@ -3,49 +3,276 @@ title: Richard Secord
aliases:
- Richard Secord
- Richard V. Secord
- Richard Vernon Secord
- Dick Secord
- General Secord
created: 2026-05-17
updated: 2026-05-17
updated: 2026-10-09
category: "Military"
tags:
- Person
- IranContra
- Enterprise
- CIA
- AirForce
- Laos
- Iran
- AWACS
- PROMIS
- 1980s
summary: "Major General who co-directed the Iran-Contra Enterprise with Albert Hakim, purchasing weapons for Iran through Israeli intermediaries and channeling profits to fund the Nicaraguan Contras outside congressional appropriations before pleading guilty in 1989 to making false statements to Congress."
summary: "Air Force major general who co-directed the Iran-Contra Enterprise with Albert Hakim and, after pleading guilty in 1989 to lying to Congress about Enterprise money going to Oliver North, was sentenced to two years' probation."
born: 1932-07-06
died: 2024-10-15
location: "LaRue, Ohio"
relations:
- type: employed_by
with: "[[U.S. Air Force]]"
role: "commissioned 1955; major general (May 1980); retired May 1983"
start: 1955
end: 1983-05
fn: 28
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Department of Defense]]"
role: "deputy assistant secretary of defense (international security affairs; Middle East, Africa and southern Asia), 1981 to 1983"
start: 1981
end: 1983-05
fn: 4
- type: founded
with: "[[Stanford Technology Trading Group International]]"
role: "co-founded with Albert Hakim in 1983; Secord was president"
start: 1983
fn: 29
- type: partner_of
with: "[[Albert Hakim]]"
role: "co-directed the Enterprise; equal partner in Stanford Technology Trading Group International"
start: 1983
fn: 12
- type: head_of
with: "[[The Enterprise (Iran-Contra)]]"
role: "operational director with Albert Hakim"
start: 1985
end: 1986
fn: 29
- type: partner_of
with: "[[Tom Clines]]"
role: "served together in Laos in the late 1960s; Clines oversaw Enterprise arms logistics"
start: 1968
fn: 7
- type: funded
with: "[[Oliver North]]"
role: "paid for a home security system for North and set up a 200,000 dollar Swiss account for North's family; both were charged as illegal gratuities"
start: 1986
fn: 53
- type: investigated
with: "[[Department of Justice]]"
reverse: true
role: "conflict-of-interest and bribery inquiry of Secord and Clines arising from their relationship with Edwin Wilson, 1981; closed January 1986 without indictments"
start: 1981
end: 1986-01
fn: 9
- type: subject_of
with: "[[Edwin Wilson]]"
role: "relationship with Wilson was the subject of the 1981 Justice Department inquiry and a 1982 Pentagon suspension of three months"
start: 1981
end: 1986-01
fn: 8
- type: prosecuted
with: "[[Lawrence Walsh]]"
reverse: true
role: "indicted March 16, 1988 with Poindexter, North and Hakim; pleaded guilty November 8, 1989 to one count of false statements to Congress; sentenced January 24, 1990"
start: 1988-03-16
end: 1990-01-24
fn: 5
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Iran-Contra Affair]]"
role: "operational participant; first witness before the joint committees, May 5 to 8, 1987"
start: 1984
fn: 4
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Southern Air Transport]]"
role: "Enterprise paid the company 1,935,596 dollars for contra-related services in 1985 and 1986"
start: 1985
end: 1986
fn: 31
- type: head_of
with: "[[Air Commando Association]]"
role: "president"
fn: 2
---
Richard Vernon Secord was born July 6, 1932, in LaRue, Ohio. He died October 15, 2024. He served as a [[United States Air Force]] officer, rising to Major General, before retiring under a cloud of controversy and becoming the operational director of the private covert network known as the Enterprise that was at the center of the [[Iran-Contra Affair]].[^1]
Richard Vernon Secord was born July 6, 1932, in LaRue, Ohio.[^1] He died October 15, 2024, at a nursing home in Port Orange, Florida, at the age of 92.[^2] He graduated from the [[United States Military Academy|West Point]] in 1955, received a commission in the [[U.S. Air Force]] and retired in May 1983 as a major general.[^3] He co-directed the private covert network known as the [[The Enterprise (Iran-Contra)|Enterprise]] with [[Albert Hakim]], which sold U.S. weapons to Iran and bought and resold weapons for the [[Contras]] during the [[Iran-Contra Affair]].[^4] In 1989 he pleaded guilty to one felony count of making false statements to Congress, and in 1990 he was sentenced to two years' probation.[^5]
### Military Career and Edwin Wilson
### West Point, the Air Commandos and Laos
Secord’s Air Force career included extensive special operations and counterinsurgency assignments. He served in Southeast Asia during the [[Vietnam War]] era in roles involving air operations in Laos and Vietnam. During the 1970s he served in the Pentagon in special operations planning and was involved in programs coordinating with CIA paramilitary networks, a role that brought him into contact with [[Ted Shackley]]’s network of CIA officers.[^1]
Secord was appointed to West Point in 1951 from the twelfth district of Ohio and was commissioned in the Air Force on graduating in 1955.[^3] He ranked 193rd in a class of 470, and the tactical officer of his company was Capt. [[Alexander Haig]].[^1] After flight school he served three years as a single-engine jet instructor in Texas and in 1959 was posted to [[Tinker Air Force Base]] in Oklahoma. In August 1961 he volunteered for a special tactical group forming at [[Hurlburt Field]] in Florida and became an Air Commando, with tours in South Vietnam and Iran over the next four years.[^1]
In the late 1970s, Secord came under investigation for his relationship with [[Edwin Wilson]], a former CIA officer who had gone into private arms dealing and was selling weapons and training services to Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi - transactions that were illegal and represented a serious counterintelligence problem. Wilson was eventually arrested, convicted in 1983, and sentenced to 52 years in prison. Secord was a central figure in congressional investigations of Wilson’s Libya operations because of documented contacts between them; Secord was not criminally charged but the investigation effectively ended his military career advancement. He retired from the Air Force in 1983.[^1]
In less than a year he flew more than 200 missions in AT-28 fighters in South Vietnam while serving officially as an adviser to Vietnamese pilots, and Pentagon records show at least four combat air medals in 1962.[^1] The Independent Counsel [[Lawrence Walsh]] counted 285 combat missions in Southeast Asia during the 1960s.[^4] In November 1964, according to a study published in 1980 by the [[National Defense University]], Secord was assigned to help fly Belgian paratroopers to [[Stanleyville]] in the Congo for the hostage rescue, and he made an emergency landing in a C-130 after a wing panel opened and an inflated life raft fouled the tail controls.[^1] He received a Distinguished Flying Cross for the mission.[^6]
Secord had also been assigned to help plan the April 1980 Iran hostage rescue operation (Operation Eagle Claw), which ended in disaster at the Desert One staging area in Iran with eight Americans killed and five aircraft destroyed. He was not responsible for the operational failure but was among the senior military planners involved in the operation’s preparation.[^1]
In 1965 he attended the Air Force's Air Command and Staff College in Montgomery, Alabama. In August 1966 he returned to Saigon and was then assigned to a classified CIA unit at [[Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base]] in [[Thailand]]. For two years he coordinated clandestine flights by [[Air America]] and other CIA airlines to dozens of remote airfields in [[Laos]], and a former CIA officer who worked with him said: "He was responsible for the air sector."[^1] In September 1968 he returned to Hurlburt Field and commanded the 603rd Special Operations Squadron there until he left Florida in 1971.[^1]
### The Enterprise
In his 1987 testimony he said he served in [[Vietnam War|Vietnam]] and in Laos over quite a number of years throughout the 1960s.[^3] He said he first met [[Tom Clines]] in 1968 and that the two "served together in Laos in combat for a several year period."[^7] The [[The Wall Street Journal|Wall Street Journal]] reported in 1982 that Clines and Secord had been close friends since both served in covert operations in Southeast Asia in 1967.[^8] The joint congressional report places both men at the CIA station in Laos in the late 1960s.[^9] Asked in 1987 whether he was aware that the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] had contracted Air America before and during the war to place supplies inside Vietnam, Secord answered that he "used to be in charge of a major section of it," and he called Air America "a government proprietary."[^10]
After leaving the Air Force, Secord formed a business partnership with [[Albert Hakim]], an Iranian-American arms dealer and businessman who had extensive contacts in the Iranian military and defense community dating to the Shah’s era. Together they established Stanford Technology Trading Group International (STTGI), which they used as the vehicle for arms transactions. The partnership also operated through Lake Resources S.A., a Swiss financial account maintained by Hakim, into which profits from arms deals were deposited.[^2]
### Naval War College and the Pentagon
The Enterprise became the private infrastructure for the Iran-Contra operations when National Security Council staff member [[Oliver North]] recruited Secord and Hakim to execute what North and CIA Director [[William J. Casey]] had conceived as a "self-financing" covert program: sell U.S.-approved weapons to Iran through Israeli intermediaries, charge prices substantially above the American government’s cost, and funnel the markup profits to the Nicaraguan Contras, who had been cut off from direct U.S. military assistance by the Boland Amendment.[^2]
From 1971 to 1972 Secord attended a one-year George Washington University graduate program at the [[Naval War College]] in Newport, Rhode Island, one of 16 Air Force officers in a class of 203.[^1] His 1972 master's thesis, "Unconventional warfare/covert operations as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy," was directed by the CIA adviser to the head of the college. In the first pages of its 55 pages he wrote that the CIA should be given "the authority" to run such operations and that the Pentagon should be "removed from the chain of command."[^1]
The operations ran primarily from 1985 to 1986. Israeli arms dealers Ya’acov Nimrodi and Al Schwimmer provided the initial Israeli connection; Iranian intermediary [[Manucher Ghorbanifar]] was the primary conduit to Iranian buyers. Secord and Hakim managed the logistics, finance, and some direct negotiations. The Enterprise also maintained the Contra air resupply operation at [[Ilopango Airbase|Ilopango Air Base]] in El Salvador through aircraft managed by [[Felix Rodriguez]] and others. [[Monzer Al-Kassar]], a Syrian arms dealer, was paid approximately $1.2 million to move weapons from Israel to Contra forces, documented by the Tower Commission.[^2]
Promoted to colonel in 1972, he became the Pentagon desk officer for Southeast Asia, and in 1973 he became aide to the director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency, which manages foreign military sales and assistance.[^1] The joint congressional report states that when Secord returned from Laos and was stationed at the Pentagon, Clines introduced him to a number of Clines's CIA associates, including [[Rafael Quintero]], and to [[Edwin Wilson]].[^9] [[Newsweek]] reported that Secord received his first general's star at the age of 43.[^6]
### Exposure and Criminal Proceedings
### Iran, 1975 to 1978
The Enterprise was exposed in October 1986 when a Contra resupply aircraft was shot down over Nicaragua and its crew member, Eugene Hasenfus, was captured by the Sandinistas. Hasenfus described the operation’s infrastructure, and the subsequent unraveling revealed the Iran arms sales as well. The Iran-Contra Affair became the major domestic political crisis of Reagan’s second term.[^2]
From September 1975 to July 1978 Secord was chief of the Air Force section of the U.S. [[Military Assistance Advisory Group]] in [[Iran]].[^4] He told the committees that he commanded the Air Force mission to Iran during the Shah's rule and spent a total of four and a half years in the country.[^3] The [[Los Angeles Times]] reported that he was chief Air Force salesman to the Shah, whose air force was being built to about 500 combat aircraft, and that he helped negotiate the sale of AWACS aircraft, F-4, F-5 and F-14 aircraft; the [[Washington Post]] obituary states that he arranged 17 billion dollars in arms deals for the Shah.[^1][^2] The joint report says that in the mid-1970s he "exercised substantial influence over purchasing decisions of the Iranian Air Force."[^9]
Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh indicted Secord in 1987. In November 1989, Secord pleaded guilty to one count of making false statements to Congress regarding his knowledge of North’s diversion of Iran arms sale profits to the Contras, and to related false testimony. He received a two-year suspended sentence and was not imprisoned.[^2]
Secord testified that he met Albert Hakim in 1976 or 1977 when Hakim, an Iranian businessman selling electronic intelligence systems to the Iranian Air Force, came to his office to protest the Air Force mission's recommendation to discontinue a 23 million dollar project that duplicated a U.S.-Iranian program called IBEX.[^11] The joint report states that Hakim and Secord claimed that they first met on unfriendly terms in 1976 or 1977, when Secord recommended against a contract that Hakim proposed to the Iranian government.[^9] The same report states that Hakim's Iranian operations included payoffs to Iranian Air Force and Army generals through "bearer letters" and numbered Swiss accounts, and that in a May 1987 deposition Hakim said Edwin Wilson had infiltrated his organization through Hakim's associate [[Frank Terpil]], and that he removed both from it in 1976 or 1977.[^12] According to CIA files cited in the report, in August 1976 [[Ted Shackley]] tried to arrange for Secord to assist Hakim in obtaining security contracts with the Iranian government in return for Hakim providing intelligence to the CIA, with Clines to introduce Hakim to Secord; a CIA official rebuffed the proposal in part because Hakim had sold the Iranians "unneeded over sophisticated equipment at exorbitant price[s]."[^13] The Los Angeles Times reported that in a 1983 deposition in Connecticut Hakim admitted using Swiss bank accounts to funnel millions of dollars in payoffs to Iranian military officers in this period.[^1]
Secord later published a memoir, *Honored and Betrayed: Irangate, Covert Affairs, and the Secret War in Laos* (Wiley, 1992), in which he characterized himself as a loyal officer carrying out administration policy who was abandoned when the operations became politically untenable.[^1]
### The Hostage Rescue Task Force
### Footnotes
Walsh found that Secord was promoted to major general in May 1980 and was the ranking Air Force officer in charge of rescue efforts for the American hostages held in Iran during 1980 and 1981.[^4] Secord testified in 1987 that he served as deputy commander of the hostage rescue task force established after the failed April 1980 attempt ([[Operation Eagle Claw]]) at [[Desert One]], that the force was combat ready by August 1980, and that in October 1980 an intelligence briefing he called the "Eureka Briefing" claimed to have located the hostages; he said the CIA refused to disclose its sources and methods, and that the location was later shown to be wrong when the hostages were debriefed in 1981.[^14] He testified that his role ended in December 1980.[^15] Maj. Gen. [[James Vaught]], the Delta Force commander planning the mission, told the Los Angeles Times: "He was my deputy."[^1]
[^1]: Secord, Richard, with Jay Wurts. *Honored and Betrayed: Irangate, Covert Affairs, and the Secret War in Laos*. John Wiley & Sons, 1992.
[^2]: Walsh, Lawrence E. *Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-Up*. W.W. Norton, 1997. Tower Commission Report (President’s Special Review Board). *The Tower Commission Report*. Bantam Books/Times Books, 1987.
Secord also testified that in 1980 he gave Hakim's name, among a number of Iranian names, to U.S. intelligence personnel for vetting and possible use in the rescue operation, and that Hakim was contacted, vetted and volunteered his services.[^11]
### Deputy Assistant Secretary and the AWACS Sale
From 1978 to 1981 Secord headed the Air Force International Programs Office in the Pentagon, directing Air Force security assistance programs and foreign military sales worldwide; the Los Angeles Times described a business of 30 billion dollars in programs in about 60 countries.[^1][^11] In April 1981 he was appointed deputy assistant secretary of defense. Walsh gives the post as deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs from 1981 to 1983; the Los Angeles Times gives it as the Near East, Africa and South Asia, about 40 countries; and Secord testified that his responsibility was the Middle East, Africa and southern Asia.[^1][^4][^11] The City Club of Cleveland's forum listing for October 9, 1981 gives the title as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, for his appearance on the debate over selling [[Airborne Warning and Control System|AWACS]] aircraft to [[Saudi Arabia]]. The listing reports that he argued the sale would make a significant contribution to U.S. security and the security of its allies, and that this was the president's central reason for approving it.[^16]
Secord told the committees that he was the senior Pentagon representative on the interagency group charged with shepherding the proposed AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia through Congress, and that "this project consumed most of 1981."[^17] He said his first recollection of meeting [[Oliver North]] came in 1981, when North was on the [[National Security Council]] staff and was involved in scheduling the group's meetings.[^17] Secord later testified that he was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal "at the request of the President" after the Senate narrowly approved the sale, and Newsweek reported that he and North had teamed up to lobby Congress for the approval.[^1][^6]
### Edwin Wilson, the Justice Department Inquiry and EATSCO
Called by Wilson's lawyers at Wilson's trial over the shipment of C-4 explosives to Libya, on February 3, 1985, Secord testified that he had first met Wilson in 1971, then twice in [[Tehran]] in 1976 and 1977 and twice in [[Brussels]] in 1979 and 1980, and that at one meeting Wilson offered to provide a Soviet MiG-25: "I was interested," Secord said, according to the transcript.[^1] Prosecutors said Secord had visited Wilson's [[Mount Airy Farms]] estate in Virginia several times, frequently borrowed his private plane and sold him a house in Fairfax County, Virginia.[^1] The joint report states that Wilson provided Secord with nearly exclusive use of a private plane for almost a year, and that Clines arranged for Wilson to buy a townhouse that Clines had originally sold to Secord, so that Secord could recover his investment.[^18]
The Wall Street Journal reported in October 1982 that Secord bought the townhouse from Clines for 56,500 dollars in 1977 while an adviser in Iran and that Wilson took it for 69,000 dollars in September 1978; that Secord piloted a twin-engine Beechcraft that Wilson had bought, from the fall of 1978 until mid-1979, paying for fuel but not for the aircraft's use; and that in January 1979, around the time Wilson arranged a 500,000 dollar loan for Clines, Secord and the Pentagon arms-sales chief [[Erich von Marbod]] dined in [[London]] with Wilson. Sources close to Secord told the Journal that the dinner was purely social, and Secord's lawyer [[Thomas Green]] said the house transactions were innocent and that his client had not profited from them.[^8]
The joint report states that in 1981 Secord and Clines became subjects of a Justice Department conflict-of-interest and bribery investigation stemming from their relationship with Wilson, a former CIA officer later convicted of smuggling arms to [[Libya]], and that in 1982 Clines became a target of a separate investigation into fraudulent overbilling of the government by the [[Egyptian American Transport Company]] (EATSCO), 49 percent of which he owned.[^9] The Wall Street Journal reported that a grand jury in Alexandria, Virginia, was studying how EATSCO won Pentagon approval and whether its billing was proper, and that prosecutors were examining the conduct of Secord and von Marbod, who had helped oversee the Egyptian sales; it reported, citing a Pentagon official, that Secord had been suspended for three months in 1982 after the Pentagon learned of his ties to Wilson and was reinstated after he agreed to a lie-detector test of his assertions of innocence, a test never given.[^8] A Washington Post report of the same year stated that prosecutors investigating Wilson had received allegations that Wilson may have held an option to invest in EATSCO through other companies owned by Clines; Clines's lawyer said Wilson had never had any interest in it.[^19]
In November 1981 [[Douglas Schlacter]], a former Wilson aide, told [[CBS News]] that Secord had shared profits from Wilson's illegal arms sales, and the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] opened an investigation.[^1] Secord sued Schlacter for libel and slander, and in April 1983 a federal judge in Washington awarded him 2 million dollars in a default judgment; Schlacter had entered the federal witness protection program and neither contested the suit nor paid. At the hearing Secord testified: "No matter what I have done, I can't get rid of this shadow that's been hanging over me."[^1] Newsweek reported that Wilson claimed he had taught Secord about turning government experience into private profit, and that Wilson claimed Secord, Shackley and von Marbod were silent partners in EATSCO; all of them denied it.[^6] Wilson and his secretary also claimed that Secord was a silent partner in EATSCO, and Secord denied any improper ties.[^1]
Secord retired from the Air Force in May 1983, and the joint report states that he did so because "the Wilson story and the ongoing Justice Department investigation had placed a cloud over his military career."[^9] The Air Force pension was 3,800 dollars a month, and he remained on an Air Force advisory panel on unconventional warfare policy until August 1986.[^1] Two months after his retirement EATSCO pleaded guilty to criminal and civil overbilling charges; the Los Angeles Times put the overcharge to the Pentagon at 8 million dollars. Clines, on behalf of the corporate entity that held his interest, paid a 10,000 dollar criminal fine and a 100,000 dollar civil fine. The Justice Department closed the EATSCO case in July 1984 and closed the Secord and Clines inquiry in January 1986, and the joint report states that no indictments or other prosecutorial action followed.[^1][^9] In 1984, when Clines needed 33,000 dollars toward the civil fine, Secord lent him 33,000 dollars through a cashier's check carried by [[Glenn Robinette]].[^20]
In May 1987 Secord told the committees that he had been investigated for almost three years, was cleared, and was given a letter by Justice; Senator [[David Boren]] answered that the finding was that he had not broken the law and that it was not a certification that the use of the plane of a person like Wilson was appropriate.[^21] The Washington Post obituary states, of the Wilson association, that Secord "was never charged with any wrongdoing."[^2]
Wilson was convicted in 1983 in the Eastern District of Virginia of exporting firearms, in the Southern District of Texas of plastic explosives offenses and in the Southern District of New York of conspiracy to murder federal witnesses, as Boren put the record to Secord in 1987.[^22] The Fourth Circuit's 1983 opinion describes the Virginia conviction by jury of seven offenses involving the export of an M-16 rifle and four revolvers.[^23] The Los Angeles Times reported in March 1987 that Wilson was serving a 52-year federal prison sentence.[^1] In 2003 Judge [[Lynn Hughes]] of the Southern District of Texas, in an opinion on the Texas conviction, recorded sentences of 17 years in Texas (imposed February 18, 1983), 10 years in the Eastern District of Virginia and 25 years in the Southern District of New York to run consecutively, and wrote that the conviction would be vacated because the government had knowingly used false evidence against Wilson and suppressed favorable evidence.[^24]
### Nugan Hand, the Christic Institute Suit and INSLAW
The Christic Institute filed a 22 million dollar federal suit in [[Miami]] in May 1986 alleging that Secord and 27 others took part in a worldwide scheme of assassinations, terrorism, embezzlement and drug smuggling, and in December 1986 its lawyer [[Daniel Sheehan]] filed an affidavit saying Secord "secretly smuggled . . . large suitcases" of money from opium sales in Laos to an Australian bank. Secord denied all the charges in the suit.[^1] The joint report states that the lawsuit brought by the journalists [[Tony Avirgan]] and [[Martha Honey]] named Secord.[^25]
The [[New York Times]] reported in March 1987 that the Australian Commonwealth-New South Wales Joint Task Force on Drug Trafficking, in a report completed in March 1983, named Secord, Shackley, Clines and Quintero as men close to [[Michael Hand]], a co-founder of the [[Nugan Hand Bank]] who served in Laos in the late 1960s with Air America in the period when, the Times wrote, Secord played a large role in directing Air America's operations. The Times wrote that the study does not demonstrate that Secord and the others smuggled weapons or narcotics, and that a 1985 Australian royal commission disputed some of the task force's conclusions. According to the report as the Times described it, a witness stated that in April, when a travel case left at Wilson's [[Geneva]] office by Nugan Hand's [[Bernie Houghton]] was opened in the presence of Clines and Quintero, Secord's name was mentioned and Clines said: "We've got to keep Dick's name out of this."[^26]
INSLAW's Third Supplemental Submission in its bankruptcy-court litigation states that an affidavit by [[Richard Babayan]] recounted the alleged involvement of Secord in the Iraqi acquisition of the [[PROMIS]] software.[^27]
### Stanford Technology Trading Group International
Hakim, who had kept in touch with Secord after Secord left Iran, tried to recruit him to revive Hakim's security-sales company, Expantrade, by offering security systems to foreign governments; Hakim said that by doing so "you have a deep penetration in that government and therefore you can do a lot of business." Secord joined Hakim in May 1983 as an equal partner.[^9] Secord testified that he went into business as president of Stanford Technology Trading Group with Hakim as an equal shareholder, 50 percent each, headquartered in Vienna, Virginia.[^28]
Secord and Hakim founded [[Stanford Technology Trading Group International]] (STTGI) in 1983. Hakim was chairman, Secord was president, and the company was wholly controlled by the two of them.[^29] It was distinct from Stanford Technology Corporation, which Hakim had founded in 1974. The partners formed further shell companies in Switzerland with related names, including StanTech Services S.A. and Scitech S.A.[^29] The Geneva fiduciary [[Compagnie de Services Fiduciaires]] (CSF), controlled by the American tax lawyer [[Willard Zucker]], managed the Enterprise's money. Zucker had provided Hakim with financial services since the mid-1970s.[^29] Walsh wrote that "by 1986, the business of STTGI was the Enterprise."[^29] In mid-1984 the partners represented Marwais Steel Company of Larkspur, California, in pursuit of a 100 million dollar aircraft-shelter contract from the United Arab Emirates, which an Italian company won.[^1]
### The Enterprise: Contra Supply
Secord testified that in January or February 1984, after he retired, a mutual friend asked him to join a visit to North, and that in about July 1984 North telephoned him and named retired General [[John Singlaub]] among the others he was approaching.[^17] After the [[Boland Amendment]] barred CIA aid to the contras in October 1984, [[William J. Casey|CIA Director William J. Casey]] was instrumental in pairing North with Secord as a contra-support team, according to the Independent Counsel, who also found that Casey supported the North-Secord combination in the Iran arms sales despite deep reservations about Secord within the CIA hierarchy.[^30] In the fall of 1984 North introduced Secord to the Contra leader [[Adolfo Calero]], to help Calero buy arms with money from Saudi Arabia. The Saudis gave 32 million dollars for the contras during the period when the Boland Amendment barred U.S. aid.[^29]
Secord's first contra sale was arranged late in 1984 through the Canadian firm TransWorld Arms, headed by Emanuel Weigensberg, whose supplier was the Portuguese arms firm Defex; Defex arranged the purchase of a shipload of weapons from the People's Republic of China, which reached Central America in April 1985. The contras paid 2.3 million dollars; of 720,400 dollars in profit, Weigensberg and the Washington lawyer Thomas Green, who had introduced Secord to the firm, each received a third, and Secord and Hakim split the remainder.[^29] Secord then recruited Clines and Rafael Quintero for a second order, filled from Defex [[Portugal]] in January and March 1985 with air transport arranged through [[Richard Gadd]], a former subordinate of Secord in the Air Force, who enlisted the Miami charter company [[Southern Air Transport]]. The contras paid 1.235 million dollars, with profits of 310,840 dollars divided 40 percent each to Secord and Hakim and 20 percent to Clines. A third shipment, carried on the Danish freighter Erria and delivered in June 1985, cost the contras 6.407 million dollars and produced profits of 1.5 million dollars on the same terms.[^29] The profit draws from the contra sales between April 1985 and September 1986 totaled 4.579 million dollars.[^29]
In late June 1985, North and Secord told Calero and the contra commander [[Enrique Bermudez]] in Miami that private donors would pay the Enterprise directly for weapons. In July 1985 CSF created a Liberian shell company named Defex S.A., whose name resembled the supplier's, so that the Enterprise's markups would appear to have been paid to the supplier. Walsh wrote that the account's purpose was to hide the Enterprise's profits. That summer the partners also created Lake Resources, into which the funds from Energy Resources International were transferred. Walsh wrote that "after Lake was formed, all Enterprise receipts were effectively commingled in that account, regardless of their origin."[^29]
The resupply operation that flew arms to the contras from [[Ilopango Airbase]] in [[El Salvador]] drew much of its aircraft and maintenance through Southern Air Transport, a Miami charter company used in both the contra and Iran operations. The Enterprise paid Southern Air Transport 1,935,596 dollars for contra-related services in 1985 and 1986, and paid it 200,000 dollars for a Jetstar aircraft that Secord and others used for contra travel.[^31] In the spring of 1986 Secord asked [[Robert Dutton]], who had replaced Gadd as manager of the resupply operation, to prepare a description of Enterprise assets for possible sale to the CIA. Dutton valued the assets at 4.089 million dollars, listed 25 salaried employees, gave Ilopango the code name "Cincinnati," and proposed that the CIA either buy the assets or lease them for 311,500 dollars a month.[^32] According to Dutton, the purpose of a later reorganization of the operation was to disguise the roles of Secord and North, because the Avirgan and Honey lawsuit had named Secord, and North and Secord were concerned that [[Felix Rodriguez]], who had become disaffected, was giving information about the operation to the plaintiffs. Dutton also stated that Rodriguez and his associate Ramon Medina coordinated with the Ilopango commander and oversaw the local fuel account.[^33]
On October 5, 1986, a resupply aircraft was shot down over [[Nicaragua]] and [[Eugene Hasenfus]] was captured. Walsh wrote that the Enterprise had effectively ceased its Central American activities after the shootdown.[^4] Before it, Secord and Hakim at North's request had three checks issued to pay outstanding contra grocery bills. Afterward Secord told Quintero to set aside a second check for 75,000 dollars and a third for 50,000 dollars to establish a defense fund for Hasenfus.[^31]
### The Enterprise: The HAWK Shipment of November 1985
A letter dated November 19, 1985, which North signed with his own name for the national security adviser [[Robert McFarlane]], asked Secord, described as a retired U.S. Air Force general officer, to proceed to a third-country transit point and arrange the transfer of "sensitive materiel" being shipped from Israel.[^34] The Tower Commission recorded that [[Dewey Clarridge|Duane Clarridge]] of the CIA told the U.S. official trying to obtain flight clearance to be in touch with a man named "Copp," whom Clarridge was told was an alias for Secord, and that a CIA field officer attributed the failure of the arrangements to the amateurish way in which Secord and his associates approached officials in the government from which landing clearance was needed.[^35][^36] The Israelis transferred 1 million dollars on November 20, 1985 to the Enterprise's Lake Resources account to pay for airlifting the missiles; after 18 HAWKs were delivered and the Iranians rejected them, about 870,000 dollars remained in Lake Resources, commingled with other funds and used for the contras and other purposes.[^37] Clines accompanied Secord to Europe in late November 1985 to facilitate the shipment.[^38] Secord testified that the Israelis did not ask for the money back, and that North told him "we could use it for whatever purpose we wanted. We actually expended it on the Contra project."[^39] Secord quickly chartered a jet to fly the 18 HAWKs to Iran under cover of a humanitarian mission, according to the Los Angeles Times.[^1]
### The Enterprise: Iran Arms Sales and Swiss Accounts
More than 47.6 million dollars from the Iran and contra operations flowed into the Enterprise's Swiss accounts. The largest share went to Lake Resources Inc. (31.5 million), with Energy Resources International (11.3 million) and Hyde Park Square Corporation (4.8 million) receiving the rest.[^29] Lake Resources was controlled by Hakim and later pleaded guilty to the corporate felony of theft of government property for diverting the proceeds of the arms sales.[^30] The Enterprise transferred 12.2 million dollars to a CIA Swiss account for weapons sold to Iran.[^29]
[[Manucher Ghorbanifar]], an Iranian exile and former CIA informant whom the agency had discredited as a fabricator, was a driving force behind the proposals to sell arms to Iran.[^40] On January 17, 1986, President Reagan signed a covert-action Finding that authorized direct U.S. sales to Iran, with Secord acting as an agent of the CIA. Under the Finding, Secord was to collect payment in advance and deposit the Defense Department's cost in a CIA account.[^40] In January 1986 North and Secord negotiated on behalf of the United States the sale of 4,000 TOW missiles to Iran, at 10,000 dollars per missile for an initial 1,000. In February 1986 [[Adnan Khashoggi]] deposited 10 million dollars into Lake Resources to finance the first sale; on February 10 and 11, 3.7 million dollars went from Lake to a CIA account, and the surplus on the sale was 5.6 million dollars.[^40] In February 1986 Secord, using the alias Major General Adams, requested alias documentation from North, and on February 20 he met Ghorbanifar in [[Frankfurt]] with North, [[Amiram Nir]] and a CIA officer.[^41] In May 1986 about 16.7 million dollars in Iranian and Israeli payments for HAWK parts and TOW replenishment went into Lake Resources, leaving a surplus of 9.2 million dollars.[^40] When Robert McFarlane flew to Tehran on May 25, 1986, Secord and one communicator remained in [[Tel Aviv]].[^42] A further 500 TOW missiles were sold in October 1986, and the Enterprise cleared 1.463 million dollars on that sale.[^40]
Walsh's trial-proof estimate of the diversion of arms-sale proceeds to the contras was 3.6 million dollars, and he judged the figure to be at least 1.1 million dollars low. Walsh wrote that North pressed Secord to send money from the Iran operation to the contra operation, and that Secord "claimed he did not view this as a diversion."[^43] In July 1986 the Enterprise paid Defex Portugal 2.6 million dollars and paid the Syrian arms dealer [[Monzer Al-Kassar]] 500,000 dollars for contra weapons; Walsh left the Al-Kassar payment out of his diversion estimate because Al-Kassar "was not available to testify."[^44]
### Secord's Personal Receipts
Walsh found that Secord personally received 1.037 million dollars in cash from the Enterprise in 1985 and 1986, of which about 34,000 dollars was accounted for as legitimate expenses or withdrawals from his profits. Three payments totaling 796,000 dollars were unaccounted for. Secord said he gave two cash payments, of 225,000 and 260,000 dollars received on May 15 and 21, 1986, to the Israeli official Amiram Nir, and a further 311,000 dollars in July 1986 to the Iranian arms dealer Ghorbanifar. He produced no documentation for any of them, and Ghorbanifar denied receiving the 311,000 dollars. The Independent Counsel stated that Nir had died and that the Israelis denied their government ever received the funds.[^45]
Walsh found that in July 1985 Secord had CSF delete his name from the Enterprise profit accounts, and that his profit distributions, totaling 1,457,568 dollars, were credited to a shell company, Korel Assets, whose documents he signed on September 20, 1985. Withdrawals from the Korel account paid for a small private airplane, a Porsche and a stay at a German weight-reduction spa. Walsh concluded that Secord personally received at least 2 million dollars from the Enterprise in 1985 and 1986. His 1985 return reported adjusted gross income of 147,000 dollars and answered "no" when asked about foreign financial accounts, and Walsh did not charge him with a tax offense because the Swiss records could not be used in a tax case.[^46] Hakim received 2.06 million dollars from the Enterprise in the same years.[^47]
### Congressional Testimony, May 1987
In December 1986 Secord was subpoenaed by the intelligence committees and refused to testify, invoking the Fifth Amendment. In February 1987 he refused to testify before the grand jury, and in March 1987 he appeared before Chief U.S. District Judge Aubrey E. Robinson Jr. in response to a corporate subpoena and denied having custody of Enterprise records. In late April 1987 he agreed to testify voluntarily.[^48] He was the first witness before the joint House and Senate committees, testifying from May 5 to May 8, 1987, without immunity. He was recalled and deposed in June 1987.[^2][^48] Newsweek wrote on May 5, 1987 that committee chairman Senator [[Daniel Inouye]] said Secord "feels sincerely that he has nothing to hide."[^6] Walsh's assessment was that Secord "provided an enormous amount of largely truthful information regarding the Enterprise's operational workings," but that his "responses to questions about its financial activities were much less candid."[^48]
On the first day Secord testified, according to the New York Times, that about 3.5 million dollars of 12 million dollars in profits from the sale of arms to Iran was spent on behalf of the contras, that more than half of the money was kept by his partner Hakim, and that part of the rest was used for a secret project unrelated to Iran or Nicaragua that he did not identify; he said: "We believed our conduct was in the furtherance of the President's policies," and "I also understood that this Administration knew of my conduct and approved it."[^49] In his testimony Secord said that North told him several times that he had mentioned to President Reagan that it was "very ironic" that "some of the ayatollah's money was being used to support the contras"; Secord said, "Whether he actually said this to the president, or whether he was joking with me, I'm not sure," and that it was "not said to me in a way that I took it as a joke."[^50] He said he had no direct knowledge of what the president knew, and that he had spoken to officials including Casey, McFarlane and [[John Poindexter]], some of whom told him the president was aware of what he was doing with the contras. He said that a White House aide told him on November 25, 1986 that "they'd already built a wall around the president," and that [[Edwin Meese]]'s remarks that day "betrayed all of us, and it's unforgivable."[^50] On the third day he acknowledged that the Enterprise had amassed 12 million dollars in cash and assets in about two years, said the money was intended for future operations, and agreed that it had been set up at the request of Poindexter and North.[^51]
Walsh listed the statements on which the 1989 charges were based. Secord testified that he had waived all interest in Enterprise profits after July 1985, that Korel was not his company, that he had received no money from the Iran sales beyond his salary, that Defex was set up to hide the source of Enterprise funds from arms dealers, and that he held no beneficial interest in foreign accounts other than a British checking account. Walsh found each of these statements false. Walsh also found that the 500,000 dollars STTGI received from CSF was not a loan, as Secord had testified, and that STTGI in fact received at least 700,000 dollars. Walsh described Hakim, who had received limited use immunity from Congress, as the committees' chief source for Enterprise financial information.[^48]
### Indictment, Plea and Sentence
The Independent Counsel indicted Secord on March 16, 1988, together with Poindexter, North and Hakim, in a 23-count indictment whose first count charged conspiracy to defraud the United States; Secord was named in six felony counts that included conspiracy and theft and three counts of illegal gratuities paid to North.[^5][^30] The conspiracy and theft charges were dismissed because of problems with classified information, and the trials of the four defendants were severed. On May 11, 1989 a second indictment charged Secord with nine counts of obstruction, perjury and false statements.[^5][^48]
On November 8, 1989, five days before he was to stand trial on twelve felony charges, Secord pleaded guilty to one felony count of making false statements to Congress, admitting that he lied when he denied that North had received personal benefits from the Enterprise.[^48] The Deseret News reported that the plea was taken before Chief U.S. District Judge Aubrey E. Robinson Jr.; that Secord told the judge he had answered "no" "in a misguided effort to prevent further criticism" of North and himself; that the offense carried up to five years in prison; and that Walsh's chief prosecutor in the Secord case, [[Reid Weingarten]] told the judge the government was prepared to prove that Secord provided North with a home security system costing almost 14,000 dollars and a Swiss bank account containing 200,000 dollars funded by arms profits.[^52] Under the plea Secord agreed to cooperate in the pending trials and the Independent Counsel's investigation.[^48]
The gratuities concerned a 16,000 dollar security system installed at North's home in Great Falls, Virginia, after Secord introduced North to Glenn A. Robinette in the spring of 1986, and a 200,000 dollar Swiss account, the "B. Button" account, set up in 1986 to help educate North's children; Walsh wrote that the Independent Counsel could not prove that North accepted or received any of the money in that account.[^53] A 1989 conviction of North on the gratuity charge was later overturned on appeal.[^53]
Robinson sentenced Secord on January 24, 1990, to two years' probation.[^5]
Thomas Clines was indicted in February 1990 following the cooperation of Secord and Hakim, and was convicted in September 1990 of four tax felonies after a two-week jury trial in U.S. District Court in Baltimore. Secord, compelled to testify under a cooperation agreement, was a central prosecution witness; he admitted there that the Korel account was his own investment account, a fact he had denied before his plea.[^38][^46]
### Later Activity and the Memoir
Secord published the memoir *Honored and Betrayed: Irangate, Covert Affairs, and the Secret War in Laos*, written with [[Jay Wurts]] and published by John Wiley & Sons in 1992.[^54] The Washington Post obituary says that in the memoir he maintained he joined the operation out of what he saw as patriotic duty, and that later disclosures suggested financial motives "played no small role."[^2] In a 1987 interview with [[Playboy]] he said: "I feel I was betrayed."[^2]
After leaving the Air Force, Secord was a top executive at Computerized Thermal Imaging, a computer imaging firm, and was president of the Air Commando Association.[^2] He and his wife had formed Secord Associates in 1983 and bought three houses near their McLean, Virginia, home.[^1]
[^1]: Los Angeles Times, March 29, 1987, "Secord: A Specialist in Covert Deals" ("Skilled Secret Soldier"), CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP90-00965R000201700001-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000201700001-4.
[^2]: Bill Hewitt, "Richard V. Secord, general embroiled in Iran-contra affair, dies at 92," *Washington Post*, Oct. 16, 2024, text reprinted by the National Security Archive, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/media/32473/ocr.
[^3]: Testimony of Richard V. Secord, *Iran-Contra Investigation: Joint Hearings*, 100th Cong., 1st sess., May 5-8, 1987 (Hearings 100-1), p. 46, https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152829_0342.
[^4]: Lawrence E. Walsh, *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters*, vol. I (1993), pt. V, ch. 9, "United States v. Richard V. Secord," pp. 173-178, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_09.htm.
[^5]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, "Summary of Prosecutions," entry for Richard V. Secord (indicted March 16, 1988; second indictment May 11, 1989; plea November 8, 1989; sentenced January 24, 1990 by Chief Judge Aubrey E. Robinson Jr. to two years' probation), pp. xxiii ff., https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/summpros.htm.
[^6]: "The Secret World of General Secord," *Newsweek*, May 5, 1987, CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP90-00965R000605790003-5, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000605790003-5.
[^7]: Secord testimony, Hearings 100-1, p. 303.
[^8]: Edward T. Pound and Walter S. Mossberg, "Weapons Windfall: Obscure New Shipping Company Profited Handsomely From U.S. Arms Sales to Egypt," *Wall Street Journal*, Oct. 1, 1982, pp. 1, 18, CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP09S00048R000100020015-5, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp09s00048r000100020015-5.
[^9]: *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, H. Rept. 100-433 and S. Rept. 100-216 (1987), ch. 21, "The Enterprise," pp. 326-327, https://archive.org/details/reportofcongress87unit.
[^10]: Secord testimony, Hearings 100-1, p. 343 (questions by Rep. Courter).
[^11]: Secord testimony, Hearings 100-1, p. 47.
[^12]: H. Rept. 100-433, ch. 21, pp. 327-328.
[^13]: H. Rept. 100-433, ch. 21, n. 23, citing CIA files (C7 147-59) and Shackley deposition, Sept. 21, 1987, at 284-300.
[^14]: Secord testimony, Hearings 100-1, pp. 148-149.
[^15]: Secord testimony, Hearings 100-1, p. 318.
[^16]: City Club of Cleveland, "Major General Richard Secord," forum of October 9, 1981, https://www.cityclub.org/events/major-general-richard-secord.
[^17]: Secord testimony, Hearings 100-1, p. 48.
[^18]: H. Rept. 100-433, ch. 21, n. 24, citing FBI report on Wilson's aircraft used by Secord, FB393, 389-90.
[^19]: Al Kamen and Scott Armstrong, "Cost of Transporting Arms to Egypt Probed by Justice," *Washington Post*, 1982, CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP09S00048R000100020016-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp09s00048r000100020016-4.
[^20]: H. Rept. 100-433, ch. 21, n. 30, citing Senate committee staff memorandum on the EATSCO fine, Oct. 12, 1987, and Robinette testimony, Hearings 100-6, June 23, 1987, at 27-29.
[^21]: Secord testimony, Hearings 100-1, pp. 213-214 (aircraft and appointment exchange) and p. 214 (investigation and Justice letter).
[^22]: Secord testimony, Hearings 100-1, pp. 212-213 (questions by Sen. Boren).
[^23]: *United States v. Wilson*, 721 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1983), https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/427533/united-states-v-edwin-paul-wilson/.
[^24]: *United States v. Wilson*, 289 F. Supp. 2d 801 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2003) (Hughes, J.), https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2430886/united-states-v-wilson/.
[^25]: H. Rept. 100-433, ch. 3, p. 67.
[^26]: Keith Schneider, "North's Aides Linked to Australia Study," *New York Times*, Mar. 8, 1987, CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP90-00965R000605740024-7, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000605740024-7.
[^27]: INSLAW, Inc., Third Supplemental Submission in Support of Its Motion to Take Limited Discovery, U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia, Case No. 85-00070, Adv. Proc. No. 86-0069, summarizing the Babayan affidavit (Exhibit 3), https://archive.org/details/InslawAffairInBriefSupportingDocs.
[^28]: Secord testimony, Hearings 100-1, pp. 47-48.
[^29]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, pt. V, ch. 8, "The Enterprise and Its Finances," pp. 159-172, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_08.htm.
[^30]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, "Executive Summary," pp. xiii ff., https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/execsum.htm.
[^31]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172 (Southern Air Transport, Jetstar and Hasenfus defense-fund passages).
[^32]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172 (Dutton outline of the resupply operation, dated July 21, 1986).
[^33]: H. Rept. 100-433, ch. 3, pp. 66-67.
[^34]: *The Tower Commission Report* (Bantam/Times Books, 1987), p. 32, https://archive.org/details/towercommission00unit.
[^35]: *The Tower Commission Report*, p. 162.
[^36]: *The Tower Commission Report*, p. 73.
[^37]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172 (Phase IV and November 1985 HAWK shipment), citing the Israeli Financial Chronology, Apr. 26, 1987.
[^38]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, pt. V, ch. 11, "United States v. Thomas G. Clines," pp. 181-184, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_11.htm.
[^39]: Secord testimony, Hearings 100-1, p. 95; cited in Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, n. 32.
[^40]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172 (Direct U.S. Arms Sales to Iran; February 1986, May-August 1986 and October-November 1986 sections).
[^41]: *The Tower Commission Report*, pp. 248-249.
[^42]: *The Tower Commission Report*, p. 296.
[^43]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172 (The Iran/Contra Diversion), citing Secord, FBI 302, Mar. 12, 1988, p. 4.
[^44]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172, and n. 51.
[^45]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 9, pp. 173-178 (Secord's Finances), citing Secord, OIC Interview, Mar. 9, 1988, pp. 106-07, Secord, Grand Jury, Jan. 22, 1988, pp. 150-51, and Ghorbanifar, OIC Deposition, Dec. 10, 1987, p. 94.
[^46]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 9, pp. 173-178 (Secord's Finances; Korel perjury charge; Secord, Clines Trial Testimony, Sept. 5, 1990, p. 193).
[^47]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, pt. V, ch. 10, "United States v. Albert Hakim," pp. 179-180, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_10.htm.
[^48]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 9, pp. 173-178 (Secord's Testimony to Congress and Independent Counsel; Secord Indicted; Obstruction, Perjury and False Statements).
[^49]: David E. Rosenbaum, "Secord Says High Officials Helped Him Supply Contras Despite Ban on U.S. Arms Aid," *New York Times*, dateline May 5, 1987, CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP90-00965R000605580005-6, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000605580005-6.
[^50]: "North Said He Mentioned Diversion to Reagan, Secord Says," *Washington Post*, May 7, 1987, CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP90-00965R000504550012-3, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000504550012-3.
[^51]: Dan Morgan and Walter Pincus, "Secord Testifies Unspent Money Was for Future Operations, Not His Use," *Washington Post*, May 1987, CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP90-00965R000504550011-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000504550011-4.
[^52]: "Secord guilty of lying to Congress," *Deseret News*, Nov. 8, 1989, https://www.deseret.com/1989/11/8/18831419/secord-guilty-of-lying-to-congress/.
[^53]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 9, pp. 173-178 (Gratuities to North: The Basis for the Guilty Plea; The North Security Fence; The "B. Button" Account; n. 13).
[^54]: Richard V. Secord, with Jay Wurts, *Honored and Betrayed: Irangate, Covert Affairs, and the Secret War in Laos* (John Wiley & Sons, 1992), ISBN 0471573280, https://archive.org/details/honoredbetrayedi0000seco.

16
10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/William Sullivan.md
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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
---
created: 2026-05-15
updated: 2026-05-16
updated: 2026-10-09
title: William Sullivan
aliases:
- William C. Sullivan
@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ tags:
- 1960s
- 1970s
category: "Law Enforcement & Legal"
summary: "William C. Sullivan was the FBI's Assistant Director for Domestic Intelligence who architected COINTELPRO, drafted the 1964 anonymous 'suicide letter' to Martin Luther King Jr., was fired by Hoover in 1971, and was shot in a ruled hunting accident on November 9, 1977, the day before he was to testify to congressional investigators."
summary: "FBI domestic intelligence chief who ran COINTELPRO, was named in FBI records as preparing the 1964 anonymous letter to Martin Luther King Jr., was fired in 1971, and died in a 1977 hunting accident."
born: 1912-05-12
died: 1977-11-09
location: "Sugar Hill, New Hampshire"
@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ Sullivan was known within the FBI as intellectually aggressive and willing to pu
### COINTELPRO and King
As head of Domestic Intelligence, Sullivan was the senior FBI official responsible for COINTELPRO operations targeting the [[Southern Christian Leadership Conference]] and King personally. Following the announcement that King would receive the Nobel Peace Prize in October 1964, Sullivan supervised the preparation of an anonymous package containing a tape recording from a King hotel room accompanied by a letter characterizing King as a fraud and implicitly encouraging him to commit suicide before the Nobel ceremony. The letter was mailed to King's home in [[Atlanta, Georgia|Atlanta]], where his wife Coretta opened it.
As head of Domestic Intelligence, Sullivan was the senior FBI official responsible for COINTELPRO operations targeting the [[Southern Christian Leadership Conference]] and King personally. Following the announcement that King would receive the Nobel Peace Prize in October 1964, Sullivan supervised the preparation of an anonymous package containing a tape recording from a King hotel room accompanied by a letter characterizing King as a fraud and implicitly encouraging him to commit suicide before the Nobel ceremony. The package was addressed to King and mailed from a post office near the Miami airport on or about November 21, 1964, and was received at the Southern Christian Leadership Conference office in [[Atlanta, Georgia|Atlanta]], which stored it and later sent it to King's home with other tapes.[^2]
The [[Church Committee]] confirmed in 1975-1976 that Sullivan's division had prepared and sent this letter. The letter was the most extreme documented example of the FBI's COINTELPRO effort to neutralize King as a civil rights leader, and it appeared in the Church Committee's final report as evidence of one of the most egregious abuses of the program.
The [[Church Committee]] recorded that Sullivan testified on November 1, 1975 that [[Alan Belmont]] told him Hoover wanted a King tape mailed to [[Coretta Scott King]], that he sent an agent to Tampa to mail a package, and that he did not recall ever having seen the letter given to the committee by the FBI, which he said it was "possible" he had something to do with and which he suggested might have been "planted" in his files.[^2] In his 1979 memoir Sullivan wrote that his division prepared the letter.[^3] The letter was the most extreme documented example of the FBI's COINTELPRO effort to neutralize King as a civil rights leader, and it appeared in the Church Committee's final report as evidence of one of the most egregious abuses of the program.
Sullivan also supervised the wiretapping of King's phones and hotel rooms, the infiltration of SCLC chapters with informants, and the dissemination of derogatory information about King to news organizations and government officials including the [[White House]] and [[Department of Justice]].[^2]
Sullivan also supervised the wiretapping of King's phones and hotel rooms, the infiltration of SCLC chapters with informants, and the dissemination of derogatory information about King to news organizations and government officials including the [[White House]] and [[Department of Justice]].[^4]
### Break with Hoover
@ -55,4 +55,6 @@ The timing of Sullivan's death - the day before planned congressional testimony,
### Footnotes
[^1]: Sullivan, William C. *The Bureau: My Thirty Years in Hoover's FBI.* Norton, 1979. Church Committee (U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities). *Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans.* Book II, Senate Report No. 94-755, 1976.
[^2]: Garrow, David. *The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr.* Norton, 1981. O'Reilly, Kenneth. *"Racial Matters": The FBI's Secret File on Black America, 1960-1972.* Free Press, 1989.
[^2]: Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Final Report*, Book III, S. Rept. 94-755, April 26, 1976, King case study, pp. 158 to 161 (Sullivan, November 1, 1975, pp. 104 to 106 and 112; Young, February 19, 1976).
[^3]: William C. Sullivan, *The Bureau: My Thirty Years in Hoover's FBI* (Norton, 1979).
[^4]: Garrow, David. *The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr.* Norton, 1981. O'Reilly, Kenneth. *"Racial Matters": The FBI's Secret File on Black America, 1960-1972.* Free Press, 1989.