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@ -52,9 +52,11 @@ The Associated Press reported in 1994 that Camp Peary, "referred to on area maps
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### Yuri Nosenko
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[[John D. Marks]] placed the confinement of the Soviet defector [[Yuri Nosenko]], from April 1964 to October 1967, in a specially constructed cell at Camp Peary, on the judgment of [[James Jesus Angleton]] and the defector [[Anatoliy Golitsyn]] that Nosenko was a false defector sent to mislead the [[Warren Commission]].[^3] [[John Clement Hart]], a CIA officer who had retired in 1972 and studied the Nosenko case from mid-June to late December 1976, testified to the [[HSCA|House Select Committee on Assassinations]] on September 15, 1978, as the Agency's official representative, on guidance from [[Director of Central Intelligence]] [[Stansfield Turner]], that Nosenko "remained in solitary confinement, under constant visual observation, until, if my memory serves me correctly, August 1967. There was a change of the location, but that bore no particular significance because he was treated approximately the same way in both locations."[^4]
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[[John D. Marks]] placed the confinement of the Soviet defector [[Yuri Nosenko]], from April 1964 to October 1967, in a specially constructed cell at Camp Peary, on the judgment of [[James Jesus Angleton]] and the defector [[Anatoliy Golitsyn]] that Nosenko was a false defector sent to mislead the [[Warren Commission]].[^3] [[John Clement Hart]], a CIA officer who had retired in 1972 and studied the Nosenko case from mid-June to late December 1976, testified to the [[HSCA|House Select Committee on Assassinations]] on September 15, 1978, as the Agency's official representative, on guidance from [[Director of Central Intelligence]] [[Stansfield Turner]], that Nosenko "remained in solitary confinement, under constant visual observation, until, if my memory serves me correctly, August 1967. There was a change of the location, but that bore no particular significance because he was treated approximately the same way in both locations."[^4] Hart said he was "not and never have been what is called a career agent," but "an employee or an officer of the Agency," and that Admiral Turner had specifically asked him to return periodically to give presentations to senior officials on the case, the first of which took four and a half hours of continuous lecturing. His study required the full-time work of himself and four assistants and ten four-drawer safes of documents, and he said the group "put together the first full picture which has ever been had of this activity."[^5]
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Hart testified that the conditions were modeled on the confinement of the American professor [[Frederick Barghoorn]] in Moscow in 1963: the original plan for the cell provided no heat, a boarded window and "one 60-watt bulb burning all night," with rising at six and bed at ten, and a diet of weak tea, porridge, watery soup and macaroni. Nosenko "was incarcerated for 1,277 days, on only 292 days was he in part questioned"; for 77 percent of the time "he was left entirely unoccupied." On August 23, 1966, Director [[Richard Helms]] "set a limit of 60 days" to resolve the case; in September 1966 he refused a proposal to interrogate Nosenko under sodium amytal, and a second polygraph series followed from October 19 to 28, 1966. Hart read to the committee a document, mostly in the handwriting of the deputy chief of the Soviet Bloc Division, on the aims of the 1966 polygraphs: "To gain more insight into points of detail which we could use in fabricating an ostensible Nosenko confession, insofar as we could make one consistent and believable even to the Soviets, a confession would be useful in any eventual disposal of Nosenko." Helms then took the case from the Soviet Bloc Division and the Counterintelligence Staff and gave it to his deputy, Admiral [[Rufus Taylor]], who brought in the [[CIA Office of Security|Office of Security]].[^4] Its officer [[Bruce Solie]] re-examined the case and concluded that the defection was genuine.[^3]
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Hart testified that on February 12, 1964, Nosenko "was lodged in a CIA controlled house under constant guard, while being treated in a friendly fashion," and that during this period of friendly confinement he went through a personality crisis that led to heavy drinking.[^6] A Soviet defector who was then working for the CIA wrote a memorandum to the deputy chief of the Soviet Bloc Division stating that the 1962 transcripts of the meetings with Nosenko did not resemble the tapes, naming about 150 discrepancies and offering a full report; Hart found no record of a reply.[^6]
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Hart testified that the conditions were modeled on the confinement of the American professor [[Frederick Barghoorn]] in Moscow in 1963: the original plan for the cell provided no heat, a boarded window and "one 60-watt bulb burning all night," with rising at six and bed at ten, and a diet of weak tea, porridge, watery soup and macaroni. The plan was that Nosenko would receive the first of three polygraph examinations, be told afterward that he had failed, be "arrested," and be taken to an area where he would be forced to strip and put on prison clothes; the guards were instructed that there was to be no physical mistreatment, but that they were not to talk to him or smile at him and were to treat him very impersonally.[^7] He was under 24-hour visual surveillance through the door and was not allowed to lie down during the day. The guards watched a television in the house with earphones so that he would not hear it, and the original plan gave him no toilet facilities beyond a slop pail to empty once a day; this was changed because the Office of Security, "which was in charge of the house," refused some of the more extreme measures the operational people had produced.[^7] The first polygraph was administered on April 4, 1964, from 1045 to 1515 hours, with an artifact described to Nosenko as an electroencephalograph attached, and the operator was told to tell him at the end that he had failed; Hart said the examination "has been adjudged invalid."[^7] Nosenko "was incarcerated for 1,277 days, on only 292 days was he in part questioned"; for 77 percent of the time "he was left entirely unoccupied." On August 23, 1966, Director [[Richard Helms]] "set a limit of 60 days" to resolve the case; in September 1966 he refused a proposal to interrogate Nosenko under sodium amytal, and a second polygraph series followed from October 19 to 28, 1966, in which Nosenko was kept on the machine a total of 28 hours and 29 minutes, almost seven hours on the second day, and it was later discovered that during lunch breaks he was left strapped to the chair; Hart said the medical officer who examined Nosenko during a period of hallucinations concluded that he was feigning them, and added that Soviet research showed long isolation does lead to hallucination.[^8] Hart read to the committee a document, mostly in the handwriting of the deputy chief of the Soviet Bloc Division, on the aims of the 1966 polygraphs: "To gain more insight into points of detail which we could use in fabricating an ostensible Nosenko confession, insofar as we could make one consistent and believable even to the Soviets, a confession would be useful in any eventual disposal of Nosenko." Helms then took the case from the Soviet Bloc Division and the Counterintelligence Staff and gave it to his deputy, Admiral [[Rufus Taylor]], who brought in the [[CIA Office of Security|Office of Security]].[^4] Its officer [[Bruce Solie]] re-examined the case and concluded that the defection was genuine.[^3] The committee's own report states that it was certain Nosenko lied about Oswald, that it was unable to resolve the Nosenko matter, and that it criticized the CIA's hostile interrogation and solitary confinement of Nosenko from 1964 to 1968.[^9]
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### Footnotes
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@ -62,3 +64,8 @@ Hart testified that the conditions were modeled on the confinement of the Americ
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[^2]: Associated Press, "Expansion Plans Permit Small Peek into Secretive Camp Peary," *The Virginian-Pilot,* September 5, 1994, p. B5. https://scholar.lib.vt.edu/VA-news/VA-Pilot/issues/1994/vp940905/09050031.htm
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[^3]: John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*. Times Books, 1979, Chapters 8 and 11.
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[^4]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Hearings,* vol. II, testimony of John Clement Hart, September 15, 1978, pp. 487-504. https://history-matters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol2/pdf/HSCA_Vol2_0915_3_Hart.pdf
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[^5]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Hearings,* 95th Cong., 2d sess., vol. II, testimony of John Clement Hart, September 15, 1978, pp. 487-490. https://history-matters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol2/pdf/HSCA_Vol2_0915_3_Hart.pdf
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[^6]: Vol. II, Hart testimony, pp. 497-498. https://history-matters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol2/pdf/HSCA_Vol2_0915_3_Hart.pdf
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[^7]: Vol. II, Hart testimony, pp. 498-501. https://history-matters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol2/pdf/HSCA_Vol2_0915_3_Hart.pdf
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[^8]: Vol. II, Hart testimony, pp. 501-503. https://history-matters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol2/pdf/HSCA_Vol2_0915_3_Hart.pdf
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[^9]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), pp. 101-103 and 255. https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
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@ -16,6 +16,13 @@ tags:
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- DarkAllianceInvestigation
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summary: "Salvadoran military air base that served as the hub for Oliver North's illegal Contra resupply operation and a center for Contra-connected cocaine trafficking during the 1980s."
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location: "El Salvador"
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relations:
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- type: participant_in
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with: "[[NHAO]]"
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role: "Used Hangar 4 in 1985 and 1986 after CIA moved out, per the CIA Inspector General"
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start: 1985
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end: 1986
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fn: 6
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---
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Ilopango Air Force Base is a military airfield outside [[San Salvador]], [[El Salvador]], that served as the hub for [[Oliver North]]'s illegal Contra resupply operation and a center for Contra-connected cocaine trafficking during the 1980s. Situated atop a plateau surrounded by imposing cliffs, the base had a restricted military side tightly guarded by the Salvadoran military and a civilian side used for private aviation.[^1]
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@ -29,9 +36,9 @@ The operation was run openly. The assistant regional security officer for the U.
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### Hangars 4 and 5
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[[Central Intelligence Agency]] records show Hangar No. 4 was used by the Agency for covert Contra operations until it was turned over in 1985 to the National Security Council and Oliver North's illegal arms network, "The Enterprise." CIA agent Felix Rodriguez also used Hangar No. 4 for his helicopter-based counterinsurgency program. The adjoining Hangar No. 5 continued to be used by the CIA in support of the Contra project.[^1]
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Gary Webb wrote that [[Central Intelligence Agency]] records showed Hangar No. 4 was used by the Agency for covert Contra operations until it was turned over in 1985 to the National Security Council and Oliver North's illegal arms network, "The Enterprise." CIA agent Felix Rodriguez also used Hangar No. 4 for his helicopter-based counterinsurgency program. The adjoining Hangar No. 5 continued to be used by the CIA in support of the Contra project.[^1] The CIA Inspector General's report gives a different sequence. In 1984 the CIA occupied a newly constructed warehouse and hangar, Hangar 5, and moved to it activities that had been conducted in the smaller Hangar 4. The report states that "After CIA had moved out of Hangar 4, it was used in 1985 and 1986 by NHAO and the Private Benefactors in support of their Contra-related operations."[^6]
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In March 1986, a cable from the Costa Rican [[DEA]] office reported that a pilot named Carlos Amador intended to fly into Ilopango, pick up cocaine at Hangar No. 4, and transport it to [[Miami]]. Amador had been working with the CIA for years, flying missions for the Costa Rican Contras. The CIA had collected information for at least a year indicating Amador was also flying drug planes between [[Costa Rica]], [[Panama]], Belize, and Miami for a pair of major cocaine traffickers, the Sarcovic brothers, at the same time he was flying for the [[White House]].[^1]
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Webb wrote that in March 1986 a cable from the Costa Rican [[DEA]] office reported that a pilot named Carlos Amador intended to fly into Ilopango, pick up cocaine at Hangar No. 4, and transport it to [[Miami]]. The Inspector General's report describes a cable of April 1986 that reported a March 18, 1986 DEA report that Amador had recently flown from Costa Rica to San Salvador, where he had access to Hangar 4.[^7] The report also records that the drafter of one 1986 cable was not certain of the nature or affiliation of another entity that had operated from Hangar 4, and surmised that it "may have been associated either with Oliver North, the Private Benefactors, or the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office (NHAO)."[^8] Amador had been working with the CIA for years, flying missions for the Costa Rican Contras. The CIA had collected information for at least a year indicating Amador was also flying drug planes between [[Costa Rica]], [[Panama]], Belize, and Miami for a pair of major cocaine traffickers, the Sarcovic brothers, at the same time he was flying for the [[White House]].[^1]
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### Drug Trafficking
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Former Meneses aide [[Enrique Miranda]] testified at the 1991 Nicaraguan trial that cocaine from [[Colombia]] arrived at various Costa Rican airstrips, including one on CIA operative [[John Hull]]'s farm, and was placed aboard Contra planes flown into Ilopango. There, according to Miranda, Aguado and Meneses supervised loading the cocaine onto U.S.-bound aircraft owned by the Salvadoran Air Force and, on occasion, the Miami-based CIA contractor [[Southern Air Transport]]. Miranda said Meneses told him U.S. military hardware stockpiled at Ilopango was loaded onto Salvadoran transport planes and flown south, where guns were traded for cocaine and flown back.[^1]
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In February and March 1988 a CIA station cable reported that the Guatemalan suspected trafficker Reyner Veliz Cruz flew into Ilopango with Aguado in a twin-engine aircraft, the second time after customs officers had left, and that customs personnel at Ilopango "assume that Aguado has connections with drug trafficking."[^6]
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In February and March 1988 a CIA station cable reported that the Guatemalan suspected trafficker Reyner Veliz Cruz flew into Ilopango with Aguado in a twin-engine aircraft, the second time after customs officers had left, and that customs personnel at Ilopango "assume that Aguado has connections with drug trafficking."[^9]
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The Justice Department Inspector General reports that on December 14, 1988 Bustillo met DEA agent Celerino Castillo to discuss Castillo's suspicions that Salvadoran Air Force officers were using Ilopango for drug trafficking; Castillo named, among others, Air School Director Lieutenant Colonel Manfredo Koenigsberg, and according to a State Department cable of January 3, 1989, Bustillo said he would investigate and seek to transfer the officer. After DEA agent Richard deTriquet was detailed to Guatemala in 1989, he and Castillo went to El Salvador to investigate reports that cocaine moved through hangar five; a Salvadoran security officer denied them access, and the CIA chief of station told them there was no drug activity associated with hangar five.[^7]
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The Justice Department Inspector General reports that on December 14, 1988 Bustillo met DEA agent Celerino Castillo to discuss Castillo's suspicions that Salvadoran Air Force officers were using Ilopango for drug trafficking; Castillo named, among others, Air School Director Lieutenant Colonel Manfredo Koenigsberg, and according to a State Department cable of January 3, 1989, Bustillo said he would investigate and seek to transfer the officer. After DEA agent Richard deTriquet was detailed to Guatemala in 1989, he and Castillo went to El Salvador to investigate reports that cocaine moved through hangar five; a Salvadoran security officer denied them access, and the CIA chief of station told them there was no drug activity associated with hangar five.[^10]
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### CIA Obstruction of Investigations
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### Bombs from the Airport Battalion, 1992
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Five 500-pound bombs were taken from a battalion at the San Salvador airport on February 26, 1992. [[Semana]] reported on April 12, 1992 that the arrested men, among them a Salvadoran army colonel, [[Roberto Antonio Leiva Jacobo]], confessed that members of the [[Cali Drug Cartel|Cali cartel]] had hired them and paid four million dollars for the bombs, and that the bombs were meant for a plan to kill [[Pablo Escobar]] in the [[Envigado]] prison.[^8]
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Five 500-pound bombs were taken from a battalion at the San Salvador airport on February 26, 1992. [[Semana]] reported on April 12, 1992 that the arrested men, among them a Salvadoran army colonel, [[Roberto Antonio Leiva Jacobo]], confessed that members of the [[Cali Drug Cartel|Cali cartel]] had hired them and paid four million dollars for the bombs, and that the bombs were meant for a plan to kill [[Pablo Escobar]] in the [[Envigado]] prison.[^11]
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### Footnotes
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@ -62,6 +69,9 @@ Five 500-pound bombs were taken from a battalion at the San Salvador airport on
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[^3]: CIA Inspector General, *Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States*, Volume II (October 8, 1998), Marcos Antonio Aguado section of the Southern Front chapter, https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine2/south.html
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[^4]: "Salvador airport said to be transfer point for arms to contras," *Christian Science Monitor*, October 10, 1986, https://proof.csmonitor.com/1986/1010/omerc.html
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[^5]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy*, S. Prt. 100-165 (December 1988), pp. 37, 50 to 52, https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
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[^6]: CIA Inspector General, *Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States*, Volume II (October 8, 1998), Marcos Antonio Aguado section and the pilots chapter (March 23, 1988 cable on Reyner Veliz Cruz), https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine2/south.html and https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine2/pilots.html
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[^7]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter X, sections D and E, https://irp.fas.org/agency/doj/oig/c4rpt/ch10p3.htm
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[^8]: "¿Bombas contra Escobar?", *Semana*, April 12, 1992, https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/bombas-contra-escobar/17208-3. The Cali cartel buyers are Semana's report of the arrested men's confessions and of an unnamed Salvadoran government source.
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[^6]: CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation on allegations of connections between CIA and the Contras in cocaine trafficking, para. 1023. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06974497
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[^7]: CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation, para. 447. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06974497
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[^8]: CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation, para. 453. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06974497
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[^9]: CIA Inspector General, *Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States*, Volume II (October 8, 1998), Marcos Antonio Aguado section and the pilots chapter (March 23, 1988 cable on Reyner Veliz Cruz), https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine2/south.html and https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine2/pilots.html
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[^10]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter X, sections D and E, https://irp.fas.org/agency/doj/oig/c4rpt/ch10p3.htm
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[^11]: "¿Bombas contra Escobar?", *Semana*, April 12, 1992, https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/bombas-contra-escobar/17208-3. The Cali cartel buyers are Semana's report of the arrested men's confessions and of an unnamed Salvadoran government source.
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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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---
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created: 2026-05-15
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updated: 2026-05-15
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updated: 2026-10-09
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title: JM/WAVE
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aliases:
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- JM WAVE
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@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ tags:
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- ColdWar
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- 1960s
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category: "Military Installation"
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summary: "JM/WAVE was the CIA's massive Miami station operating under the cover of 'Zenith Technical Enterprises, Inc.' at the University of Miami's South Campus, which at its Operation Mongoose peak employed over 400 CIA officers and several thousand Cuban exile agents, making it temporarily the second-largest CIA station in the world."
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summary: "CIA's Miami station from 1961 under the cover of Zenith Technical Enterprises at the University of Miami's South Campus, which employed over 400 CIA officers at its Mongoose peak."
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start: 1961
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end: 1968
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location: "University of Miami South Campus, Coral Gables, Florida"
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### The Shackley Era
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[[Ted Shackley]], who later became one of the CIA's most consequential officers in Southeast Asia and [[Latin America]], served as JM/WAVE chief from approximately 1962 to 1965. Shackley had previously worked under [[William Harvey]] in [[Berlin]] and was assigned to Miami when Harvey took command of [[Operation Mongoose]] operational planning. When Harvey was removed from operational control of Cuba operations in late 1962, Shackley continued as station chief through the period of Mongoose's wind-down and the subsequent reduced covert operations period.
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[[Ted Shackley]], who later became one of the CIA's most consequential officers in Southeast Asia and [[Latin America]], served as JM/WAVE chief from approximately 1962 to 1965. Shackley had previously worked under [[William Harvey]] in [[Berlin]] and was assigned to Miami when Harvey was chief of [[Task Force W]], the CIA component of Mongoose.[^2] Harvey was appointed to Task Force W in early 1962; the Mongoose titles are the CIA project officer role and the Task Force W command.[^3] When Harvey was removed from operational control of Cuba operations in January 1963, when [[Desmond FitzGerald]] replaced him as chief of Task Force W,[^2] Shackley continued as station chief through the period of Mongoose's wind-down and the subsequent reduced covert operations period.
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Under Shackley, JM/WAVE operated extensive maritime raiding teams (the "cowboys," as station personnel called them) that conducted boat raids against Cuban coastal targets, intelligence collection missions along the Cuban coast, and infiltration/exfiltration operations for agents inside Cuba. The station also coordinated with the large and fractious Cuban exile community in Miami, attempting to channel exile groups' energy into CIA-directed operations while managing the political conflicts among exile factions.[^1]
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Following the [[Cuban Missile Crisis|October 1962 Missile Crisis]], Operation Mongoose was suspended and the no-invasion pledge reduced the strategic rationale for large-scale covert operations against Cuba. JM/WAVE continued in a reduced capacity through the mid-1960s. Shackley left in 1965 for [[Laos]], where he commanded the CIA's covert war against the [[Pathet Lao]] and [[North Vietnam|North Vietnamese]]. The station was formally closed in 1968 as the Cuba threat receded from the top of U.S. intelligence priorities.
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Many of the Cuban exile personnel trained and organized through JM/WAVE remained in the CIA network for years afterward. Some appeared in later operations, including the [[Watergate]] burglary (the "plumbers" included several veterans of the anti-Castro operations) and, according to various accounts, in aspects of Central American operations in the 1970s and 1980s.[^2]
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Many of the Cuban exile personnel trained and organized through JM/WAVE remained in the CIA network for years afterward. Some appeared in later operations, including the [[Watergate]] burglary (the "plumbers" included several veterans of the anti-Castro operations) and, according to various accounts, in aspects of Central American operations in the 1970s and 1980s.[^4]
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### Footnotes
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[^1]: Corn, David. *Blond Ghost: Ted Shackley and the CIA's Crusades.* Simon & Schuster, 1994. Thomas, Evan. *The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA.* Simon & Schuster, 1995.
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[^2]: Shackley, Theodore, and Richard A. Finney. *Spymaster: My Life in the CIA.* Potomac Books, 2005. Trento, Joseph. *Prelude to Terror: The Rogue CIA and the Legacy of America's Private Intelligence Network.* Carroll & Graf, 2005.
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[^2]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report*, S. Rept. 94-465, November 20, 1975, pp. 86-87 and pp. 153-155. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
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[^3]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. XI, doc. 10 (October 8, 1962), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11/d10, and vol. X, doc. 323 (April 10, 1962), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d323
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[^4]: Shackley, Theodore, and Richard A. Finney. *Spymaster: My Life in the CIA.* Potomac Books, 2005. Trento, Joseph. *Prelude to Terror: The Rogue CIA and the Legacy of America's Private Intelligence Network.* Carroll & Graf, 2005.
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