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@ -7,13 +7,29 @@ tags:
- DoJ
- INSLAW
summary: "Jack Rugh was a figure in the PROMIS Software Scandal, primarily involved in the administration of the Inslaw contract with the DOJ."
relations:
- type: reported_to
with: "[[C. Madison Brewer]]"
role: "Assistant Director, Executive Office for United States Attorneys"
start: 1982
fn: 5
updated: 2026-10-09
---
Jack Rugh was a figure in the [[PROMIS Software Scandal]], primarily involved in the administration of the [[INSLAW|Inslaw]] contract with the [[Department of Justice|DOJ]]. He served as [[C. Madison Brewer]]'s deputy and as the contracting officer's Technical Representative, working closely with [[Peter Videnieks]].
Rugh played a role in the DOJ's response to Inslaw's proposed methodology for identifying proprietary enhancements in the [[PROMIS]] software. He considered Inslaw's methodology inadequate, particularly objecting to the part that would count privately funded hours first, believing the issue was whether actual hours were billed to a private client. He also thought [[INSLAW]] did not keep sufficient records to prove private funding. Rugh, along with Videnieks, chose neither to accept Inslaw's methodology nor to propose revisions or an acceptable alternative, and did not inform Inslaw why its methodology was unacceptable. The Special Counsel's investigation concluded that Rugh's actions were driven by a desire to protect the government's interests and not by an intent to cheat Inslaw, attributing his conduct to the atmosphere of distrust surrounding the contract's administration.[^1]
Rugh played a role in the DOJ's response to Inslaw's proposed methodology for identifying proprietary enhancements in the [[PROMIS]] software. He considered Inslaw's methodology inadequate, particularly objecting to the part that would count privately funded hours first, believing the issue was whether actual hours were billed to a private client. He also thought INSLAW did not keep sufficient records to prove private funding. Rugh, along with Videnieks, chose neither to accept Inslaw's methodology nor to propose revisions or an acceptable alternative, and did not inform Inslaw why its methodology was unacceptable. The Special Counsel's investigation concluded that Rugh's actions were driven by a desire to protect the government's interests and not by an intent to cheat Inslaw, attributing his conduct to the atmosphere of distrust surrounding the contract's administration.[^1]
Rugh was also involved in the allegations surrounding the attempted conversion of Inslaw's bankruptcy to a liquidation. In February 1985, shortly after Inslaw filed for bankruptcy, Rugh had a telephone conversation with Peter Videnieks, during which Videnieks made a note that read: "2/20/85 JR called re/•our computer.' Brick talked to Stanton . •no way• 11 will be '7.' Need home for computer." Rugh testified that he did not remember the conversation but that the note accurately reflected his pessimistic view of Inslaw's prospects, believing it would end up in liquidation. He might have told [[Gregory McKain]], an Inslaw employee, that the DOJ had talked to the "Trustees" who said Inslaw would not survive Chapter 11 and would likely be in Chapter 7 within 30 to 60 days. However, Rugh claimed this was his personal opinion and not based on any statement from the Trustee's Office. The Special Counsel's investigation found that the interpretation of Videnieks' notes by Rugh and Videnieks was reasonable and consistent with other evidence, suggesting Rugh was expressing his own opinion rather than relaying a confirmed plan for conversion. The investigation found insufficient evidence to support a finding that the DOJ planned or attempted to convert Inslaw's bankruptcy case or engaged in any cover-up.[^1]
By memorandum dated May 12, 1983, Rugh turned PROMIS over to Brewer for submission to the Government of Israel, enclosing "the PROMIS materials that you asked me to produce for Dr. Ben Orr of the Government of Israel," consisting of the LEAA DEC PDP 11/70 version of PROMIS on magnetic tape, its printed specifications and two printed volumes of documentation.[^2] In a memorandum of August 12, 1983, Rugh wrote that when Don Manson called on August 10 to ask for the Prime enhanced version of PROMIS for the Virgin Islands, he told Manson "that even though I expected the dispute to be resolved in favor of the Government, we could not supply a copy of the software at this time."[^3]
The bankruptcy court found that in February 1985, after Brewer had talked to [[Thomas Stanton]], Rugh telephoned Peter Videnieks, told him there was "no way" the INSLAW bankruptcy would continue as a Chapter 11 case, and said that the government computer on INSLAW's premises in Lanham, Maryland, would need a new site. The court found that on or about February 21, 1985, Rugh telephoned [[Gregory McKain]] and discussed his working for DOJ under a six-month sole-source contract if INSLAW went out of business.[^4] The hearing officer in the 1997 congressional reference case described Rugh as Brewer's Assistant Director and as the supervisor of the contract's technical representative.[^5]
Rugh was also involved in the allegations surrounding the attempted conversion of Inslaw's bankruptcy to a liquidation. In February 1985, shortly after Inslaw filed for bankruptcy, Rugh had a telephone conversation with Peter Videnieks, during which Videnieks made a note that read: "2/20/85 JR called re/'our computer.' Brick talked to Stanton . 'no way' 11 will be '7.' Need home for computer." Rugh testified that he did not remember the conversation but that the note accurately reflected his pessimistic view of Inslaw's prospects, believing it would end up in liquidation. He might have told Gregory McKain, an Inslaw employee, that the DOJ had talked to the "Trustees" who said Inslaw would not survive Chapter 11 and would likely be in Chapter 7 within 30 to 60 days. However, Rugh claimed this was his personal opinion and not based on any statement from the Trustee's Office. The Special Counsel's investigation found that the interpretation of Videnieks' notes by Rugh and Videnieks was reasonable and consistent with other evidence, suggesting Rugh was expressing his own opinion rather than relaying a confirmed plan for conversion. The investigation found insufficient evidence to support a finding that the DOJ planned or attempted to convert Inslaw's bankruptcy case or engaged in any cover-up.[^1]
### Footnotes
[^1]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993.
[^1]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993.
[^2]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. *The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report.* H. Rept. 102-857, 102d Cong., 2d sess., September 10, 1992, p. 48 n. 114. https://archive.org/details/InslawAffairInvestigativeReport
[^3]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. *The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report.* H. Rept. 102-857, 102d Cong., 2d sess., September 10, 1992, p. 49 n. 116. https://archive.org/details/InslawAffairInvestigativeReport
[^4]: *In re INSLAW, Inc.*, 83 B.R. 89 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1988), Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Adv. Proc. No. 86-0069, Findings 351 and 352. https://archive.org/details/Inslaw-FindingsOfFact
[^5]: *INSLAW, Inc. v. United States*, Cong. Ref. No. 95-338X, Report of the Hearing Officer (Miller), July 31, 1997, 39 Fed. Cl. 307. https://static.case.law/fed-cl/39/cases/0307-01.json