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---
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tags:
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- Person
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- Diplomat
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- USA
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---
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Walworth Barbour was the American ambassador to [[Israel]] from 1961 to 1973, serving longer in one post than all but three other American ambassadors. He was a compelling presence, described as a tall, shy, hugely overweight diplomat with a gluttonous appetite and acute emphysema. He constantly sprayed his throat with a vaporizer, wore yellowing white suits with brown-and-white shoes, and walked with a shambling gait. Barbour spoke no Hebrew and rarely attended educational, cultural, or social events, yet he was beloved by [[Israel]]'s leadership.[^1]
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Barbour's long assignment was a testament to his understanding of when and when not to accept every Israeli assertion at face value, and his willingness to operate the American embassy as a subsidiary, if necessary, of the Israeli foreign ministry. He often reminded his questioning subordinates that he was a President's man with a personal mandate, not a servant of the [[State Department]].[^1]
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In his first six years as ambassador, Barbour rarely interfered with the job of those working in his embassy, and some of the most accurate reporting on [[Dimona]] was forwarded to [[Washington D.C.]]. However, these reports had no impact and disappeared into the bureaucratic maze. After the 1967 [[Six-Day War]], he ordered his staff to stop reporting on nuclear weapons in [[Israel]], over the objection of one key aide. His primary assignment was to insulate President [[Lyndon B. Johnson]] and his men from facts that would compel action regarding [[Israel]]'s nuclear program.[^1]
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Barbour's closest associates were senior officials of the Israeli government, including [[Golda Meir]] and Major General [[Aharon Yariv]]. He shared the taboo of not discussing nuclear weapons with outsiders. However, it was Barbour's men who reported before the June 1967 war that [[Israel]] had completed its basic weapons design and was capable of manufacturing warheads for deployment on missiles.[^1]
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In 1970, Barbour made a rare public appearance, sharing a podium with Prime Minister [[Golda Meir]] at the opening of an American school in [[Tel Aviv]]. After his retirement in 1973, he became a board member of the American branch of Bank Leumi, the Israeli state bank, a move that confounded and distressed many of his former colleagues in the Foreign Service who saw it as a conflict of interest.[^1]
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Upon the inauguration of President [[Richard M. Nixon]] in January 1969, Barbour became even less interested in [[Dimona]], effectively exorcising the issue. He famously told a senior American intelligence officer who briefed him on [[Israel]]'s nuclear weapons program, "Gentlemen, I don't believe a word of it," explaining that if he acknowledged it, he would have to go to the President, and the President did not want bad news.[^1]
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Barbour's support for [[Israel]] was profound and heartfelt. He remained on the board of Bank Leumi until his death, seemingly unconcerned with his peers' opinions.[^1]
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### Footnotes
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[^1]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 12.
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