vault backup: 2026-05-13 21:30:09

10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Moshe Dayan.md

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 ---
-created: 2025-07-23
-updated: 2025-07-23
-title: Moshe Dayan
+category: "Key Figures"
 tags:
-  - person
-  - military
-  - Israel
-  - Government Official
+  - Person
+  - Stargate
+  - CIA
+  - Military
+summary: "Dayan's rise to prominence began when David Ben-Gurion appointed him as the new army chief of staff in late 1953, with the strategic aim of ensuring that Moshe Sharett's dovish views on the Arab question would not go unchallenged."
 ---
+
 [[Moshe Dayan]] (1915–1981) was a highly prominent [[Israel|Israeli]] military leader and politician, famous for his signature black eye-patch and his pivotal role in shaping [[Israel]]'s military doctrine and nuclear policy. Throughout his career, he served in various high-level positions including army chief of staff, Defense Minister, and Foreign Minister, while also developing an unusual passion for archaeological treasure hunting.[^1][^2][^3]
 
 ### Early Military Leadership
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Dayan's rise to prominence began when [[David Ben-Gurion]] appointed him as the
 
 As Defense Minister, [[Moshe Dayan|Dayan]] emerged as a hero of the 1956 [[Suez Crisis]] campaign, establishing his reputation as a formidable military strategist. His influence continued to grow, and in 1967, he became Defense Minister as part of the reconstituted coalition government under [[Levi Eshkol]]. In this capacity, he oversaw the capture of [[East Jerusalem]] during the 1967 [[Six-Day War]], cementing his status as one of [[Israel]]'s most celebrated military leaders.[^2]
 
-Dayan's involvement in [[Israel]]'s nuclear program was extensive and controversial. He was Defense Minister when [[Israel]] agreed to show the [[Dimona reactor]] to [[USA|American]] inspectors, and when [[Israel]] refused to sign a [[United Nations]] agreement not to test nuclear weapons. During the 1973 [[Yom Kippur War]], when [[Syria|Syrian]] forces penetrated the [[Golan Heights]], [[Moshe Dayan|Dayan]] made the dramatic decision to order the arming of all 13 [[Israel|Israeli]] nuclear bombs and put 24 [[B-52 bombers]] on standby, bringing the region perilously close to nuclear conflict.[^2]
+Dayan's involvement in [[Israel]]'s nuclear program was extensive and controversial. He was Defense Minister when [[Israel]] agreed to show the [[Dimona]] to [[United States|American]] inspectors, and when [[Israel]] refused to sign a [[United Nations]] agreement not to test nuclear weapons. During the 1973 [[Yom Kippur War]], when [[Syria|Syrian]] forces penetrated the [[Golan Heights]], [[Moshe Dayan|Dayan]] made the dramatic decision to order the arming of all 13 [[Israel|Israeli]] nuclear bombs and put 24 [[B-52 bombers]] on standby, bringing the region perilously close to nuclear conflict.[^2]
 
 His tenure as Defense Minister also included oversight of controversial military actions, including when [[Israel]] bombed the [[USS Liberty]] in 1967. Additionally, he managed [[Israel|Israel's]] efforts to develop its nuclear capabilities with new international partners, particularly [[South Africa]], after [[France]] severed relations following the 1967 war.[^2]
 
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Dayan's drive for the bomb was heightened by his conviction that [[Israel]] coul
 
 Dayan's mission in late 1967 and early 1968 was to convince his fellow cabinet members that a credible Israeli nuclear threat would deter the Soviets from supporting an all-out Arab attack on [[Israel]] or supplying an Arab nation with nuclear weapons. He envisioned a scenario where Israeli intelligence agents would secretly inform their Soviet counterparts once [[Dimona]]'s assembly line went into full production, and when [[Israel]] developed its first bomb in a suitcase. For the rest of the world, including the [[United States]], there would still be studied ambiguity on the question of whether [[Israel]] had the bomb, thus giving birth to the argument for an Israeli "bomb in the basement."[^4]
 
-During the 1973 [[Yom Kippur War]], Dayan's panic on Monday, October 8, was widely known among Israelis. He assessed the situation as desperate, stating, "Everything is lost. We must withdraw." This led to a dramatic meeting in [[Golda Meir]]'s office, where the Israeli leadership resolved to implement three critical decisions: rally its collapsing forces for a major counterattack; arm and target its nuclear arsenal in the event of total collapse and subsequent need for the [[Samson Option]]; and inform [[Washington D.C.]] of its unprecedented nuclear action to demand an emergency airlift of replacement arms and ammunition.[^5]
+During the 1973 [[Yom Kippur War]], Dayan's panic on Monday, October 8, was widely known among Israelis. He assessed the situation as desperate, stating, "Everything is lost. We must withdraw." This led to a dramatic meeting in [[Golda Meir]]'s office, where the Israeli leadership resolved to implement three critical decisions: rally its collapsing forces for a major counterattack; arm and target its nuclear arsenal in the event of total collapse and subsequent need for the [[Samson Option]]; and inform [[Washington, D.C.]] of its unprecedented nuclear action to demand an emergency airlift of replacement arms and ammunition.[^5]
 
 Dayan's standing among his peers in the military and the upper echelons of the Israeli government declined due to his incessant womanizing, financial dealings, and propensity to talk. He was considered a "loose cannon" at a time when [[Israel]] was in a precarious situation. While he lost no authority, it was eventually made clear to him that he was no longer welcome at [[Dimona]], as he no longer had a military need to know anything about the Israeli nuclear program, which was being managed out of the prime minister's office.[^5]
 
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ His perspective on the Palestinian problem remained notably limited. Along with
 
 Beyond his official duties, Dayan developed an illicit pastime of digging up archaeological treasures across [[Israel]] and the [[Sinai Desert|Sinai]] without a license or scientific oversight. His unconventional method for finding ancient sites often involved "visions" he experienced early in the morning. He would then drive to these sites, comb through the earth, and bring home relics for display in his home. The dangers of this unauthorized archaeological work became evident in 1968, when he was badly injured by a landslide while looting artifacts from a cave.[^1]
 
-In the summer of 1970, Dayan began an unusual collaboration with [[Uri Geller]], who was then becoming [[Israel|Israel's]] most famous psychic. Geller recalls spending hours over maps, using an ancient form of [[Clairvoyance|clairvoyance]] called [[Map Dowsing]] to help Dayan locate ancient artifacts and archaeological finds illegally. Reflecting on this period, Geller later stated, "I was young and naïve at the time. Here I was, talking to the Moshe Dayan."[^1]
+In the summer of 1970, Dayan began an unusual collaboration with [[Uri Geller]], who was then becoming [[Israel|Israel's]] most famous psychic. Geller recalls spending hours over maps, using an ancient form of [[Clairvoyance|clairvoyance]] called [[Dowsing]] to help Dayan locate ancient artifacts and archaeological finds illegally. Reflecting on this period, Geller later stated, "I was young and naïve at the time. Here I was, talking to the Moshe Dayan."[^1]
 
 This controversial partnership came to an end in 1971 after a group of twenty [[Israel|Israeli]] archaeologists signed a petition urging Dayan to give up his "legally questionable hobby." While Dayan discussed his illegally acquired collection in his 1978 memoir, _Living with the Bible_, he notably did not mention using Geller as a map dowser, perhaps seeking to distance himself from the more eccentric aspects of his archaeological pursuits.[^1]
 
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ Despite his military prowess and diplomatic involvement, Dayan's perspective on
 ### Footnotes
 
 [^1]: Jacobsen, Annie. _Phenomena: The Secret History of the U.S. Government's Investigations into Extrasensory Perception and Psychokinesis_. Little, Brown and Company, 2017. 
-[^2]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. _Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network_. TrineDay, 1992. (Hereafter, "Profits of War") 
+[^2]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. _Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network_. TrineDay, 1992. 
 [^3]: Hersh, Seymour M. _The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy_. Random House, 1991. Chapter 3.
 [^4]: Hersh, Seymour M. _The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy_. Random House, 1991. Chapter 13.
 [^5]: Hersh, Seymour M. _The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy_. Random House, 1991. Chapter 17.