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23
40 - EVENTS/INTELLIGENCE_SCANDALS/Freedom of Information Act.md
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@ -27,30 +27,33 @@ The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. section 552, gives the public a
The House passed H.R. 12471, the amendments to the Act, on March 14, 1974, 383 to 8, and the Senate passed it on May 30, 1974, 64 to 17. After a conference, the Senate approved the conference version by voice vote on October 1 and the House by 392 to 2 on October 7. President [[Gerald Ford]] vetoed the bill on October 17, 1974. His veto message raised three objections: that judicial in camera review of classified material risked exposing "military and intelligence secrets," that the investigatory files exemption would burden law enforcement, and that the administrative deadlines were unrealistic. On November 20 the House overrode the veto 371 to 31 and on November 21 the Senate overrode it 65 to 27.[^1]
The veto message to the House, dated October 17, 1974, states: "I remain concerned that our military or intelligence secrets and diplomatic relations could be adversely affected by this bill." Ford proposed that courts review classifications but "uphold the classification if there is a reasonable basis to support it," and that more flexible criteria govern requests for lengthy investigatory records.[^2]
The National Security Archive's compilation of the White House record includes a September 25, 1974, memorandum from Ken Cole to Ford stating "There is little question that the legislation is bad on the merits, the real question is whether opposing it is important enough to face the political consequences"; a Central Intelligence Agency memorandum of September 26 describing a call from [[Antonin Scalia]], then head of the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel, urging the agency to lobby a White House staffer directly; and handwritten notes of a September 30 staff meeting presided over by [[Donald Rumsfeld]], with [[Dick Cheney]] as deputy chief of staff, that devote much of the discussion to leaks.[^1]
### Phillippi v. CIA and the Glomar Response
In March 1975 news organizations reported that the vessel [[Hughes Glomar Explorer]], publicly listed as a research ship owned and operated by the Summa Corporation, was owned and operated by the United States government (see [[Project Azorian]]). The journalist Harriet Ann Phillippi requested all [[Central Intelligence Agency]] records of its contacts with the media about the ship. The agency answered that the existence or nonexistence of such records was itself information pertaining to intelligence sources and methods protected by the National Security Act of 1947, and invoked FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). The district court upheld the refusal and denied her request for a Vaughn index. On November 16, 1976, the D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded, requiring the agency to supply as detailed a public affidavit as possible, and rejecting the Government's reliance on an affidavit by [[Brent Scowcroft]], then Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, filed in another case. Judge MacKinnon dissented on the ground that the CIA's statute controlled. The agency's refusal to confirm or deny became known as a "Glomar response."[^2]
In March 1975 news organizations reported that the vessel [[Hughes Glomar Explorer]], publicly listed as a research ship owned and operated by the Summa Corporation, was owned and operated by the United States government (see [[Project Azorian]]). The journalist Harriet Ann Phillippi requested all [[Central Intelligence Agency]] records of its contacts with the media about the ship. The agency answered that the existence or nonexistence of such records was itself information pertaining to intelligence sources and methods protected by the National Security Act of 1947, and invoked FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). The district court upheld the refusal and denied her request for a Vaughn index. On November 16, 1976, the D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded, requiring the agency to supply as detailed a public affidavit as possible, and rejecting the Government's reliance on an affidavit by [[Brent Scowcroft]], then Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, filed in another case. Judge MacKinnon dissented on the ground that the CIA's statute controlled. The agency's refusal to confirm or deny became known as a "Glomar response."[^3]
### Ground Saucer Watch and the CIA
On January 1, 1979, the New York Times reported that Ground Saucer Watch, an Arizona organization headed by the aerospace engineer William Spaulding, said it had obtained 1,000 pages of CIA documents in a Freedom of Information suit showing agency surveillance of UFOs since 1949, although the agency had said its interest ended in 1952. The article quoted an agency memorandum of August 1, 1952, urging "that no indication of CIA interest or concern reach the press or public"; an October 2, 1952, report to the Director of Central Intelligence recommending that the National Security Council be advised of "the implications of the flying saucer problem" and that the Psychological Strategy Board be consulted on a public information policy to "minimize concern and possible panic"; and a November 1975 document advising against acknowledging any pattern in sightings. Spaulding stated that the documents described a 1976 incident in [[Iran]] in which two F-4 fighters pursued a large object that released smaller craft, and that he held sworn statements from retired Air Force colonels that two objects had crashed and been recovered, one in New Mexico in 1948 and one near Kingman, Arizona, in 1953. The group was awaiting a federal judge's ruling on 57 further items, including motion picture film and landing residue.[^3]
On January 1, 1979, the New York Times reported that Ground Saucer Watch, an Arizona organization headed by the aerospace engineer William Spaulding, said it had obtained 1,000 pages of CIA documents in a Freedom of Information suit showing agency surveillance of UFOs since 1949, although the agency had said its interest ended in 1952. The article quoted an agency memorandum of August 1, 1952, urging "that no indication of CIA interest or concern reach the press or public"; an October 2, 1952, report to the Director of Central Intelligence recommending that the National Security Council be advised of "the implications of the flying saucer problem" and that the Psychological Strategy Board be consulted on a public information policy to "minimize concern and possible panic"; and a November 1975 document advising against acknowledging any pattern in sightings. Spaulding stated that the documents described a 1976 incident in [[Iran]] in which two F-4 fighters pursued a large object that released smaller craft, and that he held sworn statements from retired Air Force colonels that two objects had crashed and been recovered, one in New Mexico in 1948 and one near Kingman, Arizona, in 1953. The group was awaiting a federal judge's ruling on 57 further items, including motion picture film and landing residue.[^4]
### FBI and CIA Releases in the Vault's Files
The FBI's copy of the March 22, 1950, "Hottel" memorandum circulates under a cover sheet of the Bureau's Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts Section.[^4] The CIA's Stargate files carry release stamps from the agency's review, for example "Approved For Release 2001/04/02" on the Project 8501 file concerning the kidnapped [[DEA]] agent Enrique Camarena, which bears redaction codes such as "SG1A" and "SG1J" where text was withheld, and classification markings reading "Declassify On: OADR."[^5] A House Select Committee on Assassinations record on the FBI's Crisman file shows a "Date of Last Review" of February 17, 1998, under the JFK records process.[^6]
The FBI's copy of the March 22, 1950, "Hottel" memorandum circulates under a cover sheet of the Bureau's Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts Section.[^5] The CIA's Stargate files carry release stamps from the agency's review, for example "Approved For Release 2001/04/02" on the Project 8501 file concerning the kidnapped [[DEA]] agent Enrique Camarena, which bears redaction codes such as "SG1A" and "SG1J" where text was withheld, and classification markings reading "Declassify On: OADR."[^6] A House Select Committee on Assassinations record on the FBI's Crisman file shows a "Date of Last Review" of February 17, 1998, under the JFK records process.[^7]
### The Contra Record
[[Gary Webb]] wrote that his FOIA requests to multiple federal agencies produced thousands of pages about [[Danilo Blandon]] and [[Norwin Meneses]], including DEA reports, CIA cables, FBI files and court documents, and that the records confirmed federal agencies had known of the Blandon-Meneses network for years without prosecuting or disrupting it. Webb also wrote that the DEA stated under the Freedom of Information Act that it had no reports from [[Celerino Castillo]] about drug trafficking at [[Ilopango Airbase]], and that the Justice Department Inspector General found and quoted such reports. The Inspector General's published report describes Castillo's reports on the pilots Grasheim and others but does not mention a FOIA response.[^7]
[[Gary Webb]] wrote that his FOIA requests to multiple federal agencies produced thousands of pages about [[Danilo Blandon]] and [[Norwin Meneses]], including DEA reports, CIA cables, FBI files and court documents, and that the records confirmed federal agencies had known of the Blandon-Meneses network for years without prosecuting or disrupting it. Webb also wrote that the DEA stated under the Freedom of Information Act that it had no reports from [[Celerino Castillo]] about drug trafficking at [[Ilopango Airbase]], and that the Justice Department Inspector General found and quoted such reports. The Inspector General's published report describes Castillo's reports on the pilots Grasheim and others but does not mention a FOIA response.[^8]
### Footnotes
[^1]: National Security Archive, "Veto Battle 30 Years Ago Set Freedom of Information Norms," Electronic Briefing Book No. 142, edited by Dan Lopez, Thomas Blanton, Meredith Fuchs and Barbara Elias (November 23, 2004), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB142/
[^2]: Phillippi v. Central Intelligence Agency, 546 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1976), argued April 19, decided November 16, amended November 24, 1976, https://law.resource.org/pub/us/case/reporter/F2/546/546.F2d.1009.76-1004.html
[^3]: "C.I.A. Papers Detail U.F.O. Surveillance," New York Times, January 1, 1979, as reproduced at https://ufology.patrickgross.org/htm/nytcia79.htm
[^4]: Federal Bureau of Investigation, memorandum of March 22, 1950, FOIA/Privacy Acts Section cover sheet "Guy Hottel (3-22-1950)," https://archive.org/details/GuyHottel
[^5]: Memorandum for Record, "Project 8501," March 18, 1985, CIA-RDP96-00788R001900750015-5, https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP96-00788R001900750015-5
[^6]: HSCA Outside Contact Report 008624, NARA record 180-10085-10264, JFK Assassination System Identification Form, https://archive.org/details/crisman_fbifile
[^7]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 1, and Chapter 13: "The wrong kind of friends." Compare U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter X, https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/legacy/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
[^2]: Ford, Gerald R., message to the House of Representatives returning H.R. 12471 without approval, October 17, 1974, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, as posted in National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 142. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB142/101774%20Veto%20Message.pdf
[^3]: Phillippi v. Central Intelligence Agency, 546 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1976), argued April 19, decided November 16, amended November 24, 1976, https://law.resource.org/pub/us/case/reporter/F2/546/546.F2d.1009.76-1004.html
[^4]: "C.I.A. Papers Detail U.F.O. Surveillance," New York Times, January 1, 1979, as reproduced at https://ufology.patrickgross.org/htm/nytcia79.htm
[^5]: Federal Bureau of Investigation, memorandum of March 22, 1950, FOIA/Privacy Acts Section cover sheet "Guy Hottel (3-22-1950)," https://archive.org/details/GuyHottel
[^6]: Memorandum for Record, "Project 8501," March 18, 1985, CIA-RDP96-00788R001900750015-5, https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP96-00788R001900750015-5
[^7]: HSCA Outside Contact Report 008624, NARA record 180-10085-10264, JFK Assassination System Identification Form, https://archive.org/details/crisman_fbifile
[^8]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 1, and Chapter 13: "The wrong kind of friends." Compare U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter X, https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/legacy/special/9712/ch10p2.htm

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40 - EVENTS/INTELLIGENCE_SCANDALS/HSCA.md
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@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
---
---
created: 2026-05-15
updated: 2026-05-17
updated: 2026-10-09
title: HSCA
aliases:
- House Select Committee on Assassinations
- HSCA
- Select Committee on Assassinations
tags:
- Event
- JFKAssassination
@ -13,49 +14,244 @@ tags:
- Investigation
- 1970s
category: "Intelligence Scandal"
summary: "The House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA, 1976-1979) was the second major U.S. government inquiry into the Kennedy assassination, concluding that a 'probable conspiracy' existed based on acoustic evidence suggesting a fourth shot from the grassy knoll, finding that the CIA had improperly withheld information about the ZR/RIFLE program from the Warren Commission, and producing a report whose conspiracy finding was partially reversed by a 1982 acoustic re-analysis."
start: 1976-09-01
end: 1979-01-03
summary: "The House Select Committee on Assassinations (1976-1979) reported that Kennedy was 'probably assassinated as a result of a conspiracy' and found a 'likelihood of conspiracy' in King's death."
start: 1976-09-17
end: 1979-01-02
location: "Washington, D.C."
relations:
- type: head_of
with: "[[Thomas N. Downing]]"
reverse: true
start: 1976-10
end: 1977-01
role: chairman
fn: 1
- type: head_of
with: "[[Henry B. Gonzalez]]"
reverse: true
start: 1977-01
end: 1977-03-08
role: chairman
fn: 2
- type: head_of
with: "[[Louis Stokes]]"
reverse: true
start: 1977-03-08
end: 1979-01-02
role: chairman
fn: 1
- type: head_of
with: "[[Richard A. Sprague]]"
reverse: true
start: 1976-10-04
end: 1977-03-30
role: acting chief counsel, then chief counsel
fn: 3
- type: head_of
with: "[[G. Robert Blakey]]"
reverse: true
start: 1977-06
end: 1979-01-02
role: chief counsel and staff director
fn: 1
- type: investigated
with: "[[James Earl Ray]]"
start: 1977-03-30
end: 1979-01-02
fn: 4
- type: investigated
with: "[[Carlos Marcello]]"
start: 1977-06
end: 1979-01-02
fn: 5
- type: investigated
with: "[[Santos Trafficante, Jr.]]"
start: 1977-06
end: 1979-01-02
fn: 6
- type: investigated
with: "[[Jimmy Hoffa]]"
start: 1977-06
end: 1979-01-02
fn: 7
- type: investigated
with: "[[Jack Ruby]]"
start: 1977-06
end: 1979-01-02
fn: 8
- type: investigated
with: "[[Yuri Nosenko]]"
start: 1978
end: 1979-01-02
fn: 9
---
The House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) was a special committee of the U.S. House of Representatives established in September 1976 to investigate the assassinations of President [[John F. Kennedy]] (November 22, 1963) and Dr. [[Martin Luther King Jr.]] (April 4, 1968). The committee published its final report in January 1979, reaching conclusions on both assassinations that differed significantly from earlier official findings.[^1]
The House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) was a special committee of the U.S. House of Representatives created by [[House Resolution 1540]] in September 1976 to reinvestigate the murders of President [[John F. Kennedy]] (November 22, 1963) and Dr. [[Martin Luther King Jr.]] (April 4, 1968). It filed its final report in January 1979. The report reached conclusions on both assassinations that differ from the earlier official findings of the [[Warren Commission]] and the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]], and its acoustic finding in the Kennedy case was disputed by a [[National Research Council]] panel in 1982.[^10]
### Establishment
### Authorization and membership
The committee was established in the context of the revelations from the [[Church Committee]] (1975-1976) about CIA assassination plots and other domestic abuses, and widespread public skepticism about the [[Warren Commission]]'s lone-gunman findings. It operated under two chairmen: Thomas Downing (D-Virginia) initially, then Louis Stokes (D-Ohio) for the bulk of its work. [[G. Robert Blakey]], a law professor specializing in organized crime, served as chief counsel and investigator.
The House adopted House Resolution 1540 by 280 to 65 on September 17, 1976, during the 94th Congress.[^11] The resolution followed the April 1976 report of the Senate select committee led by [[Frank Church]] ([[Church Committee]]), which found that the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] had withheld from the Warren Commission information about United States plots against [[Fidel Castro]] and that the FBI had conducted a counterintelligence program ([[COINTELPRO]]) against King and the [[Southern Christian Leadership Conference]]. The new committee was constituted for the months remaining in that Congress and expired on January 3, 1977.[^1] [[House Resolution 222]], passed by the House on February 2, 1977, reconstituted it for two months, and [[House Resolution 433]], approved on March 30, 1977, continued it through the 95th Congress.[^1]
### Kennedy Assassination Findings
The first chairman was [[Thomas N. Downing]] (D-Virginia), who served from October 1976 until he retired in early January 1977.[^12] [[Henry B. Gonzalez]] (D-Texas) then became chairman. [[Louis Stokes]] (D-Ohio) was named chairman on March 8, 1977, to replace the chairman who had resigned.[^1] The Kennedy subcommittee was chaired by [[Richardson Preyer]] and the King subcommittee by [[Walter E. Fauntroy]].[^1] The final report was submitted over Stokes's signature in a letter dated December 29, 1978.[^10]
The HSCA's findings on the Kennedy assassination represented a significant departure from the Warren Commission:
### Chief counsels and the Sprague dispute
Probable conspiracy: The committee concluded that "President John F. Kennedy was probably assassinated as a result of a conspiracy," based primarily on acoustic evidence suggesting a fourth shot had been fired from the grassy knoll in front of the motorcade. This evidence came from a Dallas Police Department Dictabelt recording that acoustics experts claimed showed four distinct impulses consistent with gunfire.
[[Richard A. Sprague]], a Philadelphia prosecutor who had been chief prosecutor in the Yablonski murder case that convicted [[W. A. Boyle]], was named acting counsel by Downing on October 4, 1976.[^13] Gonzalez and Sprague clashed over budgets and funding in the early months of 1977. The separate views appended to the report, written by members who joined the committee after Gonzalez left it, describe the two men as spending "a good deal of time from January through March" 1977 "struggling over budgets and funding measures," with little time left for investigation.[^12]
Organized crime: The committee found that certain members of organized crime, including [[Santos Trafficante, Jr.]] and [[Carlos Marcello]], had both the motive and the means to organize Kennedy's assassination. It found that [[Johnny Roselli]] and [[Sam Giancana]], both connected to the CIA-Mafia anti-Castro plots, "may have been involved" in the conspiracy.
*Newsweek* wrote in April 1977 that Gonzalez resigned as chairman following "a nasty clash" with Sprague, "in which most other panel members backed Sprague," and cited its own report of February 21, 1977.[^14] The *New York Times* reported on March 3, 1977, that Gonzalez "submitted his resignation yesterday," March 2, after accusing other members of trying to usurp his power; the Speaker, [[Tip O'Neill]], declined to accept it until he had spoken to Gonzalez, and it required approval of the full House.[^15] The *Washington Post* reported on March 29, 1977, that Gonzalez "quit the chairmanship and the committee on March 8," the day Stokes was appointed chairman, and quoted his speech from the House floor, in which he said "I think I have been treated shabbily" and attributed his treatment at least partly to racial discrimination.[^2] A *Chicago Tribune* report of April 3, 1977, quoted the same speech, in which Gonzalez said he had received no support from committee members or the Democratic leadership in his attempts to rein in what he called Sprague's "extravagant and arrogant behavior," and said that "within hours of Gonzalez' attack from the House floor, Sprague quit."[^16]
CIA information withholding: The committee concluded that the CIA had not revealed its knowledge of the CIA-Mafia assassination plots to the Warren Commission and that this "may have led the Warren Commission to draw incorrect conclusions about the existence of a conspiracy."
Sprague resigned on March 30, 1977, the day the House voted 230 to 181 to continue the committee under House Resolution 433.[^3] The separate views say that Sprague "left shortly thereafter" and that the committee's first priority was a new chief counsel.[^12] [[G. Robert Blakey]], a law professor at Cornell University with Justice Department experience, was appointed chief counsel and staff director in June 1977, and the investigations did not start until July 1977.[^1] Blakey was chief counsel when the final report was filed.[^10]
Soviet and Cuban non-involvement: The committee found no evidence that the Soviet or Cuban governments were involved in Kennedy's assassination.[^1]
### The CIA interface
### The Acoustic Evidence Controversy
The agency handled its dealings with the committee through its [[Office of Legislative Counsel]]. A memorandum from the office sets out procedures for committee staff reviews of agency documents and interviews at headquarters. It states that the original notes taken by committee researchers were retained by the office, that copies went to the offices of interest for sanitization, and that the sanitized notes were then returned for forwarding to the committee.[^17] A separate memorandum, titled "Control of Draft House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) Reports," concerns the handling of draft committee reports within the agency.[^18]
The conspiracy finding rested substantially on the acoustic analysis by Bolt, Beranek and Newman (BBN) and the National Science Foundation. This analysis of the Dallas Police Department Dictabelt recording concluded that four shots were fired, with the fourth from the grassy knoll, based on timing patterns consistent with echo signatures from that location.
[[George E. Joannides]] served as the agency's liaison to the committee in 1978. A May 24, 1978, memorandum from the Career Management Staff of the Directorate of Operations to the Office of General Counsel and the Office of Legislative Counsel describes him as a GS-16 operations careerist with a law degree who, after major surgery, sought a position in one of those two offices.[^19] The agency's Honor and Merit Awards Board narrative for his Career Intelligence Medal, dated March 20, 1981, states that he continued in his assignment "until June 1978, when he was selected to assist the Agency's senior coordinator for work with the House Select Committee on Assassinations," that "he was rated Outstanding for his handling of this unusual special assignment," and that he continued in it until his retirement on January 12, 1979.[^20] On July 24, 1978, a CIA memorandum for the record lists Joannides among six agency officers who met [[G. Robert Blakey]] and Gary Cornwell on a Saturday morning at 0730 "to discuss activity in Mexico City planned by HSCA."[^21] A memorandum of November 24, 1978, records that [[Ann Goodpasture]] said Joannides had called to tell her that a committee investigator was trying to reach her.[^22] In November 1978 he also testified under cover at the espionage trial of [[William Kampiles]].[^23]
In 1982, the National Academy of Sciences convened a panel (the Ramsey Panel) that reviewed the acoustic evidence and concluded the BBN analysis was flawed - that the sounds identified as gunshots on the Dictabelt recording were not synchronized with the shooting and therefore could not be gunshots from [[Dealey Plaza]]. Subsequent studies have both supported and challenged this re-analysis, and the acoustic evidence remains scientifically contested.
In 1963 Joannides had been the CIA case officer for the anti-Castro [[Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil]] (DRE), whose members had contact with [[Lee Harvey Oswald]] that year. Blakey and [[Jefferson Morley]], with other signatories including [[Don DeLillo]], [[Norman Mailer]], [[Gerald Posner]] and [[Anthony Summers]], wrote in a December 2003 letter that "in 1978, he served as the CIA's liaison to the House Select Committee on Assassinations," and that the agency "did not reveal to the Congress his role in the events of 1963, compromising the committee's investigation."[^24] In 2014 Blakey stated that "George Joannides was brought out of retirement by the Agency to specifically work as a liaison with our Committee," that he was tasked mainly with dealing with the committee staff lawyers [[Dan Hardway]] and [[Edwin Lopez]], and that the CIA employee who told Blakey that the agency could find no record of any such DRE case officer was Joannides himself. Blakey added that "I no longer trust anything that the Agency has told us in regard to the assassination," and that he had been wrong to accept the assurance of Director [[Stansfield Turner]]'s letter to Stokes of November 30, 1978, that the agency had provided all pertinent information.[^25] Hardway stated in a sworn submission to the House Oversight Committee in 2025 that "beginning in May of 1978, the CIA assigned George Joannides" to handle liaison with Lopez and himself, that the obstruction "escalated over the summer," ending in a refusal of unexpurgated access to files in violation of the memorandum of understanding negotiated in August 1977, and that in 1978 he was told nothing of Joannides's role in the Kennedy case.[^26]
The practical effect of the 1982 NAS report was to remove the primary evidentiary basis for the HSCA's conspiracy finding while leaving the committee's documentary findings about CIA concealment and organized crime connections unaffected.[^2]
In the Freedom of Information Act suit *Morley v. CIA*, the D.C. Circuit decided in 2007 a request that sought the Office of General Counsel records "pertaining to the selection of George Joannides as liaison to the [HSCA] in May 1978." The court described Joannides as a deceased CIA officer, and the agency told Morley it could "neither confirm nor deny" the existence of records about his participation in covert operations.[^27]
### MLK Assassination Findings
### Kennedy findings
On the King assassination, the HSCA concluded that [[James Earl Ray]] shot King but that Ray "was not a member of an organized conspiracy to assassinate Dr. King." However, it found that Ray's brothers John and Jerry Ray, and others, "may have assisted" in the planning. The committee found no evidence that the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]], state and local government, or foreign governments were involved in the conspiracy, though it noted the FBI's extensive [[COINTELPRO]] harassment of King.[^1]
The committee's findings on the Kennedy assassination were filed in summary form in January 1979. It found that Lee Harvey Oswald fired three shots, that the second and third struck the President, and that the third killed him.[^10]
### Legacy and Records
The committee stated that President Kennedy "was probably assassinated as a result of a conspiracy," and that it "is unable to identify the other gunman or the extent of the conspiracy."[^10] It found that the Soviet and Cuban governments were not involved, that anti-Castro Cuban groups as groups were not involved though individual members may have been, and that the national syndicate of organized crime as a group was not involved though individual members may have been. On the Secret Service, the FBI and the CIA, it stated in Finding I.C.5 that they "were not involved in the assassination of President Kennedy," after Findings I.C.3 and I.C.4 had stated that "the available evidence does not preclude the possibility that individual members may have been involved."[^28]
The HSCA's records were sealed for fifty years upon publication of its report, scheduled for release in 2029. Portions have been released earlier through the JFK Records Act (1992) and subsequent executive orders. The committee produced approximately 250,000 documents, many of which remain partially redacted.
The committee found that agencies and departments of the U.S. government "performed with varying degrees of competency in the fulfillment of their duties." It found that the Secret Service "was deficient in the performance of its duties," that the Department of Justice "failed to exercise initiative" in supervising the FBI investigation, and that the FBI was "deficient in its sharing of information with other agencies and departments." On the CIA it found that the agency "was deficient in its collection and sharing of information both prior to and subsequent to the assassination."[^10] It found that the Warren Commission "failed to investigate adequately the possibility of a conspiracy to assassinate the President," a deficiency "attributable in part to the failure of the Commission to receive all the relevant information that was in the possession of other agencies and departments of the Government," and that its conclusions were "presented in a fashion that was too definitive."[^29]
The committee's organized crime analysis, its documentation of CIA information withholding from the Warren Commission, and its Mexico City evidence review remain valuable historical resources regardless of the disputed acoustic finding.[^1]
### The medical and firearms evidence
Volume VII of the hearings, published in March 1979, contains the report of the Forensic Pathology Panel, chaired by [[Michael M. Baden]], chief medical examiner of New York City, with the dissent of [[Cyril H. Wecht]] and the majority's response, and the report of the Firearms Panel.[^30]
### The acoustic evidence
The conspiracy finding rested on the acoustic analysis of a [[Dallas Police Department]] radio recording of November 22, 1963, which was recorded on a Dictabelt for channel 1 and a Gray Audograph disc for channel 2. The committee contracted with [[Bolt, Beranek and Newman]] (BBN) in May 1978 for the analysis, which was supervised by [[James E. Barger]].[^31] The BBN report printed in volume VIII records that the committee's request was made on May 12, 1978, that the channel 1 tape covered 12:28 to 12:34 p.m., and that the channel 2 tape was intermittent and carried the communications of Chief [[Jesse Curry]]. The Dallas reconstruction fired test shots from the book depository and from behind the fence on the grassy knoll in [[Dealey Plaza]], and BBN matched them against the impulses on the 1963 tape.[^32] The committee's acoustic hearings included Barger's testimony of September 11, 1978.[^33]
Barger estimated that the impulses on the dispatch tape included motorcade impulses with 99 percent probability, and he gave a 50 percent chance that any one of the matches was invalid. In his September 1978 testimony he put the probability of a grassy knoll shot at 50 percent.[^31] In July 1978 the committee had asked the Acoustical Society of America to recommend reviewers, and it selected Professor [[Mark Weiss]] of [[Queens College]], who had served on the panel of experts appointed by Judge [[John J. Sirica]] to examine the White House tape recordings, and his research associate [[Ernest Aschkenasy]]. In mid-September 1978 the committee asked them to refine the work. They modeled a microphone on a motorcycle moving at about 11 miles per hour and found a sequence of impulses matching a shot from the grassy knoll to within 1/1,000 of a second.[^34]
Weiss and Aschkenasy computed, "with a certainty factor of 95 percent or better," that a shot was fired from the grassy knoll.[^35] Their written report to the committee of February 1979 gave binary correlation coefficients of 0.79 and 0.75 within a window of one millisecond, and located the microphone on Elm Street about 97 feet south of the book depository and the source of the shot about eight and a half feet west of the corner of the stockade fence.[^36] The report gives a further figure of 76 percent, the product of a 95 percent chance of a rifle-level noise and an 80 percent chance that the N-wave was caused by a supersonic bullet.[^34] On this basis the committee concluded that the cause of the impulses was "probably a gunshot fired at the motorcade."[^34]
In separate views, [[Samuel L. Devine]] and [[Robert W. Edgar]] each wrote, "I saw little evidence of a conspiracy" and "I saw little evidence of a second shooter," and that until further study of the acoustics work was undertaken each would "stand by my belief that Lee Harvey Oswald acted as the lone assassin." The separate views quote [[Marvin E. Wolfgang]], professor of sociology and law at the University of Pennsylvania, who wrote on January 2, 1979, that it was "premature and inappropriate" for a federal committee to make a major policy decision on the basis of the acoustic findings. They also quote [[Francis K. Davis]], dean of science at [[Drexel University]], who wrote on January 8, 1979, that the 95 percent confidence claim was "grossly exaggerated."[^37]
The Department of Justice asked the [[National Research Council]] to review the evidence, and in the fall of 1980 the council established its [[Committee on Ballistic Acoustics]], chaired by [[Norman F. Ramsey]] of Harvard University. Its members included [[Luis W. Alvarez]], [[Herman Chernoff]], [[Robert H. Dicke]], [[Richard L. Garwin]], [[Paul Horowitz]] and Alfred Johnson of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. The panel met on January 31 and February 1, 1981, with Barger, Weiss, Aschkenasy and the FBI acoustician Bruce E. Koenig. An FBI Technical Services Division report dated November 19, 1980, and released on December 1, 1980, had found that the acoustical evidence "did not scientifically prove" that the Dictabelt contained gunshots.[^38]
In 1982 the council published the panel's report. It states that the acoustic analyses "do not demonstrate that there was a grassy knoll shot," that there is "no acoustic basis for the claim of 95% probability of such a shot," and that the impulses attributed to gunshots were recorded about one minute after the President had been shot, a timing derived from a crosstalk on the recording that Steve Barber of Mansfield, Ohio, had called to the panel's attention. It concludes that "reliable acoustic data do not support a conclusion that there was a second gunman."[^38] In 2001 D. B. Thomas published a reanalysis in *Science & Justice* that supported the committee's conclusion, and in 2005 Linsker, Garwin, Chernoff, Horowitz and Ramsey replied in the same journal that the paper contained serious errors, corrected errors in the council's own report, and reaffirmed its conclusion.[^39] The acoustic evidence remains contested among researchers.
### Organized crime and the Warren Commission
Volume IX of the hearings is the committee's organized crime staff material.[^40] The report states that [[Johnny Roselli]] and [[Sam Giancana]], both of whom took part in the CIA plots against Castro, had been murdered by the time of the investigation, and that the committee was ultimately frustrated in its attempt to determine the details of those plots. It states that "there is reason to speculate" that the Mafia continued to appear to participate in the plots "just to keep the CIA interested."[^41] The committee found that the CIA should have provided the Warren Commission with the details of the AMLASH plot against Castro, since Castro may well have known of the plot by November 22, 1963.[^42] It found that the CIA-Mafia-Cuban plots had "all the elements necessary for a successful assassination conspiracy" (people, motive and means), and that the CIA-Mafia plots, like the AMLASH plot, should have been aggressively explored in the 1963-64 investigation.[^41] The report also quotes FBI electronic surveillance of a December 3, 1963, conversation in which Giancana's lieutenant Charles English told him that the FBI was "gonna start running down Fair Play for Cuba."[^43]
The report names "most likely" the family bosses [[Carlos Marcello]] and [[Santos Trafficante, Jr.]] as the organized crime figures who might have been involved.[^43] It states that Marcello had "the motive, means and opportunity to have President John F. Kennedy assassinated," and that the committee was "unable to establish direct evidence." It describes as the critical evidentiary element the existence of credible associations linking [[Lee Harvey Oswald]] and [[Jack Ruby]] to Marcello's organization, and it lists Oswald's uncle Charles "Dutz" Murret, a minor underworld gambling figure and an associate of organized crime figures affiliated with the Marcello organization, acquaintances of Oswald's mother, and a call to the Marcello lieutenant Nofio Pecora from Ruby on October 30, 1963. It found [[David Ferrie]], who worked for Marcello's lawyer G. Wray Gill, with Marcello at the New Orleans courthouse on November 22, 1963. It recounts a September 1962 account by the informant [[Edward Becker]] of a threat by Marcello against the President at Churchill Farms, states that the FBI never investigated it and tried to discredit the informant, and says that the committee found the informant had a questionable reputation for honesty. It states that the FBI never maintained electronic surveillance of Marcello despite two attempts, and that Marcello denied involvement in executive session. The committee concluded that "it may be said that it is unlikely that Marcello was in fact, involved in the assassination of the President," and added that his motive and links to Oswald and Ruby, coupled with the failure of the 1963-64 investigation, "precluded a judgment by the committee that Marcello and his associates were not involved."[^5]
The Trafficante material begins with the Cuban exile [[Jose Aleman]], who told the *Washington Post* in 1976 that Trafficante had said in a 1962 conversation, which also touched on the prosecution of [[Jimmy Hoffa]], that the President "was going to be hit." In a March 1977 interview with the committee Aleman said that Trafficante made clear he was not guessing, that a crime was being planned, and that Hoffa would be principally involved. In September 1978 he reaffirmed this and then, after stating that he feared reprisal, testified that the remark might have meant "a lot of Republican votes" in 1964. Trafficante denied the account in public session on September 28, 1978. The committee found it difficult to understand how Aleman could have misunderstood or why he would fabricate the account, but doubted its validity, and concluded that it was "unlikely that Trafficante plotted to kill the President, although it could not rule out the possibility of such participation."[^6]
The report also examined the 1959 contact between Ruby and Trafficante at the [[Trescornia]] detention camp in Cuba. Trafficante was held from June 6 to August 18, 1959, and Ruby's first Cuba trip began on August 8, 1959. The report said that the importance of a Ruby-Trafficante meeting there "should not be overemphasized," that the most such a contact would show was a brief meeting, and that no one had suggested the assassination was planned at Trescornia in 1959.[^44] It later stated that the committee had "developed corroborating evidence that Ruby may have met with Trafficante at Trescornia," and that there was considerable evidence that it did take place. [[Lewis McWillie]] testified that he visited another detainee at Trescornia in that period and possibly saw Trafficante there, and Trafficante testified that Ruby had no reason to visit him.[^6] On Hoffa, the committee found motive, means and opportunity, examined the account of [[Edward Partin]], and concluded that "the balance of the evidence argued that it was improbable that Hoffa had anything to do with the death of the President."[^7]
The report's general conclusion on the organized crime figures is that knowledge or availability through association "falls considerably short of the sort of evidence that would be necessary to establish criminal responsibility for a conspiracy."[^45] The same section lists as one of three possibilities that organized crime was not involved, and states that Oswald was not likely a hired killer.[^45]
### Jack Ruby
The report states that Ruby was not a "member" of organized crime but had "a significant number of associations and direct and indirect contacts with underworld figures."[^8] It states that the committee "believed that Ruby's shooting of Oswald was not a spontaneous act, in that it involved at least some premeditation," and found it less likely that Ruby entered the Dallas police basement without assistance. It concluded that Ruby probably did not come down the Main Street ramp, as the Warren Commission had found, and that his most likely route was the alleyway and stairway leading to the basement garage. The committee was troubled by the apparently unlocked doors along the stairway route, the removal of security guards from the garage area shortly before the shooting, and a Saturday night telephone call from Ruby to his closest friend, [[Ralph Paul]], in which Paul responded to something Ruby said by asking him if he was crazy.[^46]
### New Orleans and Cuban exile groups
In New Orleans the committee found that [[Guy Banister]]'s firm occupied an office in 1963 in the Newman Building at 531 Lafayette Street, that another entrance to the building was at 544 Camp Street, the address Oswald stamped on his [[Fair Play for Cuba Committee]] handouts, and that the Cuban Revolutionary Council had also been an occupant. It stated that during the summer of 1963 Ferrie frequented 544 Camp Street regularly as a result of his working relationship with Banister, that there was at least a possibility that Oswald and Banister were acquainted, and that it was puzzled by Oswald's apparent association with Ferrie in light of Ferrie's connection with G. Wray Gill and Marcello. It found the witnesses at Clinton, Louisiana, "credible and significant" and was inclined to believe that Oswald was in Clinton in late August or early September 1963 in the company of Ferrie, if not [[Clay Shaw]]. On the Cuban exile student group, it concluded that there had been no relationship between Oswald and Carlos Bringuier and the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil with the exception of the confrontation over Oswald's distribution of pro-Castro literature, and tended to agree with Bringuier and others that Oswald was seeking to infiltrate their ranks.[^47]
### Nosenko
The committee investigated the defector [[Yuri Nosenko]] and stated that it was certain Nosenko lied about Oswald, "whether it was to the FBI and CIA in 1964, or to the committee in 1978, or perhaps to both." It was unable to resolve the Nosenko matter, found that his conduct had "virtually ruined him as a valid source," and limited its conclusion to describing him as an unreliable source. The report criticized the CIA's hostile interrogation of Nosenko, which included solitary confinement from 1964 to 1968.[^9]
The testimony of CIA officer [[John Clement Hart]], printed in volume II at pages 487 to 504, described the case. Hart stated that his study of the Nosenko case ran from mid-June to late December 1976, with four assistants and ten four-drawer safes of documents, and that he put together "the first full picture" of it. He testified that Nosenko was lodged on February 12, 1964, in a CIA-controlled house under guard in what was called friendly confinement, that a defector held there found 150 discrepancies between the 1962 transcripts and tapes, and that a "much more spartan" confinement, modeled on the treatment of the American professor Frederick Barghoorn in Moscow in 1963, followed. Nosenko was stripped to prison clothes, guards were told not to talk or smile, and his diet was weak tea, porridge, watery soup and macaroni. A first polygraph examination on April 4, 1964, used an artifact described to Nosenko as an electroencephalograph, and he was told afterward that he had failed; the CIA adjudged the result invalid. Hart testified that Nosenko remained in solitary confinement under constant visual observation until August 1967, that he was held 1,277 days and questioned on 292, and that [[Richard Helms]] set a 60-day limit on August 23, 1966. A second polygraph series in October 1966 kept Nosenko on the machine for 28 hours and 29 minutes.[^48]
The polygraph consultant [[Richard O. Arther]] analyzed the Nosenko examinations for the committee. His report, printed in volume VIII, states that he first visited the CIA on June 2, 1978, and was given no handwritten notes and no tape recordings, and that in his blind analysis several Oswald-related answers were flagged as lying indicators.[^49]
[[G. Robert Blakey]] later wrote to the *New York Times* that, as chief counsel from 1977 to 1979, he directed an investigation of Nosenko and concluded, "along with a unanimous committee, that Nosenko had lied to the F.B.I. and C.I.A. in 1963-64," and to the committee in 1978. He wrote that the committee reviewed [[Edward Jay Epstein]]'s allegations about Nosenko and the source code-named Fedora, and concluded, "contrary to Epstein's assertion[s]," that the bona fides of Nosenko were "not inextricably intertwined with those of any other defector."[^50]
### Mexico City and the Lopez report
The committee examined Oswald's trip to [[Mexico City]] in September and October 1963. The CIA's surveillance of the Cuban and Soviet diplomatic compounds in Mexico City was the subject of a staff study, "Oswald, the CIA, and Mexico City," by Edwin Lopez and Dan Hardway, known as the [[Lopez Report]]. Its conclusions state that a person identifying himself as Lee Harvey Oswald telephoned the Soviet Consulate on October 1, 1963, and visited the consulates five or six times, and that "the possibility that someone else used Lee Harvey Oswald's name" could not be absolutely dismissed. They state that the Mexico City station "definitely knew" of the contacts, that they were not accurately and expeditiously reported to headquarters before the assassination, that the CIA's photographic surveillance "probably obtained a photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald entering either or both the Soviet and Cuban Consulates," that the CIA denies such a photograph exists, and that its disposition is unknown. The surveillance tapes were erased after October 16, 1963. The table of contents lists a section on the "Disposition of Production from the Operation."[^51]
The [[Assassination Records Review Board]] later stated that it had released 99 percent of the Hardway/Lopez Report.[^52]
### Volumes
The committee's Kennedy hearings and appendices were published in twelve volumes. Volumes I through V are hearing volumes, and Volume VI is an appendix to the hearings.[^40] Volume VI covers the photographic evidence. Volume VII covers the medical and firearms evidence, and Volume VIII the acoustics, polygraph, handwriting and fingerprint reports. Volume IX covers organized crime. Volume X contains the staff report "The Evolution and Implications of the CIA-Sponsored Assassination Conspiracies Against Fidel Castro," and material on David Ferrie and [[Silvia Odio]].[^53] Volume XI covers the Warren Commission, CIA support to the Warren Commission, the motorcade, and the military investigation of the assassination. Volume XII covers the Dealey Plaza conspiracy witnesses, the Oswald-Tippit associates, [[George de Mohrenschildt]], the depositions of Marina Oswald Porter, and a study of Nosenko. Volumes XI and XII were printed in March 1979.[^40]
### King findings
On the King assassination, the committee found that [[James Earl Ray]] "acted with full knowledge of what he was doing in the murder of Dr. King," and that his alibi and his story of "Raoul" were "not worthy of belief." It concluded that "there was a likelihood of conspiracy in the assassination of Dr. King."[^54]
The conclusion section states that the committee found it "highly likely that John and James robbed the Bank of Alton in Alton, Ill., on July 13, 1967," and that [[Jerry Ray]] knew of the robbery and assisted in distributing the proceeds. It judged the possibility of "the involvement of one or both brothers," [[John Ray]] and Jerry Ray, to be raised by three negative factors, and found strong circumstantial evidence of the involvement of a brother in a consulting capacity at the purchase of the murder weapon.[^4] The detail on the Alton robbery and on John Ray's foreknowledge of the escape is at pages 341 to 344.[^55]
The committee found "substantial evidence to establish the existence of a St. Louis-based conspiracy to finance the assassination of Dr. King." It reported that [[John Sutherland]], a St. Louis patent attorney, and [[John Kauffmann]] solicited the businessman [[Russell Byers]] in late 1966 or early 1967 with an offer of $50,000, and that a witness described a standing offer of $20,000 or $30,000 for killing King. The committee found no direct link to Ray or his brothers and no payoff, but believed that word of the offer likely reached Ray through the campaign activity of the [[American Independent Party]].[^56] It found that "no private organizations or individuals, other than those discussed under section B," were involved in King's death, and that "no Federal, State or local government agency was involved."[^54]
The committee found that the Department of Justice and the FBI "performed with varying degrees of competency and legality."[^54] It quoted the 1975 Justice Department task force, which described the COINTELPRO type campaign against King as "ultra vires" and "very probably" felonious, and found the electronic surveillance of 1963 to 1966 "particularly abusive." Examining the March 20, 1968, memorandum from G. C. Moore, chief of the Racial Intelligence Section, to [[William Sullivan]], it was "satisfied that the March 20 memorandum did not cause Dr. King to stay at the Lorraine," while stating that the FBI's intent in drafting it "remained an open issue." It found no evidence that COINTELPRO initiatives of the Memphis field office were tied to the assassination, and it stated in a note that it was unable to take testimony from Sullivan, who was killed in a hunting accident in 1977, and that when Sullivan testified before the Senate select committee "he had broken with the Director."[^57] The report cited indications that John Ray may have assisted his brother in the escape only in connection with its discussion of possible official complicity.[^58]
### Records and release
The Assassination Records Review Board reported that the HSCA's unpublished records were sealed under House rules for 50 years, until 2029, and that the JFK Records Collection Act of 1992 led to the opening of the Kennedy portion of the files. It stated that the committee took testimony from 335 witnesses in 38 days of public hearings, that it generated approximately 414,000 pages of records relating to the assassination, and that in 1992 the unpublished records resided with the House Administration Committee.[^59]
The board also reported that the committee concluded there was a "high probability" that two gunmen fired at President Kennedy, validating some of the Warren Commission's critics.[^59]
### Footnotes
[^1]: House Select Committee on Assassinations. *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives.* Government Printing Office, 1979. Blakey, G. Robert, and Richard N. Billings. *Fatal Hour: The Assassination of President Kennedy by Organized Crime.* Berkley, 1992.
[^2]: National Academy of Sciences, Committee on Ballistic Acoustics. *Reexamination of Acoustic Evidence in the Kennedy Assassination.* National Academy Press, 1982.
[^1]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), "History of the Committee," pp. 9-10 (H. Res. 1540 and the Senate select committee findings on the CIA and the FBI; expiry on January 3, 1977; H. Res. 9; H. Res. 222 passed February 2, 1977; H. Res. 433 approved March 30, 1977; Stokes named chairman March 8, 1977; two subcommittees; Blakey appointed June 1977). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^2]: Lardner, George, Jr., *Washington Post,* March 29, 1977, report on the House floor speech of Henry B. Gonzalez and the Rules Committee vote, press clipping in CIA Reading Room document 00026481. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00026481
[^3]: Madden, Richard L., *New York Times,* dispatch datelined March 30, 1977 (House vote of 230 to 181 and the resignation of Richard A. Sprague), press clipping in CIA Reading Room document 00026481. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00026481
[^4]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), "Conclusion," pp. 371-373. https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^5]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), pp. 169-172 (Marcello). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^6]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), pp. 172-175 (Trafficante and the Aleman account). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^7]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), pp. 176-179 (Hoffa and Partin). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^8]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), pp. 149-150 (the Warren Commission and the committee on Ruby and organized crime). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^9]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), section on Yuri Nosenko, pp. 101-103, and p. 255. https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^10]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), summary of findings and recommendations, Findings I.A to I.D (pp. 3-4), dated January 2, 1979, with the submittal letter of December 29, 1978. https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^11]: House of Representatives, H. Res. 1540, 94th Cong., adopted 280 to 65 on September 17, 1976, as recorded in CIA Reading Room document 00419419 quoting H. Rept. 95-130. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00419419
[^12]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), separate views of Hons. Samuel L. Devine and Robert W. Edgar, pp. 493-494. https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^13]: Office of Representative Thomas N. Downing, news release, "Richard A. Sprague named acting counsel," October 4, 1976, CIA Reading Room document 00544302. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00544302
[^14]: *Newsweek,* April 11, 1977, report on the committee, press clipping in CIA Reading Room document 00543522; the article cites a *Newsweek* report of February 21, 1977. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00543522
[^15]: Burnham, David, "Assassination Panel Wants 3 to Testify," *New York Times,* dispatch of March 3, 1977, press clipping in CIA Reading Room document 00026481. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00026481
[^16]: *Chicago Tribune,* April 3, 1977, press clipping in CIA Reading Room document 00543522. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00543522
[^17]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Legislative Counsel, memorandum, "Procedures for the Conduct of Reviews of Agency Documents and Interviews by House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) Staff Personnel at Headquarters," routing slip dated May 23, 1978, CIA-RDP81M00980R000200030008-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp81m00980r000200030008-9
[^18]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Legislative Counsel, memorandum, "Control of Draft House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) Reports," CIA-RDP81M00980R000200050025-8. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp81m00980r000200050025-8
[^19]: Central Intelligence Agency, Career Management Staff/DDO, memorandum to the Office of General Counsel and the Office of Legislative Counsel, "George Joannides (GS-16)," May 24, 1978, CIA Reading Room document 01138247. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01138247
[^20]: Central Intelligence Agency, Honor and Merit Awards Board, memorandum "Career Intelligence Medal, Mr. George E. Joannides," March 20, 1981, with the recommendation narrative, CIA Reading Room document 07176748. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-07176748
[^21]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum for the record, "Meeting with HSCA on Mexican Interviews," July 24, 1978, record number 104-10127-10019 (distribution includes "George Joannides/OLC"). https://documents3.theblackvault.com/documents/jfkfiles/NARA-Oct2017/NARA-Nov9-2017/104-10127-10019.pdf
[^22]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Legislative Counsel, OLC 78-3136, memorandum for the record, "Meeting With Ann Goodpasture," November 24, 1978, CIA-RDP81M00980R000300020019-7. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp81m00980r000300020019-7
[^23]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum from AC/CCS regarding George Joannides and the trial of Kampiles, CIA Reading Room document 07176735 (catalog date November 8, 1978); Associated Press, "CIA Shrugged at Kampiles Plea for Covert Job, Spy Trial Told," *Washington Star,* CIA-RDP81M00980R000400080037-0. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-07176735
[^24]: Blakey, G. Robert, Jefferson Morley, and others, letter, "JFK's Assassination," *New York Review of Books,* December 18, 2003. https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2003/12/18/jfks-assassination/
[^25]: Blakey, G. Robert, "The HSCA and the CIA: The View From the Top," address to the Assassination Archives and Research Center conference, 2014, with footnote citations to Turner to Stokes, November 30, 1978 (RIF 104-10150-10027), and Blakey to Carpenter, March 22, 1978 (RIF 180-10140-10065). https://aarclibrary.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/aarc-blakey-letter-09-2014.doc
[^26]: Hardway, Dan, submitted statement, May 20, 2025, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Hardway-Written-Testimony.pdf
[^27]: *Morley v. Central Intelligence Agency,* 508 F.3d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2007), opinion filed December 7, 2007. https://static.case.law/f3d/508/cases/1108-01.json
[^28]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), summary Findings I.B to I.C (p. 3). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^29]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), summary Findings I.D.1 to I.D.5 (p. 4) and p. 256 (Warren Commission). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^30]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Hearings,* 95th Cong., 2d sess., vol. VII (Medical and Firearms Evidence, March 1979), Report of the Forensic Pathology Panel (chairman Michael M. Baden; dissent of Cyril H. Wecht, Part VI; majority response, Part VII) and Report of the Firearms Panel (p. 353). https://archive.org/details/investigationofa68unit
[^31]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), "Analysis by Bolt Beranek and Newman," pp. 65-72. https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^32]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Hearings,* 95th Cong., 2d sess., vol. VIII, James E. Barger, Scott P. Robinson, Edward C. Schmidt and Jared J. Wolf, "Analysis of Recorded Sounds Relating to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy," Bolt Beranek and Newman Inc., January 1979 (foreword, request of May 12, 1978; sections 1.4 and 1.5, pp. 47-49). https://archive.org/details/investigationofa68unit
[^33]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Hearings,* 95th Cong., 2d sess., vol. II, testimony of James E. Barger, September 11, 1978, printed p. 67. https://history-matters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol2/pdf/HSCA_Vol2_0911_4_Barger.pdf
[^34]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), "Weiss-Aschkenasy analysis," pp. 72-75 (mid-September 1978 engagement; the +/-1/1,000 second match; the 95 percent and 76 percent probabilities; the conclusion that the cause was "probably a gunshot fired at the motorcade"). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^35]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Hearings,* 95th Cong., 2d sess., vol. V, testimony of Mark Weiss and Ernest Aschkenasy, December 29, 1978. https://history-matters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol5/pdf/HSCA_Vol5_1229_2_Weiss.pdf
[^36]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Hearings,* 95th Cong., 2d sess., vol. VIII (Acoustics, Polygraph, Handwriting, and Fingerprint Reports, March 1979), Mark R. Weiss and Ernest Aschkenasy, "An Analysis of Recorded Sounds Relating to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy," Queens College, February 1979, sections 1.5 and 1.6 (pp. 10-11). https://archive.org/details/investigationofa68unit
[^37]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), separate views of Hons. Samuel L. Devine and Robert W. Edgar, pp. 491-497 (Wolfgang letter of January 2, 1979, and Davis letter of January 8, 1979, p. 497). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^38]: National Research Council, Committee on Ballistic Acoustics, *Report of the Committee on Ballistic Acoustics* (Washington: National Academy Press, 1982), doi:10.17226/10264: committee roster, p. ii; Executive Summary, pp. 1-2; Introduction and Overview, pp. 3-6; Conclusions, p. 34. https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/10264
[^39]: Linsker, R., R. L. Garwin, H. Chernoff, P. Horowitz and N. F. Ramsey, "Synchronization of the acoustic evidence in the assassination of President Kennedy," *Science & Justice* 45, no. 4 (2005): 207-226, replying to D. B. Thomas, "Echo correlation analysis and the acoustic evidence in the Kennedy assassination revisited," *Science & Justice* 41, no. 1 (2001): 21-32. https://research.ibm.com/publications/synchronization-of-the-acoustic-evidence-in-the-assassination-of-president-kennedy
[^40]: National Archives, "House Select Committee on Assassinations Report: Table of Contents," and the hearing volumes as published on archive.org (investigationofa01unit through investigationofa05unit; investigationofa68unit, vols. VI-VIII; investigationofa09unit, organized crime; investigationofa10unit; investigationofa11unit and investigationofa12unit, printed March 1979). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/select-committee-report/toc
[^41]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), pp. 114-116 (CIA-Mafia plots; "all the elements necessary for a successful assassination conspiracy"; Roselli, Giancana, and the "turnaround" account). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^42]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), pp. 112-114 (AMLASH and the committee's view that the plot should have been provided to the Warren Commission). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^43]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), pp. 168-169 (the 1963-64 investigation; Giancana and English, December 3, 1963; Marcello and Trafficante as the most likely participants). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^44]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), pp. 152-153 (Trafficante and Ruby at Trescornia; McWillie; Verdacia; Trafficante's testimony). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^45]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), organized crime summary and analysis, pp. 179-181. https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^46]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), pp. 156-158 (route into the basement; "not a spontaneous act"; assistance). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^47]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), pp. 141-146 (New Orleans: Ferrie, G. Wray Gill, Guy Banister, 544 Camp Street, the Clinton witnesses, and the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^48]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Hearings,* 95th Cong., 2d sess., vol. II, testimony of John Clement Hart, September 15, 1978, pp. 487-504. https://history-matters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol2/pdf/HSCA_Vol2_0915_3_Hart.pdf
[^49]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Hearings,* 95th Cong., 2d sess., vol. VIII, Richard O. Arther, "The Analysis of Yuri Nosenko's Polygraph Examination" (March 1979), pp. 187-196, paras. 18-20, 28-30 and 38-39. https://archive.org/details/investigationofa68unit
[^50]: Blakey, G. Robert, "Unpersuasive Case Against 'Fedora,'" letter to the editor, *New York Times,* September 27, 1981 (letter dated September 17, 1981), CIA-RDP90-00552R000100590002-6. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00552r000100590002-6
[^51]: Lopez, Edwin, and Dan Hardway, "Oswald, the CIA, and Mexico City" (the Lopez Report), staff report of the Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 1-10 (introduction and conclusions) and table of contents, as released through the Assassination Records Review Board. https://archive.org/details/OswaldTheCIAAndMexicoCity
[^52]: Assassination Records Review Board, *Final Report* (1998), Part I, section C.5, "The Select Committee on Assassinations of the House of Representatives," and the discussion of the "Rule of Reason" (release of the Lopez report). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/review-board/report/arrb-final-report.txt
[^53]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Hearings,* 95th Cong., 2d sess., vol. X (staff report, "The Evolution and Implications of the CIA-Sponsored Assassination Conspiracies Against Fidel Castro"), with David Ferrie and Silvia Odio materials. https://archive.org/details/investigationofa10unit
[^54]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), summary Findings II.A to II.E (p. 5). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^55]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), pp. 341-344 (John Ray and the escape, pp. 341-342; the Alton bank robbery, pp. 342-344). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^56]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), pp. 359-364 and 372-373 (Byers, Sutherland and Kauffmann; the standing offer; the Buff Acres Motel; the American Independent Party). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^57]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), pp. 405-413 (FBI and COINTELPRO; COINTELPRO and the Memphis field office, p. 409; the March 20, 1968 Moore memorandum, pp. 410-411) and pp. 435-437 (electronic surveillance and the anonymous package; note on Sullivan at p. 436). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^58]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), p. 428 and note (prison officials; "indications that John Ray may have assisted his brother in the escape"). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^59]: Assassination Records Review Board, *Final Report* (1998), Part I, section C.5, p. 3 (335 witnesses; 38 days of public hearings; approximately 414,000 pages of records; unpublished records held by the House Administration Committee in 1992). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/review-board/report/arrb-final-report.txt

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@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ The composition of the commission drew criticism for the conflicts of interest a
The commission held 26 sessions over approximately six months. Its investigation covered CIA mail-opening programs, the testing of drugs on unsuspecting subjects, domestic surveillance of political activists, and CIA relationships with police departments. CIA Director William Colby provided the commission with access to the Family Jewels documents, the same compendium he had provided to the [[Justice Department]] and subsequently shared with the Church Committee and Pike Committee.
The commission's findings on Operation CHAOS were among the most specific it produced. Operation CHAOS, run under Angleton and overseen by [[Richard Ober]], had by the time of its termination on March 15, 1974, accumulated files on approximately 7,200 Americans and a computerized index of 300,000 names of civilians and approximately 1,000 organizations.[^13] The commission's report, released on June 10, 1975, confirmed this as a violation of the CIA's charter.
The commission's findings on Operation CHAOS were among the most specific it produced. Operation CHAOS, run under Angleton and overseen by [[Richard Ober]], had by the time of its termination on March 15, 1974, accumulated files on approximately 7,200 Americans and a computerized index of 300,000 names of civilians and approximately 1,000 organizations.[^13] The commission's report, released in June 1975, confirmed this as a violation of the CIA's charter.
On the CIA's mail-opening program, the commission found that HTLINGUAL, which intercepted mail between the United States and the Soviet Union from 1952 to 1973, had resulted in the examination of more than 215,000 pieces of correspondence. The program operated through CIA facilities in New York City and Los Angeles. The commission characterized this as unlawful.[^14]
@ -66,21 +66,25 @@ By June 5, 1975, commission staff had completed an 86-page section documenting C
The White House removed the entire 86-page section before publication. [[Richard Cheney]], then serving as deputy assistant to the president and deputy to [[Donald Rumsfeld]] as chief of staff, made handwritten edits to the commission's draft report. Cheney's edits removed the section on "Alleged Plans to Assassinate Certain Foreign Leaders," eliminated a provision that would have allowed CIA employees to report improper activities to the CIA's Inspector General, and changed the commission's characterization of several CIA activities from "unlawful" to having "exceeded statutory authority." The White House also suppressed Griswold's footnote recommending public disclosure of the CIA budget.[^19]
On October 31, 1975, Ford wrote to [[Frank Church]] urging him to suppress the Church Committee's parallel assassination report. On November 4, 1975, Church rejected Ford's request. The Senate voted to release the Church Committee's "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders" report on November 20, 1975, revealing publicly what the Rockefeller Commission had withheld.[^20]
The [[National Security Archive]]'s 2016 posting reproduces the June 5, 1975 commission section on CIA plots to assassinate foreign leaders (Document 19), which was excised from the final report on White House orders. Staff director [[David Belin]] was the main author of the portion on CIA plotting against Fidel Castro, including Operation ZR/RIFLE, and the archive reported that Cheney and White House Counsel [[Philip Buchen]] induced Belin to cancel a press conference on the assassination findings, citing concerns raised by [[Henry A. Kissinger]]. The archive also reported that the commission voted, over its chairman's objection, to include assassination plots in its inquiry; that Cheney's edits replaced the word "unlawful" with language about actions exceeding statutory authority, except for the CIA drug experiments, which the edit called "illegal"; and that Ford's January 1975 remark to newspaper editors had disclosed CIA involvement in assassination plots. The archive's account is its own reading of its documents.[^20]
The commission had also encountered obstruction in its attempts to investigate CIA records. CIA denied commission staff access to NSC records. [[Henry Kissinger]] withheld State Department cooperation. The commission was denied access to minutes of the [[40 Committee]] and its predecessor bodies, meaning it could not document the full chain of authorization for covert operations.[^21]
Executive Order 11828 required the commission to furnish the Attorney General any evidence it found that might relate to federal offenses, and to present its final report within three months of the order; the transmittal letter is dated June 6, 1975.[^21][^22]
On October 31, 1975, Ford wrote to [[Frank Church]] urging him to suppress the Church Committee's parallel assassination report. On November 4, 1975, Church rejected Ford's request. The Senate voted to release the Church Committee's "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders" report on November 20, 1975, revealing publicly what the Rockefeller Commission had withheld.[^23]
The commission had also encountered obstruction in its attempts to investigate CIA records. CIA denied commission staff access to NSC records. [[Henry Kissinger]] withheld State Department cooperation. The commission was denied access to minutes of the [[40 Committee]] and its predecessor bodies, meaning it could not document the full chain of authorization for covert operations.[^24]
### Rockefeller's Position
In 1955, as special assistant to the president, Nelson Rockefeller chaired the [[Planning Coordination Group]], set up under [[NSC 5412]] as the channel for policy approval of CIA covert operations. In May 1955 [[Charles Geschickter]] asked the CIA to contribute $375,000 toward a research building at Georgetown University Hospital, one-sixth of whose beds were to be reserved for the CIA along with cover for three CIA scientists and "human patients and volunteers for experimental use." The journalist John Marks, working from CIA documents released in 1977, wrote that Allen Dulles personally approved the contribution and then took it to "President Eisenhower's special committee to review covert operations," which assented on the understanding that Geschickter could provide "a reasonable expectation" that the agency would have the space.[^22] The historians Gerard Colby and Charlotte Dennett identified the committee's chairman as Rockefeller and wrote that he gave the approval. The 1977 Senate hearing took testimony on the CIA's use of hospital construction money without naming him. Rockefeller initially opposed even permitting the commission to investigate assassination plots, and it was only Belin's persistence and the threat of adverse publicity that extended the commission's mandate into that territory.[^23]
In 1955, as special assistant to the president, Nelson Rockefeller chaired the [[Planning Coordination Group]], set up under [[NSC 5412]] as the channel for policy approval of CIA covert operations. In May 1955 [[Charles Geschickter]] asked the CIA to contribute $375,000 toward a research building at Georgetown University Hospital, one-sixth of whose beds were to be reserved for the CIA along with cover for three CIA scientists and "human patients and volunteers for experimental use." The journalist John Marks, working from CIA documents released in 1977, wrote that Allen Dulles personally approved the contribution and then took it to "President Eisenhower's special committee to review covert operations," which assented on the understanding that Geschickter could provide "a reasonable expectation" that the agency would have the space.[^25] The historians Gerard Colby and Charlotte Dennett identified the committee's chairman as Rockefeller and wrote that he gave the approval. The 1977 Senate hearing took testimony on the CIA's use of hospital construction money without naming him. Rockefeller initially opposed even permitting the commission to investigate assassination plots, and it was only Belin's persistence and the threat of adverse publicity that extended the commission's mandate into that territory.[^26]
### Report Structure and Outcome
The commission's final report, submitted to President Ford on June 10, 1975, comprised four main parts with 19 chapters plus seven appendices. The chapters covered CIA legal authority, supervision and control mechanisms, mail intercept programs, Operation CHAOS, domestic surveillance of political activists, CIA files on American citizens, and an examination of allegations regarding the assassination of President Kennedy (where the commission upheld the Warren Commission's single-assassin finding). The report contained 27 recommendations, of which 20 were agency-level reforms recommended for immediate implementation and 7 addressed CIA structure, function, and presidential oversight.[^24]
The commission's final report, submitted to President Ford on June 6, 1975, comprised four main parts with 19 chapters plus seven appendices. The chapters covered CIA legal authority, supervision and control mechanisms, mail intercept programs, Operation CHAOS, domestic surveillance of political activists, CIA files on American citizens, and an examination of allegations regarding the assassination of President Kennedy (where the commission upheld the Warren Commission's single-assassin finding). The report contained 27 recommendations, of which 20 were agency-level reforms recommended for immediate implementation and 7 addressed CIA structure, function, and presidential oversight.[^27]
The Ford administration's response to the report was coordinated by a memorandum dated August 9, 1975, from Kissinger, White House counsel [[Philip Buchen]], and [[Office of Management and Budget]] director [[James Lynn]], which argued for prompt action on the domestic-improprieties recommendations while deferring broader intelligence restructuring questions, explicitly noting that congressional committees were simultaneously investigating related matters and that delay risked losing "the initiative entirely."[^25]
The Ford administration's response to the report was coordinated by a memorandum dated August 9, 1975, from Kissinger, White House counsel Philip Buchen, and [[Office of Management and Budget]] director [[James Lynn]], which argued for prompt action on the domestic-improprieties recommendations while deferring broader intelligence restructuring questions, explicitly noting that congressional committees were simultaneously investigating related matters and that delay risked losing "the initiative entirely."[^28]
The commission's records, totaling approximately 41 cubic feet (82,000 pages), are held at the [[Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library]] in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Materials related to Kennedy assassination allegations and anti-Castro activities from 1960 to 1964 were processed for research access following the [[JFK Records Act]]; significant portions of the collection remain classified.[^26]
The commission's records, totaling approximately 41 cubic feet (82,000 pages), are held at the [[Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library]] in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Materials related to Kennedy assassination allegations and anti-Castro activities from 1960 to 1964 were processed for research access following the [[JFK Records Act]]; significant portions of the collection remain classified.[^29]
### Footnotes
@ -96,17 +100,20 @@ The commission's records, totaling approximately 41 cubic feet (82,000 pages), a
[^10]: [[National Security Archive]], "Gerald Ford White House Altered Rockefeller Commission Report in 1975," NSAEBB, February 29, 2016. Griswold's footnote recommending CIA budget disclosure was among the items suppressed by the White House.
[^11]: Reagan's attendance at commission sessions: Commission meeting records, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library; also cited in Ronald Reagan Presidential Library finding aids for the 1975 Rockefeller Commission records.
[^12]: Edgar F. Shannon Jr., University of Virginia President 1959-1974. Washington Post obituary, August 25, 1997.
[^13]: Operation CHAOS statistics from the Rockefeller Commission report, June 10, 1975, confirmed in subsequent Church Committee findings.
[^14]: HTLINGUAL program details from the Rockefeller Commission report, June 10, 1975. The program ran 1952-1973 and processed more than 215,000 pieces of mail through facilities in New York City and Los Angeles.
[^13]: Operation CHAOS statistics from the Rockefeller Commission report, June 6, 1975, confirmed in subsequent Church Committee findings.
[^14]: HTLINGUAL program details from the Rockefeller Commission report, June 6, 1975. The program ran 1952-1973 and processed more than 215,000 pieces of mail through facilities in New York City and Los Angeles.
[^15]: Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States. *Report to the President.* Government Printing Office, June 1975, summary of findings and pp. 226-228. https://archive.org/details/reporttopresiden01unit
[^16]: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research, *Project MKULTRA, the CIA's Program of Research in Behavioral Modification,* joint hearing, August 3, 1977, appendix, on the death of Dr. Olson. https://archive.org/details/project-mkultra-the-cias-program-of-research-in-behavioral-modification
[^17]: National Security Archive, NSAEBB, "Gerald Ford White House Altered Rockefeller Commission Report in 1975." Document 3: David W. Belin Memorandum to Members of the Commission, "Scope of Commission Investigation - Assassinations," March 10, 1975.
[^18]: National Security Archive, NSAEBB Document 11: Peter Clapper to David Belin, "Public Affairs Considerations in Report," May 2, 1975.
[^19]: National Security Archive, NSAEBB Document 4: Richard Cheney, handwritten comments on draft Rockefeller Commission report, circa June 1975. Cheney served as deputy assistant to the president under Rumsfeld at the time of these edits.
[^20]: Church Committee, "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders," Senate Report 94-465, released November 20, 1975. Ford's suppression request sent October 31, 1975; Church's rejection November 4, 1975; Senate vote November 20, 1975.
[^21]: National Security Archive, NSAEBB Document 10: Mason Cargill to File, "CIA denial of access to records of Special Group Augmented re Cuba," April 30, 1975.
[^22]: Marks, John. *The Search for the "Manchurian Candidate": The CIA and Mind Control.* Times Books, 1979, ch. 12, n. 6, as transcribed at https://cryptome.org/mkultra-0005.htm. The Subproject 35 memorandum of November 15, 1954, does not mention the committee: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/32726-document-11-memorandum-director-central-intelligence-project-mkultra-subproject-35
[^23]: Colby and Dennett, Ch. 18, 44, and Ch. 18 n. 32, citing MKULTRA Subproject 35-10, May 16, 1955. The book calls the body he chaired the "Special Group." For the Planning Coordination Group, its membership and its role as the "normal channel for giving policy approval" to covert operations: Rowland Hughes memorandum to Eisenhower, March 3, 1955, *FRUS 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community,* Document 210, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d210. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research, *Project MKULTRA, the CIA's Program of Research in Behavioral Modification,* joint hearing, August 3, 1977, testimony of Adm. Stansfield Turner and exchange with Sen. Richard Schweiker, https://archive.org/details/project-mkultra-the-cias-program-of-research-in-behavioral-modification
[^24]: Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Topic Guide, "Rockefeller Commission Report, June 1975." FRUS 1969-76, Vol. XXXVIII, Part 2, Document 46, Memorandum on implementation of Rockefeller Commission recommendations, August 9, 1975.
[^25]: FRUS 1969-76, Vol. XXXVIII, Part 2, Document 46, August 9, 1975, Kissinger, Buchen, and Lynn to Ford on implementation of Rockefeller Commission recommendations.
[^26]: Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Finding Aid, "U.S. President's Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States Files," collection extent approximately 41 cubic feet.
[^19]: National Security Archive, NSAEBB Document 15: Richard Cheney, handwritten comments on draft Rockefeller Commission report, circa June 1975. Cheney served as deputy assistant to the president under Rumsfeld at the time of these edits.
[^20]: National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 543, edited by John Prados and Arturo Jimenez-Bacardi, February 29, 2016, Documents 15, 19 and the introductory essay. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/intelligence/2016-02-29/gerald-ford-white-house-altered-rockefeller-commission-report
[^21]: Executive Order 11828, January 4, 1975, Sections 3 and 6. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-11828-establishing-commission-cia-activities-within-the-united-states
[^22]: Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, transmittal letter dated June 6, 1975. https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/LIBRARY/document/0005/1561495.pdf
[^23]: Church Committee, "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders," Senate Report 94-465, released November 20, 1975. Ford's suppression request sent October 31, 1975; Church's rejection November 4, 1975; Senate vote November 20, 1975.
[^24]: National Security Archive, NSAEBB Document 10: Mason Cargill to File, "CIA denial of access to records of Special Group Augmented re Cuba," April 30, 1975.
[^25]: Marks, John. *The Search for the "Manchurian Candidate": The CIA and Mind Control.* Times Books, 1979, ch. 12, n. 6, as transcribed at https://cryptome.org/mkultra-0005.htm. The Subproject 35 memorandum of November 15, 1954, does not mention the committee: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/32726-document-11-memorandum-director-central-intelligence-project-mkultra-subproject-35
[^26]: Colby and Dennett, Ch. 18, 44, and Ch. 18 n. 32, citing MKULTRA Subproject 35-10, May 16, 1955. The book calls the body he chaired the "Special Group." For the Planning Coordination Group, its membership and its role as the "normal channel for giving policy approval" to covert operations: Rowland Hughes memorandum to Eisenhower, March 3, 1955, *FRUS 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community,* Document 210, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d210. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research, *Project MKULTRA, the CIA's Program of Research in Behavioral Modification,* joint hearing, August 3, 1977, testimony of Adm. Stansfield Turner and exchange with Sen. Richard Schweiker, https://archive.org/details/project-mkultra-the-cias-program-of-research-in-behavioral-modification
[^27]: Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Topic Guide, "Rockefeller Commission Report, June 1975." FRUS 1969-76, Vol. XXXVIII, Part 2, Document 46, Memorandum on implementation of Rockefeller Commission recommendations, August 9, 1975.
[^28]: FRUS 1969-76, Vol. XXXVIII, Part 2, Document 46, August 9, 1975, Kissinger, Buchen, and Lynn to Ford on implementation of Rockefeller Commission recommendations.
[^29]: Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Finding Aid, "U.S. President's Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States Files," collection extent approximately 41 cubic feet.

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@ -1,65 +1,285 @@
---
created: 2026-05-15
updated: 2026-05-17
updated: 2026-10-09
title: Warren Commission
aliases:
- President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy
- Warren Report
- Warren Commission Report
tags:
- Event
- JFKAssassination
- Government
- Investigation
- 1960s
- SingleBulletTheory
- CIAAssassinationPlots
category: "Intelligence Scandal"
summary: "The Warren Commission was the official body appointed by President Johnson in November 1963 to investigate the Kennedy assassination, whose September 1964 report concluded Oswald acted alone - a finding undermined by the CIA's deliberate concealment of ZR/RIFLE and the anti-Castro assassination programs from the commission, and later challenged by the HSCA's 1979 conclusion that 'probable conspiracy' existed."
summary: "Seven-member commission created by Executive Order 11130 that reported on September 24, 1964 that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone, a finding the House committee later said was presented in a fashion that was 'too definitive.'"
start: 1963-11-29
end: 1964-09-24
location: "Washington, D.C."
relations:
- type: member_of
with: "[[Earl Warren]]"
reverse: true
role: "chairman"
start: 1963-11-29
end: 1964-09-24
fn: 3
- type: member_of
with: "[[Richard B. Russell]]"
reverse: true
start: 1963-11-29
end: 1964-09-24
fn: 3
- type: member_of
with: "[[John Sherman Cooper]]"
reverse: true
start: 1963-11-29
end: 1964-09-24
fn: 3
- type: member_of
with: "[[Hale Boggs]]"
reverse: true
start: 1963-11-29
end: 1964-09-24
fn: 3
- type: member_of
with: "[[Gerald R. Ford]]"
reverse: true
start: 1963-11-29
end: 1964-09-24
fn: 3
- type: member_of
with: "[[Allen Dulles]]"
reverse: true
start: 1963-11-29
end: 1964-09-24
fn: 3
- type: member_of
with: "[[John J. McCloy]]"
reverse: true
start: 1963-11-29
end: 1964-09-24
fn: 3
- type: employed_by
with: "[[J. Lee Rankin]]"
reverse: true
role: "general counsel"
start: 1963-12-16
end: 1964-09-24
fn: 14
- type: reported_to
with: "[[Lyndon B. Johnson]]"
start: 1963-11-29
end: 1964-09-24
fn: 3
- type: investigated
with: "[[Lee Harvey Oswald]]"
start: 1963-11-29
end: 1964-09-24
fn: 1
- type: investigated
with: "[[Jack Ruby]]"
start: 1963-11-29
end: 1964-09-24
fn: 1
---
The President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy - universally known as the Warren Commission after its chairman, Chief Justice Earl Warren - was an investigative body established by President [[Lyndon B. Johnson]] by executive order on November 29, 1963, one week after the Kennedy assassination. It issued its report on September 24, 1964, concluding that [[Lee Harvey Oswald]] had acted alone in killing President Kennedy and that [[Jack Ruby]] had acted alone in killing Oswald.[^1]
The President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, known as the Warren Commission after its chairman, Chief Justice [[Earl Warren]], was created by [[Lyndon B. Johnson]] in Executive Order 11130 on November 29, 1963, one week after the assassination of [[John F. Kennedy]] in [[Dallas, Texas]]. The Commission presented its Report to the President on September 24, 1964. The Report concluded that the shots which killed Kennedy and wounded [[John Connally]] were fired from the sixth-floor window of the [[Texas School Book Depository]] and that [[Lee Harvey Oswald]] acted alone. It stated that it had found no evidence that Oswald or [[Jack Ruby]], who shot Oswald on November 24, 1963, was part of any conspiracy.[^1]
### Composition
### Membership and the executive order
The Commission's seven members were:
- Chief Justice Earl Warren (chairman)
- Senator Richard Russell (D-Georgia)
- Senator John Sherman Cooper (R-Kentucky)
- Representative Hale Boggs (D-Louisiana)
- Representative [[Gerald Ford]] (R-Michigan)
- [[John McCloy]] (former High Commissioner of Germany, former President of the World Bank)
- [[Allen Dulles]] (former CIA Director, fired by [[John F. Kennedy|Kennedy]] after the [[Bay of Pigs]])
Executive Order 11130 named seven members: Warren; Senators [[Richard B. Russell]] of Georgia and [[John Sherman Cooper]] of Kentucky; Representatives [[Hale Boggs]] of Louisiana and [[Gerald R. Ford]] of Michigan; and [[Allen Dulles]], the former Director of Central Intelligence, and [[John J. McCloy]], a former president of the World Bank and former High Commissioner for Germany.[^2] The order directed the Commission to examine the evidence developed by the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]] and any additional evidence, to make such further investigation as it found desirable, and to report its findings and conclusions to the President.[^3] The Commission's first meeting was held on December 5, 1963.[^4] In recorded telephone conversations of November 29, 1963, in which he told Russell that he was to serve, Johnson said that the matter had to be taken "out of the arena where they're testifying it's [Nikita S.] Khrushchev and [Fidel A.] Castro did this and did that," and described the alternative as "kicking us into a war that can kill 40 million Americans in an hour."[^5]
The presence of Allen Dulles on the Commission was significant and, in hindsight, problematic. Dulles had been director of the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] during the period when ZR/RIFLE and the CIA-Mafia anti-Castro plots were authorized. He had a personal motive not to expose these programs, which might have led investigators to examine whether the organized crime and anti-Castro networks had any connection to Oswald's background or the assassination. Dulles did not disclose these programs to his fellow commissioners. Gerald Ford secretly provided the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] with reports on the Commission's internal deliberations.[^1]
Dulles was [[Director of Central Intelligence]] at the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] from 1953 until November 1961. Kennedy removed him from the directorship after the failure of the [[Bay of Pigs]] invasion, and [[John McCone]] was sworn in as his successor in November 1961.[^6][^7][^8][^9] Senate Joint Resolution 137, passed on December 13, 1963, authorized the Commission to issue subpoenas and to compel testimony by granting immunity. The Commission granted immunity to no witness.[^4]
On December 12, 1963 [[Cartha DeLoach]] of the FBI recorded in a memorandum to [[John P. Mohr]] that Ford, in his office that morning, had offered to keep the Bureau informed of the Commission's activities on a confidential basis. A second DeLoach memorandum, dated December 17, 1963, summarized what Ford reported of the Commission's meeting of the day before, including that two members were not convinced that the President had been shot from the sixth-floor window of the Depository.[^10][^11][^12] The [[Associated Press]] reported in 2008 that DeLoach, with [[J. Edgar Hoover]]'s personal approval, lent Ford a locked Bureau briefcase to carry the FBI report on the assassination on a ski trip.[^12] In 1997 Ford told [[T. Jeremy Gunn]] of the [[Assassination Records Review Board]] that DeLoach's claim that valuable information about the Commission's discussions had been obtained was not true, and that DeLoach may have exaggerated to curry favor with Hoover.[^13]
### Staff and counsel
[[J. Lee Rankin]], formerly Solicitor General of the United States, was sworn in as general counsel on December 16, 1963. Fourteen assistant counsel worked under him.[^14] The [[Church Committee]] recorded that [[Burt Griffin]], [[Howard Willens]] and [[David Belin]] of the Commission staff had not known of the CIA plots against Castro, and that former Senator Cooper said the subject never came up in the Commission's deliberations.[^7][^15]
Rankin's records, about 40,000 pages, were made public by the Assassination Records Review Board in July 1997, and included Ford's handwritten notes on a staff draft of the Report.[^16]
### Liaison with the FBI and the CIA
The division of the FBI responsible for investigating the criminal aspects of the assassination, and not the division responsible for subversive activities, served as the Bureau's liaison to the Commission. The Church Committee found that Hoover perceived the Commission as an adversary, and that the subordinate officers at the FBI and the CIA who acted as liaisons with the Commission did not know of the CIA assassination attempts.[^17]
On December 10, 1963 Hoover told Assistant Director [[Alan Belmont]] that he would be "personally responsible for reviewing every piece of paper that went to the Warren Commission" and designated the FBI headquarters inspector who had supervised the Dallas field investigation as liaison. Hoover's memorandum of that meeting records his instruction to the inspector "to establish the closest and most amiable working relationship with Mr. Rankin," whom Hoover said he had known since Rankin served as Solicitor General.[^18][^19] Throughout the Commission's existence Belmont kept Hoover informed daily on the Commission's internal meetings and decisions, the areas in which it requested information or further FBI investigation, and the materials the Bureau intended to provide.[^19][^20] Each time Hoover learned that a person was being considered for the Commission staff, he asked what the Bureau had on the individual.[^18]
Hoover's handwritten note on an April 4, 1964 memorandum reads: "I place no credence in any complimentary remarks made by Warren nor the Commission. They were looking for FBI 'gaps' and having found none yet they try to get sympathy." When he learned that the Commission intended to send two staff members to [[Mexico City]], the Director "expressed concern as to how lawyers on the Commission could spot gaps in our investigation."[^20] On May 13, 1964 [[James Jesus Angleton]] of the CIA contacted [[William Sullivan]] of the FBI to say that it would be well for McCone and Hoover to be aware that the Commission might ask the same questions of both, and gave Sullivan the replies he expected McCone to give, among them that Oswald had never been an agent of the CIA and that the CIA had no evidence of a conspiracy.[^20] On October 1, 1964, a week after the Report was delivered, a senior Bureau official instructed the FBI inspector who had handled the liaison to telephone Rankin and tell him that "he did the Bureau a great disservice and had out-McCarthyed McCarthy."[^21]
On the CIA side, the desk officer responsible for intelligence activity related to Mexico was instructed by [[Richard Helms]], then Deputy Director for Plans, immediately after the assassination to coordinate the agency's information.[^22] In late December 1963 Angleton suggested that his Counterintelligence Division take over the investigation, and Helms agreed. One of Angleton's subordinates stated that he was designated the "point of record" for all matters relating to the assassination and the Commission on January 23, 1964, when the Commission began requesting information from the CIA.[^23] [[Raymond Rocca]], Chief of Research and Analysis in the counterintelligence staff, was the CIA's working-level contact point with the Commission and had no knowledge of the agency's efforts to assassinate [[Fidel Castro]].[^22] The House committee found that the Commission's staff assumed the CIA would provide it with all relevant information, while Helms testified that the CIA's general position was that it should forward information only in response to specific requests.[^22]
### Executive sessions
The National Archives inventory lists transcripts for the executive sessions of December 5, 6 and 16, 1963, January 21, 27, February 24, March 16, April 30, May 19, June 4 and June 23, 1964.[^24] The transcript of the January 22, 1964 session was prepared in August 1974 by a [[Department of Defense]] stenographer from reporter's notes among the Commission's records, at the request of the [[General Services Administration]].[^25][^26] The [[Assassination Archives and Research Center]] holds the transcripts of all the sessions.[^27]
For the September 18, 1964 session the National Archives holds minutes, and the first page of those minutes appears to be the beginning of a verbatim transcript. In 1996 the Assassination Records Review Board staff examined, at the request of [[James Lesar]] of the Assassination Archives and Research Center, whether a stenotape or transcript had been made. Lesar's letter of May 7, 1996 postulated that Rankin or Warren destroyed any stenotape or transcript, or replaced it with minutes, to preserve the appearance of unanimity. The staff memorandum recorded that Rankin is the only staff member listed as present, that two stenographers of the Commission's reporting firm who examined the minutes supported the view that the first page begins as a verbatim transcript, that Warren's papers at the [[Library of Congress]] contain the same cover sheet and minutes, and that former Commission staff and reporting-firm personnel interviewed had no recollection of the session.[^26] A separate review board memorandum of August 28, 1996 records the view of some researchers that the session was contentious, with Russell expressing strong concerns about the Report and the degree of certainty it ascribed to some of its conclusions.[^28]
### The informant allegation, January 22, 1964
The Commission met in executive session on the evening of January 22, 1964, from 5:30 to 7:00 p.m., after Rankin reported a call he had received that day. Rankin said that [[Waggoner Carr]], the Attorney General of Texas, had telephoned him at 11:10 that morning to say that the word had come out that Oswald had been an undercover FBI agent, with a badge number, and had been paid two hundred dollars a month from September 1962 through the assassination. Carr said that [[Henry Wade]], the Dallas County district attorney, had cited the story in court to explain why the FBI was so willing to give records to Ruby's defense counsel. Carr said the source was a member of the press, and that Wade did not know the informant's name. Rankin said that [[Leon Jaworski]], who was working with the Attorney General on the matter, did not think Wade would make the claim without substantial information.[^25]
Members questioned the story. Boggs noted a denial of it in one of the FBI records. Cooper asked how the claim could be tested, and Rankin answered that the FBI would never admit it. Ford said that postal authorities might have watched activity at a particular box, and said that Oswald had been "playing ball" with the Communist parties and with the Trotskyites. Dulles asked what the ostensible mission would have been, suggested that it may have been to penetrate the [[Fair Play for Cuba Committee]], and said that the FBI did not need such a person on the outside. Dulles said that practically any American could obtain a passport good for anywhere, and that the Passport Bureau had no record of Oswald's defection.[^25]
Dulles argued that if the employers were sure the story would close the case, the approach would work for them, but that if it did not close the case they were worse off than ever. Boggs said: "This closes the case, you see." Dulles then said: "I think this record ought to be destroyed." Boggs said he hoped none of the records would be circulated to anybody. Rankin said that the copies would go only to the Commissioners.[^25]
On January 28, 1964, Rankin met with Hoover at the Commission's direction to discuss the allegation that Oswald had been an FBI informant. According to Hoover's memorandum of January 31, Rankin said that the Commission did not want to initiate an investigation on the outside, because it might appear the Commission was investigating the FBI. Hoover replied that Oswald "was never at any time a confidential informant, undercover agent, or even a source of information for the FBI."[^19]
### Investigation
The Commission reviewed over 26,000 interviews conducted by the FBI, inspected physical evidence, and heard testimony from 552 witnesses. It relied heavily on FBI investigation and, for national security matters, on CIA briefings. The investigation took approximately ten months.
The Report states that the Commission heard testimony from 552 witnesses.[^14] The Report's foreword states that from November 22, 1963 the FBI conducted approximately 25,000 interviews and reinterviews of persons with information of possible relevance, and that by September 11, 1964 it had submitted 2,300 reports totaling about 25,400 pages.[^4] The investigation ran from November 29, 1963 to September 24, 1964. The hearings were published in 26 volumes.[^14][^29]
The Commission was working under significant constraints. President Johnson had expressed concern that if Soviet or Cuban government involvement were found, it could lead to nuclear confrontation. Commission members were aware that their findings could have diplomatic and military consequences beyond the fact-finding mission. This awareness shaped the investigation's scope and caution.[^1]
Book V states that the CIA's Counterintelligence Division, under Angleton, conducted the agency's research for the Commission. Angleton testified that he was not aware of the AMLASH operation.[^30]
### Principal Findings
The Commission was apparently not given the administrative cover pages of the report that [[John W. Fain]], a Special Agent, wrote on Oswald, which discussed Oswald's refusal to take a polygraph test. When Fain testified on May 6, 1964, he did not mention the refusal, although Ford and Dulles questioned him in detail about discrepancies in Oswald's statements and about his reaction to them.[^31]
The Commission's report concluded:
- Three shots were fired from the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository
- All three shots were fired by Oswald using a Mannlicher-Carcano rifle
- A single bullet caused both President Kennedy's wounds and Texas Governor John Connally's wounds ("the single bullet theory," sometimes called the "magic bullet theory" by critics)
- No evidence of conspiracy involving any foreign government, domestic organization, or individuals other than Oswald was found
- Jack Ruby acted alone in shooting Oswald, with no evidence of advance planning
At the executive session of December 16, 1963, which took up the FBI's report, Russell said that practically everything in it had already appeared in the press. Cooper raised whether any bullets had been found in the President. McCloy said, "This bullet business leaves me confused," and the Chairman said, "It's totally inconclusive." Russell said that the investigators could not find where the bullet that struck the President came out, and yet had found a bullet on the stretcher.[^32]
### CIA Concealment and Later Criticism
### Oswald's contacts in Mexico City
The Commission's credibility was fundamentally compromised by what the CIA did not tell it. The [[Church Committee]] established in 1975 that the CIA had not disclosed to the Warren Commission the existence of [[ZR RIFLE|ZR/RIFLE]], the agency's assassination planning program targeting Castro, or the CIA-organized crime anti-Castro plots involving [[Johnny Roselli]] and [[Sam Giancana]]. CIA Director [[Richard Helms]] and former Director Dulles deliberately withheld this information. The practical consequence was that the Commission had no basis for investigating whether Oswald had any contact with the organized crime or Cuban exile networks that the CIA had been running, or whether the anti-Castro operations created any pathways through which enemies of the Kennedy administration might have reached Oswald.[^1]
The Report states that eight weeks before the assassination Oswald traveled to Mexico City, where he visited both the Cuban and Soviet embassies, and that he was in Mexico from September 26 to October 3, 1963.[^33] The Report states that no credible witness had been located who saw Oswald with any unidentified person in Mexico City.[^34] It describes the testimony of [[Silvia Duran]], a Mexican employee of the Cuban consulate who dealt with Oswald, and states that "[b]y far the most important confirmation of Senora Duran's testimony, however, has been supplied by confidential sources of extremely high reliability available to the United States in Mexico."[^34] It states, on information produced for the Commission by the CIA, that the "comrade Kostin" of Oswald's last letter to the Soviet Embassy in Washington was probably [[Valeriy Kostikov|Valeriy Vladimirovich Kostikov]], a member of the consular staff of the Soviet Union in Mexico City and one of the [[KGB]] officers stationed at the embassy.[^35]
The [[HSCA|House Select Committee on Assassinations]] (1976-1979) later found that "the Warren Commission failed to investigate adequately the possibility of a conspiracy to assassinate the President" and that "the Secret Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation and Central Intelligence Agency... were deficient in their performance of [their] duties."[^2]
The House Select Committee on Assassinations found that within two days of the assassination CIA headquarters had received detailed reports of Oswald's contacts at the Soviet embassy and Cuban consulate. Accurate summaries were given to the Commission on January 31, 1964, and direct access to the original material was not provided until April 1964, when Commission investigators traveling abroad met a CIA representative. A staff member who reviewed it wrote in a memorandum of April 22, 1964 that it "disclosed immediately how incorrect our previous information had been on Oswald's contacts with the Soviet and Cuban Embassies." The committee also found that the CIA did not give the Commission all of its information on [[Luisa Calderon]], a Cuban consulate employee in Mexico City, who in a conversation about five hours after the assassination indicated possible foreknowledge of it.[^36]
### Legacy
The Report states that on November 22 the CIA provided the FBI with a photograph of a man who it was thought might have been associated with Oswald, taken by the CIA outside the United States between July 1 and November 22, 1963. FBI Special Agent Odum trimmed the background from it, and the copy supplied to the Commission was cropped along the contours of the figure. It was shown to Oswald's mother on November 23 and again in her testimony.[^37]
The Warren Commission Report remains the official U.S. government position on the Kennedy assassination. Opinion polling consistently shows that majorities of Americans do not accept the lone-gunman conclusion. The Commission's findings and methodology have been debated for six decades in an extensive literature that includes both serious historical scholarship (Gerald Posner's *Case Closed*, Vincent Bugliosi's *Reclaiming History*) and speculative conspiracy literature of varying quality.
### The Odio visit
The Commission's concealed context - that it operated in ignorance of the CIA's own assassination programs - remains the strongest specific basis for questioning whether its investigation was complete, regardless of what conclusions one draws about Oswald's guilt or innocence.[^1]
The Report states that [[Sylvia Odio]], a member of the [[Cuban Revolutionary Junta]] (JURE) whose parents were political prisoners in Cuba, testified that late in September 1963 three men came to her apartment in Dallas, that one of them, an American introduced as "Leon Oswald," was in her belief Lee Harvey Oswald, and that her sister, who saw them briefly, also believed so. Odio testified that one of the Cubans telephoned the next day and reported that the American had said that "President Kennedy should have been assassinated after the Bay of Pigs." The Commission concluded that Oswald could not have been in Dallas on the evening of September 26 or 27 and requested further FBI investigation. On September 16, 1964 the FBI located [[Loran Eugene Hall]] in California, who said he had visited Odio in September 1963 with two companions. The Report states that the FBI had not completed its investigation at the time the Report went to press, and that the Commission had concluded that Oswald was not at Odio's apartment.[^38]
The House committee reported that on September 14, 1964 the Commission's assistant counsel [[J. Wesley Liebeler]] wrote to Willens that there was "no evidence at all" that Oswald left Houston on the bus the Report placed him on, and "There are problems. Odio may well be right. The Commission will look bad if it turns out that she is." Rankin wrote to Hoover on August 23, 1964 that "It is a matter of some importance to the Commission that Mrs. Odio's allegation either be proved or disproved." The committee reported that portions of the FBI's investigation were not sent to Rankin until November 9, 1964, after the Report was complete, that Hall said Oswald was not one of the men, that his two companions denied having met Odio, and that Hall later retracted his statement about meeting her. It stated that it was inclined to believe Odio, that one of the three men at least looked like Oswald and was introduced as Leon Oswald, and that it did not agree with the Commission's conclusion that Oswald could not have been in Dallas at the requisite time.[^39][^40]
### Nosenko
The House committee reported that the Commission "found itself in the middle of the Nosenko controversy," that it chose not to call [[Yuri Nosenko]] as a witness or to mention him in its Report, and that Helms told Chief Justice Warren about Nosenko.[^41][^42]
### The Report
The Report, delivered September 24, 1964, runs 888 pages in a single volume.[^3] At the Commission's last executive session, on September 18, 1964, the members approved 100 bound copies of the Report and hearings for distribution and 500 copies of the Report alone. The minutes record a discussion of Chapters III and IV, and an instruction to the General Counsel that their conclusions be checked so that they did not conflict with those in Chapter I. The minutes set delivery of the Report to the President for September 24 at 11:00 a.m. at the White House. A motion by Ford to print a letter from Representative [[John R. Pillion|Pillion]] in the hearings failed for want of a second.[^43]
The Report's introduction states that the Commission presented the Report to the President "in which each member concurred."[^14]
### Principal findings
The Report states that "[t]he weight of the evidence indicates that there were three shots fired," and that the shots which killed the President and wounded Governor Connally were fired from the sixth-floor window at the southeast corner of the Texas School Book Depository.[^1] It concludes "[o]n the basis of the evidence before the Commission" that Oswald acted alone.[^1] It states: "The Commission has found no evidence that either Lee Harvey Oswald or Jack Ruby was part of any conspiracy, domestic or foreign, to assassinate President Kennedy."[^1] On the killing of Oswald it states that the Commission found no evidence that Ruby acted with any other person.[^1]
### The single-bullet finding
The Report's narrative states: "A bullet had entered the base of the back of his neck slightly to the right of the spine."[^44] Its summary states that the President was first struck by a bullet which entered at the back of his neck and exited through the lower front portion of his neck, causing a wound which would not necessarily have been lethal, and that he was struck a second time by a bullet which entered the right-rear portion of his head, causing a massive and fatal wound.[^1]
The summary then addresses Connally: "Although it is not necessary to any essential findings of the Commission to determine just which shot hit Governor Connally, there is very persuasive evidence from the experts to indicate that the same bullet which pierced the President's throat also caused Governor Connally's wounds. However, Governor Connally's testimony and certain other factors have given rise to some difference of opinion as to this probability."[^1] Connally himself thought it likely that all of his wounds were caused by a single bullet.[^45]
### Ford's edit to the wound location
The staff draft read: "A bullet had entered his back at a point slightly above the shoulder and to the right of the spine." Ford proposed: "A bullet had entered the back of his neck at a point slightly to the right of the spine." The published Report reads: "A bullet had entered the base of the back of his neck slightly to the right of the spine." Asked about the change, Ford said: "My changes had nothing to do with a conspiracy theory," and "My changes were only an attempt to be more precise."[^16] The Associated Press reported that the changes tended to support the single-bullet theory by placing the entry at the back of the neck rather than the uppermost back. [[Robert D. Morningstar]], a computer systems specialist in New York who has written an Internet book on the assassination, called the edit "the most significant lie in the whole Warren Commission report."[^16]
James Lesar of the Assassination Archives and Research Center said that both Ford's description and the staff's wording conflict with the Kennedy death certificate, which says the bullet entered "in the upper back region, well below the neck." [[Gerald Posner]], author of *Case Closed* (1993), which accepts the Warren conclusions, said that the death certificate was based on erroneous drawings by the doctors who performed the autopsy.[^16] A transcript of the Commission's January 27, 1964 session records Rankin describing the back entry as below the shoulder blade and to the right of the backbone, and saying that the neck wound could be explained by a fragment that came out the front of the neck.[^46]
### Russell's objections
Russell's papers, as described in the 1996 review board memorandum, include two draft amendments or dissents dated September 16, 1964, prepared for the September 18 meeting, on the single-bullet theory and on the possibility of a conspiracy. A document in the same papers, dated September 18, 1964, records that Rankin's secretary telephoned Russell's office that day and dictated McCloy's compromise language on the single-bullet theory. When the Report was published the [[Atlanta Journal]] ran the headline "Russell at Odds on Bullet Report" and the [[Atlanta Constitution]] "Sen. Russell Wins a Change in Wording of Warren Report." In a letter of December 24, 1966, Russell described Cooper as very strong in opposition to the single-bullet theory and Boggs as having mild doubts.[^26]
On September 18, 1964, Russell and Johnson spoke by telephone. The transcript of the call, from the Johnson Library tape, includes this exchange. Russell: "The commission believes that the same bullet that hit Kennedy hit Connally. Well, I don't believe it." Johnson: "I don't either." Russell: "And so I couldn't sign it. And I said that Governor Connally testified directly to the contrary, and I'm not going to approve of that. So I finally made them say there was a difference in the commission, in that part of them believed that that wasn't so."[^47] Johnson asked whether the Report was unanimous. Russell answered: "Yes, sir. I tried my best to get in a dissent, but they'd come round and trade me out of it by giving me a little old thread of it."[^47]
[[Michael R. Beschloss]] transcribed the last word as "threat" in *Taking Charge: The Johnson White House Tapes, 1963-1964* (1998). The 22 November 1963 website reproduces the call with "thread" and argues that Russell's contemporaneous notes and later remarks show that his public acceptance of the Report's conclusions came about because he was deceived, not because he was threatened.[^48]
### Dulles's role
Book V states that, with the exception of Dulles, it is unlikely that anyone on the Warren Commission knew of the CIA's assassination efforts, and that Dulles knew of the plots with underworld figures that had taken place during his tenure as Director of Central Intelligence.[^7][^15] Angleton testified that Dulles consulted him before agreeing to President Johnson's request that he serve on the Commission, that the two were in frequent contact, and that Dulles consulted him about what further investigation the CIA could do.[^30]
Helms told the Church Committee that Dulles "was sitting right there" in the Commission's deliberations and "knew about this," and that he did not know what Dulles had said to the Commission about the plots.[^49] The 1975 interim report of the Church Committee states that Dulles "did not inform the other members about the plots that had occurred during his term as DCI."[^50] The interim report also states that it is "not entirely certain that Dulles was ever made aware of the true nature of the underworld operation."[^51]
In the January 22, 1964 session, Dulles raised the Fair Play for Cuba angle, passport practice, and whether a record of the discussion should exist.[^25] FBI Director Hoover's files held index cards on Dulles that cross-referenced a November 29, 1963 memorandum.[^52]
### The CIA and the plots against Castro
The Church Committee's final report states that neither the CIA nor the FBI told the Commission about the CIA attempts to assassinate Castro, and that none of the testimony or documents received by the Commission mentioned them.[^17] The interim report's section on [[ZR RIFLE|Project ZR/RIFLE]] identifies [[Johnny Roselli]] as the agency's principal contact in the underworld dealings connected with the Castro plots.[^50]
Belin, the Commission's counsel, wrote in 1975 that "[a]t no time did the CIA disclose to the Warren Commission any facts which pertained to alleged assassination plans to kill Fidel Castro," and that the CIA withheld from the Commission information which might have been relevant in light of the allegations of conspiratorial contact between Oswald and agents of the Cuban government. Griffin, also a former staff counsel, wrote to Belin that if the CIA suspected pro-Castro individuals in addition to Oswald, "they would have considered retaliation against Castro."[^53]
On why the plots were not disclosed, the record contains several accounts. The Church Committee's 1975 interim report states that Helms "failed to inform the Warren Commission of the plots because the precise question was not asked," and that McCone failed to disclose the plot to the Commission during its inquiry.[^50] Helms testified to the committee that he had been asked: "you were charged with furnishing the Warren Commission information from the CIA, information that you thought was relevant?" and answered: "No sir. I was instructed to reply to inquiries from the Warren Commission for information from the Agency. I was not asked to initiate any particular thing." To Senator Morgan's statement "if you weren't asked for it, you didn't give it," Helms answered: "That's right, sir." He also said he did not recall being instructed, or deciding on his own, to cover with the Commission the precise details of the Agency's operations, and that his recollection at the time was that it was public knowledge that the United States was trying to get rid of Castro.[^49][^54] In his testimony to the [[Rockefeller Commission 1975|Rockefeller Commission]], asked whether it entered his mind that Oswald's pro-Cuban activity might be connected to retaliation by Castro, he answered: "I don't recall its having done so."[^54]
The Church Committee's final report of 1976 states that the officials whom the Commission relied on for expertise advised it that the CIA had no evidence of foreign conspiracy, that why senior FBI and CIA officials permitted the Commission to reach its conclusion without all relevant information "is still unclear," and that "the possibility exists that senior officials in both agencies made conscious decisions not to disclose potentially important information."[^55] The House Select Committee on Assassinations reported that Helms indicated he did not inform the Commission of the anti-Castro plots because he was never asked to testify before it about operations, and stated in a note that the committee considered this an unacceptable explanation, since the Commission was unaware of the plots and could not make a specific request about them.[^22] The same committee stated that only Helms would have been in a position to have both the knowledge and the power to cover up the plots in the course of the CIA's or the Commission's investigation, and that it was satisfied, on the basis of its investigation, that it was highly unlikely he did.[^56]
The CIA Inspector General's report of May 23, 1967 on plots to assassinate Castro, which was prepared at the request of the Director of Central Intelligence and whose text, according to the Inspector General's covering memorandum, had been read only by Helms, the Inspector General [[John Earman|John S. Earman]] and two of the report's authors, describes the AMLASH operation in its own pages. It records that according to [[Desmond FitzGerald]], then Chief of the Special Affairs Staff, he discussed the planned October 29, 1963 meeting in Paris with Helms, who decided it was not necessary to seek approval from [[Robert Kennedy|Robert F. Kennedy]] for FitzGerald to speak in his name.[^57][^58] It states that "it is likely that at the very moment President Kennedy was shot a CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban agent in Paris and giving him an assassination device for use against Castro," and that "The AMLASH project was probably about as widely known within the Clandestine Services as any other project of a similar nature."[^59] The report also states that [[Sam Giancana]] was "supposedly cut out of the second phase" of the underworld operation, and records, as one way the story of the Roselli plot may have reached the government, a chain running from Roselli to [[Robert Maheu]], Maheu's Washington lawyer, the columnist [[Drew Pearson]], and Pearson to Chief Justice Warren and to the President, and from Warren to the chief of the [[United States Secret Service|Secret Service]].[^60]
Book V states that the Cuban official code-named AMLASH met a CIA case officer on November 22, 1963, the day the President was shot.[^30] Helms, then Deputy Director for Plans, knew of the operation, although he would not characterize it as an assassination plot.[^30] The Chief of the Special Affairs Staff's counterintelligence section testified that it would have been logical for officials who knew of both the Kennedy investigation and the AMLASH operation to consider a connection and to explore it on their own.[^53] Angleton's subordinate who had been designated "point of record" for the Commission stated that he did not know of any assassination plots against Castro. In 1975, after being questioned by the Rockefeller Commission on the point, he noted that knowledge of an ongoing assassination plot might have changed his thinking about Oswald's Mexican trip.[^30][^49] Book V states that a memorandum by the same analyst stated that he was unaware of the plots until 1975 and expressed concern about the Commission's findings in light of the new information.[^61]
### Later findings and literature
The [[HSCA|House Select Committee on Assassinations]] found in 1979 that the Warren Commission "conducted a thorough and professional investigation into the responsibility of Lee Harvey Oswald" but "failed to investigate adequately the possibility of a conspiracy to assassinate the President." It attributed that deficiency in part to the Commission's failure to receive all relevant information held by other agencies, and it said the Commission "presented the conclusions in its report in a fashion that was too definitive." The committee also stated that scientific acoustical evidence "establishes a high probability that two gunmen fired" at the President.[^62] In the same findings it stated that the Secret Service "was deficient in the performance of its duties," that the Department of Justice "failed to exercise initiative" in supervising the FBI investigation, that the FBI was "deficient in its sharing of information with other agencies and departments," and that the CIA "was deficient in its collection and sharing of information both prior to and subsequent to the assassination." Finding I.C.5 states that the Secret Service, the FBI and the CIA "were not involved in the assassination of President Kennedy," following findings I.C.3 and I.C.4, which state that "the available evidence does not preclude the possibility that individual members may have been involved."[^63] The committee reported that Ruby's shooting of Oswald "was not a spontaneous act, in that it involved at least some premeditation," and that Ruby probably did not come down the Main Street ramp, as the Commission had concluded.[^64]
The Report is the government's published account of the assassination, and the Commission's records are held by the National Archives in Record Group 272.[^14] A [[Gallup]] poll conducted November 22-27, 1963 found that 29 percent of Americans believed one man was responsible for the shooting and 52 percent believed others were involved. Gallup reported that a majority had said others were involved each time it asked over the following fifty years except in December 1966, when exactly half did, that the figure was 81 percent in 1976, and that it was 61 percent in 2013.[^65] The debate has produced a large literature, including Posner's *Case Closed* and [[Vincent Bugliosi]]'s *Reclaiming History* (2007).[^66]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Warren Commission. *Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy.* Government Printing Office, 1964. Church Committee (U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities). *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders.* Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975.
[^2]: House Select Committee on Assassinations. *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives.* Government Printing Office, 1979.
[^1]: Warren Commission. *Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy*, 1964, chapter 1, summary and conclusions, pp. 19-22 (killing of Oswald by Ruby on November 24, 1963; three shots; no evidence of conspiracy; Oswald acted alone; the Connally paragraph). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/warren-commission-report/chapter-1.html
[^2]: Bush, George H. W., "Statement on the Death of John J. McCloy," March 12, 1989 (President of the World Bank; Military Governor and High Commissioner in Germany), George Bush Presidential Library. https://www.bush41library.gov/digital-research-room/finding-aid/public-papers/statement-death-john-j-mccloy
[^3]: Executive Order 11130, November 29, 1963, reproduced in the Report's appendix, which also gives the Report as one volume of 888 pages. https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/warren-commission-report/appendix-01.html
[^4]: Warren Commission. *Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy*, 1964, foreword (first meeting December 5, 1963; Senate Joint Resolution 137 of December 13, 1963; immunity never granted; FBI interviews, reinterviews and reports). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/warren-commission-report/foreword.html
[^5]: Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard B. Russell Jr., telephone conversations of November 29, 1963 (K6311-05-07 and K6311-06-14-15-16), Miller Center, Presidential Recordings Program, "You're Goddamn Sure Going to Serve." https://millercenter.org/sites/default/files/conversations/K6311-05-07_K6311-06-14-15-16%20-%20You%27re%20Goddamn%20Sure%20Going%20to%20Serve.pdf
[^6]: Central Intelligence Agency, Museum, "Identification Card of Allen W. Dulles" (Dulles appointed Director of Central Intelligence in 1953; retired in 1961). https://www.cia.gov/legacy/museum/artifact/identification-card-of-allen-w-dulles/
[^7]: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. *The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies*, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, p. 68. Dulles "had been Director of Central Intelligence until November 1961," was a member of the Commission, and knew of the CIA plots with underworld figures during his tenure. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf
[^8]: Robarge, David S., "Directors of Central Intelligence, 1946-2005: A Long Look Back," *Studies in Intelligence* 49, no. 3 (2005) (the Bay of Pigs under Dulles among the failures that led to the departures of the operator DCIs; McCone sworn in as DCI in November 1961). https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/volume-49-no-3/directors-of-central-intelligence-1946-2005
[^9]: Warner, Michael, "The CIA's Internal Probe of the Bay of Pigs Affair: Lessons Unlearned," *Studies in Intelligence*, Winter 1998-1999 (Kennedy accepted the resignations of Dulles and Bissell without waiting for the Taylor or Kirkpatrick reports). https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/static/Internal-Probe-Bay-Pigs.pdf
[^10]: Lardner, George, Jr. "Documents Show Ford Promised FBI Data, Secretly, About Warren Probe," *Washington Post*, January 20, 1978 (CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP91-00901R000500110025-7), on the December 12, 1963 conversation recorded in the DeLoach memorandum. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP91-00901R000500110025-7.pdf
[^11]: Holland, Max. "The Ford Files," *Washington Decoded*, August 11, 2008, citing "Memo, DeLoach to Mohr, 12 December 1963." https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/53424
[^12]: Associated Press. "Ford was the FBI's spy on the Warren Commission," August 10, 2008 (Deseret News), on the FBI file release, the DeLoach memorandum of December 17, 1963 and the briefcase loan. https://www.deseret.com/2008/8/10/20268447/ford-was-the-fbi-s-spy-on-the-warren-commission
[^13]: Gunn, T. Jeremy. Memorandum to file, "Gerald R. Ford 'Desk Diaries' and Interview," June 2, 1997, Assassination Records Review Board. https://documents3.theblackvault.com/documents/jfkfiles/NARA-Oct2017/ARRB/JGUNN/WP-DOCS/INTERVIE/FORD.02.PDF
[^14]: Warren Commission. *Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy*, 1964, introduction (Rankin sworn December 16, 1963; fourteen assistant counsel; 552 witnesses; the Report presented September 24, 1964 "in which each member concurred"; 26 volumes of hearings; Record Group 272). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/warren-commission-report/intro.html
[^15]: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. *The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies*, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, p. 67. "With the exception of Allen Dulles, it is unlikely that anyone on the Warren Commission knew of CIA assassination efforts"; Cooper staff discussion of May 24, 1976. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf
[^16]: Feinsilber, Mike. Associated Press, "Ford defends his changes in JFK report," July 3, 1997 (Deseret News) (staff draft, Ford's proposed wording, Report wording, Ford's statement, Morningstar, Lesar, Posner; Rankin papers made public by the Assassination Records Review Board). https://www.deseret.com/1997/7/3/19321566/ford-defends-his-changes-in-jfk-report/
[^17]: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. *The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies*, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, p. 5. Hoover and the Commission; FBI division serving as liaison; "Neither the CIA nor the FBI told the Warren Commission about the CIA attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro"; the liaison officers did not know of the plots. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf
[^18]: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. *The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies*, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, p. 47. Hoover's request for information on prospective staff; December 10, 1963 memoranda on the liaison inspector. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf
[^19]: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. *The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies*, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, pp. 48-49. Hoover's memorandum on the liaison inspector; Rankin's meeting with Hoover on January 28, 1964 and Hoover memorandum of January 31, 1964; Belmont's daily reports to Hoover. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf
[^20]: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. *The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies*, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, p. 49. Hoover's notes of April 3 and 4, 1964; the Commission's 52 questions; Hoover on the Mexico City trip; Angleton to Sullivan, May 13, 1964 (memorandum, W. C. Sullivan to A. H. Belmont, May 13, 1964). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf
[^21]: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. *The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies*, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, p. 56. Bureau instruction to the liaison inspector of October 1, 1964 and Rosen to Belmont memorandum of October 2, 1964. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf
[^22]: U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Assassinations. *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations*, 1979, Part I-D, pp. 252-253 (CIA liaison and Raymond Rocca; Commission staff assumption; Helms testimony; Senate committee note). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/select-committee-report/part-1d.html
[^23]: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. *The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies*, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, p. 31. Angleton, the Counterintelligence Division and the "point of record" designation of January 23, 1964. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf
[^24]: National Archives, catalog entry for Warren Commission records, Entry 1, "Proceedings and Minutes of Executive Sessions of the Commission," NAID 7455921. https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7455921
[^25]: Warren Commission, executive session transcript, January 22, 1964, 5:30 to 7:00 p.m. (PDF; prepared in August 1974 from reporter's notes). https://aarclibrary.org/publib/jfk/wc/wcexec/pdf/WcEx0122.pdf
[^26]: Freeman, Joe. Memorandum to Jeremy Gunn, "Jim Lesar letter of 5/7/96, re: WC Executive Session of 9/18/64," August 15, 1996 (last revised September 19, 1996), Assassination Records Review Board. https://documents3.theblackvault.com/documents/jfkfiles/NARA-Oct2017/ARRB/JFREEMAN/WP-DOCS/081596.WPD.pdf
[^27]: Assassination Archives and Research Center, "Warren Commission Executive Session Transcripts." https://aarclibrary.org/publib/jfk/wc/wcexec/contents.htm
[^28]: Horne, Doug, and Joe Freeman to Jeremy Gunn and David Marwell, memorandum, "Possible questions for former President Gerald Ford," August 28, 1996, section on the September 18, 1964 executive session. https://documents3.theblackvault.com/documents/jfkfiles/NARA-Oct2017/ARRB-Emails/ARRBmails03282.pdf
[^29]: *Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Hearings Before the President's Commission*, Vol. IV (1964). https://archive.org/details/investigationofa04pres
[^30]: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. *The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies*, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, p. 69. Angleton's testimony on AMLASH and on Dulles's consultation (note 134); AMLASH meeting of November 22, 1963; Helms and the case officer on the characterization of the operation; the "point of record". https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf
[^31]: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. *The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies*, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, p. 88 and note 8. Fain report cover pages and Fain testimony of May 6, 1964 (Warren Report, Vol. IV, p. 418). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf
[^32]: Warren Commission, executive session transcript, December 16, 1963 (PDF). https://aarclibrary.org/publib/jfk/wc/wcexec/pdf/WcEx1216.pdf
[^33]: Warren Commission. *Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy*, 1964, chapter 6, pp. 299-300 (Oswald in Mexico, September 26 to October 3, 1963). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/warren-commission-report/chapter-6.html
[^34]: Warren Commission. *Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy*, 1964, chapter 6, pp. 304-305 (Duran testimony and confirmation; no credible witness saw Oswald with an unidentified person). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/warren-commission-report/chapter-6.html
[^35]: Warren Commission. *Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy*, 1964, chapter 6, pp. 309-310 (the letter to the Soviet Embassy in Washington; Kostikov). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/warren-commission-report/chapter-6.html
[^36]: U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Assassinations. *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations*, 1979, Part I-D, p. 254 (CIA summaries of January 31, 1964; April 1964 access; staff memorandum of April 22, 1964; Luisa Calderon). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/select-committee-report/part-1d.html
[^37]: Warren Commission. *Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy*, 1964, chapter 6, pp. 364-365 (the CIA photograph trimmed by the FBI). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/warren-commission-report/chapter-6.html
[^38]: Warren Commission. *Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy*, 1964, chapter 6, pp. 321-325 (Odio testimony; the Commission's conclusions; Hall). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/warren-commission-report/chapter-6.html
[^39]: U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Assassinations. *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations*, 1979, Part I-C, p. 138 (Liebeler memorandum of September 14, 1964; Rankin letters of July 24 and August 23, 1964; FBI report of November 9, 1964; Hall). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/select-committee-report/part-1c.html
[^40]: U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Assassinations. *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations*, 1979, Part I-C, p. 139 (committee's conclusion on Odio). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/select-committee-report/part-1c.html
[^41]: U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Assassinations. *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations*, 1979, Part I-C, p. 101 (Nosenko and the Warren Commission). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/select-committee-report/part-1c.html
[^42]: U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Assassinations. *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations*, 1979, Part I-C, p. 102 (the Commission's decision not to call Nosenko; Helms and Chief Justice Warren). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/select-committee-report/part-1c.html
[^43]: Warren Commission, executive session minutes, September 18, 1964 (PDF). https://aarclibrary.org/publib/jfk/wc/wcexec/pdf/WcEx0918.pdf
[^44]: Warren Commission. *Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy*, 1964, chapter 1, p. 3. https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/warren-commission-report/chapter-1.html
[^45]: Warren Commission. *Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy*, 1964, chapter 3, p. 96 (Connally's testimony). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/warren-commission-report/chapter-3.html
[^46]: Warren Commission, executive session transcript, January 27, 1964 (PDF). https://aarclibrary.org/publib/jfk/wc/wcexec/pdf/WcEx0127.pdf
[^47]: Telephone conversation between Richard B. Russell and Lyndon B. Johnson, September 18, 1964, from the Johnson Library tape as transcribed at 22 November 1963. https://22november1963.org.uk/jfk-assassination-documents/richard-russell-warren-report
[^48]: Michael R. Beschloss, *Taking Charge: The Johnson White House Tapes, 1963-1964* (Simon and Schuster, 1998), as quoted in the 22 November 1963 reproduction of the call, which reads "thread" where Beschloss printed "threat." https://22november1963.org.uk/jfk-assassination-documents/richard-russell-warren-report
[^49]: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. *The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies*, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, pp. 70-71. Helms testimony to the Church Committee, July 17 and 18, 1975 (testimony of 7/18/75, pp. 36-37; 7/17/75, pp. 118-119); "Mr. Helms was the only CIA official who was both in contact with the Warren Commission and knowledgeable of the AMLASH operation"; Karamessines. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf
[^50]: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report*, Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975, p. 269 and note 1. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^51]: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report*, Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975, p. 267. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^52]: U.S. Assassination Records Review Board, memorandum by Ronald G. Haron, "Assassination Records Among the Files of J. Edgar Hoover (FBI-36)," January 8, 1998 (index cards cross-referencing the November 29, 1963 memorandum in O&C File 92). https://documents3.theblackvault.com/documents/jfkfiles/NARA-Oct2017/ARRB/RHARON/HARON/FBIMEM.002.pdf
[^53]: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. *The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies*, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, p. 73. Belin memorandum to the Rockefeller Commission, May 20, 1975, p. 1; Griffin letter to Belin, April 7, 1975, p. 3; Chief, SAS/CI testimony, May 10, 1976, p. 21. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf
[^54]: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. *The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies*, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, pp. 71-72. Helms testimony, the Rockefeller Commission questioning of April 24, 1975 (testimony pp. 389-391) and his statement that the AMLASH operation was not relevant to the investigation. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf
[^55]: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. *The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies*, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, p. 7. Summary of findings on the FBI and CIA investigations. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf
[^56]: U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Assassinations. *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations*, 1979, Part I-C, p. 128 (the committee on a possible CIA cover-up and Helms). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/select-committee-report/part-1c.html
[^57]: Central Intelligence Agency, Inspector General (J. S. Earman). Memorandum for the Record, "Report on Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro," May 23, 1967, covering the report prepared at the request of the Director of Central Intelligence (JFK record 104-10213-10101, 143 pp.). https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/104-10213-10101.pdf
[^58]: Central Intelligence Agency, Inspector General. "Report on Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro," May 23, 1967, pp. 88-89 (Project AMLASH, October 1963). https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/104-10213-10101.pdf ; National Security Archive copy: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/33578-document-19-cia-inspector-general-john-s-earman-report-plots-assassinate-fidel
[^59]: Central Intelligence Agency, Inspector General. "Report on Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro," May 23, 1967, p. 94 (November 22, 1963). https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/104-10213-10101.pdf
[^60]: Central Intelligence Agency, Inspector General. "Report on Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro," May 23, 1967, p. 56 (likely channels of the Roselli story; see also p. 131). https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/104-10213-10101.pdf
[^61]: U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. *The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies*, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, p. 74. CIA analyst, the "point of record," memorandum on the plots and the Commission's findings. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf
[^62]: U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Assassinations. *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations*, 1979, summary and findings on the Warren Commission and acoustical evidence. https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/select-committee-report/summary.html
[^63]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), summary Findings I.C.3 to I.C.5 (p. 3) and I.D.1 to I.D.4 (p. 4). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^64]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), pp. 156-158 (Ruby's route into the police basement; premeditation). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^65]: Swift, Art. "Majority in U.S. Still Believe JFK Killed in a Conspiracy," Gallup, November 15, 2013 (poll of November 22-27, 1963 and later polls). https://news.gallup.com/poll/165893/majority-believe-jfk-killed-conspiracy.aspx
[^66]: Gerald Posner, *Case Closed* (Random House, 1993); Vincent Bugliosi, *Reclaiming History* (W. W. Norton, 2007).