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---
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tags:
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- Person
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- Diplomat
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- Politician
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- USA
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- Secretary of State
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- National Security Advisor
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- Nuclear Policy
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- Israel
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- Nixon Administration
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- Harvard University
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- Cold War
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---
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Henry A. Kissinger was an American diplomat and political scientist who served as the United States Secretary of State and National Security Advisor under Presidents [[Richard Nixon]] and [[Gerald R. Ford]]. In the fall of 1967, while a [[Harvard University]] professor and consultant on [[Vietnam]] to the [[Lyndon B. Johnson|Johnson]] administration, Kissinger visited [[Tel Aviv]] to teach for a week at the Israeli Defense College. At the end of his course, he went to [[William N. Dale]]'s office in the embassy and sent an urgent, top-secret message to the White House, warning about [[Dimona]] and concluding that [[Israel]] was making nuclear warheads.[^1]
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Kissinger approached inauguration day on January 20, 1969, convinced that [[Israel]]'s nuclear ambitions were justified and understandable. Once in office, he and [[Richard M. Nixon|Nixon]] endorsed [[Israel]]'s nuclear ambitions and shared a contempt for the 1968 [[Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty|Nonproliferation Treaty]]. Kissinger told his staff in the first months of 1969 that [[Japan]], as well as [[Israel]], would be better off with the bomb than without it, believing that nuclear weapons were essential to the national security of both nations. His view was pragmatic: most major powers would eventually obtain nuclear weapons, and the [[United States]] could benefit most by helping them do so rather than engaging in futile exercises in morality.[^2]
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Kissinger's support for [[Israel]]'s nuclear weapons program was widely known to the Israeli leadership. This was overtly signaled by the decision in 1969 to end the [[Floyd L. Culler, Jr.|Floyd Culler]] inspections of [[Dimona]], a move that became American policy for the next two decades, signifying that [[Israel]] had gone nuclear and the [[United States]] would not intervene.[^2]
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### Footnotes
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[^1]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 12.
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[^2]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 16.
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