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46
20 - ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/USA/Central Intelligence Agency.md
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@ -16,6 +16,14 @@ category: "U.S. Government"
summary: "The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is the principal U.S. civilian foreign intelligence service, established by the National Security Act of 1947 and headquartered at Langley, Virginia."
start: 1947-09-18
location: "Langley, Virginia"
relations:
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Bobby Ray Inman]]"
reverse: true
role: "deputy director"
start: 1981-02
end: 1982-04
fn: 15
---
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is a primary intelligence-gathering organization of the United States government. In the context of psychic research, the CIA played a significant, albeit often covert, role in funding and overseeing programs aimed at exploring and utilizing psychic phenomena for intelligence purposes.[^1]
@ -65,9 +73,15 @@ The CIA sent the [[Inter-Services Intelligence|Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)
In 1980, Jimmy Carter signed a presidential "finding" authorizing the CIA to aid the Afghan rebels in "harassment" of the Soviet occupying forces through secret supplies of light weapons and limited funds.[^13] This became the largest covert-action program since [[World War Two]].[^13]
### Deputy Director Bobby Ray Inman, 1981 to 1982
President Ronald Reagan nominated [[Bobby Ray Inman]], then director of the [[NSA]], as deputy director of Central Intelligence in 1981.[^14] The White House announced his resignation on April 21, 1982.[^15] The White House biography gives March 1982 as the date he resigned.[^14]
The [[Philadelphia Inquirer]] reported that Inman had submitted his resignation during a "heated internal debate" over a secret counterintelligence study, and that he and other intelligence officials had since narrowed the study's scope. Its sources said two topics that Inman, Casey and FBI Director William Webster had feared might be included, the organization of U.S. counterintelligence agencies and deceptive Soviet missile telemetry, were not on the agenda approved by an interagency working group chaired by John Kohler of the intelligence community staff.[^16] A CBS radio commentary of April 22, 1982 described William J. Casey, the director, as "a professional politician."[^17]
### Senior Review Panel
The Senior Review Panel was an advisory body within the Director's area that reviewed draft national intelligence estimates and commented on them to the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and the relevant National Intelligence Officer. In a 1991 letter printed in the Senate report on the nomination of [[Robert Gates]], Gates wrote that "The SRP's sole function was to review draft national estimates and offer comments as a group to the DCI, the Chairman/NIC and the relevant NIO."[^14] The Senate report records that [[James D. Theberge]] served on the panel from January 1986 until his death in January 1988, and that he had been hired on a three-days-per-week basis.[^14] Panel memoranda in the CIA reading room carry his name among the signers of comments dated September 1, September 8, September 24, October 22 and December 1, 1987, alongside [[William Leonhart]], B. McPherson and, on some, [[Richard L. Walker]] or [[Courtland D. Perkins]].[^15]
The Senior Review Panel was an advisory body within the Director's area that reviewed draft national intelligence estimates and commented on them to the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and the relevant National Intelligence Officer. In a 1991 letter printed in the Senate report on the nomination of [[Robert Gates]], Gates wrote that "The SRP's sole function was to review draft national estimates and offer comments as a group to the DCI, the Chairman/NIC and the relevant NIO."[^18] The Senate report records that [[James D. Theberge]] served on the panel from January 1986 until his death in January 1988, and that he had been hired on a three-days-per-week basis.[^18] Panel memoranda in the CIA reading room carry his name among the signers of comments dated September 1, September 8, September 24, October 22 and December 1, 1987, alongside [[William Leonhart]], B. McPherson and, on some, [[Richard L. Walker]] or [[Courtland D. Perkins]].[^19]
### UAP Research and Secrecy
@ -79,29 +93,29 @@ In recent years, the CIA has been more involved in the official UAP investigatio
### Dark Alliance Investigation
The CIA's covert action division, the Directorate of Operations, created and managed the Contra project during the 1980s, with its Latin American Division headed by [[Dewey Clarridge]] from 1981 to 1984. The agency recruited Contra leaders including [[Enrique Bermudez|Enrique Bermúdez]] in 1980 and [[Eden Pastora]] in 1981. The CIA maintained station chiefs in [[Costa Rica]], notably [[Joseph Fernandez|Joseph Fernández]] from 1984 to 1986, who were integral to Oliver North's illegal Contra resupply operation.[^16]
The CIA's covert action division, the Directorate of Operations, created and managed the Contra project during the 1980s, with its Latin American Division headed by [[Dewey Clarridge]] from 1981 to 1984. The agency recruited Contra leaders including [[Enrique Bermudez|Enrique Bermúdez]] in 1980 and [[Eden Pastora]] in 1981. The CIA maintained station chiefs in [[Costa Rica]], notably [[Joseph Fernandez|Joseph Fernández]] from 1984 to 1986, who were integral to Oliver North's illegal Contra resupply operation.[^20]
### Contra Drug Trafficking and the Frogman Case
Federal law enforcement records and congressional testimony established that the CIA had reports of [[Cocaine]] being transshipped through Contra-linked facilities, including [[Ilopango Airbase]] in [[El Salvador]]. When defense attorneys in the [[Frogman Case]] obtained letters from CIA assets claiming seized drug money belonged to the Contras, the CIA's Costa Rican station cabled Langley that both men were assets of an organization that had "unwittingly received CIA support." CIA lawyer Lee Strickland flew to [[San Francisco]] and asked the prosecutor to ensure depositions did not go forward. The government returned $36,020 in seized drug money and a CIA cable declared: "CIA equities are fully protected."[^17]
Federal law enforcement records and congressional testimony established that the CIA had reports of [[Cocaine]] being transshipped through Contra-linked facilities, including [[Ilopango Airbase]] in [[El Salvador]]. When defense attorneys in the [[Frogman Case]] obtained letters from CIA assets claiming seized drug money belonged to the Contras, the CIA's Costa Rican station cabled Langley that both men were assets of an organization that had "unwittingly received CIA support." CIA lawyer Lee Strickland flew to [[San Francisco]] and asked the prosecutor to ensure depositions did not go forward. The government returned $36,020 in seized drug money and a CIA cable declared: "CIA equities are fully protected."[^21]
The pseudonymous agent [[Ivan Gomez|Iván Gómez]], assigned to Costa Rica in 1982 as the CIA's liaison to the Contra armies, admitted during polygraph tests that he had laundered drug money. He was fired in 1989 for repeated polygraph failures concerning drug dealing.[^17]
The pseudonymous agent [[Ivan Gomez|Iván Gómez]], assigned to Costa Rica in 1982 as the CIA's liaison to the Contra armies, admitted during polygraph tests that he had laundered drug money. He was fired in 1989 for repeated polygraph failures concerning drug dealing.[^21]
### The Secret 1982 Agreement with the Justice Department
In early 1982, CIA director William J. Casey and Attorney General [[William French Smith]] signed a formal Memorandum of Understanding that exempted the CIA from reporting drug crimes committed by its non-employees - a category including agents, assets, and non-staff employees. Drug offenses were specifically removed from the list of crimes the CIA was required to report. The agreement remained in effect from 1982 to 1995.[^18]
In early 1982, CIA director William J. Casey and Attorney General [[William French Smith]] signed a formal Memorandum of Understanding that exempted the CIA from reporting drug crimes committed by its non-employees - a category including agents, assets, and non-staff employees. Drug offenses were specifically removed from the list of crimes the CIA was required to report. The agreement remained in effect from 1982 to 1995.[^22]
### Ilopango Obstruction
When [[DEA]] agent [[Celerino Castillo]] began investigating Contra drug trafficking at Ilopango, the CIA intervened directly. In April 1986 the El Salvador station sent a cable asking the Costa Rica station to persuade the DEA to back off: "El Salvador Station would appreciate Costa Rica Station advising DEA not to make any inquiries into anyone re: Hangar No. 4 at Ilopango since only legitimate CIA supported operations were conducted from this facility."[^19]
When [[DEA]] agent [[Celerino Castillo]] began investigating Contra drug trafficking at Ilopango, the CIA intervened directly. In April 1986 the El Salvador station sent a cable asking the Costa Rica station to persuade the DEA to back off: "El Salvador Station would appreciate Costa Rica Station advising DEA not to make any inquiries into anyone re: Hangar No. 4 at Ilopango since only legitimate CIA supported operations were conducted from this facility."[^23]
### Inspector General Investigation
CIA Inspector General [[Fred Hitz]] testified before the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence|House Intelligence Committee]] in March 1998 that the CIA "did not, in an expeditious or consistent fashion, cut off relationships with individuals supporting the Contra program who were alleged to have engaged in drug trafficking activity," including trafficking within the United States. His 400-page report documented CIA relationships with more than 50 suspected drug traffickers during the Contra war.[^18]
CIA Inspector General [[Fred Hitz]] testified before the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence|House Intelligence Committee]] in March 1998 that the CIA "did not, in an expeditious or consistent fashion, cut off relationships with individuals supporting the Contra program who were alleged to have engaged in drug trafficking activity," including trafficking within the United States. His 400-page report documented CIA relationships with more than 50 suspected drug traffickers during the Contra war.[^22]
### Iran-Contra Indictments
Multiple CIA officials were indicted during the Iran-Contra investigation. Clarridge was indicted on seven counts of perjury. Fernández was indicted on four counts. [[Alan Fiers]] pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress. All were pardoned by former CIA director [[George H.W. Bush]].[^16]
Multiple CIA officials were indicted during the Iran-Contra investigation. Clarridge was indicted on seven counts of perjury. Fernández was indicted on four counts. [[Alan Fiers]] pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress. All were pardoned by former CIA director [[George H.W. Bush]].[^20]
### Footnotes
@ -118,9 +132,13 @@ Multiple CIA officials were indicted during the Iran-Contra investigation. Clarr
[^11]: Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992, ch. 11, "BCCI, the CIA and Foreign Intelligence." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/11intel.htm
[^12]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 334.
[^13]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 341.
[^14]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence*, S. Exec. Rept. 102-19, 102d Cong., 1st sess., October 24, 1991, section 5, PDF pages 186 to 188. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-10219.pdf
[^15]: CREST Senior Review Panel memoranda CIA-RDP93T00837R000400110005-3 (NIC-03024-87, September 1, 1987), CIA-RDP93T01222R000100010013-9 (NIC-03595-87, September 8, 1987), CIA-RDP92T00306R000300090020-0 (September 24, 1987), CIA-RDP93T00451R000300080006-5 (NIC-04228-87, October 22, 1987) and CIA-RDP93T00451R000400110014-1 (December 1, 1987). https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t00837r000400110005-3, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t01222r000100010013-9, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp92t00306r000300090020-0, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t00451r000300080006-5, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t00451r000400110014-1
[^16]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Prologue and Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom"
[^17]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom"
[^18]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue: "The damage that has been done"
[^19]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 13: "The wrong kind of friends"
[^14]: White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Biography of Bobby Ray Inman," December 16, 1993. https://clintonwhitehouse6.archives.gov/1993/12/1993-12-16-biography-of-bobby-ray-inman.html
[^15]: George C. Wilson and George Gardner Jr., "Leaving for Private Industry: Inman Quitting," *The Washington Post*, April 22, 1982, CIA CREST copy CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230020-3. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230020-3
[^16]: Michael J. Sniffen, *Philadelphia Inquirer*, April 1982, CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230017-7. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230017-7
[^17]: CBS Radio network commentary, April 22, 1982, "Admiral Inman Resigns," CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230019-5. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230019-5
[^18]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence*, S. Exec. Rept. 102-19, 102d Cong., 1st sess., October 24, 1991, section 5, PDF pages 186 to 188. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-10219.pdf
[^19]: CREST Senior Review Panel memoranda CIA-RDP93T00837R000400110005-3 (NIC-03024-87, September 1, 1987), CIA-RDP93T01222R000100010013-9 (NIC-03595-87, September 8, 1987), CIA-RDP92T00306R000300090020-0 (September 24, 1987), CIA-RDP93T00451R000300080006-5 (NIC-04228-87, October 22, 1987) and CIA-RDP93T00451R000400110014-1 (December 1, 1987). https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t00837r000400110005-3, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t01222r000100010013-9, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp92t00306r000300090020-0, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t00451r000300080006-5, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t00451r000400110014-1
[^20]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Prologue and Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom"
[^21]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom"
[^22]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue: "The damage that has been done"
[^23]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 13: "The wrong kind of friends"

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20 - ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/USA/Defense Intelligence Agency.md
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@ -14,6 +14,14 @@ category: "U.S. Government"
summary: "The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is a major intelligence agency of the United States, specializing in defense and military intelligence."
start: 1961-10-01
location: "Washington, D.C."
relations:
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Bobby Ray Inman]]"
reverse: true
role: "vice director for plans, operations and support"
start: 1976
end: 1977
fn: 7
---
The [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] (DIA) is a major intelligence agency of the United States, specializing in defense and military intelligence. The DIA played a significant role in the oversight and funding of the [[Stargate Project]], particularly after the Army's initial involvement.[^1]
@ -23,19 +31,23 @@ In March 1979, when [[Jimmy Carter]] decided to provide [[Israel]] with KH-11 sa
[[Daniel O. Graham]] directed the agency from September 1974. He declared his intention to retire on November 3, 1975, when the dismissal of Secretary of Defense [[James R. Schlesinger]] and Director of Central Intelligence [[William Colby|William E. Colby]] was announced, and retired on January 1, 1976.[^3] He told the Senate Select Committee in 1987 that the DIA "coordinates all military intelligence activities."[^4] On June 23, 1975 he submitted a written statement to the House Appropriations Military Construction Subcommittee asking for $86.1 million in the fiscal 1976 budget for a new DIA building.[^5] The DIA report "Soviet and Czechoslovakian Parapsychology Research" was issued in September 1975, during his directorship, under the task number PT-1810-12-75.[^6]
### Vice director Bobby Ray Inman, 1976 to 1977
[[Bobby Ray Inman]], who had been Director of Naval Intelligence in 1974, became vice director of the agency in 1976. His title in that post was "Vice Director for Plans, Operations and Support." He became director of the [[NSA]] in July 1977.[^7][^8]
### Involvement in Psi Research
The DIA's interest in psi research was driven by concerns over perceived Soviet advancements. A 1972 DIA report, *Controlled Offensive Behavior - USSR*, highlighted the potential threat of Soviet psi capabilities.[^1] [[Jack Vorona]], head of the DIA's Scientific and Technical Intelligence Directorate, was the overall manager of the Grill Flame program. The DIA continued to oversee the program even after the Army's funding was initially terminated in 1985.[^1]
### Dark Alliance Investigation
Historian [[Roger Morris]] wrote that [[Barry Seal]] worked for the DIA "where coded records reportedly showed him on the payroll beginning in 1982." Arms manufacturer [[Tim LaFrance]] told journalist [[Nick Schou]] that the DIA was involved in [[Ronald Lister]]'s weapons manufacturing plant in [[El Salvador]], and that meetings Lister had with death squad commander [[Roberto D'Aubuisson]] "happened because the DIA wanted them to happen." Records found in Lister's house in the 1986 raid disclosed connections between Lister and "a DIA subcontractor."[^7]
Historian [[Roger Morris]] wrote that [[Barry Seal]] worked for the DIA "where coded records reportedly showed him on the payroll beginning in 1982." Arms manufacturer [[Tim LaFrance]] told journalist [[Nick Schou]] that the DIA was involved in [[Ronald Lister]]'s weapons manufacturing plant in [[El Salvador]], and that meetings Lister had with death squad commander [[Roberto D'Aubuisson]] "happened because the DIA wanted them to happen." Records found in Lister's house in the 1986 raid disclosed connections between Lister and "a DIA subcontractor."[^9]
### Role in Modern UAP Investigation
The DIA was the original home of the [[Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program]] (AAWSAP), the precursor to the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP). The program was led by [[James Lacatski]] and initially enjoyed the support of DIA leadership. According to [[Luis Elizondo]], new leadership was hostile to the investigation of paranormal aspects of the UAP phenomenon.[^8]
The DIA was the original home of the [[Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program]] (AAWSAP), the precursor to the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP). The program was led by [[James Lacatski]] and initially enjoyed the support of DIA leadership. According to [[Luis Elizondo]], new leadership was hostile to the investigation of paranormal aspects of the UAP phenomenon.[^10]
The DIA is also central to the events described in the [[Wilson-Davis Memo]], in which Admiral Thomas R. Wilson, then Director of the DIA, described his discovery of and subsequent denial of access to a secret UAP reverse-engineering program.[^8]
The DIA is also central to the events described in the [[Wilson-Davis Memo]], in which Admiral Thomas R. Wilson, then Director of the DIA, described his discovery of and subsequent denial of access to a secret UAP reverse-engineering program.[^10]
### Footnotes
@ -45,5 +57,7 @@ The DIA is also central to the events described in the [[Wilson-Davis Memo]], in
[^4]: Deposition of Daniel O. Graham, May 26, 1987, Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, Appendix B, vol. 12 (Internet Archive item micro_IA41152840_0234), pp. 976-978.
[^5]: Statement of Lieutenant General Daniel O. Graham, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, before the Military Construction Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, June 1975, CIA-RDP80B01495R000300020008-2. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80b01495r000300020008-2
[^6]: Louis F. Maire III and J. D. LaMothe, "Soviet and Czechoslovakian Parapsychology Research," Defense Intelligence Agency, DST-1810S-387-75, September 1975, CIA-RDP96-00792R000600350001-3, cover page.
[^7]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 6: "They were doing their patriotic duty"
[^8]: Elizondo, Luis. *Imminent*. William Morrow, 2024.
[^7]: White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Biography of Bobby Ray Inman," December 16, 1993. https://clintonwhitehouse6.archives.gov/1993/12/1993-12-16-biography-of-bobby-ray-inman.html
[^8]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Nomination of Admiral B. R. Inman to Be Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, hearing of February 3, 1981, prepared statement. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/hearings/97inman.pdf
[^9]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 6: "They were doing their patriotic duty"
[^10]: Elizondo, Luis. *Imminent*. William Morrow, 2024.

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20 - ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/USA/NSA.md
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@ -28,12 +28,12 @@ relations:
role: "Navy officer assigned to a research billet; Project LIGHTNING (ultra-high-speed computers)"
start: 1960
end: 1963
fn: 2
fn: 5
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Bill Hamilton]]"
reverse: true
role: "worked for NSA in the 1960s according to NSA's statement to the Bua inquiry; personnel records purged"
fn: 10
fn: 13
- type: investigated
with: "[[Church Committee]]"
reverse: true
@ -42,63 +42,81 @@ relations:
end: 1975
fn: 1
---
- type: head_of
with: "[[Bobby Ray Inman]]"
reverse: true
role: "director"
start: 1977-07-05
end: 1981-02
fn: 2
The National Security Agency (NSA) was established by a presidential memorandum of October 1952, which directed the creation of the agency, designated the Secretary of Defense as the President's executive agent for communications intelligence, and set out the agency's missions. The agency's director, Lieutenant General [[Lew Allen]], described it in that form to the [[Church Committee]] on October 29, 1975.[^1] Its headquarters are at [[Fort Meade]], Maryland, where the Army's [[United States Army Intelligence and Security Command]] (INSCOM) also kept its remote viewing unit.
### Director Bobby Ray Inman, 1977 to 1981
Bobby Ray Inman became director on July 5, 1977. In February 1981 he told the [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]] that he had served as director "since 5 July 1977."[^2] He told the committee that during his four years at the agency "this committee constantly pressed on the administration the question of the adequacy of the intelligence assets."[^2]
The BBC's Tim Harford wrote in 2017 that the agency's head "was genuinely puzzled about the academics' motives" in the public-key cryptography episode, and that he "soon accepted that the professor had a point and no prosecutions followed."[^3]
A Senate executive summary of January 1993 records that Inman testified that the NSA's signals intelligence collection in Southeast Asia was dismantled after the war and was not resumed until at least 1978.[^4]
### SHAMROCK and the watch list activity
The Church Committee's statement of November 6, 1975 described SHAMROCK as a message collection program in which the government persuaded three international telegraph companies, [[RCA Global]], [[ITT World Communications]] and [[Western Union International]], to make their international telegraph traffic available, so that "for almost 30 years, copies of most international telegrams originating in or forwarded through the United States were turned over to the National Security Agency and its predecessor agencies." The committee found that the [[Army Security Agency]], later folded into INSCOM, was the first agency with operational responsibility for SHAMROCK; the [[Armed Forces Security Agency]] inherited it in 1949 and NSA assumed operational control when it was created in 1952. The committee added that no documents at NSA or the Department of Defense reflected the operational arrangements between the government and the companies.[^1] In his own testimony Allen separately described a "watch list activity" conducted by NSA between 1967 and 1973 in response to requirements levied by other government agencies, and the committee chairman's opening statement noted that NSA, like the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] and the [[Internal Revenue Service]], had maintained a watch list containing the names of United States citizens.[^1]
### Hal Puthoff at the NSA
[[Hal Puthoff]], later the principal investigator of the [[Stanford Research Institute]] remote viewing work, reported to active duty as a [[U.S. Navy|Navy]] officer in 1960 after taking a master's degree at the [[University of Florida]] and was assigned to a research billet at the NSA at Fort Meade. According to the biography SRI filed with its 1979 Grill Flame protocol, he pursued research and monitored contracts on the development of ultra-high-speed computers under Project LIGHTNING, started a program on the potential of lasers, fiber optics and related devices for optical computers, received a Department of Defense Certificate of Commendation, and won second prize for outstanding paper of the year in the NSA Technical Journal in 1963. He left active duty in February 1963 and remained a civilian (GS-13) until September 1963, when he entered [[Stanford University]].[^2]
[[Hal Puthoff]], later the principal investigator of the [[Stanford Research Institute]] remote viewing work, reported to active duty as a [[U.S. Navy|Navy]] officer in 1960 after taking a master's degree at the [[University of Florida]] and was assigned to a research billet at the NSA at Fort Meade. According to the biography SRI filed with its 1979 Grill Flame protocol, he pursued research and monitored contracts on the development of ultra-high-speed computers under Project LIGHTNING, started a program on the potential of lasers, fiber optics and related devices for optical computers, received a Department of Defense Certificate of Commendation, and won second prize for outstanding paper of the year in the NSA Technical Journal in 1963. He left active duty in February 1963 and remained a civilian (GS-13) until September 1963, when he entered [[Stanford University]].[^5]
### The 1973 West Virginia target
SRI's final report for the period January 1974 through February 1975 describes experiments "under the control of the sponsor," in which an SRI experimenter requested geographical coordinates of a site unknown to the experimenters and subjects from "the sponsor's group responsible for threat analysis." The coordinates received were 38 degrees 23 minutes 45 seconds to 48 seconds north, 79 degrees 25 minutes west, described only as being in West Virginia. On May 29, 1973 [[Puthoff]] relayed them by telephone to a first subject, designated S3 in the final report and named as [[Ingo Swann]] in SRI's October 1, 1973 proposal, whose sessions of May 29 and 30 described rolling hills, lawns like those around a military base, and "either some old bunkers around, or maybe this is a covered reservoir." On June 1, 1973 Puthoff gave the coordinates to a second subject, designated S1 and named as [[Pat Price]] in the proposal, whose written response of June 2 reported a peak in a mountain chain, a concealed road, a "former missile site" where underground rooms held records, microfilm and file cabinets under "Army 5th Corps Engineers," and, beyond them, bays "with computers, communication equipment, large maps" staffed by the Army Signal Corps. The report states that both West Virginia reports and the report on a Urals site that Price volunteered were "verified by personnel in the sponsor organization as being substantially correct."[^3]
SRI's final report for the period January 1974 through February 1975 describes experiments "under the control of the sponsor," in which an SRI experimenter requested geographical coordinates of a site unknown to the experimenters and subjects from "the sponsor's group responsible for threat analysis." The coordinates received were 38 degrees 23 minutes 45 seconds to 48 seconds north, 79 degrees 25 minutes west, described only as being in West Virginia. On May 29, 1973 [[Puthoff]] relayed them by telephone to a first subject, designated S3 in the final report and named as [[Ingo Swann]] in SRI's October 1, 1973 proposal, whose sessions of May 29 and 30 described rolling hills, lawns like those around a military base, and "either some old bunkers around, or maybe this is a covered reservoir." On June 1, 1973 Puthoff gave the coordinates to a second subject, designated S1 and named as [[Pat Price]] in the proposal, whose written response of June 2 reported a peak in a mountain chain, a concealed road, a "former missile site" where underground rooms held records, microfilm and file cabinets under "Army 5th Corps Engineers," and, beyond them, bays "with computers, communication equipment, large maps" staffed by the Army Signal Corps. The report states that both West Virginia reports and the report on a Urals site that Price volunteered were "verified by personnel in the sponsor organization as being substantially correct."[^6]
On a later date, the report says, S1 was asked to return to the site "with the goal of obtaining information on code words," and supplied the following: top of desk with papers labeled "Flytrap" and "Minerva"; a file cabinet labeled "Operation Pool"; folders labeled "Cueball," "14 Ball," "4 Ball," "8 Ball" and "Rackup"; a site name that "vaguely seems like Hayfork or Haystack"; and the personnel "Col. R. J. Hamilton, Maj. Gen. George R. Nash, Major John C. Calhoun (??)."[^3] The name Sugar Grove does not appear in the SRI report. An article by the former [[Time]] science correspondent John L. Wilhelm in [[The Washington Post]] (c. 1977) wrote that the coordinates were encoded and passed through an NSA monitor in the Washington area to a CIA scientist at [[Menlo Park]], that the site was a satellite interrogation station which "eavesdrops on Soviet space vehicles," that an officer exclaimed "Hell, there's no security left," and that a security investigation was launched to determine whether the information had leaked to Price. Wilhelm, who also names Sugar Grove in listing the explanations later offered, quoted a source as saying the security men "wouldn't buy the idea of remote viewing."[^4] An Army briefing script on the Grill Flame program, describing the same episode without naming the site, states that the viewer "actually entered the place, calling out names of people who were working there," that he "read" classified codewords on folders, some locked inside security containers, and that "the CIA later confirmed with NSA the validity of much of the subject's information."[^5]
On a later date, the report says, S1 was asked to return to the site "with the goal of obtaining information on code words," and supplied the following: top of desk with papers labeled "Flytrap" and "Minerva"; a file cabinet labeled "Operation Pool"; folders labeled "Cueball," "14 Ball," "4 Ball," "8 Ball" and "Rackup"; a site name that "vaguely seems like Hayfork or Haystack"; and the personnel "Col. R. J. Hamilton, Maj. Gen. George R. Nash, Major John C. Calhoun (??)."[^6] The name Sugar Grove does not appear in the SRI report. An article by the former [[Time]] science correspondent John L. Wilhelm in [[The Washington Post]] (c. 1977) wrote that the coordinates were encoded and passed through an NSA monitor in the Washington area to a CIA scientist at [[Menlo Park]], that the site was a satellite interrogation station which "eavesdrops on Soviet space vehicles," that an officer exclaimed "Hell, there's no security left," and that a security investigation was launched to determine whether the information had leaked to Price. Wilhelm, who also names Sugar Grove in listing the explanations later offered, quoted a source as saying the security men "wouldn't buy the idea of remote viewing."[^7] An Army briefing script on the Grill Flame program, describing the same episode without naming the site, states that the viewer "actually entered the place, calling out names of people who were working there," that he "read" classified codewords on folders, some locked inside security containers, and that "the CIA later confirmed with NSA the validity of much of the subject's information."[^8]
### NSA and the Army remote viewing program
An INSCOM staff paper of 1982, written when [[Congress]] was ending National Foreign Intelligence Program funding for the Army's Grill Flame project, listed among the options for its future a determination "if the Director, NSA would integrate the current INSCOM GRILL FLAME project into any NSA program."[^6] A September 22, 1982 memorandum from the 902d Military Intelligence Group set out the mechanics of NSA sponsorship: the psi personnel could be carried on the rolls of the CONUS MI Group, the housekeeping organization for Army personnel working at NSA, under a "Strategic Systems Planning Detachment" with funding provided by the NSA sponsor and tasking exercised by the INSCOM commander through an INSCOM liaison officer at the NSA.[^7] INSCOM's chronology records that Lieutenant General [[Lincoln D. Faurer]], director of the NSA, was briefed on the program on August 2, 1982.[^6]
An INSCOM staff paper of 1982, written when [[Congress]] was ending National Foreign Intelligence Program funding for the Army's Grill Flame project, listed among the options for its future a determination "if the Director, NSA would integrate the current INSCOM GRILL FLAME project into any NSA program."[^9] A September 22, 1982 memorandum from the 902d Military Intelligence Group set out the mechanics of NSA sponsorship: the psi personnel could be carried on the rolls of the CONUS MI Group, the housekeeping organization for Army personnel working at NSA, under a "Strategic Systems Planning Detachment" with funding provided by the NSA sponsor and tasking exercised by the INSCOM commander through an INSCOM liaison officer at the NSA.[^10] INSCOM's chronology records that Lieutenant General [[Lincoln D. Faurer]], director of the NSA, was briefed on the program on August 2, 1982.[^9]
On August 27, 1982 the Grill Flame project manager, Lieutenant Colonel [[Robert Jachim]], recorded a conversation with NSA personnel. The NSA people said the agency had "no active remote viewers," asked INSCOM how remote viewers were selected, what psychological battery was used, whether a screening questionnaire could be provided and what training SRI had offered, and were given copies of articles from Signal, [[Omni]] and an [[IEEE]] article by [[Robert Jahn]] of Princeton. Jachim wrote that Puthoff had telephoned an NSA contact to say that some of SRI's funding had not materialized and to invite NSA into the program, and that the NSA contact "was noncommittal." The memorandum gives an internal NSA designation for the agency's own parapsychology activity, which is redacted in the released copy.[^8] A 1984 INSCOM commanding general's memorandum lists the NSA among the agencies that had tasked remote viewing and says an evaluation from the NSA, with one from the CIA, was attached to it.[^9]
On August 27, 1982 the Grill Flame project manager, Lieutenant Colonel [[Robert Jachim]], recorded a conversation with NSA personnel. The NSA people said the agency had "no active remote viewers," asked INSCOM how remote viewers were selected, what psychological battery was used, whether a screening questionnaire could be provided and what training SRI had offered, and were given copies of articles from Signal, [[Omni]] and an [[IEEE]] article by [[Robert Jahn]] of Princeton. Jachim wrote that Puthoff had telephoned an NSA contact to say that some of SRI's funding had not materialized and to invite NSA into the program, and that the NSA contact "was noncommittal." The memorandum gives an internal NSA designation for the agency's own parapsychology activity, which is redacted in the released copy.[^11] A 1984 INSCOM commanding general's memorandum lists the NSA among the agencies that had tasked remote viewing and says an evaluation from the NSA, with one from the CIA, was attached to it.[^12]
### PROMIS
An NSA database named PROMIS appears in the [[Department of Justice]] inquiry into the INSLAW matter. The 1993 report of Special Counsel [[Nicholas J. Bua]] records that [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] told Bua's team that the "PROMIS" software [[Earl Brian]] distributed to the Israelis was an NSA program and not INSLAW's, that the NSA had developed it to translate Vietnamese into English, and that [[Bill Hamilton]] had worked on it while employed at the NSA before INSLAW existed. Ben-Menashe had earlier sworn affidavits for INSLAW stating that Brian told a 1987 Israeli meeting that the CIA, the NSA, the Department of Justice and Israeli intelligence had been allowed to use PROMIS since 1982; he told Bua that he had let the Hamiltons "assume" he meant INSLAW's product. The Bua report states that the NSA told the investigators Hamilton had worked for the NSA in the 1960s but that, because his personnel records had been purged, it could not say whether he had worked on such a program. The NSA also told them it used a commercial software package from [[Computer Corporation of America]] and that in 1974 and 1975, six years before INSLAW was incorporated, it had developed a database in the M204 language called PROMIS, an acronym for Product Related On-line Management Information System ("product" being the agency's term for its intelligence reports), which it said had no relationship to INSLAW's product and shared the name coincidentally. The NSA general counsel's office told the investigators that many NSA personnel knew of its PROMIS and that many had since moved to other agencies and private employers. The Bua report declined to credit the rest of Ben-Menashe's account.[^10]
An NSA database named PROMIS appears in the [[Department of Justice]] inquiry into the INSLAW matter. The 1993 report of Special Counsel [[Nicholas J. Bua]] records that [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] told Bua's team that the "PROMIS" software [[Earl Brian]] distributed to the Israelis was an NSA program and not INSLAW's, that the NSA had developed it to translate Vietnamese into English, and that [[Bill Hamilton]] had worked on it while employed at the NSA before INSLAW existed. Ben-Menashe had earlier sworn affidavits for INSLAW stating that Brian told a 1987 Israeli meeting that the CIA, the NSA, the Department of Justice and Israeli intelligence had been allowed to use PROMIS since 1982; he told Bua that he had let the Hamiltons "assume" he meant INSLAW's product. The Bua report states that the NSA told the investigators Hamilton had worked for the NSA in the 1960s but that, because his personnel records had been purged, it could not say whether he had worked on such a program. The NSA also told them it used a commercial software package from [[Computer Corporation of America]] and that in 1974 and 1975, six years before INSLAW was incorporated, it had developed a database in the M204 language called PROMIS, an acronym for Product Related On-line Management Information System ("product" being the agency's term for its intelligence reports), which it said had no relationship to INSLAW's product and shared the name coincidentally. The NSA general counsel's office told the investigators that many NSA personnel knew of its PROMIS and that many had since moved to other agencies and private employers. The Bua report declined to credit the rest of Ben-Menashe's account.[^13]
The House Judiciary Committee's 1992 report on the INSLAW affair had recorded a different claim: [[Juval Aviv]], a former Israeli intelligence officer and head of the investigative firm [[Interfor]], told committee investigators in January 1991 that Brian had sold INSLAW's Enhanced PROMIS to United States agencies outside the Department of Justice, including the CIA, the NSA, [[NASA]] and the [[National Security Council]], and to [[Interpol]], the [[Mossad]], the Israeli Air Force and the Egyptian government.[^11]
The House Judiciary Committee's 1992 report on the INSLAW affair had recorded a different claim: [[Juval Aviv]], a former Israeli intelligence officer and head of the investigative firm [[Interfor]], told committee investigators in January 1991 that Brian had sold INSLAW's Enhanced PROMIS to United States agencies outside the Department of Justice, including the CIA, the NSA, [[NASA]] and the [[National Security Council]], and to [[Interpol]], the [[Mossad]], the Israeli Air Force and the Egyptian government.[^14]
### UFO records and Citizens Against UFO Secrecy v. NSA
In [[Ground Saucer Watch]] v. CIA (D.D.C., Civil Action 78-859) the Central Intelligence Agency located documents that originated with the NSA and referred them to that agency in four separate referrals, the last on July 27, 1979. The attorney for the plaintiff, [[Peter A. Gersten]], then requested the documents from the NSA; by letters of January 9, 1979 and December 19, 1979 the NSA's policy staff chief, [[Roy R. Banner]], told him the records were classified in their entirety and exempt under 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1) and (b)(3), the latter on the strength of 18 U.S.C. 798, 50 U.S.C. 403(d)(3) and Public Law 86-36. The NSA appeals authority affirmed on March 24, 1980, and in Citizens Against Unidentified Flying Objects Secrecy v. National Security Agency (D.D.C., Civil Action 80-1562) the agency's Chief of the Office of Policy, [[Eugene F. Yeates]], swore an affidavit that the withheld material consisted of communications intelligence reports that were "all based on intercepted foreign communications," whose disclosure would identify communications "successfully intercepted and processed," together with four non-COMINT records, and that he would supply a second affidavit classified Top Secret for the court's in camera consideration. A portion of one responsive document was declassified and released to plaintiff's counsel on September 15, 1980.[^12]
In [[Ground Saucer Watch]] v. CIA (D.D.C., Civil Action 78-859) the Central Intelligence Agency located documents that originated with the NSA and referred them to that agency in four separate referrals, the last on July 27, 1979. The attorney for the plaintiff, [[Peter A. Gersten]], then requested the documents from the NSA; by letters of January 9, 1979 and December 19, 1979 the NSA's policy staff chief, [[Roy R. Banner]], told him the records were classified in their entirety and exempt under 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1) and (b)(3), the latter on the strength of 18 U.S.C. 798, 50 U.S.C. 403(d)(3) and Public Law 86-36. The NSA appeals authority affirmed on March 24, 1980, and in Citizens Against Unidentified Flying Objects Secrecy v. National Security Agency (D.D.C., Civil Action 80-1562) the agency's Chief of the Office of Policy, [[Eugene F. Yeates]], swore an affidavit that the withheld material consisted of communications intelligence reports that were "all based on intercepted foreign communications," whose disclosure would identify communications "successfully intercepted and processed," together with four non-COMINT records, and that he would supply a second affidavit classified Top Secret for the court's in camera consideration. A portion of one responsive document was declassified and released to plaintiff's counsel on September 15, 1980.[^15]
### The KH-11 and the Israeli access dispute
[[Seymour Hersh]] wrote in *The Samson Option* that a former NSA official told him the KH-11 satellite, launched in December 1976, was considered the most important advance of its time in reconnaissance photography, that every military and civilian intelligence agency had an urgent requirement for its imagery, and that the NSA, responsible for all communications intelligence, had a role in scheduling the satellite to maximize collection. Hersh wrote that [[Jimmy Carter]]'s decision in March 1979 to give [[Israel]] direct access to KH-11 photographs disrupted that scheduling and was unpopular within the NSA and other agencies, and that during the [[Ronald Reagan]] administration it was learned that Israeli military officers were permitted to attend Pentagon meetings where future KH-11 missions and orbital paths were discussed, which dismayed some NSA officials.[^13]
[[Seymour Hersh]] wrote in *The Samson Option* that a former NSA official told him the KH-11 satellite, launched in December 1976, was considered the most important advance of its time in reconnaissance photography, that every military and civilian intelligence agency had an urgent requirement for its imagery, and that the NSA, responsible for all communications intelligence, had a role in scheduling the satellite to maximize collection. Hersh wrote that [[Jimmy Carter]]'s decision in March 1979 to give [[Israel]] direct access to KH-11 photographs disrupted that scheduling and was unpopular within the NSA and other agencies, and that during the [[Ronald Reagan]] administration it was learned that Israeli military officers were permitted to attend Pentagon meetings where future KH-11 missions and orbital paths were discussed, which dismayed some NSA officials.[^16]
### USS Liberty intercepts, 2003 to 2007
The NSA released transcripts of intercepts made after the June 8, 1967, attack on the [[USS Liberty Incident|USS Liberty]] in July 2003, in response to a Freedom of Information Act request by [[A. Jay Cristol]] filed April 26, 2001. The letter of July 2, 2003, enclosed three recordings of Israeli communications in Hebrew, three transcripts and two summary reports, and states that "No communications of the attacking aircraft or torpedo boats were available" and that an EC-121 aircraft had collected conversations between two Israeli helicopter pilots and the control tower at Hazor Airfield; it states that portions were withheld under Executive Order 12958 and under statutes including 18 U.S.C. 798 and Section 6 of Public Law 86-36.[^14] In January 2004 the agency's historian, [[David Hatch]], said the new material "doesn't settle much," according to the Financial Times, and that his reading of the air controller's conversations with two helicopter pilots "suggested strongly" that the Israelis did not know at first that the ship was American.[^15] On June 8, 2007, the NSA announced that it had finished its review of all material relating to the attack and had posted additional documents, stating: "It is not NSA's intention to prove or disprove any one set of conclusions, many of which can be drawn from a thorough review of this material."[^16] [[Oliver Kirby]], the NSA deputy director for operations/production in 1967, said in an interview of February 14, 2003 that within weeks of the attack he read transcripts of the Israeli pilots' conversations that made it "absolutely certain" the Israelis knew the ship was American.[^17] The Chicago Tribune reported on October 2, 2007 that the NSA's position was that it never intercepted the communications of the attacking Israeli pilots; quoted Kirby as saying "I'm willing to swear on a stack of Bibles that we knew they knew"; quoted Michael Prostinak, a Hebrew linguist aboard the EC-121, as saying "there were more tapes than just the three on the Internet"; and reported that the posted tape designated A1104/A-02 begins at 2:29 p.m. local time and that a preceding tape designated A1104/A-01 is absent. An NSA media adviser did not respond to the Tribune's question about the difference.[^18]
The NSA released transcripts of intercepts made after the June 8, 1967, attack on the [[USS Liberty Incident|USS Liberty]] in July 2003, in response to a Freedom of Information Act request by [[A. Jay Cristol]] filed April 26, 2001. The letter of July 2, 2003, enclosed three recordings of Israeli communications in Hebrew, three transcripts and two summary reports, and states that "No communications of the attacking aircraft or torpedo boats were available" and that an EC-121 aircraft had collected conversations between two Israeli helicopter pilots and the control tower at Hazor Airfield; it states that portions were withheld under Executive Order 12958 and under statutes including 18 U.S.C. 798 and Section 6 of Public Law 86-36.[^17] In January 2004 the agency's historian, [[David Hatch]], said the new material "doesn't settle much," according to the Financial Times, and that his reading of the air controller's conversations with two helicopter pilots "suggested strongly" that the Israelis did not know at first that the ship was American.[^18] On June 8, 2007, the NSA announced that it had finished its review of all material relating to the attack and had posted additional documents, stating: "It is not NSA's intention to prove or disprove any one set of conclusions, many of which can be drawn from a thorough review of this material."[^19] [[Oliver Kirby]], the NSA deputy director for operations/production in 1967, said in an interview of February 14, 2003 that within weeks of the attack he read transcripts of the Israeli pilots' conversations that made it "absolutely certain" the Israelis knew the ship was American.[^20] The Chicago Tribune reported on October 2, 2007 that the NSA's position was that it never intercepted the communications of the attacking Israeli pilots; quoted Kirby as saying "I'm willing to swear on a stack of Bibles that we knew they knew"; quoted Michael Prostinak, a Hebrew linguist aboard the EC-121, as saying "there were more tapes than just the three on the Internet"; and reported that the posted tape designated A1104/A-02 begins at 2:29 p.m. local time and that a preceding tape designated A1104/A-01 is absent. An NSA media adviser did not respond to the Tribune's question about the difference.[^21]
### Footnotes
[^1]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Intelligence Activities, Senate Resolution 21*, Hearings, vol. 5, "The National Security Agency and Fourth Amendment Rights," 94th Cong., 1st sess., October 29 and November 6, 1975 (testimony of Lt. Gen. Lew Allen, Jr.; committee statement on SHAMROCK read November 6), https://archive.org/details/Church-Committee-Hearings-Volume5-National-Security-Agency (text at https://archive.org/download/Church-Committee-Hearings-Volume5-National-Security-Agency/Vol5-NSA_djvu.txt).
[^2]: "Proposed Grill Flame Protocol: Proposed SRI International Applied Remote Viewing Protocol," SRI 9-4107, March 23, 1979, CIA-RDP96-00788R001300070001-1, biography of Harold E. Puthoff, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00788r001300070001-1.
[^3]: Harold E. Puthoff and Russell Targ, "Perceptual Augmentation Techniques, Part Two: Research Report," final report covering January 1974 through February 1975, SRI International, December 1, 1975, section on "West Virginia Site (S3)," "West Virginia Site (S1)" and "Urals Site," CIA-RDP96-00788R001300030001-5, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00788r001300030001-5; and SRI Proposal for Research ISH 73-146, "Perceptual Augmentation Techniques, Part One," October 1, 1973, CIA-RDP96-00787R000700100001-5, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00787r000700100001-5, which names Price in the same passage.
[^4]: John L. Wilhelm, "The CIA, the Pentagon and the Russians: The Military Potential of Parapsychology," *The Washington Post* (c. 1977), as reproduced in CIA-RDP96-00788R001700360003-3, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00788r001700360003-3. Wilhelm is the sole source for the NSA monitor, the "satellite interrogation station," the exclamation and the security investigation.
[^5]: "Army's Role in a Sensitive, Close-Hold DoD Project," Army briefing script on psychoenergetics (undated), CIA-RDP96-00787R000200020023-5, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00787r000200020023-5.
[^6]: Staff paper on termination of the Army Grill Flame program, 1982, and "Center Lane Historical Overview," CIA-RDP96-00788R001500180001-7, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00788r001500180001-7 and CIA-RDP96-00788R000400060001-2.
[^7]: Memorandum, "Detachment G Reorganization," 902d Military Intelligence Group Security Support Detachment, September 22, 1982, CIA-RDP96-00788R001700350013-3, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00788r001700350013-3.
[^8]: Memorandum for the record, "NSA Involvement in GRILL FLAME," Lt. Col. Robert J. Jachim, August 1982, CIA-RDP96-00788R001700230009-1, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00788r001700230009-1.
[^9]: INSCOM commanding general's memorandum and talking paper, May 4, 1984, CIA-RDP96-00788R001500180001-7.
[^10]: Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc. (1993), pp. 73 to 80, released by the Department of Justice Office of Information Policy on September 30, 2013 (AG/13-00675 (F)), https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/nsa/DOJ-OIP-INSLAW_1993.pdf.
[^11]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, *The INSLAW Affair*, H. Rept. 102-857, September 10, 1992, pp. 67 to 68, https://archive.org/details/InslawAffairInvestigativeReport. Aviv is the sole source for these statements, which the report records as his account to committee investigators.
[^12]: Affidavit of Eugene F. Yeates, Chief, Office of Policy, National Security Agency, *Citizens Against Unidentified Flying Objects Secrecy v. National Security Agency*, Civil Action No. 80-1562 (D.D.C. 1980), https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/declassified-documents/ufo/assets/files/affadavit_yeates.pdf (archived copy: https://web.archive.org/web/2020/https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/declassified-documents/ufo/assets/files/affadavit_yeates.pdf).
[^13]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (Random House, 1991). Hersh attributes the account of the KH-11 scheduling to an unnamed former NSA official.
[^14]: National Security Agency, letter from Louis F. Giles, Director of Policy, to A. Jay Cristol, FOIA Case 40039A, July 2, 2003. https://irp.fas.org/nsa/liberty.html
[^15]: Guy Dinmore, *Financial Times*, January 13, 2004, reprinted by the History News Network. https://www.historynewsnetwork.org/article/3027
[^16]: National Security Agency, "U.S.S. Liberty," release page (Wayback Machine 2007 capture). http://web.archive.org/web/2007/http://www.nsa.gov/liberty
[^17]: David C. Walsh, "Former NSA Officials Agree," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, June 2003. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2003/june/former-nsa-officials-agree
[^18]: "New revelations in attack on American spy ship," *Chicago Tribune*, October 2, 2007. https://www.chicagotribune.com/2007/10/02/new-revelations-in-attack-on-american-spy-ship/
[^2]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Nomination of Admiral B. R. Inman to Be Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, hearing of February 3, 1981 (Washington: GPO, 1981). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/hearings/97inman.pdf
[^3]: Tim Harford, "Geeks v government: The battle over public key cryptography," BBC News, April 24, 2017. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-39341663
[^4]: U.S. Senate, Report of the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, S. Rept. 103-1, Executive Summary, January 13, 1993. https://irp.fas.org/congress/1993_rpt/pow-exec.html
[^5]: "Proposed Grill Flame Protocol: Proposed SRI International Applied Remote Viewing Protocol," SRI 9-4107, March 23, 1979, CIA-RDP96-00788R001300070001-1, biography of Harold E. Puthoff, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00788r001300070001-1.
[^6]: Harold E. Puthoff and Russell Targ, "Perceptual Augmentation Techniques, Part Two: Research Report," final report covering January 1974 through February 1975, SRI International, December 1, 1975, section on "West Virginia Site (S3)," "West Virginia Site (S1)" and "Urals Site," CIA-RDP96-00788R001300030001-5, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00788r001300030001-5; and SRI Proposal for Research ISH 73-146, "Perceptual Augmentation Techniques, Part One," October 1, 1973, CIA-RDP96-00787R000700100001-5, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00787r000700100001-5, which names Price in the same passage.
[^7]: John L. Wilhelm, "The CIA, the Pentagon and the Russians: The Military Potential of Parapsychology," *The Washington Post* (c. 1977), as reproduced in CIA-RDP96-00788R001700360003-3, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00788r001700360003-3. Wilhelm is the sole source for the NSA monitor, the "satellite interrogation station," the exclamation and the security investigation.
[^8]: "Army's Role in a Sensitive, Close-Hold DoD Project," Army briefing script on psychoenergetics (undated), CIA-RDP96-00787R000200020023-5, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00787r000200020023-5.
[^9]: Staff paper on termination of the Army Grill Flame program, 1982, and "Center Lane Historical Overview," CIA-RDP96-00788R001500180001-7, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00788r001500180001-7 and CIA-RDP96-00788R000400060001-2.
[^10]: Memorandum, "Detachment G Reorganization," 902d Military Intelligence Group Security Support Detachment, September 22, 1982, CIA-RDP96-00788R001700350013-3, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00788r001700350013-3.
[^11]: Memorandum for the record, "NSA Involvement in GRILL FLAME," Lt. Col. Robert J. Jachim, August 1982, CIA-RDP96-00788R001700230009-1, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00788r001700230009-1.
[^12]: INSCOM commanding general's memorandum and talking paper, May 4, 1984, CIA-RDP96-00788R001500180001-7.
[^13]: Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc. (1993), pp. 73 to 80, released by the Department of Justice Office of Information Policy on September 30, 2013 (AG/13-00675 (F)), https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/nsa/DOJ-OIP-INSLAW_1993.pdf.
[^14]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, *The INSLAW Affair*, H. Rept. 102-857, September 10, 1992, pp. 67 to 68, https://archive.org/details/InslawAffairInvestigativeReport. Aviv is the sole source for these statements, which the report records as his account to committee investigators.
[^15]: Affidavit of Eugene F. Yeates, Chief, Office of Policy, National Security Agency, *Citizens Against Unidentified Flying Objects Secrecy v. National Security Agency*, Civil Action No. 80-1562 (D.D.C. 1980), https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/declassified-documents/ufo/assets/files/affadavit_yeates.pdf (archived copy: https://web.archive.org/web/2020/https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/declassified-documents/ufo/assets/files/affadavit_yeates.pdf).
[^16]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (Random House, 1991). Hersh attributes the account of the KH-11 scheduling to an unnamed former NSA official.
[^17]: National Security Agency, letter from Louis F. Giles, Director of Policy, to A. Jay Cristol, FOIA Case 40039A, July 2, 2003. https://irp.fas.org/nsa/liberty.html
[^18]: Guy Dinmore, *Financial Times*, January 13, 2004, reprinted by the History News Network. https://www.historynewsnetwork.org/article/3027
[^19]: National Security Agency, "U.S.S. Liberty," release page (Wayback Machine 2007 capture). http://web.archive.org/web/2007/http://www.nsa.gov/liberty
[^20]: David C. Walsh, "Former NSA Officials Agree," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, June 2003. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2003/june/former-nsa-officials-agree
[^21]: "New revelations in attack on American spy ship," *Chicago Tribune*, October 2, 2007. https://www.chicagotribune.com/2007/10/02/new-revelations-in-attack-on-american-spy-ship/