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27
10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Allen Dulles.md
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@ -28,6 +28,11 @@ relations:
start: 1949
role: "vice-chairman"
fn: 2
- type: member_of
with: "[[Warren Commission]]"
start: 1963-11-29
end: 1964-09-24
fn: 11
---
Allen Welsh Dulles (April 7, 1893 - January 29, 1969) served as [[Director of Central Intelligence]] from February 26, 1953, to November 29, 1961 - the longest tenure of any DCI, the first civilian DCI, and the only brother of a sitting Secretary of State to hold the position. Dulles built the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] into the instrument of Cold War covert action that executed [[Operation AJAX]] in [[Iran]] (1953), [[Operation PBSUCCESS]] in [[Guatemala]] (1954), and the [[Bay of Pigs]] invasion of [[Cuba]] (1961). The Bay of Pigs disaster cost him his position - President [[John F. Kennedy]] forced his resignation, along with [[Richard Bissell]] and [[Charles P. Cabell|C.P. Cabell]] - and his subsequent appointment by President [[Lyndon B. Johnson]] to the [[Warren Commission]] investigating Kennedy's assassination placed him in the remarkable position of overseeing the investigation of the event that had ended both his patron's life and his own career.[^1]
@ -77,17 +82,19 @@ The Bay of Pigs invasion of April 17-19, 1961 was the catastrophic failure that
Kennedy publicly accepted responsibility but was privately furious. He reportedly told aide [[Ted Sorensen]] that he wanted to "splinter the CIA into a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds" - a remark almost certainly apocryphal in its precise wording but consistent with his documented anger. The Taylor Commission's findings and the classified Kirkpatrick IG report both pointed to fundamental CIA failures in planning, execution, and judgment.
Dulles submitted his resignation in September 1961; it was formally accepted November 29, 1961. He was replaced by [[John McCone]]. Bissell and Cabell were also forced out. CIA veterans viewed their dismissal as Kennedy scapegoating the agency for a failure the [[White House]] had co-created by canceling the air strikes.[^1]
Dulles submitted his resignation in September 1961; it was formally accepted November 29, 1961. He was replaced by [[John McCone]]. The CIA's own history states that a "humiliated President Kennedy did not wait for either report before cleaning house at CIA" and that he accepted resignations from Dulles and from Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell, who stayed at their posts until their successors were selected a few months later.[^10] Bissell and Cabell were also forced out. CIA veterans viewed their dismissal as Kennedy scapegoating the agency for a failure the [[White House]] had co-created by canceling the air strikes.[^1]
### The Warren Commission
On November 29, 1963 - exactly two years after Dulles's forced resignation - President Lyndon Johnson appointed the Warren Commission to investigate Kennedy's assassination. Among the seven commissioners Johnson named was Allen Dulles despite Kennedy’s firing of Dulles.
On November 29, 1963 - exactly two years after Dulles's forced resignation - President Lyndon Johnson appointed the Warren Commission to investigate Kennedy's assassination. Among the seven commissioners Johnson named was Allen Dulles despite Kennedy’s firing of Dulles.[^11]
The investigation was examining whether CIA-connected parties (specifically the anti-Castro exile networks and organized crime figures that Dulles had directly overseen) had any role in the assassination. He was now in a position to shape what evidence the Commission sought, what witnesses it called, and what conclusions it reached regarding the CIA programs he had run.
Dulles was reportedly among the most active commissioners in shaping the investigation's scope. He briefed commissioners on CIA history and procedures. He did not disclose the [[ZR/RIFLE]] assassination plotting program - which [[Richard Helms]] as DDP was simultaneously concealing from the Commission at the agency level. The CIA's failure to disclose the assassination plots to the Warren Commission, documented by the Church Committee in 1975, was the institutional decision; Dulles's personal role in that decision - as both a commissioner and the former DCI who had authorized the programs - was the structural conflict of interest the Commission's composition created.
Dulles was reportedly among the most active commissioners in shaping the investigation's scope. He briefed commissioners on CIA history and procedures. Book V of the Church Committee's final report states that, with the exception of Dulles, it is unlikely anyone on the Warren Commission knew of the CIA's assassination efforts, and that Dulles knew of the plots with underworld figures that had taken place during his tenure as Director of Central Intelligence.[^12] The Church Committee's 1975 interim report states that Dulles "did not inform the other members about the plots that had occurred during his term as DCI,"[^13] and also states that "it is not entirely certain that Dulles was ever made aware of the true nature of the underworld operation."[^14] The [[ZR/RIFLE]] assassination plotting program was, in the same period, not disclosed to the Commission at the agency level by [[Richard Helms]] as Deputy Director for Plans. Helms testified that Dulles "was sitting right there" in the Commission's deliberations and "knew about this," and that he did not know what Dulles had said to the Commission about the plots.[^15] The CIA's failure to disclose the assassination plots to the Warren Commission was documented by the Church Committee in 1975; Dulles's role as both a commissioner and the former DCI who had authorized the programs is the structural conflict of interest the Commission's composition created.
The [[HSCA|House Select Committee on Assassinations]] (1979) found that the Warren Commission had not been fully informed of CIA activities relevant to the investigation. The precise mechanism by which this occurred - institutional CIA decision, active concealment by Dulles, or some combination - was not definitively established.[^7]
Angleton testified that Dulles consulted him before agreeing to President Johnson's request that he serve, that the two were in frequent contact, and that they informally discussed the progress of the investigation and what further work the CIA could do.[^16] At the January 22, 1964 executive session, the Commission took up a report that [[Lee Harvey Oswald]] had been a paid FBI informant. Dulles asked whether the purpose of such a hire could have been to penetrate the [[Fair Play for Cuba Committee]]. He said that practically any American could obtain a passport good for anywhere, and that the Passport Bureau had no record of Oswald's defection. Near the end of the meeting, Dulles said: "I think this record ought to be destroyed."[^17] FBI Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]]'s files held an index card on Dulles that cross-referenced a November 29, 1963 memorandum.[^18]
The [[HSCA|House Select Committee on Assassinations]] (1979) found that the Warren Commission's failure to investigate adequately the possibility of a conspiracy was "attributable in part to the failure of the Commission to receive all the relevant information that was in the possession of other agencies and departments of the Government," and that the CIA "was deficient in its collection and sharing of information both prior to and subsequent to the assassination."[^19] The report does not name Dulles in those findings. It states that the committee did not ignore the possibility that certain CIA officials who knew that close scrutiny of United States-Cuban relations could have exposed the CIA-Mafia plots might have tried to keep the CIA's or the Warren Commission's inquiry from the question of Cuban complicity, and that it determined that only Deputy Director Helms was in a position to have both the knowledge and the power to accomplish such a cover-up and was satisfied, on the basis of its investigation, that it was "highly unlikely he in fact did so."[^20] It found that the details of the AMLASH plot and the CIA-Mafia plots should have been provided to the Warren Commission.[^21]
### Death and Legacy
@ -104,3 +111,15 @@ Dulles spent his post-CIA years writing, lecturing, and defending the covert act
[^7]: Kornbluh, Peter, ed. *Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba.* New Press, 1998. Church Committee. "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders." Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975. Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy.* Random House, 1991. Chapter 4.
[^8]: John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*. Times Books, 1979, Chapter 4; "Project MKULTRA, the CIA's Program of Research in Behavioral Modification," Joint Senate Hearing, August 3, 1977.
[^9]: Gerard Colby and Charlotte Dennett, *Thy Will Be Done: The Conquest of the Amazon*. HarperCollins, 1995, Ch. 18; John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*. Times Books, 1979, Chapter 9.
[^10]: Warner, Michael, "The CIA's Internal Probe of the Bay of Pigs Affair: Lessons Unlearned," *Studies in Intelligence*, Winter 1998-1999. https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/static/Internal-Probe-Bay-Pigs.pdf
[^11]: Executive Order 11130, "Appointing a Commission To Report Upon the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy," November 29, 1963. The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-11130-appointing-commission-report-upon-the-assassination-president-john-f
[^12]: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies*, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, pp. 67-68. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf
[^13]: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report*, Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975, p. 269, note 1. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^14]: *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, p. 267. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^15]: Book V, p. 70 (Helms testimony of July 18, 1975). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf
[^16]: Book V, p. 69 (note 134, Angleton testimony of February 6, 1976, pp. 31-34). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf
[^17]: Warren Commission, executive session transcript, January 22, 1964, 5:30 to 7:00 p.m. https://aarclibrary.org/publib/jfk/wc/wcexec/pdf/WcEx0122.pdf
[^18]: U.S. Assassination Records Review Board, memorandum by Ronald G. Haron, "Assassination Records Among the Files of J. Edgar Hoover (FBI-36)," January 8, 1998. https://documents3.theblackvault.com/documents/jfkfiles/NARA-Oct2017/ARRB/RHARON/HARON/FBIMEM.002.pdf
[^19]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), summary Findings I.D.4 and I.D.5(b) (p. 4). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^20]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report,* H. Rept. 95-1828, p. 128. https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^21]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report,* H. Rept. 95-1828, pp. 112-116. https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit

12
10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Dale Graff.md
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@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ updated: 2026-09-22
Graff's interest in [[Psi|psi]] phenomena stemmed from a personal experience in 1968, where he had a profound [[Out-of-Body Experience|out-of-body experience]] while caught in a rip current. This led him to research anomalous mental phenomena, and he later sought to integrate psychic abilities into military applications.[^1]
He authored the 1977 report "[[Paraphysics R&D - Warsaw Pact]]," which highlighted Soviet research in electromagnetic fields, quantum physics, and [[Psychokinesis]]. This report, along with his advocacy, contributed to the DoD's decision to officially fund a psychic research program.[^1]
Annie Jacobsen wrote that he authored the report "[[Paraphysics R&D - Warsaw Pact]]" (DST-1810S-202-78, published March 30, 1978), which highlighted Soviet research in electromagnetic fields, quantum physics, and [[Psychokinesis]]. This report, along with his advocacy, contributed to the DoD's decision to officially fund a psychic research program.[^1]
Graff was instrumental in the establishment and management of the Grill Flame program. He collaborated with [[Hal Puthoff]] and [[Russell Targ]] of [[Stanford Research Institute|SRI]] and oversaw the remote viewing unit at [[Fort Meade]]. He was involved in numerous operational taskings, including the successful remote viewing of a new Chinese nuclear device and the location of a lost Soviet bomber in Zaire.[^1]
@ -39,8 +39,8 @@ A cable from the Foreign Technology Division at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base
### Footnotes
[^1]: Jacobsen, Annie. *Phenomena: The Secret History of the U.S. Government's Investigations into Extrasensory Perception and Psychokinesis*. Little, Brown and Company, 2017.
[^2]: Defense Intelligence Agency, minutes of the DoD Grill Flame Committee, November 28, 1978 (enclosed in Progress Report #1), July 12, 1979 (CIA-RDP96-00788R002000130008-9), November 27, 1979 (CIA-RDP96-00788R002000130015-1), and January 10, 1980 (CIA-RDP96-00788R002000100009-1). Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
[^3]: "Psychic Spies: Cold War Whimsy or Secret Weapon?," ABC News *Nightline,* November 28, 1995, Radio TV Reports transcript for the CIA Public Affairs Staff, CIA-RDP99-01448R000402140001-7, read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room.
[^4]: Defense Intelligence Agency, "Minutes of the DoD Grill Flame Committee Meeting, 27 November 1979," S-1168/DT-1, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000130015-1, and "Minutes of the DoD Grill Flame Committee Meeting, 10 January 1980," S-1008/DT-1, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000100009-1, both signed Jack Vorona, chairman. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
[^5]: Defense Intelligence Agency, "Minutes of the Meeting of the DoD Committee on Remote Viewing Activities," August 24, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000140009-7; Vorona to the Army assistant chief of staff for intelligence, S-1862/DT-1, September 6, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200410015-9; Commander, Naval Intelligence Command, to DIA, September 14, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200410025-8; DIA to the 902d Military Intelligence Group, September 22, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000140015-0; James L. Brown, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, to Vorona, September 29, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200410026-7; Army ACSI (DAMI-ISH) to Vorona, October 4, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200410024-9. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
[^6]: Foreign Technology Division (XRQ) to CIA/OTS, "Request for OTS Report," cable of April 13, 1976, CIA-RDP96-00787R000200020005-5 and R000200020001-9; "Sensory Technology Assessment," November 14, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00787R000500120001-5; DoD Grill Flame Committee minutes of May 3, July 12 and September 25, 1979, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000130022-3, R002000130020-5, R002000130009-8; "Paraphysics R&D - Warsaw Pact," May 15, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000160008-6; minutes of the DoD Grill Flame Committee, November 28, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000140013-2; "QRT Tasking," December 4, 1984, CIA-RDP96-00788R001800220001-9. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
[^2]: Defense Intelligence Agency, minutes of the DoD Grill Flame Committee, November 28, 1978 (enclosed in Progress Report #1), July 12, 1979 (CIA-RDP96-00788R002000130008-9), November 27, 1979 (CIA-RDP96-00788R002000130015-1), and January 10, 1980 (CIA-RDP96-00788R002000100009-1).
[^3]: "Psychic Spies: Cold War Whimsy or Secret Weapon?," ABC News *Nightline,* November 28, 1995, Radio TV Reports transcript for the CIA Public Affairs Staff, CIA-RDP99-01448R000402140001-7.
[^4]: Defense Intelligence Agency, "Minutes of the DoD Grill Flame Committee Meeting, 27 November 1979," S-1168/DT-1, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000130015-1, and "Minutes of the DoD Grill Flame Committee Meeting, 10 January 1980," S-1008/DT-1, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000100009-1, both signed Jack Vorona, chairman.
[^5]: Defense Intelligence Agency, "Minutes of the Meeting of the DoD Committee on Remote Viewing Activities," August 24, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000140009-7; Vorona to the Army assistant chief of staff for intelligence, S-1862/DT-1, September 6, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200410015-9; Commander, Naval Intelligence Command, to DIA, September 14, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200410025-8; DIA to the 902d Military Intelligence Group, September 22, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000140015-0; James L. Brown, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, to Vorona, September 29, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200410026-7; Army ACSI (DAMI-ISH) to Vorona, October 4, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200410024-9.
[^6]: Foreign Technology Division (XRQ) to CIA/OTS, "Request for OTS Report," cable of April 13, 1976, CIA-RDP96-00787R000200020005-5 and R000200020001-9; "Sensory Technology Assessment," November 14, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00787R000500120001-5; DoD Grill Flame Committee minutes of May 3, July 12 and September 25, 1979, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000130022-3, R002000130020-5, R002000130009-8; "Paraphysics R&D - Warsaw Pact," May 15, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000160008-6; minutes of the DoD Grill Flame Committee, November 28, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000140013-2; "QRT Tasking," December 4, 1984, CIA-RDP96-00788R001800220001-9.

3
10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Danilo Blandon.md
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@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ Webb wrote that in October 1995 Assistant U.S. Attorney [[David Hall]] warned hi
Webb listed Blandón's network as Chepita, Lister, Corrales, Guerra and the Colombian supplier [[Aparicio Moreno]], whom Webb described as having reported ties to the FDN and the CIA and whom Blandón said Meneses introduced to him in 1985; the Inspector General records Blandón's statement that he and his associates thought a one-ton air delivery of Moreno's cocaine routed through Oklahoma "might be connected to the CIA because someone had placed a small FDN sticker somewhere on the airplane," which he called "just a rumor."[^29][^3] Webb added that Blandón had a partnership with Jairo Meneses in the 764 kilograms seized in Nicaragua in 1991 and owned hotels and casinos there with the Meneses family; the Inspector General's report mentions neither the hotels nor the 425-kilogram figure.[^29][^24]
Webb wrote that Blandón's electronics, procured by Lister, included walkie-talkies, pagers, police scanners, voice scramblers and anti-eavesdropping equipment; that during a 1987 raid on Ross associates Los Angeles County Sheriff's sergeant [[Robert Sobel]] complained that the dealers had "better equipment than we have"; that Blandón proposed to Ross that Ross set up a cocaine buy as an ambush, offering "you keep the dope"; and that Ross also bought police-raid warnings from him.[^9] Webb wrote that Meneses's later aide [[Enrique Miranda]] said Meneses's drug planes flew out of [[Ilopango Airbase]] in El Salvador, the hub [[Oliver North]] used for his Contra air force, where, according to Iran-Contra prosecutor [[Lawrence Walsh]], North's operatives worked "practically unfettered"; the Inspector General found Miranda's account second-hand and uncorroborated.[^26][^30]
Webb wrote that Blandón's electronics, procured by Lister, included walkie-talkies, pagers, police scanners, voice scramblers and anti-eavesdropping equipment; that during a 1987 raid on Ross associates Los Angeles County Sheriff's sergeant [[Robert Sobel]] complained that the dealers had "better equipment than we have"; that Blandón proposed to Ross that Ross set up a cocaine buy as an ambush, offering "you keep the dope"; and that Ross also bought police-raid warnings from him.[^9] Webb wrote that Meneses's later aide [[Enrique Miranda]] said Meneses's drug planes flew out of [[Ilopango Airbase]] in El Salvador, the hub [[Oliver North]] used for his Contra air force, where, according to Iran-Contra prosecutor [[Lawrence Walsh]], North's operatives worked "practically unfettered"; the Inspector General found Miranda's account second-hand and uncorroborated.[^26][^30][^31]
### Footnotes
@ -187,3 +187,4 @@ Webb wrote that Blandón's electronics, procured by Lister, included walkie-talk
[^28]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 25: "Things are moving all around us."
[^29]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Cast of Characters.
[^30]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter VII (Enrique Miranda-Jaime), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch07.htm
[^31]: Office of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters, Final Report, Vol. I, Part V, The Flow of Funds: The Prosecution of the Private Operatives, Overview. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_v.htm

26
10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Danny Casolaro.md
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@ -59,15 +59,17 @@ The family disputed the suicide ruling, citing Casolaro's known fear of blood an
Casolaro had packed his notes, handwritten outlines, a 12-page Riconosciuto memo detailing PROMIS allegations, newspaper clippings, and names of former CIA officers and arms dealers into a black leather tote bag and a dark brown briefcase when he left for Martinsburg. The briefcase, which his associates said contained documents central to his investigation, was not recovered.[^1]
In 2024, Martinsburg police released records under a Freedom of Information Act request by researchers Zachary Treitz and Christian Hansen. These records indicated that another person had visited Casolaro's room on the night of August 9, and that an eyewitness had provided police with a written statement and sketch of this visitor - a description matching [[Joseph Cuellar]], a man who had made contact with Casolaro weeks earlier at a local bar. Cuellar had described himself to Casolaro as a Special Forces operative and had offered to arrange a meeting between Casolaro and [[Peter Videnieks]], the DOJ contracting official central to the PROMIS case, through Videnieks' wife Barbara, who served as executive assistant to Senator [[Robert Byrd]].[^1]
In 2024, Martinsburg police released records under a Freedom of Information Act request by researchers Zachary Treitz and Christian Hansen. These records indicated that another person had visited Casolaro's room on the night of August 9, and that an eyewitness had provided police with a written statement and sketch of this visitor - a description matching [[Joseph Cuellar]], a man who had made contact with Casolaro weeks earlier at a local bar. Cuellar talked of his exploits in the Army special forces, and Casolaro asked him repeatedly to arrange a meeting with [[Peter Videnieks]], the DOJ contracting official central to the PROMIS case, to question him about Riconosciuto's March 1991 affidavit. The Justice Department's 1994 review of the Bua report recorded that Videnieks' wife works for Senator [[Robert Byrd]], and that Cuellar said a former fiancée had worked with her in the Senator's Capitol Hill office. Cuellar called Videnieks, who refused.[^1][^5]
The 1994 Justice Department review of the Bua report addressed the allegation that Videnieks was involved in the death. The review found "no evidence whatsoever" of his involvement and recorded that Videnieks said he had been at a summer cottage in New York state from August 5 to August 11, 1991. His personnel records reflect leave in that period, and a credit card receipt shows a purchase at a bookstore in Oneonta, New York, on August 9. The review found no evidence linking Cuellar to the death, and recorded that Cuellar was in Washington, D.C., on August 10, 1991.[^6]
### Congressional and Official Findings
The [[House Committee on the Judiciary|House Judiciary Committee]]'s September 1992 report noted that Casolaro had "encountered dangerous individuals associated with organized crime and the world of covert intelligence operations" and recommended further investigation into the circumstances of his death. The committee found no evidence that DOJ had sought to influence the local West Virginia investigation.[^2]
The Bua Report, completed in March 1993, stated that "the physical evidence in Casolaro's hotel room strongly supports the conclusion of the local authorities that the death was a suicide," found no DOJ influence on the local investigation, and stated that "there was ample reason to believe Casolaro had a motive to commit suicide," noting that he had been unemployed for months, was dependent on family for support, faced a balloon mortgage, and had been told by a prospective publisher shortly before his death that it would not advance him money on his proposed book about the "Octopus."[^5]
The Bua Report, completed in March 1993, stated that "the physical evidence in Casolaro's hotel room strongly supports the conclusion of the local authorities that the death was a suicide," found no DOJ influence on the local investigation, and stated that "there was ample reason to believe Casolaro had a motive to commit suicide," noting that he had been unemployed for months, was dependent on family for support, faced a balloon mortgage, and had been told by a prospective publisher shortly before his death that it would not advance him money on his proposed book about the "Octopus."[^7]
The Bua report listed the tests it relied on: handwriting analysis confirming that Casolaro wrote the note found in the room; fingerprint analysis finding his prints and none other except a single print on an ash tray; hair and fiber analysis; an analysis of the bloodstains by Dr. Lee of the Connecticut State Police Forensic Science Laboratory consistent with suicide; and an autopsy finding hemorrhage from the wrist wounds as the cause of death and no evidence that he was unconscious or debilitated when cut. It addressed criticisms that the room was not sealed, that notification of next of kin was delayed while the body was embalmed, and that Martinsburg authorities discounted suspicions about his "sources," stating that "no credible evidence suggested that any of Casolaro's 'sources' played any role in his death." The report also records that Michael Riconosciuto, in a lawsuit against Bua, alleged that one of the FBI agents assigned to the investigation had murdered Casolaro; the district court dismissed the suit as patently frivolous (*Riconosciuto v. Bua*, No. 92 C 6217, N.D. Ill.).[^6]
The Bua report listed the tests it relied on: handwriting analysis confirming that Casolaro wrote the note found in the room; fingerprint analysis finding his prints and none other except a single print on an ash tray; hair and fiber analysis; an analysis of the bloodstains by Dr. Lee of the Connecticut State Police Forensic Science Laboratory consistent with suicide; and an autopsy finding hemorrhage from the wrist wounds as the cause of death and no evidence that he was unconscious or debilitated when cut. It addressed criticisms that the room was not sealed, that notification of next of kin was delayed while the body was embalmed, and that Martinsburg authorities discounted suspicions about his "sources," stating that "no credible evidence suggested that any of Casolaro's 'sources' played any role in his death." The report also records that Michael Riconosciuto, in a lawsuit against Bua, alleged that one of the FBI agents assigned to the investigation had murdered Casolaro; the district court dismissed the suit as patently frivolous (*Riconosciuto v. Bua*, No. 92 C 6217, N.D. Ill.).[^8]
FBI task force members assigned to examine Casolaro's death privately "questioned the conclusion of suicide" and recommended further investigation; expressing doubt about the ruling reportedly "risked one's career" within the Bureau as of December 1992. FBI documents related to Casolaro remain partially withheld from public release under national security exemptions, while the Bureau simultaneously claims the files are missing - a contradiction noted by MuckRock journalists who filed FOIA requests.[^1]
@ -79,9 +81,9 @@ Casolaro's investigation intersected with the drug-trafficking networks document
### The research files
Casolaro's research files, photographed by [[Christian Hansen]] at the Missouri State Historical Society and published on the Internet Archive, include a folder labelled "Promotional Material" of corporate and weapons literature, hand-numbered "BD|AI|PM-01" onward. Its items are a brochure for the Inter-Probe modular energy transfer catalyzer (PM-01), a printed page numbered 207 on fuel air munitions (PM-02), a [[Brunswick Corporation]] defense division cover sheet and drawing for the Rifleman's Assault Weapon for urban warfare dated October 1976 (PM-03), a sales sheet of the defense division of the Chilean firm [[Industrias Cardoen]] (PM-04) and a fax of the resumes of the associates of [[Counter Terrorism Consultants, Inc.]], whose fax counters run 141 P01 to 141 P12 (PM-05) and whose page headers carry the date June 20, 1990 and times from 16:53 to 17:01.[^7] In the order of the photographs the folder runs PM-04, PM-02, PM-03, PM-05, PM-01.[^7] The packet names [[Carter Cornick]], [[Eugene Propper]], [[E. Lawrence Barcella, Jr.|E. Lawrence Barcella]], [[Francis J. McNeil]], [[James B. Motley]] (a vice president of [[Wackenhut Advanced Technologies Corporation]]), [[Mayer Nudell]] and a former CIA counterterrorism chief whose entry carries no name.[^7] The files also contain a folder of 1980s newspaper and magazine material on [[Frank Terpil]] and [[Edwin Wilson]], folders of Wackenhut annual reports, correspondence, profiles and newsletters, and, in a folder of Department of Defense publications, a magazine article by David Corn on Barcella and the Pan Am 103 bombing.[^8]
Casolaro's research files, photographed by [[Christian Hansen]] at the Missouri State Historical Society and published on the Internet Archive, include a folder labelled "Promotional Material" of corporate and weapons literature, hand-numbered "BD|AI|PM-01" onward. Its items are a brochure for the Inter-Probe modular energy transfer catalyzer (PM-01), a printed page numbered 207 on fuel air munitions (PM-02), a [[Brunswick Corporation]] defense division cover sheet and drawing for the Rifleman's Assault Weapon for urban warfare dated October 1976 (PM-03), a sales sheet of the defense division of the Chilean firm [[Industrias Cardoen]] (PM-04) and a fax of the resumes of the associates of [[Counter Terrorism Consultants, Inc.]], whose fax counters run 141 P01 to 141 P12 (PM-05) and whose page headers carry the date June 20, 1990 and times from 16:53 to 17:01.[^9] In the order of the photographs the folder runs PM-04, PM-02, PM-03, PM-05, PM-01.[^9] The packet names [[Carter Cornick]], [[Eugene Propper]], [[E. Lawrence Barcella, Jr.|E. Lawrence Barcella]], [[Francis J. McNeil]], [[James B. Motley]] (a vice president of [[Wackenhut Advanced Technologies Corporation]]), [[Mayer Nudell]] and a former CIA counterterrorism chief whose entry carries no name.[^9] The files also contain a folder of 1980s newspaper and magazine material on [[Frank Terpil]] and [[Edwin Wilson]], folders of Wackenhut annual reports, correspondence, profiles and newsletters, and, in a folder of Department of Defense publications, a magazine article by David Corn on Barcella and the Pan Am 103 bombing.[^10]
The INSLAW folder of the research files includes a *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* report of February 19, 1991 that names Industrias Cardoen and its owner [[Carlos Cardoen]]. It states that [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], in an affidavit filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia, said that Cardoen told him in January 1989 that Cardoen had brokered a deal between Earl Brian and an Iraqi military intelligence representative for the use of PROMIS, and that the sale was consummated in Santiago, Chile.[^9] Brian called the allegations "nonsense," according to the report.[^9] The report of Special Counsel [[Nicholas J. Bua]] dates the affidavit February 17, 1991.[^10]
The INSLAW folder of the research files includes a *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* report of February 19, 1991 that names Industrias Cardoen and its owner [[Carlos Cardoen]]. It states that [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], in an affidavit filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia, said that Cardoen told him in January 1989 that Cardoen had brokered a deal between Earl Brian and an Iraqi military intelligence representative for the use of PROMIS, and that the sale was consummated in Santiago, Chile.[^11] Brian called the allegations "nonsense," according to the report.[^11] The report of Special Counsel [[Nicholas J. Bua]] dates the affidavit February 17, 1991.[^12]
### Bibliography
@ -93,9 +95,11 @@ The INSLAW folder of the research files includes a *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* rep
[^2]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. *The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report.* House Report 102-857, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, September 10, 1992.
[^3]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 6: "They were doing their patriotic duty."
[^4]: U.S. Department of Justice, *Report of the United States Department of Justice on the Review of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua's Report on the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc.*, September 27, 1994, p. 9 (Summary item 4) and pp. 107-168 (Section V), at pp. 137 (August 7, 1991 call, August 17, 1991 letter, later interview), 146 (September 1990 agent meeting; "part-time author"), 148 to 149 (December 1990 New York meetings) and 154 (his account of Casolaro's state of mind). https://archive.org/details/InslawPROMISBuaReport.
[^5]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 246-250 ("B. The Death of Joseph Daniel Casolaro").
[^6]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 246-250 and p. 69. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
[^7]: Danny Casolaro papers, folder "Promotional Material," Internet Archive items casolaro-notebooks (PromotionalMaterial.pdf) and PromotionalMaterial, https://archive.org/details/casolaro-notebooks.
[^8]: Danny Casolaro papers, folders "CIA Frank Terpil Renegades," "Wackenhut - Newsletters" and "DOD PUBLICATIONS," https://archive.org/details/ddosecrets_casolaro_files (the Corn item is headed "SPECIAL EDITION - TERRORISM / Did It Blow Up Flight 103?").
[^9]: *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, February 19, 1991, "Stolen Software Scattered: Affidavits Allege Sales To Iraqis And Israelis," clipping in the INSLAW folder, https://archive.org/download/casolaro-notebooks/InslawIi_djvu.txt.
[^10]: Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General regarding the allegations of INSLAW, Inc. (March 1993), pp. 73-74.
[^5]: U.S. Department of Justice. Review of the *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua*, September 27, 1994, pp. 161-162. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
[^6]: U.S. Department of Justice. Review of the *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua*, September 27, 1994, pp. 159-160, 162. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
[^7]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 246-250 ("B. The Death of Joseph Daniel Casolaro").
[^8]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, pp. 246-250 and p. 69. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
[^9]: Danny Casolaro papers, folder "Promotional Material," Internet Archive items casolaro-notebooks (PromotionalMaterial.pdf) and PromotionalMaterial, https://archive.org/details/casolaro-notebooks.
[^10]: Danny Casolaro papers, folders "CIA Frank Terpil Renegades," "Wackenhut - Newsletters" and "DOD PUBLICATIONS," https://archive.org/details/ddosecrets_casolaro_files (the Corn item is headed "SPECIAL EDITION - TERRORISM / Did It Blow Up Flight 103?").
[^11]: *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, February 19, 1991, "Stolen Software Scattered: Affidavits Allege Sales To Iraqis And Israelis," clipping in the INSLAW folder, https://archive.org/download/casolaro-notebooks/InslawIi_djvu.txt.
[^12]: Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General regarding the allegations of INSLAW, Inc. (March 1993), pp. 73-74.

14
10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Desmond FitzGerald.md
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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
created: 2026-05-15
updated: 2026-05-15
updated: 2026-10-09
title: Desmond FitzGerald
aliases:
- Des FitzGerald
@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ tags:
- ColdWar
- 1960s
category: "Intelligence & Government"
summary: "Desmond FitzGerald was the CIA's Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division from 1963 who personally managed the AM/LASH operation targeting Fidel Castro, meeting with Cuban official Rolando Cubela on the day of President Kennedy's assassination to provide him a poison pen, and died of a heart attack while playing tennis on July 23, 1967."
summary: "CIA Western Hemisphere Division chief from 1963 who handled the AM/LASH contact Rolando Cubela, met him in Paris on the day of the Kennedy assassination, and died of a heart attack on July 23, 1967."
born: 1910-04-16
died: 1967-07-23
location: "Washington, D.C."
@ -24,17 +24,17 @@ Desmond FitzGerald (April 16, 1910 - July 23, 1967) was a senior [[Central Intel
FitzGerald came from a Boston Brahmin background, educated at Harvard College and [[Harvard Law School]]. He served in the U.S. Army during World War II and joined the CIA in 1950. His early career included work in Asia, including involvement in the [[Philippines]] operations under [[Edward Lansdale]]. He rose rapidly through the clandestine service, becoming Chief of the Far East Division before his assignment as Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division in 1963.
His assignment to the Western Hemisphere Division came after [[William Harvey]]'s removal to [[Rome]] following the Cuban Missile Crisis. FitzGerald inherited responsibility for the CIA's anti-Castro operations at a moment when [[Operation Mongoose]] had been formally suspended but covert pressure on Cuba continued under different organizational structures.[^1]
FitzGerald replaced [[William Harvey]] as chief of [[Task Force W]] in January 1963, according to the Inspector General's report of 1967 as quoted by the Senate interim report. The Senate report states that it is unclear whether Harvey or FitzGerald conceived the plan to present Castro with a contaminated diving suit.[^2] Harvey's move to the [[Rome]] station followed; a CIA appointment memorandum of June 1963 made him chief of station effective on or about June 30, 1963.[^3] FitzGerald inherited responsibility for the CIA's anti-Castro operations at a moment when [[Operation Mongoose]] had been formally suspended but covert pressure on Cuba continued under different organizational structures.[^1]
### AM/LASH and Rolando Cubela
The AM/LASH operation involved [[Rolando Cubela]], a senior figure in the Cuban revolutionary government who served as a military officer and had access to Castro's inner circle. Cubela had made contact with CIA officers indicating his willingness to work against Castro. Whether Cubela was a genuine defector, a double agent working for [[Cuban intelligence|Cuban G2]], or something more complex was never resolved.
The AM/LASH operation involved Rolando Cubela, a senior figure in the Cuban revolutionary government who served as a military officer and had access to Castro's inner circle. Cubela had made contact with CIA officers indicating his willingness to work against Castro. Whether Cubela was a genuine defector, a double agent working for [[Cuban intelligence|Cuban G2]], or something more complex was never resolved.
FitzGerald personally met with Cubela in Paris on September 7, 1963, taking the unusual step of identifying himself (falsely) as a personal representative of [[Robert Kennedy]] - thereby invoking the attorney general's name without authorization as a means of establishing the seriousness of American intent. This impersonation was later considered a serious breach of operational security and proper authority.
On November 22, 1963 - the day Kennedy was assassinated in [[Dallas, Texas|Dallas]] - FitzGerald was in Paris meeting again with Cubela, providing him with a concealed hypodermic needle disguised as a ballpoint pen, developed by the CIA's [[Technical Services Division]], loaded with a toxin intended for administration to Castro. The irony of the simultaneous events - an American officer providing Castro assassination equipment at the exact moment Kennedy was being shot - was noted by the [[Church Committee]] and by subsequent investigators as emblematic of the confusions and entanglements of Cold War covert operations.
The AM/LASH operation ultimately produced no result against Castro. Cuban intelligence service sources later claimed the operation had been penetrated from early on, and that Cubela had been operating as a double agent. Cubela was arrested by Cuban authorities in 1966 and sentenced to twenty-five years; he was released in 1979.[^2]
The AM/LASH operation ultimately produced no result against Castro. Cuban intelligence service sources later claimed the operation had been penetrated from early on, and that Cubela had been operating as a double agent. Cubela was arrested by Cuban authorities in 1966 and sentenced to twenty-five years; he was released in 1979.[^4]
### Post-Operational Career and Death
@ -45,4 +45,6 @@ He died suddenly on July 23, 1967, of a massive heart attack while playing tenni
### Footnotes
[^1]: Thomas, Evan. *The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA.* Simon & Schuster, 1995. Church Committee (U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities). *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders.* Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975.
[^2]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Dark Side of Camelot.* Little, Brown, 1997. Escalante, Fabián. *The Cuba Project: CIA Covert Operations 1959-1962.* Ocean Press, 2004.
[^2]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report*, S. Rept. 94-465, November 20, 1975, pp. 86-87 (citing the Inspector General's report, p. 75). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^3]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum "Appointment of Mr. William K. Harvey Chief of Station, Rome, Italy," June 12, 1963. Reading room document 01228805, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01228805
[^4]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Dark Side of Camelot.* Little, Brown, 1997. Escalante, Fabián. *The Cuba Project: CIA Covert Operations 1959-1962.* Ocean Press, 2004.

12
10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/George H.W. Bush.md
View file

@ -18,6 +18,12 @@ summary: "Vice President under Reagan and 41st U.S. President who dealt with Isr
born: 1924-06-12
died: 2018-11-30
location: "Milton, Massachusetts"
relations:
- type: reported_to
with: "[[Gerald R. Ford]]"
role: "Director of Central Intelligence"
start: 1976-01-30
fn: 5
---
George H.W. Bush served as the Vice President under President [[Ronald Reagan]] and later as the 41st President of the United States. He was present at a meeting of Reagan's high command following the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor at [[Osirak bombing]] in June 1981, where he agreed that some sanctions against [[Israel]] were essential.[^1]
@ -31,11 +37,13 @@ The [[Medellin Cartel|Medellín Cartel]] reportedly made a deal with Vice Presid
At the same time Reagan and Bush were publicly whipping the American public into a frenzy over street-corner crack dealers, [[Oliver North]] and other top administration officials were livid that Contra-connected drug trafficker General [[Jose Bueso Rosa]] had even been charged with a crime. North's computer messages about Bueso Rosa illustrated how skewed the Reagan administration's sense of justice had become regarding its "War on Drugs." [[Scott Weekly]], a figure connected to the CIA and the Hasenfus shootdown, claimed on tape that he reported to people who reported to Bush.[^3]
As director of central intelligence in 1976 Bush was briefed on the CIA's remote-viewing research at [[Stanford Research Institute]] after the agency learned that Soviet visitors were "questioning Puthoff and Targ at SRI," and left office before reacting. As vice president, in 1983 (the chronology's date reads as March 31 or August 3), he "was briefed for thirty minutes concerning [[Center Lane|CENTER LANE]] related activities by Dr. [[Jack Vorona]], DIA," the Army's remote-viewing unit, with "Adm. Murphy, C/S," and "Mr. Gregg" present; INSCOM's chronology records that "the briefing was well received and the Vice President was interested and impressed."[^4]
On November 3, 1975 President [[Gerald R. Ford]] announced at a news conference that he intended to nominate Ambassador Bush, then the United States representative to the People's Republic of China, as Director of Central Intelligence, succeeding [[William Colby]].[^4] Bush was sworn in as Director of Central Intelligence on January 30, 1976.[^5] As director of central intelligence in 1976 Bush was briefed on the CIA's remote-viewing research at [[Stanford Research Institute]] after the agency learned that Soviet visitors were "questioning Puthoff and Targ at SRI," and left office before reacting. As vice president, in 1983 (the chronology's date reads as March 31 or August 3), he "was briefed for thirty minutes concerning [[Center Lane|CENTER LANE]] related activities by Dr. [[Jack Vorona]], DIA," the Army's remote-viewing unit, with "Adm. Murphy, C/S," and "Mr. Gregg" present; INSCOM's chronology records that "the briefing was well received and the Vice President was interested and impressed."[^6]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991.
[^2]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 13: "The wrong kind of friends"
[^3]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 20: "It is a sensitive matter"
[^4]: Kress, Kenneth A. "Parapsychology in Intelligence: A Personal Review and Conclusions," *Studies in Intelligence,* vol. 21, no. 4, winter 1977, declassified, document NSA-RDP96X00790R000100010031-3; reprinted with the author's postscript of January 1999 in *Journal of Scientific Exploration,* vol. 13, no. 1, 1999. US Army Intelligence and Security Command, "List of Events from September 1977 to January 1986," CIA-RDP96-00788R001100020001-8. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
[^4]: The President's News Conference, November 3, 1975, including the statement announcing personnel changes. The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-60
[^5]: Remarks at the Swearing In of George Bush as Director of Central Intelligence, January 30, 1976. The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-swearing-george-bush-director-central-intelligence
[^6]: Kress, Kenneth A. "Parapsychology in Intelligence: A Personal Review and Conclusions," *Studies in Intelligence,* vol. 21, no. 4, winter 1977, declassified, document NSA-RDP96X00790R000100010031-3; reprinted with the author's postscript of January 1999 in *Journal of Scientific Exploration,* vol. 13, no. 1, 1999. US Army Intelligence and Security Command, "List of Events from September 1977 to January 1986," CIA-RDP96-00788R001100020001-8.

190
10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Gerald R. Ford.md
View file

@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
---
aliases:
- Gerald Ford
- Gerald R. Ford
- President Ford
category: "Political Figure"
tags:
- Person
@ -8,17 +10,195 @@ tags:
- Israel
- Diplomat
- Military
summary: "In late 1976, at the end of his tenure as President, Henry A."
- WarrenCommission
- FBI
- UFO
- NixonPardon
- RockefellerCommission
- ChurchCommittee
- PikeCommittee
- HalloweenMassacre
- IntelligenceReform
- FreedomOfInformationAct
summary: "Thirty-eighth President of the United States, a member of the Warren Commission and House Minority Leader who called for a 1966 congressional inquiry into UFO sightings, who later pardoned Richard Nixon."
born: 1913-07-14
died: 2006-12-26
location: "Omaha, Nebraska"
updated: 2026-10-09
relations:
- type: member_of
with: "[[Warren Commission]]"
start: 1963-12
end: 1964-09-18
fn: 2
- type: informant_for
with: "[[Federal Bureau of Investigation]]"
start: 1963-12-12
fn: 10
- type: appointed
with: "[[Nelson Rockefeller]]"
role: "Chairman, Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States"
start: 1975-01-05
fn: 21
- type: appointed
with: "[[James D. Theberge]]"
role: "Ambassador to Nicaragua (nominee)"
start: 1975-05-30
fn: 27
- type: appointed
with: "[[Donald Rumsfeld]]"
role: "Secretary of Defense (nominee)"
start: 1975-11-03
fn: 33
- type: appointed
with: "[[Brent Scowcroft]]"
role: "Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs"
start: 1975-11-03
fn: 33
- type: appointed
with: "[[Dick Cheney]]"
role: "Assistant to the President (White House staff coordinator)"
start: 1975-11-03
fn: 33
- type: appointed
with: "[[Elliot Richardson]]"
role: "Secretary of Commerce (nominee)"
start: 1975-11-03
fn: 33
- type: appointed
with: "[[George H.W. Bush]]"
role: "Director of Central Intelligence"
start: 1976-01-30
fn: 34
---
Gerald R. Ford was the 38th President of the [[United States]], serving from 1974 to 1977. His administration, along with that of [[Richard Nixon|Richard Nixon]], maintained a warm relationship with [[Israel]], a stark contrast to the later approach of the [[Jimmy Carter|Carter]] administration. Ford's precedent was to tightly restrict access to high-quality [[KH-11]] imagery, even to close allies like [[Great Britain]].[^1]
Gerald R. Ford was the 38th President of the [[United States]], serving from 1974 to 1977. He succeeded [[Richard Nixon]], whose resignation took effect on August 9, 1974.[^1] Before he became President he was a Republican member of the House of Representatives from [[Michigan]], and he was one of the seven members of the [[Warren Commission]] investigating the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.[^2]
In late 1976, at the end of his tenure as President, [[Henry A. Kissinger]] casually mentioned to [[Hermann F. Eilts]], the American ambassador to [[Egypt]], a concern that the Israelis might go nuclear if they didn't receive military equipment quickly. This occurred during a final meeting where Kissinger brought up the 1973 [[Yom Kippur War]] again.[^2]
### Warren Commission
Ford served on the commission from its first meeting in December 1963 through its final meeting on September 18, 1964. His desk diaries for 1963 and 1964 were reviewed in 1997 by T. Jeremy Gunn of the [[Assassination Records Review Board]]. Gunn wrote that most diary entries relating to the commission were brief, usually recording an executive session or the subject of a witness's testimony. A March 1964 entry concerned a commission meeting about staff counsel [[Norman Redlich]]. Ford gave some consideration to resigning after that meeting, and [[Allen Dulles]] telephoned him the next day and urged him not to resign. Gunn also wrote that a January 1964 entry appeared to record a viewing of the assassination film at the Treasury Department, and that Ford said he believed it referred to the Zapruder film. Gunn added his own speculation that Ford may have been shown a [[United States Secret Service|Secret Service]] copy before the original was shown to the commission.[^2]
Ford recalled to Gunn that the principal subject of the final meeting was Senator [[Richard Russell]]'s concern that the report include language saying that "the Commission had found no evidence of a conspiracy, foreign or domestic." Ford said he had since become aware of no evidence that points to a conspiracy. Gunn also asked Ford about a January 1975 Ford Library document recording statements by [[Henry A. Kissinger]] about information he had recently received from [[Richard Helms]] on Castro assassination attempts of the early 1960s. Ford did not recall the conversation and suggested speaking to Kissinger.[^2]
At the executive session of January 22, 1964, called after Texas Attorney General [[Waggoner Carr]] reported that Oswald had been an undercover FBI agent, Ford said that postal authorities might have watched activity at a particular post office box, and said that Oswald had been "playing ball" with the Communist parties and with the Trotskyites.[^3] When Special Agent [[John W. Fain]] testified on May 6, 1964, Ford and Dulles questioned him in detail about discrepancies in Oswald's statements; the Church Committee's Book V records that Fain did not mention Oswald's refusal to take a polygraph test at that testimony.[^4] At the September 18, 1964 session, a motion by Ford to print in the hearings a letter from Representative [[John R. Pillion]] of Buffalo failed for want of a second.[^5]
In 1964 Ford changed the commission staff's description of where the bullet entered [[John F. Kennedy|Kennedy]]'s body. The staff text placed the wound in the uppermost back. Ford's handwritten change placed the entry "at the back of his neck." The [[Associated Press]] reported that the change strengthened the commission's conclusion that a single bullet passed through Kennedy and wounded [[John Connally|Texas Governor John Connally]]. Ford's handwritten notes were among about 40,000 pages of records kept by commission chief counsel [[J. Lee Rankin]], and the Assassination Records Review Board made them public on July 2, 1997.[^6]
In a telephone interview from Beaver Creek, Colorado, Ford said, "My changes had nothing to do with a conspiracy theory," and "My changes were only an attempt to be more precise." Robert D. Morningstar, a computer systems specialist in New York City who had written an internet book on the assassination, called the change "the most significant lie in the whole Warren Commission report." Morningstar argued that the change suggested a bullet had struck Kennedy in the neck, "raising the wound two or three inches."[^6]
The published report states in its summary of the shooting that "A bullet had entered the base of the back of his neck slightly to the right of the spine." Its chapter on the shots describes "another bullet wound" observed at the autopsy "near the base of the back of President Kennedy's neck slightly to the right of his spine."[^7][^8]
### FBI liaison
A 1963 FBI memorandum, released long before 2008, recorded that Ford, then a congressman, volunteered to keep the bureau informed about the commission's private deliberations, on condition that the arrangement remain confidential. The bureau agreed.[^9] That memorandum is [[Cartha DeLoach]]'s account to [[John P. Mohr]] of the bureau, dated December 12, 1963, of his first conversation with Ford, which took place in the congressman's office on the morning of December 12, one week after the commission's first meeting and three days after the FBI delivered its report on the assassination to the commission.[^10][^11] The [[Washington Post]] reported on its release in January 1978 together with more than 58,000 other pages of the bureau's assassination files.[^10]
[[Max Holland]] quoted the memorandum: "Ford told me he was somewhat disturbed about the manner in which Chief Justice Warren was carrying on his chairmanship of the presidential commission." DeLoach continued: "Ford indicated he would keep me thoroughly advised as to the activities of the commission. He stated this would have to be on a confidential basis[;] however, he thought it should be done. He also asked if he could call me from time to time and straighten out questions in his mind concerning our investigation. I told him by all means he should do this. He reiterated that our relationship would of course, remain confidential."[^11] The Washington Post reported that the memorandum recorded Ford's criticism of [[Earl Warren]], including Warren's proposal of his protege [[Warren Olney]] as chief counsel, which Ford described as an attempt to establish a "one-man commission," and that Ford relayed similar complaints by Representative [[Hale Boggs]] and by Dulles. The newspaper reported that J. Lee Rankin was named chief counsel instead, as a compromise.[^10]
A second memorandum, dated December 17, 1963, summarized what Ford told DeLoach in the congressman's office about the commission meeting of the day before. It was first reported in 2008, when the FBI released about 500 pages of its file on Ford in response to Freedom of Information Act requests that the Associated Press and others had filed on the day of his death in December 2006. DeLoach wrote: "Two members of the commission brought up the fact that they still were not convinced that the president had been shot from the sixth floor window of the Texas Book Depository." He added: "These members failed to understand the trajectory of the slugs that killed the president. He stated he felt this point would be discussed further but, of course, would represent no problem." Ford also reported internal disputes over hiring staff and Warren's timetable for the final report. In return, DeLoach gave Ford confidential updates on the position of [[J. Edgar Hoover]] on panel disputes and discussed where leaks were coming from. With Hoover's approval, DeLoach also lent Ford a locked bureau briefcase so that he could take the FBI's confidential report on the assassination on a ski trip. DeLoach wrote that Ford had no way to take the report "in complete safety," and the memorandum bears a handwritten "OK" over Hoover's initial.[^9]
Holland wrote that the bureau's files record only two later contacts between DeLoach and Ford in memorandum form, on July 10 and August 24, 1964, both concerning the leaking of Lee Harvey Oswald's diary to the news media; that on April 16, 1964 Ford and his wife attended a party at DeLoach's home at which Hoover was present, followed by a letter from Hoover to Ford dated April 17, 1964; and that after the January 1965 election of Ford as House minority leader the bureau placed him on its "Special Correspondents' List."[^11] The Associated Press reported an internal FBI memorandum of 1965 stating that "though we did experience some difficulty with all the members of the Warren Commission, Ford was of considerable help to the Bureau."[^9]
Ford told Gunn in 1997 that DeLoach's claim that valuable information about the commission's discussions had been obtained was not true. He suggested that DeLoach had exaggerated what he obtained in order to curry favor with Hoover. Gunn wrote that he found no entries in the desk diaries recording meetings between Ford and Hoover or DeLoach. Ford recalled that DeLoach came by his office on occasion during the commission's work and asked general questions, such as whether the FBI was cooperating, and that the only meetings with Hoover he might have had were when Hoover dropped into his office while the bureau's budget was before Congress.[^2]
### The 1966 House UFO inquiry
On March 25, 1966, while House Minority Leader, Ford said that a national inquiry into unidentified flying objects would be worthwhile because the American people were becoming alarmed by the UFO stories.[^12] On March 28 he sent a letter to Representatives [[George P. Miller]], chairman of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, and [[L. Mendel Rivers]], chairman of the [[House Committee on Armed Services]]. The letter concerned sightings reported in Michigan that month. Ford wrote that [[J. Allen Hynek]], the astrophysicist the Air Force had sent to Michigan, "dismissed all of them as the product of college-student pranks or swamp gas or an impression created by the rising crescent moon and the planet Venus." He wrote that he did not agree "that all of these reports can be or should be so easily explained away." He proposed that "either the Science and Astronautics Committee or the Armed Services Committee of the House schedule hearings on the subject of UFO's and invite testimony from both the executive branch of the government and some of the persons who claim to have seen UFO's." The letter enclosed a column by Roscoe Drummond and six articles by Bulkley Griffin of the Griffin-Larrabee News Bureau, and it quoted telegrams from persons who said they had seen UFOs. The news release issued with the letter described the "swamp gas" explanation given by Hynek as "flippant."[^13]
On April 3 Ford issued a statement noting that the Armed Services Committee had scheduled a closed-door hearing with the Air Force for Tuesday. He said that Representative Joseph E. Karth had headed a three-man subcommittee that held two days of closed hearings on Air Force witnesses for the Science and Astronautics Committee in 1961, and that no record of them was made. Ford said that Miller had shied away from a UFO probe, saying his committee did not have jurisdiction over the Air Force. Ford wrote that he had never said that he believed any of the reported sightings indicated "visits to earth from another planet," and that some of the objects "may well be products of experimentation by our own military."[^14]
The Armed Services hearing took place on April 5, 1966. Secretary of the Air Force [[Harold Brown]] and [[John P. McConnell|General McConnell]] appeared, and Hynek and Major Hector Quintanilla, the Project Blue Book officer, attended. Rivers opened the UFO portion of the session by saying, "Mr. Ford has come out, he has a pretty good size stature in the Congress," and later asked that Ford's letter and Brown's response be put into the record.[^15] The printed transcript reproduces the letter addressed to Rivers alone and signed "Gerald R. Ford, Member of Congress," with the Drummond column as an enclosure.[^16]
On April 21 Ford announced that the Air Force had arranged for a study of unexplained sightings by high-caliber scientists at a university with no close ties to the Air Force. The study was to be placed under contract after July 1, and Ford reported that the Air Force assured him the report would be made public.[^17]
### Nixon pardon
On September 8, 1974, Ford issued Proclamation 4311, which granted "a full, free, and absolute pardon unto Richard Nixon for all offenses against the United States which he, Richard Nixon, has committed or may have committed or taken part in during the period from January 20, 1969 through August 9, 1974." The proclamation was issued under the pardon power in Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution. It recites the House Committee on the Judiciary's impeachment inquiry, which it describes as extending over more than eight months.[^1]
On October 17, 1974 Ford appeared before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary on two resolutions of inquiry about the pardon. He stated: "In that entire period no references or discussions on a possible pardon for then President Nixon occurred until August 1 and 2, 1974." Asked whether [[Alexander M. Haig, Jr.|Alexander Haig]] had discussed a pardon with Nixon or his representatives during the week of August 4 or afterward, he answered that it was "not to my knowledge."[^18]
### Freedom of Information Act veto
On October 17, 1974, the day he testified on the pardon, Ford vetoed H.R. 12471, the bill amending the [[Freedom of Information Act]]. His message to the House stated: "I remain concerned that our military or intelligence secrets and diplomatic relations could be adversely affected by this bill." He objected that courts should not be forced to make the initial classification decision, and proposed that the courts uphold a classification where there was a reasonable basis to support it. He also objected to the burden on FBI and other law enforcement files and to the ten-day and twenty-day deadlines.[^19] The [[National Security Archive]] reported that concerns about leaks, shared by Rumsfeld and Cheney, and legal arguments that the bill was unconstitutional, marshaled by government lawyer [[Antonin Scalia]] among others, persuaded Ford to veto it. The House overrode the veto 371 to 31 on November 20, 1974, and the Senate 65 to 27 on November 21.[^20]
### Rockefeller Commission
On January 4, 1975 Ford issued Executive Order 11828 establishing the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States and announced that it would "ascertain and evaluate any facts relating to activities conducted within the United States by the Central Intelligence Agency that give rise to questions as to whether the Agency has exceeded its statutory authority."[^21] The order directed the commission to ascertain and evaluate facts bearing on compliance with 50 U.S.C. 403, to determine whether existing safeguards were adequate, and to make recommendations to the President and the Director of Central Intelligence. It required the commission to furnish the Attorney General any evidence it found that might relate to offenses under federal statutes, and to present its final report within three months of the order.[^22] On January 5 the White House announced the chairman and members: Vice President [[Nelson Rockefeller]], chairman, with John T. Connor, [[C. Douglas Dillon]], Erwin N. Griswold, [[Ronald Reagan]], Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Edgar F. Shannon and Joseph Lane Kirkland.[^21] The commission is known as the [[Rockefeller Commission 1975]]. Its executive director was [[David W. Belin]], who had been a lawyer for the Warren Commission.[^23]
The commission's report states that the President had requested a report on many of the charges from the Director of Central Intelligence and received it in late December 1974. The transmittal letter to Ford is dated June 6, 1975.[^23]
According to the National Security Archive, which published the White House and commission files on February 29, 2016, the commission's assassination inquiry was narrowed by the White House. The archive reported that Ford's January 1975 remark to newspaper editors had revealed CIA involvement in assassination plots, and that the commission voted, over its chairman's objection, to include CIA plots against foreign leaders. It reported that Belin was the main author of the portion on CIA plotting against [[Fidel Castro]], including [[ZR RIFLE|ZR/RIFLE]]. It reported that Cheney, then deputy assistant to the president, and White House Counsel [[Philip Buchen]] intervened to induce Belin to cancel a press conference on the assassination findings, citing concerns raised by Kissinger. This account rests on the archive's posting of the documents and its reading of them.[^24]
The archive reported that the commission's final report, received by Ford on June 6, 1975, omitted an 86-page section on CIA plots against foreign leaders dated June 5, 1975, and that Cheney made numerous edits to the report. It reported that the edits replaced the commission's finding of "unlawful" activities with language about actions exceeding statutory authority, with a single exception for the CIA drug experiments, which the edit described as "illegal."[^24]
### The May 1975 submarine story
On May 25, 1975 the [[New York Times]] published a story by [[Seymour Hersh]] about American submarine intercept missions in Soviet waters. At a White House meeting on May 27, Ford, [[James R. Schlesinger]], [[William Colby]], Rumsfeld, [[Robert Ingersoll]] and [[Brent Scowcroft]] discussed the story. Ford said, "I was shocked when I read in the newspaper about our submarines operating off Soviet waters," and "Somehow someone must be made an example of." Schlesinger called the disclosure "a flagrant violation of the law" and suggested a search warrant for material Hersh was said to hold. Colby told the meeting that the Supreme Court's refusal to review the [[Victor Marchetti|Marchetti]] case was good news. Ford said that a communication to Justice ought to ask for action and for recommendations under the law ("prosecution of Hersh and the New York Times"). The memorandum records, in brackets, that "The President decided to go the FBI route," and Ford directed that Justice look into "the alternatives of getting at Hersh and the New York Times."[^25]
A memorandum dated May 31, 1975 in the Cheney files records that Attorney General [[Edward Levi]] had instructed the criminal division and the FBI to prepare a proposal for an investigation. It states that "we should not have an FBI investigation if there is no intention to prosecute." The memorandum also states that the May 25 story was "based on papers filed with the court in the Marchetti case." The memoranda concern the May 25 story. They do not concern the March 19, 1975 articles on the [[Glomar Explorer]].[^25][^26]
### Nomination of James D. Theberge
On May 30, 1975 the White House announced Ford's intention to nominate [[James D. Theberge]], director of Latin American Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies at [[Georgetown University]], as Ambassador to [[Nicaragua]], succeeding Turner B. Shelton, who was resigning from the Foreign Service.[^27]
### Church and Pike committees
On October 31, 1975 Ford wrote to Senator [[Frank Church]], chairman of the [[Church Committee]], asking that the committee's final report on assassination plots be kept secret on national security grounds, and wrote that publication would "result in grievous harm to the national interest and may endanger individuals." Church replied on November 4 that "in my view the national interest is better served by letting the American people know the true and complete story." The committee voted to reject Ford's request.[^28]
On January 29, 1976 Ford wrote to Representative [[Otis Pike]], chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, on the committee's proposed report. The letter states that representatives of the executive branch with responsibilities in the intelligence area had reviewed the proposed report and that, as Ford understood, they had communicated their views to Pike and the members. Ford wrote that he understood "there are still some issues regarding inclusion in the report of certain classified information which have not been resolved by your Committee and the various agencies of the Executive Branch concerned." He continued: "Pursuant to the agreement regarding public release of classified information, I await your submission of these unresolved issues to me so that I might determine whether or not the disclosure of the information involved would be detrimental to the national security."[^29]
### Israel and nuclear questions
Hersh wrote that the Nixon and Ford administrations maintained a warm relationship with [[Israel]], in contrast to the later approach of the [[Jimmy Carter|Carter]] administration, and that Ford's precedent was to restrict access to high-quality [[KH-11]] imagery, even to close allies such as [[Great Britain]].[^30]
Hersh also wrote that in late 1976, at the end of Ford's tenure, Kissinger casually mentioned to [[Hermann F. Eilts]], the American ambassador to [[Egypt]], a concern that the Israelis might go nuclear if they did not receive military equipment quickly. He wrote that this occurred in a final meeting in which Kissinger brought up the 1973 [[Yom Kippur War]] again.[^31]
### Executive Order 11905
On February 18, 1976 Ford signed [[Executive Order 11905]], "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities." Section 5(g) of the order states: "No employee of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, political assassination." Section 5 took effect on March 1, 1976.[^32]
The order set the CIA's duties as "related to the foreign intelligence functions" listed in the order, and directed the Director of Central Intelligence to delegate the day-to-day operation of the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. It established a Committee on Foreign Intelligence chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence, an Operations Advisory Group to consider each special activity in support of national foreign policy objectives, and a three-member Intelligence Oversight Board of persons from outside the government.[^32]
### Halloween Massacre and the appointment of Bush
On November 3, 1975 Ford announced personnel changes at a news conference. He said he intended to nominate Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense and thanked Schlesinger for his service as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Director of the CIA and Secretary of Defense. He said that Scowcroft would become Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs when Kissinger gave up that post to concentrate on being Secretary of State, and that Cheney was to replace Rumsfeld as Assistant to the President. [[Elliot Richardson]], Ambassador to Great Britain, was to be nominated Secretary of Commerce. Ford also said it was his intention to nominate "Ambassador Bush" as Director of Central Intelligence. He said that in recent months the CIA "has been the focus of some controversy," and that Colby had "done an outstanding job."[^33]
Asked why Schlesinger and Colby did not fit on the new team, Ford answered: "I think any President has to have the opportunity to put together his own team." Asked about reports that Schlesinger had been in conflict with his attitude on detente and with Kissinger's, he said: "There were no basic differences." The same day Rockefeller delivered to Ford a letter, released by the Office of the Vice President, stating: "I do not wish my name to enter into your consideration for the upcoming Republican Vice Presidential nominee." Ford said at the news conference: "The decision by Vice President Rockefeller was a decision on his own." The joint statement released by the Vice President's press office read: "The letter speaks for itself. The initiative was the Vice President's." The November 1975 changes are known as the Halloween Massacre.[^33]
[[George H.W. Bush|George H. W. Bush]], who had been the United States representative to the People's Republic of China, was sworn in as Director of Central Intelligence on January 30, 1976.[^34]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 1.
[^2]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 17.
[^1]: Proclamation 4311, "Granting Pardon to Richard Nixon," September 8, 1974. The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/proclamation-4311-granting-pardon-richard-nixon
[^2]: Gunn, T. Jeremy. Memorandum to file, "Gerald R. Ford 'Desk Diaries' and Interview," June 2, 1997, describing a May 28, 1997 review of Ford's 1963 and 1964 desk diaries and an interview at Rancho Mirage, California. Assassination Records Review Board files, File no. 4.05. https://documents3.theblackvault.com/documents/jfkfiles/NARA-Oct2017/ARRB/JGUNN/WP-DOCS/INTERVIE/FORD.02.PDF
[^3]: Warren Commission, executive session transcript, January 22, 1964. https://aarclibrary.org/publib/jfk/wc/wcexec/pdf/WcEx0122.pdf
[^4]: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies*, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, p. 88 and note 8. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf
[^5]: Warren Commission, executive session minutes, September 18, 1964. https://aarclibrary.org/publib/jfk/wc/wcexec/pdf/WcEx0918.pdf
[^6]: Feinsilber, Mike. "Warren Commission Report Altered," Associated Press, July 1997, as copied in an Assassination Records Review Board email of July 3, 1997. https://documents3.theblackvault.com/documents/jfkfiles/NARA-Oct2017/ARRB-Emails/ARRBmails03283.pdf
[^7]: Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, 1964, Chapter 1, "Summary and Conclusions," p. 3. National Archives. https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/warren-commission-report/chapter-1
[^8]: Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, 1964, Chapter 3, "The Shots from the Texas School Book Depository," section "The President's Neck Wounds," pp. 87-88. National Archives. https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/warren-commission-report/chapter-3
[^9]: Associated Press. "Ford was the FBI's spy on the Warren Commission," August 10, 2008, quoting the FBI memorandum of December 17, 1963 from Cartha DeLoach and describing the 2008 release from Ford's FBI file. Reproduced by the Deseret News. https://www.deseret.com/2008/8/10/20268447/ford-was-the-fbi-s-spy-on-the-warren-commission
[^10]: Lardner, George, Jr. "Documents Show Ford Promised FBI Data, Secretly, About Warren Probe," Washington Post, January 20, 1978 (reproduced as CIA-RDP91-00901R000500110025-7, CIA Reading Room), quoting the DeLoach memorandum of the December 12, 1963 conversation. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP91-00901R000500110025-7.pdf
[^11]: Holland, Max. "The Ford Files," Washington Decoded, August 11, 2008, citing "Memo, DeLoach to Mohr, 12 December 1963, courtesy of the Mary Ferrell Foundation," memoranda of July 10 and August 24, 1964, and Hoover's letter to Ford of April 17, 1964. https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/53424
[^12]: Ford, Gerald R. News release, March 25, 1966. Gerald R. Ford Congressional Papers, Press Secretary and Speech File, Box D9, folder "Ford Press Releases - UFO, 1966," Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/sites/default/files/pdf_documents/library/document/0054/4525586.pdf
[^13]: Ford, Gerald R. Letter to Representatives George P. Miller and L. Mendel Rivers, with news release, March 28, 1966. Same file as note 9.
[^14]: Ford, Gerald R. Statement, April 3, 1966. Same file as note 9.
[^15]: U.S. House Committee on Armed Services. Unidentified Flying Objects: Hearing, No. 85, 89th Congress, 2d session, April 5, 1966. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966. The opening exchange between Chairman Rivers and Secretary Brown. https://archive.org/details/ufo_1966_1 The printed cover gives April 6, 1966 as the date.
[^16]: U.S. House Committee on Armed Services. Unidentified Flying Objects: Hearing, April 5, 1966, second part, Rivers's request that "Mr. Ford's letter, and the response by Secretary Brown" go into the record and the letter of March 28, 1966 as printed. https://archive.org/details/UfoHearing19662
[^17]: Ford, Gerald R. Statement, April 21, 1966. Same file as note 9.
[^18]: Ford, Gerald R. Statement before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, House Committee on the Judiciary, October 17, 1974. Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Philip Buchen Files, Box 34, "Nixon Pardon Hungate Subcommittee, Ford Testimony, 1974/10/17." https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0019/4520699.pdf
[^19]: Ford, Gerald R. Message to the House of Representatives returning H.R. 12471 without approval, October 17, 1974. Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, as posted in National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 142. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB142/101774%20Veto%20Message.pdf
[^20]: National Security Archive, "Veto Battle 30 Years Ago Set Freedom of Information Norms," Electronic Briefing Book No. 142, edited by Dan Lopez, Thomas Blanton, Meredith Fuchs and Barbara Elias, November 23, 2004. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB142/
[^21]: Statement Announcing Establishment of a Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, January 4, 1975, with the White House announcement of the commission's members, January 5, 1975. The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-announcing-establishment-commission-cia-activities-within-the-united-states
[^22]: Executive Order 11828, "Establishing a Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States," January 4, 1975, Sections 2, 3 and 6. The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-11828-establishing-commission-cia-activities-within-the-united-states
[^23]: Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, June 1975, transmittal letter dated June 6, 1975 and Preface, section B. Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Richard B. Cheney Files, Box 7, folder "Intelligence - Rockefeller Commission Report - Final (1)." https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/LIBRARY/document/0005/1561495.pdf
[^24]: National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 543, "Gerald Ford White House Altered Rockefeller Commission Report in 1975; Removed Section on CIA Assassination Plots," edited by John Prados and Arturo Jimenez-Bacardi, February 29, 2016. Documents cited in the posting include Document 15 (Cheney's marginal edits), Document 19 (the 86-page section, June 5, 1975) and a photograph of Ford receiving the report on June 6, 1975. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/intelligence/2016-02-29/gerald-ford-white-house-altered-rockefeller-commission-report
[^25]: Memorandum of conversation, May 27, 1975, Ford, Schlesinger, Colby, Rumsfeld, Ingersoll and Scowcroft. National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 12, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1553088.pdf
[^26]: Memorandum, May 31, 1975, Richard B. Cheney Files, Box 6, folder "Intelligence - New York Times Articles by Seymour Hersh (2)," Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0005/7288231.pdf
[^27]: "Nomination of James D. Theberge To Be Ambassador to Nicaragua," White House press release, May 30, 1975. Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, White House Press Releases, Box 11. https://fordlibrarymuseum.gov/sites/default/files/pdf_documents/library/document/0248/whpr19750530-004.pdf
[^28]: National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 543, Documents 21 and 22: letter from President Gerald R. Ford to Senator Frank Church, October 31, 1975, and Church's reply of November 4, 1975. Gerald R. Ford Library, Ronald Nessen Papers, Box 299, and Ford Papers, Box 31. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/intelligence/2016-02-29/gerald-ford-white-house-altered-rockefeller-commission-report
[^29]: Ford, Gerald R. Letter to Representative Otis G. Pike, Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, January 29, 1976. Gerald R. Ford Library, James E. Connor Files, Intelligence Series, Box 56, folder "House Select Com. - General." National Security Archive, "White House, Letter from President Gerald Ford to Representative Otis Pike, Re Classified Information in Pike Report." https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/3763100/Document-41-White-House-Letter-from-President.pdf
[^30]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 1.
[^31]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 17.
[^32]: Executive Order 11905, "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities," February 18, 1976. The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-11905-united-states-foreign-intelligence-activities
[^33]: The President's News Conference, November 3, 1975, including the statement announcing personnel changes in the administration and the text of Vice President Rockefeller's letter of the same date. The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-60
[^34]: Remarks at the Swearing In of George Bush as Director of Central Intelligence, January 30, 1976. The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-swearing-george-bush-director-central-intelligence

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@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ In 1963 he shoved Representative [[Ed Foreman]], who had called him a "pinko," a
### The Assassinations Committee
Gonzalez became chairman of the [[HSCA|House Select Committee on Assassinations]] in 1977 and entered a public dispute with its chief counsel, [[Richard A. Sprague]], over Sprague's independence of the committee. The other members sided with Sprague, and Gonzalez resigned on March 2, 1977, within a month of taking the chair.[^1]
Gonzalez became chairman of the [[HSCA|House Select Committee on Assassinations]] in January 1977, after [[Thomas N. Downing]] retired.[^3] He entered a public dispute with the chief counsel, [[Richard A. Sprague]], and the separate views appended to the report describe the two men as spending January through March 1977 "struggling over budgets and funding measures."[^3] *Newsweek* wrote in April 1977 that Gonzalez resigned following "a nasty clash" with Sprague "in which most other panel members backed Sprague," citing its report of February 21, 1977.[^4] The *New York Times* reported on March 3, 1977, that Gonzalez "submitted his resignation yesterday," March 2, after accusing other committee members of trying to usurp his power, and that Speaker [[Tip O'Neill]] would not accept it until he had spoken with Gonzalez.[^5] The *Washington Post* reported on March 29, 1977, that Gonzalez "quit the chairmanship and the committee on March 8," the date on which [[Louis Stokes]] was appointed chairman, and quoted his speech from the House floor: "I think I have been treated shabbily."[^6] A *Chicago Tribune* report of April 3, 1977, quoted the same speech, in which Gonzalez said he had received no support from committee members or the Democratic leadership in his attempts to rein in Sprague's "extravagant and arrogant behavior," and said that "within hours of Gonzalez' attack from the House floor, Sprague quit."[^7] Sprague resigned on March 30, 1977, the day the House voted 230 to 181 to continue the committee.[^8]
### The Banking Committee
@ -38,40 +38,46 @@ He became chairman of the banking committee in January 1989, having warned of th
### Banca Nazionale del Lavoro
The FBI raided the Atlanta branch of the Italian state bank in August 1989 and found that it had lent Iraq several billion dollars off its books, much of it guaranteed by the [[Commodity Credit Corporation]] of the [[Department of Agriculture]]. When Gonzalez proposed hearings, the [[John F. Kennedy Presidential Library|Kennedy Library]] later recorded, "he was asked by high-ranking government officials to desist on the grounds of national security." [[United States Attorney General|Attorney General]] [[Richard Thornburgh]] wrote to him on September 26, 1990, that a hearing scheduled for October 9 and staff interviews of witnesses raised "the prospect that culpable parties will elude prosecution," and added: "As you should be aware, this is a sensitive case with national security concerns." On December 18 the [[State Department]] informed the [[Department of Justice]] that "with respect to the national security aspects of the investigation, we have determined that the State Department does not have any concerns it wishes to raise at this juncture." The committee issued subpoenas. Beginning in February 1992 he delivered about twenty hour-long special order speeches on the House floor, among them "Efforts to Thwart Investigation of the [[BNL Scandal]]," "[[Kissinger Associates]], [[Brent Scowcroft|Scowcroft]], [[Lawrence Eagleburger|Eagleburger]], Stoga, Iraq, and BNL," "The Rostow Gang," "Scowcroft Improperly Intervened in CCC Program and Many More Lies to Congress," and "The BNL Case: Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil," and entered the documents in the [[Congressional Record]].[^2][^3]
The FBI raided the Atlanta branch of the Italian state bank in August 1989 and found that it had lent Iraq several billion dollars off its books, much of it guaranteed by the [[Commodity Credit Corporation]] of the [[Department of Agriculture]]. When Gonzalez proposed hearings, the [[John F. Kennedy Presidential Library|Kennedy Library]] later recorded, "he was asked by high-ranking government officials to desist on the grounds of national security." [[United States Attorney General|Attorney General]] [[Richard Thornburgh]] wrote to him on September 26, 1990, that a hearing scheduled for October 9 and staff interviews of witnesses raised "the prospect that culpable parties will elude prosecution," and added: "As you should be aware, this is a sensitive case with national security concerns." On December 18 the [[State Department]] informed the [[Department of Justice]] that "with respect to the national security aspects of the investigation, we have determined that the State Department does not have any concerns it wishes to raise at this juncture." The committee issued subpoenas. Beginning in February 1992 he delivered about twenty hour-long special order speeches on the House floor, among them "Efforts to Thwart Investigation of the [[BNL Scandal]]," "[[Kissinger Associates]], [[Brent Scowcroft|Scowcroft]], [[Lawrence Eagleburger|Eagleburger]], Stoga, Iraq, and BNL," "The Rostow Gang," "Scowcroft Improperly Intervened in CCC Program and Many More Lies to Congress," and "The BNL Case: Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil," and entered the documents in the [[Congressional Record]].[^2][^9]
On May 18, 1992, he said: "When the BNL offices were raided in Atlanta in August 1989, investigators uncovered massive fraud, placing the entire [[Commodity Credit Corporation Iraq Program|CCC Program for Iraq]] in jeopardy. So the [[White House]] and NSC, armed with National Security Directive 26, sprang into action in order to save the CCC Program for Iraq." He named Scowcroft, the president's counsel [[C. Boyden Gray]], Gray's deputy [[John Schmitz]], [[Richard Haass]] of the [[National Security Council]] staff, and [[Clayton Yeutter]] as parties to the discussions, and said that by April 1990 "it was apparent the BNL indictment was being delayed." On July 21 he quoted a July 1990 intelligence report, "Iraq's Growing Arsenal," which identified Iraq's State Establishment for Oil Refining and Gas Processing as "a dedicated front for procuring chemical weapons related components," against the text of [[National Security Directive 26]], which placed "particular emphasis on expanding [[United States]]-Iraq oil industry related trade."[^3][^4]
On May 18, 1992, he said: "When the BNL offices were raided in Atlanta in August 1989, investigators uncovered massive fraud, placing the entire [[Commodity Credit Corporation Iraq Program|CCC Program for Iraq]] in jeopardy. So the [[White House]] and NSC, armed with National Security Directive 26, sprang into action in order to save the CCC Program for Iraq." He named Scowcroft, the president's counsel [[C. Boyden Gray]], Gray's deputy [[John Schmitz]], [[Richard Haass]] of the [[National Security Council]] staff, and [[Clayton Yeutter]] as parties to the discussions, and said that by April 1990 "it was apparent the BNL indictment was being delayed." On July 21 he quoted a July 1990 intelligence report, "Iraq's Growing Arsenal," which identified Iraq's State Establishment for Oil Refining and Gas Processing as "a dedicated front for procuring chemical weapons related components," against the text of [[National Security Directive 26]], which placed "particular emphasis on expanding [[United States]]-Iraq oil industry related trade."[^9][^10]
On September 25 he described a brass factory worth 40 million dollars sold to Iraq by [[SerVaas Inc.]] of [[Indianapolis]] under a contract negotiated with [[Safa al-Habobi]] and financed by the Atlanta branch. Its owner had told the committee in April 1991 that the brass was "solely for commercial uses." Gonzalez produced a memorandum of July 31, 1988, showing that the Iraqi purchaser meant it for cartridge cases and artillery fuses, and quoted the owner's remark to the [[Indianapolis Star]] in August 1992: "Probably the only thing they are doing is melting the brass down." President [[George H.W. Bush]]'s report to Congress of September 1991 had stated that "United States suppliers did not contribute directly to Iraq's conventional or nonconventional weapons capability."[^5]
On September 25 he described a brass factory worth 40 million dollars sold to Iraq by [[SerVaas Inc.]] of [[Indianapolis]] under a contract negotiated with [[Safa al-Habobi]] and financed by the Atlanta branch. Its owner had told the committee in April 1991 that the brass was "solely for commercial uses." Gonzalez produced a memorandum of July 31, 1988, showing that the Iraqi purchaser meant it for cartridge cases and artillery fuses, and quoted the owner's remark to the [[Indianapolis Star]] in August 1992: "Probably the only thing they are doing is melting the brass down." President [[George H.W. Bush]]'s report to Congress of September 1991 had stated that "United States suppliers did not contribute directly to Iraq's conventional or nonconventional weapons capability."[^11]
In the White House he was dismissed as a "flake." He told the House: "We are obstructed blatantly, premeditatedly and coldly, and in defiance of the plain constitutional prerogative of the Congress to know." When he learned that lawyers from the National Security Council staff and other agencies were meeting under [[C. Nicholas Rostow|Nicholas Rostow]] to coordinate what Congress would be given, he named them "the Rostow gang." "It used to be that cover-ups were sort of ad hoc events, a mad scramble to provide damage control for the moment. The Rostow gang advances the notion that cover-up mechanisms have become an integral cog in the machinery of this administration." His chief investigator, [[Dennis Kane]], recalled Rostow telling him "it would be a cold day in hell before Congress got NSD 26 or any of those documents."[^6]
In the White House he was dismissed as a "flake." He told the House: "We are obstructed blatantly, premeditatedly and coldly, and in defiance of the plain constitutional prerogative of the Congress to know." When he learned that lawyers from the National Security Council staff and other agencies were meeting under [[C. Nicholas Rostow|Nicholas Rostow]] to coordinate what Congress would be given, he named them "the Rostow gang." "It used to be that cover-ups were sort of ad hoc events, a mad scramble to provide damage control for the moment. The Rostow gang advances the notion that cover-up mechanisms have become an integral cog in the machinery of this administration." His chief investigator, [[Dennis Kane]], recalled Rostow telling him "it would be a cold day in hell before Congress got NSD 26 or any of those documents."[^12]
### The January 1993 update
On January 21, 1993, Gonzalez used a special order to report on the Banking Committee's inquiry into the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro. He told the House that BNL had sued on December 15, 1992 in the United States Court of Federal Claims in Washington to recover over 340 million dollars in defaulted Iraqi loans guaranteed under the Department of Agriculture's Commodity Credit Corporation program.[^7]
On January 21, 1993, Gonzalez used a special order to report on the Banking Committee's inquiry into the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro. He told the House that BNL had sued on December 15, 1992 in the United States Court of Federal Claims in Washington to recover over 340 million dollars in defaulted Iraqi loans guaranteed under the Department of Agriculture's Commodity Credit Corporation program.[^13]
He described a defunct British firm, [[Allivane]], which the Venice indictment identified as one of several firms secretly supplying Iran with armaments, and which also had contracts to supply Iraq with a million artillery fuses. Two former Allivane directors had been convicted in Britain in early 1992 of illegal arms shipments related to the Iraqi fuse deals. Allivane had been set up and run by an American, [[Terry Byrne]], whom Gonzalez said was never indicted for the Iraqi deals and was reportedly back in the United States. Byrne had worked for Rexon Corp. and then for [[International Signal and Control]], and Gonzalez said: "ISC was founded by James Guerin, who is serving time in jail after being convicted of, among other things, illegally shipping military technology to Iraq."[^7]
He described a defunct British firm, [[Allivane]], which the Venice indictment identified as one of several firms secretly supplying Iran with armaments, and which also had contracts to supply Iraq with a million artillery fuses. Two former Allivane directors had been convicted in Britain in early 1992 of illegal arms shipments related to the Iraqi fuse deals. Allivane had been set up and run by an American, [[Terry Byrne]], whom Gonzalez said was never indicted for the Iraqi deals and was reportedly back in the United States. Byrne had worked for Rexon Corp. and then for [[International Signal and Control]], and Gonzalez said: "ISC was founded by James Guerin, who is serving time in jail after being convicted of, among other things, illegally shipping military technology to Iraq."[^13]
Gonzalez said Rexon, a New Jersey firm, was under criminal investigation for shipments of artillery fuse parts and technology to Iraq for a project run by [[Gerald Bull]] and his Space Research Corp., and was also under investigation involving [[Carlos Cardoen]]'s activities in Iraq. He said the committee had tried to contact Byrne and Rexon, that Rexon refused to talk and Byrne remained elusive, and that the committee wanted to know whether BNL Atlanta loans figured in the fuse deals.[^7]
Gonzalez said Rexon, a New Jersey firm, was under criminal investigation for shipments of artillery fuse parts and technology to Iraq for a project run by [[Gerald Bull]] and his Space Research Corp., and was also under investigation involving [[Carlos Cardoen]]'s activities in Iraq. He said the committee had tried to contact Byrne and Rexon, that Rexon refused to talk and Byrne remained elusive, and that the committee wanted to know whether BNL Atlanta loans figured in the fuse deals.[^13]
### The Ethics Resolution
His statement of July 7, 1992, drew on a [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] document titled "Iraq-[[Italy]], Repercussions of the BNL-Atlanta Scandal." Director [[Robert Gates]] wrote to him that it "included information from a TOP SECRET compartmented and particularly sensitive document" of September 4, 1989, and that "because of the sources and methods underlying that information, I will ask for a damage assessment to determine the impact of the disclosure." Admiral [[William Studeman]] wrote that the statements of July 21 and 27 were drawn from similar material. Attorney General [[William Barr]] told the committee that the executive branch would stop supplying classified documents without guarantees. On August 4 the minority leader, [[Bob Michel]], introduced a resolution calling for an ethics investigation, arguing that the proper course was a vote in secret session. "I believe that Mr. Gonzalez' conduct does not reflect creditably on the House," he said. He was not censured, and he continued the statements into 1993.[^8]
His statement of July 7, 1992, drew on a [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] document titled "Iraq-[[Italy]], Repercussions of the BNL-Atlanta Scandal." Director [[Robert Gates]] wrote to him that it "included information from a TOP SECRET compartmented and particularly sensitive document" of September 4, 1989, and that "because of the sources and methods underlying that information, I will ask for a damage assessment to determine the impact of the disclosure." Admiral [[William Studeman]] wrote that the statements of July 21 and 27 were drawn from similar material. Attorney General [[William Barr]] told the committee that the executive branch would stop supplying classified documents without guarantees. On August 4 the minority leader, [[Bob Michel]], introduced a resolution calling for an ethics investigation, arguing that the proper course was a vote in secret session. "I believe that Mr. Gonzalez' conduct does not reflect creditably on the House," he said. He was not censured, and he continued the statements into 1993.[^14]
The Kennedy Library gave him its Profile in Courage Award on September 11, 1994, for investigating, "regardless of the attempts to strip him of his committee chairmanship, the involvement of high-level officials in the Reagan and Bush Administrations in the sale of U.S. arms to Iraq." Of the war of 1991 he had said: "Not only did our own service men and women face military material that had been exported from the U.S., the U.S. military itself relied on these Iraqi front companies for some of the military goods they used." He lost the chairmanship to [[Jim Leach|James Leach]] in 1995 and did not run in 1998. His son Charles succeeded him.[^1][^2]
### BCCI
On September 11, 1991, Gonzalez opened the banking committee's hearings on the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]], with [[Clark Clifford]] and [[Robert Altman]] as the first witnesses. He described BCCI as "tantamount to a racketeering bank" and the hearings as an inquiry into how it "gained a foothold in the United States and how regulators and bank officials failed to detect or understand or report the invasion." Recalling his inquiry into Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, which "became Bagdad's banker in the United States before our regulatory companies at the [[Federal Reserve Board|Federal Reserve]] could locate Iraq on the map," he said that "in the case of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, the Federal Reserve would have us believe that BCCI was a stealth banking operation, undetected on the regulators' radar screens," and asked: "What other foreign entities or criminal elements are secretly in control of U.S. banks at this very moment? That is a question I have been raising for 2 years."[^9]
On September 11, 1991, Gonzalez opened the banking committee's hearings on the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]], with [[Clark Clifford]] and [[Robert Altman]] as the first witnesses. He described BCCI as "tantamount to a racketeering bank" and the hearings as an inquiry into how it "gained a foothold in the United States and how regulators and bank officials failed to detect or understand or report the invasion." Recalling his inquiry into Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, which "became Bagdad's banker in the United States before our regulatory companies at the [[Federal Reserve Board|Federal Reserve]] could locate Iraq on the map," he said that "in the case of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, the Federal Reserve would have us believe that BCCI was a stealth banking operation, undetected on the regulators' radar screens," and asked: "What other foreign entities or criminal elements are secretly in control of U.S. banks at this very moment? That is a question I have been raising for 2 years."[^15]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Kohout, Martin Donell. "González, Henry Barbosa," *Handbook of Texas,* Texas State Historical Association. https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/entries/gonzalez-henry-barbosa
[^2]: John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, "Henry González," Profile in Courage Award, 1994.
[^3]: Gonzalez, Henry B. "Continuing Saga of Attempts to Thwart BNL Investigation," *Congressional Record,* House, May 18, 1992; index of statements, 102nd Congress, second session, February 24 to September 28, 1992.
[^4]: Gonzalez, Henry B. "United States Policy to Arm Iraq," *Congressional Record,* House, July 21, 1992.
[^5]: Gonzalez, Henry B. "Brass Factory in Iraq," *Congressional Record,* House, September 25, 1992, p. H9502.
[^6]: Friedman, Alan. *Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq*. Bantam, 1993, pp. 206, 216, 221.
[^7]: Rep. Henry B. Gonzalez, "Update on BNL Investigation," *Congressional Record*, House of Representatives, January 21, 1993, pp. H132 to H140. The statement about Guerin is Gonzalez's own characterization; the Third Circuit and the SEC release describe the Guerin charges as fraud and exports to South Africa, with Iraq named in the SEC release. https://irp.fas.org/congress/1993_cr/h930121-bnl.htm
[^8]: "Resolution Calling for an Ethics Probe of Chairman Gonzalez," *Congressional Record,* House, August 4, 1992, p. H7366. https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_cr/h920804-gonzales.htm
[^9]: House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs. *Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) Investigation, Part 1.* 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., September 11, 1991, Serial No. 102-69, pp. 1-2. https://archive.org/details/BCCIHearingsBeforeTheCommitteeOnBankingFinanceAndUrbanAffairs
[^3]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), separate views of Hons. Samuel L. Devine and Robert W. Edgar, pp. 493-494; "History of the Committee," pp. 9-10 (Stokes named chairman March 8, 1977). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^4]: *Newsweek,* April 11, 1977, press clipping in CIA Reading Room document 00543522. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00543522
[^5]: Burnham, David, *New York Times,* March 3, 1977, press clipping in CIA Reading Room document 00026481. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00026481
[^6]: Lardner, George, Jr., *Washington Post,* March 29, 1977, press clipping in CIA Reading Room document 00026481. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00026481
[^7]: *Chicago Tribune,* April 3, 1977, press clipping in CIA Reading Room document 00543522. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00543522
[^8]: Madden, Richard L., *New York Times,* March 30, 1977, press clipping in CIA Reading Room document 00026481. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00026481
[^9]: Gonzalez, Henry B. "Continuing Saga of Attempts to Thwart BNL Investigation," *Congressional Record,* House, May 18, 1992; index of statements, 102nd Congress, second session, February 24 to September 28, 1992.
[^10]: Gonzalez, Henry B. "United States Policy to Arm Iraq," *Congressional Record,* House, July 21, 1992.
[^11]: Gonzalez, Henry B. "Brass Factory in Iraq," *Congressional Record,* House, September 25, 1992, p. H9502.
[^12]: Friedman, Alan. *Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq*. Bantam, 1993, pp. 206, 216, 221.
[^13]: Rep. Henry B. Gonzalez, "Update on BNL Investigation," *Congressional Record*, House of Representatives, January 21, 1993, pp. H132 to H140. The statement about Guerin is Gonzalez's own characterization; the Third Circuit and the SEC release describe the Guerin charges as fraud and exports to South Africa, with Iraq named in the SEC release. https://irp.fas.org/congress/1993_cr/h930121-bnl.htm
[^14]: "Resolution Calling for an Ethics Probe of Chairman Gonzalez," *Congressional Record,* House, August 4, 1992, p. H7366. https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_cr/h920804-gonzales.htm
[^15]: House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs. *Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) Investigation, Part 1.* 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., September 11, 1991, Serial No. 102-69, pp. 1-2. https://archive.org/details/BCCIHearingsBeforeTheCommitteeOnBankingFinanceAndUrbanAffairs

15
10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Joseph Cuellar.md
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@ -3,15 +3,20 @@ category: "Other"
tags:
- PROMIS
- Person
summary: "Casolaro confided to friends that he was unnerved by this supposedly chance meeting."
summary: "Joseph Cuellar, an Army Reserve major, met Danny Casolaro at a bar in Arlington, Virginia, in May 1991 and called Peter Videnieks at Casolaro's request."
updated: 2026-10-09
---
[[Joseph Cuellar]] was a man who approached [[Danny Casolaro]] in a pub during the week prior to Casolaro's death. Cuellar claimed to be a Special Forces operative and offered to arrange a rendezvous between [[Peter Videnieks]] and Casolaro. Cuellar's connection to Videnieks allegedly came through Videnieks' wife, Barbara, who was the executive assistant to Senator [[Robert Byrd]].[^1]
[[Joseph Cuellar]], an Army Reserve major, met [[Danny Casolaro]] by chance at a bar in Arlington, Virginia, in May 1991. Cuellar talked of his exploits in the Army special forces, and according to Cuellar, Casolaro became fascinated. In a later conversation Casolaro asked about people in his "Octopus" story, and Cuellar told him he knew [[Peter Videnieks]], because a former fiancée had worked with Videnieks' wife in the Capitol Hill office of [[Robert Byrd]]. Cuellar and Videnieks both told the reviewers that their relationship was social.[^1]
Casolaro confided to friends that he was unnerved by this supposedly chance meeting. He met with Cuellar at other times that week, but it is unknown whether he ever spoke with Videnieks. Sources later suggested that Cuellar was a [[U.S. Army|U.S. Army]] Major in an [[Army Intelligence Agency|Army intelligence]] unit who went to work for a company that was a [[Defense Intelligence Agency|DIA]] cutout. One [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] agent reported that Cuellar spoke Arabic fluently and had spent time in [[Iraq]].[^1]
Casolaro asked Cuellar repeatedly to arrange a meeting with Videnieks, so that he could interview him about Riconosciuto's March 1991 affidavit. Cuellar called Videnieks, who refused.[^2] The review found that Cuellar was in Washington, D.C., on August 10, 1991, working on his separation from Operation Desert Storm and his reassignment to a Southern Command post, and that several witnesses verified this.[^2]
[[Bill Hamilton]], president of [[INSLAW]], stated that he had received an affidavit from [[Bill Turner]] on "highly classified computer printouts on off-shore accounts that he claimed Casolaro intended to use the night he died in a planned meeting with [[Peter Videnieks]] and [[Joseph Cuellar]] and others."[^1]
The writer Cheri Seymour wrote that Cuellar approached Casolaro in a pub during the week before his death, claimed to be a Special Forces operative and offered to arrange a rendezvous with Videnieks, and that Casolaro confided to friends that he was unnerved by the encounter.[^3] Sources later suggested that Cuellar was a [[U.S. Army|U.S. Army]] Major in an [[Army Intelligence Agency|Army intelligence]] unit who went to work for a company that was a [[Defense Intelligence Agency|DIA]] cutout. One [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] agent reported that Cuellar spoke Arabic fluently and had spent time in [[Iraq]].[^3]
[[Bill Hamilton]], president of [[INSLAW]], stated that he had received an affidavit from [[Bill Turner]] on "highly classified computer printouts on off-shore accounts that he claimed Casolaro intended to use the night he died in a planned meeting with Peter Videnieks and Joseph Cuellar and others."[^3]
---
### Footnotes
[^1]: Seymour, Cheri. *The Last Circle: Danny Casolaro’s Investigation into the Octopus and the PROMIS Software Scandal*. First Edition. TrineDay, 2010.
[^1]: U.S. Department of Justice. Review of the *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua*, September 27, 1994, p. 161. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
[^2]: U.S. Department of Justice. Review of the *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua*, September 27, 1994, p. 162. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
[^3]: Seymour, Cheri. *The Last Circle: Danny Casolaro’s Investigation into the Octopus and the PROMIS Software Scandal*. First Edition. TrineDay, 2010.

8
10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Robert Byrd.md
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@ -3,16 +3,16 @@ category: "Political Figure"
tags:
- Person
- CIA
summary: "Powerful West Virginia Democratic Senator in whose office Barbara Videnieks, wife of the PROMIS contracting officer Peter Videnieks, worked."
summary: "Powerful West Virginia Democratic Senator in whose Capitol Hill office the wife of PROMIS contracting officer Peter Videnieks worked."
born: 1917-11-20
died: 2010-06-28
location: "North Wilkesboro, North Carolina"
created: 2025-08-05
updated: 2026-09-22
updated: 2026-10-09
---
[[Robert Byrd]] was a powerful West Virginia Democratic Senator. Barbara Videnieks, wife of [[Peter Videnieks]], the [[Department of Justice|Justice Department]] contracting officer on the [[PROMIS]] contract, worked in his office.[^1][^2] The suggestion by [[Michael Riconosciuto]] and others that Peter Videnieks was involved in the death of [[Danny Casolaro]] in [[West Virginia]], the Justice Department's review of 1994 stated, appeared "to rest on the fact that Mr. Videnieks' wife works for Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia"; it found "no evidence whatsoever of Mr. Videnieks' involvement." [[Joseph Cuellar]], an Army Reserve major, told the reviewers that his former fiancée had worked with Barbara Videnieks "in the Capitol Hill office of West Virginia Senator Robert Byrd."[^2] Byrd played a major role in the effort to have the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] move some of its administrative offices to Charlestown, 20 miles from Martinsburg, on the Virginia border.[^1]
[[Robert Byrd]] was a powerful West Virginia Democratic Senator. The wife of [[Peter Videnieks]], the [[Department of Justice|Justice Department]] contracting officer on the [[PROMIS]] contract, worked in his office.[^1][^2] The suggestion by [[Michael Riconosciuto]] and others that Peter Videnieks was involved in the death of [[Danny Casolaro]] in [[West Virginia]], the Justice Department's review of 1994 stated, appeared "to rest on the fact that Mr. Videnieks' wife works for Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia"; it found "no evidence whatsoever of Mr. Videnieks' involvement." [[Joseph Cuellar]], an Army Reserve major, told the reviewers that his former fiancée had worked with Videnieks' wife "in the Capitol Hill office of West Virginia Senator Robert Byrd."[^2] Byrd played a major role in the effort to have the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] move some of its administrative offices to Charlestown, 20 miles from Martinsburg, on the Virginia border.[^1]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Seymour, Cheri. *The Last Circle: Danny Casolaro’s Investigation into the Octopus and the PROMIS Software Scandal*. First Edition. TrineDay, 2010.
[^2]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report on the Review of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua's Report,* September 27, 1994, section on the death of Danny Casolaro. https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
[^2]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report on the Review of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua's Report,* September 27, 1994, pp. 159-161 (section on the death of Danny Casolaro). https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993

26
10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Sam Giancana.md
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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
created: 2026-05-15
updated: 2026-06-13
updated: 2026-10-09
title: Sam Giancana
aliases:
- Salvatore Giancana
@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ tags:
- 1960s
- 1970s
category: "Organized Crime"
summary: "Sam Giancana was the boss of the Chicago Outfit from 1957 who was recruited by the CIA through Robert Maheu and Johnny Roselli in 1960 to plan the assassination of Fidel Castro under ZR/RIFLE, and who was shot seven times in his Oak Park, Illinois home on June 19, 1975, days before he was scheduled to testify before the Church Committee."
summary: "Chicago Outfit boss from 1957, recruited by the CIA through Robert Maheu and Johnny Roselli in 1960 for ZR/RIFLE plots against Castro, shot in Oak Park, Illinois on June 19, 1975."
born: 1908-05-19
died: 1975-06-19
location: "Chicago, Illinois"
@ -31,15 +31,17 @@ Salvatore "Sam" Giancana (May 19, 1908 - June 19, 1975) was the boss of the [[La
Giancana rose through the Chicago criminal organization under Al Capone's successors, beginning as an enforcer and driver for mob figures during Prohibition and rising through the ranks over the following decades. Taking effective operational control from boss [[Tony Accardo]] in the mid-1950s, he became the Outfit's official boss around 1957, at which point it controlled substantial gambling, loan-sharking, labor racketeering, and criminal operations across Chicago and the Midwest, with significant interests in [[Las Vegas]] casinos and [[Cuba]] before the revolution. The organization sustained its political influence through the ward machinery of the Cook County Democratic Party. Giancana held the leadership until about 1966, when intensifying federal pressure drove him into self-imposed exile in [[Mexico]]; he returned to the United States in 1974.
His personal style differed from the older generation of organized crime leadership. Giancana cultivated connections to the entertainment world (a long relationship with singer Phyllis McGuire and a place in the celebrity circles around [[Frank Sinatra]]) and presented a more public-facing image than his predecessors. His flamboyant disregard for surveillance was unusual for an Outfit boss: he sued the FBI in federal court over its intensive physical surveillance and won a temporary order restricting agents from following him onto golf courses, a rare instance of a mob leader confronting law enforcement directly rather than keeping a low profile.[^1]
His personal style differed from the older generation of organized crime leadership. Giancana cultivated connections to the entertainment world (a long relationship with singer [[Phyllis McGuire]] and a place in the celebrity circles around [[Frank Sinatra]]) and presented a more public-facing image than his predecessors. His flamboyant disregard for surveillance was unusual for an Outfit boss: he sued the FBI in federal court over its intensive physical surveillance and won a temporary order restricting agents from following him onto golf courses, a rare instance of a mob leader confronting law enforcement directly rather than keeping a low profile.[^1]
### CIA Anti-Castro Operations
In September 1960, CIA officer [[Robert Maheu]], a former FBI agent used as an agency cutout for sensitive operations, approached Roselli about the CIA's desire to assassinate Castro. Roselli introduced Maheu to Giancana and Trafficante as the organized crime figures with Cuban casino experience and existing connections in the Cuban underworld who could provide operational support. The agency's rationale was practical: the Mafia retained personnel and contacts in Cuba from its pre-revolutionary casino operations, and routing the work through Maheu created deniable distance from the CIA.
In September 1960, [[Robert Maheu]], a former FBI agent and private investigator used by the CIA as a cutout for sensitive operations, approached Roselli about the CIA's desire to assassinate Castro. Roselli introduced Maheu to Giancana and Trafficante as the organized crime figures with Cuban casino experience and existing connections in the Cuban underworld who could provide operational support. The agency's rationale was practical: the Mafia retained personnel and contacts in Cuba from its pre-revolutionary casino operations, and routing the work through Maheu created deniable distance from the CIA.
Giancana agreed to participate. The CIA's Technical Services Division developed poison pills containing botulinum toxin, intended for Castro's food and passed through Roselli to Cuban contacts; multiple attempts were made through the early 1960s without result. When [[William Harvey]] replaced Maheu as the CIA's primary handler for the operation in 1961, Giancana's role became secondary to Roselli's, but his participation in the anti-Castro infrastructure was documented. The plots were authorized at the highest levels of the agency, with Director [[Allen Dulles]] informed and the effort continuing under [[Richard Helms]].[^1]
Giancana agreed to participate. The CIA's Technical Services Division developed poison pills containing botulinum toxin, intended for Castro's food and passed through Roselli to Cuban contacts; multiple attempts were made through the early 1960s without result. After the CIA reactivated the Roselli contact in April 1962, [[William Harvey]], acting on what he testified were explicit orders from [[Richard Helms]], told Roselli to stop dealing with Giancana, whom Harvey had decided was "surplus."[^2] Giancana's role became secondary to Roselli's, but his participation in the anti-Castro infrastructure was documented. The plots were authorized at the highest levels of the agency, with Director [[Allen Dulles]] informed and the effort continuing under Helms.[^1]
The CIA-Giancana relationship created significant friction with the FBI. In 1962, when the FBI was running intensive surveillance of Giancana as a priority of Robert Kennedy's organized crime crackdown, the CIA asked the bureau to pull back because Giancana was an operational asset; the FBI resisted. The episode documented that the CIA was protecting organized crime figures the FBI was simultaneously trying to prosecute. The contradiction reached into the Kennedy administration itself: President [[John F. Kennedy]]'s father, Joseph Kennedy, had longstanding ties to the Chicago Outfit, and organized-crime-connected voter mobilization in Illinois had aided the 1960 campaign even as Robert Kennedy's Justice Department made Giancana a chief target. It sharpened further when Maheu arranged an illegal wiretap for Giancana, bugging the Las Vegas hotel room of comedian Dan Rowan, then involved with Phyllis McGuire; the bug's discovery by local authorities produced a scandal the CIA concealed from the FBI to protect the Castro operation.[^1]
In late October 1960 Maheu arranged for the Florida investigator [[Edward DuBois]] to place an electronic listening device in a Las Vegas room. DuBois's employee, [[Arthur James Balletti]], installed a telephone tap instead. On October 31, 1960, a maid found the equipment, and the local sheriff arrested Balletti, who telephoned Maheu in Miami.[^3] The Church Committee found conflicting evidence on whether the CIA had been consulted before the installation. The CIA Office of Security's operational support chief testified that Maheu had told him a girlfriend of Giancana's was having an affair with the target, and that Giancana had threatened to fly to Las Vegas himself unless the room was bugged.[^4] The memorandum of May 14, 1962 by [[Sheffield Edwards]], the CIA's Director of Security, records that Maheu stated Giancana "thought that Phyllis McGuire might know of the proposed operation and might pass on the information to one Dan Rowan," described as another friend of McGuire's.[^5] The Justice Department decided not to prosecute the tap after a CIA briefing of the attorney general.[^4]
The CIA-Giancana relationship created significant friction with the FBI. In 1962, when the FBI was running intensive surveillance of Giancana as a priority of Robert Kennedy's organized crime crackdown, the CIA asked the bureau to pull back because Giancana was an operational asset; the FBI resisted. The episode documented that the CIA was protecting organized crime figures the FBI was simultaneously trying to prosecute. The contradiction reached into the Kennedy administration itself: President [[John F. Kennedy]]'s father, Joseph Kennedy, had longstanding ties to the Chicago Outfit, and organized-crime-connected voter mobilization in Illinois had aided the 1960 campaign even as Robert Kennedy's Justice Department made Giancana a chief target. It sharpened further when Maheu arranged an illegal wiretap for Giancana, bugging the Las Vegas hotel room of comedian [[Dan Rowan]], then involved with Phyllis McGuire; the bug's discovery by local authorities produced a scandal the CIA concealed from the FBI to protect the Castro operation.[^1]
### Church Committee and Death
@ -53,9 +55,17 @@ The timing, days before his scheduled testimony, was widely noted. Whether the m
Giancana's murder removed a primary witness to the CIA-organized crime anti-Castro collaboration at the moment that collaboration came under Senate scrutiny. The Church Committee found that the existence of the CIA-mob plots had been deliberately concealed from the [[Warren Commission]], so neither Giancana's nor Roselli's testimony before that body was ever sought, and their deaths foreclosed full testimony before the Church Committee as well.
The [[HSCA|House Select Committee on Assassinations]] concluded that Giancana and Roselli "may have been involved" in a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy, citing their Mafia backgrounds and CIA connections, but it reached no definitive conclusion and noted that both men were murdered before they could testify fully.[^2]
The [[HSCA|House Select Committee on Assassinations]] did not find that Giancana or John Roselli "may have been involved" in a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy. The report states that both men "had been murdered," and that the committee was "ultimately frustrated in its attempt to determine details of those activities that might have led to the assassination."[^6] It found "little credibility" in the explanation that Roselli supplied, the so-called "turnaround" theory of the assassination, and it said there is "reason to speculate that the Mafia continued to appear to participate in the plots just to keep the CIA interested."[^6] The report's phrase "individual members may have been involved" is a general statement about the national syndicate and about anti-Castro Cuban groups, not a finding about Giancana or Roselli.[^7]
The committee found that the CIA-Mafia-Cuban plots had "all the elements necessary for a successful assassination conspiracy," which it described as people, motive and means, and that the CIA-Mafia plots, like the AMLASH plot, should have been aggressively explored in the 1963-64 investigation.[^6] The report also quotes FBI electronic surveillance of a conversation of December 3, 1963, in which Giancana's lieutenant Charles English told him that "the FBI will be like it was 5 years ago" and that the FBI was "gonna start running down Fair Play for Cuba."[^8]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Church Committee (U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities). *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders.* Senate Report 94-465, November 20, 1975. Roemer, William F. *Man Against the Mob.* Donald I. Fine, 1989.
[^2]: House Select Committee on Assassinations. *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives.* Government Printing Office, 1979. Blakey, G. Robert, and Richard N. Billings. *Fatal Hour: The Assassination of President Kennedy by Organized Crime.* Berkley, 1992. Giancana, Sam, and Chuck Giancana. *Double Cross: The Explosive Inside Story of the Mobster Who Controlled America.* Warner Books, 1992.
[^2]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report*, S. Rept. 94-465, November 20, 1975, p. 84 (citing Harvey testimony of June 25, 1975, p. 65; "untrustworthy" and "surplus"). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^3]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report*, S. Rept. 94-465, p. 77 and nn. 3-4 (October 31, 1960 arrest; Balletti's call to Maheu). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^4]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report*, S. Rept. 94-465, p. 78 and nn. 1-3 (CIA payment for the tap; support chief and Maheu testimony; Joseph Shimon testimony that Giancana paid Maheu $5,000) and p. 79 (Herbert J. Miller memorandum of April 24, 1962; decision not to prosecute). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^5]: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, *Cuba, January 1961-September 1962*, doc. 337, memorandum for the record by Sheffield Edwards, May 14, 1962, pp. 808-809. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d337
[^6]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), pp. 114-116 (CIA-Mafia plots; Roselli and Giancana "had been murdered"; turnaround theory; "little credibility"). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^7]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report,* H. Rept. 95-1828, summary Findings I.C.3 and I.C.4 (p. 3) and the organized crime section (p. 129). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^8]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report,* H. Rept. 95-1828, p. 169 (Giancana and English, December 3, 1963). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit

15
10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Tom Clines.md
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@ -16,6 +16,14 @@ tags:
- 1980s
summary: "CIA officer under Ted Shackley at JMWAVE, in Laos, and in the Western Hemisphere Division, later of the Safari Club and Iran-Contra Enterprise network, convicted in 1990 of underreporting Iran-Contra income."
location: "United States"
relations:
- type: prosecuted
with: "[[Lawrence Walsh]]"
reverse: true
start: 1990-02-22
end: 1992-02-27
role: "Independent Counsel; indicted February 22, 1990, convicted September 18, 1990, affirmed February 27, 1992"
fn: 6
---
Thomas G. Clines was a [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] career officer whose career tracked closely with that of his patron [[Ted Shackley]]. Clines served under Shackley at JMWAVE, the CIA's Miami anti-Castro station, in Laos, and in the Western Hemisphere Division, and left CIA in 1979 in the period of Shackley's forced departure by Director Stansfield Turner. He subsequently became a central figure in the private covert operations network that ran from the [[Safari Club]] era through the [[Iran-Contra Affair]].[^1]
@ -40,7 +48,7 @@ A [[Domestic Contact Service]] cable of June 22, 1976, records a request from th
Clines became an operational participant in the Enterprise, the private covert network directed by Secord and [[Albert Hakim]] that executed the Iran arms sales and Contra funding operations. His primary role was in the logistics and transportation aspects of the Enterprise's weapons movements - specifically managing air freight and cargo operations for weapons shipments.[^1]
Clines was indicted in February 1990 after the guilty pleas and cooperation of Richard Secord and Albert Hakim, and on September 18, 1990 a jury in U.S. District Court in Baltimore, before Judge Norman P. Ramsey, convicted him of four income-tax-related felonies; on December 13, 1990 Ramsey sentenced him to 16 months in prison and a 40,000 dollar fine. The Fourth Circuit affirmed and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.[^6] Secord and Willard Zucker were the central prosecution witnesses; Secord testified under a cooperation agreement.[^6] The prosecution established that Clines had received income from Enterprise operations that he failed to report on his tax returns.[^7]
Clines was indicted in February 1990 after the guilty pleas and cooperation of Richard Secord and Albert Hakim, and on September 18, 1990 a jury in U.S. District Court in Baltimore, before Judge Norman P. Ramsey, convicted him of four income-tax-related felonies; on December 13, 1990 Ramsey sentenced him to 16 months in prison and a 40,000 dollar fine. The indictment of February 22, 1990 charged four felony counts of underreporting his income to the Internal Revenue Service for 1985 and 1986 and of falsely stating on his 1985 and 1986 returns that he had no foreign financial accounts.[^6] The Fourth Circuit upheld the convictions on February 27, 1992, the Supreme Court denied certiorari, and Clines served his prison sentence.[^6][^7] Secord and Willard Zucker were the central prosecution witnesses; Secord testified under a cooperation agreement.[^7] The prosecution established that Clines had received income from Enterprise operations that he failed to report on his tax returns.[^8]
### Shackley Network
@ -53,5 +61,6 @@ Clines's career illustrates the structural feature of the Shackley network: offi
[^3]: Edward T. Pound and Walter S. Mossberg, "Weapons Windfall," Wall Street Journal, Oct. 1, 1982, pp. 1, 18, CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP09S00048R000100020015-5, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp09s00048r000100020015-5.
[^4]: Testimony of Richard V. Secord, Iran-Contra Investigation: Joint Hearings, 100th Cong., 1st sess., Hearings 100-1, p. 303, https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152829_0342.
[^5]: Central Intelligence Agency, Domestic Collection Division, case file 65805, "Wackenhut Corp.," JFK Assassination Records Collection, record 104-10291-10017, released 2023. https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2023/104-10291-10017.pdf, pp. 19-22.
[^6]: Lawrence E. Walsh, Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters, vol. I, pt. V, ch. 11, "United States v. Thomas G. Clines," pp. 181-184, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_11.htm.
[^7]: Walsh, Lawrence E. *Iran-Contra: The Final Report*. Random House, 1994. Walsh, Lawrence E. *Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-Up*. W.W. Norton, 1997.
[^6]: Office of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters, Final Report, Vol. I, Summary of Prosecutions. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/summpros.htm
[^7]: Lawrence E. Walsh, Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters, vol. I, pt. V, ch. 11, "United States v. Thomas G. Clines," pp. 181-184, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_11.htm.
[^8]: Walsh, Lawrence E. *Iran-Contra: The Final Report*. Random House, 1994. Walsh, Lawrence E. *Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-Up*. W.W. Norton, 1997.

20
10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Uri Geller.md
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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
created: 2026-05-15
updated: 2026-10-08
updated: 2026-10-09
title: Uri Geller
aliases:
- Uri Geller
@ -19,6 +19,13 @@ tags:
summary: "Israeli performer tested at Stanford Research Institute in 1972 and 1973 with Technical Services Division money, whom a CIA reviewer thought no more than a skillful magician."
born: 1946-12-20
location: "Tel Aviv, British Mandate Palestine"
relations:
- type: funded
with: "[[Edgar Mitchell]]"
reverse: true
start: 1972
role: "original funding source for the SRI tests"
fn: 10
---
Uri Geller is a famous Israeli-British illusionist, mentalist, and spoon bender. He was born on the winter solstice of 1946, in Tel Aviv, to Hungarian emigré parents. According to the Geller legend, at the age of four, he was visited by a strange luminous apparition, after which he began to manifest paranormal talents. Unlike [[Ingo Swann]] and [[Pat Price]], he did not have out-of-body experiences or premonitions; instead, he claimed to be able to read minds, visualize hidden objects and drawings clairvoyantly, and bend small pieces of metal.[^1]
@ -27,7 +34,7 @@ When Geller was ten, his parents separated, and he moved with his mother to Cypr
Allegedly, Geller worked with Israeli military intelligence chief [[Aharon Yariv]], [[Mossad]], and [[Shin Bet]], performing tasks such as clairvoyantly viewing intelligence targets in the [[Middle East]], predicting troop deployments, and telepathically influencing Arab figures. However, he later chose to pursue a high-profile career as a stage performer rather than a psychic warrior.[^1]
In 1972, Geller was brought to America by [[Andrija Puharich]], funded by a grant from the [[Institute of Noetic Science]], run by former astronaut [[Edgar Mitchell]]. Geller visited [[Stanford Research Institute]] (SRI) in 1972 and 1973, where [[Hal Puthoff]] and [[Russell Targ]] tested his abilities. He performed feats such as blindfolded driving, bending or breaking spoons and rings, remotely reducing the weight of objects on electronic scales, describing sketches in briefcases, and scrambling electronic equipment. While some tests showed genuine psi abilities, his hyperkinetic and chaotic style often led Puthoff and Targ to suspect sleight of hand. The CIA was interested in determining if Geller was genuine and his potential as an intelligence asset, or if he was part of a disinformation project.[^1]
In 1972, Geller was brought to America by [[Andrija Puharich]]. [[Jim Schnabel]] wrote that the trip was funded by a grant from the [[Institute of Noetic Science]], run by former astronaut [[Edgar Mitchell]]. Geller visited [[Stanford Research Institute]] (SRI) in 1972 and 1973, where [[Hal Puthoff]] and [[Russell Targ]] tested his abilities. He performed feats such as blindfolded driving, bending or breaking spoons and rings, remotely reducing the weight of objects on electronic scales, describing sketches in briefcases, and scrambling electronic equipment. While some tests showed genuine psi abilities, his hyperkinetic and chaotic style often led Puthoff and Targ to suspect sleight of hand. The CIA was interested in determining if Geller was genuine and his potential as an intelligence asset, or if he was part of a disinformation project.[^1]
Despite the skepticism and his tricksterish demeanor, Geller produced remarkable results in some controlled tests, such as accurately reproducing a drawing of a bunch of grapes. However, his psychokinetic displays never occurred under fully controlled conditions, leading to suspicions of magician's tricks. Puthoff and Targ even brought in stage magician [[Milbourne Christopher]] to observe Geller. Geller's presence at SRI attracted significant attention and controversy, eventually leading Puthoff and Targ to conclude he was "not worth the trouble."[^1]
@ -39,6 +46,8 @@ In the winter of 1975, Geller was tested by a group of nuclear physicists and en
On January 23, 1973, Russell Targ and Hal Puthoff showed a CIA audience a film of their experiments with "Uri Geller, an Israeli magician with claimed capabilities in ESP." The Office of Research and Development's memorandum of the next day recorded that "the SRI work with Geller has been supported by Edgar Mitchell's foundation, by something with a name like Mind Science Institute of Los Angeles, and by TSD," the [[Technical Services Division]]. The film showed Geller reproducing sealed drawings, calling dice, finding metal or water in one of twelve containers, "and bending spoons by touching them with apparently much less force than would be required normally." The writer added: "On the basis of meetings I have attended at ARPA, whose Drs. Austin Kibler and George Lawrence have been to SRI to observe Geller, Puthoff and Targ in action, there is serious doubt that Geller's accomplishment transcends the range of activities a skillful magician can perform and much concern that Puthoff's and Targ's own experimental bias in favor of successful outcomes is undermining their objectivity in designing properly controlled experimental procedures. Geller's connections with Dr. A. Puharich, with whom many unsavory reports have been linked, also is disturbing." He recommended asking TSD about "their plans for future research at SRI, both with Geller and with other subjects such as Ingo Swann," and noted that one manager in the science and technology directorate had said he was "humbled" by the film. A further file, "Experiments - Uri Geller at SRI, August 4-11, 1973," is in the same collection.[^3]
Targ and Puthoff's Nature paper of October 18, 1974 thanks Judith Skutch and Edgar D. Mitchell of the Institute of Noetic Sciences for support.[^9] New Scientist reported on October 17, 1974 that Mitchell was Geller's original funding source and a co-experimenter on Geller at Stanford Research Institute, who had fallen out with Geller the year before, that funding came mainly from Skutch and Mitchell, and that Mitchell "two years ago set up his Institute of Noetic Sciences in Palo Alto."[^10] The Internal Revenue Service tax exemption of the California Institute of Noetic Sciences was issued in June 1973.[^11]
### The ARPA team, 1972 to 1973
[[Ray Hyman]] wrote that he visited SRI on December 8, 1972 with [[George Lawrence]] of [[DARPA|ARPA]], and that Geller sent everyone out of the room except Lawrence and Hyman.[^4] [[Roger A. Beaumont]] wrote that in 1972 the agency sent a team headed by Lawrence, including Hyman and [[Robert Van de Castle]], and that the team's report was totally negative.[^5] According to Schnabel, the agency's corporate stance was not to pursue Geller further, while Van de Castle was impressed by Geller's abilities.[^1] Time reported in 1974 that Hyman, accompanied by Lawrence, caught Geller in some outright deceptions, and quoted Hyman as calling the SRI tests conducted with "incredible sloppiness."[^6] [[David Suter]], in an undated Washington Post article, wrote that DARPA consultants concluded that SRI's work with Geller was conducted with "incredible sloppiness," and quoted Van de Castle, "a member of the DARPA team that investigated Geller," on two CIA men who visited him: "One thing they wanted to know was if Geller could jam computers."[^7]
@ -51,9 +60,12 @@ Targ's log of the sessions of August 4 to 11, 1973, in an "electrically shielded
[^1]: Schnabel, Jim. *Remote Viewers: The Secret History of America's Psychic Spies.* Dell, 1997.
[^2]: Jacobsen, Annie. *Phenomena: The Secret History of the U.S. Government's Investigations into Extrasensory Perception and Psychokinesis.* Little, Brown and Company, 2017.
[^3]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Research and Development, memorandum ORD-413-73, "Briefing by Stanford Research Institute," January 24, 1973, CIA-RDP96-00787R000400070029-2. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection. "Experiments - Uri Geller at SRI, August 4-11, 1973," CIA-RDP96-00787R000700110003-2.
[^3]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Research and Development, memorandum ORD-413-73, "Briefing by Stanford Research Institute," January 24, 1973, CIA-RDP96-00787R000400070029-2. "Experiments - Uri Geller at SRI, August 4-11, 1973," CIA-RDP96-00787R000700110003-2.
[^4]: Ray Hyman, "Psychics and Scientists: 'Mind-Reach' and Remote Viewing," *The Humanist*, May/June 1977, CIA-RDP96-00787R000200080037-4. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00787R000200080037-4.pdf Jim Schnabel, *Remote Viewers* (Dell, 1997), p. 138, dates the visit of the agency's three-man team to early 1973.
[^5]: Roger A. Beaumont, "On the Strategic Potential of ESP," clipping reproduced in the 1983 Center Lane staff study, CIA-RDP96-00788R001700360003-3. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R001700360003-3.pdf
[^6]: "Boom Times on the Psychic Frontier," *Time*, March 4, 1974, CIA-RDP96-00787R000100030002-8. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00787R000100030002-8.pdf
[^7]: David Suter, article for *The Washington Post*, undated clipping reproduced in CIA-RDP96-00788R001700360003-3. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R001700360003-3.pdf
[^8]: Targ, Russell. "Experiments: Uri Geller at SRI, August 4-11, 1973," memorandum of August 13, 1973, CIA-RDP96-00787R000700110003-2. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
[^8]: Targ, Russell. "Experiments: Uri Geller at SRI, August 4-11, 1973," memorandum of August 13, 1973, CIA-RDP96-00787R000700110003-2.
[^9]: R. Targ and H. Puthoff, "Information transmission under conditions of sensory shielding," *Nature*, vol. 251, October 18, 1974, pp. 602-607, acknowledgments. CIA Reading Room copy, CIA-RDP96-00787R000200090024-7. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00787r000200090024-7
[^10]: Joseph Hanlon, report on Uri Geller and the Targ and Puthoff paper, *New Scientist*, vol. 64, no. 919, October 17, 1974, reprinted in CIA-RDP96-00787R000200090024-7. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00787r000200090024-7
[^11]: ProPublica Nonprofit Explorer, "California Institute of Noetic Sciences" (EIN 23-7236986), tax exemption issued June 1973. https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/237236986

45
10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/William Yandell Elliott.md Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
---
title: William Yandell Elliott
aliases:
- William Yandell Elliott
- William Y. Elliott
- W. Y. Elliott
- William Elliott
category: "Intelligence & Government"
created: 2026-10-09
updated: 2026-10-09
tags:
- Person
- NationalSecurityCouncil
- Harvard
summary: "Harvard professor of government who was Assistant Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization and its representative on the National Security Council Planning Board from 1953."
relations:
- type: member_of
with: "[[National Security Council]]"
role: "Office of Defense Mobilization representative on the NSC Planning Board"
start: 1953
end: 1954
fn: 1
---
William Yandell Elliott was a professor of government at [[Harvard University]]. The Foreign Relations of the United States list of persons gives his posts as Assistant Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, 1952 to 1953, and Office of Defense Mobilization representative on the Planning Board of the [[National Security Council]], 1953 to 1954.[^1]
### National Security Council Planning Board
The minutes of the 146th meeting of the Council on May 27, 1953 list "W. Y. Elliott, ODM Planning Board Member," and the minutes of the 155th meeting on July 16, 1953 list "William Y. Elliott, Office of Defense Mobilization."[^2][^3] The Hoover Institution's biographical note for his papers lists him as a member of the National Security Council planning board from 1953 to 1957.[^4] The Harvard Crimson reported in July 1959, when he left for Moscow with Vice President [[Richard Nixon]] as Director of the Harvard Summer School, that since 1953 he had been a member of the National Security Council planning board and had served as assistant director of the Office of Defense Mobilization from 1951 to 1953.[^5] The Foreign Relations list of persons (1952) and the Crimson (1951) differ by a year on the start of the Office of Defense Mobilization post.
The Eisenhower Library's finding aid for the Council's administrative subseries lists a folder of 1949 to 1953 containing "suggestions by William Elliott re reorganization of the NSC."[^6]
### Charles Marsh and Marion Pettie
Kenn Thomas and Len Bracken wrote in 1998 in *Steamshovel Press* that [[Charles Marsh]] facilitated [[Marion Pettie]]'s tie to Elliott, whom they described as a Harvard professor on the National Security Council planning board and a [[Radio Liberty]] trustee.[^7]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, vol. II, part 1, list of persons, entry "Elliott, William Y." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1
[^2]: FRUS 1952-1954, vol. II, part 2, doc. 90, minutes of the 146th meeting of the National Security Council, May 27, 1953. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p2/d90
[^3]: FRUS 1952-1954, vol. II, part 1, doc. 79, minutes of the 155th meeting of the National Security Council, July 16, 1953. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d79
[^4]: Hoover Institution Library and Archives, William Yandell Elliott papers, biographical note: "member, planning board, National Security Council, 1953-1957." https://oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/tf1199n4gh/
[^5]: "Elliott Flies to Moscow With Nixon's Mission," *The Harvard Crimson,* July 23, 1959. https://www.thecrimson.com/article/1959/7/23/elliott-flies-to-moscow-with-nixons/
[^6]: Eisenhower Presidential Library, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Administrative Subseries finding aid, folder "National Security Council - organization and Functions (1) [1949-1953]." https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/finding-aids/pdf/who-osansa/nsc-series-administrative-subseries.pdf
[^7]: Kenn Thomas and Len Bracken, "The Finders' Keeper," *Steamshovel Press* #16, 1998.