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23
10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Arif Durrani.md
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@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
---
updated: 2026-10-08
category: "Arms Dealers & Brokers"
tags:
- Person
@ -17,13 +18,19 @@ Durrani had close connections to the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International
He outlined BCCI's and [[Asaf Ali]]'s weapons deals across the globe, from [[Bulgaria]] to [[Nigeria]].[^10] Durrani also stated that BCCI steered some of his business to [[First American Bank]] in [[New York City]], considering BCCI and First American Bank interchangeable for financial transactions.[^11]
Until his arrest, Durrani was the managing director of Merex, a California arms firm that supplied the Israelis.[^12]
Beaty and Gwynne describe Durrani, until his arrest, as the managing director of Merex, a California arms firm that supplied the Israelis.[^12]
[[Christopher Byron]] reported in December 1991 that Durrani formed a Los Angeles company called Merex Corporation in 1984, and suggested that Durrani chose the name to trade on the reputation of a much larger company of the same name, Merex, Inc., of Alexandria, Virginia and Konigswinter, Germany.[^13] Byron also reported that a court-appointed investigator working on Durrani's case had found 1984 documents and telex traffic of [[GeoMiliTech Consultants Corp.]] suggesting negotiations for South Korean explosives, cannon shells and F-4 parts. According to the investigator, one of the F-4 parts, a QK410B oscillator, is a component of certain Hawk surface-to-air missile systems. Durrani claims that the only Hawk systems then in operation anywhere that used that part were those installed in Iran, and that his later efforts to ship an identical part to Iran led to his arrest.[^13]
### Sentence and Appeal
In May 1987 Chief Judge [[T.F. Gilroy Daly]] of the federal court in [[Connecticut]] sentenced Durrani to ten years in prison and a fine of 2 million dollars for illegally exporting HAWK missile parts to Iran in 1986, with a concurrent ten years and 1 million dollars for selling arms without registering with the [[United States Department of State|State Department]]. The judge told him his testimony was riddled with "greed, lies, money, perjury, avarice and conniving" and that "your behavior was bordering on treason."[^13] In December 1987 the [[United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit|Second Circuit]] rejected his defense that he had acted on the orders of Oliver North and [[John Poindexter]], the first use of what became known as the "Oliver North defense," and upheld the conviction (United States v. Durrani, 835 F.2d 410). A petition he filed in 2003, his fourth post-conviction attack on the sentence, was denied (Durrani v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 2d 204, D. Conn.).[^14][^15]
In May 1987 Chief Judge [[T.F. Gilroy Daly]] of the federal court in [[Connecticut]] sentenced Durrani to ten years in prison and a fine of 2 million dollars for illegally exporting HAWK missile parts to Iran in 1986, with a concurrent ten years and 1 million dollars for selling arms without registering with the [[United States Department of State|State Department]]. The judge told him his testimony was riddled with "greed, lies, money, perjury, avarice and conniving" and that "your behavior was bordering on treason."[^14] In December 1987 the [[United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit|Second Circuit]] rejected his defense that he had acted on the orders of Oliver North and [[John Poindexter]], the first use of what became known as the "Oliver North defense," and upheld the conviction (United States v. Durrani, 835 F.2d 410). A petition he filed in 2003, his fourth post-conviction attack on the sentence, was denied (Durrani v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 2d 204, D. Conn.).[^15][^16]
From prison he told *[[Time (magazine)|Time]]* in 1991 that "Asaf is B.C.C.I.'s man in the weapons business," referring to Asaf Ali.[^16]
He moved for a reduction of sentence under Rule 35 in July 1988, and the motion was denied on May 23, 1989. He filed a pro se petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255 on March 4, 1990, and on August 6, 1991 filed an amended petition with counsel, alleging that the government had withheld exculpatory material and that agents knew private individuals, including [[Manuel Pires]], were procuring weapons for Iran. On October 2, 1991, after in camera review, the district court ordered some documents produced by the Office of Independent Counsel to be disclosed to Durrani. On May 21, 1992 Durrani moved to dismiss the section 2255 petition voluntarily, saying he wanted to resolve his immigration proceedings first, and the court dismissed it without prejudice.[^16]
On September 9, 1991 the United States Attorney's Office in Bridgeport objected to each of seven requests for production in Durrani's second request for documents. The objection characterizes the claims as a fishing expedition and states that the government had searched for any connection between Pires and the government up to August 1, 1987 without result.[^17] It also reports that defense counsel had taken the depositions of [[Barbara Studley]] and [[John Singlaub]] in Washington in August 1991, and states that neither witness had any knowledge of Durrani's claims and that both had met Pires only within the last two years. The same page states that a deposition of former CIA official [[George Cave]] would offer no greater prospect of usefulness than the Studley-Singlaub examinations, citing Cave's relationship with the CIA and exposure to classified information.[^17]
From prison he told *[[Time (magazine)|Time]]* in 1991 that "Asaf is B.C.C.I.'s man in the weapons business," referring to Asaf Ali.[^18]
### Footnotes
@ -39,7 +46,9 @@ From prison he told *[[Time (magazine)|Time]]* in 1991 that "Asaf is B.C.C.I.'s
[^10]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 306.
[^11]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 306.
[^12]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 305.
[^13]: "Arms dealer sentenced to 10 years," United Press International, May 13, 1987. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1987/05/13/Arms-dealer-sentenced-to-10-years/6753547876800/
[^14]: "Court rejects arms merchant's use of 'Oliver North defense,'" United Press International, December 4, 1987. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1987/12/04/Court-rejects-arms-merchants-use-of-Oliver-North-defense/3615565592400
[^15]: Durrani v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 2d 204 (D. Conn. 2003).
[^16]: "Scandals: Not Just a Bank," *Time,* September 2, 1991. https://time.com/archive/6718475/scandals-not-just-a-bank/
[^13]: Christopher Byron, "Did Convict Arif Durrani Help Set the Stage for Iran/Contra?," *New York*, December 16, 1991, pp. 38-44, GeoMiliTech passages on pp. 42-44. https://books.google.com/books?id=6ugCAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA42
[^14]: "Arms dealer sentenced to 10 years," United Press International, May 13, 1987. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1987/05/13/Arms-dealer-sentenced-to-10-years/6753547876800/
[^15]: "Court rejects arms merchant's use of 'Oliver North defense,'" United Press International, December 4, 1987. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1987/12/04/Court-rejects-arms-merchants-use-of-Oliver-North-defense/3615565592400
[^16]: *Durrani v. United States*, 294 F. Supp. 2d 204 (D. Conn. 2003), Background. https://www.ctd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/112503.SRU_.Durrani.pdf
[^17]: Government's Objection to Arif Durrani's Second Request for Production of Documents, *United States v. Arif Durrani*, D. Conn., B-90-090 (TFGD) and B-86-59 (TFGD), September 9, 1991, pp. 1-11. CIA CREST document 0001474388. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0001474388
[^18]: "Scandals: Not Just a Bank," *Time,* September 2, 1991. https://time.com/archive/6718475/scandals-not-just-a-bank/

195
10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Daniel O. Graham.md Normal file
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---
title: Daniel O. Graham
aliases:
- Daniel O. Graham
- Daniel Orrin Graham
- Dan Graham
- Danny Graham
- Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham
- Lieutenant General Daniel O. Graham
- Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham
- General Graham
- Gen. Graham
created: 2026-10-08
updated: 2026-10-08
category: "Intelligence & Government"
tags:
- Person
- DefenseIntelligenceAgency
- CentralIntelligenceAgency
- TeamB
- HighFrontier
- StrategicDefenseInitiative
- PsiResearch
- Stargate
- IranContra
- GeoMiliTech
- SpaceTransportation
summary: "Lieutenant general who directed the Defense Intelligence Agency from September 1974 to January 1976, founded High Frontier in 1981 to promote space-based missile defense, and was deposed in the Iran-Contra inquiry in 1987."
born: 1925-04-13
died: 1995-12-31
relations:
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Central Intelligence Agency]]"
role: "staff officer, Office of National Estimates; later deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community Staff"
start: 1963
end: 1974
fn: 2
- type: head_of
with: "[[Defense Intelligence Agency]]"
role: "director"
start: 1974-09
end: 1976-01-01
fn: 7
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Team B]]"
role: "member"
start: 1976
end: 1976
fn: 10
- type: employed_by
with: "[[University of Miami]]"
role: "adjunct professor of military strategy"
start: 1976
fn: 3
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Ronald Reagan]]"
role: "military adviser to the 1976 and 1980 presidential campaigns"
start: 1976
end: 1980
fn: 3
- type: head_of
with: "[[Coalition for Peace through Strength]]"
role: "co-chairman"
start: 1978
fn: 3
- type: founded
with: "[[High Frontier]]"
start: 1981
fn: 2
- type: head_of
with: "[[High Frontier]]"
role: "director"
start: 1981
fn: 2
- type: member_of
with: "[[National Strategy Committee]]"
role: "member"
start: 1980
end: 1980
fn: 18
- type: member_of
with: "[[National Intelligence Study Center]]"
role: "advisory board"
start: 1983
fn: 19
- type: head_of
with: "[[Space Transportation Association]]"
role: "leader, as described in a 1995 letter"
fn: 26
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Iran-Contra Affair]]"
role: "deponent before the Senate Select Committee, May 26, 1987"
start: 1987
end: 1987
fn: 2
---
Daniel Orrin Graham (1925 to December 31, 1995) was an Army officer and intelligence official who served on the staff of the [[Central Intelligence Agency]], directed the [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] from September 1974 to January 1, 1976, and afterward led the campaign for space-based missile defense through [[High Frontier]], which he founded in 1981. The [[New York Times]] called him "probably the most persistent advocate" of the approach.[^1] He was deposed by the [[Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition]] on May 26, 1987 about his acquaintance with [[Barbara Studley]] and her firm [[GeoMiliTech Consultants Corp.]][^2]
### Birth, schooling and early service
The New York Times obituary of January 3, 1996 gives his birth as April 13, 1925, near [[Medford, Oregon]], and says he was the son of farmers who worked in sawmills and orchards as a teenager.[^1] The finding aid for his papers at the University of Miami gives his birthplace as [[Portland, Oregon]].[^3] In his deposition he listed public schools in Oregon, then [[United States Military Academy|West Point]], which he entered in 1943 and left with a commission in 1946.[^2]
After West Point he served in Germany until 1951, was assigned to the [[11th Airborne Division]], was sent to Monterey to learn Russian, and served in [[United States Army Special Forces|Special Forces]]. He commanded an infantry company in [[South Korea|Korea]] from 1954 to 1956, then returned to the [[101st Airborne Division]] and attended the [[United States Army Command and General Staff College|Command and General Staff College]] at [[Fort Leavenworth]]. In 1958 he became assistant chief of staff for intelligence at the [[Pentagon]].[^2]
### Central Intelligence Agency, 1963 to 1974
In 1963 Graham joined the [[Office of National Estimates]] of the CIA as a staff officer covering Soviet military affairs. He returned to the Army in 1966 to command the 319th Military Intelligence Battalion in the Pacific. In 1967 he attended the [[United States Army War College|Army War College]] and then served as chief of current intelligence and estimates at the [[Military Assistance Command, Vietnam]] from August 1967 to August 1968. He went back to the Office of National Estimates until 1971.[^2]
In 1971 he became a brigadier general and was assigned to the DIA as director of collections, which he described as running the attache corps and coordinating collection among the services, and then as the agency's first director of estimates.[^2] In 1972 he returned to the CIA as a major general on the new [[Intelligence Community Staff]]. In early 1973 he became deputy to Director of Central Intelligence [[William E. Colby]] for intelligence community affairs.[^2] On January 21, 1974 he sent [[James R. Schlesinger]] at the Pentagon a copy of a preliminary post-mortem report on the Middle East crisis of the previous autumn, describing it as "rather candid."[^4] He received the Distinguished Intelligence Medal at a CIA ceremony on August 29, 1974 for his service as deputy to the Director for the Intelligence Community.[^5]
### Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency
Graham became director of the DIA in September 1974. A biographical note in his 1976 monograph "U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads" states that he declared his intention to retire on November 3, 1975, when the dismissal of Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger and Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby was announced, and that he retired on January 1, 1976.[^6] In his deposition he said he was reassigned to the DIA as director in 1974 and retired from the position in January 1976 as a lieutenant general.[^2] The same note gives his earlier DIA posts as Assistant Director for Collection from January to November 1970 and Deputy Director for Estimates until May 1973, when he joined the Intelligence Community Staff; the deposition places the first DIA assignment in 1971 and the Intelligence Community Staff in 1972.[^6] In his deposition he said the DIA "coordinates all military intelligence activities," that it ran the attache corps, and that it had no covert logistics branch while he was director. He reported to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[^7]
On June 23, 1975 he submitted a written statement to the House Appropriations Military Construction Subcommittee asking for $86.1 million in the fiscal 1976 budget for a new DIA building.[^8]
### Team B
A CIA memorandum of August 18, 1976, addressed to the Director of Security, lists "General Daniel O. Graham" among the senior people who might serve on the outside group reviewing Soviet strategic objectives, known as [[Team B]]. Graham is shown with the affiliation "[[Center for Advanced International Studies]]," in a list that also includes Van Cleave, Thomas W. Wolfe and Paul Wolfowitz.[^9] The team's report, dated December 1, 1976, names [[Richard Pipes]] as team leader, [[William Van Cleave]] as associate, and "Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, USA, (Ret.)" with Thomas Wolfe of the [[RAND Corporation]] and General [[John Vogt]] as members. The advisory panel listed [[Paul Nitze]], [[Foy Kohler]], [[Seymour Weiss]], [[Jasper Welch]] and [[Paul Wolfowitz]].[^10] The report says its members were "deliberately selected from among experienced political and military analysts of Soviet affairs known to take a more somber view of the Soviet strategic threat than that accepted as the intelligence community's consensus."[^10]
### Psychic research during his directorship
The Defense Intelligence Agency issued "Soviet and Czechoslovakian Parapsychology Research" in September 1975, while Graham was director. The report, DST-1810S-387-75, was prepared by [[Louis F. Maire III]] and Major [[J. D. LaMothe]] of the [[United States Army Medical Intelligence and Information Agency|Army Medical Intelligence and Information Agency]], Office of the Surgeon General, under DIA task PT-1810-12-75, with an information cut-off of April 15, 1975. Its contents include telepathy, psychotronic generator research, psychokinesis and remote viewing.[^11]
In January 1984 [[Time]] reported that the Pentagon denied any interest in parapsychology, and quoted retired Lieutenant General Daniel O. Graham, a former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, who had been interviewed by the New York Times. Time wrote that Graham "indicated that the military had unquestionably been involved in psychic research," and that he considered the $6 million annual figure in [[Ronald McRae]]'s forthcoming book Mind Wars to be an exaggeration. He said: "I wouldn't be surprised if the intelligence community were following this. They would be remiss if they didn't."[^12] Graham's papers at the University of Miami contain a file titled "SRI - Sov. Exchange," which the finding aid lists without description.[^3]
### High Frontier and the Strategic Defense Initiative
Graham retired from the Army in 1976. According to his deposition, he then took a post as adjunct professor of military strategy at the University of Miami, in a think tank called the Institute for Advanced Strategic Studies.[^2] Journalist George Lardner Jr. reported that Graham had been on the staff of the [[American Security Council]], headed by [[John Fisher]], and Graham told him that Fisher "really didn't think much of this idea" of space defense.[^13] The University of Miami finding aid says Graham became co-chairman of the [[Coalition for Peace through Strength]] in 1978.[^3]
Graham founded High Frontier in September 1981 and served as its director.[^2] He told the [[Washington Post]] in 1985 that he had raised about $500,000 in private funds, "mostly from individuals," and that the checks for the study, which the Post described as 175 pages long and issued under the imprimatur of the [[Heritage Foundation]], were made out to Heritage although Heritage had little to do with the project. He said: "We went public in March 1982 and by March 1983 we had the president of the United States going our way."[^13] The Post reported that Graham had been "claiming much of the credit for the Star Wars initiative since President Reagan announced it in a speech in 1983." The paper quoted other SDI supporters and critics who said he overstated his importance.[^13] At a House Armed Services Committee hearing on the SDI program on June 6, 1985, Representative [[William L. Dickinson]] referred to "Danny Graham and the High Frontier people" and asked whether High Frontier had been right all along; John Gardner, director of the Systems Division of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, answered that at an earlier time "when General Graham was associated with the DIA" Graham "saw some evidence of these Soviet direct energy weapons programs."[^14]
On January 8, 1982 Casey wrote to Graham thanking him for the "prospectus on the High Frontier project," called it "very well done and deserving of close attention," and said he found "something of a disconnect" in the budget paragraphs, which moved from a $35 billion figure to a higher $50 billion figure.[^15] The CIA reading room lists a letter from Graham to [[William J. Casey]] about High Frontier dated December 9, 1982. On December 20 Casey replied that he had "enjoyed your talk at the [[National Strategy Information Center]] breakfast" and offered to arrange for Graham to exchange ideas with CIA officers knowledgeable about space and missile technology.[^16]
### Advisory roles and awards
In May 1980 the New York Times listed Graham with Richard Pipes, William Van Cleave and Seymour Weiss among the handful of former Team B members at the core of Ronald Reagan's foreign policy and defense working groups.[^17] A partial membership list of the [[National Strategy Committee]], sent with a letter from Graham to [[Walter Pforzheimer]] on September 23, 1980, names Graham as a member.[^18] In 1983 he was named to the advisory board of the [[National Intelligence Study Center]] in Washington. That board included Casey and Paul Nitze, and Ray Cline sat on the board of directors.[^19] In early 1984 the [[International Strategic Studies Association]] named five recipients of its Award for Outstanding Contributions to Strategic Progress, among them Graham and Senator [[John Tower]]. The association's invitation to Casey was declined for him by the CIA Public Affairs office on February 9, 1984.[^20]
### Challenger and the sabotage question
In May 1986, while the presidential commission investigating the loss of the space shuttle Challenger was sitting, Graham called for an inquiry into sabotage. He told the [[Washington Times]]: "The case for foul play is undeniably strong." The commission's spokesman declined to say whether sabotage was being investigated. Graham, then head of High Frontier, said by telephone that he doubted it was being investigated "because I know what kind of reaction one gets when you bring up such a possibility." In the same interview he said he was not making a case for sabotage, that "you ought to look awfully close at it," and that the Titan, Nike-Orion and Delta failures, with the shuttle, made four space launch systems failing in a row.[^21]
On July 23, 1986 Graham wrote to Casey enclosing a paper titled "Is the KGB Sabotaging SDI?" He wrote that "My experts calculate the odds against this being coincidence" were 250 million to one, listed among his further suspicions the absence of normal Soviet surveillance of the Challenger flight, the 1983 disappearance of an Air Force officer expert in destruct systems, and French suspicions of sabotage of Ariane, and wrote that "none of this adds up to proof of Soviet sabotage." He urged Casey and [[Edwin Meese]] to "leave no stone unturned" in getting answers. Casey's note of July 28, 1986 asked the Deputy Director for Science and Technology to draft a reply. Casey replied on August 16, 1986, acknowledging Graham's letters of July 23 and 29, 1986, and the [[Space Shuttle Challenger|Challenger]] and Delta failures Graham had cited: "I am very concerned about the possibility of Soviet sabotage; however, based on the information developed in investigations of all aspects of the accidents, we do not believe the U.S. space launch failures you cited were due to Soviet action." He wrote that the specific technical failures had been identified and traced to "errors or procedural problems," that investigations had found no evidence of Soviet involvement, and that the similarity in detonation times "was a true coincidence." He also addressed a separate claim about an Air Force officer who disappeared in 1983, saying the officer "was never involved with rockets, satellites, launch control, missile destruction systems, or any similar duties."[^22] On December 8, 1986 Graham wrote to [[Robert Gates|Robert M. Gates]], then deputy director of the CIA, praising his assessment of Soviet strategic defense efforts, and copied Casey.[^23]
### Iran-Contra deposition
Graham was deposed on May 26, 1987 by [[Charles Kerr]], associate counsel to the Senate Select Committee, at the committee's offices in the [[Hart Senate Office Building]].[^2] He said he had known Studley since about 1977, when she was a Miami radio broadcaster who invited him onto her talk show, and that he met her again when she came to Washington. Counsel dated her move to about June 1984. Graham said he did not know. Asked about GeoMiliTech, he said "all I know is that she runs it and it's an international trading firm in high-tech items." He said he had no function with the company and had received no remuneration from it.[^2]
He said that in early 1985 he recommended [[Werner Glatt]] to Studley as an honest arms broker, after Studley and [[John Singlaub]] had been looking for a broker to supply arms to the [[Contras]]. He had earlier placed the conversation in early 1986. He described Glatt as "a combination of a sheep farmer and arms trader," and said he arranged a lunch, at what he recalled as the [[Carlton Hotel|Carlton]] hotel, where he introduced Glatt and Studley, stayed about ten minutes, and received no feedback about the deal. He said that Singlaub was not present, that he had never introduced Glatt to Singlaub, and that Glatt had donated to High Frontier in 1984.[^2]
Graham said that after the delivery Studley told him of "some folks that were not part of the deal showing up when the ship arrived." Counsel asked, "This would be [[Mario Dellamico]]?" and Graham answered "Okay." He said he did not know their names. He then arranged a meeting at Langley with Casey, himself and Studley so that she could tell Casey directly. Counsel put the date at about December 20, 1985, and Graham said it was "Toward the end of '85." He said: "I introduced Mrs. Studley to Bill." He said the meeting lasted "about 30 minutes, 20, 30 minutes," that Studley left documents with Casey, and that Casey "did not admit to any connection with any of the people that she named" and "just nodded like a wise old owl."[^2]
Counsel showed Graham Exhibit 1, a memorandum from Studley to Lt. Col. [[Oliver North]] dated October 30, 1985. It describes a call from an agent called "W" and says that Mario Dellamico, working with [[Ron Martin]], had asked the company to help sell Martin's arms to the Contras. The memorandum ends: "General John K. Singlaub has been advised of this information." Graham said he had not reviewed the memorandum but knew the events in general from Studley, who had told him enough to say "you need to inform Casey, not me."[^24] Graham said Studley had her own concern that the affair would hurt Glatt's business and, through him, hers.[^2]
Counsel also showed Graham Exhibit 2, a quotation dated July 28, 1986 on GeoMiliTech letterhead, over Singlaub's signature as "Consultant," offering arms to Casey. Graham said he had never seen it, and he said he knew of no relationship between Glatt and North.[^25] Graham said he met Studley and Glatt together in [[Frankfurt]], Germany, on or about May 1, 1987. He said the two were more concerned about publicity than about the law, and that he had discussed the matter with Studley three times after the story became public.[^2]
### Later years and space transportation
In a letter dated May 10, 1995, printed in the [[Congressional Record]] in February 1996, House Speaker [[Newt Gingrich]] thanked Graham for leading High Frontier and its "sister organization, the Space Transportation Association," and wrote that the X-33 reusable launch program "would not be happening today without the contributions of you and your colleagues."[^26]
Graham's papers at the University of Miami cover 1967 to 1991. They include files on the [[Westmoreland v. CBS]] suit, Arlington County politics, drafts of the High Frontier study, a file on Soviet-American relations, materials on the Strategic Defense Initiative and the CIA, and press clippings.[^3]
### Death
Graham died at his home in [[Arlington, Virginia]], on Sunday, December 31, 1995, aged 70. The New York Times reported that he died of colon cancer.[^1] He was survived by his second wife, Adele Piro Graham, whom he married in 1994. His first wife, Ruth Maxwell Graham, had died in 1989.[^1] He was buried at [[Arlington National Cemetery]] with full military honors.[^3]
### Footnotes
[^1]: "Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham" obituary, New York Times, January 3, 1996, reprinted in Congressional Record, vol. 142, Extensions of Remarks, pp. E143-E144 (February 1, 1996), "Tribute to General D.O. Graham," remarks of Rep. Dana Rohrabacher. https://irp.fas.org/congress/1996_cr/h960201a.htm
[^2]: Deposition of Daniel O. Graham, May 26, 1987, Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, in Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, Appendix B, vol. 12 (Depositions), pp. 972-1040, Internet Archive item micro_IA41152840_0234. The career chronology is at pp. 974-979. The Studley, Glatt, Dellamico and Casey meeting passages rest on this deposition. Sole source for the witness's own account of those passages.
[^3]: University of Miami Special Collections, "Daniel O. Graham papers," ASM0492, finding aid, biographical sketch and series list. https://atom.library.miami.edu/index.php/asm0492 and https://atom.library.miami.edu/downloads/asm0492.pdf
[^4]: Letter, Daniel O. Graham to James R. Schlesinger, January 21, 1974, CIA reading room, CIA-RDP80M01082A000800060030-9. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80m01082a000800060030-9
[^5]: "Honor and Merit Awards Ceremony [Distinguished Intelligence Medal to Daniel O. Graham]," August 29, 1974, CIA reading room, CIA-RDP80R01731R002000060020-6. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r002000060020-6
[^6]: Daniel O. Graham, "U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads," United States Strategic Institute, USSI Report 76-1 (1976), author biographical note, CIA reading room, CIA-RDP91M00696R000900060007-5. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp91m00696r000900060007-5
[^7]: Deposition of Daniel O. Graham, May 26, 1987, Appendix B, vol. 12, pp. 976-978.
[^8]: Statement of Lieutenant General Daniel O. Graham, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, before the Military Construction Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, June 1975 (archive date June 23, 1975), CIA reading room, CIA-RDP80B01495R000300020008-2. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80b01495r000300020008-2
[^9]: Memorandum, "Status Report on the Experiment in Competitive Analysis and Request for Your Assistance," August 18, 1976, CIA reading room, CIA-RDP91M00696R000600180054-3. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp91m00696r000600180054-3
[^10]: Team B report, published December 1, 1976, CIA reading room, CIA-RDP91M00696R001000110006-8 (56 pages, released November 7, 2006), team and advisory panel roster (p. iv) and introduction. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/node/975749
[^11]: Louis F. Maire III and J. D. LaMothe, "Soviet and Czechoslovakian Parapsychology Research," Defense Intelligence Agency, DST-1810S-387-75, September 1975, DIA task PT-1810-12-75, CIA-RDP96-00792R000600350001-3, cover and table of contents.
[^12]: "An E.S.P. Gap: Exploring psychic weapons," Time, January 23, 1984, p. 17, CIA reading room, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200230025-5. Quotations are as reported by Time from Graham's interview with the New York Times. Sole source for the quotations.
[^13]: George Lardner Jr., "GEN. GRAHAM'S STAR WARS: The one-man lobby to fill space with weaponry," Washington Post, November 17, 1985, CIA reading room, CIA-RDP90-00965R000403710030-7. Statements attributed to Graham are his own, as reported by the Post.
[^14]: Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI] Program, hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 99th Congress, 1st session, H.A.S.C. No. 99-30, June 6, 1985, pp. 21 and 41 (exchange of Rep. Dickinson and John Gardner). Internet Archive item micro_IA41152646_0474. Gardner's statement is his description of Graham's earlier DIA exposure; sole source for it.
[^15]: Letter, William J. Casey to Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, January 8, 1982, CIA reading room, CIA-RDP83M00914R001900220074-1. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp83m00914r001900220074-1
[^16]: CIA reading room record CIA-RDP83M00914R002400010001-8, catalogued as a letter from Daniel O. Graham to William J. Casey regarding High Frontier, December 9, 1982 (the released pages show Casey's December 20, 1982 reply and one denied page); reply, William J. Casey to Graham, December 20, 1982, CIA-RDP88B00443R001203980021-9.
[^17]: Hedrick Smith, "Reagan Advisers Hold Somber View of Soviet Intentions," New York Times, May 25, 1980, CIA reading room, CIA-RDP90-00552R000505080020-3.
[^18]: National Strategy Committee, partial membership listing enclosed with a letter from Daniel O. Graham to Walter Pforzheimer, September 23, 1980, CIA-RDP02T06251R000900300002-4.
[^19]: National Intelligence Study Center, invitation to the Russell J. Bowen collection exhibit, Georgetown University, November 3, 1983, with advisory board and board of directors lists, CIA-RDP90-00806R000100430001-2.
[^20]: International Strategic Studies Association, letter to William J. Casey naming the 1984 award recipients, January 1984, and Central Intelligence Agency Public Affairs Office, letter to Kaswell Perazich & Watson, February 9, 1984, CIA-RDP86M00886R002100010008-3.
[^21]: Walter Andrews and Warren Strobel, "Shuttle explosion probers warned to suspect sabotage," Washington Times, May 22, 1986, CIA reading room, CIA-RDP90-00965R000100190002-2.
[^22]: Letter, Daniel O. Graham to William J. Casey, July 23, 1986, enclosing "Is the KGB Sabotaging SDI?", with the July 28, 1986 cover memorandum "Possible Soviet Sabotage of Our Space Program," CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6. Reply, William J. Casey to Graham, August 16, 1986, CIA-RDP88B00443R002004470017-0 (also filed as CIA-RDP90B01390R000300340046-0). The reply acknowledges Graham's letters of July 23 and 29, 1986.
[^23]: Letter, Daniel O. Graham to Robert M. Gates, December 8, 1986, CIA-RDP88G01116R000700840002-1, copy to William J. Casey.
[^24]: Deposition of Daniel O. Graham, May 26, 1987, Graham Exhibit 1, memorandum from Barbara F. Studley to Lt. Col. Oliver North, October 30, 1985, Appendix B, vol. 12, pp. 1029-1030 of the OCR text. The OCR of the closing sentence reads "informacion"; the wording here follows the Barcella and Singlaub pages.
[^25]: Deposition of Daniel O. Graham, May 26, 1987, Graham Exhibit 2, quotation dated July 28, 1986 on GeoMiliTech letterhead, enclosed with a "Dear Bill" letter to Casey, Appendix B, vol. 12, pp. 1034-1037 of the OCR text.
[^26]: Letter, Newt Gingrich to Daniel O. Graham, May 10, 1995, printed in Congressional Record, "Tribute to General D.O. Graham," February 1, 1996. https://irp.fas.org/congress/1996_cr/h960201a.htm

103
10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/E. Lawrence Barcella, Jr..md
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@ -55,21 +55,21 @@ relations:
with: "[[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]]"
role: "defense coordinator, Tampa money-laundering case"
start: 1988
fn: 7
fn: 8
- type: partner_of
with: "[[Laxalt, Washington, Perito & Dubuc]]"
start: 1988
fn: 7
fn: 8
- type: member_of
with: "[[Counter Terrorism Consultants, Inc.]]"
role: "active consultant named in 1988; associate listed in the 1990 resume packet"
start: 1988
end: 1990
fn: 5
fn: 6
- type: partner_of
with: "[[Katten Muchin Zavis & Dombroff]]"
start: 1991
fn: 4
fn: 5
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Paul Hastings]]"
role: "partner, Washington office, white-collar and government contract matters"
@ -79,13 +79,13 @@ relations:
role: "chief counsel"
start: 1992
end: 1993
fn: 12
fn: 13
- type: reported_to
with: "[[Lee Hamilton]]"
role: "chief counsel to the task force chairman"
start: 1992
end: 1993
fn: 12
fn: 13
---
E. Lawrence Barcella, Jr. (May 23, 1945 to November 4, 2010) was a [[Washington, D.C.]] lawyer and former federal prosecutor. He built the government's case against [[Edwin Wilson]], helped coordinate the defense of the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]] (BCCI) after its 1988 indictment in [[Tampa, Florida|Tampa]], and served as chief counsel of the [[House October Surprise Task Force]], the bipartisan panel co-chaired by Rep. [[Lee Hamilton]] (D-Indiana) and Rep. [[Henry Hyde]] (R-Illinois) that investigated the [[October Surprise]] allegations that the [[Ronald Reagan|Reagan]] campaign had negotiated with [[Iran]] to delay the 1980 hostage release.[^1]
@ -105,72 +105,72 @@ Barcella also worked on the inquiries into the 1983 bombings of the American emb
### Private practice (1986 to 1991)
He left federal service in 1986 and went into private practice in Washington, initially at a firm where the lawyer for [[Barbara Studley]] also worked.[^3] His private work covered internal investigations for corporations and the defense of clients charged with securities fraud, antitrust violations, tax evasion and money laundering.[^1]
He left federal service in 1986 and went into private practice in Washington, initially at a firm where the lawyer for [[Barbara Studley]] also worked.[^3] His private work covered internal investigations for corporations and the defense of clients charged with securities fraud, antitrust violations, tax evasion and money laundering.[^1] A letter of April 28, 1987 to the House Iran-Contra committee's assistant counsel [[Kenneth Ballen]], on the letterhead of [[Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg, Manley, Myerson & Casey|Finley, Kumble]] in Washington and captioned "Re: Barbara F. Studley/GMT," refers to a telephone conference between Ballen and [[Paul L. Perito]], and its signature block ends with the name Koszorus above the enclosure notation.[^4] The Courant reported that Barcella went into private practice in June 1986 "initially at the same firm where Koszorus, Studley's lawyer, worked," without naming the firm, and that Barcella said he did not know Koszorus before joining it.[^3]
His client [[Lyn Nofziger]], a political adviser to President Reagan, was represented by Barcella from 1987 and was convicted of illegal lobbying in 1988. A federal appeals court overturned that conviction the following year.[^1][^3] From 1988 Barcella represented [[Melvyn Paisley]], a former Pentagon official who was later convicted in the wide-ranging "Ill Wind" contracting investigation.[^3] Around 1990 he represented [[Jose Blandon]], a former senior intelligence officer in Panama and political foe of [[Manuel Noriega]].[^3]
[[Laxalt, Washington, Perito & Dubuc]] had been formed in December 1987 by Paul Laxalt and Robert B. Washington Jr.[^4] A business column in the *Chicago Tribune* of July 23, 1991 reported that the Chicago-based [[Katten Muchin Zavis & Dombroff]] (then Katten Muchin & Zavis) had added Barcella, "a former assistant U.S. attorney in Washington and partner at Washington, Perito & Dubuc," to its Washington office.[^4]
[[Laxalt, Washington, Perito & Dubuc]] had been formed in December 1987 by Paul Laxalt and Robert B. Washington Jr.[^5] A business column in the *Chicago Tribune* of July 23, 1991 reported that the Chicago-based [[Katten Muchin Zavis & Dombroff]] (then Katten Muchin & Zavis) had added Barcella, "a former assistant U.S. attorney in Washington and partner at Washington, Perito & Dubuc," to its Washington office.[^5]
### Counter Terrorism Consultants (1988 to 1990)
In August 1988 [[Carter Cornick]], a retired FBI terrorism official, and [[Eugene Propper]], a former prosecutor in the Letelier case, announced [[Counter Terrorism Consultants, Inc.]], which offered governments, airlines and event sponsors counterterrorism strategies and the management of kidnappings and hijackings. Barcella, then with Laxalt, Washington, Perito & Dubuc, was to be called on for legal consultation on matters such as extradition procedures. The announcement named Robert Scherrer and Barcella as active consultants, and said that the four men had worked together on the Letelier case and on the investigation of Wilson, in which Barcella had obtained information that Wilson was shipping explosives to Libya.[^5]
In August 1988 [[Carter Cornick]], a retired FBI terrorism official, and [[Eugene Propper]], a former prosecutor in the Letelier case, announced [[Counter Terrorism Consultants, Inc.]], which offered governments, airlines and event sponsors counterterrorism strategies and the management of kidnappings and hijackings. Barcella, then with Laxalt, Washington, Perito & Dubuc, was to be called on for legal consultation on matters such as extradition procedures. The announcement named Robert Scherrer and Barcella as active consultants, and said that the four men had worked together on the Letelier case and on the investigation of Wilson, in which Barcella had obtained information that Wilson was shipping explosives to Libya.[^6]
A resume packet circulated by the firm, by then named CounterTerrorism Consultants, L.P., with a fax header of 1990, lists Barcella among its associates. The others listed were Cornick, Propper, [[Robert Scherrer]], an unnamed former senior CIA counterterrorism officer, [[Francis J. McNeil|Frank McNeil]], [[James B. Motley]] of [[Wackenhut Corporation|Wackenhut]] Advanced Technologies Corporation, and [[Mayer Nudell]], a former foreign service officer.[^6]
A resume packet circulated by the firm, by then named CounterTerrorism Consultants, L.P., with a fax header of 1990, lists Barcella among its associates. The others listed were Cornick, Propper, [[Robert Scherrer]], an unnamed former senior CIA counterterrorism officer, [[Francis J. McNeil|Frank McNeil]], [[James B. Motley]] of [[Wackenhut Corporation|Wackenhut]] Advanced Technologies Corporation, and [[Mayer Nudell]], a former foreign service officer.[^7]
### BCCI (1988 to 1990)
Barcella was brought onto the BCCI case shortly after the October 1988 indictment of the bank in Tampa. [[Lawrence Wechsler]], with whom he had worked at the Department of Justice, recruited him "to coordinate the bank's defense." The Senate subcommittee chaired by [[John Kerry]] listed him, with [[Raymond Banoun]] and Wechsler, among the former federal prosecutors in BCCI's Washington "cadre of professional help," which also included [[Clark Clifford]]. The report stated that "the full extent of Barcella's activities on behalf of BCCI remains unknown" and recorded the following.[^7]
Barcella was brought onto the BCCI case shortly after the October 1988 indictment of the bank in Tampa. [[Lawrence Wechsler]], with whom he had worked at the Department of Justice, recruited him "to coordinate the bank's defense." The Senate subcommittee chaired by [[John Kerry]] listed him, with [[Raymond Banoun]] and Wechsler, among the former federal prosecutors in BCCI's Washington "cadre of professional help," which also included [[Clark Clifford]]. The report stated that "the full extent of Barcella's activities on behalf of BCCI remains unknown" and recorded the following.[^8]
In 1988 Barcella tried to persuade his firm's lead partner, former senator [[Paul Laxalt]], to meet BCCI's chief executive, [[Swaleh Naqvi]], in [[London]] and to lobby for the bank on Capitol Hill. The subcommittee "has been unable to determine what, if any, services Senator Laxalt performed on behalf of BCCI."[^7] In 1989 and 1990 he joined [[John Vardaman]] of [[Williams & Connolly]] and [[Robert Altman]] in warning the journalist [[Larry Gurwin]], who was writing about BCCI and [[First American Bank|First American]] for *[[Regardie's]]* magazine, that it would be improper to link the two institutions. Barcella called Gurwin's allegations "absurd."[^7] In early 1990, after members of Congress criticized the bank's plea bargain as too lenient, he met Senator [[Dennis DeConcini]], one of the critics, "in an effort to persuade him that BCCI was not the corrupt institution that he and others had claimed."[^7]
In 1988 Barcella tried to persuade his firm's lead partner, former senator [[Paul Laxalt]], to meet BCCI's chief executive, [[Swaleh Naqvi]], in [[London]] and to lobby for the bank on Capitol Hill. The subcommittee "has been unable to determine what, if any, services Senator Laxalt performed on behalf of BCCI."[^8] In 1989 and 1990 he joined [[John Vardaman]] of [[Williams & Connolly]] and [[Robert Altman]] in warning the journalist [[Larry Gurwin]], who was writing about BCCI and [[First American Bank|First American]] for *[[Regardie's]]* magazine, that it would be improper to link the two institutions. Barcella called Gurwin's allegations "absurd."[^8] In early 1990, after members of Congress criticized the bank's plea bargain as too lenient, he met Senator [[Dennis DeConcini]], one of the critics, "in an effort to persuade him that BCCI was not the corrupt institution that he and others had claimed."[^8]
One 1992 newspaper account gave a different start date, saying that in 1990 Barcella "was hired to represent" the bank.[^3]
In mid-December 1989 Barcella and Wechsler represented BCCI in meetings with the Tampa prosecutors at which the bank offered to plead guilty to money laundering in return for an end to its exposure for offenses then known to the government. The agreement was reached in January 1990.[^8] After the United States Attorney in Tampa, [[Robert Genzman]], told Florida regulators on January 31, 1990, that his office took no position on BCCI's state license, the Senate report recorded that "BCCI's lawyers, principally former federal prosecutors Lawrence Wechsler, Lawrence Barcella, and Raymond Banoun, dissatisfied with this result, decided to talk to others in the Justice Department to bring about a different result."[^8] Two weeks later [[Charles Saphos]] of the Criminal Division agreed to write to the state regulators. His letter of February 13, 1990, asked that BCCI be permitted to operate, and the Florida comptroller, [[Gerald Lewis]], answered it the next day.[^8] Genzman's first assistant, [[Greg Kehoe]], testified that "[they] tried to go behind my back."[^8] The Senate report described Kehoe as "the Justice Department official with whom BCCI lawyers, including Barcella, negotiated the bank's plea agreement in Tampa."[^7]
In mid-December 1989 Barcella and Wechsler represented BCCI in meetings with the Tampa prosecutors at which the bank offered to plead guilty to money laundering in return for an end to its exposure for offenses then known to the government. The agreement was reached in January 1990.[^9] After the United States Attorney in Tampa, [[Robert Genzman]], told Florida regulators on January 31, 1990, that his office took no position on BCCI's state license, the Senate report recorded that "BCCI's lawyers, principally former federal prosecutors Lawrence Wechsler, Lawrence Barcella, and Raymond Banoun, dissatisfied with this result, decided to talk to others in the Justice Department to bring about a different result."[^9] Two weeks later [[Charles Saphos]] of the Criminal Division agreed to write to the state regulators. His letter of February 13, 1990, asked that BCCI be permitted to operate, and the Florida comptroller, [[Gerald Lewis]], answered it the next day.[^9] Genzman's first assistant, [[Greg Kehoe]], testified that "[they] tried to go behind my back."[^9] The Senate report described Kehoe as "the Justice Department official with whom BCCI lawyers, including Barcella, negotiated the bank's plea agreement in Tampa."[^8]
### Antigua (1989)
In April 1989 a network of Israeli arms traffickers operating out of [[Miami]] shipped 500 Israeli-made machine guns through the Caribbean island of [[Antigua and Barbuda|Antigua]] for members of the [[Medellin Cartel|Medellin cartel]]. One of the weapons was later used in the assassination of the Colombian presidential candidate [[Luis Carlos Galan]]. The principals included [[Yair Klein]], [[Pinchas Shahar]] and [[Maurice Sarfati]]. A subsequent investigation for the government of Antigua, conducted by Barcella, left many questions unanswered.[^9] The shipment grew out of a "melon farm" that Sarfati set up on Antigua in 1983, financed by a $2 million loan from the [[Overseas Private Investment Corporation]]. BCCI's Miami office wrote to the lender on June 14, 1983, that Sarfati was "one of our valued customers."[^9]
In April 1989 a network of Israeli arms traffickers operating out of [[Miami]] shipped 500 Israeli-made machine guns through the Caribbean island of [[Antigua and Barbuda|Antigua]] for members of the [[Medellin Cartel|Medellin cartel]]. One of the weapons was later used in the assassination of the Colombian presidential candidate [[Luis Carlos Galan]]. The principals included [[Yair Klein]], [[Pinchas Shahar]] and [[Maurice Sarfati]]. A subsequent investigation for the government of Antigua, conducted by Barcella, left many questions unanswered.[^10] The shipment grew out of a "melon farm" that Sarfati set up on Antigua in 1983, financed by a $2 million loan from the [[Overseas Private Investment Corporation]]. BCCI's Miami office wrote to the lender on June 14, 1983, that Sarfati was "one of our valued customers."[^10]
### Hiring by the House (1992)
House Resolution 258, adopted on February 5, 1992, created a task force of thirteen members of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, appointed by the Speaker, to investigate allegations that the 1980 Reagan campaign had communicated with Iranians to delay the release of the hostages. The House agreed to the resolution by a recorded vote of 247 to 158.[^10]
House Resolution 258, adopted on February 5, 1992, created a task force of thirteen members of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, appointed by the Speaker, to investigate allegations that the 1980 Reagan campaign had communicated with Iranians to delay the release of the hostages. The House agreed to the resolution by a recorded vote of 247 to 158.[^11]
The task force adopted its rules on March 11, 1992. House Resolution 258 authorized the chairman, in consultation with the ranking Republican member, to employ attorneys, investigators and consultants and allowed the task force to require its staff to enter nondisclosure agreements. Rule 9 of the rules ("Staff, Detailees, and Consultants") addressed the hiring of staff and the security procedures for classified material.[^11] The final report states that Barcella "was hired as Chief Counsel," and that his services were retained because of his experience as a federal prosecutor and as a white-collar criminal defense counsel. The staff biography in the report describes him as "presently a partner in the Washington office of Katten, Muchin, Zavis and Dombroff," states that he served in the United States Attorney's Office in Washington from 1970 to 1986, and states that since then he "has represented a variety of national and international clients in complex criminal matters and internal investigations."[^12]
The task force adopted its rules on March 11, 1992. House Resolution 258 authorized the chairman, in consultation with the ranking Republican member, to employ attorneys, investigators and consultants and allowed the task force to require its staff to enter nondisclosure agreements. Rule 9 of the rules ("Staff, Detailees, and Consultants") addressed the hiring of staff and the security procedures for classified material.[^12] The final report states that Barcella "was hired as Chief Counsel," and that his services were retained because of his experience as a federal prosecutor and as a white-collar criminal defense counsel. The staff biography in the report describes him as "presently a partner in the Washington office of Katten, Muchin, Zavis and Dombroff," states that he served in the United States Attorney's Office in Washington from 1970 to 1986, and states that since then he "has represented a variety of national and international clients in complex criminal matters and internal investigations."[^13]
Hamilton, as chairman, selected Barcella, and a May 29, 1992 press account dated the hiring to March 1992. Hamilton said in that account, "I was looking for someone that had a large amount of international experience, had done a lot of investigative-type law practice, who had worked as a prosecutor and, of course, whose reputation was very good." The same account stated that in the summer of 1985, while an assistant United States attorney, Barcella had given a legal opinion clearing a private $5 million shipment of Soviet-bloc rifles, machine guns and grenade launchers to the Nicaraguan contras. The shipment was arranged by [[John Singlaub]] and Barbara Studley, who had created [[GeoMiliTech Consultants Corp.]]. In telephone interviews that month, Barcella "refused to explain" how the opinion came about.[^3] Studley, in a deposition quoted in the same account, answered the question of who in the Justice Department approved the shipment with "Larry Barcella signed it"; her lawyer, Frank Koszorus Jr., said he was "not at all certain that she was ever issued a written opinion."[^3]
Asked about the opinion in May 1992, Barcella said, "It was a simple situation where somebody in the government came to me," and said he did not identify the official who sought it. Asked about his past contacts with intelligence agencies, he said, "I don't see where that causes a problem," and "I'm going to do as thorough and independent and professional an investigation as I can." [[Joseph diGenova]], the United States Attorney in Washington in those years, first said, "Assistant U.S. attorneys do not issue legal opinions on arms shipments," and "Larry would never have done that." A week later diGenova said, "Larry was sought out by a lot of people in intelligence and by a lot of people in the marshals service and the FBI who knew that he was creative." diGenova said that Barcella, through his anti-terrorism work, knew [[Oliver North]]; Barcella said he had met North once and that North was not the official who sought the opinion.[^3] Hamilton said he had learned of the opinion after the newspaper's inquiries, and when asked whether he would look into it, said, "I will investigate all aspects of criticisms of staff, including Larry or anybody else."[^3]
Studley's October 30, 1985 memorandum to North, an exhibit to the deposition of [[Daniel O. Graham]], refers to a shipment that left on June 20, 1985, and ends: "General John K. Singlaub has been advised of this information."[^13] The congressional report states that a purchase Singlaub arranged for [[Adolfo Calero]] through a European dealer arrived in Central America on July 8, 1985.[^14] Graham testified on May 26, 1987 that he had arranged a meeting between Studley and [[William J. Casey]] at Langley toward the end of 1985; Singlaub testified in 1987 that he had set up that meeting.[^3][^13]
Studley's October 30, 1985 memorandum to North, an exhibit to the deposition of [[Daniel O. Graham]], refers to a shipment that left on June 20, 1985, and ends: "General John K. Singlaub has been advised of this information."[^14] The congressional report states that a purchase Singlaub arranged for [[Adolfo Calero]] through a European dealer arrived in Central America on July 8, 1985.[^15] Graham testified on May 26, 1987 that he had arranged a meeting between Studley and [[William J. Casey]] at Langley toward the end of 1985; Singlaub testified in 1987 that he had set up that meeting.[^3][^14]
### House October Surprise Task Force (1992 to 1993)
The task force's chairman was Hamilton and its ranking Republican was Hyde. The Democrats were [[Stephen Solarz]], [[Sam Gejdenson]], [[Mervyn Dymally]], [[Robert Torricelli]], [[Howard Berman]], [[Edward Feighan]] and [[Ted Weiss]]. The Republicans were [[Jim Leach]], [[Olympia Snowe]], [[Doug Bereuter]] and [[Porter Goss]].[^12] Barcella and [[Richard J. Leon]], the chief minority counsel, selected the legal staff.[^12]
The task force's chairman was Hamilton and its ranking Republican was Hyde. The Democrats were [[Stephen Solarz]], [[Sam Gejdenson]], [[Mervyn Dymally]], [[Robert Torricelli]], [[Howard Berman]], [[Edward Feighan]] and [[Ted Weiss]]. The Republicans were [[Jim Leach]], [[Olympia Snowe]], [[Doug Bereuter]] and [[Porter Goss]].[^13] Barcella and [[Richard J. Leon]], the chief minority counsel, selected the legal staff.[^13]
The majority staff included [[Michael F. Zeldin]] as deputy chief counsel, the former Securities and Exchange Commission lawyer [[Sotiris Planzos]], and two lawyers from the Katten office, [[Nancy Luque]] and [[Anne Pings]]. The minority staff included Greg Kehoe, deputy chief minority counsel, who had been first assistant United States attorney for the Middle District of Florida and joined the task force on June 18, 1992.[^12] The Senate report, published in December 1992, stated that Barcella "has been hired by the House Foreign Affairs Committee" and that Kehoe was "on leave from the Justice Department to assist Barcella in his investigation."[^7]
The majority staff included [[Michael F. Zeldin]] as deputy chief counsel, the former Securities and Exchange Commission lawyer [[Sotiris Planzos]], and two lawyers from the Katten office, [[Nancy Luque]] and [[Anne Pings]]. The minority staff included Greg Kehoe, deputy chief minority counsel, who had been first assistant United States attorney for the Middle District of Florida and joined the task force on June 18, 1992.[^13] The Senate report, published in December 1992, stated that Barcella "has been hired by the House Foreign Affairs Committee" and that Kehoe was "on leave from the Justice Department to assist Barcella in his investigation."[^8]
On October 2, 1992, the House considered House Resolution 585, which authorized the task force to file its final report with the Clerk after adjournment sine die and before noon on January 3, 1993, and limited its expenses to the amounts in House Resolution 512. Representative [[Anthony C. Beilenson]] (D-California), introducing the resolution, said its purpose was to make clear that the investigation "may continue after we adjourn, but no later than the end of this year," and that the budget would be no higher than $1.35 million. In the same debate a member speaking for the resolution said that Hamilton and Hyde had told the Rules Committee that the work would be finished "by probably the middle of November."[^15] The task force approved its report on December 10, 1992. The transmittal letter to Speaker [[Thomas S. Foley]] is dated January 3, 1993, and cites House Resolutions 258 and 585.[^12]
On October 2, 1992, the House considered House Resolution 585, which authorized the task force to file its final report with the Clerk after adjournment sine die and before noon on January 3, 1993, and limited its expenses to the amounts in House Resolution 512. Representative [[Anthony C. Beilenson]] (D-California), introducing the resolution, said its purpose was to make clear that the investigation "may continue after we adjourn, but no later than the end of this year," and that the budget would be no higher than $1.35 million. In the same debate a member speaking for the resolution said that Hamilton and Hyde had told the Rules Committee that the work would be finished "by probably the middle of November."[^16] The task force approved its report on December 10, 1992. The transmittal letter to Speaker [[Thomas S. Foley]] is dated January 3, 1993, and cites House Resolutions 258 and 585.[^13]
The report concludes that the allegations were either "wholly insufficient or no credible evidence exists to substantiate" them.[^12] Its transmittal letter says the report "was approved unanimously by the Task Force on December 10, 1992." Dymally later told [[Robert Parry]] that he knew of no such vote on that date or any other. Hamilton told Parry that he would not have claimed a unanimous vote if there had not been one. A House Foreign Affairs Committee spokesman, [[David Barnes]], wrote to Parry that "From the records we have there is no evidence of a recorded vote."[^16] The printed report states that Dymally "has declined to sign the report."[^12]
The report concludes that the allegations were either "wholly insufficient or no credible evidence exists to substantiate" them.[^13] Its transmittal letter says the report "was approved unanimously by the Task Force on December 10, 1992." Dymally later told [[Robert Parry]] that he knew of no such vote on that date or any other. Hamilton told Parry that he would not have claimed a unanimous vote if there had not been one. A House Foreign Affairs Committee spokesman, [[David Barnes]], wrote to Parry that "From the records we have there is no evidence of a recorded vote."[^17] The printed report states that Dymally "has declined to sign the report."[^13]
The report states that the task force "interviewed and/or deposed more than 230 people."[^12] The report describes the October Surprise Group as "a group of individuals who provided foreign policy and defense advice to the campaign," and lists ten members: [[Richard V. Allen]], [[Fred C. Ikle]], [[Charles M. Kupperman]], [[John R. Lehman, Jr.]], [[Thomas H. Moore]], [[Robert G. Neumann]], [[Eugene V. Rostow]], [[Laurence Silberman]], [[William R. Van Cleave]] and [[Seymour Weiss]].[^12] Parry wrote that Barcella and [[Michael Ledeen]] were personal friends, that Barcella had sold Ledeen a house and that the two shared a housekeeper, citing Peter Maas's book *Manhunt* for a 1982 night visit by Ledeen to Barcella, during the Wilson investigation, about two associates who had come under suspicion in the Wilson case, [[Ted Shackley]] and [[Erich von Marbod]].[^17] Parry wrote that the secret draft report named six informal members of the group, among them Ledeen, and that "the final report deleted the names of six informal members" of the group. The six were Ledeen, [[Richard G. Stilwell|Richard Stilwell]], [[William Middendorf]], [[Richard Perle]], General [[Louis Walt]] and Admiral [[James Holloway]].[^17]
The report states that the task force "interviewed and/or deposed more than 230 people."[^13] The report describes the October Surprise Group as "a group of individuals who provided foreign policy and defense advice to the campaign," and lists ten members: [[Richard V. Allen]], [[Fred C. Ikle]], [[Charles M. Kupperman]], [[John R. Lehman, Jr.]], [[Thomas H. Moore]], [[Robert G. Neumann]], [[Eugene V. Rostow]], [[Laurence Silberman]], [[William R. Van Cleave]] and [[Seymour Weiss]].[^13] Parry wrote that Barcella and [[Michael Ledeen]] were personal friends, that Barcella had sold Ledeen a house and that the two shared a housekeeper, citing Peter Maas's book *Manhunt* for a 1982 night visit by Ledeen to Barcella, during the Wilson investigation, about two associates who had come under suspicion in the Wilson case, [[Ted Shackley]] and [[Erich von Marbod]].[^18] Parry wrote that the secret draft report named six informal members of the group, among them Ledeen, and that "the final report deleted the names of six informal members" of the group. The six were Ledeen, [[Richard G. Stilwell|Richard Stilwell]], [[William Middendorf]], [[Richard Perle]], General [[Louis Walt]] and Admiral [[James Holloway]].[^18]
Parry reported that Barcella told him, years after the report, that so much incriminating evidence arrived in the final month of the inquiry that he asked Hamilton to extend the investigation three months, and that Hamilton declined.[^18] Barcella said Hamilton "declined to go through the necessary reauthorization of the task force and instead ordered him to proceed with the final report."[^19] In Meldon's 2008 article, with a Parry addendum, Barcella is quoted as saying that Hamilton cited the complexity of getting the task force reauthorized in a new Congress.[^20] Hamilton told Parry in 2010, as Parry reported in 2013, that he might have explained the problem of the authorization running out at the end of the session: "All I could have done is go before the next Congress and request reauthorization."[^21] Hamilton told Parry in 2010 that he had no recollection of such a proposal, and in 2011 that he had no recollection of Barcella's request.[^18][^19] Hamilton's January 24, 1993 New York Times op-ed, titled "Case Closed," stated that the task force's staff "conducted over 230 formal interviews and depositions." A 2008 article by [[Jerry Meldon]], with an addendum by Parry, quoted the op-ed as saying that the report "should put the controversy to rest once and for all." The addendum says that Barcella recommended the extension to Hamilton.[^20]
Parry reported that Barcella told him, years after the report, that so much incriminating evidence arrived in the final month of the inquiry that he asked Hamilton to extend the investigation three months, and that Hamilton declined.[^19] Barcella said Hamilton "declined to go through the necessary reauthorization of the task force and instead ordered him to proceed with the final report."[^20] In Meldon's 2008 article, with a Parry addendum, Barcella is quoted as saying that Hamilton cited the complexity of getting the task force reauthorized in a new Congress.[^21] Hamilton told Parry in 2010, as Parry reported in 2013, that he might have explained the problem of the authorization running out at the end of the session: "All I could have done is go before the next Congress and request reauthorization."[^22] Hamilton told Parry in 2010 that he had no recollection of such a proposal, and in 2011 that he had no recollection of Barcella's request.[^19][^20] Hamilton's January 24, 1993 New York Times op-ed, titled "Case Closed," stated that the task force's staff "conducted over 230 formal interviews and depositions." A 2008 article by [[Jerry Meldon]], with an addendum by Parry, quoted the op-ed as saying that the report "should put the controversy to rest once and for all." The addendum says that Barcella recommended the extension to Hamilton.[^21]
The Russian report was requested by Hamilton on October 21, 1992, and reached the task force on January 11, 1993.[^22] Parry identified it as provided by [[Sergey V. Stepashin]], chairman of the Supreme Soviet's Committee on Defense and Security Issues. As Parry described it, the report said that the 1980 hostage negotiations amounted to a competition between the Carter administration and the Reagan campaign.[^19] Hamilton presided over a press conference on January 13, 1993, dismissing the allegations.[^20] Parry wrote that Hamilton told him, "I don't recall seeing it." Barcella first said he did not recall whether he showed Hamilton the report, then wrote, "I do specifically recall discussing it with Lee."[^22] Barcella told Parry that the task force did not want to be bothered with trying to get the report declassified.[^20]
In a memo dated December 8, 1992, which Parry quotes, Barcella instructed his deputies "to put some language in, as a trap door" in case later disclosures disproved parts of it or complaints arose about selective omission of evidence. The memo language quoted by Parry states that "This report does not and could not reflect every single lead that was investigated."[^17][^23]
The Russian report was requested by Hamilton on October 21, 1992, and reached the task force on January 11, 1993.[^23] Parry identified it as provided by [[Sergey V. Stepashin]], chairman of the Supreme Soviet's Committee on Defense and Security Issues. As Parry described it, the report said that the 1980 hostage negotiations amounted to a competition between the Carter administration and the Reagan campaign.[^20] Hamilton presided over a press conference on January 13, 1993, dismissing the allegations.[^21] Parry wrote that Hamilton told him, "I don't recall seeing it." Barcella first said he did not recall whether he showed Hamilton the report, then wrote, "I do specifically recall discussing it with Lee."[^23] Barcella told Parry that the task force did not want to be bothered with trying to get the report declassified.[^21]
In a memo dated December 8, 1992, which Parry quotes, Barcella instructed his deputies "to put some language in, as a trap door" in case later disclosures disproved parts of it or complaints arose about selective omission of evidence. The memo language quoted by Parry states that "This report does not and could not reflect every single lead that was investigated."[^18][^24]
Parry wrote in 1996 that Barcella and Hamilton pressed Dymally to withdraw a dissent. According to sources who saw it, the dissent argued that "just because phones ring and planes fly doesn't mean that someone is there to answer the phone or is on the plane."[^24] In the same article Parry wrote that Barcella and his law firm had earned more than $2 million from BCCI, that the Laxalt and BCCI links were left out of the public report, and that the conflict "was handled simply by purging any reference to BCCI and Barcella's associates from the final report."[^24] In 2005 Parry wrote that Barcella told him he did not believe his work for BCCI created a conflict of interest, and that the Senate report said Barcella worked directly with Laxalt on the BCCI account.[^17] Parry also wrote that Henry Hyde denounced the allegations as a "myth" in a House special order on February 3, 1993.[^24]
Parry wrote in 1996 that Barcella and Hamilton pressed Dymally to withdraw a dissent. According to sources who saw it, the dissent argued that "just because phones ring and planes fly doesn't mean that someone is there to answer the phone or is on the plane."[^25] In the same article Parry wrote that Barcella and his law firm had earned more than $2 million from BCCI, that the Laxalt and BCCI links were left out of the public report, and that the conflict "was handled simply by purging any reference to BCCI and Barcella's associates from the final report."[^25] In 2005 Parry wrote that Barcella told him he did not believe his work for BCCI created a conflict of interest, and that the Senate report said Barcella worked directly with Laxalt on the BCCI account.[^18] Parry also wrote that Henry Hyde denounced the allegations as a "myth" in a House special order on February 3, 1993.[^25]
### Later career (1993 to 2010)
The alumni magazine of Dartmouth published a cover profile in March 1993 that listed Barcella as a partner of Katten, Muchin, Zavis & Dombroff. The profile described his private clients as including BCCI and Reagan's former press secretary, who was charged with ethics violations.[^25] Parry reported that the Clinton administration considered Barcella "at the top of the list" for under-secretary of the Treasury for law enforcement, and that others in the administration opposed the appointment.[^26]
The alumni magazine of Dartmouth published a cover profile in March 1993 that listed Barcella as a partner of Katten, Muchin, Zavis & Dombroff. The profile described his private clients as including BCCI and Reagan's former press secretary, who was charged with ethics violations.[^26] Parry reported that the Clinton administration considered Barcella "at the top of the list" for under-secretary of the Treasury for law enforcement, and that others in the administration opposed the appointment.[^27]
At his death he was a partner in the Washington office of [[Paul Hastings]], Janofsky and Walker, where he specialized in cases involving bribery, political corruption, fraud and government contract violations.[^2]
### Dispute with Parry
In an e-mail to Parry in 2010, Barcella wrote: "You're no longer merely cherry-picking facts and misrepresenting events, but flat out lying." He wrote that he would not go "line by line" through Parry's work.[^22]
In an e-mail to Parry in 2010, Barcella wrote: "You're no longer merely cherry-picking facts and misrepresenting events, but flat out lying." He wrote that he would not go "line by line" through Parry's work.[^23]
### Death
@ -181,26 +181,27 @@ Barcella died of bladder cancer on November 4, 2010, at a hospital near his home
[^1]: Hevesi, Dennis. "E. Lawrence Barcella, Prosecutor of Terrorism Cases, Dies at 65." *The New York Times*, November 17, 2010 (corrected November 23, 2010). https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/us/18barcella.html (archived: http://web.archive.org/web/20240709144843/https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/us/18barcella.html)
[^2]: Shapiro, T. Rees. "E. Lawrence Barcella Jr., lawyer." *The Washington Post*, November 9, 2010. https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/09/AR2010110905919.html (archived: https://web.archive.org/web/2020/https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/09/AR2010110905919.html)
[^3]: Bixby, Lyn. "Head of Iran Hostage Probe Linked to Arms Deal." *Hartford Courant*, May 29, 1992; reprinted as "A Surprise in 'October Surprise' Investigation: Congress' Lead Investigator Linked to Contra-Arms Deal," *The Seattle Times*, May 29, 1992. https://www.courant.com/1992/05/29/head-of-iran-hostage-probe-linked-to-arms-deal/ and https://archive.seattletimes.com/archive/19920529/1494391/a-surprise-in-october-surprise-investigation----congress-lead-investigator-linked-to-contra-arms-deal
[^4]: "Kinder, gentler profession urged," business column, *Chicago Tribune*, July 23, 1991. https://www.chicagotribune.com/1991/07/23/kinder-gentler-profession-urged/ Firm formation: Karlyn Barker and Kathleen Day, "Robert Washington, Laxalt Team Up to Replace Failed Law Firm," *The Washington Post*, December 23, 1987. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1987/12/23/robert-washington-laxalt-team-up-to-replace-failed-law-firm/71c2b588-772c-47c4-acdb-68bc9bdfe123/
[^5]: "A group of top former FBI agents and federal prosecutors," *United Press International*, August 2, 1988. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1988/08/02/A-group-of-top-former-FBI-agents-and-federal/9684730900658/
[^6]: CounterTerrorism Consultants, L.P., "Proudly Presents the Resumes of its Associates," fax copy (header 1990), pp. 141 P01 to P12, in the Casolaro papers, folder "Promotional Material," https://archive.org/details/casolaro-notebooks. Sole source for the passages so cited.
[^7]: Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992, ch. 17, "BCCI's Lawyers and Lobbyists." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/17law.htm
[^8]: Kerry and Brown, *The BCCI Affair,* ch. 8, "BCCI and Law Enforcement: The Justice Department and the U.S. Customs Service." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/08just.htm
[^9]: Kerry and Brown, *The BCCI Affair,* ch. 4, "BCCI's Criminality." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/04crime.htm
[^10]: U.S. House of Representatives, *Journal of the House*, February 5, 1992, pp. T 9.18 to T 9.19 (H. Res. 258 agreed to, 247 yeas, 158 nays). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/HJOURNAL-1992/pdf/HJOURNAL-1992-02-05-para9-18.pdf
[^11]: Task Force to Investigate Certain Allegations Concerning the Holding of American Hostages by Iran in 1980, *Rules of the Task Force*, adopted March 11, 1992 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), Rule 9. https://archive.org/details/RulesOfTheOctoberSurpriseTaskForce
[^12]: U.S. House of Representatives, October Surprise Task Force, *Joint Report of the Task Force to Investigate Certain Allegations Concerning the Holding of American Hostages by Iran in 1980*, H. Rept. 102-1102, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, transmittal letter dated January 3, 1993 (Part I, sections "Task Force Organization and Structure" and "Staff"; Task Force Members; the October Surprise Group discussion in the chapter on Reagan campaign activities). https://archive.org/details/6199732-Joint-Report-of-the-October-Surprise-Task-Force
[^13]: Graham Exhibit 1 and deposition of Daniel O. Graham, May 26, 1987, Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, Appendix B, vol. 12 (Internet Archive item micro_IA41152840_0234).
[^14]: Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, ch. 2, p. 51 (HathiTrust full view, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=txu.059173017837367&seq=75).
[^15]: U.S. House of Representatives, *Congressional Record*, October 2, 1992 (H. Res. 585, "Providing for completion of activities of Task Force to investigate certain allegations concerning holding of Americans as hostages in Iran in 1980"; text of the resolution and floor statements of Representative Beilenson and another member speaking for it). https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_cr/h921002-october.htm
[^16]: Parry, Robert. "Dymally and the Unanimous Vote," *Consortium News*, June 17, 2010 (article on the task force report's cover letter). https://consortiumnews.com/2010/061710.html Sole source for the Dymally, Barnes and Hamilton statements as reported by Parry.
[^17]: Parry, Robert. "A Lawyer & National Security Cover-ups," *Consortium News*, May 4, 2005. https://consortiumnews.com/2005/050405.html Sole source for the trap door memo, the Ledeen and October Surprise Group claims, and the Laxalt account, as reported by Parry.
[^18]: Parry, Robert. "Inside the October Surprise Cover-up," *Consortium News*, July 12, 2011. https://consortiumnews.com/2011/07/12/inside-the-october-surprise-cover-up/ Sole source for the extension request and the Hamilton response as reported by Parry.
[^19]: Parry, Robert. "The October Surprise Mysteries," *Consortium News*, October 22, 2012. https://consortiumnews.com/2012/10/22/the-october-surprise-mysteries/ Sole source for the Barcella and Hamilton statements, the Stepashin identification and the January 11, 1993 transmittal as reported by Parry.
[^20]: Meldon, Jerry. "Dr. Hamilton and Mr. Hyde," *Consortium News*, March 27, 2008, with addendum from Robert Parry. https://consortiumnews.com/2008/032608c.html Sole source for the quoted phrase "should put the controversy to rest once and for all" attributed to the op-ed and for the addendum account of the extension and the declassification remark. Hamilton, Lee H., "DIALOGUE: Last Word on the October Surprise?; Case Closed," *The New York Times*, January 24, 1993, Section 4, p. 17. https://www.nytimes.com/1993/01/24/opinion/dialogue-last-word-on-the-october-surprise-case-closed.html
[^21]: Parry, Robert. "Second Thoughts on October Surprise," *Consortium News*, June 8, 2013. https://consortiumnews.com/2013/06/08/second-thoughts-on-october-surprise/ Sole source for the Hamilton statement as reported by Parry.
[^22]: Parry, Robert. "The Russian Report," *Consortium News*, August 5, 2010. https://consortiumnews.com/2010/080510.html Sole source for the Hamilton and Barcella statements about the Russian report and the e-mail quoted. Request date and transmittal per the Parry translation page, https://www.consortiumnews.com/2005/russianreport1980.html
[^23]: Parry, Robert. "October Surprise X-Files: The Ladies' Room Secrets," *Consortium News*, 1996. https://www.consortiumnews.com/archive/xfile2.html Sole source for the memo quotation as reported by Parry.
[^24]: Parry, Robert. "October Surprise X-Files (Part 8): Lies Spun into History," *Consortium News*, 1996. https://www.consortiumnews.com/archive/xfile8.html Sole source for the Dymally dissent, the BCCI and Laxalt omissions, and the Hyde special order as reported by Parry.
[^25]: "Lawrence Barcella '67," cover story, *Dartmouth Alumni Magazine*, March 1993. https://archive.dartmouthalumnimagazine.com/article/1993/3/1/lawrence-barcella-67
[^26]: Parry, Robert. "Clinton & a BCCI Lawyer," *Consortium News* (undated archive article, 1993). https://www.consortiumnews.com/archive/story3.html Sole source for the Treasury consideration as reported by Parry.
[^4]: Letter from Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg, Manley, Myerson & Casey to Kenneth Ballen, April 28, 1987, Appendix B, vol. 12 (Internet Archive item micro_IA41152840_0234); signature block as indexed in the 1988 published volume of the report, p. 1040 ("Koszorus, Enclosure cc: Charles M. Kerr, Esq.").
[^5]: "Kinder, gentler profession urged," business column, *Chicago Tribune*, July 23, 1991. https://www.chicagotribune.com/1991/07/23/kinder-gentler-profession-urged/ Firm formation: Karlyn Barker and Kathleen Day, "Robert Washington, Laxalt Team Up to Replace Failed Law Firm," *The Washington Post*, December 23, 1987. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1987/12/23/robert-washington-laxalt-team-up-to-replace-failed-law-firm/71c2b588-772c-47c4-acdb-68bc9bdfe123/
[^6]: "A group of top former FBI agents and federal prosecutors," *United Press International*, August 2, 1988. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1988/08/02/A-group-of-top-former-FBI-agents-and-federal/9684730900658/
[^7]: CounterTerrorism Consultants, L.P., "Proudly Presents the Resumes of its Associates," fax copy (header 1990), pp. 141 P01 to P12, in the Casolaro papers, folder "Promotional Material," https://archive.org/details/casolaro-notebooks. Sole source for the passages so cited.
[^8]: Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992, ch. 17, "BCCI's Lawyers and Lobbyists." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/17law.htm
[^9]: Kerry and Brown, *The BCCI Affair,* ch. 8, "BCCI and Law Enforcement: The Justice Department and the U.S. Customs Service." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/08just.htm
[^10]: Kerry and Brown, *The BCCI Affair,* ch. 4, "BCCI's Criminality." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/04crime.htm
[^11]: U.S. House of Representatives, *Journal of the House*, February 5, 1992, pp. T 9.18 to T 9.19 (H. Res. 258 agreed to, 247 yeas, 158 nays). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/HJOURNAL-1992/pdf/HJOURNAL-1992-02-05-para9-18.pdf
[^12]: Task Force to Investigate Certain Allegations Concerning the Holding of American Hostages by Iran in 1980, *Rules of the Task Force*, adopted March 11, 1992 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), Rule 9. https://archive.org/details/RulesOfTheOctoberSurpriseTaskForce
[^13]: U.S. House of Representatives, October Surprise Task Force, *Joint Report of the Task Force to Investigate Certain Allegations Concerning the Holding of American Hostages by Iran in 1980*, H. Rept. 102-1102, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, transmittal letter dated January 3, 1993 (Part I, sections "Task Force Organization and Structure" and "Staff"; Task Force Members; the October Surprise Group discussion in the chapter on Reagan campaign activities). https://archive.org/details/6199732-Joint-Report-of-the-October-Surprise-Task-Force
[^14]: Graham Exhibit 1 and deposition of Daniel O. Graham, May 26, 1987, Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, Appendix B, vol. 12 (Internet Archive item micro_IA41152840_0234).
[^15]: Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, ch. 2, p. 51 (HathiTrust full view, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=txu.059173017837367&seq=75).
[^16]: U.S. House of Representatives, *Congressional Record*, October 2, 1992 (H. Res. 585, "Providing for completion of activities of Task Force to investigate certain allegations concerning holding of Americans as hostages in Iran in 1980"; text of the resolution and floor statements of Representative Beilenson and another member speaking for it). https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_cr/h921002-october.htm
[^17]: Parry, Robert. "Dymally and the Unanimous Vote," *Consortium News*, June 17, 2010 (article on the task force report's cover letter). https://consortiumnews.com/2010/061710.html Sole source for the Dymally, Barnes and Hamilton statements as reported by Parry.
[^18]: Parry, Robert. "A Lawyer & National Security Cover-ups," *Consortium News*, May 4, 2005. https://consortiumnews.com/2005/050405.html Sole source for the trap door memo, the Ledeen and October Surprise Group claims, and the Laxalt account, as reported by Parry.
[^19]: Parry, Robert. "Inside the October Surprise Cover-up," *Consortium News*, July 12, 2011. https://consortiumnews.com/2011/07/12/inside-the-october-surprise-cover-up/ Sole source for the extension request and the Hamilton response as reported by Parry.
[^20]: Parry, Robert. "The October Surprise Mysteries," *Consortium News*, October 22, 2012. https://consortiumnews.com/2012/10/22/the-october-surprise-mysteries/ Sole source for the Barcella and Hamilton statements, the Stepashin identification and the January 11, 1993 transmittal as reported by Parry.
[^21]: Meldon, Jerry. "Dr. Hamilton and Mr. Hyde," *Consortium News*, March 27, 2008, with addendum from Robert Parry. https://consortiumnews.com/2008/032608c.html Sole source for the quoted phrase "should put the controversy to rest once and for all" attributed to the op-ed and for the addendum account of the extension and the declassification remark. Hamilton, Lee H., "DIALOGUE: Last Word on the October Surprise?; Case Closed," *The New York Times*, January 24, 1993, Section 4, p. 17. https://www.nytimes.com/1993/01/24/opinion/dialogue-last-word-on-the-october-surprise-case-closed.html
[^22]: Parry, Robert. "Second Thoughts on October Surprise," *Consortium News*, June 8, 2013. https://consortiumnews.com/2013/06/08/second-thoughts-on-october-surprise/ Sole source for the Hamilton statement as reported by Parry.
[^23]: Parry, Robert. "The Russian Report," *Consortium News*, August 5, 2010. https://consortiumnews.com/2010/080510.html Sole source for the Hamilton and Barcella statements about the Russian report and the e-mail quoted. Request date and transmittal per the Parry translation page, https://www.consortiumnews.com/2005/russianreport1980.html
[^24]: Parry, Robert. "October Surprise X-Files: The Ladies' Room Secrets," *Consortium News*, 1996. https://www.consortiumnews.com/archive/xfile2.html Sole source for the memo quotation as reported by Parry.
[^25]: Parry, Robert. "October Surprise X-Files (Part 8): Lies Spun into History," *Consortium News*, 1996. https://www.consortiumnews.com/archive/xfile8.html Sole source for the Dymally dissent, the BCCI and Laxalt omissions, and the Hyde special order as reported by Parry.
[^26]: "Lawrence Barcella '67," cover story, *Dartmouth Alumni Magazine*, March 1993. https://archive.dartmouthalumnimagazine.com/article/1993/3/1/lawrence-barcella-67
[^27]: Parry, Robert. "Clinton & a BCCI Lawyer," *Consortium News* (undated archive article, 1993). https://www.consortiumnews.com/archive/story3.html Sole source for the Treasury consideration as reported by Parry.

19
10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Henry B. Gonzalez.md
View file

@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ born: 1916-05-03
died: 2000-11-28
location: "San Antonio, Texas"
created: 2026-09-21
updated: 2026-09-23
updated: 2026-10-08
---
Henry B. Gonzalez (May 3, 1916 to November 28, 2000) represented [[San Antonio]] in the [[United States House of Representatives]] from 1961 to 1999 and was chairman of the [[House Banking Committee|Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs]] from 1989 to 1995. In 1977 he was briefly chairman of the [[House Select Committee on Assassinations]]. From 1990 to 1993 he investigated the loans of the [[Atlanta]] branch of [[Banca Nazionale del Lavoro]] to [[Iraq]], and published much of what his committee obtained by reading it on the House floor.[^1][^2]
@ -46,15 +46,23 @@ On September 25 he described a brass factory worth 40 million dollars sold to Ir
In the White House he was dismissed as a "flake." He told the House: "We are obstructed blatantly, premeditatedly and coldly, and in defiance of the plain constitutional prerogative of the Congress to know." When he learned that lawyers from the National Security Council staff and other agencies were meeting under [[C. Nicholas Rostow|Nicholas Rostow]] to coordinate what Congress would be given, he named them "the Rostow gang." "It used to be that cover-ups were sort of ad hoc events, a mad scramble to provide damage control for the moment. The Rostow gang advances the notion that cover-up mechanisms have become an integral cog in the machinery of this administration." His chief investigator, [[Dennis Kane]], recalled Rostow telling him "it would be a cold day in hell before Congress got NSD 26 or any of those documents."[^6]
### The January 1993 update
On January 21, 1993, Gonzalez used a special order to report on the Banking Committee's inquiry into the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro. He told the House that BNL had sued on December 15, 1992 in the United States Court of Federal Claims in Washington to recover over 340 million dollars in defaulted Iraqi loans guaranteed under the Department of Agriculture's Commodity Credit Corporation program.[^7]
He described a defunct British firm, [[Allivane]], which the Venice indictment identified as one of several firms secretly supplying Iran with armaments, and which also had contracts to supply Iraq with a million artillery fuses. Two former Allivane directors had been convicted in Britain in early 1992 of illegal arms shipments related to the Iraqi fuse deals. Allivane had been set up and run by an American, [[Terry Byrne]], whom Gonzalez said was never indicted for the Iraqi deals and was reportedly back in the United States. Byrne had worked for Rexon Corp. and then for [[International Signal and Control]], and Gonzalez said: "ISC was founded by James Guerin, who is serving time in jail after being convicted of, among other things, illegally shipping military technology to Iraq."[^7]
Gonzalez said Rexon, a New Jersey firm, was under criminal investigation for shipments of artillery fuse parts and technology to Iraq for a project run by [[Gerald Bull]] and his Space Research Corp., and was also under investigation involving [[Carlos Cardoen]]'s activities in Iraq. He said the committee had tried to contact Byrne and Rexon, that Rexon refused to talk and Byrne remained elusive, and that the committee wanted to know whether BNL Atlanta loans figured in the fuse deals.[^7]
### The Ethics Resolution
His statement of July 7, 1992, drew on a [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] document titled "Iraq-[[Italy]], Repercussions of the BNL-Atlanta Scandal." Director [[Robert Gates]] wrote to him that it "included information from a TOP SECRET compartmented and particularly sensitive document" of September 4, 1989, and that "because of the sources and methods underlying that information, I will ask for a damage assessment to determine the impact of the disclosure." Admiral [[William Studeman]] wrote that the statements of July 21 and 27 were drawn from similar material. Attorney General [[William Barr]] told the committee that the executive branch would stop supplying classified documents without guarantees. On August 4 the minority leader, [[Bob Michel]], introduced a resolution calling for an ethics investigation, arguing that the proper course was a vote in secret session. "I believe that Mr. Gonzalez' conduct does not reflect creditably on the House," he said. He was not censured, and he continued the statements into 1993.[^7]
His statement of July 7, 1992, drew on a [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] document titled "Iraq-[[Italy]], Repercussions of the BNL-Atlanta Scandal." Director [[Robert Gates]] wrote to him that it "included information from a TOP SECRET compartmented and particularly sensitive document" of September 4, 1989, and that "because of the sources and methods underlying that information, I will ask for a damage assessment to determine the impact of the disclosure." Admiral [[William Studeman]] wrote that the statements of July 21 and 27 were drawn from similar material. Attorney General [[William Barr]] told the committee that the executive branch would stop supplying classified documents without guarantees. On August 4 the minority leader, [[Bob Michel]], introduced a resolution calling for an ethics investigation, arguing that the proper course was a vote in secret session. "I believe that Mr. Gonzalez' conduct does not reflect creditably on the House," he said. He was not censured, and he continued the statements into 1993.[^8]
The Kennedy Library gave him its Profile in Courage Award on September 11, 1994, for investigating, "regardless of the attempts to strip him of his committee chairmanship, the involvement of high-level officials in the Reagan and Bush Administrations in the sale of U.S. arms to Iraq." Of the war of 1991 he had said: "Not only did our own service men and women face military material that had been exported from the U.S., the U.S. military itself relied on these Iraqi front companies for some of the military goods they used." He lost the chairmanship to [[Jim Leach|James Leach]] in 1995 and did not run in 1998. His son Charles succeeded him.[^1][^2]
### BCCI
On September 11, 1991, Gonzalez opened the banking committee's hearings on the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]], with [[Clark Clifford]] and [[Robert Altman]] as the first witnesses. He described BCCI as "tantamount to a racketeering bank" and the hearings as an inquiry into how it "gained a foothold in the United States and how regulators and bank officials failed to detect or understand or report the invasion." Recalling his inquiry into Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, which "became Bagdad's banker in the United States before our regulatory companies at the [[Federal Reserve Board|Federal Reserve]] could locate Iraq on the map," he said that "in the case of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, the Federal Reserve would have us believe that BCCI was a stealth banking operation, undetected on the regulators' radar screens," and asked: "What other foreign entities or criminal elements are secretly in control of U.S. banks at this very moment? That is a question I have been raising for 2 years."[^8]
On September 11, 1991, Gonzalez opened the banking committee's hearings on the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]], with [[Clark Clifford]] and [[Robert Altman]] as the first witnesses. He described BCCI as "tantamount to a racketeering bank" and the hearings as an inquiry into how it "gained a foothold in the United States and how regulators and bank officials failed to detect or understand or report the invasion." Recalling his inquiry into Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, which "became Bagdad's banker in the United States before our regulatory companies at the [[Federal Reserve Board|Federal Reserve]] could locate Iraq on the map," he said that "in the case of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, the Federal Reserve would have us believe that BCCI was a stealth banking operation, undetected on the regulators' radar screens," and asked: "What other foreign entities or criminal elements are secretly in control of U.S. banks at this very moment? That is a question I have been raising for 2 years."[^9]
### Footnotes
@ -64,5 +72,6 @@ On September 11, 1991, Gonzalez opened the banking committee's hearings on the [
[^4]: Gonzalez, Henry B. "United States Policy to Arm Iraq," *Congressional Record,* House, July 21, 1992.
[^5]: Gonzalez, Henry B. "Brass Factory in Iraq," *Congressional Record,* House, September 25, 1992, p. H9502.
[^6]: Friedman, Alan. *Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq*. Bantam, 1993, pp. 206, 216, 221.
[^7]: "Resolution Calling for an Ethics Probe of Chairman Gonzalez," *Congressional Record,* House, August 4, 1992, p. H7366. https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_cr/h920804-gonzales.htm
[^8]: House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs. *Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) Investigation, Part 1.* 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., September 11, 1991, Serial No. 102-69, pp. 1-2. https://archive.org/details/BCCIHearingsBeforeTheCommitteeOnBankingFinanceAndUrbanAffairs
[^7]: Rep. Henry B. Gonzalez, "Update on BNL Investigation," *Congressional Record*, House of Representatives, January 21, 1993, pp. H132 to H140. The statement about Guerin is Gonzalez's own characterization; the Third Circuit and the SEC release describe the Guerin charges as fraud and exports to South Africa, with Iraq named in the SEC release. https://irp.fas.org/congress/1993_cr/h930121-bnl.htm
[^8]: "Resolution Calling for an Ethics Probe of Chairman Gonzalez," *Congressional Record,* House, August 4, 1992, p. H7366. https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_cr/h920804-gonzales.htm
[^9]: House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs. *Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) Investigation, Part 1.* 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., September 11, 1991, Serial No. 102-69, pp. 1-2. https://archive.org/details/BCCIHearingsBeforeTheCommitteeOnBankingFinanceAndUrbanAffairs

152
10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/James Guerin.md Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
---
aliases:
- James Guerin
- James H. Guerin
- Jim Guerin
- James Harold Guerin
category: "Arms Dealers & Brokers"
tags:
- Person
- ArmsDealers
- Fraud
- Ferranti
- SouthAfrica
- Iraq
- Armscor
- Cardoen
- InmanProxyBoard
summary: "Founder of International Signal and Control, who merged the Lancaster defense firm into Ferranti in 1987, was indicted with twenty others in 1991 and pleaded guilty to fraud and export violations."
location: "Lancaster, Pennsylvania"
created: 2026-10-08
updated: 2026-10-08
relations:
- type: head_of
with: "[[International Signal and Control]]"
start: 1971
end: 1989
role: "founder, president and chief executive of the Lancaster company"
fn: 4
- type: director_of
with: "[[Ferranti]]"
start: 1987
end: 1989
role: "deputy chairman after the 1987 merger"
fn: 4
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Lockheed Aircraft Company]]"
end: 1969
role: "missile program engineer in Sunnyvale, California"
fn: 2
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Hamilton Watch]]"
start: 1969
end: 1971
role: "general manager of the systems (military electronics) division"
fn: 2
- type: prosecuted
with: "[[Department of Justice]]"
reverse: true
start: 1991-10
role: "indicted with twenty others in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Crim. No. 91-601; pleaded guilty December 1991; sentenced to 15 years in 1992"
fn: 1
- type: represented
with: "[[Joseph A. Tate]]"
reverse: true
start: 1989
role: "defense counsel whose statements on Guerin's behalf were issued in September 1989"
fn: 4
- type: partner_of
with: "[[Carlos Cardoen]]"
start: 1984
role: "agreement to divide the world cluster bomb market, as described by investigator Thomas L. Flannery and reported by Timmerman (sole source)"
fn: 22
---
[[James Guerin]] (died February 10, 2022, aged 91) founded [[International Signal and Control]] (ISC), a defense electronics company in [[Lancaster, Pennsylvania]], in his basement in 1971. The company reported about 600 million dollars in annual revenue by 1987, when it merged into the British defense firm [[Ferranti]]. He was indicted in [[Philadelphia]] in 1991 for fraud and for illegal exports to [[South Africa]], and in 1992 he was sentenced to 15 years in prison.[^1][^2][^3]
### Lancaster and the basement company
Guerin worked for [[Lockheed Aircraft Company|Lockheed]] as a missile program engineer in [[Sunnyvale, California]], and came to Lancaster in 1969 as general manager of the newly established systems (military electronics) division of [[Hamilton Watch]]. The division lost money, he tried and failed to buy it from Hamilton, and in 1971 he left to found his own company in his basement.[^2] The company opened its first assembly line in a converted chicken coop.[^4] It made space-vehicle rocket engines, electronic artillery fuzes, cluster bombs, electronic battlefield sensors and build-to-print circuit boards, and by the mid-1980s occupied a corporate campus off Donnerville Road in West Hempfield Township.[^2] It employed 1,800 people in Lancaster County and 5,500 worldwide.[^2] Guerin donated 4 million dollars toward a local sports center.[^4]
[[United Chem-Con]], another Lancaster arms maker in which Guerin held a 20 percent interest, was the subject of a federal fraud case in 1988. Its president, [[James B. Christian]], pleaded guilty to defrauding the Pentagon of 12 million dollars and, at his sentencing in June 1989 to six years in prison, claimed Guerin had masterminded the scheme. Guerin denied the claim and said federal prosecutors had told him he was not a subject of their Chem-Con investigation.[^2][^4]
### The proxy board and Washington names
A special proxy board of [[Bobby Ray Inman]], a former deputy director of the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] and director of the [[National Security Agency]], retired Army general [[John Guthrie]] and former assistant secretary of the Navy [[Barry Shillito]] was set up so that ISC could handle classified American defense work although it was listed in London. The consulting firm of former secretary of state [[Alexander M. Haig, Jr.|Alexander Haig]], [[Worldwide Associates]], did consulting work for ISC between 1985 and 1987, according to a filing Haig made when running for president in 1988.[^4] The same article reported that Inman and Haig had lent their names to Guerin's business activities over the years.[^4]
### The Ferranti merger and Guerin's departure
Guerin took the company public in London rather than on the New York Stock Exchange, and British investors did not warm to the stock. After it fell in 1987 he merged the company with Ferranti, becoming deputy chairman while [[Derek Alun-Jones]] remained chairman.[^4] The merger was announced in September 1987.[^5] In September 1989 the [[Ministry of Defence]] wrote to the Prime Minister's office that Ferranti's chairman had given an account of the merger that was "sufficiently unconvincing" for the ministry to order secret enquiries after its permanent secretary and the chief of defence procurement had sought an explanation. The enquiries showed that ISC and Guerin "had close contacts with the South African government," and that ISC had been involved in "a certain amount of two-way trade in missile equipment and technology." The ministry told the [[Department of Trade and Industry]] in May 1988 and told Alun-Jones of its concerns in July 1988. The letter states that ISC Technologies' divestment by Ferranti and Guerin's resignation were, in the ministry's belief, partly a result of that warning, and that Guerin had been unable to raise the funds to finance the acquisition. It also records an alleged connection between ISC and a British company in the European network supplying technology for the Condor missile programme.[^5]
Guerin resigned in May 1989 after seeking unsuccessfully to buy back the company. Over the following months his 32 million shares of Ferranti were sold for about 40 million dollars. His lawyer's statement claimed the sale was not made by Guerin and that [[Citicorp]] had made "the sole and unilateral decision to sell those shares, which were pledged as collateral for a loan."[^4] In September 1989 Ferranti told shareholders that its board had come to "suspect significant irregularities" in overseas contracts of ISC Technologies, and appointed [[Coopers & Lybrand]] to investigate.[^6]
Guerin left Lancaster in August 1989 for [[Naples, Florida]], announcing the move in a six-page letter to the Lancaster New Era titled "Farewell Lancaster," which dealt mostly with Christian and with the newspaper's publisher.[^2] His lawyer, [[Joseph A. Tate]], issued statements in September 1989 acknowledging a federal grand jury investigation in Philadelphia, reportedly of illegal arms and weapons technology sales to [[Iran]], [[Iraq]] and South Africa. The statements denied sales to Iran or Iraq during their war, denied the sale of cluster bombs to either, said "ISC has never manufactured or sold any chemicals or gases of any types," said Guerin "has cooperated with the grand jury investigation by providing documents and information requested," and said he "will fight vigorously against any charges leveled against him."[^4]
### The phantom contracts and the Parent plea
Ferranti alleged in September 1989 that Guerin had misled or defrauded it of 250 million dollars by making it appear that ISC held secret contracts with foreign governments. Ferranti pointed to a purported 200 million dollar missile contract with [[Pakistan]]. Pakistani officials were reported to say it never existed, and Guerin's longtime associate [[Clyde Ivy]] said it did. A former Pakistani official said ISC had held a contract with the Pakistani Air Force for cluster bombs or cluster-bomb technology in 1985 and 1986 that was completed.[^4] The Ministry of Defence letter of September 12, 1989 describes the contract as supposed to be with Pakistan for "missile know-how," with dealings through intermediaries and the work supposed to have been done in South Africa.[^5]
[[Parent Industries]], a company of which Guerin was then sole shareholder, was reported in September 1990 to have pleaded guilty to the fraudulent diversion of more than 700 million dollars from International Signal & Control Inc. It set up holding companies and bank accounts abroad, awarded the company non-existent Third World contracts, and had it pay money to subcontractors that was routed back as staged payments on the contracts. It agreed to pay 4.4 million dollars. The report said Guerin had allegedly used 67 million dollars of Ferranti shares as collateral to raise money to buy back the part of ISC holding the fictitious contracts.[^7]
Prosecutors said the fraud rested on 42 front companies in [[Panama]], 53 bank accounts in [[Switzerland]] and at least 10 in the United States, with warehouses rented and filled with crates of phony inventory for outside auditors. They said Guerin diverted 18.1 million dollars for his own use and gave 2.1 million of it to local charities.[^2]
### The 1991 indictment, plea and sentence
On October 31, 1991, the [[Securities and Exchange Commission]] and the United States Attorney for the [[United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania|Eastern District of Pennsylvania]] announced the indictment of Guerin and twenty others in "an international financial fraud, securities fraud and money laundering scheme involving a billion dollars in phony contracts," together with "smuggling of weapons and restricted commodities to South Africa and Iraq." The cases were docketed as United States v. James H. Guerin, Crim. No. 91-601, and United States v. [[ARMSCOR|Armaments Corporation of South Africa]] Ltd., et al., Crim. No. 91-602. The release credits the [[Serious Fraud Office]], the [[Metropolitan Police]], Belgium's national police and the [[Italian Intelligence Service]] with cooperation.[^1]
Guerin pleaded guilty before a federal judge in Philadelphia in December 1991, and a December 9, 1991 report said he admitted "inflating the value of the company by booking over $1,000m in fictitious weapons contracts with Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates and other countries," while denying that he diverted 18 million dollars for his own use.[^8] The plea covered eight counts: money laundering, conspiracy, mail fraud, securities fraud, two export violations and two tax evasion counts.[^2]
At a two-day sentencing hearing in June 1992, a federal prosecutor said he had never seen so much criminal activity over such a long period in his career. Guerin blamed his downfall on his drive to succeed and on "misguided patriotism," and said selling weapons to South Africa would counter a communist threat. Judge [[Louis Bechtle]] told him: "It's difficult for the court to believe, Mr. Guerin, you could have felt you were doing the right thing," and sentenced him to 15 years.[^3] A report of June 23, 1992 recorded the 15-year sentence.[^9] A Knight-Ridder report of November 10, 1992 said he had "earlier this year" begun serving it.[^10]
### The South African shipments and the claims of Washington approval
The indicted South African firms were ARMSCOR, its subsidiary [[Kentron]] and [[Fuchs Electronics]]. The [[Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control]] reports that they were charged with cooperating with ISC to smuggle munitions, restricted commodities and technology to South Africa from 1978 to 1989, and that Armscor and Kentron acknowledged in their plea agreement that they had obtained shipments from ISC by routing them through front companies.[^11] The State Department's 1997 debarment notice records that Fuchs pleaded guilty on February 27, 1997.[^12]
[[Thomas P. Jasin]], president of the subsidiary ISC Technologies from March 1986 to March 1987, was the first of the ISC defendants tried, in November and December 1992, on the Striker missile part of the conspiracy, a project to sell South African antitank missiles, partly made with American parts and technology, to China, for which ISC was to take a 35 percent commission on a sale valued at 300 to 500 million dollars.[^13] Jasin testified that Guerin told him ISC had "Washington approval" for the Striker dealings.[^14] His lawyer told the jury that Haig, officials of the CIA and the Army knew of the plans to import the missile components and none objected, and Assistant U.S. Attorney [[Robert E. Goldman]] answered: "Haig was never told they were bringing in missile parts from South Africa."[^10] Jasin also testified that he had met CIA agents and gained the impression that ISC acted covertly but legally, according to the National Registry of Exonerations.[^15] A defense witness, James Shinehouse, testified of conversations in which Guerin "would state that the CIA is knowledgeable about ISC's activities and that it backs certain activities that ISC had."[^16] A James Shinehouse is also identified by the Lancaster newspaper as having led Ferranti's internal investigation of ISC; the records found do not state whether the two are the same person.[^17]
Guerin, who did not testify, had written a letter to the court before the trial that Jasin faxed to his lawyer on October 2, 1992. It stated: "I implied to Tom, as I did to several others, that we had Washington's 'blessings' on this activity. I interfaced a lot with Washington contacts and fed them a lot of information. But I did not have their approval for such shipments in writing. Jasin did not know this."[^16] The government told the jury in closing that almost every piece of incriminating evidence was blamed on Guerin's telling Jasin it was okayed by Washington. In 2001 it argued that Guerin had a long history of lying, and conceded that it had accepted at trial that Guerin told Jasin ISC had Washington approval, contending that Jasin could not reasonably rely on it.[^16]
Ivy, whom the Third Circuit identifies as Robert Clyde Ivy, an ISC president and chairman of ISC Technologies from 1980 to 1989, invoked the Fifth Amendment when Jasin subpoenaed him, later pleaded guilty and served six months in 1997. In a December 7, 1999 affidavit he stated: "I informed Jasin of Guerin's statements to me that ISC's exports of defense components to South Africa had Washington's approval."[^18]
Jasin was sentenced on July 16, 1998 to 24 months, a departure below the guideline range of 57 to 60 months, on the court's finding that he had a good faith belief his conduct was lawful.[^14] The Third Circuit affirmed in an unreported opinion of August 12, 1999, the Supreme Court denied certiorari on January 24, 2000, and the Third Circuit affirmed denial of a new trial based on Ivy's affidavit on February 5, 2002.[^18] On August 8, 2002 Judge [[Jan E. DuBois]] vacated the conviction and the 1998 judgment, holding that trial counsel had been ineffective in failing to interview and call witnesses, including Guerin, and stated that Guerin's testimony would have supported Jasin's reliance.[^16] According to the National Registry of Exonerations, prosecutors then dismissed the charges.[^15]
### Inman's letter
In an April 27, 1992 letter to Chief Judge Louis Bechtle of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Inman called Guerin a patriot and said he had worked in the mid-1970s with U.S. intelligence agencies. Inman had acknowledged working secretly with Guerin. In December 1993 the ties were expected to be raised at Inman's confirmation hearing as secretary of defense, and Inman told reporters he would not comment before the hearing.[^19] Inman withdrew his nomination on January 18, 1994, saying in a letter that he could not take the attacks on his reputation that had accompanied the nomination process.[^20]
[[Open Secrets]], which published South African military intelligence documents in 2017, stated that "James Guerin himself used to be a CIA agent," listing it as circumstantial evidence that the CIA knew of the ISC shipments; the article cites no document for the claim.[^21] [[Kenneth R. Timmerman]] wrote that Guerin "knew how to ship American weaponry and technology anywhere in the world, claiming he had received quiet approval from the CIA."[^22]
### Iraq and Cardoen
Allegations that Guerin improperly sold missile technology to Iraq were reported in 1989, and Tate denied them.[^4] Timmerman wrote that [[Carlos Cardoen]] bought fuzes for his cluster bombs, despite the United Nations arms embargo on Chile, from a Pentagon contractor in Lancaster called International Signals Corporation, managed by Guerin, which had developed the Rockeye cluster bomb fuze on a second-source contract for the U.S. Navy. He wrote that Guerin's biggest customers were Cardoen and the South African Armaments Corporation, and that the two men "were old friends" by 1984. Timmerman quoted Thomas L. Flannery, who investigated Guerin for the Lancaster Intelligencer Journal, as saying the two made a sweeping agreement "to split the world cluster bomb market in two," Cardoen taking Latin America and "special" countries such as Iraq, and Guerin the rest of the Gulf, Pakistan and South Africa.[^22] Timmerman also wrote that Cardoen was seized by U.S. customs officers in Miami on August 2, 1983 and indicted for attempting to smuggle night-vision goggles to Chile, and settled in a plea bargain costing his company 100,000 dollars in fines.[^22]
In January 1993 Representative [[Henry B. Gonzalez]] told the House that [[Terry Byrne]], who had set up and run the British firm [[Allivane]], had previously worked for ISC, and that "ISC was founded by James Guerin, who is serving time in jail after being convicted of, among other things, illegally shipping military technology to Iraq."[^23] A 2022 retrospective states that federal officials said ISC did not necessarily know its South African components would reach Iraq and that there was no evidence ISC sold directly to Iraq.[^3]
### Release and death
Guerin's sentence was trimmed from 15 years to 13 for good conduct. He was scheduled for release from the federal prison in [[Coleman, Florida]], on January 25, 2005, to serve the last six months in home confinement at his son's home in [[Mountville, Pennsylvania]], with an electronic monitoring bracelet. His wife, Helen, had died in Florida in June 2004. Goldman said: "He served his time. I wish him and his family well."[^2] Guerin died on February 10, 2022. He had remarried, and his obituary stated that "his greatest joy was in Christ and his beloved family."[^3]
### Footnotes
[^1]: SEC Digest, November 7, 1991, "James Guerin and Twenty Others Indicted" (Litigation Release LR-13077, announced October 31, 1991, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Crim. Nos. 91-601 and 91-602), https://www.sec.gov/news/digest/1991/dig110791.pdf.
[^2]: Tim Mekeel, "Guerin 'home' to complete sentence," *LNP* (LancasterOnline), January 3, 2005, https://lancasteronline.com/news/guerin-home-to-complete-sentence/article_ab95d10d-7b72-511a-8c23-a388df496dfb.html.
[^3]: Dan Nephin, "James Guerin, who died Feb. 10, masterminded Lancaster County's largest fraud at $1B-plus," *LNP* (LancasterOnline), February 20, 2022, https://lancasteronline.com/news/local/james-guerin-who-died-feb-10-masterminded-lancaster-countys-largest-fraud-at-1b-plus/article_28d01f02-9102-11ec-a536-0f7e5967191d.html. The article gives the June 1992 two-day sentencing hearing, the quotations of Judge Bechtle and Guerin, the federal officials' statement on Iraq, and the date of death. It describes the 1987 merger as a 1.5 billion dollar deal, where the 2005 article in note 2 gives 670 million dollars.
[^4]: Glenn Frankel, "British Firm Claims It Was Duped by Pa. Arms Maker," *Washington Post*, September 29, 1989, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1989/09/29/british-firm-claims-it-was-duped-by-pa-arms-maker/5b675f69-e5e0-4c25-9aee-ced8b8e07efa/. The article places Guerin at 59 and describes the Haig filing as "a filing Haig made when running for president last year."
[^5]: Ministry of Defence letter of 12 September 1989 (B. R. Hawtin, Private Secretary) to Charles Powell, 10 Downing Street, and Powell's reply of 13 September 1989, in Prime Minister's papers on Ferranti (file PO-CH-NL 0500 PART A), Margaret Thatcher Foundation archive, https://archive.margaretthatcher.org/HMTPO/PO-CH-NL%200500%20PART%20A.pdf. The letter is marked "secret" and "commercial in confidence/market sensitive."
[^6]: "Ferranti calls in Coopers & Lybrand to investigate ISC contracts," *Computer Business Review* (Tech Monitor), September 17, 1989, https://www.techmonitor.ai/?p=208120.
[^7]: "Guerin's company pleads guilty to $700m International Signal fraud," *Computer Business Review* (Tech Monitor), published September 25, 1990, https://www.techmonitor.ai/?p=222346. Sole source for the Parent Industries plea and the 4.4 million dollar settlement; the report does not state the date of the plea.
[^8]: "James Guerin has finally admitted fraud and tax evasion," *Computer Business Review* (Tech Monitor), published December 9, 1991, https://techmonitor.ai/?p=184145.
[^9]: "Ferranti gets losses under control but it will be a long, hard climb out of the pit," *Computer Business Review* (Tech Monitor), published June 23, 1992, https://www.techmonitor.ai/?p=184616.
[^10]: "Weapons-smuggling plot tied to Pa. executive on trial for trade violations," Knight-Ridder News Service, *Baltimore Sun*, November 10, 1992, https://www.baltimoresun.com/1992/11/10/weapons-smuggling-plot-tied-to-pa-executive-on-trial-for-trade-violations/. The defense account is that of Jasin's attorney, Gaar Steiner; the quoted reply is Goldman's.
[^11]: "South African Firms Settle Arms Smuggling Case," Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, https://www.wisconsinproject.org/south-african-firms-settle-arms-smuggling-case/ (undated).
[^12]: Department of State, Office of Defense Trade Controls, Public Notice 2522, "Statutory Debarment Under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations," *Federal Register* 62, no. 56 (March 24, 1997), p. 13933, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1997-03-24/html/97-7273.htm.
[^13]: *United States v. Jasin*, 280 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 2002) (Greenberg, J.), https://static.case.law/f3d/280/cases/0355-01.json. The opinion gives the 67-count indictment against 19 codefendants, Jasin's positions from July 1984, and the verdict of December 10, 1992 after a five-week trial. It dates the indictment October 30, 1991; the district court's 2002 opinion in note 16 dates it October 31, 1991.
[^14]: *United States v. Jasin*, 25 F. Supp. 2d 551 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (DuBois, J.), No. Crim. 91-602-08, decided August 12, 1998, https://static.case.law/f-supp-2d/25/cases/0551-01.json, citing N.T. November 24, 1992, at 70 for the "Washington approval" testimony. Sole source for the sentencing findings of July 16, 1998.
[^15]: Maurice Possley, "Thomas Jasin," National Registry of Exonerations, posted January 10, 2013, https://exonerationregistry.org/cases/11260. Sole source for Jasin's testimony about meeting CIA agents and for the dismissal of the charges after the 2002 ruling.
[^16]: *United States v. Jasin*, 215 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (DuBois, J.), memorandum and order of August 8, 2002, https://static.case.law/f-supp-2d/215/cases/0552-01.json. The opinion quotes Guerin's letter (Def.'s Ex. 14 at 52), the government's closing (T. Dec. 3, 1992, at 95), the government's 2001 reply, and Shinehouse's testimony (T. Nov. 30, 1992, at 149), and notes that Guerin was named in a separate indictment and pleaded guilty.
[^17]: Dan Nephin, *LNP*, February 20, 2022 (see note 3), which states that Shinehouse "led the internal investigation and directed subsequent litigation to help Ferranti recover what money it could."
[^18]: *United States v. Jasin*, 280 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 2002), https://static.case.law/f3d/280/cases/0355-01.json; the opinion cites the August 12, 1999 affirmance, 191 F.3d 446 (table), and the denial of certiorari, 528 U.S. 1139 (2000).
[^19]: "Ties to convict could be questioned," *Tampa Bay Times*, December 17, 1993, https://www.tampabay.com/archive/1993/12/17/ties-to-convict-could-be-questioned/. Sole source for the April 27, 1992 letter; the article does not say which of the two men the letter's "he had worked in the mid-1970s with U.S. intelligence agencies" describes.
[^20]: "Inman withdraws from nomination," *Christian Science Monitor*, January 19, 1994, https://csmonitor.com/1994/0119/19242.html.
[^21]: Open Secrets, "Declassified: Apartheid Profits," *Daily Maverick*, October 9, 2017, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-10-09-declassified-apartheid-profits-american-guns/. Sole source for the claim that Guerin was a CIA agent; the article dates Guerin's sentencing October 31, 1991, which is the date of the indictment announcement in note 1.
[^22]: Kenneth R. Timmerman, *The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991), pp. 168 to 169. Sole source for the Rockeye fuze, the CIA-approval statement, the agreement and the August 2, 1983 Cardoen arrest; the market-division quotation is Timmerman's quotation of Thomas L. Flannery.
[^23]: Rep. Henry B. Gonzalez, "Update on BNL Investigation," *Congressional Record*, House of Representatives, January 21, 1993, p. H132, https://irp.fas.org/congress/1993_cr/h930121-bnl.htm. Sole source for the statement about Byrne and ISC.

11
10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Michael Aquino.md
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@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ born: 1946-10-16
died: 2019-09-01
location: San Francisco, California
created: 2026-06-03
updated: 2026-09-22
updated: 2026-10-08
---
Michael A. Aquino was a Lieutenant Colonel in the [[U.S. Army]] Reserve, serving in Military Intelligence and psychological operations. He was attached to the 7th Psychological Operations Group at the [[Presidio of San Francisco|Presidio]] and held Top Secret security clearance. Born October 16, 1946, he earned bachelor's and master's degrees in political science from the [[University of California Santa Barbara]] before launching concurrent careers in military intelligence and the occult.[^1][^2]
@ -26,12 +26,17 @@ Aquino founded the [[Temple of Set]] in 1975 after leaving the [[Church of Satan
In November 1986, allegations of child sexual abuse surfaced at the Presidio Army base Child Development Center in [[San Francisco]]. Investigations expanded over the following months, and in August 1987, a young girl identified Aquino as one of her abusers. At least 58 of approximately 100 children who attended the daycare showed physical or psychological signs of abuse. Aquino was investigated by Army and civilian authorities but was never charged. The case became one of the most prominent of the 1980s satanic ritual abuse controversies, and Aquino aggressively denied all allegations through legal channels and public statements.[^1][^2]
### Security Clearance Remark
In an undated transcript of an interview with [[Ted Gunderson]], a speaker initialed "M.R." (the transcript's cover line begins with the name "Michael") says that the reaction to Aquino that he got from "Dr. Malkin" was "Well, his clearance isn't all that high." The speaker adds that nearly everyone in Aquino's group was psy-ops or intelligence related.[^3] The passage does not state Aquino's rank or the clearance level discussed. Records found do not establish whether "Dr. Malkin" is [[Myron S. Malkin]].
### Project Monarch Allegations
A.B.H. Alexander, writing in *PROBE* around 1996, alleged that Aquino took part in [[Project Monarch]] conditioning of subjects at [[NASA]] bases as a handler for programming operations. [[Cathy O'Brien]] identified Aquino as one of her handlers during her alleged Monarch programming. The allegations placed Aquino at the intersection of military psychological warfare expertise and the claimed Monarch programming operations. [[Marion David Pettie|Pettie]]'s network also intersected with Aquino's circle through Christopher Bird, a former CIA officer who served in [[Japan]] as an Army psych warfare specialist and who was associated with Pettie.[^3]
A.B.H. Alexander, writing in *PROBE* around 1996, alleged that Aquino took part in [[Project Monarch]] conditioning of subjects at [[NASA]] bases as a handler for programming operations. [[Cathy O'Brien]] identified Aquino as one of her handlers during her alleged Monarch programming. The allegations placed Aquino at the intersection of military psychological warfare expertise and the claimed Monarch programming operations. [[Marion David Pettie|Pettie]]'s network also intersected with Aquino's circle through Christopher Bird, a former CIA officer who served in [[Japan]] as an Army psych warfare specialist and who was associated with Pettie.[^4]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Los Angeles Times, August 11, 1987.
[^2]: Aquino vitae and published works at rachane.org.
[^3]: A.B.H. Alexander, "Sex, Drugs, the CIA, MIND CONTROL and Your Children," PROBE, c. 1996; Kenn Thomas and Len Bracken, "The Finders' Keeper," Steamshovel Press #16, 1998.
[^3]: Ted Gunderson and Michael Riconosciuto interview notes, file "Folder 7 Acc5516" (archive.org casolaro-notebooks item, file "Folder 7 Acc5516.pdf", text layer). Undated passage. Sole source for the passages so cited. https://archive.org/details/casolaro-notebooks
[^4]: A.B.H. Alexander, "Sex, Drugs, the CIA, MIND CONTROL and Your Children," PROBE, c. 1996; Kenn Thomas and Len Bracken, "The Finders' Keeper," Steamshovel Press #16, 1998.

8
10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Robert Gates.md
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@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
---
updated: 2026-10-08
aliases:
- Robert Gates
- Bob Gates
@ -26,6 +27,12 @@ On November 28, 1995, Gates appeared on *Nightline* with [[Ted Koppel]] to discu
On ABC's *Nightline* of November 28, 1995, the night the [[1995 AIR evaluation of Star Gate|AIR evaluation]] of the remote-viewing program was released, Gates said that after the mid-1970s "CIA basically monitored the activities of other government agencies and what was going on in the academic community and then in mid 1980s, then-deputy director [[John McMahon]] formalized that. So, CIA really during that period had a very limited role"; that "I don't know of a single instance where it is documented that this kind of activity contributed in any significant way to a policy decision or even to informing policy makers about important information"; that "most intelligence professionals have been pretty skeptical of this. We got into it, I think, mainly because we heard the Soviets were involved and also because the Congress, individual members of the Congress and some staff pushed us into it"; and that "this is a pretty low priority for the intelligence community, and it's better done on the outside."[^3]
### Senate inquiry into Cardoen Industries, 1991
In its October 24, 1991 report on Gates's nomination, the [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]] recorded that [[Richard Babayan|Richard H. Babayan]] alleged in news reporting and other forums that Gates had assisted an individual named M. K. Moss in a covert CIA operation to supply arms to Iraq, had sought to transfer cluster bomb technology to [[Carlos Cardoen]], and had been aware that a Lancaster, Pennsylvania company was supplying arms to Iraq through South Africa.[^4] The report records a July 16, 1991 letter from Cardoen to the United States ambassador in Chile denying that he had met Gates and denying that he had worked with Gates and the CIA to deliver weapons to Iraq. Gates's calendar and travel records were reviewed for the dates of the alleged meetings, and the committee wrote that "No credible evidence has been presented to the Committee to support these allegations." At his confirmation hearing Gates denied Babayan's allegations.[^4]
The committee also reported that, while investigating relationships between Gates and Cardoen, it received information about a relationship between [[Industrias Cardoen|Cardoen Industries]] and a former part-time senior CIA employee, [[James D. Theberge]]. The report states that "There is no evidence that the nominee, Mr. Gates, participated in either his recruitment or selection" to the Senior Review Panel. In written answers printed in the report, Gates said that he had moved the panel's organization from the Directorate of Intelligence to the Director's area when he became deputy director for intelligence in January 1982, that decisions on panel members were made by the Director, and that "I do not recall meeting Ambassador Theberge prior to his joining the SRP." He wrote that he was "unaware of his [Theberge's] relationships, his connection to the SWISSCO Management Group, or any connection to the Carlos Cardoen Group."[^4]
### Publications
* *From the Shadows* (1997)
@ -34,3 +41,4 @@ On ABC's *Nightline* of November 28, 1995, the night the [[1995 AIR evaluation o
[^1]: Schnabel, Jim. *Remote Viewers*. Dell, 1997.
[^2]: Jacobsen, Annie. *Phenomena: The Secret History of the U.S. Government's Investigations into Extrasensory Perception and Psychokinesis*. Little, Brown and Company, 2017.
[^3]: "Psychic Spies: Cold War Whimsy or Secret Weapon?," ABC News *Nightline,* November 28, 1995, Radio TV Reports transcript for the CIA Public Affairs Staff, CIA-RDP99-01448R000402140001-7, read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room.
[^4]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence*, S. Exec. Rept. 102-19, 102d Cong., 1st sess., October 24, 1991, section 5, PDF pages 186 to 188. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-10219.pdf

145
10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Ward Boston.md Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
---
title: Ward Boston
aliases:
- Ward Boston
- Ward Boston Jr.
- Ward Boston, Jr.
- Captain Ward Boston
- Captain Ward Boston Jr.
category: "Military"
tags:
- Person
- Military
- Navy
- USSLiberty
- SixDayWar
- Israel
- CourtOfInquiry
- CoverUp
- LyndonJohnson
- McNamara
summary: "Navy lawyer who was senior counsel to the 1967 Court of Inquiry into the USS Liberty attack and later stated that Admiral Kidd told him Johnson and McNamara ordered a mistaken-identity finding."
born: 1923-06-21
died: 2008-06-12
location: "Coronado, California"
relations:
- type: employed_by
with: "[[U.S. Navy]]"
start: 1950
end: 1975
role: "Judge Advocate General's Corps; retired as a captain with thirty-four and a half years of service"
fn: 2
- type: participant_in
with: "[[USS Liberty Incident]]"
start: 1967-06-10
end: 1967-06-18
role: "senior legal counsel to the Navy Court of Inquiry"
fn: 5
- type: reported_to
with: "[[Isaac C. Kidd Jr.]]"
start: 1967-06-10
end: 1967-06-18
role: "counsel to the court of which Kidd was president"
fn: 5
- type: reported_to
with: "[[John S. McCain Jr.]]"
start: 1967-06-10
end: 1967-06-18
role: "designated counsel to the court convened by McCain"
fn: 5
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Federal Bureau of Investigation]]"
role: "special agent, San Francisco and Los Angeles, according to a family obituary"
fn: 2
created: 2026-10-08
updated: 2026-10-08
---
Ward Boston Jr. (1923 to 2008) was a United States Navy captain and Judge Advocate General's Corps lawyer who served as senior legal counsel to the 1967 Court of Inquiry into the Israeli attack on the [[USS Liberty Incident|USS Liberty]]. In an affidavit released in October 2003 and a longer declaration dated January 8, 2004, he stated that [[Isaac C. Kidd Jr.|Rear Admiral Isaac C. Kidd Jr.]], the court's president, had told him that [[Lyndon B. Johnson]] and [[Robert S. McNamara]] ordered the court to conclude that the attack was a case of mistaken identity.[^1]
### Early career
Boston was born in [[Moberly, Missouri]], on June 21, 1923, the only son of Ward and Margaret Boston. The family obituary states that before the war he held a scholarship to study oboe at the [[Curtis Institute of Music]], and that at nineteen he entered flight training as an aviation cadet and earned his wings at [[Pensacola, Florida]].[^2] It records that he flew the F6F Hellcat as a fighter pilot in the Pacific fleet, with combat duty aboard the [[USS Yorktown]], and flew Hellcats and Corsairs from two escort carriers and two CVL carriers, including USS Midway, in the Atlantic Fleet, and that his flight crew called him "Blackie."[^2] His 2007 op-ed describes him as a naval aviator in World War II on the Yorktown.[^3]
After the war Boston attended the law school of the [[College of William and Mary]], which his 2007 op-ed names.[^3] The obituary states that he passed the Virginia bar while still in law school, practiced in [[Williamsburg, Virginia|Williamsburg]] with the firm of Richardson & Boston, continued to fly as a reservist stationed at [[Norfolk, Virginia|Norfolk]], where he met and married Emma Penello, and then accepted an appointment as a special agent of the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]], serving in San Francisco and Los Angeles after graduating from the FBI Academy.[^2] It states that shortly after the Korean War began he returned to active duty in the regular Navy as a Judge Advocate, and that he was a graduate of the [[Armed Forces Staff College]], the [[Naval War College]], and did graduate law studies at [[George Washington University]].[^2] [[A. Jay Cristol]], the author of the book that prompted Boston's public statements, wrote in 2007 that Boston returned to the Navy "as a legal specialist in the days prior to creation of the Judge Advocate Generals Corp."[^4] The obituary records that Boston retired as the senior captain in the Navy after thirty-four and a half years of service and that he and his wife settled in [[Coronado, California]], in 1975.[^2]
### The Court of Inquiry, June 1967
[[John S. McCain Jr.]], Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, appointed the court by order of June 10, 1967, naming Rear Admiral Kidd as president, Captains [[Bernard J. Lauff]] and [[Bert M. Atkinson Jr.]] as members, Boston as counsel, and Lieutenant Commander [[Allen Feingersch]] as assistant counsel.[^5] The record opens in [[London]] at 2314 on June 10 with the appointing order read into the record, and the President administered the oath to counsel; the appointed reporter was Yeoman Chief [[Joeray Spencer]].[^5] The court heard its first witness, Captain Leonard Raish of McCain's staff, and adjourned at 0250 on June 11. The president, counsel and reporter boarded the ship at sea off [[Souda Bay]], [[Crete]], and the court met aboard at 0630 on June 12; the record shows the full court in session at [[Malta]] from 0755 on June 13, adjourning aboard the ship on June 15. It reconvened in London on June 16 and closed at 1645 that day.[^5] The posted description of the record, which dates the meeting of the full court with the ship at Valletta to June 14, gives nineteen witnesses, transcribed testimony of 158 pages, and forty-nine exhibits, and states that the court presented fifty-two findings with the record to McCain.[^6] The complete record is posted as a 728-page scan.[^5]
Finding 1 of the court states: "Available evidence combines to indicate the attack on LIBERTY on 8 June was in fact a case of mistaken identity." Finding 6 states: "There are no available indications that the attack was intended against a U. S. Ship."[^5] McCain's first endorsement of June 18, 1967 describes "an unprovoked attack by Israeli air and naval forces in international waters off the coast of the United Arab Republic" and states that the convening authority's comments "lead to an overall conclusion that the attack was in fact a mistake."[^5] The [[Associated Press]] summarized the outcome as a finding that there was "insufficient information to make a judgment about why Israel attacked the ship."[^7]
Boston stated that he and Kidd were given one week to gather evidence, although each of them estimated that a proper inquiry would take at least six months.[^1][^3] The scan contains the testimony of Lieutenant (junior grade) [[Lloyd C. Painter]], the officer of the deck, at transcript pages 55 to 59 (scan pages 160 to 164). Painter testified that the ship's life rafts "had been strafed and most of them were burned," that the crew "knocked most of them over the side," and that the three torpedo boats "were laying off, waiting for us to sink."[^5] In the declaration Boston states that Painter's testimony on the deliberate machine-gunning of the life rafts by the Israeli torpedo boat crews, which he recalled being given at the court and included in the original transcript, "is now missing and has been excised."[^1] Painter told the [[Chicago Tribune]] in 2007 that he testified that an Israeli torpedo boat "methodically machine-gunned one of our life rafts" and charged that this testimony was purposely omitted; the Tribune described him as having spent thirty-two years as a [[United States Secret Service|Secret Service]] agent after leaving the Navy.[^8] Transcript page 153 in the scan is a page bearing the typed legend "PAGE 153 BLANK" (scan page 258).[^5]
### Public statements, 2002 to 2003
[[Ronald Fraser]] reported that Boston had told the [[Navy Times]] the previous year: "I feel the Israelis knew what they were doing. They knew they were shooting at a U.S. Navy ship. That's the bottom line. I don't care how they tried to get out of it."[^9] [[Arab News]] reported that on June 26, 2002, Boston told a reporter for the [[Marine Corps Times]], [[Bryant Jordan]], that the attack was deliberate.[^10] Fraser also reported that Boston said Kidd told him after delivering the report to Washington that top officials were not interested in hearing the truth.[^9]
Boston said he came forward after reading Cristol's book [[The Liberty Incident]], published in 2002. Arab News reported in July 2003 that Cristol's book tour had included a December 2002 presentation at the [[Naval Historical Center]].[^10] In a July 2003 interview with Arab News, Boston said: "There is no question in my mind that those people tried to kill every one on board." He also said: "I made lots of corrections which are no longer in the report. There are even pages missing."[^10]
On October 22, 2003, a signed affidavit by Boston was released at a Capitol Hill news conference.[^4][^7] The Associated Press quoted it as stating that Johnson and McNamara told those heading the Navy's inquiry to "conclude that the attack was a case of 'mistaken identity' despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary." [[Thomas H. Moorer]], chairman of the [[Independent Commission of Inquiry]] into the attack, spoke at the same event. Moorer, who attended from a wheelchair, asked: "Why in the world would our government put Israel's interest ahead of our own?"[^7][^11]
### The affidavit and the January 2004 declaration
The text printed in the Congressional Record on October 11, 2004, headed "Affidavit of Captain Ward Boston, USN, JAG (Ret.)," carries no date. It contains the statements on the one-week deadline, the evidence of a deliberate attack, the flag, the lifeboats, Cristol's book, and the Johnson and McNamara order, and it describes Boston's service as "Judge Advocates General Department," where the declaration reads "Judge Advocate General Corps." Representative [[John Conyers]] introduced the findings and the affidavit in remarks dated October 7, 2004.[^11]
The declaration is a four-page signed document with twenty-six numbered paragraphs, dated "January 8, 2004" at Coronado, California.[^1] It contains paragraphs that the Record text omits: Kidd's repeated characterization of the Israeli forces (paragraph 7), McCain's refusal to allow travel to Israel (11), the more than sixty witness declarations never received into evidence (12), the order to rewrite the findings and "put the lid" on the attack (17 and 18), the transcript (19 and 20), Kidd's later conversations (21), and Cristol's 1990 telephone call and later letter (22 to 25).[^1] Paragraph 16 states: "I know from personal conversations I had with Admiral Kidd that President Lyndon Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ordered him to conclude that the attack was a case of 'mistaken identity' despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary." Paragraph 17 states that Kidd told him, "after returning from Washington, D.C. that he had been ordered to sit down with two civilians from either the White House or the Defense Department, and rewrite portions of the court's findings." Paragraph 18 states that Kidd said he had been ordered to "put the lid" on everything concerning the attack and that no one was to speak of it again.[^1] Paragraphs 19 and 20 state that the transcript released to the public "is not the same one that I certified and sent off to Washington," that it was necessary to hand correct and initial a substantial number of pages and the released version bears none of them, that "the original did not have any deliberately blank pages, as the released version does," and that Painter's testimony "is now missing and has been excised."[^1]
The Kidd conversations are sole-sourced to Boston, who attributes them to a man who died in 1999.[^1][^9] Boston gave other accounts of how Kidd conveyed the order. Arab News in 2003 reported that Kidd returned to Washington and telephoned Boston: "We have to be quiet," and quoted Boston as saying that Johnson "had ordered us to put the lid on it."[^10] In the Chicago Tribune in 2007 Boston said Kidd flew to Washington with the record while he returned to [[Naples]], and that two weeks later Kidd telephoned him from his office in Naples and said: "Ward, they aren't interested in the facts. It's a political issue and we have to put a lid on it. We've been ordered to shut up."[^8] The family obituary describes him as the "Senior Judge Advocate" for the [[U.S. Sixth Fleet|Sixth Fleet]] in Naples, Italy.[^2] Paragraphs 22 to 25 of the declaration describe a 1990 telephone call from Cristol, after which Kidd said that "Cristol must be an Israeli agent," and a later letter from Cristol containing notes of the conversation that Boston calls "grossly incorrect."[^1]
Accounts differ on when Boston signed. Arab News on January 11, 2004 described "a signed affidavit last October."[^12] The [[Financial Times]] reported on January 13, 2004 that Boston had signed an affidavit "last week."[^13] The Associated Press obituary states that "In 2002" Boston made the statement according to a signed affidavit.[^14] One transcription of the declaration prints the date as January 9, 2004. The signed page reads January 8.[^1]
### The June 2007 op-ed
On June 8, 2007, the fortieth anniversary of the attack, the [[San Diego Union-Tribune]] published a Boston op-ed titled "Time for the truth about the Liberty." It repeats the Kidd account and the claim that the released transcript was altered. It ends with the call: "Let former intelligence officers testify that they received real-time Hebrew translations of Israeli commanders instructing their pilots to sink 'the American ship.'"[^3]
Cristol answered in the [[History News Network]] on June 12, 2007. He argued that the Kidd account is hearsay about a dead man and that the record contains no testimony showing that the Israelis intended to destroy the ship.[^4] He also named a man, [[Ron Gotcher]], whom he said helped Boston with the affidavit and declaration and "very likely wrote or assisted in the preparation" of the op-ed. Cristol says that Gotcher's claim to have worked for the [[National Security Agency]] is refuted by an NSA letter posted on the Liberty Incident website.[^4] Cristol also states that McNamara told the [[Senate Foreign Relations Committee]] in July 1967 that he had read the record of investigation and supported its conclusion that the attack was not intentional.[^4]
### Signals intelligence
In July 2003 the NSA released transcripts of the Liberty intercepts in response to a Freedom of Information Act request by Cristol filed April 26, 2001. In a letter dated July 2, 2003, the agency enclosed three recordings of Israeli communications in Hebrew, three transcripts, two summary reports, and a compiled report dated June 22, 1967. The letter states that "No communications of the attacking aircraft or torpedo boats were available" and that an EC-121 aircraft had collected conversations between two Israeli helicopter pilots and the control tower at [[Hazor Airfield]].[^15]
In January 2004 the NSA historian, [[David Hatch]], said that the new material "doesn't settle much." His reading of the conversations between an Israeli air controller and two helicopter pilots "suggested strongly" that the Israelis did not know at first that they were attacking a U.S. vessel, though the pilots mentioned an American flag flying.[^13]
On June 8, 2007, the NSA announced that it had finished its review of all material relating to the attack and had posted additional documents, including oral histories, messages, and follow-up reports. The agency wrote: "It is not NSA's intention to prove or disprove any one set of conclusions, many of which can be drawn from a thorough review of this material."[^16]
In a June 2003 Proceedings article, [[David C. Walsh]] reported that [[Oliver Kirby]], the NSA deputy director for operations/production, said in an interview of February 14, 2003 that within weeks of the attack he read transcripts of the Israeli pilots' conversations, and that they made it "absolutely certain" the Israelis knew the ship was American.[^17] On October 2, 2007, the Chicago Tribune reported that the NSA's position was that it never intercepted the communications of the attacking Israeli pilots, and quoted Kirby as saying he had read such transcripts: "They said, 'We've got him in the zero,' whatever that meant, I guess the sights or something. And then one of them said, 'Can you see the flag?' They said 'Yes, it's U.S, it's U.S.' They said it several times, so there wasn't any doubt in anybody's mind that they knew it." Kirby told the Tribune: "I'm willing to swear on a stack of Bibles that we knew they knew."[^8] The Tribune also quoted a [[James Gotcher]], an attorney in California who served with the [[Air Force Security Service]]'s 6924th Security Squadron at Son Tra, Vietnam, as recalling transcripts in which controllers urged the aircraft to "complete the job." Records found do not establish whether he is the Ron Gotcher named by Cristol.[^4][^8]
### Israeli position
The Israeli Embassy spokesman, [[Mark Regev]], responded to the October 2003 news conference: "I can say unequivocally that the Liberty tragedy was a terrible accident, that the Israeli pilots involved believed they were attacking an enemy ship." He added: "This was in the middle of a war. This is something that we are not proud of."[^7] Israel has long maintained that the attack was a case of mistaken identity.[^7]
### State Department conference, January 2004
The Office of the Historian of the [[U.S. Department of State]] announced a two-day conference on the 1967 war, to coincide with the publication of the Foreign Relations of the United States volume on the Arab-Israeli crisis and war of 1967. The announcement, carried by [[Democracy Now]] on January 7, 2004, described the conference as a forum to discuss the 1967 Israeli attack on the USS Liberty.[^18] Arab News reported before the event that Cristol would be a featured speaker and that [[David Satterfield]], deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, would give the keynote address.[^12] The Office's press release, dated January 12, 2004, describes the volume as including "newly declassified documentation on the USS Liberty incident regarding Israeli involvement."[^19] The Financial Times reported that the conference opened in the State Department basement "with heated debate" over the newly released NSA intercepts.[^13]
### Death and papers
Boston died on June 12, 2008, of pneumonia in a hospital in the San Diego area, aged 84.[^14] The family obituary gives the place of death as Coronado Hospital and states that he was interred at [[Fort Rosecrans National Cemetery]] on June 24, 2008, survived by his wife, Emma, three children and six grandchildren.[^2] The History News Network gives the date of death as June 11, 2008, citing his wife.[^20]
Boston's papers at the [[Hoover Institution]], acquired in 2012, consist of three manuscript boxes and a card file covering 1956 to 2008, including correspondence, writings, notes, and a photocopy of the court of inquiry proceedings.[^21] The Hoover also holds a photocopy of the court of inquiry record in one manuscript box.[^22]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Ward Boston Jr., Declaration Concerning the Court of Inquiry into the Attack on USS Liberty, dated "January 8, 2004 at Coronado, California," four pages, signed. Scanned copy at https://archive.org/download/boston-declaration/BostonDeclaration.pdf (signature page read directly). Text transcription at https://stationhypo.com/?p=69026, which prints the date as January 9. Sole source for the conversations with Kidd and for the account of the transcript alterations.
[^2]: "Obituary: Captain Ward Boston Jr. Dies June 12," Connection Newspapers, June 17, 2008. https://connectionnewspapers.com/news/2008/jun/17/obituary-captain-ward-boston-jr-dies-june-12. Family-supplied; sole source for the early career details, the retirement, and the burial.
[^3]: Ward Boston Jr., "Time for the truth about the Liberty," San Diego Union-Tribune, June 8, 2007, two-page PDF copy at https://archive.org/details/time-for-the-truth-about-the-liberty. The page identifies the author as a naval aviator in World War II on the Yorktown, an FBI agent before his Navy assignment, and a graduate of the College of William and Mary School of Law.
[^4]: A. Jay Cristol, "Why You Shouldn't Pay Attention to the Claims that Israel Attacked the USS Liberty Deliberately," History News Network, June 12, 2007. https://www.historynewsnetwork.org/article/why-you-shouldnt-pay-attention-to-the-claims-that-. Cristol is the author of The Liberty Incident and an advocate of the accident finding. His claims about Gotcher, McNamara, and the release of the affidavit on October 22, 2003 are his.
[^5]: United States Navy, Record of Proceedings, Court of Inquiry into the armed attack on USS Liberty (AGTR-5), 1967, 728-page scan, posted at https://libertyincident.com/docs/CourtOfInquiry.pdf. Scan pages cited: 34 to 38 (McCain's first endorsement, June 18, 1967), 106 and 107 (opening, appointing order, oath), 117 (adjournment of June 11, boarding at sea, Malta June 13), 243 and 244 (adjournment of June 15, London June 16), 160 to 164 (Painter testimony, transcript pages 55 to 59), 258 (transcript page 153), 265 (closing of the court at 1645 on June 16), 266 and 267 (findings of fact 1 and 6).
[^6]: "US Navy Court of Inquiry," The Liberty Incident (website of A. Jay Cristol), https://libertyincident.com/USNcourt.html. Descriptive text accompanying the posted record; the witness, page, exhibit, and finding counts, the date Kidd boarded the ship, and the Malta meeting come from this description.
[^7]: Associated Press, "Ex-Navy Official: 1967 Israeli Attack on U.S. Ship Was Deliberate," Fox News, October 23, 2003 (12:21 a.m. EDT). https://www.foxnews.com/story/ex-navy-official-1967-israeli-attack-on-u-s-ship-was-deliberate.amp. Includes the affidavit quotation, the Moorer quotation, the Regev statement, and the outcome summary of the 1967 court.
[^8]: "New revelations in attack on American spy ship," Chicago Tribune, October 2, 2007. https://www.chicagotribune.com/2007/10/02/new-revelations-in-attack-on-american-spy-ship/. Reprinted at https://www.historynewsnetwork.org/article/43350. The Boston, Painter, Kirby, and Gotcher statements are as the Tribune reported them.
[^9]: Ronald Fraser, "Captain Boston's Secret," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 129, no. 7 (July 2003). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2003/july/captain-bostons-secret. The Navy Times quotation and Boston's account of Kidd are Fraser's, quoting Boston. Fraser gives Kidd's death year as 1999.
[^10]: "Navy Captain, Other Officials Call for Probe of Israel's Attack on USS Liberty," Arab News, July 16, 2003. https://www.arabnews.com/node/234373. The Marine Corps Times date and reporter name are from the Arab News report. Fraser's article attributes the 2002 remark to the Navy Times; the two accounts name different papers.
[^11]: Congressional Record, Extensions of Remarks, vol. 150, no. 130 (October 11, 2004), pp. E1886-E1889, "In Recognition of Admiral Thomas H. Moorer" (remarks of Rep. John Conyers, Jr., dated October 7, 2004), with the Findings of the Independent Commission of Inquiry and the affidavit of Captain Ward Boston. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CREC-2004-10-11/html/CREC-2004-10-11-pt1-PgE1886-3.htm. The same remarks state that Moorer made his final Capitol Hill appearance as chairman on October 22, 2003, and that he died on February 5, 2004.
[^12]: "State Dept to Spotlight Attack on USS Liberty," Arab News, January 11, 2004. https://www.arabnews.com/node/242842. Announces the conference, Cristol as a featured speaker, and Satterfield's keynote. The announcement predates the event and does not confirm who spoke.
[^13]: Guy Dinmore, "Tempers Flare Over Inquiry on Israeli Attack on U.S. Spy-Ship," Financial Times, January 13, 2004, reprinted by the History News Network. https://www.historynewsnetwork.org/article/3027. Dinmore reports the conference, Hatch's remarks, and Boston's affidavit "last week."
[^14]: Associated Press, obituary of Ward Boston, reprinted by the Philadelphia Inquirer, June 20, 2008. https://www.inquirer.com/philly/obituaries/20080620_Ward_Boston___Naval_investigator__84.html. This text dates the statement to 2002 ("In 2002, Capt. Boston said...") and does not give a day for the affidavit.
[^15]: National Security Agency, letter from Louis F. Giles, Director of Policy, to A. Jay Cristol, FOIA Case 40039A, July 2, 2003. https://irp.fas.org/nsa/liberty.html. The enclosed transcripts and reports are posted on the same page.
[^16]: National Security Agency, "U.S.S. Liberty," release page (archived copy, Wayback Machine 2007 capture, http://web.archive.org/web/2007/http://www.nsa.gov/liberty). The page records that the review of all material was finalized on June 8, 2007, and lists the release contents; it states that the collection was previously posted on July 2, 2003.
[^17]: David C. Walsh, "Former NSA Officials Agree," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 129, no. 6 (June 2003). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2003/june/former-nsa-officials-agree. Interview with Oliver Kirby dated February 14, 2003. The quoted phrase comes from the article's public text.
[^18]: "State Dept. To Hold Conference On USS Liberty Attack," Democracy Now!, headline of January 7, 2004. https://democracynow.org/2004/1/7/headlines/state_dept_to_hold_conference_on_uss_liberty_attack
[^19]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, press release announcing Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, January 12, 2004. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/pressrelease
[^20]: "Key Figure in USS Liberty Inquiry Dies," History News Network, June 2008. https://www.historynewsnetwork.org/article/51532. Gives June 11 as the date of death, citing Emma Boston.
[^21]: Hoover Institution Library & Archives, "Boston (Ward) papers, 1956-2008," finding aid, Online Archive of California. https://oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt7779s1db
[^22]: Hoover Institution Library & Archives, "United States. Navy. Liberty (Ship) Court of Inquiry records, 1967," finding aid, Online Archive of California. https://oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt4p30341f

52
10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/William J. Casey.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ aliases:
- "William Casey"
category: "Intelligence & Government"
created: 2024-04-25
updated: 2026-05-17
updated: 2026-10-08
tags:
- KeyFigure
- Person
@ -22,38 +22,62 @@ born: 1913-03-13
died: 1987-05-06
location: "Elmhurst, Queens, New York"
---
William Joseph Casey was born March 13, 1913, in Elmhurst, Queens, New York. He attended [[St. John's University]] and Fordham Law School, becoming a corporate and tax attorney. During World War II he served in the [[Office of Strategic Services]] (OSS) under [[William J. Donovan|William "Wild Bill" Donovan]], rising to head the OSS's Secret Intelligence operations in Europe and coordinating the infiltration of agents into Nazi-controlled territory. After the war he became a wealthy lawyer and author of tax shelter guides. President [[Richard Nixon|Nixon]] appointed him Chairman of the [[Securities and Exchange Commission]] in 1971, a post he held through 1973. He managed [[Ronald Reagan]]'s 1980 presidential campaign. Reagan appointed him [[Director of Central Intelligence]] in January 1981, and he served as DCI until resigning due to illness in January 1987. He died May 6, 1987, at a hospital in Glen Cove, New York, having suffered a seizure in December 1986 and subsequently undergone brain surgery. He was subpoenaed to testify before the Senate [[Iran-Contra Affair|Iran-Contra]] investigating committee but died before he could appear.[^5]
William Joseph Casey was born March 13, 1913, in Elmhurst, Queens, New York. He attended [[St. John's University]] and Fordham Law School, becoming a corporate and tax attorney. During World War II he served in the [[Office of Strategic Services]] (OSS) under [[William J. Donovan|William "Wild Bill" Donovan]], rising to head the OSS's Secret Intelligence operations in Europe and coordinating the infiltration of agents into Nazi-controlled territory. After the war he became a wealthy lawyer and author of tax shelter guides. President [[Richard Nixon|Nixon]] appointed him Chairman of the [[Securities and Exchange Commission]] in 1971, a post he held through 1973. He managed [[Ronald Reagan]]'s 1980 presidential campaign. Reagan appointed him [[Director of Central Intelligence]] in January 1981, and he served as DCI until resigning due to illness in January 1987. He died May 6, 1987, at a hospital in Glen Cove, New York, having suffered a seizure in December 1986 and subsequently undergone brain surgery. He was subpoenaed to testify before the Senate [[Iran-Contra Affair|Iran-Contra]] investigating committee but died before he could appear.[^1]
### October Surprise
The central allegation against Casey is that he served as the principal American negotiator in secret meetings with Iranian representatives in [[Spain]] and [[France]] in 1980, during which the Reagan campaign agreed to delay the release of 52 American hostages held in [[Iran]] until after the November 4 election in exchange for promises of arms and the release of frozen Iranian assets. The allegation is the subject of the [[October Surprise]] affair.[^1]
The central allegation against Casey is that he served as the principal American negotiator in secret meetings with Iranian representatives in [[Spain]] and [[France]] in 1980, during which the Reagan campaign agreed to delay the release of 52 American hostages held in [[Iran]] until after the November 4 election in exchange for promises of arms and the release of frozen Iranian assets. The allegation is the subject of the [[October Surprise]] affair.[^2]
Multiple sources identified two probable meeting locations: Madrid in July 1980 and Paris in October 1980. A U.S. Embassy cable indicating Casey was in Madrid "for purposes unknown" in summer 1980 was withheld from the House October Surprise Task Force by [[George H.W. Bush|Bush]] administration officials and only surfaced through journalist [[Robert Parry]]'s reporting in 2011. Casey's personal calendar for October 20, 1980, showed an 8 a.m. Metropolitan Club appointment in Washington, which the House Task Force cited in its January 1993 report finding "no credible evidence" of a deal. Former French intelligence chief [[Alexandre de Marenches]], through his biographer's sworn testimony, indicated he had arranged meetings between Casey and Iranians in Paris in October 1980.[^1][^2]
Multiple sources identified two probable meeting locations: Madrid in July 1980 and Paris in October 1980. A U.S. Embassy cable indicating Casey was in Madrid "for purposes unknown" in summer 1980 was withheld from the House October Surprise Task Force by [[George H.W. Bush|Bush]] administration officials and only surfaced through journalist [[Robert Parry]]'s reporting in 2011. Casey's personal calendar for October 20, 1980, showed an 8 a.m. Metropolitan Club appointment in Washington, which the House Task Force cited in its January 1993 report finding "no credible evidence" of a deal. Former French intelligence chief [[Alexandre de Marenches]], through his biographer's sworn testimony, indicated he had arranged meetings between Casey and Iranians in Paris in October 1980.[^2][^3]
A separate [[Senate Foreign Relations Committee]] investigation found that Casey had engaged in "potentially dangerous" unauthorized efforts to collect intelligence on the Carter administration's hostage-release negotiations, confirming Reagan-campaign intelligence operations against Carter's Iran policy without concluding a deal had been struck.[^2]
A separate [[Senate Foreign Relations Committee]] investigation found that Casey had engaged in "potentially dangerous" unauthorized efforts to collect intelligence on the Carter administration's hostage-release negotiations, confirming Reagan-campaign intelligence operations against Carter's Iran policy without concluding a deal had been struck.[^3]
Casey died before he could be formally questioned under oath. He was subpoenaed to testify at the Iran-Contra hearings, which were examining a separate but related set of covert arms deals with Iran from 1985-1986.[^5]
Casey died before he could be formally questioned under oath. He was subpoenaed to testify at the Iran-Contra hearings, which were examining a separate but related set of covert arms deals with Iran from 1985-1986.[^1]
### KH-11 and Israeli Intelligence
Casey was an enthusiastic supporter of the [[KH-11]] imagery-sharing program with [[Israel]] from the moment he took office, ordering that Israeli liaison officers be provided with a private office near [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] headquarters to ensure all essential intelligence was turned over. After the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor at [[Osirak bombing]], Casey authorized a review that found [[Israel]] had significantly expanded the agreement, requesting and receiving extensive KH-11 coverage of western [[Russia]].[^4]
Casey was an enthusiastic supporter of the [[KH-11]] imagery-sharing program with [[Israel]] from the moment he took office, ordering that Israeli liaison officers be provided with a private office near [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] headquarters to ensure all essential intelligence was turned over. After the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor at [[Osirak bombing]], Casey authorized a review that found Israel had significantly expanded the agreement, requesting and receiving extensive KH-11 coverage of western [[Russia]].[^4]
### Launching the Contra War
Reagan approved the intelligence finding for covert operations in [[Nicaragua]] in December 1981, and sent Casey to present it to Congress. Halting Sandinista arms shipments to [[El Salvador]] was the official reason Casey gave, but the operation's scope extended far beyond border policing. According to one account, Casey himself leaked news of the Contra project to *Newsweek* to ensure it could not be abandoned, reasoning that stopping it would look like another [[Bay of Pigs]].[^3]
Reagan approved the intelligence finding for covert operations in [[Nicaragua]] in December 1981, and sent Casey to present it to Congress. Halting Sandinista arms shipments to [[El Salvador]] was the official reason Casey gave, but the operation's scope extended far beyond border policing. According to one account, Casey himself leaked news of the Contra project to *Newsweek* to ensure it could not be abandoned, reasoning that stopping it would look like another [[Bay of Pigs]].[^5]
### The Secret 1982 Agreement
In early 1982, Casey and Attorney General [[William French Smith]] signed a formal Memorandum of Understanding that exempted CIA assets from drug crimes reporting. Crimes committed by people "acting for" an intelligence agency no longer needed to be reported to the [[Department of Justice]], and drug offenses were specifically removed from the list of crimes the CIA was required to report. For thirteen years, the CIA and Justice had what Inspector General Hitz called "a gentleman's agreement to look the other way." Robert Parry argued the timing proved premeditation: "That could only have been done for one purpose. They were anticipating what eventually happened. They knew drugs were going to be sold."[^3]
In early 1982, Casey and Attorney General [[William French Smith]] signed a formal Memorandum of Understanding that exempted CIA assets from drug crimes reporting. Crimes committed by people "acting for" an intelligence agency no longer needed to be reported to the [[Department of Justice]], and drug offenses were specifically removed from the list of crimes the CIA was required to report. For thirteen years, the CIA and Justice had what Inspector General Hitz called "a gentleman's agreement to look the other way." Robert Parry argued the timing proved premeditation: "That could only have been done for one purpose. They were anticipating what eventually happened. They knew drugs were going to be sold."[^5]
### Protecting Drug Traffickers
Casey decided not to raise allegations of [[Manuel Noriega|Noriega's]] cocaine trafficking with him "on the ground that Noriega was providing valuable support for our policies in [[Central America]]." [[Oliver North]] wrote that Casey did not want the Contras' "unofficial funds" coming into U.S. banks because Treasury agents on the lookout for drug money would grow suspicious. A former CIA station chief testified that the unspoken policy was that "we were going to play with these guys. That was made clear by Casey and [[Dewey Clarridge|Clarridge]]."[^3]
Casey decided not to raise allegations of [[Manuel Noriega|Noriega's]] cocaine trafficking with him "on the ground that Noriega was providing valuable support for our policies in [[Central America]]." [[Oliver North]] wrote that Casey did not want the Contras' "unofficial funds" coming into U.S. banks because Treasury agents on the lookout for drug money would grow suspicious. A former CIA station chief testified that the unspoken policy was that "we were going to play with these guys. That was made clear by Casey and [[Dewey Clarridge|Clarridge]]."[^5]
### High Frontier correspondence
[[Daniel O. Graham]], the retired lieutenant general who directed the [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] from September 1974 to January 1, 1976, wrote to Casey about [[High Frontier]], the space defense group he had founded in 1981. On January 8, 1982 Casey wrote to Graham that the High Frontier prospectus was "very well done and deserving of close attention" and that he found "something of a disconnect" in its budget paragraphs, from a $35 billion figure to a higher $50 billion figure.[^6] Casey wrote to Graham on December 20, 1982 that he had enjoyed Graham's talk at the [[National Strategy Information Center]] breakfast and offered to arrange for Graham to exchange ideas with CIA officers knowledgeable about space and missile technology.[^7]
On July 23, 1986 Graham wrote to Casey enclosing a paper titled "Is the KGB Sabotaging SDI?", written after the loss of the shuttle Challenger, and urged Casey and [[Edwin Meese]] to "leave no stone unturned" in getting answers. A cover memorandum dated July 28, 1986, titled "Possible Soviet Sabotage of Our Space Program," carries Casey's instruction: "Please take the lead in drafting a response from me to General Graham."[^8] Casey replied on August 16, 1986, acknowledging Graham's letters of July 23 and 29, 1986, and rejected Graham's sabotage theory. He wrote that "we do not believe the U.S. space launch failures you cited were due to Soviet action," that the failures had been traced to "errors or procedural problems," and that "none of the investigations found any evidence of Soviet involvement."[^9] On December 8, 1986 Graham wrote to [[Robert Gates|Robert M. Gates]], then deputy director of the CIA, praising his assessment of Soviet strategic defense efforts, with a copy to Casey.[^10]
### National Intelligence Study Center
Casey is listed on the advisory board of the [[National Intelligence Study Center]] in Washington, alongside Graham and [[Paul Nitze]]. The board of directors of the center included [[Ray Cline]]. The center's invitation to an exhibit of intelligence books, dated November 3, 1983, carries these lists.[^11]
### Recruitment of James D. Theberge to the Senior Review Panel
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, in its October 24, 1991 report on the nomination of Gates, named Casey as one of three CIA officials involved in the recruitment and selection of [[James D. Theberge]] for the Senior Review Panel, with Deputy Director [[John McMahon]] and Executive Director [[James Taylor]].[^12] The report states that "the Committee's documentary evidence makes clear that Director Casey was the CIA official most instrumental in recruiting Mr. Theberge."[^12] The report records that Theberge disclosed his consulting work for a Cardoen subsidiary in the personal history statement he submitted to the CIA in December 1985, and that he was hired on a three-days-per-week basis.[^12] CIA visitor records held in the reading room list Theberge as meeting the director at headquarters in November 1984 and, as "Ambassador Theberge," calling on the director on September 23, 1985.[^13] A routing sheet of August 12, 1985 confirms a courtesy call on the director at 1100 hours on August 14, 1985, twelve days after Theberge left his post in Chile, stating that he "has completed his tour in Chile and has no particular items to discuss."[^14] In a memorandum of August 19, 1985 titled "Soviet Game Plan," Casey told the Vice Chairman of the [[National Intelligence Council]]: "You will get in touch with Theberge, talk about the project generally, see what he has to contribute and perhaps have him do some work on the Latin America phase of it."[^15]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Sick, Gary. *October Surprise: America's Hostages in Iran and the Election of Ronald Reagan*. Times Books, 1991.
[^2]: U.S. House of Representatives, October Surprise Task Force. *Joint Report of the Task Force to Investigate Certain Allegations Concerning the Holding of American Hostages by Iran in 1980*. 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, January 1993.
[^3]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998.
[^1]: Persico, Joseph E. *Casey: From the OSS to the CIA*. Viking, 1990.
[^2]: Sick, Gary. *October Surprise: America's Hostages in Iran and the Election of Ronald Reagan*. Times Books, 1991.
[^3]: U.S. House of Representatives, October Surprise Task Force. *Joint Report of the Task Force to Investigate Certain Allegations Concerning the Holding of American Hostages by Iran in 1980*. 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, January 1993.
[^4]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991.
[^5]: Persico, Joseph E. *Casey: From the OSS to the CIA*. Viking, 1990.
[^5]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998.
[^6]: Letter, William J. Casey to Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, January 8, 1982, CIA-RDP83M00914R001900220074-1. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp83m00914r001900220074-1
[^7]: Letter, William J. Casey to Graham, December 20, 1982, CIA-RDP88B00443R001203980021-9, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp88b00443r001203980021-9; the reading room also catalogues Graham's letter to Casey of December 9, 1982 under CIA-RDP83M00914R002400010001-8.
[^8]: Letter, Daniel O. Graham to William J. Casey, July 23, 1986, enclosing "Is the KGB Sabotaging SDI?", with the cover memorandum "Possible Soviet Sabotage of Our Space Program," July 28, 1986, CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6.
[^9]: Letter, William J. Casey to Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, August 16, 1986, CIA-RDP88B00443R002004470017-0.
[^10]: Letter, Daniel O. Graham to Robert M. Gates, December 8, 1986, CIA-RDP88G01116R000700840002-1, copy to William J. Casey.
[^11]: National Intelligence Study Center, invitation to the Russell J. Bowen collection exhibit, Georgetown University, November 3, 1983, CIA-RDP90-00806R000100430001-2.
[^12]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence*, S. Exec. Rept. 102-19, 102d Cong., 1st sess., October 24, 1991, section 5, PDF pages 186 to 188. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-10219.pdf
[^13]: Central Intelligence Agency, "American Ambassadors" visitor log, November 1984 (1045), CREST document CIA-RDP93-00415R000100040012-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp93-00415r000100040012-4; visitor record, September 23, 1985 (1645), CREST document CIA-RDP93-00415R000200230005-0, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp93-00415r000200230005-0.
[^14]: Central Intelligence Agency, "DCI 14 August 1985 Meeting with Mr. James D. Theberge, Former U.S. Ambassador to Chile," August 12, 1985, CREST document CIA-RDP87M00539R000801050023-0. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp87m00539r000801050023-0
[^15]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Soviet Game Plan," memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence to the Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council, August 19, 1985, signed William J. Casey, CREST document CIA-RDP97M00248R000500220030-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp97m00248r000500220030-9