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---
---
category: "Diplomacy"
tags:
- Event
- Diplomacy
category: "Diplomacy"
summary: "The Camp David Accords were the September 1978 framework agreements produced by thirteen days of secret negotiations between Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, facilitated by U.S. President Jimmy Carter at the presidential retreat in Maryland."
- CampDavidAccords
- EgyptIsraelPeaceTreaty
- JimmyCarter
- AnwarSadat
- MenachemBegin
- SinaiPeninsula
- MultinationalForceAndObservers
- USForeignAid
- CIA
alias:
- Camp David Accords
- Camp David summit
- Camp David
- Camp David Agreements
- Camp David Peace Treaty
- Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty
- Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty
summary: "Two framework agreements signed September 17, 1978 after thirteen days at Camp David between Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin with Jimmy Carter mediating, followed by the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty and its U.S. aid commitments."
start: 1978-09-05
end: 1978-09-17
location: "Camp David, Maryland"
location: "Camp David, Maryland; Washington, D.C."
relations:
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Jimmy Carter]]"
reverse: true
start: 1978-09-05
end: 1978-09-17
role: "mediator and witness to the signed frameworks"
fn: 1
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Anwar Sadat]]"
reverse: true
start: 1978-09-05
end: 1978-09-17
role: "president of Egypt and signatory"
fn: 1
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Menachem Begin]]"
reverse: true
start: 1978-09-05
end: 1978-09-17
role: "prime minister of Israel and signatory"
fn: 1
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Cyrus Vance]]"
reverse: true
start: 1978-09-05
end: 1978-09-17
role: "U.S. secretary of state, head of the delegation's expert group"
fn: 9
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Moshe Dayan]]"
reverse: true
start: 1978-09-16
end: 1978-09-17
role: "Israeli foreign minister"
fn: 11
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Ezer Weizman]]"
reverse: true
start: 1978-09-17
end: 1978-09-17
role: "Israeli defense minister"
fn: 11
created: 2026-05-14
updated: 2026-05-17
updated: 2026-10-01
---
The Camp David Accords were the product of secret negotiations held September 5-17, 1978, between Egyptian President [[Anwar Sadat]] and Israeli Prime Minister [[Menachem Begin]], brokered by U.S. President [[Jimmy Carter]] at the Camp David presidential retreat in Maryland. The thirteen-day summit ended with two framework agreements signed on September 17, 1978: "A Framework for Peace in the [[Middle East]]" and "A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel."[^1]
The Camp David Accords are two framework agreements, "A Framework for Peace in the [[Middle East]]" and "A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel," signed at the [[White House]] on September 17, 1978 by Egyptian President [[Anwar Sadat]] and Israeli Prime Minister [[Menachem Begin]], with U.S. President [[Jimmy Carter]] signing as witness, after thirteen days of negotiation at Camp David, Maryland, that began on September 5.[^1] The second framework led to the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, signed on March 26, 1979.[^2] The [[State Department]] historian describes the later talks on Palestinian autonomy that followed the treaty as "ultimately inconclusive."[^3] The Nobel Peace Prize for 1978 was awarded jointly to Sadat and Begin "for jointly having negotiated peace between Egypt and Israel in 1978."[^4] After the 1979 treaty most Arab countries ostracized Egypt and expelled it from the [[Arab League]], and the [[Palestine Liberation Organization]] rejected the accords. The 1993 [[Oslo Accords]] between Israel and the PLO provided for a transitional period, an elected self-governing Palestinian authority and negotiations on final status.[^5]
The first framework established principles for Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza and committed Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Palestinian representatives to negotiate an agreement within five years. That broader framework produced no subsequent treaty. The second led directly to the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, signed on March 26, 1979 - the first peace agreement between Israel and any of its Arab neighbors.[^1]
### Preparations and the Intelligence Briefing
Sadat and Begin shared the Nobel Peace Prize in 1978 for the agreements. Sadat's willingness to negotiate was deeply controversial within the Arab world; Egypt was expelled from the Arab League following the 1979 treaty and not readmitted until 1989. Sadat was assassinated in October 1981 by Egyptian Islamic Jihad militants who opposed normalization with Israel.[^2]
Carter decided on July 30, 1978 to call a summit, after talks at Leeds Castle earlier that month had been inconclusive; the White House announced the meeting on August 8.[^2][^3] On August 21, [[Director of Central Intelligence]] [[Stansfield Turner]] sent [[Zbigniew Brzezinski]] a [[Central Intelligence Agency]] report, described as a raw report not finally evaluated, on Sadat's expectations for the summit. According to the report, Sadat hoped for two achievements: a publicly announced agreement on principles based on [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 242]] together with an agreement on the Palestinian question based on the Aswan Formula Carter had announced in January 1978, and a precisely written secret agreement on a framework for a settlement, to be signed by Sadat and Begin and witnessed by Carter. The report stated that Sadat wanted Carter's witnessing signature to prevent either party from later misinterpreting the understanding, and that Sadat had "lost the trust and confidence" he had in Begin. The copy printed in the State Department's documentary series carries a handwritten notation, "Outside the System. Bill Quandt," referring to the [[National Security Council]] staff member [[William B. Quandt]].[^6]
The Camp David negotiations had significant intelligence dimensions. [[Kamal Adham]], former director of Saudi intelligence, served as a back-channel intermediary facilitating Saudi acceptance of the framework. Some American intelligence officials suspected that Carter's decision to provide [[Israel]] with KH-11 reconnaissance satellite imagery constituted a reward for Begin's flexibility at the summit.[^3]
On August 26, 1978 Ambassador [[Hermann Eilts]] met Sadat and Vice President [[Hosni Mubarak]] at Ismailia. In the course of that meeting, as Eilts recorded it, Sadat said that the Israelis, who took nineteen days to defeat the Egyptians in October 1973, "would not have been able to do so if the U.S. satellite photography had not been furnished to the Israelis," and that the photography had revealed his 25th Division preparing to cross the Canal.[^7]
The Accords were frequently cited as a model for subsequent Arab-Israeli diplomacy, including the Oslo process of the 1990s.
During the same month Carter, visiting the CIA, interrupted a briefing to ask how the agency could help before the summit, saying that he wanted to be "steeped in the personalities of Begin and Sadat." Three CIA components were tasked: the Office of Regional and Political Analysis with political profiles, the Office of Central Reference with biographic profiles, and the Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior, which updated studies of Sadat and Begin first produced in 1977. The Center's updated profile of Begin "called attention to the increasing trend of oppositionism and rigidity in his personality"; its updated profile of Sadat was entitled "Sadat's Nobel Prize Complex" and "stressed his increasing preoccupation with his role in history and the leverage this could provide in negotiations." A third paper addressed the contrasting intellectual styles of the two men. The Center's founder, [[Jerrold Post]], wrote in the agency's journal *Studies in Intelligence* in 1979 that Carter afterwards told the agency: "After spending 13 days with the two principals, I wouldn't change a word." Carter's own diary entry for September 4 records that he spent the day before the summit studying "psychological assessments of Begin and Sadat."[^8]
### The Summit Record
The U.S. delegation worked in two groups. The political group consisted of Carter, Brzezinski, Secretary of State [[Cyrus Vance]], press secretary [[Jody Powell]], adviser [[Hamilton Jordan]] and, occasionally, Vice President [[Walter Mondale]] and Secretary of Defense [[Harold Brown]]. The expert group, directed by Vance, consisted of Assistant Secretary of State [[Harold H. Saunders]], Ambassador-at-Large [[Alfred L. Atherton Jr.]], Eilts, Ambassador [[Samuel W. Lewis]] and Quandt.[^9]
The State Department's historians reported that, according to members of the U.S. delegation, no written memoranda of conversation were kept of Carter's discussions with Begin and Sadat, and that none of the delegation's internal discussions have been found. Carter kept his own notes and held debriefings with his staff. The unedited version of Carter's diary is held privately by the Carter Center, and the department's request for access to it was denied. Brown and Brzezinski gave historians access to significant portions of their papers at the [[Library of Congress]], both of which were closed to the public when the volume was published in 2014; Brzezinski denied access to his personal journals.[^10]
The State Department's milestones history states that U.S. experts produced a draft treaty text that served as the basis of negotiation and was revised numerous times, and that the trilateral format became impossible to sustain, after which Carter and Vance met the Egyptian and Israeli delegations individually for twelve days.[^3] Carter wrote in a note dated September 20 that on the night of September 16 he, Vance, Begin, Foreign Minister [[Moshe Dayan]] and the Israeli legal adviser [[Aharon Barak]] agreed the wording on new settlements in the [[West Bank]] and Gaza: "After the signing of this framework and during the negotiations, no new Israeli settlements will be established in this area. The issue of future Israeli settlements will be decided and agreed among the negotiating parties." On September 17 Barak brought Carter a text from Begin that differed from it, and Carter told him it was unsatisfactory.[^11]
### The Frameworks and the Side Letters
The first framework, citing Resolution 242 "in all its parts," provided that Egypt, Israel, Jordan and representatives of the Palestinian people would negotiate on the West Bank and Gaza in three stages: transitional arrangements for a period not exceeding five years under an elected self-governing authority, negotiations on final status beginning no later than the third year of that period, and an Israel-Jordan peace treaty by the end of it. The second framework set a three-month goal for an Egypt-Israel treaty, full Egyptian sovereignty to the international border, Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai within two to three years of signing, civilian use of the airfields near [[Al-Arish]], Rafah, Ras en-Naqb and Sharm el-Sheikh, and limits on forces in zones on both sides of the border.[^12]
Nine letters accompanied the frameworks: Begin's undertaking to submit the Sinai settlements question to the [[Knesset]]; Sadat's letters on the Sinai settlements, on Jerusalem, and on Egypt's readiness to "assume the Arab role" for the West Bank and Gaza provisions; Begin's letter on Jerusalem; Carter's letters of transmittal and acknowledgment, including his acknowledgment that Begin understood "Palestinians" to mean "Palestinian Arabs" and "West Bank" to mean "Judea and Samaria." A tenth letter, from Secretary of Defense Brown to Israeli Defense Minister [[Ezer Weizman]], agreed on September 28, committed the [[United States]] to consult with Israel on assistance for relocating the Israeli airbases at Eitam and Etzion in the Sinai to the Negev. Egyptian Foreign Minister [[Muhammad Ibrahim Kamel]] resigned after the signing ceremony, and [[Boutros Boutros-Ghali]] replaced him on an interim basis. The Knesset approved the agreements on September 28 by 84 to 19, and Commerce and Industry Minister [[Yigael Hurvitz]] resigned in protest.[^12]
### The Saudi Channel
The documentary series records [[Kamal Adham]], adviser to the Saudi royal family and chief of the Saudi intelligence secretariat, at several points around the summit. Vance's August 11, 1977 report to Carter and Brzezinski from the aircraft carrying him, on his stop in Amman to see [[King Hussein]], records that "Adham also said there had been some progress on acceptance of Resolution 242 by the PLO."[^13] After the summit, Saunders held meetings with Adham, [[Prince Turki bin Faisal]] and others in [[Jidda]] on October 18 and 19, 1978; on October 20 he told Begin that he had spoken with Crown Prince [[Fahd bin Abdulaziz]], Prince Saud, Adham and Turki, and that "I had found the task of selling the CDA difficult."[^14]
A February 16, 1980 telegram from the U.S. Embassy in Jidda reported that Fahd had asked the ambassador to tell Carter that Saudi restraint toward Egyptian press attacks on the royal family was wearing out. The ambassador commented that Saudi replies would probably include revelations that Mrs. Sadat "was involved with the Arab arms industry" ("It was rumored that she held a ten percent interest therein"), that Fahd had referred to information furnished by Ashraf Marwan, "the now deposed head of Arab arms," and that the "Saudi principal in this venture was Kamal Adham, now out of favor here."[^15]
### Treaty Negotiations and the Aid Commitments
Negotiation of the treaty began at Blair House in October 1978, reached a deadlock that Vance's visits could not break, and was concluded after Carter travelled to Israel and Egypt in March 1979.[^10] The financing of the commitments to both governments is documented in a series of March 1979 memoranda. On March 14 Brown reported to Carter that in discussions with Egyptian Minister of Defense Kamal Ali and Weizman he had described, for Egypt, United States financing of $1.0 to $1.5 billion over three years, and for Israel, $2.0 to $2.5 billion over three years in addition to the existing annual $1.785 billion, including help relocating the Sinai airbases, subject to congressional approval.[^16] On March 19 Quandt reported that Brown and Weizman had agreed on $3 billion over three years, of which $800 million would be cash grants and the remainder foreign military sales credits on ten years' grace and twenty years' repayment.[^17] On March 20 Quandt wrote that the United States was committed to sell equipment and services worth $4.5 billion to Israel and Egypt, that if present terms were maintained "the U.S. Treasury will be hit for only $1.1 billion of that amount," and that "the total of resources (goods and services) which we will transfer to Egypt and Israel over the next three years will be almost $13 billion, of which over $3.5 billion will be financed directly by the U.S. taxpayer."[^18] On March 21 Brzezinski wrote Carter that the Egyptian proposal was "extremely lopsided in Israel's favor" and recommended credits for the full $1.5 billion; Carter approved that option.[^19] Brown's letter to Ali of March 23 pledged a recommendation to Congress of $1.5 billion in military equipment and services over three years, with up to $500 million annually in credits at current interest rates, and attached a list that included twelve improved HAWK batteries, 800 M113 armored personnel carriers and four destroyers.[^20]
At a meeting with Carter on March 26, 1979, the day of the signing, Begin asked that the $800 million grant and $2.2 billion loan ratio of the Israeli package be changed to 50-50 "as a personal gift to his wife." The record states that Carter said he could not offer any encouragement. In the same meeting Carter asked whether Sadat had agreed to return the oil sector in seven months in return for an uninterrupted flow to Israel, and Begin confirmed it.[^21] A draft Memorandum of Agreement between the United States and Israel, annotated by Carter, with a final version dated March 26, provided that the United States "will provide support it deems appropriate" for Israeli responses to treaty violations and "will oppose and, if necessary, vote against any action or resolution in the [[United Nations]] which in its judgement adversely affects the Treaty of Peace."[^22]
The Congressional Research Service reports that since 1946 the United States has provided Egypt more than $90 billion in bilateral aid, with military and economic assistance increasing significantly after the 1979 treaty, and that the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026 provides Egypt $1.5 billion in total aid. It reports that Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign assistance since [[World War II]], with $174 billion in bilateral assistance and missile defense funding.[^23]
### The Treaty Text, Sinai Observation and the Multinational Force
The Treaty of Peace, signed on March 26, 1979 with Carter as witness, provided in Article IV and Annex I that the parties would request United Nations forces and observers and would not request their withdrawal unless the Security Council approved with the affirmative votes of the five permanent members. Its appendix to Annex I requested that the United States continue airborne surveillance flights over the limited-forces zones "in accordance with previous agreements," and that the United States-operated Sinai Field Mission continue until Israel completed its withdrawal from the area east of the Giddi and Mitla Passes. The agreed minutes to Annex III provided for normal commercial sales of Egyptian oil to Israel, with Israel entitled to bid for Egyptian oil not needed for domestic consumption.[^24]
The Multinational Force and Observers history states that on May 18, 1981 the President of the Security Council announced that the United Nations would not provide the force, that Egypt, Israel and the United States then negotiated a Protocol establishing an organization outside the United Nations, signed August 3, 1981, and that the organization is funded in equal parts by Egypt, Israel and the United States. It also states that in 1979, after the mandate of the United Nations Emergency Force II expired, the existing U.S. Sinai Field Mission took on certain of the treaty's verification functions.[^25] [[Public Law 97-132]], signed on December 29, 1981, authorized U.S. participation; under 22 U.S.C. 3423 the United States share could not exceed 60 percent of the budget for establishment and initial operation through September 30, 1982 and 33 and one third percent of annual operating expenses afterwards.[^26]
### The KH-11 Agreement
[[Seymour Hersh]] wrote in 1991 that in March 1979 Carter decided to give Israel access to [[KH-11]] satellite photographs covering troop movements or other threatening activities up to one hundred miles inside Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and Jordan, that the decision disrupted the satellite's scheduling and left some American intelligence agencies with less access, and that "some American intelligence officials" suspected it was a reward for Begin's conduct at Camp David. Hersh also wrote that the Israelis regarded the agreement as inevitable because of what they saw as the CIA's failure to anticipate Soviet pressure on Afghanistan and the upheavals in Iran, and not because of the success of Camp David. Hersh attributed the account of the unpopularity of the decision to a former official of the [[National Security Agency]].[^27]
### Footnotes
[^1]: "Camp David Accords," *Encyclopaedia Britannica.* https://www.britannica.com/event/Camp-David-Accords
[^2]: "Anwar Sadat," Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anwar_Sadat
[^3]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy.* Random House, 1991. Chapter 1.
[^1]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978-December 1980, ed. Alexander R. Wieland (Washington: Government Printing Office), Document 51, Editorial Note, pp. 193-195 (signing ceremony in the East Room, September 17, 1978; frameworks signed). Text of the frameworks: "Camp David Accords; September 17, 1978," Avalon Project, Yale Law School. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v09 ; https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/campdav.asp
[^2]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, "Camp David Accords and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process," Milestones 1977-1980 (retired page). https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/camp-david
[^3]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume IX, Preface, pp. VII-X (describing the post-treaty autonomy talks as "(ultimately inconclusive)"; the Leeds Castle talks; the August 8, 1978 acceptances). https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v09/pdf/frus1977-80v09.pdf ; milestones page cited at note 2 (July 30 decision; draft treaty text; trilateral format).
[^4]: "The Nobel Peace Prize 1978," NobelPrize.org. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1978/summary/
[^5]: Jimmy Carter, "Camp David Accords," *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, sections "A framework for peace" (entry updated September 10, 2026). https://www.britannica.com/event/Camp-David-Accords
[^6]: Memorandum from Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), August 21, 1978, with attached CIA report, "Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat's Perceptions of the Camp David Summit as of 18 August 1978," Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume IX, Document 14, pp. 37-38 (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 9). https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v09/pdf/frus1977-80v09.pdf
[^7]: Memorandum of conversation, Ismailia, August 26, 1978, "Meeting with President Sadat re Camp David," Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume IX, Document 16, pp. 44-45. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v09/pdf/frus1977-80v09.pdf
[^8]: Jerrold Post, "Personality Profiles in Support of the Camp David Summit," *Studies in Intelligence* 23, no. 2 (Summer 1979), pp. 1-5 (CIA Reading Room, CIA-RDP80-00630A000100070001-2, approved for release March 5, 2008; text read in the Internet Archive mirror). https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80-00630a000100070001-2 ; Editorial Note, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume IX, Document 26, pp. 78-79 (quoting Carter, White House Diary, p. 216).
[^9]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume IX, Document 26, Editorial Note, p. 79 (quoting Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 218-219). https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v09/pdf/frus1977-80v09.pdf
[^10]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume IX, Preface, pp. VIII-X; Document 26, Editorial Note, pp. 79-80 ("No memoranda of conversation or official records of the substance of these conversations ... have been found"). https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v09/pdf/frus1977-80v09.pdf
[^11]: "Note Prepared by President Carter," undated (signed September 20, 1978), "Settlements in West Bank and Gaza," Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume IX, Document 50, pp. 192-193 (Carter Library, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 53). https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v09/pdf/frus1977-80v09.pdf
[^12]: "Camp David Accords; September 17, 1978," Avalon Project (texts of both frameworks); Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume IX, Document 51, Editorial Note, pp. 193-195 (list of nine letters, the September 28 Brown-Weizman letter, the Kamel resignation, the 84 to 19 Knesset vote, the Hurvitz resignation), and Document 50, p. 192 n. 2 (September 16 meeting with Begin, Dayan and Barak). https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/campdav.asp
[^13]: Telegram Secto 8152 from Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State, August 11, 1977, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977-August 1978, Document 88, pp. 467-468. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v08/pdf/frus1977-80v08.pdf
[^14]: Telegram 7455 from the Embassy in Saudi Arabia, October 18, 1978, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume IX, Document 86, n. 4 (Saunders's meetings of October 18 and 19 with Kamel, Adham and Turki and with Saud, Turki, Adham and others); Telegram 2886 from the Consulate General in Jerusalem, October 21, 1978, "October 20 Meeting With Prime Minister Begin," Document 91, para. 5. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v09/pdf/frus1977-80v09.pdf
[^15]: Telegram 1078 from the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State, February 16, 1980, "Fahd Threatens Retaliation for Renewed Egyptian Media Attacks," Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume IX, Document 336, pp. 1088-1090, paras. 5 and 9 (Carter Library, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 68). https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v09/pdf/frus1977-80v09.pdf
[^16]: Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter, March 14, 1979, "Supply of Arms to Egypt and Israel in Connection with the Peace Treaty," Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume IX, Document 206, pp. 729-730. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v09/pdf/frus1977-80v09.pdf
[^17]: Memorandum from William B. Quandt to Brzezinski, March 19, 1979, "U.S.-Israeli Agreement on Military Issues," Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume IX, Document 223, p. 781. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v09/pdf/frus1977-80v09.pdf
[^18]: Memorandum from William B. Quandt to Brzezinski, March 20, 1979, "U.S.-Egyptian Military Assistance Agreement," Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume IX, Document 220, pp. 777-778. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v09/pdf/frus1977-80v09.pdf
[^19]: Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, March 21, 1979, "Credits for Egypt," Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume IX, Document 222, pp. 780-781 (n. 3: "Carter approved this option and initialed 'J.'"). https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v09/pdf/frus1977-80v09.pdf
[^20]: Telegram 72667 from the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt, March 23, 1979, "Brown-Ali Letter," Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume IX, Document 224, pp. 783-784. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v09/pdf/frus1977-80v09.pdf
[^21]: Memorandum of conversation, Washington, March 26, 1979, 11:08 to 11:50 a.m. (President, Vance, Brzezinski; Begin, Dayan), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume IX, Document 229, p. 793 (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 66). https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v09/pdf/frus1977-80v09.pdf
[^22]: Draft Memorandum of Agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the State of Israel, undated, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume IX, Document 226, pp. 786-788 (Carter annotation "My suggestions. JC."; final version dated March 26, 1979 printed in Dayan, Breakthrough, pp. 356-357). https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v09/pdf/frus1977-80v09.pdf
[^23]: Jeremy M. Sharp, *Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations*, Congressional Research Service report RL33003, updated February 25, 2026; Jeremy M. Sharp, *U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023*, CRS report RL33222, updated May 28, 2025. https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL33003.html ; https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL33222.html
[^24]: "Treaty of Peace Between Israel and Egypt, March 26, 1979," Articles IV and V, Annex I (Article VI; Appendix, Article VII), and the agreed minutes to Annex III, Avalon Project, Yale Law School (United Nations Treaty Series vol. 1136, no. 17813). https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/isregypt.asp
[^25]: Multinational Force and Observers, "Origins," including "Pre-Treaty: July '79" and "1979 to 1981." https://www.mfo.org/origins
[^26]: Multinational Force and Observers Participation Resolution, Public Law 97-132, 95 Stat. 1693 (December 29, 1981), text of S.J. Res. 100, 97th Cong. https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/97/sjres100/text ; 22 U.S.C. 3423, "United States contributions to costs." https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22/3423
[^27]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Random House, 1991), chapter 1, "A Secret Agreement," pp. 3-7 (text read in the Internet Archive scan, item Sampson_Option). https://archive.org/details/Sampson_Option

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---
category: "Diplomacy"
tags:
- Event
- Diplomacy
- OsloAccords
- OsloChannel
- Fafo
- Norway
- PalestineLiberationOrganization
- PalestinianAuthority
- InternationalPeaceInstitute
- JeffreyEpstein
alias:
- Oslo Accords
- Oslo Accord
- Oslo I
- Oslo II
- Oslo process
- Oslo channel
- Oslo Peace Process
- Declaration of Principles
- Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements
- Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement
summary: "Israel and the PLO exchanged recognition and signed a Declaration of Principles on September 13, 1993 after secret talks in Norway run through Fafo, followed by the 1995 Interim Agreement and Norwegian inquiries."
start: 1993-09-13
end: 1995-09-28
location: "Oslo, Norway; Washington, D.C."
relations:
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Terje Rød-Larsen]]"
reverse: true
role: "director of Fafo and Norwegian facilitator of the Oslo channel"
fn: 2
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Mona Juul]]"
reverse: true
role: "head of the Norwegian foreign ministry's Middle East office and facilitator"
fn: 2
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Jan Egeland]]"
reverse: true
role: "Norwegian state secretary and facilitator"
fn: 2
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Johan Jørgen Holst]]"
reverse: true
role: "Norwegian foreign minister"
fn: 2
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Mahmoud Abbas]]"
reverse: true
start: 1993-09-13
end: 1993-09-13
role: "signatory for the PLO"
fn: 3
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Shimon Peres]]"
reverse: true
start: 1993-09-13
end: 1993-09-13
role: "signatory for Israel"
fn: 3
created: 2026-10-01
updated: 2026-10-01
---
The Oslo Accords are two agreements between [[Israel]] and the [[Palestine Liberation Organization]]. The first, the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, was signed at the [[White House]] on September 13, 1993; the second, the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, was signed in Washington on September 28, 1995. The negotiations that produced the first were held in secret in [[Norway]] through a channel run by the director of the Norwegian research institute [[Fafo]], [[Terje Rød-Larsen]], and by [[Mona Juul]] of the Norwegian foreign ministry.[^1][^2][^3]
### The Fafo Survey and the Norwegian Foreign Ministry
Fafo's Palestinian project began as a living-conditions survey. In his preface to the survey report, dated Oslo, May 1993, Rød-Larsen wrote that its history went back five years to Cairo, where he lived in 1989, and that the chairman of the Palestinian Red Crescent, Dr. Fathi Arafat, and the director of the Palestinian hospital in Cairo, Dr. Khalid Shbaeb, had suggested that Fafo conduct a socioeconomic study of the occupied territories. He wrote that the Norwegian foreign ministry "fully concurred," that the then deputy minister [[Knut Vollebæk]] and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation ([[NORAD]]) provided financial support to design the project and run a pilot survey, that in 1990 funding for the full project was assured from the foreign ministry, "who would foot most of the bill," and that the [[Ford Foundation]] later supplied additional funding to cover local costs. He wrote that he had urged, "with the consent of both Palestinian and Israeli leaders," that the survey be strongly policy oriented, and thanked Deputy Minister [[Jan Egeland]], who "enthusiastically accompanied us on visits in the field." Fieldwork was carried out in June, July and August 1992. The report, Fafo report 151, *Palestinian Society in Gaza, West Bank and Arab Jerusalem*, was authored by [[Marianne Heiberg]], Geir Ovensen and others, and the project was led by Heiberg.[^4]
The introduction to the report observed that the Norwegian government, which funded the survey, provided millions of dollars each year in humanitarian and development assistance to Palestinian society.[^4] The Norwegian encyclopedia *Store norske leksikon* states that Rød-Larsen established Fafo in 1982 as the Trade Union Movement's Center for Research, Evaluation and Documentation and led it until 1993, and that during the Oslo process the institute's survey served as a platform for contacts between Israelis and Palestinians that Rød-Larsen used in the secret negotiations.[^2]
### The Channel and the Signing
The [[State Department]]'s historical office states that U.S. officials were briefed on secret negotiations that the Israelis and Palestinians began in Oslo in December 1992 but made little effort to become involved in them, and that the administration of President [[Bill Clinton]] "played a limited role in bringing the Oslo Accord into being."[^5] According to *Store norske leksikon*, the Norwegian figures in the channel were State Secretary Jan Egeland, Mona Juul, Rød-Larsen, and the foreign ministers [[Thorvald Stoltenberg]] and [[Johan Jørgen Holst]]; Juul headed the ministry's [[Middle East]] office. The same source states that the agreement was first signed in secret in Oslo on August 20, 1993, at Parkveien 45, with Holst at the table, [[Uri Savir]] leading the Israeli side and [[Ahmed Qurei]] the Palestinian side, and that the final wording of the letters of mutual recognition was agreed shortly before the public ceremony. It was signed on September 13 by [[Mahmoud Abbas]] for the PLO and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres for Israel, in the presence of [[Yasser Arafat]], Prime Minister [[Yitzhak Rabin]] and Clinton.[^2][^3] The 1995 agreement recites the letters of September 9, 1993 exchanged between the Prime Minister of Israel and the Chairman of the PLO.[^6]
### The Declaration of Principles
The Declaration provided for direct elections to a Palestinian Council for the [[West Bank]] and [[Gaza Strip]] no later than nine months after it entered into force, a five-year transitional period beginning with Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the [[Jericho]] area, and permanent status negotiations to begin no later than the third year of the interim period, covering "Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, border, relations and cooperation with their neighbors." It established an Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee, treated the multilateral working groups as an instrument for a "[[Marshall Plan]]" for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and was to enter into force one month after signing.[^1]
### The Donor Conference, the Holst Fund and the United Nations Special Coordinator
On October 1, 1993, more than forty donor countries and institutions met at the Washington Conference to Support Middle East Peace, hosted by the [[United States]], and pledged about $2.4 billion to be disbursed over the five-year transitional period. The Ad Hoc Liaison Committee for assistance to the Palestinians was established in the context of that conference, and Norway chairs it. In June 1994 Secretary-General [[Boutros Boutros-Ghali]] appointed Rød-Larsen [[United Nations]] Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories; [[Chinmaya Gharekhan]] succeeded him in February 1997.[^7]
A July 1996 report of the Office of the Special Coordinator on donor-funded activities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip contains a table of pledges and payments to the Holst Fund, which the report names with the European Union as one of two major examples of support for recurrent costs of the [[Palestinian Authority]], and which it separately credits with funding 25 million dollars of public sector emergency employment projects. The table lists total pledges from, among others, Norway (17.75 million dollars), Kuwait (21 million), Japan (11.5 million) and Israel (10.5 million). The [[World Bank]] and the European Union are thanked in the report for clarifying the figures.[^8]
### The Interim Agreement of 1995
The Interim Agreement was signed in Washington on September 28, 1995 by the Government of Israel and the PLO and witnessed by the United States, the Russian Federation, Egypt, Jordan, Norway and the European Union.[^9] It defined Area A (populated areas, with the Council assuming internal security and public order), Area B (populated areas and listed hamlets) and Area C (the remainder of the West Bank, to be transferred gradually except for permanent status issues). Annex I limited the Palestinian Police to 30,000 in all branches in the interim period, up to 12,000 in the West Bank and up to 18,000 in the Gaza Strip, with the numbers changeable by agreement, and listed Norway among the countries whose observer delegations would be present at the Palestinian elections.[^6] *Store norske leksikon* states that the elections were held in 1996, that the Likud victory that year and the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000 are each regarded by some as the end of the Oslo process, and that the 1994 Hebron massacre was an instance of militant opposition to the agreement.[^2]
### Norwegian Foreign Ministry Grants to the International Peace Institute
Rød-Larsen was president of the [[International Peace Institute]] (IPI) in New York from January 2005 to October 2020.[^10] The Office of the Auditor General of Norway ([[Riksrevisjonen]]) investigated the foreign ministry's grants to the institute for 2007 to 2012. According to the report as summarized in the Storting's control committee recommendation (Innst. 167 S, 2021 to 2022), the ministry paid 130.6 million kroner to IPI and its predecessor from 1997 to 2018 and none after 2018; the ministry and IPI concluded two three-year framework agreements in the period under review, at 11 million kroner a year for 2007 to 2009 and 8 million kroner a year for 2010 to 2012. The auditor general concluded that there were considerable weaknesses in the ministry's case handling, control and follow-up, that the ministry had not followed up missing project plans, budgets, reports and accounts from IPI, and that it was open to criticism for failing to ensure that conflict-of-interest assessments were carried out. The auditor general obtained no further information from IPI.[^10]
The committee recommendation quotes the report on the ministry's legal department's assessment of April 13, 2012, which considered the possible disqualification of the then director general (ekspedisjonssjef) Geir O. Pedersen, the then director general Mona Juul, Foreign Minister [[Jonas Gahr Støre]] and the political leadership in matters concerning IPI. A Progress Party member of the committee, quoting the report, stated that about 47.1 million kroner was processed and paid to IPI during Pedersen's term, that Rød-Larsen communicated directly with Pedersen on several occasions, and that Pedersen was a member of IPI's International Advisory Council. The report quotes the legal department as stating that Juul and her department should neither prepare nor decide matters concerning IPI, her spouse being its head. On April 17, 2012 Pedersen's section advised Støre to support the establishment of IPI as an international organization; Støre declared himself not disqualified, according to the report, on the ground that "he knew Rød-Larsen solely through sporadic contact in a work context, that they were not friends, and that they had never met privately or at each other's homes." The same member added that Rød-Larsen had been planning minister in the government of [[Thorbjørn Jagland]] and that his ties to the labour movement and the [[Norwegian Labour Party]] were well known, and proposed that the Storting ask the government to consider whether foreign ministry employees had breached criminal provisions; the Progress Party and the Red Party also proposed that the Storting ask the auditor general to audit the grants for 2012 to 2018. The committee recommendation is dated February 15, 2022.[^10]
### The Epstein Donations and the 2020 Reviews
The 2017 Form 990 of IPI reports total revenue of 8,704,582 dollars, of which 6,003,286 dollars was government grants, and lists Rød-Larsen as president, 35 hours a week, with reportable compensation from the organization of 517,980 dollars and other compensation of 37,624 dollars.[^11]
The IPI board accepted Rød-Larsen's resignation on October 29, 2020 and at the same meeting decided to commission the accounting firm KPMG. The board stated that its concerns included donations Rød-Larsen accepted from Epstein-affiliated foundations, "a short-term loan from Epstein to Mr. Rød-Larsen personally," and whether IPI was involved in other transactions; it stated that on December 4, 2019 it had directed that an amount equal to all Epstein-related donations be given to programs for victims of human trafficking and sexual assault.[^12] The probity review states that the board first became aware of the donations in late 2019.[^13] KPMG's report of December 18, 2020 analyzed IPI's records from January 2010 to October 2020 against a list of 56 entities affiliated with [[Jeffrey Epstein]] and identified five donations totaling 650,000 dollars:
- October 11, 2011: [[Jeffrey Epstein VI Foundation|Enhanced Education]], 125,000 dollars, ledger description "Enhanced Education funding for WK Rick Hooper fellowship."
- May 8, 2017: [[Gratitude America]], 150,000 dollars, "Reimbursement of tickets to the Oslo Play."
- June 12, 2017: Gratitude America, 125,000 dollars.
- November 1, 2017: Gratitude America, 100,000 dollars, "Contribution from Gatitude America, LTD Oslo Play."
- April 5, 2019: Gratitude America, 150,000 dollars, "Contribution from Gratitude America."
KPMG also found a reimbursement of 14,158.88 dollars from Enhanced Education in 2014 for the flight of [[Larry Summers]]; no payments by IPI to Epstein or his entities; no payments related to the loan between Epstein and Rød-Larsen; and a 100,000 dollar honorarium wired on February 28, 2014 to LHSummers Economic Consulting for the Mongolian Advisory Board, funded by the Government of Mongolia, on wire instructions sent to Rød-Larsen by an assistant to Epstein.[^14]
A separate probity review of December 21, 2020 by IPI's treasurer, the attorney Clifford Perlman, found that Rød-Larsen did not violate the wording of IPI's 2013 conflict of interest policy but should have informed the board and should not have taken the loan, found no evidence that Epstein derived personal benefit from IPI, and described the 2017 special performance of the play *Oslo*, which dramatized Rød-Larsen's role in the accords, as a fundraising event underwritten by one of Epstein's foundations. The review stated that Epstein attended the performance, had no control over the invitation list, and that his name did not appear in association with it.[^13] IPI's statement of December 22, 2020 put the donations at about 0.9 percent of IPI's revenue over the period.[^12]
### Epstein Library Records
The [[Department of Justice]] [[Epstein Files|Epstein Library]] contains a Gratitude America, Ltd check no. 315 on [[Deutsche Bank]] Trust Company Americas, dated November 1, 2017, payable to International Peace Institute, Inc. for 100,000 dollars with the line "Attn: Terje Rod Larsen." The same document contains an email of November 1, 2017, 7:25 a.m., from the account displayed as "Jeffrey E." to [[Richard Kahn]] reading "send IPI 100 k . to terje attention."; an email of June 12, 2017 reading "Rich please send 125 k to ipi"; Kahn's message of the same day "Confirming 125k is in addition to 150k sent in may"; and a forwarded May 8, 2017 exchange in which Kahn asked Rød-Larsen whether a check to IPI at 777 United Nations Plaza should be mailed or delivered, and Rød-Larsen replied "That is great - thank you!"[^15] Another document is an email of May 12, 2015 from [[Brad Wechsler]] to the Epstein account, replying to a message "ipi donation?", stating that "A wire transfer for 750k was processed today and IPI shld have by later today or tomorrow." The email does not name the sending entity, and KPMG's schedule of five Epstein-related donations lists none in 2015.[^16] A May 6, 2014 email from IPI's senior accountant, addressed to "Ms. Groff", states that IPI wired the honorarium to LHSummers Economic Consulting for the Mongolian Advisory Board on February 28, 2014 and asks for Summers's W-9.[^17]
### The Økokrim Investigation
On February 9, 2026 the Norwegian economic crime authority [[Økokrim]] announced an investigation in which Juul was named a suspect in aggravated corruption in connection with her positions in the foreign ministry and Rød-Larsen a suspect in complicity. Økokrim's chief [[Pål Lønseth]] said the investigation would be extensive and long-running. Juul's lawyer [[Thomas Skjelbred]] said she did not recognize herself in the charge, and Rød-Larsen's lawyer [[John Christian Elden]] said his client was surprised by it. Økokrim had opened an investigation of Jagland on February 5.[^18] The newspaper *VG* reported on February 27, 2026 that Jagland, Juul and Rød-Larsen were all being investigated for aggravated corruption or complicity as a result of gifts and services received from Epstein, and on March 4, 2026 that the foreign ministry had suspected seven years earlier that Rød-Larsen had given visa help to women on Epstein's behalf and that Økokrim was now investigating the matter.[^19]
On September 26, 2026 NRK published an account of the 335-square-metre Frogner apartment at Drammensveien 42 in Oslo. According to NRK, the shipowner [[Morits Skaugen]] bought the apartment in 2011 for 12.6 million kroner, leased it to Juul and Rød-Larsen from June 1, 2011 at 500,000 kroner a year, and granted a five-year option to buy it for 13 million kroner for a premium of 3.5 million kroner, which Skaugen said Rød-Larsen paid. NRK reported that Skaugen mortgaged the apartment to SEB for 12.5 million kroner in 2013 and to DNB for 25 million kroner in December 2015, and that on March 31, 2018 Skaugen emailed Epstein that the option had lapsed and the bank's assessed market value was 18 million kroner. NRK published an email attributed to Epstein dated April 4, 2018, addressed to a lawyer for Rød-Larsen, reading "closing the rope slowly he is coming to paris to meet. the more he puts in writing the better. DO not reach out to him yet," and reported that Skaugen met Epstein in Paris on April 6, 2018. Skaugen told *VG* that he felt pressure from Epstein in Paris and told NRK that he disputes its account and that no bank suffered a loss. NRK reported that the couple took title on June 25, 2018 for 14 million kroner, and quoted an email from Skaugen to Epstein describing the price as "Half price." NRK quoted Økokrim's first state attorney Marianne Bender: "We want to find out whether Epstein, through the purchase of the apartment, contributed any transfer of wealth or other transfer to the suspected couple." Elden told NRK that "there is no funny business with this apartment sale," that the couple reject the charge and that he saw no criminal matter in it, and that Rød-Larsen did not know of any contact between Epstein and Skaugen. NRK also reported that its analysis of the released Epstein files found 5,684 emails and text messages between Epstein and Rød-Larsen, the first from 2010.[^20]
### The Oslo Papers
Nettavisen reported on September 29, 2026 that Økokrim found documents relating to the Oslo process in the cellar storage room of Juul and Rød-Larsen's home during the February search, seized one box, and that the foreign ministry and the National Archives of Norway were given access to the storage room in mid-March and collected five further boxes. The foreign ministry told the newspaper that material directly linked to the Oslo process would be made public at the National Archives, and Elden said the ministry was working with the defense on publication of the material Rød-Larsen transferred to the archives, both through Økokrim and directly from his cellar. The newspaper reported that the documents are not part of Økokrim's investigation and that the Storting's control and constitution committee, chaired by Per-Willy Amundsen, was holding hearings on September 30 and October 1, 2026 with current and former foreign and development ministers, including Støre and [[Espen Barth Eide]].[^21]
### Footnotes
[^1]: "Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization Agreement: 1993" (Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements), Articles I to XVII, Avalon Project, Yale Law School. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/isrplo.asp
[^2]: "Oslo-avtalen," *Store norske leksikon* (secret signing August 20, 1993; signatories; criticism; 1996 elections); "Terje Rød-Larsen," *Store norske leksikon* (Fafo 1982 to 1993; role in the Norwegian channel; Juul headed the ministry's Middle East office). https://snl.no/Oslo-avtalen ; https://snl.no/Terje_R%C3%B8d-Larsen
[^3]: "Oslo-avtalen," *Store norske leksikon*, section "Oslo 1" and caption to the photograph of the secret signing at Parkveien 45. https://snl.no/Oslo-avtalen
[^4]: Terje Rød Larsen, Preface (Oslo, May 1993), pp. 6 to 10, and Marianne Heiberg, Introduction, in Marianne Heiberg and Geir Ovensen, *Palestinian Society in Gaza, West Bank and Arab Jerusalem: A Survey of Living Conditions*, Fafo report 151 (Oslo: Fafo, 1993). https://www.fafo.no/media/com_netsukii/151.pdf
[^5]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, "The Oslo Accords and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process," Milestones 1993-2000 (retired page). https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/oslo
[^6]: Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Washington, D.C., September 28, 1995, preamble, Article XI, Annex I Article I and the police strength provision, and Annex II election observer provisions (English text published by the Economic Cooperation Foundation, Tel Aviv). https://content.ecf.org.il/files/M00261_TheIsraeli-PalestinianInterimAgreement-EnglishText.pdf
[^7]: Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories, "UNSCO at a Glance: A Profile," United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine. https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-208256/
[^8]: UNSCO, "Partners in Peace: LACC for Development Assistance in the West Bank and Gaza Strip," July 1996, section on public finance, "Pledges and Payments to the Holst Fund." https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-209393/
[^9]: Letters of December 1995 from the permanent representatives of Israel and the Palestinian observer, and from the United States and the Russian Federation, transmitting the Interim Agreement, United Nations document A/51/889 and S/1997/357, May 5, 1997. https://unispal.un.org/pdfs/D91C90A304F06EA4052564E60048C213.pdf
[^10]: Innstilling fra kontroll- og konstitusjonskomiteen om Riksrevisjonens undersøkelse av Utenriksdepartementets tildeling av tilskudd til International Peace Institute (IPI), Innst. 167 S (2021-2022), February 15, 2022, source document Dokument 3:12 (2020-2021), sections 1.1 to 1.4 and the committee's statements. https://www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-publikasjoner/Publikasjoner/Innstillinger/Stortinget/2021-2022/inns-202122-167s/?all=true
[^11]: International Peace Institute Inc., IRS Form 990 for the tax year 2017 (EIN 03-0213226), Part VII, Part VIII and summary, IRS e-file object 201833129349302893, published in IRS Form 990 series XML download file download990xml_2018_6. https://apps.irs.gov/pub/epostcard/990/xml/2018/download990xml_2018_6.zip
[^12]: International Peace Institute, "Release of KPMG Forensic Review and IPI Probity Review," statement of December 22, 2020. https://www.ipinst.org/2020/12/kpmg-forensic-probity-review
[^13]: Clifford Perlman, "Probity Review as requested by the Chair of the Board of Directors, International Peace Institute," December 21, 2020, items 1 and 2. https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/ProbityReviewDec2020.pdf
[^14]: KPMG LLP, "International Peace Institute: KPMG Forensic Review," December 18, 2020, Executive Summary, Summary Observations and Appendix A. https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/IPI-KPMG-Forensic-Review-12-18-2020.pdf
[^15]: Gratitude America, Ltd check no. 315 (November 1, 2017) with emails of November 1, June 12 and May 8, 2017, EFTA00802975 to EFTA00802979, DOJ Epstein Library, Data Set 9. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%209/EFTA00802975.pdf
[^16]: Email, Brad Wechsler to Jeffrey E., May 12, 2015, 16:13 UTC, EFTA00662431, DOJ Epstein Library, Data Set 9. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%209/EFTA00662431.pdf
[^17]: Email, Susan Waugh (International Peace Institute) to Ms. Groff, "Larry Summers's W9," May 6, 2014, EFTA00369962, DOJ Epstein Library, Data Set 9. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%209/EFTA00369962.pdf
[^18]: "Økokrim åpner etterforsking av Mona Juul og Terje Rød-Larsen," *NRK*, February 9, 2026 (updated February 12, 2026). https://www.nrk.no/norge/okokrim-apner-etterforsking-av-mona-juul-og-terje-rod-larsen-1.17761823
[^19]: "Dette er Epstein-siktelsene Økokrim ville holde hemmelig," *VG*, February 27, 2026; "Etterforsker visumbistand: 'Skriv ut dette anbefalingsbrevet,'" *VG*, March 4, 2026 (standfirst only; article behind a subscription wall). https://www.vg.no/nyheter/i/vree75/dette-er-epstein-siktelsene-oekokrim-ville-holde-hemmelig ; https://www.vg.no/nyheter/i/GxMwwl/epstein-saken-oekokrim-etterforsker-visumbistand
[^20]: "Leiligheten til korrupsjonssiktede Mona Juul og Terje Rød-Larsen får politiet til å klø seg i hodet," *NRK*, September 26, 2026, by Bjørn Olav Nordahl and others. https://www.nrk.no/dokumentar/xl/okokrim-etterforsker-epsteins-overforinger-til-rod-larsen-1.18001797
[^21]: Thomas Paust, "UD vil frigjøre dokumenter funnet i Rød-Larsens kjeller," *Nettavisen*, September 29, 2026. https://www.nettavisen.no/epstein-horingen/okokrim/terje-rod-larsen/ud-vil-frigjore-flere-oslo-dokumenter-funnet-i-kjellerboden-til-mona-juul-og-terje-rod-larsen/s/80-95-117074