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10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Henry B. Gonzalez.md
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@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ In 1963 he shoved Representative [[Ed Foreman]], who had called him a "pinko," a
### The Assassinations Committee
Gonzalez became chairman of the [[HSCA|House Select Committee on Assassinations]] in 1977 and entered a public dispute with its chief counsel, [[Richard A. Sprague]], over Sprague's independence of the committee. The other members sided with Sprague, and Gonzalez resigned on March 2, 1977, within a month of taking the chair.[^1]
Gonzalez became chairman of the [[HSCA|House Select Committee on Assassinations]] in January 1977, after [[Thomas N. Downing]] retired.[^3] He entered a public dispute with the chief counsel, [[Richard A. Sprague]], and the separate views appended to the report describe the two men as spending January through March 1977 "struggling over budgets and funding measures."[^3] *Newsweek* wrote in April 1977 that Gonzalez resigned following "a nasty clash" with Sprague "in which most other panel members backed Sprague," citing its report of February 21, 1977.[^4] The *New York Times* reported on March 3, 1977, that Gonzalez "submitted his resignation yesterday," March 2, after accusing other committee members of trying to usurp his power, and that Speaker [[Tip O'Neill]] would not accept it until he had spoken with Gonzalez.[^5] The *Washington Post* reported on March 29, 1977, that Gonzalez "quit the chairmanship and the committee on March 8," the date on which [[Louis Stokes]] was appointed chairman, and quoted his speech from the House floor: "I think I have been treated shabbily."[^6] A *Chicago Tribune* report of April 3, 1977, quoted the same speech, in which Gonzalez said he had received no support from committee members or the Democratic leadership in his attempts to rein in Sprague's "extravagant and arrogant behavior," and said that "within hours of Gonzalez' attack from the House floor, Sprague quit."[^7] Sprague resigned on March 30, 1977, the day the House voted 230 to 181 to continue the committee.[^8]
### The Banking Committee
@ -38,40 +38,46 @@ He became chairman of the banking committee in January 1989, having warned of th
### Banca Nazionale del Lavoro
The FBI raided the Atlanta branch of the Italian state bank in August 1989 and found that it had lent Iraq several billion dollars off its books, much of it guaranteed by the [[Commodity Credit Corporation]] of the [[Department of Agriculture]]. When Gonzalez proposed hearings, the [[John F. Kennedy Presidential Library|Kennedy Library]] later recorded, "he was asked by high-ranking government officials to desist on the grounds of national security." [[United States Attorney General|Attorney General]] [[Richard Thornburgh]] wrote to him on September 26, 1990, that a hearing scheduled for October 9 and staff interviews of witnesses raised "the prospect that culpable parties will elude prosecution," and added: "As you should be aware, this is a sensitive case with national security concerns." On December 18 the [[State Department]] informed the [[Department of Justice]] that "with respect to the national security aspects of the investigation, we have determined that the State Department does not have any concerns it wishes to raise at this juncture." The committee issued subpoenas. Beginning in February 1992 he delivered about twenty hour-long special order speeches on the House floor, among them "Efforts to Thwart Investigation of the [[BNL Scandal]]," "[[Kissinger Associates]], [[Brent Scowcroft|Scowcroft]], [[Lawrence Eagleburger|Eagleburger]], Stoga, Iraq, and BNL," "The Rostow Gang," "Scowcroft Improperly Intervened in CCC Program and Many More Lies to Congress," and "The BNL Case: Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil," and entered the documents in the [[Congressional Record]].[^2][^3]
The FBI raided the Atlanta branch of the Italian state bank in August 1989 and found that it had lent Iraq several billion dollars off its books, much of it guaranteed by the [[Commodity Credit Corporation]] of the [[Department of Agriculture]]. When Gonzalez proposed hearings, the [[John F. Kennedy Presidential Library|Kennedy Library]] later recorded, "he was asked by high-ranking government officials to desist on the grounds of national security." [[United States Attorney General|Attorney General]] [[Richard Thornburgh]] wrote to him on September 26, 1990, that a hearing scheduled for October 9 and staff interviews of witnesses raised "the prospect that culpable parties will elude prosecution," and added: "As you should be aware, this is a sensitive case with national security concerns." On December 18 the [[State Department]] informed the [[Department of Justice]] that "with respect to the national security aspects of the investigation, we have determined that the State Department does not have any concerns it wishes to raise at this juncture." The committee issued subpoenas. Beginning in February 1992 he delivered about twenty hour-long special order speeches on the House floor, among them "Efforts to Thwart Investigation of the [[BNL Scandal]]," "[[Kissinger Associates]], [[Brent Scowcroft|Scowcroft]], [[Lawrence Eagleburger|Eagleburger]], Stoga, Iraq, and BNL," "The Rostow Gang," "Scowcroft Improperly Intervened in CCC Program and Many More Lies to Congress," and "The BNL Case: Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil," and entered the documents in the [[Congressional Record]].[^2][^9]
On May 18, 1992, he said: "When the BNL offices were raided in Atlanta in August 1989, investigators uncovered massive fraud, placing the entire [[Commodity Credit Corporation Iraq Program|CCC Program for Iraq]] in jeopardy. So the [[White House]] and NSC, armed with National Security Directive 26, sprang into action in order to save the CCC Program for Iraq." He named Scowcroft, the president's counsel [[C. Boyden Gray]], Gray's deputy [[John Schmitz]], [[Richard Haass]] of the [[National Security Council]] staff, and [[Clayton Yeutter]] as parties to the discussions, and said that by April 1990 "it was apparent the BNL indictment was being delayed." On July 21 he quoted a July 1990 intelligence report, "Iraq's Growing Arsenal," which identified Iraq's State Establishment for Oil Refining and Gas Processing as "a dedicated front for procuring chemical weapons related components," against the text of [[National Security Directive 26]], which placed "particular emphasis on expanding [[United States]]-Iraq oil industry related trade."[^3][^4]
On May 18, 1992, he said: "When the BNL offices were raided in Atlanta in August 1989, investigators uncovered massive fraud, placing the entire [[Commodity Credit Corporation Iraq Program|CCC Program for Iraq]] in jeopardy. So the [[White House]] and NSC, armed with National Security Directive 26, sprang into action in order to save the CCC Program for Iraq." He named Scowcroft, the president's counsel [[C. Boyden Gray]], Gray's deputy [[John Schmitz]], [[Richard Haass]] of the [[National Security Council]] staff, and [[Clayton Yeutter]] as parties to the discussions, and said that by April 1990 "it was apparent the BNL indictment was being delayed." On July 21 he quoted a July 1990 intelligence report, "Iraq's Growing Arsenal," which identified Iraq's State Establishment for Oil Refining and Gas Processing as "a dedicated front for procuring chemical weapons related components," against the text of [[National Security Directive 26]], which placed "particular emphasis on expanding [[United States]]-Iraq oil industry related trade."[^9][^10]
On September 25 he described a brass factory worth 40 million dollars sold to Iraq by [[SerVaas Inc.]] of [[Indianapolis]] under a contract negotiated with [[Safa al-Habobi]] and financed by the Atlanta branch. Its owner had told the committee in April 1991 that the brass was "solely for commercial uses." Gonzalez produced a memorandum of July 31, 1988, showing that the Iraqi purchaser meant it for cartridge cases and artillery fuses, and quoted the owner's remark to the [[Indianapolis Star]] in August 1992: "Probably the only thing they are doing is melting the brass down." President [[George H.W. Bush]]'s report to Congress of September 1991 had stated that "United States suppliers did not contribute directly to Iraq's conventional or nonconventional weapons capability."[^5]
On September 25 he described a brass factory worth 40 million dollars sold to Iraq by [[SerVaas Inc.]] of [[Indianapolis]] under a contract negotiated with [[Safa al-Habobi]] and financed by the Atlanta branch. Its owner had told the committee in April 1991 that the brass was "solely for commercial uses." Gonzalez produced a memorandum of July 31, 1988, showing that the Iraqi purchaser meant it for cartridge cases and artillery fuses, and quoted the owner's remark to the [[Indianapolis Star]] in August 1992: "Probably the only thing they are doing is melting the brass down." President [[George H.W. Bush]]'s report to Congress of September 1991 had stated that "United States suppliers did not contribute directly to Iraq's conventional or nonconventional weapons capability."[^11]
In the White House he was dismissed as a "flake." He told the House: "We are obstructed blatantly, premeditatedly and coldly, and in defiance of the plain constitutional prerogative of the Congress to know." When he learned that lawyers from the National Security Council staff and other agencies were meeting under [[C. Nicholas Rostow|Nicholas Rostow]] to coordinate what Congress would be given, he named them "the Rostow gang." "It used to be that cover-ups were sort of ad hoc events, a mad scramble to provide damage control for the moment. The Rostow gang advances the notion that cover-up mechanisms have become an integral cog in the machinery of this administration." His chief investigator, [[Dennis Kane]], recalled Rostow telling him "it would be a cold day in hell before Congress got NSD 26 or any of those documents."[^6]
In the White House he was dismissed as a "flake." He told the House: "We are obstructed blatantly, premeditatedly and coldly, and in defiance of the plain constitutional prerogative of the Congress to know." When he learned that lawyers from the National Security Council staff and other agencies were meeting under [[C. Nicholas Rostow|Nicholas Rostow]] to coordinate what Congress would be given, he named them "the Rostow gang." "It used to be that cover-ups were sort of ad hoc events, a mad scramble to provide damage control for the moment. The Rostow gang advances the notion that cover-up mechanisms have become an integral cog in the machinery of this administration." His chief investigator, [[Dennis Kane]], recalled Rostow telling him "it would be a cold day in hell before Congress got NSD 26 or any of those documents."[^12]
### The January 1993 update
On January 21, 1993, Gonzalez used a special order to report on the Banking Committee's inquiry into the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro. He told the House that BNL had sued on December 15, 1992 in the United States Court of Federal Claims in Washington to recover over 340 million dollars in defaulted Iraqi loans guaranteed under the Department of Agriculture's Commodity Credit Corporation program.[^7]
On January 21, 1993, Gonzalez used a special order to report on the Banking Committee's inquiry into the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro. He told the House that BNL had sued on December 15, 1992 in the United States Court of Federal Claims in Washington to recover over 340 million dollars in defaulted Iraqi loans guaranteed under the Department of Agriculture's Commodity Credit Corporation program.[^13]
He described a defunct British firm, [[Allivane]], which the Venice indictment identified as one of several firms secretly supplying Iran with armaments, and which also had contracts to supply Iraq with a million artillery fuses. Two former Allivane directors had been convicted in Britain in early 1992 of illegal arms shipments related to the Iraqi fuse deals. Allivane had been set up and run by an American, [[Terry Byrne]], whom Gonzalez said was never indicted for the Iraqi deals and was reportedly back in the United States. Byrne had worked for Rexon Corp. and then for [[International Signal and Control]], and Gonzalez said: "ISC was founded by James Guerin, who is serving time in jail after being convicted of, among other things, illegally shipping military technology to Iraq."[^7]
He described a defunct British firm, [[Allivane]], which the Venice indictment identified as one of several firms secretly supplying Iran with armaments, and which also had contracts to supply Iraq with a million artillery fuses. Two former Allivane directors had been convicted in Britain in early 1992 of illegal arms shipments related to the Iraqi fuse deals. Allivane had been set up and run by an American, [[Terry Byrne]], whom Gonzalez said was never indicted for the Iraqi deals and was reportedly back in the United States. Byrne had worked for Rexon Corp. and then for [[International Signal and Control]], and Gonzalez said: "ISC was founded by James Guerin, who is serving time in jail after being convicted of, among other things, illegally shipping military technology to Iraq."[^13]
Gonzalez said Rexon, a New Jersey firm, was under criminal investigation for shipments of artillery fuse parts and technology to Iraq for a project run by [[Gerald Bull]] and his Space Research Corp., and was also under investigation involving [[Carlos Cardoen]]'s activities in Iraq. He said the committee had tried to contact Byrne and Rexon, that Rexon refused to talk and Byrne remained elusive, and that the committee wanted to know whether BNL Atlanta loans figured in the fuse deals.[^7]
Gonzalez said Rexon, a New Jersey firm, was under criminal investigation for shipments of artillery fuse parts and technology to Iraq for a project run by [[Gerald Bull]] and his Space Research Corp., and was also under investigation involving [[Carlos Cardoen]]'s activities in Iraq. He said the committee had tried to contact Byrne and Rexon, that Rexon refused to talk and Byrne remained elusive, and that the committee wanted to know whether BNL Atlanta loans figured in the fuse deals.[^13]
### The Ethics Resolution
His statement of July 7, 1992, drew on a [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] document titled "Iraq-[[Italy]], Repercussions of the BNL-Atlanta Scandal." Director [[Robert Gates]] wrote to him that it "included information from a TOP SECRET compartmented and particularly sensitive document" of September 4, 1989, and that "because of the sources and methods underlying that information, I will ask for a damage assessment to determine the impact of the disclosure." Admiral [[William Studeman]] wrote that the statements of July 21 and 27 were drawn from similar material. Attorney General [[William Barr]] told the committee that the executive branch would stop supplying classified documents without guarantees. On August 4 the minority leader, [[Bob Michel]], introduced a resolution calling for an ethics investigation, arguing that the proper course was a vote in secret session. "I believe that Mr. Gonzalez' conduct does not reflect creditably on the House," he said. He was not censured, and he continued the statements into 1993.[^8]
His statement of July 7, 1992, drew on a [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] document titled "Iraq-[[Italy]], Repercussions of the BNL-Atlanta Scandal." Director [[Robert Gates]] wrote to him that it "included information from a TOP SECRET compartmented and particularly sensitive document" of September 4, 1989, and that "because of the sources and methods underlying that information, I will ask for a damage assessment to determine the impact of the disclosure." Admiral [[William Studeman]] wrote that the statements of July 21 and 27 were drawn from similar material. Attorney General [[William Barr]] told the committee that the executive branch would stop supplying classified documents without guarantees. On August 4 the minority leader, [[Bob Michel]], introduced a resolution calling for an ethics investigation, arguing that the proper course was a vote in secret session. "I believe that Mr. Gonzalez' conduct does not reflect creditably on the House," he said. He was not censured, and he continued the statements into 1993.[^14]
The Kennedy Library gave him its Profile in Courage Award on September 11, 1994, for investigating, "regardless of the attempts to strip him of his committee chairmanship, the involvement of high-level officials in the Reagan and Bush Administrations in the sale of U.S. arms to Iraq." Of the war of 1991 he had said: "Not only did our own service men and women face military material that had been exported from the U.S., the U.S. military itself relied on these Iraqi front companies for some of the military goods they used." He lost the chairmanship to [[Jim Leach|James Leach]] in 1995 and did not run in 1998. His son Charles succeeded him.[^1][^2]
### BCCI
On September 11, 1991, Gonzalez opened the banking committee's hearings on the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]], with [[Clark Clifford]] and [[Robert Altman]] as the first witnesses. He described BCCI as "tantamount to a racketeering bank" and the hearings as an inquiry into how it "gained a foothold in the United States and how regulators and bank officials failed to detect or understand or report the invasion." Recalling his inquiry into Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, which "became Bagdad's banker in the United States before our regulatory companies at the [[Federal Reserve Board|Federal Reserve]] could locate Iraq on the map," he said that "in the case of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, the Federal Reserve would have us believe that BCCI was a stealth banking operation, undetected on the regulators' radar screens," and asked: "What other foreign entities or criminal elements are secretly in control of U.S. banks at this very moment? That is a question I have been raising for 2 years."[^9]
On September 11, 1991, Gonzalez opened the banking committee's hearings on the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]], with [[Clark Clifford]] and [[Robert Altman]] as the first witnesses. He described BCCI as "tantamount to a racketeering bank" and the hearings as an inquiry into how it "gained a foothold in the United States and how regulators and bank officials failed to detect or understand or report the invasion." Recalling his inquiry into Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, which "became Bagdad's banker in the United States before our regulatory companies at the [[Federal Reserve Board|Federal Reserve]] could locate Iraq on the map," he said that "in the case of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, the Federal Reserve would have us believe that BCCI was a stealth banking operation, undetected on the regulators' radar screens," and asked: "What other foreign entities or criminal elements are secretly in control of U.S. banks at this very moment? That is a question I have been raising for 2 years."[^15]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Kohout, Martin Donell. "González, Henry Barbosa," *Handbook of Texas,* Texas State Historical Association. https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/entries/gonzalez-henry-barbosa
[^2]: John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, "Henry González," Profile in Courage Award, 1994.
[^3]: Gonzalez, Henry B. "Continuing Saga of Attempts to Thwart BNL Investigation," *Congressional Record,* House, May 18, 1992; index of statements, 102nd Congress, second session, February 24 to September 28, 1992.
[^4]: Gonzalez, Henry B. "United States Policy to Arm Iraq," *Congressional Record,* House, July 21, 1992.
[^5]: Gonzalez, Henry B. "Brass Factory in Iraq," *Congressional Record,* House, September 25, 1992, p. H9502.
[^6]: Friedman, Alan. *Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq*. Bantam, 1993, pp. 206, 216, 221.
[^7]: Rep. Henry B. Gonzalez, "Update on BNL Investigation," *Congressional Record*, House of Representatives, January 21, 1993, pp. H132 to H140. The statement about Guerin is Gonzalez's own characterization; the Third Circuit and the SEC release describe the Guerin charges as fraud and exports to South Africa, with Iraq named in the SEC release. https://irp.fas.org/congress/1993_cr/h930121-bnl.htm
[^8]: "Resolution Calling for an Ethics Probe of Chairman Gonzalez," *Congressional Record,* House, August 4, 1992, p. H7366. https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_cr/h920804-gonzales.htm
[^9]: House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs. *Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) Investigation, Part 1.* 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., September 11, 1991, Serial No. 102-69, pp. 1-2. https://archive.org/details/BCCIHearingsBeforeTheCommitteeOnBankingFinanceAndUrbanAffairs
[^3]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), separate views of Hons. Samuel L. Devine and Robert W. Edgar, pp. 493-494; "History of the Committee," pp. 9-10 (Stokes named chairman March 8, 1977). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^4]: *Newsweek,* April 11, 1977, press clipping in CIA Reading Room document 00543522. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00543522
[^5]: Burnham, David, *New York Times,* March 3, 1977, press clipping in CIA Reading Room document 00026481. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00026481
[^6]: Lardner, George, Jr., *Washington Post,* March 29, 1977, press clipping in CIA Reading Room document 00026481. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00026481
[^7]: *Chicago Tribune,* April 3, 1977, press clipping in CIA Reading Room document 00543522. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00543522
[^8]: Madden, Richard L., *New York Times,* March 30, 1977, press clipping in CIA Reading Room document 00026481. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00026481
[^9]: Gonzalez, Henry B. "Continuing Saga of Attempts to Thwart BNL Investigation," *Congressional Record,* House, May 18, 1992; index of statements, 102nd Congress, second session, February 24 to September 28, 1992.
[^10]: Gonzalez, Henry B. "United States Policy to Arm Iraq," *Congressional Record,* House, July 21, 1992.
[^11]: Gonzalez, Henry B. "Brass Factory in Iraq," *Congressional Record,* House, September 25, 1992, p. H9502.
[^12]: Friedman, Alan. *Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq*. Bantam, 1993, pp. 206, 216, 221.
[^13]: Rep. Henry B. Gonzalez, "Update on BNL Investigation," *Congressional Record*, House of Representatives, January 21, 1993, pp. H132 to H140. The statement about Guerin is Gonzalez's own characterization; the Third Circuit and the SEC release describe the Guerin charges as fraud and exports to South Africa, with Iraq named in the SEC release. https://irp.fas.org/congress/1993_cr/h930121-bnl.htm
[^14]: "Resolution Calling for an Ethics Probe of Chairman Gonzalez," *Congressional Record,* House, August 4, 1992, p. H7366. https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_cr/h920804-gonzales.htm
[^15]: House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs. *Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) Investigation, Part 1.* 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., September 11, 1991, Serial No. 102-69, pp. 1-2. https://archive.org/details/BCCIHearingsBeforeTheCommitteeOnBankingFinanceAndUrbanAffairs