vault backup: 2026-09-21 19:17:08
This commit is contained in:
parent
269d7818d3
commit
4b8f019502
225 changed files with 2688 additions and 717 deletions
|
|
@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Earlier that year, on March 7, 1963, Gordon had sent a memorandum to [[McGeorge
|
|||
|
||||
Gordon was the central U.S. Embassy figure in the intelligence and diplomatic preparation for the April 1964 military coup against President Joao Goulart. His role included:
|
||||
|
||||
As early as March 16, 1964, he was approached by Army Chief of Staff [[Humberto Castelo Branco]] with a "white paper" rationale for a military uprising. Gordon allegedly replied that President [[Lyndon Johnson]] was prepared to recognize any rebel government on Brazilian territory that proclaimed itself in opposition to Goulart and communism and could hold out for forty-eight hours. He suggested Minas Gerais, home of the Fourth Army, as the best locale from which to launch such a rebellion.[^4]
|
||||
As early as March 16, 1964, he was approached by Army Chief of Staff [[Humberto Castelo Branco]] with a "white paper" rationale for a military uprising. Gordon allegedly replied that President [[Lyndon B. Johnson|Lyndon Johnson]] was prepared to recognize any rebel government on Brazilian territory that proclaimed itself in opposition to Goulart and communism and could hold out for forty-eight hours. He suggested Minas Gerais, home of the Fourth Army, as the best locale from which to launch such a rebellion.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
On March 27, 1964, Gordon sent a top-secret cable (received in the Department that evening; logged in FRUS as Document 187 with a dateline of March 28) to Secretary of State [[Dean Rusk]], Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, CIA Director [[John McCone]], and General [[Maxwell Taylor]]. In it he assessed that Goulart was "definitely engaged on campaign to seize dictatorial power, accepting the active collaboration of the [[Brazilian Communist Party]]," and characterized Castelo Branco as leading organized democratic resistance "with strong loyalty to legal and constitutional principles." He warned that without U.S. backing, Brazil might become "the China of the 1960s" and urged that "no loss of time can be afforded in preparing for such action." Gordon recommended "that measures be taken soonest to prepare for a clandestine delivery of arms of non-US origin, to be made available to Castello Branco supporters in Sao Paulo," with delivery via "unmarked submarine to be off-loaded at night in isolated shore spots in the state of Sao Paulo south of Santos." He also recommended positioning a US naval task force off the Brazilian coast and arranging petroleum supplies for rebel military units.[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue