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@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ His presidency was thus politically weakened from the start. He governed under a
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### Kennedy Administration Planning
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The Kennedy administration's covert planning against Goulart began almost two years before the April 1964 coup, documented in presidential recordings and declassified NSC papers now collected in the National Security Archive's Electronic Briefing Book No. 465.
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The Kennedy administration's covert planning against Goulart began almost two years before the April 1964 coup, documented in presidential recordings and declassified NSC papers now collected in the [[National Security Archive]]'s Electronic Briefing Book No. 465.
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On July 30, 1962, the first secretly-taped Oval Office meeting addressing Brazil took place. Ambassador [[Lincoln Gordon]] attended alongside presidential aide [[Richard Goodwin]]. Gordon stated "We may very well want them to take over" by year's end, referring to the Brazilian military. At that same meeting, officials agreed to appoint Lt. Col. [[Vernon Walters]] as military attache in Brazil to strengthen US ties with the Brazilian military establishment.[^4]
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On July 30, 1962, the first secretly-taped [[Oval Office]] meeting addressing Brazil took place. Ambassador [[Lincoln Gordon]] attended alongside presidential aide [[Richard Goodwin]]. Gordon stated "We may very well want them to take over" by year's end, referring to the Brazilian military. At that same meeting, officials agreed to appoint Lt. Col. [[Vernon Walters]] as military attache in Brazil to strengthen US ties with the Brazilian military establishment.[^4]
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On December 11, 1962, the NSC drafted "U.S. Short-Term Policy Toward Brazil," presenting three options: do nothing; collaborate to overthrow Goulart; or seek to change his orientation while keeping coup planning in reserve. The NSC Executive Committee (meeting as Meeting No. 35) recommended Option C as "the only feasible present approach" while directing that the option of a coup be kept "under active and continuous consideration."[^5]
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@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ On December 17, 1962, [[Robert F. Kennedy]], then Attorney General, met with Gou
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On March 8, 1963, Kennedy met again with Secretary of State [[Dean Rusk]], Ambassador Gordon, and Robert Kennedy to review US-Brazil relations. The strategy was described internally as "applying the screws" through economic aid pressure. At that same meeting, a CIA memorandum titled "Plotting Against Goulart" was circulated, tracking various coup plots; it identified Marshal Odylio Denys's network as "the best-developed plan," while warning that premature coup attempts would strengthen Goulart and alienate pro-US military officers.[^7]
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On October 7, 1963, a White House tape records Kennedy asking Gordon directly: "Do you see a situation where we might be --- find it desirable to intervene militarily ourselves?" Gordon estimated 50-50 odds that Goulart would leave power by early 1964, discussed providing fuel and ammunition to pro-US military factions, and stated: "I would not want us to close our minds to the possibility of some kind of discreet intervention...which would help see the right side win."[^8]
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On October 7, 1963, a [[White House]] tape records Kennedy asking Gordon directly: "Do you see a situation where we might be --- find it desirable to intervene militarily ourselves?" Gordon estimated 50-50 odds that Goulart would leave power by early 1964, discussed providing fuel and ammunition to pro-US military factions, and stated: "I would not want us to close our minds to the possibility of some kind of discreet intervention...which would help see the right side win."[^8]
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On November 22, 1963, the State Department issued an Embassy contingency plan with, in the words of the cover memo, "heavy emphasis on U.S. armed intervention." The date was the day of Kennedy's assassination. His death removed whatever personal restraints his approach had imposed on the embassy and CIA station in Rio.[^9]
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@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ The destabilization of Goulart's government was a multi-front operation:
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[[USAID]] (Agency for International Development), under Ambassador Gordon's direction, used development funds to build economic leverage over Brazilian states governed by US-friendly politicians (notably [[Carlos Lacerda]] of Guanabara and [[Magalhaes Pinto]] of Minas Gerais), who became the civilian front for the coup.[^11]
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CIA covert action, coordinated in part by [[J.C. King]] (chief of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division) and the CIA station in Rio, funded opposition organizations, media, and political campaigns. On September 10, 1963, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Plans [[Richard Helms]] briefed the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), stating that CIA "is carrying out covert action in the labor movement and CIA believes that Communist control can be weakened." Lincoln Gordon's secret cables to Washington, declassified in later decades, requested and received authorization for covert support to coup-planning military officers.[^12]
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CIA covert action, coordinated in part by [[J.C. King]] (chief of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division) and the CIA station in Rio, funded opposition organizations, media, and political campaigns. On September 10, 1963, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Plans [[Richard Helms]] briefed the [[President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board]] (PFIAB), stating that CIA "is carrying out covert action in the labor movement and CIA believes that Communist control can be weakened." Lincoln Gordon's secret cables to Washington, declassified in later decades, requested and received authorization for covert support to coup-planning military officers.[^12]
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Rockefeller commercial pressure operated through [[Chase Manhattan Bank]] (his brother [[David Rockefeller]]'s institution) withholding and manipulating credit to Brazilian businesses in ways that heightened the economic instability the coup required.[^13]
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@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ In January 2008, Mario Neira Barreiro, a former intelligence officer under Urugu
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In 2013, Goulart's body was exhumed in Brazil after nearly four decades, with Brazilian, Argentine, and Uruguayan forensic experts participating. The forensic analysis produced inconclusive results: tests found no definitive evidence of poison, and the autopsy concluded that death was most likely due to natural causes, though the absence of a contemporaneous autopsy left the question formally open.
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Brazil's [[National Truth Commission]] (Comissao Nacional da Verdade, CNV), which delivered its final report in December 2014, included investigation of Goulart's death in its broader examination of [[Operation Condor]]. The CNV report, covering human rights violations from 1964 to 1985, identified over 375 perpetrators of atrocities by name and found over 400 individuals killed by the military dictatorship. The chapter titled "International Connections: From Repressive Alliances in the Southern Cone to Operation Condor" documented Brazil's coordination with other Southern Cone military governments in the elimination of exiled opposition figures. The forensic inconclusion meant the CNV stopped short of formally declaring Goulart's death a murder, though it treated the circumstances as consistent with Operation Condor targeting practices.[^20]
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Brazil's [[National Truth Commission]] (Comissao Nacional da Verdade, CNV), which delivered its final report in December 2014, included investigation of Goulart's death in its broader examination of [[Operation Condor]]. The CNV report, covering human rights violations from 1964 to 1985, identified over 375 perpetrators of atrocities by name and found over 400 individuals killed by the military dictatorship. The chapter titled "International Connections: From Repressive Alliances in the [[Southern Cone]] to Operation Condor" documented Brazil's coordination with other Southern Cone military governments in the elimination of exiled opposition figures. The forensic inconclusion meant the CNV stopped short of formally declaring Goulart's death a murder, though it treated the circumstances as consistent with Operation Condor targeting practices.[^20]
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### Military Dictatorship and the Amazon
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