vault backup: 2026-09-23 16:47:02

This commit is contained in:
disinfo.zone 2026-09-23 16:47:02 -04:00
parent 0128d29d04
commit 71d15483ec
No known key found for this signature in database
122 changed files with 4324 additions and 358 deletions

View file

@ -25,11 +25,11 @@ The CIA, particularly through its Photographic Intelligence Division, was instru
The CIA's interest in psi research dates back to the early 1970s, partly in response to rumors of extensive Soviet psi research. Following a number of scandals in the mid-1970s, including revelations of domestic spying, the CIA came under unprecedented scrutiny from Congress. This led to a preference for "clean" spying methods, making psychic intelligence an appealing, low-profile alternative to traditional human intelligence (HUMINT).[^1]
In 1972, the CIA, through officials like [[Kenneth A. Kress|Ken Kress]] from the Technical Services Division (TSD) (later the Office of Technical Service, OTS), provided the initial funding for [[Hal Puthoff]]'s psi research program at [[Stanford Research Institute]] (SRI). This funding, initially $50,000 for eight months, was contingent on the researchers demonstrating a repeatable psi phenomenon. The Office of Research and Development (ORD) also jointly managed the funding and contract.[^1] In the late 1960s, the CIA had approached Hal Puthoff and Russell Targ at Stanford University to develop a program to counter a similar effort in the Soviet Union, which led to the creation of the [[Stargate Project]], a program that trained individuals in [[Remote Viewing]] to spy on foreign targets. The program was reportedly highly successful, and Puthoff reported directly to the Director of the CIA and the [[White House]].[^11]
In 1972, the CIA, through officials like [[Kenneth A. Kress|Ken Kress]] from the Technical Services Division (TSD) (later the Office of Technical Service, OTS), provided the initial funding for [[Hal Puthoff]]'s psi research program at [[Stanford Research Institute]] (SRI). This funding, initially $50,000 for eight months, was contingent on the researchers demonstrating a repeatable psi phenomenon. The Office of Research and Development (ORD) also jointly managed the funding and contract.[^1] In the late 1960s, the CIA had approached Hal Puthoff and Russell Targ at Stanford University to develop a program to counter a similar effort in the Soviet Union, which led to the creation of the [[Stargate Project]], a program that trained individuals in [[Remote Viewing]] to spy on foreign targets. The program was reportedly highly successful, and Puthoff reported directly to the Director of the CIA and the [[White House]].[^3]
### The Search for Behavioral Control
Since [[World War II]] the CIA searched secretly for ways to control human behavior, an effort that extended the wartime [[Office of Strategic Services|OSS]] quest for a truth drug and echoed both the Nazi experiments at [[Dachau]] and [[Albert Hofmann]]'s discovery of [[LSD]]. The programs were triggered by the 1949 show trial of [[Josef Cardinal Mindszenty]] in [[Hungary]], whose glazed confession convinced Agency officials the Communists had developed a technique to render defendants zombielike; what began as defensive research quickly turned offensive, with documents stressing the goal of "controlling an individual to the point where he will do our bidding against his will and even against such fundamental laws of nature as self-preservation." The effort passed through [[Project Bluebird and Project Artichoke|Project BLUEBIRD]] (1950), ARTICHOKE (1952), and finally [[Project MKUltra|MKULTRA]] under the [[Office of Technical Service|Technical Services Staff]], with [[Richard Helms]] its most important sponsor and his protégé [[Sidney Gottlieb]] running it day to day. The research systematically violated the will of subjects drawn from groups officials considered expendable, mental patients, prostitutes, foreigners, drug addicts, and prisoners; as one Agency psychologist put it, operators lacked "a universal concept of mankind" and were willing to do things to foreigners they would not try on Americans. "It was strictly a patriotic vision," he said.[^16]
Since [[World War II]] the CIA searched secretly for ways to control human behavior, an effort that extended the wartime [[Office of Strategic Services|OSS]] quest for a truth drug and echoed both the Nazi experiments at [[Dachau]] and [[Albert Hofmann]]'s discovery of [[LSD]]. The programs were triggered by the 1949 show trial of [[Josef Cardinal Mindszenty]] in [[Hungary]], whose glazed confession convinced Agency officials the Communists had developed a technique to render defendants zombielike; what began as defensive research quickly turned offensive, with documents stressing the goal of "controlling an individual to the point where he will do our bidding against his will and even against such fundamental laws of nature as self-preservation." The effort passed through [[Project Bluebird and Project Artichoke|Project BLUEBIRD]] (1950), ARTICHOKE (1952), and finally [[Project MKUltra|MKULTRA]] under the [[Office of Technical Service|Technical Services Staff]], with [[Richard Helms]] its most important sponsor and his protégé [[Sidney Gottlieb]] running it day to day. The research systematically violated the will of subjects drawn from groups officials considered expendable, mental patients, prostitutes, foreigners, drug addicts, and prisoners; as one Agency psychologist put it, operators lacked "a universal concept of mankind" and were willing to do things to foreigners they would not try on Americans. "It was strictly a patriotic vision," he said.[^4]
### Notable Operations and Impact
@ -51,67 +51,70 @@ Following the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor at [[Osirak bombing]]
### Involvement with BCCI
The CIA used the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International|BCCI]] extensively, particularly in connection with covert U.S. operations in [[Central America]].[^3] Even before [[Oliver North]] established his network for illegal payments to the [[Contras]], the [[National Security Council]] used BCCI to channel money to them through [[Saudi Arabia]].[^3] The CIA maintained accounts in BCCI for covert operations.[^4]
The CIA used the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International|BCCI]] extensively, particularly in connection with covert U.S. operations in [[Central America]].[^5] Even before [[Oliver North]] established his network for illegal payments to the [[Contras]], the [[National Security Council]] used BCCI to channel money to them through [[Saudi Arabia]].[^5] The CIA maintained accounts in BCCI for covert operations.[^6]
In 1986, the CIA issued a report stating that BCCI had owned [[First American Bank]] since 1982.[^5] In 1991, Acting CIA Director [[Richard J. Kerr]] confirmed that the agency had used BCCI to move money around the world.[^6] The CIA also maintained slush funds at BCCI branches, which were used for payoffs of Pakistani military officers and Afghan rebel leaders.[^7]
In 1986, the CIA issued a report stating that BCCI had owned [[First American Bank]] since 1982.[^7] In 1991, Acting CIA Director [[Richard J. Kerr]] confirmed that the agency had used BCCI to move money around the world.[^8] The CIA also maintained slush funds at BCCI branches, which were used for payoffs of Pakistani military officers and Afghan rebel leaders.[^9]
William J. Casey, former CIA Director, met secretly with [[Agha Hasan Abedi]] over a three-year period, discussing U.S. arms deals with Iran and the arming of Afghan resistance forces.[^8] The CIA began using BCCI in the bank's earliest days, as it was establishing itself in countries where American intelligence had few assets.[^8]
William J. Casey, former CIA Director, met secretly with [[Agha Hasan Abedi]] over a three-year period, discussing U.S. arms deals with Iran and the arming of Afghan resistance forces.[^10] The CIA began using BCCI in the bank's earliest days, as it was establishing itself in countries where American intelligence had few assets.[^10]
The [[BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report|Kerry-Brown Senate Report]] recorded that the agency produced several hundred reports on BCCI between 1979 and 1991, including special analyses in 1985, 1986 and 1989. The 1985 report, delivered in January 1985 to the Treasury's intelligence liaison, [[Douglas Mulholland]], who called it "dynamite," stated that BCCI secretly owned First American Bank; the 1986 report went to the [[State Department]], the Defense Intelligence Agency, the [[National Security Agency]], the National Security Council, Commerce and the Treasury, except for "the two agencies which would have had a statutory responsibility to begin investigations in response," the [[Federal Reserve Board|Federal Reserve]] and the [[Department of Justice|Justice Department]]. Acting Director Richard J. Kerr testified on October 25, 1991, that the agency's own use of BCCI had been "limited and routine," and acknowledged "extensive use of First American" for ordinary accounts. The agency denied any relationship between William J. Casey and Agha Hasan Abedi; the report recorded a contrary account from a BCCI official of meetings at the [[Madison Hotel]] in Washington, and the view of the agency's legal department that any such activity by Casey would have been undertaken "in his position as an advisor to the President, rather than in his position as Director of Central Intelligence," outside the agency's records.[^11]
### Operations and Activities
The CIA sent the [[Inter-Services Intelligence|Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)]] agency enormous quantities of cash to keep things moving through [[Pakistan]] during the [[Soviet-Afghan War]].[^9] The CIA was responsible for obtaining arms and ammunition for the [[Mujahideen]], but once delivered to [[Karachi]], the ISI was responsible for moving the equipment.[^9]
The CIA sent the [[Inter-Services Intelligence|Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)]] agency enormous quantities of cash to keep things moving through [[Pakistan]] during the [[Soviet-Afghan War]].[^12] The CIA was responsible for obtaining arms and ammunition for the [[Mujahideen]], but once delivered to [[Karachi]], the ISI was responsible for moving the equipment.[^12]
In 1980, Jimmy Carter signed a presidential "finding" authorizing the CIA to aid the Afghan rebels in "harassment" of the Soviet occupying forces through secret supplies of light weapons and limited funds.[^10] This became the largest covert-action program since [[World War Two]].[^10]
In 1980, Jimmy Carter signed a presidential "finding" authorizing the CIA to aid the Afghan rebels in "harassment" of the Soviet occupying forces through secret supplies of light weapons and limited funds.[^13] This became the largest covert-action program since [[World War Two]].[^13]
### UAP Research and Secrecy
The CIA has a long and complex history with the [[Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena]] (UAP) issue. The agency has been a key player in the government's long-standing policy of secrecy and denial on the UAP topic. The Robertson Panel, a CIA-sponsored committee in 1953, recommended a policy of debunking UAP reports and using the mass media to ridicule the topic. This policy was highly effective in creating the stigma that has surrounded the UAP issue for decades.[^11]
The CIA has a long and complex history with the [[Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena]] (UAP) issue. The agency has been a key player in the government's long-standing policy of secrecy and denial on the UAP topic. The Robertson Panel, a CIA-sponsored committee in 1953, recommended a policy of debunking UAP reports and using the mass media to ridicule the topic. This policy was highly effective in creating the stigma that has surrounded the UAP issue for decades.[^3]
The CIA is also said to have operated a little-known "weird desk," which was responsible for investigating unusual medical issues, implants, and abductions related to UAP encounters. [[Dr. William Livingston]], who served as a medical advisor to the [[Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program]] (AATIP), is described as having presided over this desk.[^11]
The CIA is also said to have operated a little-known "weird desk," which was responsible for investigating unusual medical issues, implants, and abductions related to UAP encounters. [[Dr. William Livingston]], who served as a medical advisor to the [[Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program]] (AATIP), is described as having presided over this desk.[^3]
In recent years, the CIA has been more involved in the official UAP investigation. The agency was a participant in the [[UAP Task Force]] and is a member of the current [[All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office]] (AARO). However, the agency's long history of secrecy and obfuscation on the UAP topic has led to a great deal of skepticism about its willingness to be fully transparent.[^11]
In recent years, the CIA has been more involved in the official UAP investigation. The agency was a participant in the [[UAP Task Force]] and is a member of the current [[All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office]] (AARO). However, the agency's long history of secrecy and obfuscation on the UAP topic has led to a great deal of skepticism about its willingness to be fully transparent.[^3]
### Dark Alliance Investigation
The CIA's covert action division, the Directorate of Operations, created and managed the Contra project during the 1980s, with its Latin American Division headed by [[Dewey Clarridge]] from 1981 to 1984. The agency recruited Contra leaders including [[Enrique Bermudez|Enrique Bermúdez]] in 1980 and [[Eden Pastora]] in 1981. The CIA maintained station chiefs in [[Costa Rica]], notably [[Joseph Fernandez|Joseph Fernández]] from 1984 to 1986, who were integral to Oliver North's illegal Contra resupply operation.[^12]
The CIA's covert action division, the Directorate of Operations, created and managed the Contra project during the 1980s, with its Latin American Division headed by [[Dewey Clarridge]] from 1981 to 1984. The agency recruited Contra leaders including [[Enrique Bermudez|Enrique Bermúdez]] in 1980 and [[Eden Pastora]] in 1981. The CIA maintained station chiefs in [[Costa Rica]], notably [[Joseph Fernandez|Joseph Fernández]] from 1984 to 1986, who were integral to Oliver North's illegal Contra resupply operation.[^14]
### Contra Drug Trafficking and the Frogman Case
Federal law enforcement records and congressional testimony established that the CIA had reports of [[Cocaine]] being transshipped through Contra-linked facilities, including [[Ilopango Airbase]] in [[El Salvador]]. When defense attorneys in the [[Frogman Case]] obtained letters from CIA assets claiming seized drug money belonged to the Contras, the CIA's Costa Rican station cabled Langley that both men were assets of an organization that had "unwittingly received CIA support." CIA lawyer Lee Strickland flew to [[San Francisco]] and asked the prosecutor to ensure depositions did not go forward. The government returned $36,020 in seized drug money and a CIA cable declared: "CIA equities are fully protected."[^13]
Federal law enforcement records and congressional testimony established that the CIA had reports of [[Cocaine]] being transshipped through Contra-linked facilities, including [[Ilopango Airbase]] in [[El Salvador]]. When defense attorneys in the [[Frogman Case]] obtained letters from CIA assets claiming seized drug money belonged to the Contras, the CIA's Costa Rican station cabled Langley that both men were assets of an organization that had "unwittingly received CIA support." CIA lawyer Lee Strickland flew to [[San Francisco]] and asked the prosecutor to ensure depositions did not go forward. The government returned $36,020 in seized drug money and a CIA cable declared: "CIA equities are fully protected."[^15]
The pseudonymous agent [[Ivan Gomez|Iván Gómez]], assigned to Costa Rica in 1982 as the CIA's liaison to the Contra armies, admitted during polygraph tests that he had laundered drug money. He was fired in 1989 for repeated polygraph failures concerning drug dealing.[^13]
The pseudonymous agent [[Ivan Gomez|Iván Gómez]], assigned to Costa Rica in 1982 as the CIA's liaison to the Contra armies, admitted during polygraph tests that he had laundered drug money. He was fired in 1989 for repeated polygraph failures concerning drug dealing.[^15]
### The Secret 1982 Agreement with the Justice Department
In early 1982, CIA director William J. Casey and Attorney General [[William French Smith]] signed a formal Memorandum of Understanding that exempted the CIA from reporting drug crimes committed by its non-employees - a category including agents, assets, and non-staff employees. Drug offenses were specifically removed from the list of crimes the CIA was required to report. The agreement remained in effect from 1982 to 1995.[^14]
In early 1982, CIA director William J. Casey and Attorney General [[William French Smith]] signed a formal Memorandum of Understanding that exempted the CIA from reporting drug crimes committed by its non-employees - a category including agents, assets, and non-staff employees. Drug offenses were specifically removed from the list of crimes the CIA was required to report. The agreement remained in effect from 1982 to 1995.[^16]
### Ilopango Obstruction
When [[DEA]] agent [[Celerino Castillo]] began investigating Contra drug trafficking at Ilopango, the CIA intervened directly. In April 1986 the El Salvador station sent a cable asking the Costa Rica station to persuade the DEA to back off: "El Salvador Station would appreciate Costa Rica Station advising DEA not to make any inquiries into anyone re: Hangar No. 4 at Ilopango since only legitimate CIA supported operations were conducted from this facility."[^15]
When [[DEA]] agent [[Celerino Castillo]] began investigating Contra drug trafficking at Ilopango, the CIA intervened directly. In April 1986 the El Salvador station sent a cable asking the Costa Rica station to persuade the DEA to back off: "El Salvador Station would appreciate Costa Rica Station advising DEA not to make any inquiries into anyone re: Hangar No. 4 at Ilopango since only legitimate CIA supported operations were conducted from this facility."[^17]
### Inspector General Investigation
CIA Inspector General [[Fred Hitz]] testified before the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence|House Intelligence Committee]] in March 1998 that the CIA "did not, in an expeditious or consistent fashion, cut off relationships with individuals supporting the Contra program who were alleged to have engaged in drug trafficking activity," including trafficking within the United States. His 400-page report documented CIA relationships with more than 50 suspected drug traffickers during the Contra war.[^14]
CIA Inspector General [[Fred Hitz]] testified before the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence|House Intelligence Committee]] in March 1998 that the CIA "did not, in an expeditious or consistent fashion, cut off relationships with individuals supporting the Contra program who were alleged to have engaged in drug trafficking activity," including trafficking within the United States. His 400-page report documented CIA relationships with more than 50 suspected drug traffickers during the Contra war.[^16]
### Iran-Contra Indictments
Multiple CIA officials were indicted during the Iran-Contra investigation. Clarridge was indicted on seven counts of perjury. Fernández was indicted on four counts. [[Alan Fiers]] pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress. All were pardoned by former CIA director [[George H.W. Bush]].[^12]
Multiple CIA officials were indicted during the Iran-Contra investigation. Clarridge was indicted on seven counts of perjury. Fernández was indicted on four counts. [[Alan Fiers]] pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress. All were pardoned by former CIA director [[George H.W. Bush]].[^14]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Schnabel, Jim. *Remote Viewers*. Dell, 1997.
[^2]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991.
[^3]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 126.
[^4]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 147.
[^5]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 12.
[^6]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 9.
[^7]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 149.
[^8]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 347.
[^9]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 334.
[^10]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 341.
[^11]: Elizondo, Luis. *Imminent*. William Morrow, 2024.
[^12]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Prologue and Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom"
[^13]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom"
[^14]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue: "The damage that has been done"
[^15]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 13: "The wrong kind of friends"
[^16]: John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*. Times Books, 1979, Chapters 1-2.
[^3]: Elizondo, Luis. *Imminent*. William Morrow, 2024.
[^4]: John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*. Times Books, 1979, Chapters 1-2.
[^5]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 126.
[^6]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 147.
[^7]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 12.
[^8]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 9.
[^9]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 149.
[^10]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 347.
[^11]: Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992, ch. 11, "BCCI, the CIA and Foreign Intelligence." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/11intel.htm
[^12]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 334.
[^13]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 341.
[^14]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Prologue and Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom"
[^15]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom"
[^16]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue: "The damage that has been done"
[^17]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 13: "The wrong kind of friends"

View file

@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ aliases:
- DOJ
- Justice Department
- U.S. Department of Justice
- "United States Department of Justice"
created: 2026-05-17
updated: 2026-09-22
tags:

View file

@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
---
category: "Intelligence & Government"
alias:
- Kerry subcommittee
- Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations
- Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations
tags:
- Organization
- Government
- Congress
- BCCI
- Contras
summary: "Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee under John Kerry that investigated drugs and foreign policy in 1987-88 and BCCI from 1988 to 1992, with a staff of two attorneys and no travel budget."
location: "Washington, D.C."
relations:
- type: head_of
with: "[[John Kerry]]"
reverse: true
role: "chairman"
fn: 1
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Jack Blum]]"
reverse: true
role: "chief counsel"
end: 1989
fn: 1
- type: investigated
with: "[[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]]"
start: 1988
end: 1992-12
fn: 1
created: 2026-09-23
updated: 2026-09-23
---
The Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations of the [[Senate Foreign Relations Committee]], chaired by Senator [[John Kerry]] of [[Massachusetts]], conducted a two-year investigation of drugs, law enforcement and foreign policy in 1987 and 1988 and, from 1988 to 1992, the congressional investigation of the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]] (BCCI) that produced the [[BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report|Kerry-Brown Senate Report]] of December 1992. Its ranking member for the BCCI inquiry was Senator [[Hank Brown]] of [[Colorado]].[^1]
### Origins
BCCI came to the subcommittee's attention in February 1988, during a hearing on the drug trafficking and money laundering of [[Manuel Noriega]]. In March 1988 the Foreign Relations Committee authorized subpoenas to BCCI and to those at the bank who handled Noriega's assets and the accounts of others in [[Panama]] and [[Colombia]]. Service was delayed at the request of the [[United States Department of Justice|Justice Department]] and the [[United States Customs Service|Customs Service]], which were concerned for the [[Operation C-Chase|C-Chase]] sting in [[Tampa, Florida|Tampa]]; by the time the subpoenas were served in late July 1988, the subcommittee's public hearings were over. BCCI officials then told its counsel, [[Jack Blum]], that the bank and its attorneys, among them [[Clark Clifford]] and [[Robert Altman]], were obstructing the inquiry. The subcommittee deposed [[Amjad Awan]] shortly before his arrest in the sting and a second former BCCI officer afterward.[^1]
In the spring of 1989, as Blum left the subcommittee, Kerry authorized him to give his information to the [[Department of Justice|Justice Department]]; when the department did not act on it, Blum took it to the New York District Attorney, [[Robert Morgenthau]]. Kerry meanwhile continued the inquiry with two members of his personal staff. After failing to obtain authorization through the Banking Committee, he obtained it from the full Foreign Relations Committee, without dissent, on May 23, 1991, together with a new subpoena to BCCI; further subpoena authorizations followed on November 27, 1991, February 29, 1992, and June 4, 1992. The report recorded that the investigation's staff "remained limited, amounting to two attorneys, with no budget for travel," which particularly hampered its work outside the [[United States]].[^1]
### Hearings and Report
The subcommittee held public hearings on BCCI on August 1, 2 and 8, October 18, 22, 23, 24 and 25, and November 21, 1991, and on February 19, March 18, May 14 and July 30, 1992, with a closed hearing on October 31, 1991. It obtained documents from BCCI and its attorneys, former officials and creditors, [[Price Waterhouse]], Clifford and Altman, [[First American Bank]], the [[Federal Reserve Board|Federal Reserve]], the [[Office of the Comptroller of the Currency]], the [[Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation]], the [[Office of Thrift Supervision]], the [[Resolution Trust Corporation]], [[Abu Dhabi]], the [[Central Intelligence Agency]], the Customs Service and the [[United States Department of State|State Department]].[^1] Its report, Senate Print 102-140, was issued in December 1992. The archivist [[Steven Aftergood]] of the [[Federation of American Scientists]], which published the committee's electronic text, noted that after its release "Sen. Hank Brown, reportedly acting at the behest of [[Henry A. Kissinger|Henry Kissinger]], pressed for the deletion of a few passages, particularly in Chapter 20 on 'BCCI and [[Kissinger Associates]],'" so that the version printed by the Government Printing Office "differs slightly from the Committee's softcopy version."[^2]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992, ch. 2, "Introduction and Summary of Investigation." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/02intro.htm
[^2]: Aftergood, Steven. Editorial note, "The BCCI Affair," Federation of American Scientists. https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/

View file

@ -2,8 +2,7 @@
category: "Intelligence & Government"
aliases:
- "Senate Committee on Foreign Relations"
- "Kerry subcommittee"
- "Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations"
- "United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations"
tags:
- Organization
- Government
@ -25,16 +24,16 @@ relations:
with: "[[John Kerry]]"
reverse: true
role: "chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations"
fn: 8
fn: 10
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Jack Blum]]"
reverse: true
role: "special counsel to the Kerry subcommittee"
fn: 8
fn: 10
- type: investigated
with: "[[Contras]]"
end: 1988-12
fn: 9
fn: 11
created: 2026-09-22
updated: 2026-09-22
---
@ -43,13 +42,13 @@ The Senate established the Committee on Foreign Relations in 1816 as one of its
### Hearings
On January 6, 1961, Secretary of State [[Christian A. Herter]] gave his farewell briefing to a closed session of the committee and spoke of a "disturbing" new element in the [[Middle East]], the reactor at [[Dimona]].[^3] At his confirmation hearing of 1966 as assistant secretary for inter-American affairs, [[Lincoln Gordon]] testified that "Neither the American Embassy nor I personally played any part" in the 1964 coup in Brazil.[^4] The committee held hearings on the [[AIFLD|American Institute for Free Labor Development]] on August 1, 1969.[^5] On February 7 and March 6, 1973, [[Richard Helms]], newly ambassador to Iran, testified to it about Chile and [[ITT Corporation|ITT]], stating under oath that the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] had not "tried to overthrow the government of Chile" and had not "passed money to the opponents of Allende"; in 1977 he pleaded no contest to two misdemeanor counts of misleading Congress.[^6][^13] At the hearing of July 26, 1983, on [[Thomas F. Ellis]], nominated to the Board for International Broadcasting, Senators Paul Tsongas and [[Joe Biden|Joseph Biden]] questioned him about his service on the board of the [[Pioneer Fund]]; he withdrew.[^7] It confirmed [[Donald Gregg]]'s ambassadorial nomination in June 1989 after hearings in which Kerry pressed him on what he had known of Contra operations.[^10]
On January 6, 1961, Secretary of State [[Christian A. Herter]] gave his farewell briefing to a closed session of the committee and spoke of a "disturbing" new element in the [[Middle East]], the reactor at [[Dimona]].[^3] At his confirmation hearing of 1966 as assistant secretary for inter-American affairs, [[Lincoln Gordon]] testified that "Neither the American Embassy nor I personally played any part" in the 1964 coup in Brazil.[^4] The committee held hearings on the [[AIFLD|American Institute for Free Labor Development]] on August 1, 1969.[^5] On February 7 and March 6, 1973, [[Richard Helms]], newly ambassador to Iran, testified to it about Chile and [[ITT Corporation|ITT]], stating under oath that the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] had not "tried to overthrow the government of Chile" and had not "passed money to the opponents of Allende"; in 1977 he pleaded no contest to two misdemeanor counts of misleading Congress.[^6][^7] At the hearing of July 26, 1983, on [[Thomas F. Ellis]], nominated to the Board for International Broadcasting, Senators Paul Tsongas and [[Joe Biden|Joseph Biden]] questioned him about his service on the board of the [[Pioneer Fund]]; he withdrew.[^8] It confirmed [[Donald Gregg]]'s ambassadorial nomination in June 1989 after hearings in which Kerry pressed him on what he had known of Contra operations.[^9]
### The Kerry Subcommittee
The Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations under [[John Kerry]], with [[Jack Blum]] as special counsel, took testimony in 1987 and 1988 from traffickers, pilots and officials, among them [[Ramon Milian Rodriguez]] and, in February 1988, José Blandón.[^8] Its report of December 1988, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy,* stated: "The Subcommittee did not find that the Contra leaders personally were involved in drug trafficking. There was substantial evidence of drug smuggling through the war zones on the part of individual Contras, Contra suppliers, Contra pilots, mercenaries who worked with the Contras, and Contra supporters throughout the region." It found that "senior U.S. policy makers were not immune to the idea that drug money was a perfect solution to the Contra's funding problems," citing [[Oliver North]]'s suggestion to the [[DEA]] in June 1985 that 1.5 million dollars from [[Barry Seal]]'s sting be given to the Contras, and that "the [[State Department]] selected four companies owned and operated by narcotics traffickers to supply humanitarian assistance to the Contras," among them [[SETCO]] Air, set up by [[Juan Matta Ballesteros|Ramón Matta Ballesteros]], and [[DIACSA]].[^9] The subcommittee's investigation of the [[BCCI|Bank of Credit and Commerce International]] led to *[[BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report|The BCCI Affair]],* the report of Kerry and Senator [[Hank Brown]] of December 1992.[^11]
The [[Kerry Committee|Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations]] under [[John Kerry]], with [[Jack Blum]] as special counsel, took testimony in 1987 and 1988 from traffickers, pilots and officials, among them [[Ramon Milian Rodriguez]] and, in February 1988, José Blandón.[^10] Its report of December 1988, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy,* stated: "The Subcommittee did not find that the Contra leaders personally were involved in drug trafficking. There was substantial evidence of drug smuggling through the war zones on the part of individual Contras, Contra suppliers, Contra pilots, mercenaries who worked with the Contras, and Contra supporters throughout the region." It found that "senior U.S. policy makers were not immune to the idea that drug money was a perfect solution to the Contra's funding problems," citing [[Oliver North]]'s suggestion to the [[DEA]] in June 1985 that 1.5 million dollars from [[Barry Seal]]'s sting be given to the Contras, and that "the [[State Department]] selected four companies owned and operated by narcotics traffickers to supply humanitarian assistance to the Contras," among them [[SETCO]] Air, set up by [[Juan Matta Ballesteros|Ramón Matta Ballesteros]], and [[DIACSA]].[^11] The subcommittee's investigation of the [[BCCI|Bank of Credit and Commerce International]] led to *[[BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report|The BCCI Affair]],* the report of Kerry and Senator [[Hank Brown]] of December 1992.[^12]
In 1992 a subcommittee of the committee investigated the [[October Surprise]] allegations and found that [[William J. Casey]] had made "potentially dangerous" unauthorized efforts to collect intelligence on the Carter administration's negotiations for the release of the hostages in Iran, without finding a deal.[^12]
In 1992 a subcommittee of the committee investigated the [[October Surprise]] allegations and found that [[William J. Casey]] had made "potentially dangerous" unauthorized efforts to collect intelligence on the Carter administration's negotiations for the release of the hostages in Iran, without finding a deal.[^13]
### Footnotes
@ -59,10 +58,10 @@ In 1992 a subcommittee of the committee investigated the [[October Surprise]] al
[^4]: Senate Foreign Relations Committee, hearing on the nomination of Lincoln Gordon as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, 1966, as quoted on the Lincoln Gordon page.
[^5]: University of Maryland Special Collections, finding aid, "Senate Foreign Relations Committee, American Institute for Free Labor Development hearings," as cited on the AIFLD page.
[^6]: Powers, Thomas. *The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA.* Knopf, 1979; Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, "Richard Helms' Eligibility Under 5 U.S.C. Section 8314 To Receive an Annuity," as cited on the Project FUBELT page.
[^7]: United Press International, dispatch on the withdrawal of Thomas Ellis, Washington, July 28, 1983; United States Senate, nomination PN59-1, 98th Congress.
[^8]: Beaty, Jonathan, and S. C. Gwynne. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI.* Random House, 1993; as cited on the John Kerry, Ramon Milian Rodriguez and Mike Harari pages.
[^9]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations. *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy,* S. Prt. 100-165, December 1988. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
[^10]: As cited on the Donald Gregg page.
[^11]: Kerry, John, and Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate,* December 1992, as cited on the BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report page.
[^13]: Powers, Thomas, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets,* as cited on the Richard Helms page.
[^12]: U.S. House of Representatives, October Surprise Task Force, *Joint Report of the Task Force to Investigate Certain Allegations Concerning the Holding of American Hostages by Iran in 1980,* 1993, as cited on the October Surprise page.
[^7]: Powers, Thomas, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets,* as cited on the Richard Helms page.
[^8]: United Press International, dispatch on the withdrawal of Thomas Ellis, Washington, July 28, 1983; United States Senate, nomination PN59-1, 98th Congress.
[^9]: As cited on the Donald Gregg page.
[^10]: Beaty, Jonathan, and S. C. Gwynne. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI.* Random House, 1993; as cited on the John Kerry, Ramon Milian Rodriguez and Mike Harari pages.
[^11]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations. *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy,* S. Prt. 100-165, December 1988. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
[^12]: Kerry, John, and Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate,* December 1992, as cited on the BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report page.
[^13]: U.S. House of Representatives, October Surprise Task Force, *Joint Report of the Task Force to Investigate Certain Allegations Concerning the Holding of American Hostages by Iran in 1980,* 1993, as cited on the October Surprise page.

View file

@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ title: State Department
aliases:
- U.S. Department of State
- Department of State
- "United States Department of State"
tags:
- Organization
- Government

View file

@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ tags:
- Contra_War
- 1980s
summary: U.S. federal law enforcement agency responsible for border protection and customs enforcement that investigated Contra-connected cocaine trafficking through informants including Joseph Kelso.
alias:
- "United States Customs Service"
---
[[U.S. Customs and Border Protection]] (U.S. Customs) is a federal law enforcement agency responsible for protecting the borders of the [[United States]].[^1]