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40 - EVENTS/INTELLIGENCE_SCANDALS/1995 AIR evaluation of Star Gate.md
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@ -18,14 +18,18 @@ start: 1995-06-01
end: 1995-11-28
location: "Washington, D.C."
created: 2026-09-21
updated: 2026-09-21
updated: 2026-09-22
---
In 1995, following a directive from Congress, the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] took custody of the [[Defense Intelligence Agency|DIA]]'s [[STARGATE PROJECT|Star Gate]] program, "which involved the use of paranormal phenomena, primarily 'remote viewing,' for intelligence collection," declassified its own parapsychology work of the 1970s "in order to facilitate a new, external review," and in June contracted the [[American Institutes for Research]] through its Office of Research and Development to evaluate it. The program had three parts: "'Operations,' using remote viewing to collect intelligence against foreign targets; 'Research and Development,' using laboratory studies to find new ways to improve remote viewing for use in the intelligence world; and 'Foreign Assessment,' the analysis of foreign activities to develop or exploit the paranormal." The foreign assessment part was excluded from the review. Operations "continued until the Spring of 1995, when the program was suspended."[^1]
The review was first offered to the [[National Research Council]]. The CIA's chronology of the transfer ([[1995 transfer of Star Gate to the CIA]]) records that on March 15, 1995, "after informal discussions with NRC, panel member selection begins: Jessica Utts, [[John Palmer]], [[James Alcock]], and Ray Hyman contacted by NRC and agree to act as commissioned reviewers," and that on May 10 "NRC formally rejects CIA study proposal citing prior definitive study. NRC stated unequivocally that 'the case for remote viewing... is virtually nonexistent.'" The CIA met AIR's president the same day; the contract was signed on June 12, and ORD's independent contractor later described AIR as the "replacement organization for the NRC." The Office of Research and Development had told the Executive Director in advance that "we do NOT intend to ask our blue ribbon panel to tell us if there is or is not anything to the concept, rather we intend to ask them to review the STARGATE program to assess its overall value to the USG based on intelligence value, process validity, customer satisfaction, and foreign assessment activity as directed by Congress," and that "it is possible that our panel will recommend that we do NOT proceed with the program." The CIA's briefing slides on the review state that the "DIA program manager asked to identify most favorable users of remote viewing," that "AIR conducted standard interviews of these users on location with CIA present," and that the "commissioned reviews exchanged, rebuttals permitted, AIR arbitrated final conclusions for CIA key recommendations."[^900][^901]
The curricula vitae of AIR's two authors are in the CIA's files: [[Michael Mumford]], who had joined AIR in 1994 and was "directing three projects concerned with the assessment and development of leadership potential for the [[United States Army]]" and skills projects "sponsored by the Department of Labor and the National Security Agency," and [[Andrew Rose]], at AIR since 1973 and by then chief scientist of its Washington office. On September 22, 1995, a week before the report's date, Mumford sent two copies of "the draft Remote Viewing report" to a redacted addressee at the Ames Building in Rosslyn: "The conclusions are solid. However, we do need to have Ray and Jessica check the material."[^902]
### The Panel
The research review was given to two outside reviewers, [[Jessica Utts]], professor of statistics at the [[University of California, Davis]] and statistical editor of the *Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research*, and [[Ray Hyman]], professor of psychology at the [[University of Oregon]], who had served on the National Research Council committee on human performance; Lincoln Moses of [[Stanford University]] advised on statistics and David Goslin, president of AIR, coordinated. The CIA transferred "all reports and documents relevant to the review," about 80 publications; one document "remained classified during the period of this review," and Michael Mumford of AIR read it and gave the panel an unclassified synopsis. The principal investigator of the research contract, [[Edwin May]], was asked to list the studies "which he believes provide the strongest evidence" and every unique study since the 1988 National Research Council report. Hyman wrote afterward: "May helped identify the ten best studies for Utts and me to evaluate." The operational review was done by AIR's own psychologists, who interviewed seven representatives of customer organizations, three remote viewers, and the program manager in July and August 1995.[^1][^2]
The research review was given to two outside reviewers, [[Jessica Utts]], professor of statistics at the [[University of California, Davis]] and statistical editor of the *Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research*, and [[Ray Hyman]], professor of psychology at the [[University of Oregon]], who had served on the National Research Council committee on human performance; [[Lincoln Moses]] of [[Stanford University]] advised on statistics and [[David Goslin]], president of AIR, coordinated. The CIA transferred "all reports and documents relevant to the review," about 80 publications; one document "remained classified during the period of this review," and Michael Mumford of AIR read it and gave the panel an unclassified synopsis. The principal investigator of the research contract, [[Edwin May]], was asked to list the studies "which he believes provide the strongest evidence" and every unique study since the 1988 National Research Council report. Hyman wrote afterward: "May helped identify the ten best studies for Utts and me to evaluate." The operational review was done by AIR's own psychologists, who interviewed seven representatives of customer organizations, three remote viewers, and the program manager in July and August 1995.[^1][^2]
### The Research Reviews
@ -35,7 +39,7 @@ Hyman's report of September 11 confined itself to the ten SAIC experiments, "the
### The Operational Review
The end users said the information was "stated in broad, vague terms," accurate "with regard to general stereotypical characteristics," inaccurate "with regard to concrete specifics," and inconsistent between viewers; "the viewings were never used as a primary source of evidence in making decisions." The viewers told AIR "that their written reports were occasionally inconsistent with their viewings. They themselves considered it appropriate to make the written reports consistent with known characteristics of the target," and "that previous managers also changed viewers' reports." Customer evaluations had been collected since 1994 for forty viewings: on a six-point accuracy scale the mean was 3.0, on a five-point value scale 3.5, and all three viewers scored within a tenth of a standard deviation of each other. Two organizations, "one concerned with tracking people and one concerned with combat intelligence," reported better results, where "the viewers had substantial general background information concerning the targets." A separate government review of the same forty tasks, printed as an appendix, found that "normally, much of the data provided by the RV(s) is either wrong or irrelevant although one cannot always tell which is which without further investigation," that scores were higher where targets were specific, "e.g., the North Korean targets," and that "as an admitted neophyte in this area of endeavor, I categorize the field as a kind of religion." Its own appendix is marked missing from the declassified copy.[^5]
The end users said the information was "stated in broad, vague terms," accurate "with regard to general stereotypical characteristics," inaccurate "with regard to concrete specifics," and inconsistent between viewers; "the viewings were never used as a primary source of evidence in making decisions." The viewers told AIR "that their written reports were occasionally inconsistent with their viewings. They themselves considered it appropriate to make the written reports consistent with known characteristics of the target," and "that previous managers also changed viewers' reports." Customer evaluations had been collected since 1994 for forty viewings: on a six-point accuracy scale the mean was 3.0, on a five-point value scale 3.5, and all three viewers scored within a tenth of a standard deviation of each other. Two organizations, "one concerned with tracking people and one concerned with combat intelligence," reported better results, where "the viewers had substantial general background information concerning the targets." A separate government review of the same forty tasks, printed as an appendix, found that "normally, much of the data provided by the RV(s) is either wrong or irrelevant although one cannot always tell which is which without further investigation," that scores were higher where targets were specific, "e.g., the North Korean targets," and that "as an admitted neophyte in this area of endeavor, I categorize the field as a kind of religion." That review, headed "Summary Report. Star Gate Operational Tasking and Evaluation" and released separately by the CIA as an extract, carries no author's name; the invoice of ORD's independent contractor for August 7, 1995, describes "my independent evaluation of the operational tasking records from the Star Gate program supplemented by the results of interviews with the staff of four of the operational organizations that tasked the Star Gate program." Its first sub-appendix is marked "Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt" in the CIA's own copy of the AIR report, released May 22, 2002, and "missing" in the copy posted by the [[National Security Archive]]. The second sub-appendix prints the interview sheets for four customer organizations, lettered A, B, C and E, dated July 7 to August 3, 1995.[^5]
### Conclusions
@ -47,7 +51,7 @@ The agency's public affairs office had said on September 6, 1995: "As mandated b
### May's Reply
May's commentary of March 1996 charged that the CIA "set the outcome with regard to intelligence usage before the evaluation had begun," that only one of seventeen members of the program's own oversight bodies was contacted, and that David Goslin of AIR had also administered the NRC's 1988 report; Utts wrote to him on December 19, 1995, that "I was explicitly asked by AIR staff NOT to mention the NRC report in my review!" and that "we were shown very little of the 'operational' remote-viewing work," and that after she asked to contact operational participants she "was contacted by the AIR staff and told that I was NOT to contact any of those individuals." May's conclusion: the evaluators "wanted to demonstrate that AC lacked usefulness for intelligence operations. They did so by construction rather than by careful analysis."[^8]
May's commentary of March 1996 charged that the CIA "set the outcome with regard to intelligence usage before the evaluation had begun," that only one of seventeen members of the program's own oversight bodies was contacted, and that David Goslin of AIR had also administered the NRC's 1988 report; Utts wrote to him on December 19, 1995, that "I was explicitly asked by AIR staff NOT to mention the NRC report in my review!" and that "we were shown very little of the 'operational' remote-viewing work," and that after she asked to contact operational participants she "was contacted by the AIR staff and told that I was NOT to contact any of those individuals." May's conclusion: the evaluators "wanted to demonstrate that AC lacked usefulness for intelligence operations. They did so by construction rather than by careful analysis."[^8] The independent contractor's invoice to ORD of September 19, 1995, states that he had "attended all specified meetings of the AIR (replacement organization for the NRC), their appointed panel members, and ORD," "participated in the review and editing of all unclassified reports prepared by the AIR, its panel members and ORD," and "assisted in the preparation (writing), review and editing of the interim and final versions of the report from the AIR and its panel."[^901]
### Footnotes
@ -55,7 +59,10 @@ May's commentary of March 1996 charged that the CIA "set the outcome with regard
[^2]: Hyman, Ray. "Evaluation of the Military's Twenty-Year Program on Psychic Spying," *Skeptical Inquirer,* March-April 1996, pp. 21-23.
[^3]: Utts, Jessica. "An Assessment of the Evidence for Psychic Functioning," September 1, 1995, reproduced in the AIR report, pp. 3-2 to 3-40, and published in *Journal of Scientific Exploration,* vol. 10, no. 1, 1996, pp. 3-30. Pages 3-2, 3-3, 3-9, 3-14 to 3-19 of the report.
[^4]: Hyman, Ray. "Evaluation of Program on Anomalous Mental Phenomena," September 11, 1995, reproduced in the AIR report, pp. 3-41 to 3-75, and published in *Journal of Scientific Exploration,* vol. 10, no. 1, 1996, pp. 31-58. Pages 3-41 to 3-44, 3-67, 3-72 to 3-79 of the report, including Utts's "Response to Ray Hyman's Report of September 11, 1995."
[^5]: Mumford, Michael D., Andrew M. Rose, and David A. Goslin. *An Evaluation of Remote Viewing: Research and Applications.* American Institutes for Research, September 29, 1995, pp. 4-7 to 4-15 and appendix D, pp. D-12 to D-16.
[^5]: Mumford, Michael D., Andrew M. Rose, and David A. Goslin. *An Evaluation of Remote Viewing: Research and Applications.* American Institutes for Research, September 29, 1995, pp. 4-7 to 4-15 and appendix D, pp. D-1, D-12 to D-16, D-19 to D-23. The CIA's copy is CIA-RDP96-00791R000200180006-4, approved for release May 22, 2002, read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room; its text matches the National Security Archive copy, and its appendix D opens with the same executive summary as "Summary Report. Star Gate Operational Tasking and Evaluation (An Extract)," CIA-RDP96-00791R000200300002-2.
[^6]: Mumford, Michael D., Andrew M. Rose, and David A. Goslin. *An Evaluation of Remote Viewing: Research and Applications.* American Institutes for Research, September 29, 1995, pp. 1-4, 3-84, 5-1 to 5-5; Hyman, Ray. "Evaluation of the Military's Twenty-Year Program on Psychic Spying," *Skeptical Inquirer,* March-April 1996, pp. 21-23.; Puthoff, H. E. "CIA-Initiated Remote Viewing Program at Stanford Research Institute," *Journal of Scientific Exploration,* vol. 10, no. 1, 1996, pp. 63-76., note 10 and reference 1; May, Edwin C. "The American Institutes for Research Review of the Department of Defense's STAR GATE Program: A Commentary," *Journal of Parapsychology,* vol. 60, no. 1, 1996, pp. 3-23, abstract only.
[^7]: Central Intelligence Agency, Public Affairs, statement on remote viewing, September 6, 1995, as reproduced in Victorian, Armen, "Remote Viewing and the US Intelligence Community," *Lobster,* c. 1996; the original release was not seen. "Psychic Spies: Cold War Whimsy or Secret Weapon?," ABC News *Nightline,* November 28, 1995, Radio TV Reports transcript for the CIA Public Affairs Staff, CIA-RDP99-01448R000402140001-7, read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room.
[^8]: May, Edwin C. "The American Institutes for Research Review of the Department of Defense's STAR GATE Program: A Commentary," *Journal of Parapsychology,* vol. 60, no. 1, March 1996, pp. 3-23. The letter of December 19, 1995, is printed at pp. 15-17 as Utts's reply to May's e-mail of December 17, checked against the page images.
[^900]: "Star Gate Transfer Chronology: 1995," memorandum for the record, undated, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200190017-9. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection. Director of Research and Development, CIA, memoranda for the Executive Director and the Comptroller, "Response to CDA on Stargate," undated, early 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100040020-2 and CIA-RDP96-00791R000100040021-1; ORD-0150-95, "Status Report to Congress: Star Gate Program," February 27, 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100040006-8; draft memorandum for the Defense Intelligence Agency, "Declassification and Cooperation in Response to Congressionally Directed STAR GATE Program Review," February 21, 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100040019-4; "Transfer of Star Gate Program from DIA to CIA, Status and Terms of Reference," drafts, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100040007-7 and -018-5; "Status of STARGATE Program," drafts faxed March 7 and May 10, 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100040012-1 and -004-0. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
[^901]: CIA briefing slides, "Star Gate," 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200080001-8. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection. Office of Research and Development, "Request to Amend Independent Contract," March 7, 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200020008-7; independent contractor's invoices of May 30, 1995 (Task A), August 7, 1995 (Task B) and September 19, 1995 (Tasks C and D), CIA-RDP96-00791R000200020005-0, -016-8 and -001-4. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
[^902]: "Curriculum Vitae - Michael D. Mumford," CIA-RDP96-00791R000100030046-5, and "Curriculum Vitae - Andrew M. Rose," CIA-RDP96-00791R000100030047-4, released 2003; Mumford, Michael D., to a redacted addressee at the Ames Building, Rosslyn, "Transmittal of Draft Remote Viewing Report," September 22, 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200180003-5. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.

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---
category: "Intelligence Scandal"
tags:
- Event
- StarGate
- RemoteViewing
- CIA
- DIA
- Congress
- Declassification
alias:
- Star Gate transfer
- Star Gate CDA
summary: "The 1995 Congressionally directed transfer of the DIA's Star Gate remote-viewing program to the CIA, which the CIA used to review, declassify and close it."
start: 1994-12-14
end: 1995-09-27
location: "Washington, D.C."
created: 2026-09-22
updated: 2026-09-22
---
In the classified annex to the defense appropriations act for fiscal 1995, Senate conferees wrote that "in the post-cold war era, the nature and activities of the STARGATE Program are more relevant to the mission of the Central Intelligence Agency Program (CIAP) than the military Intelligence services. Therefore, the conferees direct the Director of DIA to transfer ten civilian billets and $500,000 that are currently dedicated to the STARGATE program to the CIAP. The transfer of STARGATE resources and management to the CIAP should be completed by July 1, 1995." The [[Director of Central Intelligence|DCI]] was to report by March 1, 1995, on "1) management strategy; 2) transfer status; and 3) identification of a program manager." The [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] took the [[STARGATE PROJECT|Star Gate]] program from the [[Defense Intelligence Agency|DIA]] on July 1, 1995, and on September 27 the Director of Research and Development proposed that recommendations to terminate remote-viewing operations and research "within the intelligence community" be forwarded to [[United States Congress|Congress]].[^1][^2]
### The Directed Action
The conferees adopted the language of the [[Senate Appropriations Committee]]'s report, which had been addressed to DIA: "Of the funds available to the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Committee directs that $500,000 be applied to the STARGATE program and that the current 10 billets remain assigned to the program. The Committee requests that funds be applied roughly equally to foreign assessment, research and operational viewing. The Committee is concerned that Congressional direction in the past regarding the solicitation of users across the NFIP and DoD and development of joint programs with the Russians and Chinese has only been sporadically pursued. The Committee remains perplexed by the obvious reluctance of support on the part of the DIA leadership for this program." The committee "does not accept the excuse that this somehow compromises US intelligence activities," and "believes that the time has come for a re-evaluation of the classification of the existence of this effort as well as the results that have been obtained over time." It asked the DCI for "a retrospective review and technical analysis of the data that has been produced by the program since its inception 20 years ago," including "an inventory and analysis of the files held in the CIA, while it administered the program as well as in DIA," and for the DCI's declassification committee to determine "what parts of it may be declassified and be converted into an openworld activity." It asked the Director of DIA "to initiate further contacts with individuals involved in the Russian subprogram, to establish an open-world, declassified activity of cooperation between the two programs and report to the oversight Committees by February 1, 1995." Contracts "with outside entities" required prior notification.[^1]
### The CIA's Plan
On December 14, 1994, "during a briefing arranged by CMS and given by the current DIA program manager, the program was described as an operational activity that is accepting requirements, conducting remote viewing operations, and disseminating intelligence based on these 'operations.' Over 90 such operations had been conducted during the past year. Staffing consists of three remote viewers, a program manager, a technical advisor and a secretary. Asked his opinion for the reasons the Congress had transferred the program to CIA, the program manager stated his belief that he had failed to respond to previous direction to conduct objective reviews and pursue foreign liason activities. He also told us that all of the program funds had been expended and that their contractor (SRI) had stopped work on the R&D activities." The Director of Research and Development, given the action in January, sought "a corporate (i.e. all directorates) buy-in" for an approach of three parts: "(a) Seek to decompartment all aspects of the program, (b) Convene a Blue Ribbon Panel of outside experts to review the program and make recommendations to CIA regarding our next step (c) Develop a program plan including needed funding and personnel resources." With Army support, the [[Office of Research and Development (CIA)|Office of Research and Development]] planned "to contact the chairman of a panel that did a review (circa 1988-1990) for the Army of unconventional techniques (including remote viewing), for enhancing human performance," and ask him to convene a similar group. The Director of Congressional Affairs "described our approach to Mr. [[Richard D'Amato]], the congressional staffer responsible for the language effecting the transfer, and Mr. D'Amato expressed concern about the DIA people, in particular the three remote viewers." The three "should be kept as DIA employees until the Blue Ribbon Panel reports," since "they need to use the tasking and dissemination methods already in place in DIA."[^2]
The memorandum anticipated the issues: "Parapsychology is a very controversial subject. It has been studied for at least the past hundred years by many renowned scientists without reaching any yes/no answers regarding its scientific validity. We do NOT intend to ask our blue ribbon panel to tell us if there is or is not anything to the concept, rather we intend to ask them to review the STARGATE program to assess its overall value to the USG based on intelligence value, process validity, customer satisfaction, and foreign assessment activity as directed by Congress. It is possible that our panel will recommend that we do NOT proceed with the program, and that has the potential for some controversy with our oversight committees." A draft memorandum to DIA of February 21, 1995, stated that "STAR GATE has an extraordinary nature and history and it's existence within the intelligence community remains controversial." The proposed language for the March 1 status report went to the Comptroller on February 27, and on March 28 the Executive Director for Intelligence Community Affairs sent the responses to [[Larry Combest]], chairman of the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence]], with originals "to the leadership of the committees with intelligence oversight responsibilities that have an interest in this topic."[^2][^3]
### Chronology
The CIA's chronology of the transfer records: a program manager appointed by the Director of ORD; a detailed briefing by the DIA program manager and personnel on February 6, 1995; "informal discussions with US Army Research Institute (ARI) and [[National Research Council]] (NRC) about potential CIA paranormal study request" in February and March; archiving from February to April "of all DIA and CIA files relating to paranormal studies going back 20 years"; a meeting with the [[Center for the Study of Intelligence]] "to discuss potential strategies for declassification"; on February 28, "CIA met with DIA principal investigator at SAIC, Dr. [[Edwin May|Ed May]]. All-day technical exchange"; in March, a site visit to [[Fort Meade]] "to meet all program personnel and discuss transfer." On March 15, "after informal discussions with NRC, panel member selection begins: [[Jessica Utts]], [[John Palmer]], [[James Alcock]], and [[Ray Hyman]] contacted by NRC and agree to act as commissioned reviewers," and an independent contractor was hired "to assemble detailed bibliographies of all Star Gate program documents potentially subject of review," beginning work at Fort Meade "immediately." On March 21 the CIA accompanied DIA to brief the program to [[Benson Adams]], assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. On March 27 a "Terms of Reference" went to Congress "stating NRC would perform unclassified retrospective, CIA would proceed with declassification, interim report on management strategy would be provided in July," and D'Amato was briefed at the Hart Senate Office Building and agreed. In April a memorandum of understanding was "executed between US Army and CIA, funds officially transferred to Pentagon," and on April 14 "evaluation of customer feedback on Star Gate tasking begins at Ft. Meade."[^4]
On May 10, "NRC formally rejects CIA study proposal citing prior definitive study. NRC stated unequivocally that 'the case for remote viewing... is virtually nonexistent,'" and the same day the CIA met "with president and representatives of [[American Institutes for Research|American Institutes of Research]] (AIR) to consider potential CIA study request after NRC rejection." On May 16 DIA "responds to request for assistance in declassification citing new [[Executive Order 12958|EO 12958]] as controlling, declines any further DIA action. Agrees to CIA declassifying DIA fact of program." On May 19 DIA gave notice that it would "reassign Star Gate personnel since study will not be concluded by 1 July. We concur in this decision." On June 1 the [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]] "briefed on Star Gate status. Seven staffers attended." The AIR contract was signed on June 12; on June 14 DIA was notified "that CIA will give DIA documents to AIR and disclose DIA's program," and [[Stanford Research Institute|SRI]] "of CIA's intention to disclose formerly SECRET association. SRI later concurs." On June 21 an ad hoc declassification committee was formed "to review Studies in Intelligence Article summarizing history of CIA program," and on June 22 the first unclassified documents went to AIR, which "asks for identification of 10 best reports," and the Director of ORD declassified "3 ORD classified SRI contract documents identified as critical to AIR panel." The chronology ends there.[^4]
Briefing slides of May 22, 1995, for the Senate Appropriations Committee gave the transfer by month: in January "Office of Military Affairs liaison established with Army"; in February "CIA transfer manager appointed, DIA program reviewed," "archiving of all files at CIA, DIA, and SAIC begins," and "US ARI agrees to be executive for NRC study, MOU established, resources transferred from CIA to Army"; in March "CIA responds to CDA; Status report briefed to Richard D'Amato (SAC)"; in May "NRC categorically rejects remote viewing study" and "program personnel, resources still reside at DIA." Of the status briefing of March 27: "CIA terms of reference requested that no resources be transferred until Blue Ribbon Panel completes directed review, SAC staffer agreed," and "it was agreed program personnel could not be transferred immediately since CIA has no way to task them, field requirements, or disseminate product and could not keep them productive."[^11]
### The Program Under Review
A memorandum of April 17, 1995, to the DIA program manager on the "Star Gate Customer Base" recorded "your concern that the customer base exists today largely because of the personal relationships you have had with various customer elements and without those relationships, the customers might not have been interested in the program initially," asked for "points of contact (names, phone numbers, locations, etc.) so that I can interview each of these customers over the coming months," and, "based on your advice Thursday," dropped the plan of briefing the customers and "new potential CIA customers" on future services: "The interest in customers for future services, however, is still high. How can we substantiate a future operations program without it?" Of the numbered list of customers, only the last entry survives in the released copy: "Additional Classified Customers: Status as to tasking requested and feedback provided unknown."[^5]
An ORD memorandum for the record of April 20, 1995, its author and addressee redacted, states that "Ed May of SAIC called this morning and volunteered to send me unsolicited information he had obtained from a 'remote viewer' named 'Joe' relating to the [[Oklahoma City bombing|Oklahoma City Bombing]]"; ORD "did not have a means at ORD for tasking or disseminating this type of information at CIA," and the [[Counterterrorist Center]] named the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] as the recipient. The Director of Research and Development wrote to CTC the same day that "we attach no credibility to this information, and currently have no way to evaluate it," and that May "has been the primary contract investigator in this area, and we have not completed our evaluation of his past efforts."[^6]
DIA's response to the directed action, transmitted under the signature of [[Letitia Long]], Director of the DMI Staff, and faxed to the CIA on March 15, 1995, gave the program's history from the service programs of the 1970s through fiscal 1994 and reported that in March 1994, "prior to the receipt of Congressional language to review program documents for declassification, the DIA's Technology Assessment and Support Activity in concert with the SAIC's CSL initiated a review of SRI originated R&D reports covering the period 1973 through 1989. As a result of that review, 45 SRI originated project documents were reviewed and all references regarding DoD involvement were excised and the documents declassified. DIA's General Counsel and Public Affairs Office concurred with the declassification action in September 1994." Its reading of the CSL data: "Approximately 1 percent of the general population appears to meet strict statistical criteria for exhibiting a robust AC (Anomalous Cognition) ability," and "during the CY's 1992-1994 CSL may have discovered the source of an AC signal," proportional to "the total change of entropy" at the target.[^7]
### The Files and the Independent Contractor
ORD's Emerging Programs Group asked the Office of Personnel on March 7, 1995, to amend an existing independent contract "so that ORD can specifically task him to facilitate transfer of a technical program (Star Gate) from another government agency to CIA." The contractor's invoice of May 30 for Task A listed "four (4) annotated bibliographies of Star Gate-related classified and unclassified documentation," "a classified catalog listing all operational tasking of the program," and an index to "a circa-1991 program planning document" listing 266 documents. His invoice of August 7 for Task B covered "a classified and unclassified version of my report detailing the results of my independent evaluation of the operational tasking records from the Star Gate program supplemented by the results of interviews with the staff of four of the operational organizations that tasked the Star Gate program," with "a brief description of all 40+ operational tasks that were numerically evaluated by the tasking organizations." His invoice of September 19 for Tasks C and D stated that he had "attended all specified meetings of the AIR (replacement organization for the NRC), their appointed panel members, and ORD," "participated in the review and editing of all unclassified reports prepared by the AIR, its panel members and ORD," "assisted in the preparation (writing), review and editing of the interim and final versions of the report from the AIR and its panel," and "prepared a plan delineating a program for the declassification review of 43 boxes of material related to the Star Gate program and its predecessor programs."[^8]
DIA's log of the files, sent after a telephone call of October 10, 1995, between its PAQ-4A office and the contractor, reflected "the contents of 38 boxes of Project STAR GATE data that was forwarded to your Agency in a transfer function in July 1995." The CIA's management paper of September counted "43 document boxes of diverse program material relating to at least five past CIA and DOD parapsychology programs at various government agencies including SCANATE, Sun Streak, Center Lane, Grill Flame, and Star Gate," spanning "the early 1970s to 1995," some of which "remain sensitive due to sources and methods of other intelligence organizations and operations which are discussed." Under Executive Order 12958 the CIA was "now responsible for records management as though it were the originating Agency"; its Review Declassification Team estimated "four person-years" and "$400K in each of FY96 and FY97" for the review.[^8][^9]
### The Final Response
The Director of Research and Development's memorandum of September 27, 1995, recorded that status reports had been given "to SAC and SSCI Committee staff" in March and April, that presentation of the management strategy "was deferred until September 30" to allow the AIR review ([[1995 AIR evaluation of Star Gate]]), that "it was agreed by interested staff members and CIA that CIA's final proposed management strategy would be based closely on AIR's review," and that at "a third meeting with a SAC Committee staff" it was proposed "that the NIO for S&T should conduct an assessment of Russian parapsychology with the assistance of DIA Star Gate program personnel in parallel with the technical review." That assessment "was conducted largely by DIA Star Gate program officers on special, temporary assignment to CIA," under "the National Intelligence Officer for Science and Technology, and the CIA's Office of Scientific and Weapons Research," and "was reviewed by various officers of the [[National Intelligence Council|NIC]] and CIA but it was not coordinated within CIA or the Intelligence Community." The four recommendations: "Terminate remote viewing operations within the intelligence community"; "Terminate research and development relating to remote viewing within the intelligence community"; "Perform a comprehensive declassification review of all DOD and CIA program files to prepare them for official transfer to the [[National Archives and Records Administration|National Archives]]"; and "Apply no resources to the assessment of foreign developments in parapsychology," the last on the Directorate of Intelligence's view that "we view developments in parapsychology as a relatively low threat to the United States, and, consequently, as a low priority among all the threats we are trying to monitor and assess." The briefing slides prepared for the appropriations committee summarized the AIR process as "SAIC principal investigator asked to identify 10 most favorable documents," "over 80 documents ultimately declassified, transferred to blue ribbon panel," "DIA program manager asked to identify most favorable users of remote viewing," "AIR conducted standard interviews of these users on location with CIA present," and "commissioned reviews exchanged, rebuttals permitted, AIR arbitrated final conclusions for CIA key recommendations."[^9][^10]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Senate Appropriations Committee report language and conference report language on STARGATE, fiscal 1995, in "Stargate CDA and Proposed Response (Draft)," CIA-RDP96-00791R000100040001-3, and "Congressional Documents Detailing Action Requested on 'Stargate'," CIA-RDP96-00791R000300010001-4. The same directed-action text is headed "Senate Appropriations Committee" in CIA-RDP96-00791R000100040003-1 and "Senate Armed Services Committee" in CIA-RDP96-00791R000300010004-1. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
[^2]: Director of Research and Development, CIA, memoranda for the Executive Director and the Comptroller, "Response to CDA on Stargate," undated, early 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100040020-2 and CIA-RDP96-00791R000100040021-1; ORD-0150-95, "Status Report to Congress: Star Gate Program," February 27, 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100040006-8; draft memorandum for the Defense Intelligence Agency, "Declassification and Cooperation in Response to Congressionally Directed STAR GATE Program Review," February 21, 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100040019-4; "Transfer of Star Gate Program from DIA to CIA, Status and Terms of Reference," drafts, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100040007-7 and -018-5; "Status of STARGATE Program," drafts faxed March 7 and May 10, 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100040012-1 and -004-0. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
[^3]: Executive Director for Intelligence Community Affairs to Larry Combest, Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, March 28, 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100040002-2. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
[^4]: "Star Gate Transfer Chronology: 1995," memorandum for the record, undated, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200190017-9. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
[^5]: Memorandum, "Star Gate Customer Base," April 17, 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100090001-8. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
[^6]: Memorandum for the record and memorandum for CTC from the Director, Research and Development, "Star Gate Program Issues," April 20, 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100030036-6. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
[^7]: Defense Intelligence Agency, "Senate Appropriations Committee Congressionally Directed Action, Star Gate," retrospective review, technical analysis and declassification status, with transmittal memorandum signed Letitia A. Long, Director, DMI Staff, faxed March 15, 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000300010002-3, -003-2 and -004-1, and CIA-RDP96-00791R000100040003-1. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
[^8]: Office of Research and Development, "Request to Amend Independent Contract," March 7, 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200020008-7; independent contractor's invoices of May 30, 1995 (Task A), August 7, 1995 (Task B) and September 19, 1995 (Tasks C and D), CIA-RDP96-00791R000200020005-0, -016-8 and -001-4. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection. Defense Intelligence Agency, S-29850/PAQ-4A, memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence, attention ORD, "Transfer of Project STAR GATE Files," October 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200290001-5. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
[^9]: Director of Research and Development, ORD-0520-95, memorandum for the Executive Director, "Star Gate - Final Response to CDA," September 27, 1995, with attachment A, "Proposed Star Gate Management Strategy," CIA-RDP96-00791R000100150001-1 and CIA-RDP96-00791R000100150002-0. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
[^10]: CIA briefing slides, "Star Gate," 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200080001-8. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
[^11]: "Star Gate, Congressionally Directed Action," briefing slides for the Senate Appropriations Committee, May 22, 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100050001-2, image-only, read from the page images. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.

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40 - EVENTS/INTELLIGENCE_SCANDALS/Grill Flame Scientific Evaluation Committee.md
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@ -11,28 +11,62 @@ alias:
- Gale Committee
- Gale Report
summary: "An eight-member Army review under Manfred Gale, reporting in December 1979, which found remote viewing unproved and its programs poorly documented, while a majority of five allowed INSCOM's operational work to continue under oversight."
start: 1979
end: 1980-01
start: 1979-06
end: 1980-01-25
location: "Washington, D.C."
created: 2026-09-21
updated: 2026-09-21
updated: 2026-09-22
---
The Grill Flame Scientific Evaluation Committee, chaired by Manfred Gale and known in the program as the Gale Committee, reported in December 1979 on the Army's parapsychology work: the [[Stanford Research Institute|SRI]] remote-viewing research, the psychokinesis contract of the Missile Intelligence Command, the replication trials of the Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity, and the [[United States Army Intelligence and Security Command|INSCOM]] unit at [[Fort Meade]] ([[STARGATE PROJECT|Grill Flame]]). Its chapters covered a chronology, "Parapsychology in Perspective," an assessment of Warsaw Pact activity, "suggested parapsychological mechanisms," and the SRI experiments, with annexes on each Army activity.[^1]
The Grill Flame Scientific Evaluation Committee, chaired by [[Manfred Gale]] of the Army staff and known in the program as the Gale Committee, reported in December 1979 on the Defense Department's parapsychology work: the [[Stanford Research Institute|SRI]] remote-viewing research, the psychokinesis contract of the Army Missile Command (MICOM) at [[Redstone Arsenal]], the replication trials of the Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity at [[Aberdeen Proving Ground]], and the [[United States Army Intelligence and Security Command|INSCOM]] unit at [[Fort Meade]] ([[STARGATE PROJECT|Grill Flame]]). "In June 1979 it was suggested by Dr. [[Walter LaBerge|LaBerge]], then Under Secretary of the Army, that a Scientific Evaluation Committee be appointed to review the Army's parapsychological activities. In early July 1979, Dr. [[Ruth Davis]] recommended that because of the special interest of the Secretary of Defense, that the Committee review the total DOD posture and report directly to the GRILL FLAME Oversight Committee." Its mission was "to review the parapsychological research, investigations, and applications within DOD and the intelligence community," "to assess the validity of claims made for the alleged existence of the PSI phenomena," and "to recommend a course of action for DOD." Members "were carefully screened to avoid any persons with preconceived notions for or against the subject under investigation"; "since 1972, the combined funding for DOD and the intelligence community was less than a total of $1.5M." The report's security guide stated that "all connection between official U.S. Government interest or participation in the generic field of Parapsychology is classified a minimum of SECRET, caveat NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION," and that "future security planning for GRILL FLAME includes making it totally a special access program."[^1]
### Membership and Visits
The roster printed as annex 1: [[Douglas Tang]], chief of biostatistics and mathematics at the [[Walter Reed Army Institute of Research]]; Colonel [[Harry Holloway]], professor and chairman of psychiatry at the [[Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences]]; [[Frank Cartwright|W. Frank Cartwright]] of the [[Naval Weapons Center]], China Lake; Richard Montgomery, consultant; [[Jesse Orlansky]] of the science and technology division of the [[Institute for Defense Analyses]]; [[Harry Snyder]], professor of industrial engineering and operations research at [[Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University|Virginia Tech]]; Major General (retired) Laddie Stahl, consultant; Major [[William Stoner]] of the Army staff (DAMI-ISH), coordinator; and Gale (DAMA-ZD), chairman. The vote recorded in the report is of eight; Gale's distribution memorandum of January 1980 speaks of "the seven Committee members" apart from himself. The committee visited the Combat Developments Experimentation Command at [[Fort Ord]] on July 23, 1979, SRI on July 24 and 25 ([[Russell Targ]], [[Hal Puthoff]], [[Charles Tart]]), Redstone Arsenal on July 26, the [[National Security Council]] at the Executive Office Building on August 1, [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] headquarters on September 4, [[Princeton University]] and [[Bell Labs]] at Holmdel on September 8 ([[Robert Jahn]] and [[Robert Lucky]]), [[Defense Intelligence Agency|DIA]] on September 26 ([[Jack Vorona]]), INSCOM at Fort Meade on September 28 ([[Murray Watt]]), AMSAA on November 6, [[Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory|Lawrence Livermore]] ([[R. S. Hawke]]) and the Foreign Technology Division at [[Wright-Patterson Air Force Base]], with a final executive session at the Pentagon on December 10.[^1][^2]
### The Chronology
The report's own history, which it said was "not attributable to the Committee's action," ran from the SRI work of 1971 through [[Ingo Swann]]'s magnetometer trial of 1972 and [[Pat Price]]'s readings of 1973 to 1975: the West Virginia site, where Price "spoke out classified codewords he 'read' from file folders"; the Urals crane, of which "CIA analysts concluded that either Remote Viewing had taken place, or Price had intimate knowledge of the URDF-3"; the embassy code rooms; an in-house CIA trial of the fall of 1974 that produced "what could only be a SA-5 missile training site" in [[Libya]]; and the guerrilla training site of July 1975, "the same month Price tragically died of a heart attack." "Since July 1975, CIA interest has remained minimal and unofficial. The Agency claims to have stopped all work," the "primary reason for abandoning the effort" being, in a phrase the scan garbles, "of winning a 'Golden Fleece Award.'" On the Army side, MICOM let "a one-year $80K contract" in August 1977 "under the innocuous title, 'Investigation of Unconventional Discrimination Techniques'"; in July 1978 DIA "sponsored a series of four unique experiments" in which Swann, given the coordinates of "a Soviet strategic missile field east of Moscow," "passed through a silo cover, 'traveling' down until reaching a connecting tunnel," entering "a command and control room" whose "floors are paved in 'white tiles'"; in August 1978 Vorona chaired the first meeting toward "a coordinated DOD program"; INSCOM's selection criteria of the autumn of 1978 were "above average intelligence, outgoing personality, adventuresome, open-minded, mature, artistic nature, and successful life career." The Grill Flame steering committee first met on February 13, 1979, with "all Service ACSI's, Dr. Ruth Davis, Dr. LaBerge, and Dr. Vorona (standing in for LTG [[Eugene Tighe|Tighe]])." Of the Navy: "Suspicion lingers among Army project personnel that Navy may have nevertheless kept a tightly compartmented effort going. Navy representatives attend all DOD meetings, but remain uncommitted and literally silent." Funding to date: "CIA, 1972-78: $240K. DIA, 1979: $100K. USAF, 1976-79: $300K. Army, 1977-79: $490K."[^1]
### Findings
"RV research and investigations thus far have not proved the existence of the phenomena and have not conclusively established any parametric dependencies. Many of the anecdotal events reported to this Committee as potential evidence of the existence of RV do not adequately sustain their claim under careful scrutiny. A few of the examples are subjectively spectacular, but lack of scientific procedures precludes their consideration as scientific evidence of the phenomena. On balance, the Committee has indeed been persuaded that there is some probability that effects attributed to the RV phenomena exist under unexplained circumstances and in conjunction with particular individuals. However, to date, the experimental techniques have not been adequate to document such effects." Of the programs: "Inadequate documentation and failure to apply adequate controls are the most frequent causes which limit the credibility that can be given to reports of 'success' attributed to RV applications. In the judgment of the Committee, sole dependence on SRI-like protocols to resolve the RV issue will not be fruitful," and "operational programs, that by their very existence assume the reality of RV as given, may inadvertently establish the assumption in other communities that RV is real."[^1]
"RV research and investigations thus far have not proved the existence of the phenomena and have not conclusively established any parametric dependencies. Many of the anecdotal events reported to this Committee as potential evidence of the existence of RV do not adequately sustain their claim under careful scrutiny. A few of the examples are subjectively spectacular, but lack of scientific procedures precludes their consideration as scientific evidence of the phenomena. On balance, the Committee has indeed been persuaded that there is some probability that effects attributed to the RV phenomena exist under unexplained circumstances and in conjunction with particular individuals. However, to date, the experimental techniques have not been adequate to document such effects." Of the programs: "Inadequate documentation and failure to apply adequate controls are the most frequent causes which limit the credibility that can be given to reports of 'success' attributed to RV applications. In the judgment of the Committee, sole dependence on SRI-like protocols to resolve the RV issue will not be fruitful"; "lack of proper management involvement, direction, and review was evident at all activities surveyed"; "operational programs, that by their very existence assume the reality of RV as given, may inadvertently establish the assumption in other communities that RV is real." "The Committee found no evidence or any suggestion of fraudulent intent in any of the work examined." Credible research would need "management commitment to a program which is sustained for an indefinite period of time at a cost of several million dollars per year." The MICOM psychokinesis work "will not prove or disprove the existence of the PK phenomena," whereas members who visited Hawke's laboratory at Livermore "were very impressed by the scientific approach." Intelligence on the Warsaw Pact was "admittedly, highly speculative," resting on "a document prepared by the U.S. Army Medical Intelligence and Information Agency" (the reference list gives Maire and LaMothe's DIA report of September 1975), a Garrett AiResearch literature review, and a recent report of "at least three and possibly more officially-sponsored research groups" in Moscow, Leningrad and Alma-Ata; "the reasons for frequent iron-curtain representatives at Parapsychological Conferences" might be "establishing contacts with selected attendees for intelligence purposes." Of the four proposed mechanisms (extremely low frequency electromagnetism, quantum correlation, the "extra-dimensional hypothesis" of Targ, Puthoff, [[Edwin May|May]], Feinberg and Rauscher, and Walker's thermal noise), "none of these theories is sufficiently persuasive."[^1]
### The SRI Chapter
Chapter 9 credited Puthoff and Targ with "a much greater acceptance in some quarters than have the many researchers who have preceded them" because "these researchers are trained and recognized as 'hard' scientists," and found the SCANATE results for Kerguelen Island and West Virginia "impressive... until one carefully considers the timing and the notion that each subject could have obtained the impressive detailed information during the day that ensued between the first and second 'readings.'" In the local-target series "subjects who were originally considered learners somehow became gifted," a category of "unselected volunteers" was "added due to sponsor criticism and pressure," and a target that was "an airplane simulator" in one report was "a complete machine shop" in another. A drawing of the San Andres airport, in the Costa Rica series, had been made by "one of the experimenters who substituted his time for that of" a subject; annex 10 adds that "the lack of repeated use of Targ as a Subject is thus supported, even though he provided an excellent response to the San Andres airport. (One must wonder why he wasn't used again in view of this highly accurate response!)" Its summary: "The only way that their concepts will be accepted by the scientific community is for non-reproachable experimenters to conduct similar research, using improved methods, without any possible intrusion by persons (such as Puthoff and Targ) having a vested interest in the results." Annex 8 took Puthoff's own paper "Potential Criticisms and Responses," nine criticisms with his replies, and found most "at least partially valid"; of SRI's use of "double-blind": "The word clearly does not apply in either the traditional, or in a meaningful, sense to the SRI protocol." Annex 9 found that the Morris ranking method used to score transcripts "only uses a portion of the data," in the nine-target case "only 11% of rankings." Chapter 9 and annexes 8 to 10 reproduce, sentence for sentence, the "Summary and Critical Evaluation of Research in Remote Viewing" delivered by Harry Snyder and Arlene Snyder of Blacksburg, Virginia, on June 1, 1979, under a contract whose sponsor that report does not name; Snyder was invited to join the committee on July 17, 1979, "in place of Dr. Hyman."[^1]
### The Annexes on the Army Programs
Of AMSAA: "Examination of SRI findings by this Committee has not resulted in a finding that SRI has proven anything of military operational value... The SRI effort should be terminated for the convenience of the government. The current AMSAA effort should also be terminated." Of MICOM's proposed random-number replication, drawn from "SRI document dated August 1979 prepared by E. C. May, Ph.D.": "the proposed experiment by SRI has not been performed and has yielded neither positive nor negative results, ergo, replication is impossible." Of INSCOM: 251 personnel considered, 117 interviewed, "more than 90% of all those interviewed considered psychic phenomenon to be real," twelve candidates, six chosen by SRI in February 1979 and in training from April; "as of 1 Oct 79, more than 150 RV tests have been conducted at Fort Meade"; the unit "gauges how good individual sessions are based on strict operational judgments (how much usable intelligence is produced), in stark contrast to projects in other places which rely on exotic, often flawed, statistical methodologies"; the committee asked that personnel "be immediately stabilized for at least two years" and that "a general officer review of all OERs and EERs" protect their careers, and commended INSCOM "for its logical, level-headed, and professional approach to a most curious problem." The pages between annexes 5 and 7, whose heading is absent from the released copy, record the visit to Bell Labs, where Lucky, "the man who probably started the whole (serious) PSI debate" by publishing Targ and Puthoff in the Proceedings of the IEEE, "believes that SRI does not have a bona fide scientific approach," had run six trials in 1975 that were "for the most part failures" but "ambiguous," and "once proposed to Targ and Puthoff that they allow a 'debugger' like [[James Randi|Randy the Magician]] to watch an SRI RV session. They refused on the grounds that no one believes them anyhow." Annex 7 called Hawke's acoustic-emission experiments "the most objective and scientific of the investigations we have reviewed" and proposed a cover: "A small development project on 'AE applications to guided missile fuzing' would provide easily administered and controlled PK experiments by Hawke."[^1]
### Recommendations
Work to demonstrate the existence of remote viewing and psychokinesis "should be supported if a credible approach were to emerge; however, it may be preferable to do this in some other agency other than DOD in order to more readily conduct the work in an open forum." Research to characterize the phenomena "should not be sponsored until existence is established." On operations "the Committee was divided," and "the majority (5 out of 8) believed that operationally-oriented RV activities aimed at determining the empirical value of RV to intelligence (like those at INSCOM) should continue," provided the work "be monitored by an oversight committee that can review the work for its adequacy and guard against self-fulfilling prophecy" and that "dependence on SRI approach should be phased out."[^1]
Work to demonstrate the existence of remote viewing and psychokinesis "should be supported if a credible approach were to emerge; however, it may be preferable to do this in some other agency other than DOD in order to more readily conduct the work in an open forum." Research to characterize the phenomena "should not be sponsored until existence is established." On operations "the Committee was divided," and "the majority (5 out of 8) believed that operationally-oriented RV activities aimed at determining the empirical value of RV to intelligence (like those at INSCOM) should continue," provided the work "be monitored by an oversight committee that can review the work for its adequacy and guard against self-fulfilling prophecy," that "dependence on SRI approach should be phased out," and that "the attaining of useful data should not necessarily be attributed to the reality of RV phenomena." The AMSAA and MICOM work "should be discontinued and terminated in the most cost-effective manner"; the intelligence community "should continue their collection efforts in this field in order to avoid any surprises"; and "a central DOD authority should be established to manage and fund the parapsychological program." The minority opinion of Orlansky, Holloway and Tang: "A minority of the Committee believes that a test program in an operation-like environment is not likely to provide useful or reliable data. We see little to be gained by recommending operational tests. Such tests can also be dangerous. By encouraging the conduct of operational tests, this Committee endorses actions which have dubious scientific validity at best and can have dangerous implications for those, who may rely on its products."[^1]
An undated roster headed "Grill Flame Review Panel Members" gives Stahl at General Electric's corporate research and development in Schenectady, Montgomery as director of corporate development at R&D Associates in Marina del Rey, and Snyder as "Systemetrics, Inc. (VA Polytechnical Institute)." On July 17, 1979, the Under Secretary's office told Gale that "Dr. Orlansky has accepted. Dr. Snyder of VPI has been asked in place of Dr. Hyman - at this time he has not accepted the invitation," and forwarded "the memorandum from Ruth Davis on the Grill Flame Technical Review Group." Snyder had delivered his own critical evaluation of remote-viewing research six weeks earlier. On November 19, 1979, he wrote to Gale that he held "a minority viewpoint on the need for further, better, more-controlled R&D on RV," that "the major argument AGAINST seems to be the combination of notoriety, disbelief, incredulity, and loss of scientific reputation of the proponents," and that "to hide behind the cost cloak is, I think, convenient but invalid"; an unsigned paper of findings in the same file recommended terminating "efforts at MICOM, AMSAA, and FTD," "a coordinated program" at "the national level (e.g., NSC)," and "$3 million" a year for research. Watt's message from Fort Meade that month recorded Gale's assurance "that INSCOM would be provided with a copy of the team's report when it was finalized."[^6]
### The Reply
The Defense Department's Grill Flame working group, under [[Jack Vorona]] of DIA, had asked in November 1979 to see the report "prior to it being given to any other party or group." Vorona's reply supported the finding that "unexplained observations of human capabilities to generate data of potential utility to intelligence have been documented" and "strongly" disagreed with the recommendation to end the Missile Intelligence Command and AMSAA work, "based on a misinterpretation of these programs"; the "condemnation" of the SRI approach "is not understood or acceptable without further explanation"; and "many of the difficulties in the report, especially those of fact and incompleteness, could have been avoided if the report had been collectively reviewed in draft, rather than allowing only individual inputs." On February 6, 1980, the under secretary of defense, [[William Perry]], restricted the use of Program 6 funds, since it was "not appropriate for Army to fund technology programs aimed at scientific demonstration of parapsychology."[^1][^2]
The Defense Department's Grill Flame committee, under Vorona of DIA, had heard on November 27, 1979, that the report "had not been completed"; one member "questioned the substantive expertise of the Gale Committee," and the group moved that Vorona "inform him of the working group's desire and need to see and be briefed on the Gale Committee's report prior to it being given to any other party or group," since "to do otherwise would be extremely hazardous as this group represents the collective expertise, experience and background of the entire DoD and Intelligence Community." On January 10, 1980, "Mr. Gale briefed the Grill Flame Committee on his committee's findings," and "Mr. Gale's briefing was not received favorably by the Grill Flame group. There were many substantive reservations based upon errors in both facts and analysis. The report was, in the view of the group, misleading and inadequate, in part because of ambiguity in language"; it was "suggested that General Tighe contact Dr. Laberge to obtain copies of the report and to stop any further distribution," and a subcommittee was appointed "to review the Gale report in depth." At the same meeting "CIA volunteered that no Agency funds were budgeted for FY 80, 81 or 82 on parapsychological research." Vorona's written comments supported the finding that "unexplained observations of human capabilities to generate data of potential utility to intelligence have been documented" and "strongly" disagreed with the recommendation to end the MICOM and AMSAA work, "based on a misinterpretation of these programs"; the "condemnation" of the SRI approach "is not understood or acceptable without further explanation"; and "many of the difficulties in the report, especially those of fact and incompleteness, could have been avoided if the report had been collectively reviewed in draft, rather than allowing only individual inputs."[^2][^3]
Stoner's memorandum of conversation on Gale's briefing of January 14, 1980, charged that Gale "has, in briefing the report here and elsewhere, done a great deal of verbalizing (shading) issues, personal opinion, 'faction,' and general guesswork not contained anywhere in the report. Some of it is just plain misleading." Against Gale's "I rejected two people who had pronounced tendencies to be nonobjective": "One person himself declined the offer to participate, claiming potential flak from his corporation. The other, Dr [[Ray Hyman]], was rejected not because of any action by Gale, but because of a protest memo from MG [[Edmund Thompson|Thompson]] to Dr LaBerge." Quizzed by Thompson "on what the word 'proof' in the report findings meant," Gale answered "with a flurry of scientific buzzwords and jargon." Gale's figure of "over 5000 experiments" was "an unadulterated W.A.G."; his remark that "the Surgeon General is critical of the MICOM proposal" rested on "a cribbed copy of the Surgeon General's comments. Question I have is who gave it to him"; and "because of prior intelligence problems (e.g., LSD case) two members of the Surgeon General's review panel are dead set against this kind of work." "In my opinion the Gale report is big, but weak... By pushing to have the report quickly accepted by Dr LaBerge he will have an effective shield from tough questions and criticism." Gale "has gone far beyond that charter," "selling the report around the Pentagon," and "should be thanked by the DoD Steering Committee and allowed or told to quietly go his way." According to Stoner, Vorona had written to Tighe on January 11 urging that the report "be put on hold." On January 25 Gale asked Stoner to distribute 27 copies, LaBerge's "official copy by Monday, 28 Jan," with Stoner's office "designated as Office of Record for all reports." On February 6, 1980, the under secretary of defense, [[William Perry]], restricted the use of Program 6 funds, since it was "not appropriate for Army to fund technology programs aimed at scientific demonstration of parapsychology."[^4][^5]
### SRI and the Committee
On August 3, 1979, Puthoff wrote to Gale on the committee's visit of July 24 and 25 that "there were certain aspects of the meeting, however, which we felt were unsatisfactory": of the four planned parts, "with the extended ad hoc discussions that took place during the opening presentation on historical material (Part 1) and the need to press on to a discussion of planned efforts on present client programs (Part 3), we all but skipped Part 2 on scientific questions (for example, none of the slides were shown)." He answered three objections voiced during the visit: the target pool "should be chosen and maintained by someone further removed from the experimentation," which "is in fact the procedure already in force," the interviewers "had never seen the target list until your committee asked that it be brought to the conference room"; guessing and cueing, which "the statistical procedure we use takes into account at the outset"; and the suggestion "to dispense with the interviewer," which "indicates a complete failure to comprehend" the protocol's "division of labor between remote viewer and interviewer designed to mirror the two primary modes of cerebral functioning." "It is incumbent on the committee members to obtain a more thorough grounding in the technical details than was possible in the few hours available," and he asked for "further discussions... in smaller groups," naming "Drs. Synder and Tang," enclosing copies of a new "Standard Remote Viewing (RV) Procedures: Local Sites" by Puthoff, Targ and Edwin May for every member and "for Maj. Gen. E. R. Thompson, Dr. Ruth Davis, and the Hon. Walter Laberge." The enclosure set out a 6x6 rank-order judging matrix and a "direct-count-of-permutations method" credited to C. Scott (1972), "constructed sufficiently conservatively so as to apply even in the limiting case in which the target pool is completely known a priori to all involved." One member, Cartwright of China Lake, wrote on October 2, 1979, to "Chairman, Grill Flame Committee" that "the RV phenomenon, if it exists, represents a catastrophic military deficiency if left unexploited," that "the expectation of an existence proof of psychic-physical interaction is a forlorn one," that "I am an Occam," and that at INSCOM "the use of double blind procedures, and other devices to insure scientific rigor does not, any longer, seem necessary. (The integrity of the personnel has been well enough established.)... I propose, in short, that anecdotal events be emphasized"; the MICOM psychokinesis experiments were "not, in my view pseudo-science, but, rather irrelevant science."[^6]
### After the Report
[[John Kramar]], AMSAA's Grill Flame project officer, wrote for the record on February 13, 1980, under the subject line "Scientific Evaluation Committee (SEC) GRILL FLAME Report, Dated November 1979," that the report, "transmitted to AMSAA January 1980, was found to be somewhat ambiguous and confusing," and took "exception" to "Terminate all AMSAA GRILL FLAME efforts": "This recommendation, as best as can be determined, is based only on a partial understanding of AMSAA's initial effort, which was terminated before the SEC came into being. There is an apparent mistake by the SEC in considering the AMSAA challenge/validation efforts to be an integral part of the SRI contract," copying Gale and DARCOM. Murray Watt's comments of the same month, "my personal assessment," written for "Dr Vorona's letter to LTG Tighe," whose "tone... will be rather general," found the report "very shallow in nature," its recommendations "vague," "unless doing away with the program can be considered as a constructive suggestion"; of annex 5, "after all, we provided the committee with most of the data contained in the Annex"; of the screening of members, "private conversations with individual committee members give quite the opposite view"; of the handwriting passage, "they do everything but call Targ a 'cheat.' Did they, in fact, question Targ on this handwriting issue?"; and of the minority, "it appears that the committee (minority) is more concerned about the possible loss of their credibility." Colonel Chad B. White of INSCOM told Brigadier General Thomas J. Flynn on March 10 that the report "has now been released," forwarding "the complete executive summary" and "that portion of the report dealing directly with INSCOM's program." On March 19, 1980, Puthoff, Targ and May wrote to LaBerge, by then principal deputy under secretary for research and engineering, that "we have just learned that, based on a recommendation of the Gale Committee, ODDR&E will not provide support for R&D efforts in the Grill Flame area," and "were further advised that a major factor leading to this recommendation was that the Committee concluded that the work being pursued under Grill Flame was of such a complex nature as to not provide basic proof-of-principle": "our contracts stipulated that we provide 'what if' threat analyses, utilizing experimental protocols applicable to specific operational tasks; we were not mandated to undertake formal proof-of-principle research," and "our efforts have yielded both general results and specific data that have been described to us by our various DoD and Intelligence Community clients as being of vital importance to the national interests." A three-page slide digest headed "Gale Committee Report, 1980" reduced the findings to "Individuals involved are sincere, dedicated," "No evidence of fraud, deception," "Management is ambivalent, lacks focus," and "SRI dependence phased-out." The report's date is given as November 1979 in the AMSAA memorandum and December 1979 on its cover and in Watt's.[^7]
### Footnotes
[^1]: *Report by the Grill Flame Scientific Evaluation Committee,* December 1979, Manfred Gale, chairman, CIA-RDP96-00788R001300120001-5; Vorona, J., "Comments on 'Report By: The GRILLFLAME Scientific Evaluation Committee,'" memorandum of the Grill Flame Working Group, CIA-RDP96-00788R001300060001-2. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection. Chapters 1 and 4 to 9 and the annexes were not read.
[^2]: Defense Intelligence Agency, minutes of the DoD Grill Flame Committee, November 27, 1979 (CIA-RDP96-00788R002000130015-1) and January 10, 1980 (CIA-RDP96-00788R002000100009-1); US Army Intelligence and Security Command, "List of Events from September 1977 to January 1986," CIA-RDP96-00788R001100020001-8; the scan's table columns are reflowed by OCR and some dates are uncertain. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
[^1]: *Report by the Grill Flame Scientific Evaluation Committee,* December 1979, Manfred Gale, chairman, CIA-RDP96-00788R001300120001-5. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection. Chapters 1 to 9 and annexes 1 to 11; the table of contents has no entry for annex 6, whose place is marked by a redaction code, and the visit log's dates are reflowed by OCR.
[^2]: Defense Intelligence Agency, "Minutes of the DoD Grill Flame Committee Meeting, 27 November 1979," S-1168/DT-1, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000130015-1, and "Minutes of the DoD Grill Flame Committee Meeting, 10 January 1980," S-1008/DT-1, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000100009-1, both signed Jack Vorona, chairman. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection. US Army Intelligence and Security Command, "List of Events from September 1977 to January 1986," CIA-RDP96-00788R001100020001-8; the scan's table columns are reflowed by OCR and some dates are uncertain.
[^3]: Vorona, J., Chairman, Grill Flame Working Group, "Comments on 'Report By: The GRILLFLAME Scientific Evaluation Committee,'" undated, CIA-RDP96-00788R001300060001-2, read in two OCR passes; the addressee line is illegible. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
[^4]: Stoner, William L., Major, GS, "Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: Gale Briefing to ZA, Science Evaluation Group Final Report on GRILL FLAME, 14 Jan 80," CIA-RDP96-00788R001200230017-7. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
[^5]: Gale, M., "Distribution of GRILL FLAME Reports," memorandum for Major Stoner, ACSI, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development and Acquisition, January 25, 1980, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200230023-0; three CIA Reading Room items of February 13, 1980, are titled "Scientific Evaluation Committee (SEC) Grill Flame Report, Dated November 1979" (CIA-RDP96-00788R002000250025-7, R001100080007-6, R001200230026-7), not read. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
[^6]: "Grill Flame Review Panel Members," undated roster, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200230008-7; Office of the Under Secretary of the Army, memorandum for Mr. Manny Gale, July 17, 1979, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200230004-1; K. Lytle, Major, Military Assistant, memorandum for Mr. Gale, Advisor for RDA Analysis, ODCSRDA, "Briefing for Dr. Ruth Davis and Mr. Nealsen," August 8, 1979, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200230013-1; Snyder to Gale, undated (catalogued May 11, 1979, but referring to October and a visit of September 28), CIA-RDP96-00788R001200230038-4, and November 19, 1979, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200230042-9; "Findings," "Recommendations," "Estimated Costs," unsigned, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200230043-8; SSO Meade to SSO ACSI DA, "Grill Flame DoD Science Evaluation Team Report," LTC Watt, November 1979, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200230047-4. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
[^6]: Puthoff, H. E., to Manfred Gale, "SRI/Gale Committee Meeting of 24-25 July," August 3, 1979, with the enclosure "Standard Remote Viewing (RV) Procedures: Local Sites," by H. E. Puthoff, R. Targ and E. C. May, August 1979, CIA-RDP96-00787R000100060001-6 (memorandum alone at CIA-RDP96-00788R002000240028-5). Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection. Cartwright, Frank, Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, to the Chairman, Grill Flame Committee, "Comments on RV and PK Investigations," October 2, 1979, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200230034-8. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
[^7]: Kramar, John W., AMSAA Grill Flame Project Officer, memorandum for record, "Scientific Evaluation Committee (SEC) GRILL FLAME Report, Dated November 1979," February 13, 1980, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200230026-7 (copies at R002000250025-7 and R001100080007-6). Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection. Watt, Murray B., "Comments Concerning 'GRILL FLAME SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION COMMITTEE REPORT,' dated December 1979," catalogued February 13, 1980, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000130025-0. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection. White, Chad B., Colonel, ADCSOPS-HUMINT, memorandum for Brigadier General Thomas J. Flynn, "The GRILL FLAME Scientific Evaluation Committee Report," March 10, 1980, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200230056-4; "Gale Committee Report," briefing slides, 1980, CIA-RDP96-00788R001300130001-4. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection. Puthoff, H. E., R. Targ and E. C. May, Radio Physics Laboratory, SRI International, to Walter B. LaBerge, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, March 19, 1980, SRI 0-4132, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200230031-1. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.