vault backup: 2026-09-21 18:07:25

This commit is contained in:
disinfo.zone 2026-09-21 18:07:25 -04:00
parent 7ac5d56ba1
commit 269d7818d3
No known key found for this signature in database
447 changed files with 864 additions and 826 deletions

View file

@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ When President [[John F. Kennedy]] appointed him ambassador to [[Rio de Janeiro]
### October 1963: Kennedy Raises Military Intervention
On October 7, 1963, Gordon attended a White House meeting with President Kennedy, [[Secretary of Defense]] [[Robert McNamara]], [[Deputy CIA Director]] [[Marshall Carter]], CIA covert operations director [[Richard Helms]], [[USAID]] administrator [[David Bell]], [[Undersecretary of State]] [[W. Averell Harriman]], Assistant Secretary of State [[Edwin Martin]], and Special Assistant [[Ralph Dungan]]. The participants discussed Goulart's popularity, possible successors, and the Brazilian military's role. Kennedy asked Gordon directly: "What about the ... Do you see a situation coming where we might be, find desirable, to intervene militarily ourselves?" Gordon replied that a US invasion would require six divisions and a "massive military operation," framed the possibility as a "Dangerous Contingency possibly requiring rapid action," and argued it was premature without clear evidence that Brazil was adopting the "Fidel Castro model." The recordings of this meeting are archived at the [[John F. Kennedy Presidential Library]] as Tape 114/A50 and were released by the [[National Security Archive]] as Document 9 of NSAEBB No. 465.[^2]
On October 7, 1963, Gordon attended a [[White House]] meeting with President Kennedy, [[Secretary of Defense]] [[Robert McNamara]], [[Deputy CIA Director]] [[Marshall Carter]], CIA covert operations director [[Richard Helms]], [[USAID]] administrator [[David Bell]], [[Undersecretary of State]] [[W. Averell Harriman]], Assistant Secretary of State [[Edwin Martin]], and Special Assistant [[Ralph Dungan]]. The participants discussed Goulart's popularity, possible successors, and the Brazilian military's role. Kennedy asked Gordon directly: "What about the ... Do you see a situation coming where we might be, find desirable, to intervene militarily ourselves?" Gordon replied that a US invasion would require six divisions and a "massive military operation," framed the possibility as a "Dangerous Contingency possibly requiring rapid action," and argued it was premature without clear evidence that Brazil was adopting the "Fidel Castro model." The recordings of this meeting are archived at the [[John F. Kennedy Presidential Library]] as Tape 114/A50 and were released by the [[National Security Archive]] as Document 9 of NSAEBB No. 465.[^2]
Earlier that year, on March 7, 1963, Gordon had sent a memorandum to [[McGeorge Bundy]] titled "Political Considerations Affecting U.S. Assistance to Brazil," in which he recommended preparing "the most promising possible environment for his replacement by a more desirable regime."[^3]
@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ The following morning, March 28, 1964, McGeorge Bundy transmitted Gordon's cable
On March 29, 1964, Gordon sent a second top-secret cable (NSAEBB No. 118, Document 3) reiterating the need for weapons "pre-positioned prior any outbreak of violence" for "paramilitary units working with Democratic Military groups" and again proposing submarine delivery to isolated Sao Paulo shore locations.[^7]
On March 31, 1964, Secretary of State Dean Rusk sent a cable to Gordon (FRUS Document 194, dated 9:52 p.m.) authorizing the White House decisions: naval tankers with petroleum from Aruba, assembly of 110 tons of ammunition in New Jersey, and dispatch of a naval task force to the Brazilian coast. The [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] assigned the code name [[Operation Brother Sam]] to this contingency. The task force, including an aircraft carrier, helicopter carrier, six destroyers, and eleven tankers, moved secretly toward Brazil beginning at 1:50 A.M. on March 31, waiting off [[Santos]] for orders from Gordon's embassy.[^8]
On March 31, 1964, Secretary of State Dean Rusk sent a cable to Gordon (FRUS Document 194, dated 9:52 p.m.) authorizing the White House decisions: naval tankers with petroleum from Aruba, assembly of 110 tons of ammunition in [[New Jersey]], and dispatch of a naval task force to the Brazilian coast. The [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] assigned the code name [[Operation Brother Sam]] to this contingency. The task force, including an aircraft carrier, helicopter carrier, six destroyers, and eleven tankers, moved secretly toward Brazil beginning at 1:50 A.M. on March 31, waiting off [[Santos]] for orders from Gordon's embassy.[^8]
After the coup succeeded within hours, Gordon signaled triumph and advised the Johnson administration to avoid "a jubilant posture," urging instead that Johnson send a congratulatory telegram to the new acting president. Johnson's recognition came so fast it shocked even veteran observers of U.S. Latin American policy. Gordon later acknowledged that Operation Brother Sam "proved unnecessary to set in motion" once the coup succeeded without direct US military action.[^9]
@ -71,6 +71,6 @@ Gordon served as President of [[Johns Hopkins University]] from 1967 to 1971, th
[^8]: FRUS 1964-68, Vol. XXXI, Document 194, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Brazil, Washington, March 30, 1964, 9:52 p.m. Top Secret; Flash; drafted and approved by Secretary Rusk. Document 198, March 31, 1964, 2:29 p.m., assigns JCS codename "Brother Sam." NSA Electronic Briefing Book No. 118, Document 5, Secretary of State Dean Rusk to Ambassador Lincoln Gordon, March 31, 1964.
[^9]: Colby and Dennett, Ch. 29. Gordon's characterization of Operation Brother Sam as a "contingency never put into effect" is from his later public statements, cited in NSA Electronic Briefing Book No. 118 editorial introduction.
[^10]: Colby and Dennett, Ch. 29.
[^11]: Colby and Dennett, Ch. 29. Gordon's denial under oath ("Neither the American Embassy nor I personally played any part") and characterization as "the single most decisive victory of freedom": Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing record, 1966, Lincoln Gordon confirmation as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs. His 2005 retraction and 1977 admission of US funding of opposition: NSAEBB No. 118 editorial introduction by Peter Kornbluh.
[^11]: Colby and Dennett, Ch. 29. Gordon's denial under oath ("Neither the American Embassy nor I personally played any part") and characterization as "the single most decisive victory of freedom": [[Senate Foreign Relations Committee]] hearing record, 1966, Lincoln Gordon confirmation as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs. His 2005 retraction and 1977 admission of US funding of opposition: NSAEBB No. 118 editorial introduction by [[Peter Kornbluh]].
[^12]: Colby and Dennett, Ch. 29, 39.
[^13]: *Washington Post*, December 21, 2009 (obituary); *Boston Globe*, December 22, 2009 (obituary). Johns Hopkins presidency 1967-1971 and subsequent positions: Johns Hopkins University Office of the President historical records.