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10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Golda Meir.md

@@ -1,9 +1,12 @@
 ---
+category: "Nuclear Scientists & Programs"
 tags:
   - Person
-  - Politics
+  - Nuclear
   - Israel
+summary: "In 1956, Golda Meir replaced Moshe Sharett as Foreign Minister, bringing her distinctive approach to Israel's international relations."
 ---
+
 [[Golda Meir]] was a prominent [[Israel|Israeli]] politician who served as Foreign Minister and later as Prime Minister, playing crucial roles in [[Israel]]'s diplomatic relations, nuclear policy decisions, and regional strategic calculations during some of the most critical periods in the nation's history.
 
 ### Rise to Foreign Minister and Nuclear Policy
@@ -18,7 +21,7 @@ As Foreign Minister, [[Golda Meir|Meir]] was instrumental in expanding [[Israel]
 
 Meir's approach to regional politics was shaped by her personal relationships and strategic calculations. In 1948, she formed a friendship with [[King Abdullah of Jordan|King Abdullah]] of [[Jordan]], and both leaders believed the Palestinian problem would eventually resolve itself—a view that would prove overly optimistic in subsequent decades.[^1]
 
-This perspective influenced a critical decision during her later tenure. Her choice to mobilize the [[Israel Defense Forces|IDF]] against the [[Syria|Syrians]] in 1970, during a crisis with the [[PLO]] in [[Jordan]], had far-reaching consequences. While this action prevented the establishment of a Palestinian state in [[Jordan]] and kept [[King Hussein of Jordan|King Hussein]] in power, it also represented a complex strategic calculation. The intervention pleased the [[USA|Americans]] by preventing a threat to [[Saudi Arabia|Saudi]] oilfields, but was seen by some as a major setback for [[Israel|Israel's]] long-term strategic interest in a Palestinian state.[^1]
+This perspective influenced a critical decision during her later tenure. Her choice to mobilize the [[Israel|IDF]] against the [[Syria|Syrians]] in 1970, during a crisis with the [[PLO]] in [[Jordan]], had far-reaching consequences. While this action prevented the establishment of a Palestinian state in [[Jordan]] and kept [[King Hussein of Jordan|King Hussein]] in power, it also represented a complex strategic calculation. The intervention pleased the [[United States|Americans]] by preventing a threat to [[Saudi Arabia|Saudi]] oilfields, but was seen by some as a major setback for [[Israel|Israel's]] long-term strategic interest in a Palestinian state.[^1]
 
 ### Prime Ministerial Challenges and Intelligence Vulnerabilities
 
@@ -26,7 +29,7 @@ During her tenure as Prime Minister, Meir faced significant intelligence challen
 
 ### The Yom Kippur War and Nuclear Alert
 
-During the desperate early days of the 1973 [[Yom Kippur War]], on Monday, October 8, [[Golda Meir]] convened her closest aides, the "kitchen cabinet," in her office in [[Tel Aviv]]. Faced with the imminent collapse of Israeli forces, the leadership resolved to implement three critical decisions: rally its collapsing forces for a major counterattack; arm and target its nuclear arsenal in the event of total collapse and subsequent need for the [[Samson Option]]; and inform [[Washington D.C.]] of its unprecedented nuclear action to demand an emergency airlift of replacement arms and ammunition. Meir, who chain-smoked and slept very little during the early stages of the war, was reportedly confused and concerned by [[Moshe Dayan]]'s report of imminent collapse. The decision to arm the weapons of last resort, code-named the "Temple" weapons, was reached easily, though there were more complicated discussions about the number of warheads to arm and their targeting. An Israeli assumption was that the Soviets, who would learn of the nuclear arming, would then be compelled to urge their allies in [[Egypt]] and [[Syria]] to limit their offensive. This drastic step also aimed to force the [[United States]] to begin an immediate and massive resupply of the Israeli military.[^3]
+During the desperate early days of the 1973 [[Yom Kippur War]], on Monday, October 8, [[Golda Meir]] convened her closest aides, the "kitchen cabinet," in her office in [[Tel Aviv]]. Faced with the imminent collapse of Israeli forces, the leadership resolved to implement three critical decisions: rally its collapsing forces for a major counterattack; arm and target its nuclear arsenal in the event of total collapse and subsequent need for the [[Samson Option]]; and inform [[Washington, D.C.]] of its unprecedented nuclear action to demand an emergency airlift of replacement arms and ammunition. Meir, who chain-smoked and slept very little during the early stages of the war, was reportedly confused and concerned by [[Moshe Dayan]]'s report of imminent collapse. The decision to arm the weapons of last resort, code-named the "Temple" weapons, was reached easily, though there were more complicated discussions about the number of warheads to arm and their targeting. An Israeli assumption was that the Soviets, who would learn of the nuclear arming, would then be compelled to urge their allies in [[Egypt]] and [[Syria]] to limit their offensive. This drastic step also aimed to force the [[United States]] to begin an immediate and massive resupply of the Israeli military.[^3]
 
 ### Political Controversies
 
@@ -34,6 +37,6 @@ Meir's leadership style and decisions also generated internal criticism within [
 
 ### Footnotes
 
-[^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. _Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network_. TrineDay, 1992. (Hereafter, "Profits of War") 
+[^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. _Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network_. TrineDay, 1992. 
 [^2]: Hersh, Seymour M. _The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy_. Random House, 1991. Chapter 3.
 [^3]: Hersh, Seymour M. _The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy_. Random House, 1991. Chapter 17.