vault backup: 2026-09-21 19:17:08

10 - PEOPLE/(T-Z)/Roberto Viaux.md

@@ -24,6 +24,10 @@ The [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] station in [[Santiago]] told the America
 
 On October 15 [[Thomas Karamessines]] described Viaux's plans to [[Henry A. Kissinger|Henry Kissinger]] and [[Alexander Haig]]. They put his chances at no more than "one chance in twenty" and decided to send him a warning against acting alone. Kissinger later testified that he had turned the plotting off at this meeting. The cable that went to Santiago the next day said it was "firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup." A CIA officer identified in the Senate's report as "[[Sarno (CIA)|Mr. Sarno]]" testified that Viaux's people told him of the first kidnapping attempt in advance: "They indicated it was going to be at some sort of a banquet which the General (Schneider) would be attending." After that attempt failed on October 19 the station reported: "General Viaux knowledgeable of above operation but not directly involved."[^1][^2]
 
+The officers who posed as third country nationals included [[Anthony Sforza]] and [[Bruce MacMaster]]. MacMaster told Viaux's group that he represented "American business interests such as the [[Ford Foundation]], the [[Rockefeller Foundation]], and other unidentified business groups." The station's first situation report, on September 16, had proposed to "determine whether General Viaux [could be] induced to take action which would cause Communist reaction and in turn force military hand." Its log for October 10 recorded that Viaux "intends to increase the level of terrorism in Santiago over the weekend. The objective of this activity is to provoke the UP into retaliatory violence and public disorder." That day he asked for "five blank policies up to $50,000 U.S. currency and twenty other policies up to $25,000." The station chief, [[Henry Hecksher]], cabled: "You have asked us to provoke chaos in Chile. Thru Viaux solution, we provide you with formula for chaos which is unlikely to be bloodless."[^3]
+
+Ambassador [[Edward Korry]] told Kissinger that "only an insane person would deal with a man like Viaux," whose faction, he said, had been penetrated by Socialists close to Allende. On October 17 the station reported that the [[White House]] warning had been delivered and that Viaux had answered that he and his associates would proceed with or without American support.[^4]
+
 ### The Shooting
 
 General [[Rene Schneider|René Schneider]] was shot on the morning of October 22 by Viaux's men, who used handguns. The submachine guns the agency had sent by diplomatic pouch had gone to the group of General [[Camilo Valenzuela]]. A Chilean military court found that the two generals "had been in contact throughout the coup plotting." It sentenced Viaux to twenty years as "intellectual author" of the kidnapping and Valenzuela to three years of exile. The agency later paid Viaux's representatives 35,000 dollars, in the words of its report to the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence|House Intelligence Committee]], "in an effort to keep previous contact secret, maintain the good will of the group and for humanitarian reasons." They had asked for 250,000.[^1][^2]
@@ -32,3 +36,5 @@ General [[Rene Schneider|René Schneider]] was shot on the morning of October 22
 
 [^1]: Kornbluh, Peter, ed. "The CIA and Chile: Anatomy of an Assassination," National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 728, October 22, 2020. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/chile/2020-10-22/cia-chile-anatomy-assassination
 [^2]: Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders,* interim report, S. Rept. 94-465, November 20, 1975.
+[^3]: Kornbluh, Peter. *The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability*. New Press, 2003, pp. 20-23.
+[^4]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House*. Summit Books, 1983, pp. 279, 282-283, 288.