vault backup: 2026-09-23 16:47:02
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@ -9,31 +9,45 @@ tags:
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- BCCI
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- Regulation
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- Intelligence
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summary: "The Federal Reserve Board (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) is the governing body of the U.S. central banking system, established 1913; it appears in this vault primarily in connection with the BCCI scandal, in which the Federal Reserve approved Clark Clifford and Robert Altman's First American Bankshares acquisition without knowing of BCCI's secret beneficial ownership, and later investigated and fined BCCI's principals for the regulatory deception."
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summary: "Governing body of the U.S. central banking system, which approved the BCCI-backed takeover of Financial General Bankshares in 1981 on false assurances and fined BCCI 200 million dollars in July 1991."
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created: 2026-05-15
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updated: 2026-05-15
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updated: 2026-09-23
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location: "Washington, D.C."
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relations:
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- type: investigated
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with: "[[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]]"
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start: 1991-01-03
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fn: 3
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---
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The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve Board) is the governing body of the [[United States]] central banking system, established by the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 and headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Board consists of seven members appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, serving 14-year terms. The Federal Reserve is responsible for U.S. monetary policy, banking supervision and regulation, and maintenance of the financial system's stability. As a bank regulator, the Federal Reserve holds primary supervisory authority over bank holding companies - a jurisdiction directly relevant to the [[BCCI]] scandal.[^1]
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The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve Board) is the governing body of the [[United States]] central banking system, established by the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 and headquartered in [[Washington, D.C.]] The Board consists of seven members appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, serving 14-year terms. The Federal Reserve is responsible for U.S. monetary policy, banking supervision and regulation, and maintenance of the financial system's stability. As a bank regulator, the Federal Reserve holds primary supervisory authority over bank holding companies - a jurisdiction directly relevant to the [[BCCI]] scandal.[^1]
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### BCCI and First American Bankshares
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The Federal Reserve Board is prominently implicated in the [[BCCI]] scandal through its regulatory approval of the acquisition of [[First American Bankshares]], the largest bank holding company in the Washington, D.C. area. In 1981-1982, a group of Middle Eastern investors fronted by [[Clark Clifford]] - the Washington super-lawyer and former Secretary of Defense - and his law partner [[Robert Altman]] sought [[Federal Reserve]] approval to purchase First American (then called Financial General Bankshares). The investors represented themselves as independent Arab investors with no connection to [[BCCI]].
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The Federal Reserve Board is prominently implicated in the BCCI scandal through its regulatory approval of the acquisition of [[First American Bankshares]], the largest bank holding company in the Washington, D.C. area. In 1981-1982, a group of Middle Eastern investors fronted by [[Clark Clifford]] - the Washington super-lawyer and former Secretary of Defense - and his law partner [[Robert Altman]] sought [[Federal Reserve]] approval to purchase First American (then called Financial General Bankshares). The investors represented themselves as independent Arab investors with no connection to BCCI.
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The Federal Reserve approved the acquisition. In reality, [[BCCI]] secretly controlled the purchase: the nominally independent Arab investors were BCCI nominees whose shares were financed by BCCI, and BCCI chairman [[Agha Hasan Abedi]] made the key decisions about First American's management. Clifford and Altman maintained publicly - and in sworn testimony to the Federal Reserve - that BCCI did not control First American, which congressional investigators and prosecutors subsequently concluded was false. Clifford and Altman were indicted in 1992 for fraud in connection with the deception of the Federal Reserve; Clifford was ultimately not tried due to ill health, while Altman was acquitted.[^2]
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The Federal Reserve approved the acquisition. In reality, BCCI secretly controlled the purchase: the nominally independent Arab investors were BCCI nominees whose shares were financed by BCCI, and BCCI chairman [[Agha Hasan Abedi]] made the key decisions about First American's management. Clifford and Altman maintained publicly - and in sworn testimony to the Federal Reserve - that BCCI did not control First American, which congressional investigators and prosecutors subsequently concluded was false. Clifford and Altman were indicted in 1992 for fraud in connection with the deception of the Federal Reserve; Clifford was ultimately not tried due to ill health, while Altman was acquitted.[^2]
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The Federal Reserve's failure to detect BCCI's secret ownership of First American - despite BCCI's known reputation in the international banking community as an institution with irregular practices - was identified by the [[Kerry-Brown Senate Report|Kerry Committee investigation]] and the [[Bank of England]]'s [[Bingham Report]] as reflecting significant regulatory failure. The Federal Reserve paid insufficiently close attention to the backgrounds of investors seeking approval, relied on representations without adequate independent investigation, and permitted BCCI principals to escape detection for nearly a decade.
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### Post-BCCI Response
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Following the July 1991 closure of BCCI by international regulators, the Federal Reserve conducted its own investigation into BCCI's U.S. operations and imposed one of the largest fines in Federal Reserve history - $200 million - against BCCI and related entities in 1992. The settlement included the Federal Reserve's finding that BCCI and its principals had made false representations to the Board in connection with the First American acquisition, engaged in unsafe banking practices, and violated U.S. banking law.[^1]
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Following the July 1991 closure of BCCI by international regulators, the Federal Reserve conducted its own investigation into BCCI's U.S. operations and imposed one of the largest fines in Federal Reserve history, 200 million dollars against BCCI, assessed on July 29, 1991. The settlement included the Federal Reserve's finding that BCCI and its principals had made false representations to the Board in connection with the First American acquisition, engaged in unsafe banking practices, and violated U.S. banking law.[^1]
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### Iran-Contra Financial Flows
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The Federal Reserve System's broader role in the [[Iran-Contra Affair]] was as the institutional infrastructure through which the financial flows of the "Enterprise" - [[Oliver North]]'s off-books covert operations fund - moved through the banking system. Accounts at major U.S. banks, Swiss numbered accounts, and the network of front companies managed by [[Richard Secord]] and [[Albert Hakim]] all operated through correspondent banking relationships that passed through the Federal Reserve's payment system. The Federal Reserve itself was not involved in or aware of these operations, but its payment infrastructure was the medium through which the illegal financial transactions moved.[^2]
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### The Kerry-Brown Findings
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The [[BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report|Kerry-Brown Senate Report]] found that when the Board approved the takeover of [[Financial General Bankshares]] by [[Credit and Commerce American Holdings]] in 1981 "it had substantial circumstantial evidence before it to suggest that BCCI was behind the bank's purchase," and that it "would not have approved the CCAH application but for the false statements made to it." It relied on representations from the [[Central Intelligence Agency]], the [[United States Department of State|State Department]] and other agencies that they had no objections, and on the reputation of BCCI's lawyers, Clark Clifford and the former Federal Reserve counsel Baldwin Tuttle. Paul Volcker, who signed the approval, testified in 1991 that he "wasn't aware" of [[Kamal Adham]]'s intelligence background. The Treasury failed to pass on what the CIA told it in 1985 and 1986 about BCCI's ownership of [[First American Bank|First American]], although "[[Internal Revenue Service|IRS]] agents did provide important information to the Federal Reserve on this issue in early 1989, which the Federal Reserve failed adequately to investigate at the time." The purchase of the [[National Bank of Georgia]] in 1986 was an obvious warning sign not investigated until late 1990.[^3][^4]
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The Board opened a formal investigation on January 3, 1991, which the report called "aggressive and diligent." In mid-March 1991 it sent two investigators, Richard Small and Thomas Baxter, to [[Abu Dhabi]], where they were refused direct access to BCCI's files. On July 29, 1991, the day of the New York County indictments, it assessed a fine of 200 million dollars against BCCI, one of 37 million dollars against [[Ghaith R. Pharaon|Ghaith Pharaon]] and one of 20 million dollars against the BCCI official Kemal Shoaib; with the [[United States Department of Justice|Justice Department]] and District Attorney [[Robert Morgenthau]] it reached a plea agreement on December 17, 1991, under which BCCI's liquidators forfeited about 500 million dollars of BCCI's American assets. The report said that the Board's cooperation with the subcommittee "was unique among federal agencies."[^3] The [[Department of Justice|Justice Department]]'s head of the Criminal Division, [[Robert Mueller]], told the subcommittee that the information on BCCI's secret ownership "was passed on to the Federal Reserve after the October 1988 takedown," quoting the Board's general counsel, Virgil Mattingly, that it was "the kind of allegation [that] they had heard before."[^5]
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### Footnotes
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[^1]: Kerry, John and Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992.
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[^2]: Beaty, Jonathan and S.C. Gwynne. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI.* Random House, 1993.
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[^3]: Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992, ch. 12, "The Regulators." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/12reg.htm
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[^4]: Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992, ch. 11, "BCCI, the CIA and Foreign Intelligence." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/11intel.htm
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[^5]: Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992, ch. 8, "BCCI and Law Enforcement: The Justice Department and the U.S. Customs Service." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/08just.htm
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@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
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---
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category: "Intelligence & Government"
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alias:
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- ADIA
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tags:
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- Organization
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- AbuDhabi
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- SovereignWealth
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- BCCI
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summary: "Sovereign investment institution of Abu Dhabi, founded 1976, which held 10 percent of BCCI from 1980 and was awarded 1.347 billion dollars against BCCI's convicted executives in 1994."
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start: 1976
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location: "Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates"
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relations:
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- type: owned
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with: "[[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]]"
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role: "10 percent shareholder"
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start: 1980
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end: 1991
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fn: 2
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- type: head_of
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with: "[[Ghanim Faris al-Mazrui]]"
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reverse: true
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role: "secretary general"
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start: 1976
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fn: 2
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created: 2026-09-23
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updated: 2026-09-23
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---
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The [[Abu Dhabi]] Investment Authority (ADIA) is, in its own description to the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds, "a public institution established by the Government of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi in 1976 as an independent investment institution."[^1] From 1980 it held 10 percent of the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]] (BCCI), and its secretary general from 1976, [[Ghanim Faris al-Mazrui|Ghanim Faris al-Mazrui]], represented it on BCCI's board from 1981 and became the bank's chairman.[^2]
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### BCCI
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According to the [[BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report|Kerry-Brown Senate Report]], after the fall in 1980 of Abdullah Darweish, the adviser who managed the investments of the ruling family, Sheikh [[Zayed bin Sultan AL-Nahayan|Zayed]] directed ADIA to acquire a 10 percent stake in BCCI from [[ICIC]], BCCI's Cayman affiliate, which had agreed to buy back the shares of the departing [[Bank of America]]. Unlike the ruling family, which appeared to have contributed no more than 500,000 dollars to BCCI's capital before April 1990, ADIA "appears to have made some cash payments for its interest in BCCI," whose book value was about 250 million dollars at the end of 1989.[^2]
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After BCCI's closure ADIA joined the Private Department of the UAE president in suing the bank's former executives in Abu Dhabi, and on June 14, 1994, the court awarded it 1.347 billion dollars of the 9.13 billion dollars in damages.[^3] ADIA held 10 percent of Union National Bank, the former Bank of Credit and Commerce Emirates. In January 1995 BCCI's liquidators agreed to sell the bank's 40 percent stake in it back to the Abu Dhabi government for about 27.4 million dollars, and an Abu Dhabi official said the government would later transfer its 50 percent holding to ADIA; the purchase was completed in May 1996.[^4][^5]
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### Footnotes
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[^1]: International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds, "Abu Dhabi Investment Authority." https://www.ifswf.org/members/abu-dhabi-investment-authority
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[^2]: Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992, ch. 14, "Abu Dhabi: BCCI's Founding and Majority Stockholders." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/14abudhabi.htm
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[^3]: Hussain, Thomas. "UAE jails and fines BCCI executives," United Press International, June 14, 1994. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1994/06/14/UAE-jails-and-fines-BCCI-executives/7650771566400/
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[^4]: "Abu Dhabi to buy BCCI share in UAE bank," United Press International, January 31, 1995. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1995/01/31/Abu-Dhabi-to-buy-BCCI-share-in-UAE-bank/6991791528400/
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[^5]: "BCCI small depositors paid in UAE," United Press International, October 11, 1997. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1997/10/11/BCCI-small-depositors-paid-in-UAE/2814876542400/
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@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ tags:
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- Banking
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- BCCI
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- Intelligence
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summary: "The Bank of England is the UK's central bank and was the primary regulator of BCCI's British operations; its failure to act on clear warning signs about BCCI's fraud was documented in the 1992 Bingham Report, making it central to any account of how BCCI operated for so long under regulatory cover."
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summary: "Central bank of the United Kingdom and BCCI's principal supervisor, which propped up the bank in secret from 1990 before closing it in July 1991."
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created: 2026-05-14
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updated: 2026-05-14
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updated: 2026-09-23
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location: "London, United Kingdom"
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---
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@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ The Bank of England is the central bank of the [[United Kingdom]], established b
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### BCCI Supervision and Failure
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The [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]] was registered in Luxembourg and incorporated in the [[Cayman Islands]], but its primary operations and management were based in [[London]]. The Bank of England, as UK banking supervisor, was responsible for overseeing BCCI's British operations - its 65 branches and the London-based senior management.
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The Bank of Credit and Commerce International was registered in Luxembourg and incorporated in the [[Cayman Islands]], but its primary operations and management were based in London. The Bank of England, as UK banking supervisor, was responsible for overseeing BCCI's British operations - its 65 branches and the London-based senior management.
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Multiple warnings about BCCI's fraudulent operations reached the Bank of England before the July 1991 closure. The Price Waterhouse audit firm, which had discovered systematic fraud in its 1990-1991 review of BCCI accounts, disclosed its findings to the Bank of England under a provision of the Banking Act 1987. The Bank of England was also in receipt of intelligence from U.S. authorities, including the [[CIA]], about BCCI's criminal operations from at least 1985. Despite these inputs, the Bank of England did not close BCCI but instead pursued a secret plan - agreed with [[Abu Dhabi]]'s Sheikh Zayed - to reorganize the bank under Abu Dhabi ownership.
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@ -26,13 +26,26 @@ The Bank coordinated the international seizure of BCCI on July 5, 1991, when reg
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The [[Bingham Report]] - formally the Report of Inquiry into the Supervision of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, submitted to the Chancellor of the Exchequer by Lord Justice Bingham in October 1992 - examined the Bank of England's supervisory failures in detail. The Report found that the Bank had received numerous indicators of BCCI's problems over the years and had failed to investigate them adequately. It attributed the failures to the Bank's culture of giving the benefit of the doubt to those it regulated, its limited enforcement powers, and the deliberate complexity of BCCI's corporate structure.[^2]
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The [[Kerry Committee|Kerry-Brown Senate investigation]] in the United States was more critical, suggesting that intelligence about BCCI's criminal nature had been available and suppressed for reasons that included the bank's CIA utility. The Senate report documented the Bank of England's awareness of intelligence assessments from the CIA and others that went beyond mere supervisory information.[^1]
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The [[Kerry Committee|Kerry-Brown Senate investigation]] in the [[United States]] was more critical, suggesting that intelligence about BCCI's criminal nature had been available and suppressed for reasons that included the bank's [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] utility. The Senate report documented the Bank of England's awareness of intelligence assessments from the CIA and others that went beyond mere supervisory information.[^1]
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### Role in Broader Financial Oversight
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The Bank of England is also referenced in this vault through its historical role in overseeing the City of London's offshore financial markets, which provided the regulatory architecture within which [[Eurodollar]] markets and offshore bond markets developed. These markets were used extensively by the arms-brokering and intelligence-connected financial flows documented in subjects including [[Iran-Contra Affair]] and the [[BNL scandal]].[^1]
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### The Kerry-Brown Findings
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The [[BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report|Kerry-Brown Senate Report]] recorded that the Bank considered BCCI "the most difficult bank we have to deal with" as far back as the 1970s, and set out its conduct in a list of findings. In 1988 and 1989 the Bank learned of BCCI's involvement in financing terrorism and laundering drug money. In the spring of 1990 Price Waterhouse told it of substantial loan losses, poor banking practices and evidence of fraud, and its response "was not to close BCCI down, but to find ways to prop up BCCI and prevent its collapse," which meant "keeping secret the very serious nature of BCCI's problems from its creditors and one million depositors." In April 1990 the Bank reached an agreement with BCCI, Abu Dhabi and Price Waterhouse under which Abu Dhabi guaranteed BCCI's losses and Price Waterhouse certified its books. The Bank withheld information from the [[Federal Reserve Board|Federal Reserve]] in the spring of 1990 about BCCI's lending on the shares of [[First American Bank|First American]]'s holding company, which "delayed the opening of a full investigation by the Federal Reserve for approximately eight months." In late 1990 and early 1991 it tentatively agreed to let BCCI restructure as three separate banks in London, Abu Dhabi and [[Hong Kong]], a decision the report said "demonstrated extraordinarily poor judgment," before deciding abruptly in late June 1991 to close it. Its decision of April 1990 to let BCCI move its headquarters, officers and records to Abu Dhabi "constituted a costly, and likely irretrievable, error."[^3] [[Robin Leigh-Pemberton]] told the House of Commons Treasury and Civil Service Committee that on receipt of the [[Price Waterhouse]] reports of April and October 1990 the Bank had been "alerted to [fraud and deceit]," but that "our view was that even if this added up to individual acts of fraudulent conduct it did not give evidence of a system of fraud throughout the Bank which was wide enough to justify closure. I hope it does not shock you too much, it is only a matter of realism that we do have occasions of fraud in banks... if we close down a bank every time we find an individual act or two of fraud we would have rather fewer banks than we do at the moment." On warning depositors he said: "A hint from the Bank of England that somebody on our list may not be quite pukka would be the kiss of death to the future of a bank."[^3]
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The Price Waterhouse draft report to the Bank dated June 22, 1991, code-named "Sandstorm," found evidence of "widespread fraud and manipulation" and was, in the words of the Senate report, "the final evidence that lead to the shutdown of BCCI globally on July 5, 1991." The Senate subcommittee received it only "in a heavily censured form" at the insistence of the Bank of England.[^4]
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### Three Rivers
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BCCI's liquidators, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, sued the Bank for 850 million pounds (1.78 billion dollars), the first such suit brought against it; because the Bank was protected from negligence claims, the liquidators alleged that 22 of its officials were guilty of "misfeasance," acting dishonestly or in bad faith. The trial, *Three Rivers District Council v. Bank of England*, began in January 2004, with opening speeches of 119 days for the Bank and 80 days for Deloitte. On November 2, 2005, Deloitte dropped the case after the Chancellor of the High Court said that continuing was no longer in the creditors' interests; the Bank called it "unconditional surrender," and its counsel, Nicholas Stadlen, "the most remarkable and humiliating climb down in the history of English litigation."[^5]
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### Footnotes
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[^1]: "Bank of England," *Encyclopaedia Britannica.* https://www.britannica.com/topic/Bank-of-England
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[^2]: Kerry, John, and Brown, Hank. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations.* United States Senate, 1992.
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[^3]: Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992, ch. 12, "The Regulators." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/12reg.htm
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[^4]: Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992, ch. 4, "BCCI's Criminality." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/04crime.htm
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[^5]: "BCCI's $1.8-billion suit against Bank of England collapses," Reuters, *The Globe and Mail,* November 3, 2005. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/bccis-18-billion-suit-against-bank-of-england-collapses/article18251998/
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---
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category: "Business & Finance"
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tags:
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- Organization
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- NewZealand
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- Banking
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- Privatization
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- StatutoryManagement
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- RCHorsch
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aliases:
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- Development Finance Corporation of New Zealand
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- DFC New Zealand Ltd
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- DFC
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summary: "New Zealand state development lender founded in 1964, corporatized in 1987, sold in 1988 to the National Provident Fund and Salomon Brothers, and placed in statutory management as insolvent in October 1989."
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start: 1964
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end: 1989-10-03
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location: "Wellington, New Zealand"
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relations:
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- type: owned
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with: "[[National Provident Fund]]"
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reverse: true
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role: "80 percent"
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start: 1988-11-18
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fn: 1
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- type: owned
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with: "[[Salomon Brothers]]"
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reverse: true
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role: "20 percent"
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start: 1988-11-18
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fn: 1
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created: 2026-09-23
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updated: 2026-09-23
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---
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The Development Finance Corporation (DFC) was "originally established by an Act of Parliament in 1964 to encourage investment by providing financial assistance and financial advisory services to industry." It was first owned by private banks, the [[Reserve Bank of New Zealand|Reserve Bank]] and the [[New Zealand]] government; the government assumed sole ownership in 1973.[^1]
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### Chemical Technology
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In 1981 the corporation reported favourably on the viability of the whey-to-ethanol project of [[Chemical Technology Limited]] at [[Temuka]], alongside two regional development suspensory loans totalling 120,235 dollars approved for the company on the recommendation of the South Canterbury Regional Development Council, according to the Minister of Immigration, [[Kerry Burke]], in October 1984.[^2] The company's American director, known as Dr Stanley Stokowski, was the fugitive [[R.C. Horsch]].
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### Sale and Collapse
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The corporation became a state-owned enterprise, DFC New Zealand Ltd, on April 1, 1987. Its 1987 annual report, signed by its chairman, Malcolm McConnell, said that the directors had "maintained DFC's relatively conservative accounting policies of previous years and, coupled with a rigorous approach to prudential management, this has ensured that the profit result is based on high quality earnings." In June 1988 the government announced the sale of 80 percent to the [[National Provident Fund]] and 20 percent to [[Salomon Brothers]] for 111.28 million dollars; the National Party opposition argued that the company was being "deliberately under-priced" to advantage senior managers who were to buy 20 percent later.[^1]
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In December 1988 DFC applied to become a registered bank. A management review of its loan portfolio in August and September 1989 concluded that it needed a large capital injection; its shareholders and the government declined to provide one. On October 2, 1989, the company advised the Reserve Bank that it had limited liquidity and was technically insolvent, and on October 3 it was placed in statutory management under section 38R of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Amendment Act 1986. The Reserve Bank governor, [[Don Brash]], later wrote that "the reputation of New Zealand and its financial system were very much at stake." Its total liabilities had risen from 1.578 billion dollars in 1986 to 2.881 billion in 1989.[^1]
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### Footnotes
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[^1]: Smith, Christie. "DFC NZ: a cautionary tale of one company's financial failure," preliminary draft, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, June 16, 2011. https://www.nzae.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/2011/Session4/44_Smith.pdf
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[^2]: "Impostor: immigration cleared of blame," *The Press* (Christchurch), October 3, 1984. https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/CHP19841003.2.23
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@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
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---
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category: "Intelligence & Government"
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tags:
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- Organization
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- NewZealand
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- Intelligence
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- NZSIS
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- ColdWar
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aliases:
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- NZSIS
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- New Zealand Security Service
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- Security Intelligence Service
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summary: "New Zealand's domestic intelligence agency, founded in 1956 as the New Zealand Security Service on the model of MI5 and given its present name and a statute in 1969."
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start: 1956-11-28
|
||||
location: "Wellington, New Zealand"
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[William Sutch]]"
|
||||
start: 1974
|
||||
fn: 2
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[Vsevolod Sofinsky]]"
|
||||
start: 1980
|
||||
fn: 2
|
||||
created: 2026-09-23
|
||||
updated: 2026-09-23
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
The New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) is [[New Zealand]]'s domestic intelligence agency. It was established on November 28, 1956, as the New Zealand Security Service; "until then, apart from a brief period during the Second World War, national security had been handled by the Police," and between 1956 and 1969 it "existed without a legislative base." The New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act 1969 gave it its present name, recognized it in statute, and defined its role as protecting New Zealand "from threats of espionage, sabotage and subversion."[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### Origins
|
||||
|
||||
The Police Special Branch was set up in December 1949 and concentrated on the [[Communist Party of New Zealand|Communist Party]] and other "radicals"; its limitations were exposed in the 1951 waterfront dispute. In November 1956 the government created the independent Security Service, and the Special Branch was disbanded by August 1957, after "a series of damning reports on the Special Branch from the controller general of police and from British and Australian security service officers" and amid concerns over corruption at the top of the police. The Soviet defector [[Vladimir Petrov]] had alleged in Australia that an informer was operating at a high level in the New Zealand government.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Cold War
|
||||
|
||||
The service, "closely modelled on the British [[MI5]]," concentrated its counter-espionage on the Soviet and East European embassies, and from 1973 on the new Chinese embassy. In 1962 it exposed two Soviet diplomats who were expelled for attempting to obtain information through bribery. In 1974 the economist and former senior public servant [[William Sutch]] was arrested and charged with espionage after an SIS investigation; he was acquitted. After the Sutch case and a scandal over leaked documents, the Ombudsman reported in 1976 that the service should concentrate on counter-espionage rather than counter-subversion; the amendment bill of 1977, which expanded its power to intercept communications, drew large protests. In 1980 an SIS investigation led to the expulsion of the Soviet ambassador, [[Vsevolod Sofinsky]], for allegedly passing money to the [[Socialist Unity Party (New Zealand)|Socialist Unity Party]].[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
During the [[1981 Springbok tour]] the service supplied Prime Minister [[Robert Muldoon]] with a list of eight "subversives" and seven "radicals not positively known to be members of subversive groups," which Muldoon published in an attempt to discredit the protest movement. In December 1981 an SIS officer mislaid a briefcase that was found by a ten-year-old boy whose mother, Fran O'Sullivan, was a parliamentary journalist; it contained, according to the reports, "three cold oval meat pies, two slices of cake, copies of the latest Listener and Penthouse, three identity cards, the man's letter of appointment to the SIS ... and pages from what appeared to be a notebook."[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Stokowski Affair
|
||||
|
||||
Under Brigadier [[Lindsay Smith]], director from 1983 to 1991, the service declined to comment on the disappearance in March 1984 of the American known as Dr Stanley Stokowski, a director of [[Chemical Technology Limited]], whom a Sunday newspaper had described as a Russian spy; Smith said it was "a matter for the police and for customs."[^3] The man was the fugitive [[R.C. Horsch]]. Smith's term also covered the bombing of the [[Rainbow Warrior]] in 1985.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
### Legislation
|
||||
|
||||
The statutory definition of security was amended in 1977 "to take account of international terrorism," again in 1996 and 1999, and in 2003 to align with the [[Terrorism Suppression Act 2002]]. Further changes followed with the Intelligence and Security Act 2017.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, "Our history." http://web.archive.org/web/20260513190640/https://www.nzsis.govt.nz/about-us/our-history
|
||||
[^2]: Clayworth, Peter. "Intelligence services: The Cold War, 1945 to 1984," *Te Ara: The Encyclopedia of New Zealand,* May 29, 2012. http://web.archive.org/web/20250919013618/https://teara.govt.nz/en/intelligence-services/page-2
|
||||
[^3]: "Police look for U.S. chemist," *The Press* (Christchurch), June 6, 1984 (Press Association, Timaru). https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/CHP19840606.2.48
|
||||
[^4]: "Obituary: John Lindsay Smith," *The New Zealand Herald,* September 20, 2002. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/iobituaryi-john-lindsay-smith/MKZ33367T76UQ4HMATRFJYPYGY/
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
category: "Law Enforcement & Legal"
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- Organization
|
||||
- Government
|
||||
- UnitedKingdom
|
||||
- Prosecution
|
||||
- BCCI
|
||||
alias:
|
||||
- SFO
|
||||
summary: "British prosecuting agency for serious and complex fraud, which opened its BCCI investigation in 1991 and convicted the bank's treasury chief Ziauddin Akbar in 1993 and its largest debtor Abbas Gokal in 1997."
|
||||
location: "London, United Kingdom"
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]]"
|
||||
start: 1991-06
|
||||
fn: 2
|
||||
created: 2026-09-23
|
||||
updated: 2026-09-23
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
The Serious Fraud Office (SFO) is the British agency that investigates and prosecutes serious and complex fraud in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. The [[BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report|Kerry-Brown Senate Report]] described it as "the British version of the financial crimes unit within the [[Department of Justice|Justice Department]]."[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### BCCI Investigation
|
||||
|
||||
According to the Senate report, the [[Bank of England]] alerted the SFO to begin an investigation of the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]] (BCCI) one week after receiving the draft [[Sandstorm Report]] of [[Price Waterhouse]] on June 22, 1991, four days before the bank's worldwide closure on July 5.[^2] The report recorded that when the office of the Manhattan District Attorney, [[Robert Morgenthau]], sought BCCI documents from the SFO, it "was unwilling to provide it with any assistance," and listed the SFO with BCCI's lawyers, accountants and shareholders, the Bank of England and the Justice Department among the institutions that, "while professing to cooperate with the District Attorney, in fact withheld information." It also found that the investigations of the [[Federal Reserve Board|Federal Reserve]] had been hampered by the SFO, which prevented it from interviewing certain witnesses and reviewing certain documents in the [[United Kingdom]].[^1][^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### Prosecutions
|
||||
|
||||
On September 27, 1993, [[Syed Ziauddin Ali Akbar]], the former head of BCCI's treasury division in London, pleaded guilty at the [[Old Bailey]] to sixteen counts of false accounting, and the next day was sentenced to six years, the first criminal conviction arising from BCCI's collapse; an SFO official said no further criminal prosecution of him was planned. Three further BCCI-related trials were then scheduled for January 1994.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
In September 1992 the SFO opened an inquiry into BCCI's loans to the [[Gulf Group]] of the [[Gokal brothers]], drawing on records from the London liquidators, [[Touche Ross]], and from [[Grand Cayman]], [[Abu Dhabi]] and two New York banks. [[Abbas Gokal]] was arrested at [[Frankfurt]] in July 1994, extradited, and charged in February 1995; after a trial of 122 days at the Old Bailey he was convicted of conspiracy to account falsely and conspiracy to defraud, and on May 8, 1997, he was sentenced to fourteen years, the heaviest sentence the SFO had then obtained. The trial cost about 10 million pounds.[^4][^5]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Kerry and Brown, *The BCCI Affair,* ch. 9, "BCCI and Law Enforcement: District Attorney of New York." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/09ny.htm
|
||||
[^2]: Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992, ch. 12, "The Regulators." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/12reg.htm
|
||||
[^3]: "BCCI official gets six years for fraud charges," United Press International, September 28, 1993. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1993/09/28/BCCI-official-gets-six-years-for-fraud-charges/3315749188800/
|
||||
[^4]: "On the trail of Gokal," *Accountancy Age,* May 23, 1997. https://accountancyage.com/1997/05/23/on-the-trail-of-gokal/
|
||||
[^5]: "Gokal sentenced to 14 years for BCCI fraud," *The Irish Times,* May 9, 1997. https://www.irishtimes.com/business/gokal-sentenced-to-14-years-for-bcci-fraud-1.70650
|
||||
|
|
@ -25,11 +25,11 @@ The CIA, particularly through its Photographic Intelligence Division, was instru
|
|||
|
||||
The CIA's interest in psi research dates back to the early 1970s, partly in response to rumors of extensive Soviet psi research. Following a number of scandals in the mid-1970s, including revelations of domestic spying, the CIA came under unprecedented scrutiny from Congress. This led to a preference for "clean" spying methods, making psychic intelligence an appealing, low-profile alternative to traditional human intelligence (HUMINT).[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
In 1972, the CIA, through officials like [[Kenneth A. Kress|Ken Kress]] from the Technical Services Division (TSD) (later the Office of Technical Service, OTS), provided the initial funding for [[Hal Puthoff]]'s psi research program at [[Stanford Research Institute]] (SRI). This funding, initially $50,000 for eight months, was contingent on the researchers demonstrating a repeatable psi phenomenon. The Office of Research and Development (ORD) also jointly managed the funding and contract.[^1] In the late 1960s, the CIA had approached Hal Puthoff and Russell Targ at Stanford University to develop a program to counter a similar effort in the Soviet Union, which led to the creation of the [[Stargate Project]], a program that trained individuals in [[Remote Viewing]] to spy on foreign targets. The program was reportedly highly successful, and Puthoff reported directly to the Director of the CIA and the [[White House]].[^11]
|
||||
In 1972, the CIA, through officials like [[Kenneth A. Kress|Ken Kress]] from the Technical Services Division (TSD) (later the Office of Technical Service, OTS), provided the initial funding for [[Hal Puthoff]]'s psi research program at [[Stanford Research Institute]] (SRI). This funding, initially $50,000 for eight months, was contingent on the researchers demonstrating a repeatable psi phenomenon. The Office of Research and Development (ORD) also jointly managed the funding and contract.[^1] In the late 1960s, the CIA had approached Hal Puthoff and Russell Targ at Stanford University to develop a program to counter a similar effort in the Soviet Union, which led to the creation of the [[Stargate Project]], a program that trained individuals in [[Remote Viewing]] to spy on foreign targets. The program was reportedly highly successful, and Puthoff reported directly to the Director of the CIA and the [[White House]].[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Search for Behavioral Control
|
||||
|
||||
Since [[World War II]] the CIA searched secretly for ways to control human behavior, an effort that extended the wartime [[Office of Strategic Services|OSS]] quest for a truth drug and echoed both the Nazi experiments at [[Dachau]] and [[Albert Hofmann]]'s discovery of [[LSD]]. The programs were triggered by the 1949 show trial of [[Josef Cardinal Mindszenty]] in [[Hungary]], whose glazed confession convinced Agency officials the Communists had developed a technique to render defendants zombielike; what began as defensive research quickly turned offensive, with documents stressing the goal of "controlling an individual to the point where he will do our bidding against his will and even against such fundamental laws of nature as self-preservation." The effort passed through [[Project Bluebird and Project Artichoke|Project BLUEBIRD]] (1950), ARTICHOKE (1952), and finally [[Project MKUltra|MKULTRA]] under the [[Office of Technical Service|Technical Services Staff]], with [[Richard Helms]] its most important sponsor and his protégé [[Sidney Gottlieb]] running it day to day. The research systematically violated the will of subjects drawn from groups officials considered expendable, mental patients, prostitutes, foreigners, drug addicts, and prisoners; as one Agency psychologist put it, operators lacked "a universal concept of mankind" and were willing to do things to foreigners they would not try on Americans. "It was strictly a patriotic vision," he said.[^16]
|
||||
Since [[World War II]] the CIA searched secretly for ways to control human behavior, an effort that extended the wartime [[Office of Strategic Services|OSS]] quest for a truth drug and echoed both the Nazi experiments at [[Dachau]] and [[Albert Hofmann]]'s discovery of [[LSD]]. The programs were triggered by the 1949 show trial of [[Josef Cardinal Mindszenty]] in [[Hungary]], whose glazed confession convinced Agency officials the Communists had developed a technique to render defendants zombielike; what began as defensive research quickly turned offensive, with documents stressing the goal of "controlling an individual to the point where he will do our bidding against his will and even against such fundamental laws of nature as self-preservation." The effort passed through [[Project Bluebird and Project Artichoke|Project BLUEBIRD]] (1950), ARTICHOKE (1952), and finally [[Project MKUltra|MKULTRA]] under the [[Office of Technical Service|Technical Services Staff]], with [[Richard Helms]] its most important sponsor and his protégé [[Sidney Gottlieb]] running it day to day. The research systematically violated the will of subjects drawn from groups officials considered expendable, mental patients, prostitutes, foreigners, drug addicts, and prisoners; as one Agency psychologist put it, operators lacked "a universal concept of mankind" and were willing to do things to foreigners they would not try on Americans. "It was strictly a patriotic vision," he said.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
### Notable Operations and Impact
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -51,67 +51,70 @@ Following the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor at [[Osirak bombing]]
|
|||
|
||||
### Involvement with BCCI
|
||||
|
||||
The CIA used the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International|BCCI]] extensively, particularly in connection with covert U.S. operations in [[Central America]].[^3] Even before [[Oliver North]] established his network for illegal payments to the [[Contras]], the [[National Security Council]] used BCCI to channel money to them through [[Saudi Arabia]].[^3] The CIA maintained accounts in BCCI for covert operations.[^4]
|
||||
The CIA used the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International|BCCI]] extensively, particularly in connection with covert U.S. operations in [[Central America]].[^5] Even before [[Oliver North]] established his network for illegal payments to the [[Contras]], the [[National Security Council]] used BCCI to channel money to them through [[Saudi Arabia]].[^5] The CIA maintained accounts in BCCI for covert operations.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
In 1986, the CIA issued a report stating that BCCI had owned [[First American Bank]] since 1982.[^5] In 1991, Acting CIA Director [[Richard J. Kerr]] confirmed that the agency had used BCCI to move money around the world.[^6] The CIA also maintained slush funds at BCCI branches, which were used for payoffs of Pakistani military officers and Afghan rebel leaders.[^7]
|
||||
In 1986, the CIA issued a report stating that BCCI had owned [[First American Bank]] since 1982.[^7] In 1991, Acting CIA Director [[Richard J. Kerr]] confirmed that the agency had used BCCI to move money around the world.[^8] The CIA also maintained slush funds at BCCI branches, which were used for payoffs of Pakistani military officers and Afghan rebel leaders.[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
William J. Casey, former CIA Director, met secretly with [[Agha Hasan Abedi]] over a three-year period, discussing U.S. arms deals with Iran and the arming of Afghan resistance forces.[^8] The CIA began using BCCI in the bank's earliest days, as it was establishing itself in countries where American intelligence had few assets.[^8]
|
||||
William J. Casey, former CIA Director, met secretly with [[Agha Hasan Abedi]] over a three-year period, discussing U.S. arms deals with Iran and the arming of Afghan resistance forces.[^10] The CIA began using BCCI in the bank's earliest days, as it was establishing itself in countries where American intelligence had few assets.[^10]
|
||||
|
||||
The [[BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report|Kerry-Brown Senate Report]] recorded that the agency produced several hundred reports on BCCI between 1979 and 1991, including special analyses in 1985, 1986 and 1989. The 1985 report, delivered in January 1985 to the Treasury's intelligence liaison, [[Douglas Mulholland]], who called it "dynamite," stated that BCCI secretly owned First American Bank; the 1986 report went to the [[State Department]], the Defense Intelligence Agency, the [[National Security Agency]], the National Security Council, Commerce and the Treasury, except for "the two agencies which would have had a statutory responsibility to begin investigations in response," the [[Federal Reserve Board|Federal Reserve]] and the [[Department of Justice|Justice Department]]. Acting Director Richard J. Kerr testified on October 25, 1991, that the agency's own use of BCCI had been "limited and routine," and acknowledged "extensive use of First American" for ordinary accounts. The agency denied any relationship between William J. Casey and Agha Hasan Abedi; the report recorded a contrary account from a BCCI official of meetings at the [[Madison Hotel]] in Washington, and the view of the agency's legal department that any such activity by Casey would have been undertaken "in his position as an advisor to the President, rather than in his position as Director of Central Intelligence," outside the agency's records.[^11]
|
||||
|
||||
### Operations and Activities
|
||||
|
||||
The CIA sent the [[Inter-Services Intelligence|Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)]] agency enormous quantities of cash to keep things moving through [[Pakistan]] during the [[Soviet-Afghan War]].[^9] The CIA was responsible for obtaining arms and ammunition for the [[Mujahideen]], but once delivered to [[Karachi]], the ISI was responsible for moving the equipment.[^9]
|
||||
The CIA sent the [[Inter-Services Intelligence|Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)]] agency enormous quantities of cash to keep things moving through [[Pakistan]] during the [[Soviet-Afghan War]].[^12] The CIA was responsible for obtaining arms and ammunition for the [[Mujahideen]], but once delivered to [[Karachi]], the ISI was responsible for moving the equipment.[^12]
|
||||
|
||||
In 1980, Jimmy Carter signed a presidential "finding" authorizing the CIA to aid the Afghan rebels in "harassment" of the Soviet occupying forces through secret supplies of light weapons and limited funds.[^10] This became the largest covert-action program since [[World War Two]].[^10]
|
||||
In 1980, Jimmy Carter signed a presidential "finding" authorizing the CIA to aid the Afghan rebels in "harassment" of the Soviet occupying forces through secret supplies of light weapons and limited funds.[^13] This became the largest covert-action program since [[World War Two]].[^13]
|
||||
|
||||
### UAP Research and Secrecy
|
||||
|
||||
The CIA has a long and complex history with the [[Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena]] (UAP) issue. The agency has been a key player in the government's long-standing policy of secrecy and denial on the UAP topic. The Robertson Panel, a CIA-sponsored committee in 1953, recommended a policy of debunking UAP reports and using the mass media to ridicule the topic. This policy was highly effective in creating the stigma that has surrounded the UAP issue for decades.[^11]
|
||||
The CIA has a long and complex history with the [[Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena]] (UAP) issue. The agency has been a key player in the government's long-standing policy of secrecy and denial on the UAP topic. The Robertson Panel, a CIA-sponsored committee in 1953, recommended a policy of debunking UAP reports and using the mass media to ridicule the topic. This policy was highly effective in creating the stigma that has surrounded the UAP issue for decades.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
The CIA is also said to have operated a little-known "weird desk," which was responsible for investigating unusual medical issues, implants, and abductions related to UAP encounters. [[Dr. William Livingston]], who served as a medical advisor to the [[Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program]] (AATIP), is described as having presided over this desk.[^11]
|
||||
The CIA is also said to have operated a little-known "weird desk," which was responsible for investigating unusual medical issues, implants, and abductions related to UAP encounters. [[Dr. William Livingston]], who served as a medical advisor to the [[Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program]] (AATIP), is described as having presided over this desk.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
In recent years, the CIA has been more involved in the official UAP investigation. The agency was a participant in the [[UAP Task Force]] and is a member of the current [[All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office]] (AARO). However, the agency's long history of secrecy and obfuscation on the UAP topic has led to a great deal of skepticism about its willingness to be fully transparent.[^11]
|
||||
In recent years, the CIA has been more involved in the official UAP investigation. The agency was a participant in the [[UAP Task Force]] and is a member of the current [[All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office]] (AARO). However, the agency's long history of secrecy and obfuscation on the UAP topic has led to a great deal of skepticism about its willingness to be fully transparent.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
### Dark Alliance Investigation
|
||||
|
||||
The CIA's covert action division, the Directorate of Operations, created and managed the Contra project during the 1980s, with its Latin American Division headed by [[Dewey Clarridge]] from 1981 to 1984. The agency recruited Contra leaders including [[Enrique Bermudez|Enrique Bermúdez]] in 1980 and [[Eden Pastora]] in 1981. The CIA maintained station chiefs in [[Costa Rica]], notably [[Joseph Fernandez|Joseph Fernández]] from 1984 to 1986, who were integral to Oliver North's illegal Contra resupply operation.[^12]
|
||||
The CIA's covert action division, the Directorate of Operations, created and managed the Contra project during the 1980s, with its Latin American Division headed by [[Dewey Clarridge]] from 1981 to 1984. The agency recruited Contra leaders including [[Enrique Bermudez|Enrique Bermúdez]] in 1980 and [[Eden Pastora]] in 1981. The CIA maintained station chiefs in [[Costa Rica]], notably [[Joseph Fernandez|Joseph Fernández]] from 1984 to 1986, who were integral to Oliver North's illegal Contra resupply operation.[^14]
|
||||
|
||||
### Contra Drug Trafficking and the Frogman Case
|
||||
|
||||
Federal law enforcement records and congressional testimony established that the CIA had reports of [[Cocaine]] being transshipped through Contra-linked facilities, including [[Ilopango Airbase]] in [[El Salvador]]. When defense attorneys in the [[Frogman Case]] obtained letters from CIA assets claiming seized drug money belonged to the Contras, the CIA's Costa Rican station cabled Langley that both men were assets of an organization that had "unwittingly received CIA support." CIA lawyer Lee Strickland flew to [[San Francisco]] and asked the prosecutor to ensure depositions did not go forward. The government returned $36,020 in seized drug money and a CIA cable declared: "CIA equities are fully protected."[^13]
|
||||
Federal law enforcement records and congressional testimony established that the CIA had reports of [[Cocaine]] being transshipped through Contra-linked facilities, including [[Ilopango Airbase]] in [[El Salvador]]. When defense attorneys in the [[Frogman Case]] obtained letters from CIA assets claiming seized drug money belonged to the Contras, the CIA's Costa Rican station cabled Langley that both men were assets of an organization that had "unwittingly received CIA support." CIA lawyer Lee Strickland flew to [[San Francisco]] and asked the prosecutor to ensure depositions did not go forward. The government returned $36,020 in seized drug money and a CIA cable declared: "CIA equities are fully protected."[^15]
|
||||
|
||||
The pseudonymous agent [[Ivan Gomez|Iván Gómez]], assigned to Costa Rica in 1982 as the CIA's liaison to the Contra armies, admitted during polygraph tests that he had laundered drug money. He was fired in 1989 for repeated polygraph failures concerning drug dealing.[^13]
|
||||
The pseudonymous agent [[Ivan Gomez|Iván Gómez]], assigned to Costa Rica in 1982 as the CIA's liaison to the Contra armies, admitted during polygraph tests that he had laundered drug money. He was fired in 1989 for repeated polygraph failures concerning drug dealing.[^15]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Secret 1982 Agreement with the Justice Department
|
||||
|
||||
In early 1982, CIA director William J. Casey and Attorney General [[William French Smith]] signed a formal Memorandum of Understanding that exempted the CIA from reporting drug crimes committed by its non-employees - a category including agents, assets, and non-staff employees. Drug offenses were specifically removed from the list of crimes the CIA was required to report. The agreement remained in effect from 1982 to 1995.[^14]
|
||||
In early 1982, CIA director William J. Casey and Attorney General [[William French Smith]] signed a formal Memorandum of Understanding that exempted the CIA from reporting drug crimes committed by its non-employees - a category including agents, assets, and non-staff employees. Drug offenses were specifically removed from the list of crimes the CIA was required to report. The agreement remained in effect from 1982 to 1995.[^16]
|
||||
|
||||
### Ilopango Obstruction
|
||||
|
||||
When [[DEA]] agent [[Celerino Castillo]] began investigating Contra drug trafficking at Ilopango, the CIA intervened directly. In April 1986 the El Salvador station sent a cable asking the Costa Rica station to persuade the DEA to back off: "El Salvador Station would appreciate Costa Rica Station advising DEA not to make any inquiries into anyone re: Hangar No. 4 at Ilopango since only legitimate CIA supported operations were conducted from this facility."[^15]
|
||||
When [[DEA]] agent [[Celerino Castillo]] began investigating Contra drug trafficking at Ilopango, the CIA intervened directly. In April 1986 the El Salvador station sent a cable asking the Costa Rica station to persuade the DEA to back off: "El Salvador Station would appreciate Costa Rica Station advising DEA not to make any inquiries into anyone re: Hangar No. 4 at Ilopango since only legitimate CIA supported operations were conducted from this facility."[^17]
|
||||
|
||||
### Inspector General Investigation
|
||||
|
||||
CIA Inspector General [[Fred Hitz]] testified before the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence|House Intelligence Committee]] in March 1998 that the CIA "did not, in an expeditious or consistent fashion, cut off relationships with individuals supporting the Contra program who were alleged to have engaged in drug trafficking activity," including trafficking within the United States. His 400-page report documented CIA relationships with more than 50 suspected drug traffickers during the Contra war.[^14]
|
||||
CIA Inspector General [[Fred Hitz]] testified before the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence|House Intelligence Committee]] in March 1998 that the CIA "did not, in an expeditious or consistent fashion, cut off relationships with individuals supporting the Contra program who were alleged to have engaged in drug trafficking activity," including trafficking within the United States. His 400-page report documented CIA relationships with more than 50 suspected drug traffickers during the Contra war.[^16]
|
||||
|
||||
### Iran-Contra Indictments
|
||||
|
||||
Multiple CIA officials were indicted during the Iran-Contra investigation. Clarridge was indicted on seven counts of perjury. Fernández was indicted on four counts. [[Alan Fiers]] pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress. All were pardoned by former CIA director [[George H.W. Bush]].[^12]
|
||||
Multiple CIA officials were indicted during the Iran-Contra investigation. Clarridge was indicted on seven counts of perjury. Fernández was indicted on four counts. [[Alan Fiers]] pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress. All were pardoned by former CIA director [[George H.W. Bush]].[^14]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Schnabel, Jim. *Remote Viewers*. Dell, 1997.
|
||||
[^2]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991.
|
||||
[^3]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 126.
|
||||
[^4]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 147.
|
||||
[^5]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 12.
|
||||
[^6]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 9.
|
||||
[^7]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 149.
|
||||
[^8]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 347.
|
||||
[^9]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 334.
|
||||
[^10]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 341.
|
||||
[^11]: Elizondo, Luis. *Imminent*. William Morrow, 2024.
|
||||
[^12]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Prologue and Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom"
|
||||
[^13]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom"
|
||||
[^14]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue: "The damage that has been done"
|
||||
[^15]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 13: "The wrong kind of friends"
|
||||
[^16]: John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*. Times Books, 1979, Chapters 1-2.
|
||||
[^3]: Elizondo, Luis. *Imminent*. William Morrow, 2024.
|
||||
[^4]: John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*. Times Books, 1979, Chapters 1-2.
|
||||
[^5]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 126.
|
||||
[^6]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 147.
|
||||
[^7]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 12.
|
||||
[^8]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 9.
|
||||
[^9]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 149.
|
||||
[^10]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 347.
|
||||
[^11]: Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992, ch. 11, "BCCI, the CIA and Foreign Intelligence." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/11intel.htm
|
||||
[^12]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 334.
|
||||
[^13]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 341.
|
||||
[^14]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Prologue and Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom"
|
||||
[^15]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom"
|
||||
[^16]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue: "The damage that has been done"
|
||||
[^17]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 13: "The wrong kind of friends"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ aliases:
|
|||
- DOJ
|
||||
- Justice Department
|
||||
- U.S. Department of Justice
|
||||
- "United States Department of Justice"
|
||||
created: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-09-22
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
51
20 - ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/USA/Kerry Committee.md
Normal file
51
20 - ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/USA/Kerry Committee.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
category: "Intelligence & Government"
|
||||
alias:
|
||||
- Kerry subcommittee
|
||||
- Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations
|
||||
- Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- Organization
|
||||
- Government
|
||||
- Congress
|
||||
- BCCI
|
||||
- Contras
|
||||
summary: "Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee under John Kerry that investigated drugs and foreign policy in 1987-88 and BCCI from 1988 to 1992, with a staff of two attorneys and no travel budget."
|
||||
location: "Washington, D.C."
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[John Kerry]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "chairman"
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[Jack Blum]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "chief counsel"
|
||||
end: 1989
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]]"
|
||||
start: 1988
|
||||
end: 1992-12
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
created: 2026-09-23
|
||||
updated: 2026-09-23
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
The Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations of the [[Senate Foreign Relations Committee]], chaired by Senator [[John Kerry]] of [[Massachusetts]], conducted a two-year investigation of drugs, law enforcement and foreign policy in 1987 and 1988 and, from 1988 to 1992, the congressional investigation of the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]] (BCCI) that produced the [[BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report|Kerry-Brown Senate Report]] of December 1992. Its ranking member for the BCCI inquiry was Senator [[Hank Brown]] of [[Colorado]].[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### Origins
|
||||
|
||||
BCCI came to the subcommittee's attention in February 1988, during a hearing on the drug trafficking and money laundering of [[Manuel Noriega]]. In March 1988 the Foreign Relations Committee authorized subpoenas to BCCI and to those at the bank who handled Noriega's assets and the accounts of others in [[Panama]] and [[Colombia]]. Service was delayed at the request of the [[United States Department of Justice|Justice Department]] and the [[United States Customs Service|Customs Service]], which were concerned for the [[Operation C-Chase|C-Chase]] sting in [[Tampa, Florida|Tampa]]; by the time the subpoenas were served in late July 1988, the subcommittee's public hearings were over. BCCI officials then told its counsel, [[Jack Blum]], that the bank and its attorneys, among them [[Clark Clifford]] and [[Robert Altman]], were obstructing the inquiry. The subcommittee deposed [[Amjad Awan]] shortly before his arrest in the sting and a second former BCCI officer afterward.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
In the spring of 1989, as Blum left the subcommittee, Kerry authorized him to give his information to the [[Department of Justice|Justice Department]]; when the department did not act on it, Blum took it to the New York District Attorney, [[Robert Morgenthau]]. Kerry meanwhile continued the inquiry with two members of his personal staff. After failing to obtain authorization through the Banking Committee, he obtained it from the full Foreign Relations Committee, without dissent, on May 23, 1991, together with a new subpoena to BCCI; further subpoena authorizations followed on November 27, 1991, February 29, 1992, and June 4, 1992. The report recorded that the investigation's staff "remained limited, amounting to two attorneys, with no budget for travel," which particularly hampered its work outside the [[United States]].[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### Hearings and Report
|
||||
|
||||
The subcommittee held public hearings on BCCI on August 1, 2 and 8, October 18, 22, 23, 24 and 25, and November 21, 1991, and on February 19, March 18, May 14 and July 30, 1992, with a closed hearing on October 31, 1991. It obtained documents from BCCI and its attorneys, former officials and creditors, [[Price Waterhouse]], Clifford and Altman, [[First American Bank]], the [[Federal Reserve Board|Federal Reserve]], the [[Office of the Comptroller of the Currency]], the [[Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation]], the [[Office of Thrift Supervision]], the [[Resolution Trust Corporation]], [[Abu Dhabi]], the [[Central Intelligence Agency]], the Customs Service and the [[United States Department of State|State Department]].[^1] Its report, Senate Print 102-140, was issued in December 1992. The archivist [[Steven Aftergood]] of the [[Federation of American Scientists]], which published the committee's electronic text, noted that after its release "Sen. Hank Brown, reportedly acting at the behest of [[Henry A. Kissinger|Henry Kissinger]], pressed for the deletion of a few passages, particularly in Chapter 20 on 'BCCI and [[Kissinger Associates]],'" so that the version printed by the Government Printing Office "differs slightly from the Committee's softcopy version."[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992, ch. 2, "Introduction and Summary of Investigation." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/02intro.htm
|
||||
[^2]: Aftergood, Steven. Editorial note, "The BCCI Affair," Federation of American Scientists. https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/
|
||||
|
|
@ -2,8 +2,7 @@
|
|||
category: "Intelligence & Government"
|
||||
aliases:
|
||||
- "Senate Committee on Foreign Relations"
|
||||
- "Kerry subcommittee"
|
||||
- "Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations"
|
||||
- "United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations"
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- Organization
|
||||
- Government
|
||||
|
|
@ -25,16 +24,16 @@ relations:
|
|||
with: "[[John Kerry]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations"
|
||||
fn: 8
|
||||
fn: 10
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[Jack Blum]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "special counsel to the Kerry subcommittee"
|
||||
fn: 8
|
||||
fn: 10
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[Contras]]"
|
||||
end: 1988-12
|
||||
fn: 9
|
||||
fn: 11
|
||||
created: 2026-09-22
|
||||
updated: 2026-09-22
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
@ -43,13 +42,13 @@ The Senate established the Committee on Foreign Relations in 1816 as one of its
|
|||
|
||||
### Hearings
|
||||
|
||||
On January 6, 1961, Secretary of State [[Christian A. Herter]] gave his farewell briefing to a closed session of the committee and spoke of a "disturbing" new element in the [[Middle East]], the reactor at [[Dimona]].[^3] At his confirmation hearing of 1966 as assistant secretary for inter-American affairs, [[Lincoln Gordon]] testified that "Neither the American Embassy nor I personally played any part" in the 1964 coup in Brazil.[^4] The committee held hearings on the [[AIFLD|American Institute for Free Labor Development]] on August 1, 1969.[^5] On February 7 and March 6, 1973, [[Richard Helms]], newly ambassador to Iran, testified to it about Chile and [[ITT Corporation|ITT]], stating under oath that the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] had not "tried to overthrow the government of Chile" and had not "passed money to the opponents of Allende"; in 1977 he pleaded no contest to two misdemeanor counts of misleading Congress.[^6][^13] At the hearing of July 26, 1983, on [[Thomas F. Ellis]], nominated to the Board for International Broadcasting, Senators Paul Tsongas and [[Joe Biden|Joseph Biden]] questioned him about his service on the board of the [[Pioneer Fund]]; he withdrew.[^7] It confirmed [[Donald Gregg]]'s ambassadorial nomination in June 1989 after hearings in which Kerry pressed him on what he had known of Contra operations.[^10]
|
||||
On January 6, 1961, Secretary of State [[Christian A. Herter]] gave his farewell briefing to a closed session of the committee and spoke of a "disturbing" new element in the [[Middle East]], the reactor at [[Dimona]].[^3] At his confirmation hearing of 1966 as assistant secretary for inter-American affairs, [[Lincoln Gordon]] testified that "Neither the American Embassy nor I personally played any part" in the 1964 coup in Brazil.[^4] The committee held hearings on the [[AIFLD|American Institute for Free Labor Development]] on August 1, 1969.[^5] On February 7 and March 6, 1973, [[Richard Helms]], newly ambassador to Iran, testified to it about Chile and [[ITT Corporation|ITT]], stating under oath that the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] had not "tried to overthrow the government of Chile" and had not "passed money to the opponents of Allende"; in 1977 he pleaded no contest to two misdemeanor counts of misleading Congress.[^6][^7] At the hearing of July 26, 1983, on [[Thomas F. Ellis]], nominated to the Board for International Broadcasting, Senators Paul Tsongas and [[Joe Biden|Joseph Biden]] questioned him about his service on the board of the [[Pioneer Fund]]; he withdrew.[^8] It confirmed [[Donald Gregg]]'s ambassadorial nomination in June 1989 after hearings in which Kerry pressed him on what he had known of Contra operations.[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Kerry Subcommittee
|
||||
|
||||
The Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations under [[John Kerry]], with [[Jack Blum]] as special counsel, took testimony in 1987 and 1988 from traffickers, pilots and officials, among them [[Ramon Milian Rodriguez]] and, in February 1988, José Blandón.[^8] Its report of December 1988, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy,* stated: "The Subcommittee did not find that the Contra leaders personally were involved in drug trafficking. There was substantial evidence of drug smuggling through the war zones on the part of individual Contras, Contra suppliers, Contra pilots, mercenaries who worked with the Contras, and Contra supporters throughout the region." It found that "senior U.S. policy makers were not immune to the idea that drug money was a perfect solution to the Contra's funding problems," citing [[Oliver North]]'s suggestion to the [[DEA]] in June 1985 that 1.5 million dollars from [[Barry Seal]]'s sting be given to the Contras, and that "the [[State Department]] selected four companies owned and operated by narcotics traffickers to supply humanitarian assistance to the Contras," among them [[SETCO]] Air, set up by [[Juan Matta Ballesteros|Ramón Matta Ballesteros]], and [[DIACSA]].[^9] The subcommittee's investigation of the [[BCCI|Bank of Credit and Commerce International]] led to *[[BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report|The BCCI Affair]],* the report of Kerry and Senator [[Hank Brown]] of December 1992.[^11]
|
||||
The [[Kerry Committee|Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations]] under [[John Kerry]], with [[Jack Blum]] as special counsel, took testimony in 1987 and 1988 from traffickers, pilots and officials, among them [[Ramon Milian Rodriguez]] and, in February 1988, José Blandón.[^10] Its report of December 1988, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy,* stated: "The Subcommittee did not find that the Contra leaders personally were involved in drug trafficking. There was substantial evidence of drug smuggling through the war zones on the part of individual Contras, Contra suppliers, Contra pilots, mercenaries who worked with the Contras, and Contra supporters throughout the region." It found that "senior U.S. policy makers were not immune to the idea that drug money was a perfect solution to the Contra's funding problems," citing [[Oliver North]]'s suggestion to the [[DEA]] in June 1985 that 1.5 million dollars from [[Barry Seal]]'s sting be given to the Contras, and that "the [[State Department]] selected four companies owned and operated by narcotics traffickers to supply humanitarian assistance to the Contras," among them [[SETCO]] Air, set up by [[Juan Matta Ballesteros|Ramón Matta Ballesteros]], and [[DIACSA]].[^11] The subcommittee's investigation of the [[BCCI|Bank of Credit and Commerce International]] led to *[[BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report|The BCCI Affair]],* the report of Kerry and Senator [[Hank Brown]] of December 1992.[^12]
|
||||
|
||||
In 1992 a subcommittee of the committee investigated the [[October Surprise]] allegations and found that [[William J. Casey]] had made "potentially dangerous" unauthorized efforts to collect intelligence on the Carter administration's negotiations for the release of the hostages in Iran, without finding a deal.[^12]
|
||||
In 1992 a subcommittee of the committee investigated the [[October Surprise]] allegations and found that [[William J. Casey]] had made "potentially dangerous" unauthorized efforts to collect intelligence on the Carter administration's negotiations for the release of the hostages in Iran, without finding a deal.[^13]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -59,10 +58,10 @@ In 1992 a subcommittee of the committee investigated the [[October Surprise]] al
|
|||
[^4]: Senate Foreign Relations Committee, hearing on the nomination of Lincoln Gordon as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, 1966, as quoted on the Lincoln Gordon page.
|
||||
[^5]: University of Maryland Special Collections, finding aid, "Senate Foreign Relations Committee, American Institute for Free Labor Development hearings," as cited on the AIFLD page.
|
||||
[^6]: Powers, Thomas. *The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA.* Knopf, 1979; Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, "Richard Helms' Eligibility Under 5 U.S.C. Section 8314 To Receive an Annuity," as cited on the Project FUBELT page.
|
||||
[^7]: United Press International, dispatch on the withdrawal of Thomas Ellis, Washington, July 28, 1983; United States Senate, nomination PN59-1, 98th Congress.
|
||||
[^8]: Beaty, Jonathan, and S. C. Gwynne. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI.* Random House, 1993; as cited on the John Kerry, Ramon Milian Rodriguez and Mike Harari pages.
|
||||
[^9]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations. *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy,* S. Prt. 100-165, December 1988. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
|
||||
[^10]: As cited on the Donald Gregg page.
|
||||
[^11]: Kerry, John, and Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate,* December 1992, as cited on the BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report page.
|
||||
[^13]: Powers, Thomas, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets,* as cited on the Richard Helms page.
|
||||
[^12]: U.S. House of Representatives, October Surprise Task Force, *Joint Report of the Task Force to Investigate Certain Allegations Concerning the Holding of American Hostages by Iran in 1980,* 1993, as cited on the October Surprise page.
|
||||
[^7]: Powers, Thomas, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets,* as cited on the Richard Helms page.
|
||||
[^8]: United Press International, dispatch on the withdrawal of Thomas Ellis, Washington, July 28, 1983; United States Senate, nomination PN59-1, 98th Congress.
|
||||
[^9]: As cited on the Donald Gregg page.
|
||||
[^10]: Beaty, Jonathan, and S. C. Gwynne. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI.* Random House, 1993; as cited on the John Kerry, Ramon Milian Rodriguez and Mike Harari pages.
|
||||
[^11]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations. *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy,* S. Prt. 100-165, December 1988. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
|
||||
[^12]: Kerry, John, and Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate,* December 1992, as cited on the BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report page.
|
||||
[^13]: U.S. House of Representatives, October Surprise Task Force, *Joint Report of the Task Force to Investigate Certain Allegations Concerning the Holding of American Hostages by Iran in 1980,* 1993, as cited on the October Surprise page.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ title: State Department
|
|||
aliases:
|
||||
- U.S. Department of State
|
||||
- Department of State
|
||||
- "United States Department of State"
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- Organization
|
||||
- Government
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ tags:
|
|||
- Contra_War
|
||||
- 1980s
|
||||
summary: U.S. federal law enforcement agency responsible for border protection and customs enforcement that investigated Contra-connected cocaine trafficking through informants including Joseph Kelso.
|
||||
alias:
|
||||
- "United States Customs Service"
|
||||
---
|
||||
[[U.S. Customs and Border Protection]] (U.S. Customs) is a federal law enforcement agency responsible for protecting the borders of the [[United States]].[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
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Reference in a new issue