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3
10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Armando Fernandez Larios.md
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@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ In October 1973 he was one of the squad of General [[Sergio Arellano Stark]] tha
In July 1976 Fernández and [[Michael Townley]] went to [[Paraguay]] for false passports in the names Alejandro Romeral and Juan Williams, which Ambassador [[George Landau]] photographed. That September he went ahead of Townley to Washington to watch [[Orlando Letelier]], and met Townley at [[John F. Kennedy International Airport|Kennedy Airport]] on September 9. Letelier and [[Ronni Moffitt]] were killed on September 21. A Washington grand jury indicted Fernández in 1978 with [[Manuel Contreras]] and [[Pedro Espinoza]], and Chile refused to extradite them.[^2]
In his statement of March 22, 1978, Fernández said that in mid-July 1976, while at the National Intelligence School, he was ordered to DINA headquarters, where Espinoza "told me I would have to go to Paraguay to obtain Paraguayan passports," accompanied "by a gringo" who "would serve as my interpreter and support," and that "once in the US I had to speak with a CIA chief named [[Vernon Walters]], because he was going to give me a list of people sympathetic to Chile for purposes of presenting the Chilean position before the United Nations." On the flight the gringo "began a real interrogation about my status as a military officer, my rank, time in rank, and my chances of promotion." He recalled signing the Paraguayan passport as Alejandro Romeral himself. His sister, Rose Marie Fernández Larios de Guest, interviewed informally by Propper and Barcella, said his travelling companion in September 1976 had called herself Iliana Walker and that he left for Chile about September 9; the Chilean court asked whether she had been told that her brother "should seek asylum or leave the territory of the Republic of Chile, since he could suffer an accident or be violently eliminated."[^3]
### The 1987 Arrangement
In mid-January 1987 he met American officials secretly in [[Santiago]] for ten hours. He left for [[Brazil]] on January 22, was questioned there by officers of the [[Department of State|State Department]] and the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]], and was brought to the United States. Polygraph examinations found "consistent signs of deception" in his denial that he had known the purpose of the mission. A [[State Department]] memorandum of January 26 declared that "Fernandez is not a murderer" and that "the foreign policy benefits are substantial." On February 4 he pleaded guilty before Judge [[Barrington Parker]] to being an accessory after the fact. The government promised that it "would neither seek to deport [him] to Chile nor to cooperate in his extradition to Chile." Parker sentenced him on May 6 to up to seven years. In July the State Department's lawyer [[Michael Kozak]] wrote to the parole commission: "I personally have come to know Mr. Fernandez Larios and his character well." He was paroled on September 11, 1987, after five months.[^1][^2]
@ -38,3 +40,4 @@ In 2005 he applied without success for the visa given to foreign informants. On
[^1]: Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2005).
[^2]: Kornbluh, Peter, and Sebastian Santana. "'Worst of the Worst': ICE and the Case of Chilean Intelligence Operative Armando Fernandez Larios," National Security Archive, July 10, 2026. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/chile/2026-07-10/worst-worst-ice-and-case-chilean-intelligence-operative-armando
[^3]: Fiscalía Militar Ad-Hoc, Santiago, causa 192-78 (fiscal Héctor Orozco), as reproduced in *Proceso contra Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda y Pedro Espinoza Bravo,* ministro instructor Adolfo Bañados, tomo 1, scan at https://www.latinamericanstudies.org/MNC/Causa-Contreras-Espinoza-1991.pdf. Quotations translated from the Spanish, declaraciones of Armando Fernández Larios, March 22 and April 12, 1978, and resolution before May 4, 1978; Fiscalía Militar Ad-Hoc, Santiago, causa 192-78, as reproduced in *Proceso contra Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda y Pedro Espinoza Bravo,* tomo 2, scan at https://www.latinamericanstudies.org/MNC/Causa-Contreras-Espinoza-1991-2.pdf. Quotations translated from the Spanish, memorandum of Eugene M. Propper and E. Lawrence Barcella, June 5, 1978.

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10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Bruce Berckmans.md Normal file
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---
category: "Intelligence & Government"
tags:
- Person
- BruceBerckmans
- CIA
- Wackenhut
- DomesticContactService
- Jamaica
- TomClines
alias:
- Bruce Berckmans, Jr.
- Bruce E. Berckmans
summary: "Former CIA staff agent asked to resign in 1970 who became Wackenhut's director of international operations, threatened to sue the agency in June 1976, and instead offered himself as its contact."
location: "Coral Gables, Florida"
created: 2026-09-21
updated: 2026-09-21
---
Bruce Berckmans, Jr., was "a former staff agent under the LPGLOBE program" of the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]], with the file number 201-309117, "who was asked to resign from the Agency in 1970." By 1976 he was director of international operations of the [[Wackenhut Corporation]] in [[Coral Gables, Florida|Coral Gables]], and the [[Domestic Contact Service]]'s index card on the company lists him under that title. He was later described, as a former Wackenhut vice president for international operations, as having seen a formal proposal from [[George R. Wackenhut]] to the agency offering the company's offices around the world as fronts.[^1][^2]
### The Contact
A process sheet apparently of 1974 records Berckmans as the Miami office's contact for a report on [[Algeria]] in which "FR Atlanta has reiterated interest."[^3] On June 22, 1976, the chief of the Caribbean branch of the Latin America Division, Lloyd C. Burnett, telephoned the service on the green line: Berckmans "recently telephoned an Agency staff officer with whom he is acquainted, indicating that he had information of interest and needed to talk with someone from the Agency." The assistant general counsel for the operations directorate, Anthony Goldin, "felt that a representative of the Agency should meet with" him, said "we would not be in violation of any Agency regulations or guidelines since [he] was the one requesting the meeting," and recommended "an overt employee (DCD) rather than the LA/Miami Station." Burnett added: "Upon learning of your two immediate intel reports on 22 June, [redacted] we felt there may be a connection between these reports and [his] information." The headquarters cable of the same day named [[Tom Clines]] as the officer through whom he had asked for contact, said the division "believe[d] that Berckmans may have information on political developments in [[Jamaica]]," and stated that it "has no operational interest in Berckmans nor his company."[^4]
### The Grievance
The Miami officer met him at the Wackenhut offices on the morning of June 24. "Berckmans began the interview by requesting that I read a multipage letter which he is thinking of sending to the Inspector General. It is a detailed statement of grievances stemming from his forced resignation and indicates that he is considering a suit against the Agency. He has in fact retained counsel, apparently another former Agency staffer." Berckmans, "who is fond of saying that he resigned from the Agency but not the United States, offered to serve as a fairly typical DCD contact with respect to the information he derives in his regular Wackenhut duties," having "many useful contacts especially in [[Latin America]] and soon in the [[Middle East]]." The officer told him that in view of the suit "I felt it inappropriate for us to maintain any systematic relationship at this time." The one item Berckmans offered concerned "the current Jamaican situation": through a subcontractor his company was considering a contract "which would provide custodial services for Revere bauxite holdings which the company is apparently planning to withdraw."[^5]
Late on June 28 he telephoned the officer at home "to tell me that after consultations with his attorney he has decided not to sue the Agency." Goldin "foresees no problem in acceding to Berckmans' request for another meeting. In fact, it may help defuse the situation." On July 2 Berckmans repeated that "he will not sue the Agency or any staffers or former staffers," attributing the decision "to what he called the inordinate costs in both time and money," and "volunteered his feeling that the Agency was being kicked from every side and he did not wish to add to the problem." He was "considerably more composed and relaxed," and renewed "what appears now to be a sincere offer to act on a voluntary basis and in a nonoperational capacity as a normal DCD contact." The officer wrote: "There is no doubt that Berckmans is involved in various foreign projects which could be of informational interest to us." Copies went to the inspector general, the special assistant to the deputy director for operations, and the Caribbean branch. An undated paper in the file, "volunteered for possible operational consideration on a very preliminary and noncommittal basis," describes a prospective contract for a national system of industrial security in an unnamed country, with a burn and trauma hospital, a fire department, a security control center, a training institute, an emergency communications system, and modular housing. A review log entry records Wackenhut "deleted from OSG & DDO files"; on September 9 Burnett and Goldin "posed no objection" to ending contact, and the Miami office formally closed the case on June 30, 1977.[^6]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Central Intelligence Agency, Domestic Collection Division, case file 65805, "Wackenhut Corp.," JFK Assassination Records Collection, record 104-10291-10017, released 2023. https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2023/104-10291-10017.pdf, pp. 17-18, memorandum of Lloyd C. Burnett, "Contact with Former Staff Agent," June 23, 1976; Central Intelligence Agency, Domestic Contact Service, case file 65805, "Wackenhut Corporation," JFK Assassination Records Collection, record 104-10291-10016, released 2023. https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2023/104-10291-10016.pdf, pp. 13-14.
[^2]: Seymour, Cheri. *The Last Circle: Danny Casolaro's Investigation into the Octopus and the PROMIS Software Scandal*. TrineDay, 2010, as already cited on the Wackenhut Corporation page; the title there is vice president.
[^3]: Central Intelligence Agency, Domestic Contact Service, case file 65805, "Wackenhut Corporation," JFK Assassination Records Collection, record 104-10291-10016, released 2023. https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2023/104-10291-10016.pdf, p. 31.
[^4]: Central Intelligence Agency, Domestic Collection Division, case file 65805, "Wackenhut Corp.," JFK Assassination Records Collection, record 104-10291-10017, released 2023. https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2023/104-10291-10017.pdf, pp. 17-18; Central Intelligence Agency, Domestic Contact Service, case file 65805, "Wackenhut Corporation," JFK Assassination Records Collection, record 104-10291-10016, released 2023. https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2023/104-10291-10016.pdf, p. 14, cable DCD/Headquarters 15693, June 22, 1976.
[^5]: Central Intelligence Agency, Domestic Contact Service, case file 65805, "Wackenhut Corporation," JFK Assassination Records Collection, record 104-10291-10016, released 2023. https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2023/104-10291-10016.pdf, p. 18, cable DCD/Miami 13377, June 24, 1976.
[^6]: Central Intelligence Agency, Domestic Contact Service, case file 65805, "Wackenhut Corporation," JFK Assassination Records Collection, record 104-10291-10016, released 2023. https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2023/104-10291-10016.pdf, p. 17; Central Intelligence Agency, Domestic Collection Division, case file 65805, "Wackenhut Corp.," JFK Assassination Records Collection, record 104-10291-10017, released 2023. https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2023/104-10291-10017.pdf, pp. 2, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13.

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10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Justin Gleichauf.md Normal file
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---
category: "Intelligence & Government"
tags:
- Person
- JustinGleichauf
- CIA
- DomesticContactService
- Wackenhut
- Miami
- Dallas
alias:
- Justin F. Gleichauf
- J. F. Gleichauf
summary: "Chief of the CIA Domestic Contact Service field offices in Miami and Dallas who ran the Wackenhut Corporation as a reporting source in 1970 and by 1974 worked for the company himself."
location: "Coral Gables, Florida"
created: 2026-09-21
updated: 2026-09-21
---
Justin F. Gleichauf was an officer of the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]'s [[Domestic Contact Service]], the overt component that interviewed American businessmen and travellers for foreign intelligence. Agency records describe him as "the former Chief of the [[Miami]] and [[Dallas, Texas|Dallas]] Field Offices."[^1] In an article the agency published in 2001 he described the Miami office's debriefing of Cuban refugees before the missile crisis of 1962.[^2]
### The Wackenhut File
As chief of the Miami office Gleichauf signed the memorandum of December 13, 1967, recording the office's first contact with Wackenhut Services, Inc., made by Gus C. Guerrero, and the [[Wackenhut Corporation]] of [[Coral Gables, Florida|Coral Gables]] became a standing contact, organization number A154531, whose reports on [[Chile]], [[Panama]], [[Colombia]], and [[Ecuador]] he signed as field office chief through the end of 1970; from 1971 the sheets carry B. E. Mainwaring as chief. On September 21, 1970, [[George R. Wackenhut]] invited him to a demonstration of a tracking transmitter "less than the size of a half pack of cigarettes" made by the subsidiary Electro-Finders, which he reported to the [[Technical Services Division]]; in May 1972, as chief of the Dallas office, he forwarded the company's brochure for the system from "an old friend" there. A process sheet of April 8, 1970, covering "Presidential Elections/Student Riots at National University/Maintenance Problems with Soviet Supplied Trolley Cars and Jeeps/Hire Soviet Helicopter to be Used During Construction of Pipeline/Recent Insurgency (Colombia)," is signed by J. F. Hennessey with Gleichauf as chief. Another, "Status of Lorenzo D. ('Wimpy') Barry ([[Dominican Republic]])," dated November 13, 1970, gives Gleichauf as both case officer and field office chief, with a copy "passed to JMCOSBA locally."[^3]
### Wackenhut
By 1974 Gleichauf was employed at the company's headquarters, 3280 Ponce de Leon Boulevard. A Domestic Contact Service report of March 19, 1974, numbered OO-A(S)-322 06270-74, on "Possible Identification and Surveillance References of 'CIA Agents'" by the security authorities of a country whose name is redacted, came from him. The case officer, E. B. Ames, wrote: "Mr. Gleichauf, who as you know is the former Chief of the Miami and Dallas Field Offices, currently is employed with a company with extensive contractual arrangements overseas. He learned the information contained in this report quite by chance from a co-worker who returned from [redacted] last week." The report said the authorities "have already identified six 'CIA agents.'" The service's Miami office closed its Wackenhut case on June 30, 1977.[^1][^4]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Central Intelligence Agency, Domestic Collection Division, case file 65805, "Wackenhut Corp.," JFK Assassination Records Collection, record 104-10291-10017, released 2023. https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2023/104-10291-10017.pdf, pp. 4, 6-7.
[^2]: Gleichauf, Justin F. "Red Sky in the Morning: The Cuban Missile Crisis," *Studies in Intelligence,* 2001. Cited from memory, not read for this page.
[^3]: Central Intelligence Agency, Domestic Contact Service, case file 65805, record 104-10291-10016, pp. 24, 29, 30; Central Intelligence Agency, Domestic Contact Service, case file 65805, "Wackenhut Corporation," JFK Assassination Records Collection, record 104-10291-10016, released 2023. https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2023/104-10291-10016.pdf, pp. 35, 45, 55.
[^4]: Central Intelligence Agency, Domestic Collection Division, case file 65805, "Wackenhut Corp.," JFK Assassination Records Collection, record 104-10291-10017, released 2023. https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2023/104-10291-10017.pdf, p. 3.

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10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Manuel Contreras.md
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@ -22,19 +22,23 @@ Manuel Contreras Sepulveda was the army officer who organized and commanded [[DI
From September 1966 to September 1967 Contreras attended the [[United States Army]] career officers school at [[Fort Belvoir]], [[Virginia]]. In the middle 1960s he taught strategy and intelligence at the Chilean war college, where [[Augusto Pinochet]] was deputy commandant. On November 12, 1973, he presented the intelligence chiefs of the four services with his plan for a national directorate. The American defense attaché reported within weeks of its formation that DINA "is directly subordinate to Junta President Pinochet," and the air attaché learned that Contreras briefed Pinochet every morning at half past seven: "The president issues instructions on DINA; is aware of its activities; and in fact heads it." Its foreign branch, called "Luis Gutierrez" in its communications, was run by Major [[Raúl Iturriaga Neumann]] under Contreras's deputy, [[Pedro Espinoza]].[^2]
### The 1978 Statement
In a sworn statement of March 22, 1978, in the file of the ad hoc military prosecutor [[Héctor Orozco]], Contreras said that "around June or early July 1976, CIA Chile informed me that the Deputy Director of the CIA, General [[Vernon Walters]], needed a contact in the US to give us a list of lobbyists and people who could cooperate with Chile before the US Senate and also for the UN's forthcoming session that year," Captains [[René Riveros]] and [[Rolando Mosqueira]] testified that he sent them to Washington in August for the purpose. Of [[Michael Townley]]: "I know this individual as Andrés Wilson and only recently learned from the press that he had this other name. Wilson was a good informant of my Service and acted as an informant to one of my Officers." Walters told the FBI in June that his only contact with Contreras had been the 1975 visit and that the claim was "ludicrous on its face." In February 1979 Contreras and Espinoza, through [[Sergio Miranda Carrington]], asked the Supreme Court for access to the file in the extradition proceedings.[^3]
### The CIA Relationship
The agency told Contreras at the outset that it would not support activities of his service "which might be construed as 'internal political repression,'" and urged him to follow a Chilean defense ministry circular of January 17, 1974, on the treatment of prisoners under the [[Geneva Conventions]]. "By April 1975," its report states, "intelligence reporting showed that Contreras was the principal obstacle to a reasonable human rights policy within the Junta, but an interagency committee directed the CIA to continue its relationship with Contreras." The American ambassador in [[Santiago]] urged the deputy director of central intelligence, General [[Vernon Walters]], to receive him in Washington "in the interest of maintaining good relations with Pinochet." The meeting took place in August 1975 with interagency approval.[^1]
The agency told Contreras at the outset that it would not support activities of his service "which might be construed as 'internal political repression,'" and urged him to follow a Chilean defense ministry circular of January 17, 1974, on the treatment of prisoners under the [[Geneva Conventions]]. "By April 1975," its report states, "intelligence reporting showed that Contreras was the principal obstacle to a reasonable human rights policy within the Junta, but an interagency committee directed the CIA to continue its relationship with Contreras." The American ambassador in [[Santiago]] urged the deputy director of central intelligence, General Vernon Walters, to receive him in Washington "in the interest of maintaining good relations with Pinochet." The meeting took place in August 1975 with interagency approval.[^1]
"In May and June 1975," the report continues, "elements within the CIA recommended establishing a paid relationship with Contreras to obtain intelligence based on his unique position and access to Pinochet. This proposal was overruled, citing the US Government policy on clandestine relations with the head of an intelligence service notorious for human rights abuses. However, given miscommunications in the timing of this exchange, a one-time payment was given to Contreras."[^1]
General Vernon Walters came to Santiago to confer with Pinochet on the agency's help, and Pinochet told him he had "hand-picked Contreras." The CIA gave Contreras a long lunch with Walters and officers of the Western Hemisphere Division. The State Department's Chile desk noted that "Colonel Manuel Contreras considers himself a bosom buddy of the general." On Saturday, July 5, 1975, the two met secretly at a CIA office at [[Fort Myer]], where Contreras asked how Chile might get American arms despite the congressional ban: "Wonder if there is any way they could get it indirectly via [[Spain]], [[Brazil]], or the Republic of Korea." They lunched again at Langley on August 25. On November 4, 1977, Pinochet removed him, with promotion to brigadier general, in favor of General [[Odlanier Mena]]. A CIA source said he was "completely shocked," like "a cuckolded husband who is the last to realize his wife was being unfaithful." In 1978 the agency reported that he planned to defend himself by claiming "that Michael Townley and the Cuban exiles implicated were all under CIA control, and that the Agency ordered Letelier's assassination to throw blame on Pinochet," and to implicate Ambassador [[George Landau]]. "While this defense is of course fabricated completely of whole cloth, it could cause us embarrassment."[^2]
Contreras gave his own account of the beginning. "In the year 1974, in the month of March, the president sent me to the United States. I met with Vernon Walters about how to do national intelligence. So the CIA promised to help us," he said, and "he sent us eight high-level CIA agents to organize courses or seminars here in Chile, which lasted until the middle of August of 1974." He named [[Stewart Burton]], the station chief, as the officer he dealt with. The disappeared numbered seventeen in June of that year, forty-six in July, forty-nine in August, and forty in September. On May 20, 1974, the agency ordered a "covert name trace" on him, a step that precedes a close and often paid relationship with a source. The agency's statement was that it "made clear to Contreras that no training or support which could aid internal repression could be given," but did "brief Contreras on the fundamentals of intelligence organization and management." A former DINA agent said: "I thought Contreras was some kind of genius to have built up such a large, complicated apparatus in such a short time."[^3]
Contreras gave his own account of the beginning. "In the year 1974, in the month of March, the president sent me to the United States. I met with Vernon Walters about how to do national intelligence. So the CIA promised to help us," he said, and "he sent us eight high-level CIA agents to organize courses or seminars here in Chile, which lasted until the middle of August of 1974." He named [[Stewart Burton]], the station chief, as the officer he dealt with. The disappeared numbered seventeen in June of that year, forty-six in July, forty-nine in August, and forty in September. On May 20, 1974, the agency ordered a "covert name trace" on him, a step that precedes a close and often paid relationship with a source. The agency's statement was that it "made clear to Contreras that no training or support which could aid internal repression could be given," but did "brief Contreras on the fundamentals of intelligence organization and management." A former DINA agent said: "I thought Contreras was some kind of genius to have built up such a large, complicated apparatus in such a short time."[^4]
Of the 1975 visit he told a Chilean reporter: "Vernon Walters proposed that we take on a lobby of North American senators, to get them to stop harassing Chile in the international arena," five senators of both parties "who would be paid $2 million a year so that they will act in favor of Chile." The memorandum of the August 25 conversation says only that Walters "took the opportunity to express concern over the human rights situation in Chile." Contreras said he had refused an offer from Walters to station CIA officers inside DINA. He testified in court that [[Robert Scherrer]] of the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] was in "permanent contact" with Condor's representative in [[Buenos Aires]] "and received the information that he asked for." Scherrer said he learned that the CIA had provided DINA with the computer systems and training he presumed were used for the Condor data bank.[^3]
Of the 1975 visit he told a Chilean reporter: "Vernon Walters proposed that we take on a lobby of North American senators, to get them to stop harassing Chile in the international arena," five senators of both parties "who would be paid $2 million a year so that they will act in favor of Chile." The memorandum of the August 25 conversation says only that Walters "took the opportunity to express concern over the human rights situation in Chile." Contreras said he had refused an offer from Walters to station CIA officers inside DINA. He testified in court that [[Robert Scherrer]] of the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] was in "permanent contact" with Condor's representative in [[Buenos Aires]] "and received the information that he asked for." Scherrer said he learned that the CIA had provided DINA with the computer systems and training he presumed were used for the Condor data bank.[^4]
An American intelligence officer described him: "Contreras is mild-mannered and polite. When you talk to him he seems gentle and disarming." As a young officer he was known as a beato. His military specialty was engineering.[^3]
An American intelligence officer described him: "Contreras is mild-mannered and polite. When you talk to him he seems gentle and disarming." As a young officer he was known as a beato. His military specialty was engineering.[^4]
### Condor
@ -42,15 +46,16 @@ Within a year of the coup the agency knew of cooperation among the security serv
### Letelier
In the summer of 1976 two DINA officers obtained American visas in [[Asuncion]] on Paraguayan passports, telling Ambassador [[George W. Landau]] that their trip was known to the CIA. Landau sent photographs of the passports to Washington. Walters replied that the agency had no connection with the men. The bomb that killed Letelier and [[Ronni Moffitt]] was placed by the DINA agent [[Michael Townley]], an American.[^4][^5]
In the summer of 1976 two DINA officers obtained American visas in [[Asuncion]] on Paraguayan passports, telling Ambassador [[George W. Landau]] that their trip was known to the CIA. Landau sent photographs of the passports to Washington. Walters replied that the agency had no connection with the men. The bomb that killed Letelier and [[Ronni Moffitt]] was placed by the DINA agent Michael Townley, an American.[^5][^6]
The agency's first report naming Contreras in connection with the murder is dated October 6, 1976. "During 1977, CIA met with Contreras about half a dozen times; three of those contacts were to request information on the Letelier assassination. On 3 November 1977, Contreras was transferred to a function unrelated to intelligence so CIA severed all contact with him." Chile refused to extradite him. A [[State Department]] cable of January 22, 1987, quotes him as saying he "authorized the assassination of Letelier on orders from Pinochet." The CIA's assessment of May 1, 1987, concluded that Augusto Pinochet personally ordered the killing and afterward considered having Contreras eliminated to keep him silent.[^1][^6]
The agency's first report naming Contreras in connection with the murder is dated October 6, 1976. "During 1977, CIA met with Contreras about half a dozen times; three of those contacts were to request information on the Letelier assassination. On 3 November 1977, Contreras was transferred to a function unrelated to intelligence so CIA severed all contact with him." Chile refused to extradite him. A [[State Department]] cable of January 22, 1987, quotes him as saying he "authorized the assassination of Letelier on orders from Pinochet." The CIA's assessment of May 1, 1987, concluded that Augusto Pinochet personally ordered the killing and afterward considered having Contreras eliminated to keep him silent.[^1][^7]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA Activities in Chile," report to Congress (Hinchey Report), September 18, 2000.
[^2]: Kornbluh, Peter. *The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability*. New Press, 2003, pp. 158-167, 172, 213-215, 401-402.
[^3]: Dinges, John. *The Condor Years: How Pinochet and His Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents*. New Press, 2004, pp. 63-70, 103-104, 121-124.
[^4]: Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, "'The First Terrorist Attack in the U.S.': The Letelier-Moffitt Assassinations," oral history of Ambassador George W. Landau. https://adst.org/2014/02/the-first-terrorist-attack-in-the-u-s-the-letelier-moffitt-assassinations/
[^5]: "Interview with Dinges and Landau," Radio TV Reports transcript, June 30, 1980, CIA Reading Room document 05535911.
[^6]: Kornbluh, Peter, ed. "CIA: 'Pinochet personally ordered' Letelier bombing," National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 560, September 23, 2016; "The Pinochet File: U.S. Declassifies Missing Documents in the Letelier-Moffitt Case," Electronic Briefing Book No. 532, October 8, 2015.
[^3]: Fiscalía Militar Ad-Hoc, Santiago, causa 192-78 (fiscal Héctor Orozco), as reproduced in *Proceso contra Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda y Pedro Espinoza Bravo,* ministro instructor Adolfo Bañados, tomo 1, scan at https://www.latinamericanstudies.org/MNC/Causa-Contreras-Espinoza-1991.pdf. Quotations translated from the Spanish, declaración of Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda, March 22, 1978; Fiscalía Militar Ad-Hoc, Santiago, causa 192-78, as reproduced in *Proceso contra Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda y Pedro Espinoza Bravo,* tomo 2, scan at https://www.latinamericanstudies.org/MNC/Causa-Contreras-Espinoza-1991-2.pdf. Quotations translated from the Spanish, FBI report of the interview of Vernon Walters, June 14, 1978, and pleading of February 19, 1979.
[^4]: Dinges, John. *The Condor Years: How Pinochet and His Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents*. New Press, 2004, pp. 63-70, 103-104, 121-124.
[^5]: Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, "'The First Terrorist Attack in the U.S.': The Letelier-Moffitt Assassinations," oral history of Ambassador George W. Landau. https://adst.org/2014/02/the-first-terrorist-attack-in-the-u-s-the-letelier-moffitt-assassinations/
[^6]: "Interview with Dinges and Landau," Radio TV Reports transcript, June 30, 1980, CIA Reading Room document 05535911.
[^7]: Kornbluh, Peter, ed. "CIA: 'Pinochet personally ordered' Letelier bombing," National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 560, September 23, 2016; "The Pinochet File: U.S. Declassifies Missing Documents in the Letelier-Moffitt Case," Electronic Briefing Book No. 532, October 8, 2015.

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10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Mariana Callejas.md
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@ -24,8 +24,11 @@ At seventeen, in 1950, she left school in secret after her favorite teachers, Je
In 1974 Colonel [[Pedro Espinoza]] of [[DINA]] "hired both Michael Townley and Ines Callejas for a combined salary of about $600 a month." She went with Townley to [[Buenos Aires]] that September to kill General [[Carlos Prats]]. Her attempt to fire the bomb failed, and a second attempt killed Prats and his wife. In 1975 she, Townley, and [[Virgilio Paz]] "set off on a nine-month, eight-country DINA mission to terrorize targeted Chilean exiles and the enemies of the [[Cuban Nationalist Movement]]," in which she "participated as an equal member of the DINA team." They prepared six detonators for an attempt in [[Mexico]], stopped at [[Munich]], "where DINA had cultivated contacts with former Nazi sympathizers associated with [[Christian Social Union]] leader [[Franz Josef Strauss]]," and in [[Rome]] engaged the Italian fascists who shot [[Bernardo Leighton]]. In September 1976, from [[National Airport]] in Washington, Townley telephoned her "a coded message to pass on to DINA: the bomb was in place."[^1][^3]
Callejas told the military prosecutor on April 4, 1978, that her landlady, hearing of the couple's part in the clandestine radio at Concepción, had introduced her to an army officer who "turned out to be then-Lt. Col. Pedro Espinoza," and that after talking about Radio Liberación "we concluded we could both be useful to the organization Lt. Col. Espinoza served." She knew Andrés Wilson as her husband's cover name and Kenneth Enyart as another he had used. She had seen in his office a document "bearing stamps and a signature but otherwise blank," explained to her as being "for purchasing electronic equipment whose sale in the US was restricted to governments and their security departments," and believed she had helped draft its text; "the signature was already on the document." The prosecutor ordered a handwriting sample from her against a document in the file on April 10, 1978, and a comparison again on March 9, 1979.[^4]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Dinges, John, and Saul Landau. *Assassination on Embassy Row*. McGraw-Hill, 1980, pp. 21, 95-96, 106, 130, 152-157.
[^2]: Branch, Taylor, and Eugene M. Propper. *Labyrinth*. Viking, 1982, pp. 483-486.
[^3]: National Security Archive, "The Pinochet Regime at 50: The Assassination of General Carlos Prats and Sofia Cuthbert," October 1, 2024.
[^4]: Fiscalía Militar Ad-Hoc, Santiago, causa 192-78 (fiscal Héctor Orozco), as reproduced in *Proceso contra Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda y Pedro Espinoza Bravo,* ministro instructor Adolfo Bañados, tomo 1, scan at https://www.latinamericanstudies.org/MNC/Causa-Contreras-Espinoza-1991.pdf. Quotations translated from the Spanish, declaración of Mariana Callejas Honores, April 4, 1978, and resolution of April 10, 1978; Fiscalía Militar Ad-Hoc, Santiago, causa 192-78, as reproduced in *Proceso contra Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda y Pedro Espinoza Bravo,* tomo 2, scan at https://www.latinamericanstudies.org/MNC/Causa-Contreras-Espinoza-1991-2.pdf. Quotations translated from the Spanish, resolution of March 9, 1979.

13
10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Pedro Espinoza.md
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@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ tags:
- OperationCondor
alias:
- Pedro Espinoza Bravo
summary: "Chilean army officer, operations director of DINA, indicted in Washington for the Letelier murder in 1978, named by Michael Townley as the man who asked for the killing of General Prats, and convicted in the Horman case."
summary: "Operations director of DINA, indicted in Washington for the Letelier murder in 1978, named by Michael Townley as the man who asked for the killing of General Prats, and convicted in the Horman case."
location: "Santiago, Chile"
created: 2026-09-21
updated: 2026-09-21
@ -21,12 +21,15 @@ Pedro Espinoza Bravo was a [[Chile|Chilean]] army colonel and director of operat
[[Michael Townley]] testified that Espinoza came to him several times in July and August 1974 about "doing something" about General [[Carlos Prats]], the former army commander living in [[Buenos Aires]], who Espinoza feared might lead a government in exile. Townley called it "a patriotic request." Prats and his wife were killed by Townley's bomb on September 30, 1974. The Chilean judge [[Alejandro Solís]] later indicted Contreras, Espinoza, and three other DINA officers for the killing.[^1]
A federal grand jury in Washington indicted Contreras, Espinoza, and [[Armando Fernandez Larios|Armando Fernández Larios]] in 1978 for the murder of [[Orlando Letelier]] and [[Ronni Moffitt]]. Chile put the three under military detention and refused to extradite them, and a military court dismissed the domestic case. On an appeal by Letelier's sister the [[Supreme Court of Chile|Chilean Supreme Court]] ruled in January 1982 that the dismissal "was temporary and not definitive." Contreras was sentenced to seven years for the murder in 1995.[^2]
In a sworn statement of April 24, 1978, in the file of the military prosecutor [[Héctor Orozco]], Espinoza said that in 1976 "the Director of DINA ordered me to designate an agent to carry out a mission abroad, who in any case had to be accompanied by another person fully fluent in English. For this I chose then-Lieutenant Armando Fernández Larios. The name of the second man was suggested by then-Major [[Raúl Iturriaga Neumann|Iturriaga]], under the name Andrés Wilson. This Andrés Wilson turned out to be the same person I had known since November or December 1974 as Michael Townley. The mission consisted of traveling to the USA to meet with Gen. [[Vernon Walters]], then head of the CIA, who would hand over information related to people who could disinterestedly help the Government and our country's cause." When the second pair of officers could not find Walters in August they telephoned Espinoza, who authorized their return. On April 10 the prosecutor had ordered a confrontation between Townley and Espinoza "as to who assigned Townley each of the operations he carried out abroad."[^2]
A man who sought asylum in 1987 told American officials that [[Charles Horman]] had been put to death in the [[Estadio Nacional (Chile)|National Stadium]] in September 1973 on Espinoza's orders. A Chilean court sentenced Espinoza to seven years in the Horman and [[Frank Teruggi]] case in 2015, and the Supreme Court raised the term to fifteen years in 2016.[^3]
A federal grand jury in Washington indicted Contreras, Espinoza, and [[Armando Fernandez Larios|Armando Fernández Larios]] in 1978 for the murder of [[Orlando Letelier]] and [[Ronni Moffitt]]. Chile put the three under military detention and refused to extradite them, and a military court dismissed the domestic case. On an appeal by Letelier's sister the [[Supreme Court of Chile|Chilean Supreme Court]] ruled in January 1982 that the dismissal "was temporary and not definitive." Contreras was sentenced to seven years for the murder in 1995.[^3]
A man who sought asylum in 1987 told American officials that [[Charles Horman]] had been put to death in the [[Estadio Nacional (Chile)|National Stadium]] in September 1973 on Espinoza's orders. A Chilean court sentenced Espinoza to seven years in the Horman and [[Frank Teruggi]] case in 2015, and the Supreme Court raised the term to fifteen years in 2016.[^4]
### Footnotes
[^1]: National Security Archive, "The Pinochet Regime at 50: The Assassination of General Carlos Prats and Sofia Cuthbert," October 1, 2024. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/chile/2024-10-01/pinochet-regime-50-assassination-general-carlos-prats-and-sofia
[^2]: "Letelier Case Reversal," *The Washington Post,* January 16, 1982, CIA Reading Room document CIA-RDP90-00552R000403680022-8; "Ex-Chile spy chief dies while serving 500-year sentence," Al Jazeera, August 8, 2015.
[^3]: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 33, document 2; "Sentencing in Chile begins to bring closure in 41-year-old murder cases of US citizens Frank Teruggi and Charles Horman," *The Tico Times,* January 30, 2015.
[^2]: Fiscalía Militar Ad-Hoc, Santiago, causa 192-78 (fiscal Héctor Orozco), as reproduced in *Proceso contra Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda y Pedro Espinoza Bravo,* ministro instructor Adolfo Bañados, tomo 1, scan at https://www.latinamericanstudies.org/MNC/Causa-Contreras-Espinoza-1991.pdf. Quotations translated from the Spanish, declaración of Pedro Espinoza Bravo, April 24, 1978; declaración of René Riveros Valderrama, March 22, 1978; resolution of April 10, 1978.
[^3]: "Letelier Case Reversal," *The Washington Post,* January 16, 1982, CIA Reading Room document CIA-RDP90-00552R000403680022-8; "Ex-Chile spy chief dies while serving 500-year sentence," Al Jazeera, August 8, 2015.
[^4]: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 33, document 2; "Sentencing in Chile begins to bring closure in 41-year-old murder cases of US citizens Frank Teruggi and Charles Horman," *The Tico Times,* January 30, 2015.

35
10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Ricardo Cañete.md Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
---
category: "Extremism & Violent Networks"
tags:
- Person
- RicardoCanete
- FBI
- Informant
- CubanNationalistMovement
- OrlandoLetelier
- IgnacioNovo
alias:
- Ricardo Canete
summary: "FBI informant in Brooklyn who in the spring of 1977 sold forged identity papers to Ignacio Novo of the Cuban Nationalist Movement and reported his talk of counterfeit money and war to the bureau."
location: "Brooklyn, New York"
created: 2026-09-21
updated: 2026-09-21
---
Ricardo Cañete, of 2730 West 33rd Street, [[Brooklyn]], was an informant of the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]]'s [[New York City|New York]] office, debriefed by Special Agent [[Larry Wack]] in May 1977, fifteen months before the indictments in the murder of [[Orlando Letelier]]. His reports concerned [[Ignacio Novo]] of the [[Cuban Nationalist Movement]].[^1]
### Frederick Pagan
Novo drove him to the Bergenline Avenue district of [[Union City, New Jersey|Union City]], "seemed 'uptight,'" and wrote on the back of a restaurant guest check what he wanted: a DD-214 discharge form, a [[New York]] State temporary security card, a birth certificate, and a West German passport, all in the name Frederick Pagan. On another evening Novo carried under his coat a 9-millimeter Uzi that "appeared to have a silencer attached" and "appeared to be 'cut down' in length." Cañete delivered a DD-214, two baptismal certificates from [[Baton Rouge]], a blank New York temporary license, and two [[Louisiana]] birth certificates, all for Frederick Pagan, born April 20, 1942, hidden in a motorcycle magazine at a restaurant at 2332 Broadway, where a woman introduced as "Martha" was present. Novo took the magazine to the men's room and came back to say "he needed four more sets of forged identification papers and that one set must be 'completely built up.'" Wack kept copies "for evidentiary value." On May 18 Novo said that four men had left for [[Miami]], by bus, by plane, by car, and by way of [[Washington, D.C.|Washington]], each carrying copies of the Pagan papers.[^1]
### Wine
Novo told him that the movement referred to counterfeit money as "wine" on the telephone, "because that country exports a lot of wine," and "since the NSA listens to calls placed to foreign countries and NOVO believes [[Chile]] is one of those countries monitored." Any purchase would be made through lockers at an airport or bus terminal. Asked "Did the Chilean wine get in?" Novo answered "Not yet."[^1]
### The Photograph
On May 2, 1977, Novo showed him a photograph of an FBI agent and said: "This is the cocksucker, who wants Guillermo." On May 13 Cañete recognized the man in the photograph as Wack. Around May 9 Novo told him of the bureau's pressure over the Letelier investigation: "If GUILLERMO goes inside, it's war. This was already decided on tonight." Asked who would be involved, he named the prosecutor and the FBI and said "up to BELL if we have to," and that if the [[United States]] and [[Cuba]] normalized relations "the bodies are going to be all over." At Novo's office at a [[New Jersey]] Ford dealership on May 5 Cañete heard him take a call: "Let me speak to ALEJANDRO first," then "FLACO, what's happening?"[^1]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Federal Bureau of Investigation, New York office, reports of interviews of Ricardo Cañete by Special Agent Larry E. Wack, May 10 to May 18, 1977, scans at https://www.latinamericanstudies.org/MNC/canete.pdf. The FBI file on the same site also holds Cañete's telephone toll records and his false identity papers.

15
10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Tom Clines.md
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@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ aliases:
- Tom Clines
- Thomas G. Clines
created: 2026-05-17
updated: 2026-05-17
updated: 2026-09-21
category: "Intelligence & Government"
tags:
- Person
@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ tags:
- Vietnam
- 1970s
- 1980s
summary: "CIA career officer who served under Ted Shackley at JMWAVE, Laos, and the Western Hemisphere Division, joined the private Safari Club and Iran-Contra Enterprise network after Shackley's 1979 departure, and was convicted in 1993 of underreporting Iran-Contra income."
summary: "CIA officer under Ted Shackley at JMWAVE, in Laos, and in the Western Hemisphere Division, later of the Safari Club and Iran-Contra Enterprise network, convicted in 1993 of underreporting Iran-Contra income."
location: "United States"
---
@ -30,17 +30,22 @@ After Laos, Clines continued in CIA operations roles in Southeast Asia and [[Lat
After leaving CIA, Clines became involved in the arms and intelligence consulting business that grew around the network of former CIA officers associated with Shackley. One significant connection was to [[Edwin Wilson]], the former CIA officer who was selling arms and providing paramilitary training to Libya's Muammar Qaddafi. Clines, like [[Richard Secord]], had documented contacts with Wilson during the period Wilson was running the Libya operations. Congressional investigations into Wilson's activities examined Clines's role, and while Clines was not charged in the Wilson case, the investigation contributed to the end of his government career.[^1]
### Wackenhut, 1976
A [[Domestic Contact Service]] cable of June 22, 1976, records a request from the Latin America Division for contact with [[Bruce Berckmans]], director of international operations of the [[Wackenhut Corporation]] in [[Miami]], "a former staff agent under the LPGLOBE program" who "was asked to resign from the Agency in 1970." He had asked, "through an LA Division officer, Tom Clines," to see an agency representative about information believed to concern "political developments in [[Jamaica]]," and "the name of Tom Clines may be used to facilitate contact." A week later Berckmans told the Miami officer that "after consultations with his attorney he has decided not to sue the Agency."[^2]
### Iran-Contra Enterprise
Clines became an operational participant in the Enterprise, the private covert network directed by Secord and [[Albert Hakim]] that executed the Iran arms sales and Contra funding operations. His primary role was in the logistics and transportation aspects of the Enterprise's weapons movements - specifically managing air freight and cargo operations for weapons shipments.[^1]
In 1993, Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh's prosecution resulted in Clines's conviction on four counts of tax-related offenses: specifically, underreporting income from transactions connected to the Enterprise. The prosecution established that Clines had received income from Enterprise operations that he failed to report on his tax returns. He was sentenced to sixteen months in prison and fined.[^2]
In 1993, Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh's prosecution resulted in Clines's conviction on four counts of tax-related offenses: specifically, underreporting income from transactions connected to the Enterprise. The prosecution established that Clines had received income from Enterprise operations that he failed to report on his tax returns. He was sentenced to sixteen months in prison and fined.[^3]
### Shackley Network
Clines's career illustrates the structural feature of the Shackley network: officers who had served together in the most sensitive Cold War operations built deep personal and professional loyalties that persisted after their government careers ended, creating a private network of experienced covert operators available for work that the CIA's official structure could not or would not undertake. The network's connection to [[Saudi Arabia|Saudi]], Egyptian, and French intelligence resources through the [[Safari Club]] provided funding channels; the experience of the former officers provided operational capability; and the relationships with Secord, Hakim, and eventually North provided the institutional interface that connected this network to official Reagan administration policy.[^1]
Clines's career illustrates the structural feature of the Shackley network: officers who had served together in the most sensitive Cold War operations built deep personal and professional loyalties that persisted after their government careers ended, creating a private network of experienced covert operators available for work that the CIA's official structure could not or would not undertake. The network's connection to [[Saudi Arabia|Saudi]], Egyptian, and French intelligence resources through the Safari Club provided funding channels; the experience of the former officers provided operational capability; and the relationships with Secord, Hakim, and eventually North provided the institutional interface that connected this network to official Reagan administration policy.[^1]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Corn, David, and Jeff Goldberg. "The Old Boy Network." *Mother Jones*, October 1994. Trento, Joseph. *Prelude to Terror: The Rogue CIA and the Legacy of America's Private Intelligence Network*. Carroll & Graf, 2005.
[^2]: Walsh, Lawrence E. *Iran-Contra: The Final Report*. Random House, 1994. Walsh, Lawrence E. *Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-Up*. W.W. Norton, 1997.
[^2]: Central Intelligence Agency, Domestic Collection Division, case file 65805, "Wackenhut Corp.," JFK Assassination Records Collection, record 104-10291-10017, released 2023. https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2023/104-10291-10017.pdf, pp. 19-22.
[^3]: Walsh, Lawrence E. *Iran-Contra: The Final Report*. Random House, 1994. Walsh, Lawrence E. *Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-Up*. W.W. Norton, 1997.

2
10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/William Colby.md
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@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ tags:
- 1960s
- 1970s
- Stargate
summary: "William Egan Colby served as Director of Central Intelligence from 1973 to 1976, dismissing James Angleton, cooperating with the Church Committee, and revealing the Family Jewels, having earlier directed the Vietnam-era Phoenix Program under the CORDS framework."
summary: "Director of central intelligence from 1973 to 1976 who removed James Angleton, gave the Family Jewels to the Church Committee, and had earlier run the Phoenix program in Vietnam."
born: 1920-01-04
died: 1996-04-27
location: "Saint Paul, Minnesota"