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---
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tags:
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- Person
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- Intelligence
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- USA
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---
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Dino A. Brugioni was a World War II veteran who served as an aerial photographer and later joined the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] in 1948. He was enticed by [[Arthur C. Lundahl]] to join his staff in the Photographic Intelligence Division, where he played a key role in analyzing reconnaissance photos, particularly from the [[U-2 Spy Plane]].[^1]
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Brugioni recalled seeing the first signs of what would become the Israeli nuclear reactor at [[Dimona]]. He and other photo interpreters observed the fencing off of a large, barren area, the construction of a new road, and significant subterranean digging and concrete pouring. They immediately suspected something unusual was happening, given the scale of the construction in the middle of the desert.[^1]
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Despite his fascination with the construction at [[Dimona]], Brugioni noted that the White House never encouraged further briefings on the matter. He prepared presidential briefing materials for Lundahl and knew the intelligence on [[Israel]] was reaching the top, but he never understood whether the White House wanted [[Israel]] to have the bomb or not.[^1]
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By the end of 1959, Brugioni and Lundahl had no doubt that [[Israel]] was pursuing nuclear weapons, and that President [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] and his advisers were determined to look the other way. Brugioni and his colleagues chose not to raise questions about [[Dimona]], understanding that the hierarchy had decided to "play it cool."[^1]
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### Footnotes
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[^1]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 4.
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