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@ -33,13 +33,23 @@ On October 18 the station asked headquarters for "three 45 calibre machine guns
Six hours after the delivery Schneider's car was blocked on his way to work. He drew his pistol and was shot with handguns. A Chilean military court found that two groups of officers, active and retired, had conspired to kidnap him and bring about a coup, and "that the two Generals had been in contact throughout the coup plotting." Viaux was sentenced to twenty years as "intellectual author" of the attempt. Valenzuela was sentenced to three years in exile. Martial law was declared on the day of the shooting and Valenzuela was given command of Santiago province. The CIA's task force log recorded: "The attack on General Schneider has produced developments which closely follow Valenzuela's plan." Director [[Richard Helms]] concluded the next day that "a maximum effort has been achieved." The agency later paid 35,000 dollars to members of the group that had attacked Schneider. Wimert retrieved the machine guns and threw them into the Pacific. General [[Carlos Prats]] succeeded to the command.[^1][^3]
### The Police Report
The report of the military police officer who investigated the shooting, Major Carlos Donoso Perez, makes no mention of a drawn pistol. It states that the car was "surrounded by five individuals, one of whom, making use of a blunt instrument similar to a sledgehammer, broke the rear window and then fired at General Schneider, striking him in the region of the spleen, in the left shoulder, and in the left wrist." The Senate committee reasoned that since none of the machine guns passed to Valenzuela had been used, there was "no evidence of a plan to kill Schneider." [[John Court]], an aide on the [[National Security Council]] staff, recalled Haig telling him that "if we have to take care of somebody, we could do it."[^4]
On February 16, 1971, a headquarters officer, John C. Murray, reported to [[William Broe]] that the false flag officer [[Bruce MacMaster]] had confessed that he and [[Henry Sloman]] "had met with General Viaux and were involved in the plotting against Schneider." MacMaster, travelling on a falsified Colombian passport, had presented himself as the agent of "American business interests such as the [[Ford Foundation]], the [[Rockefeller Foundation]] and other unidentified business groups." Murray warned that Viaux's jailed associates might "implicate CIA in the action taken against Schneider" and were "seeking a large amount of money." Wimert said he recovered the 50,000 dollars from Valenzuela by striking him. "There is no apparent record in the CIA files of these financial transactions, which Wimert insists he reported to Hecksher."[^4]
Congress ratified Allende on October 24 by 153 votes to 37.[^5]
### Schneider v. Kissinger
René and Raúl Schneider and other members of the family sued Kissinger and the [[United States]] in the federal court in Washington on November 12, 2002. The complaint alleged that on September 15, 1970, Nixon ordered that the CIA "play a direct role in organizing a military coup d'etat in [[Chile]]," said he was "not concerned" about the risks, authorized ten million dollars, and required a plan within 48 hours. The district court dismissed the case in 2004, and the [[United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit|court of appeals]] affirmed in 2005, holding that the decision to support a coup in a foreign country was a political question that courts could not review.[^4]
René and Raúl Schneider and other members of the family sued Kissinger and the [[United States]] in the federal court in Washington on November 12, 2002. The complaint alleged that on September 15, 1970, Nixon ordered that the CIA "play a direct role in organizing a military coup d'etat in [[Chile]]," said he was "not concerned" about the risks, authorized ten million dollars, and required a plan within 48 hours. The district court dismissed the case in 2004, and the [[United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit|court of appeals]] affirmed in 2005, holding that the decision to support a coup in a foreign country was a political question that courts could not review.[^6]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders,* interim report, S. Rept. 94-465, November 20, 1975, part III.F.
[^2]: Kornbluh, Peter, ed. "The CIA and Chile: Anatomy of an Assassination," National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 728, October 22, 2020, documents 23595 (memorandum of conversation, October 15, 1970), 23596 (cable, October 16, 1970), and 23598 (cable, October 18, 1970). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/chile/2020-10-22/cia-chile-anatomy-assassination
[^3]: Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973,* staff report, 1975.
[^4]: Schneider v. Kissinger, 310 F. Supp. 2d 251 (D.D.C. 2004), affirmed, 412 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 2005); complaint, November 12, 2002, National Security Archive document 23606.
[^4]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House*. Summit Books, 1983, pp. 275, 289-290.
[^5]: Kornbluh, Peter. *The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability*. New Press, 2003, p. 29.
[^6]: Schneider v. Kissinger, 310 F. Supp. 2d 251 (D.D.C. 2004), affirmed, 412 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 2005); complaint, November 12, 2002, National Security Archive document 23606.