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60 - PLACES/MILITARY_INSTALLATIONS/Camp Peary.md

@@ -52,9 +52,11 @@ The Associated Press reported in 1994 that Camp Peary, "referred to on area maps
 
 ### Yuri Nosenko
 
-[[John D. Marks]] placed the confinement of the Soviet defector [[Yuri Nosenko]], from April 1964 to October 1967, in a specially constructed cell at Camp Peary, on the judgment of [[James Jesus Angleton]] and the defector [[Anatoliy Golitsyn]] that Nosenko was a false defector sent to mislead the [[Warren Commission]].[^3] [[John Clement Hart]], a CIA officer who had retired in 1972 and studied the Nosenko case from mid-June to late December 1976, testified to the [[HSCA|House Select Committee on Assassinations]] on September 15, 1978, as the Agency's official representative, on guidance from [[Director of Central Intelligence]] [[Stansfield Turner]], that Nosenko "remained in solitary confinement, under constant visual observation, until, if my memory serves me correctly, August 1967. There was a change of the location, but that bore no particular significance because he was treated approximately the same way in both locations."[^4]
+[[John D. Marks]] placed the confinement of the Soviet defector [[Yuri Nosenko]], from April 1964 to October 1967, in a specially constructed cell at Camp Peary, on the judgment of [[James Jesus Angleton]] and the defector [[Anatoliy Golitsyn]] that Nosenko was a false defector sent to mislead the [[Warren Commission]].[^3] [[John Clement Hart]], a CIA officer who had retired in 1972 and studied the Nosenko case from mid-June to late December 1976, testified to the [[HSCA|House Select Committee on Assassinations]] on September 15, 1978, as the Agency's official representative, on guidance from [[Director of Central Intelligence]] [[Stansfield Turner]], that Nosenko "remained in solitary confinement, under constant visual observation, until, if my memory serves me correctly, August 1967. There was a change of the location, but that bore no particular significance because he was treated approximately the same way in both locations."[^4] Hart said he was "not and never have been what is called a career agent," but "an employee or an officer of the Agency," and that Admiral Turner had specifically asked him to return periodically to give presentations to senior officials on the case, the first of which took four and a half hours of continuous lecturing. His study required the full-time work of himself and four assistants and ten four-drawer safes of documents, and he said the group "put together the first full picture which has ever been had of this activity."[^5]
 
-Hart testified that the conditions were modeled on the confinement of the American professor [[Frederick Barghoorn]] in Moscow in 1963: the original plan for the cell provided no heat, a boarded window and "one 60-watt bulb burning all night," with rising at six and bed at ten, and a diet of weak tea, porridge, watery soup and macaroni. Nosenko "was incarcerated for 1,277 days, on only 292 days was he in part questioned"; for 77 percent of the time "he was left entirely unoccupied." On August 23, 1966, Director [[Richard Helms]] "set a limit of 60 days" to resolve the case; in September 1966 he refused a proposal to interrogate Nosenko under sodium amytal, and a second polygraph series followed from October 19 to 28, 1966. Hart read to the committee a document, mostly in the handwriting of the deputy chief of the Soviet Bloc Division, on the aims of the 1966 polygraphs: "To gain more insight into points of detail which we could use in fabricating an ostensible Nosenko confession, insofar as we could make one consistent and believable even to the Soviets, a confession would be useful in any eventual disposal of Nosenko." Helms then took the case from the Soviet Bloc Division and the Counterintelligence Staff and gave it to his deputy, Admiral [[Rufus Taylor]], who brought in the [[CIA Office of Security|Office of Security]].[^4] Its officer [[Bruce Solie]] re-examined the case and concluded that the defection was genuine.[^3]
+Hart testified that on February 12, 1964, Nosenko "was lodged in a CIA controlled house under constant guard, while being treated in a friendly fashion," and that during this period of friendly confinement he went through a personality crisis that led to heavy drinking.[^6] A Soviet defector who was then working for the CIA wrote a memorandum to the deputy chief of the Soviet Bloc Division stating that the 1962 transcripts of the meetings with Nosenko did not resemble the tapes, naming about 150 discrepancies and offering a full report; Hart found no record of a reply.[^6]
+
+Hart testified that the conditions were modeled on the confinement of the American professor [[Frederick Barghoorn]] in Moscow in 1963: the original plan for the cell provided no heat, a boarded window and "one 60-watt bulb burning all night," with rising at six and bed at ten, and a diet of weak tea, porridge, watery soup and macaroni. The plan was that Nosenko would receive the first of three polygraph examinations, be told afterward that he had failed, be "arrested," and be taken to an area where he would be forced to strip and put on prison clothes; the guards were instructed that there was to be no physical mistreatment, but that they were not to talk to him or smile at him and were to treat him very impersonally.[^7] He was under 24-hour visual surveillance through the door and was not allowed to lie down during the day. The guards watched a television in the house with earphones so that he would not hear it, and the original plan gave him no toilet facilities beyond a slop pail to empty once a day; this was changed because the Office of Security, "which was in charge of the house," refused some of the more extreme measures the operational people had produced.[^7] The first polygraph was administered on April 4, 1964, from 1045 to 1515 hours, with an artifact described to Nosenko as an electroencephalograph attached, and the operator was told to tell him at the end that he had failed; Hart said the examination "has been adjudged invalid."[^7] Nosenko "was incarcerated for 1,277 days, on only 292 days was he in part questioned"; for 77 percent of the time "he was left entirely unoccupied." On August 23, 1966, Director [[Richard Helms]] "set a limit of 60 days" to resolve the case; in September 1966 he refused a proposal to interrogate Nosenko under sodium amytal, and a second polygraph series followed from October 19 to 28, 1966, in which Nosenko was kept on the machine a total of 28 hours and 29 minutes, almost seven hours on the second day, and it was later discovered that during lunch breaks he was left strapped to the chair; Hart said the medical officer who examined Nosenko during a period of hallucinations concluded that he was feigning them, and added that Soviet research showed long isolation does lead to hallucination.[^8] Hart read to the committee a document, mostly in the handwriting of the deputy chief of the Soviet Bloc Division, on the aims of the 1966 polygraphs: "To gain more insight into points of detail which we could use in fabricating an ostensible Nosenko confession, insofar as we could make one consistent and believable even to the Soviets, a confession would be useful in any eventual disposal of Nosenko." Helms then took the case from the Soviet Bloc Division and the Counterintelligence Staff and gave it to his deputy, Admiral [[Rufus Taylor]], who brought in the [[CIA Office of Security|Office of Security]].[^4] Its officer [[Bruce Solie]] re-examined the case and concluded that the defection was genuine.[^3] The committee's own report states that it was certain Nosenko lied about Oswald, that it was unable to resolve the Nosenko matter, and that it criticized the CIA's hostile interrogation and solitary confinement of Nosenko from 1964 to 1968.[^9]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
@@ -62,3 +64,8 @@ Hart testified that the conditions were modeled on the confinement of the Americ
 [^2]: Associated Press, "Expansion Plans Permit Small Peek into Secretive Camp Peary," *The Virginian-Pilot,* September 5, 1994, p. B5. https://scholar.lib.vt.edu/VA-news/VA-Pilot/issues/1994/vp940905/09050031.htm
 [^3]: John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*. Times Books, 1979, Chapters 8 and 11.
 [^4]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Hearings,* vol. II, testimony of John Clement Hart, September 15, 1978, pp. 487-504. https://history-matters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol2/pdf/HSCA_Vol2_0915_3_Hart.pdf
+[^5]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Hearings,* 95th Cong., 2d sess., vol. II, testimony of John Clement Hart, September 15, 1978, pp. 487-490. https://history-matters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol2/pdf/HSCA_Vol2_0915_3_Hart.pdf
+[^6]: Vol. II, Hart testimony, pp. 497-498. https://history-matters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol2/pdf/HSCA_Vol2_0915_3_Hart.pdf
+[^7]: Vol. II, Hart testimony, pp. 498-501. https://history-matters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol2/pdf/HSCA_Vol2_0915_3_Hart.pdf
+[^8]: Vol. II, Hart testimony, pp. 501-503. https://history-matters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol2/pdf/HSCA_Vol2_0915_3_Hart.pdf
+[^9]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), pp. 101-103 and 255. https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit