vault backup: 2026-09-22 15:02:34

40 - EVENTS/INTELLIGENCE_SCANDALS/1995 AIR evaluation of Star Gate.md

@@ -18,14 +18,18 @@ start: 1995-06-01
 end: 1995-11-28
 location: "Washington, D.C."
 created: 2026-09-21
-updated: 2026-09-21
+updated: 2026-09-22
 ---
 
 In 1995, following a directive from Congress, the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] took custody of the [[Defense Intelligence Agency|DIA]]'s [[STARGATE PROJECT|Star Gate]] program, "which involved the use of paranormal phenomena, primarily 'remote viewing,' for intelligence collection," declassified its own parapsychology work of the 1970s "in order to facilitate a new, external review," and in June contracted the [[American Institutes for Research]] through its Office of Research and Development to evaluate it. The program had three parts: "'Operations,' using remote viewing to collect intelligence against foreign targets; 'Research and Development,' using laboratory studies to find new ways to improve remote viewing for use in the intelligence world; and 'Foreign Assessment,' the analysis of foreign activities to develop or exploit the paranormal." The foreign assessment part was excluded from the review. Operations "continued until the Spring of 1995, when the program was suspended."[^1]
 
+The review was first offered to the [[National Research Council]]. The CIA's chronology of the transfer ([[1995 transfer of Star Gate to the CIA]]) records that on March 15, 1995, "after informal discussions with NRC, panel member selection begins: Jessica Utts, [[John Palmer]], [[James Alcock]], and Ray Hyman contacted by NRC and agree to act as commissioned reviewers," and that on May 10 "NRC formally rejects CIA study proposal citing prior definitive study. NRC stated unequivocally that 'the case for remote viewing... is virtually nonexistent.'" The CIA met AIR's president the same day; the contract was signed on June 12, and ORD's independent contractor later described AIR as the "replacement organization for the NRC." The Office of Research and Development had told the Executive Director in advance that "we do NOT intend to ask our blue ribbon panel to tell us if there is or is not anything to the concept, rather we intend to ask them to review the STARGATE program to assess its overall value to the USG based on intelligence value, process validity, customer satisfaction, and foreign assessment activity as directed by Congress," and that "it is possible that our panel will recommend that we do NOT proceed with the program." The CIA's briefing slides on the review state that the "DIA program manager asked to identify most favorable users of remote viewing," that "AIR conducted standard interviews of these users on location with CIA present," and that the "commissioned reviews exchanged, rebuttals permitted, AIR arbitrated final conclusions for CIA key recommendations."[^900][^901]
+
+The curricula vitae of AIR's two authors are in the CIA's files: [[Michael Mumford]], who had joined AIR in 1994 and was "directing three projects concerned with the assessment and development of leadership potential for the [[United States Army]]" and skills projects "sponsored by the Department of Labor and the National Security Agency," and [[Andrew Rose]], at AIR since 1973 and by then chief scientist of its Washington office. On September 22, 1995, a week before the report's date, Mumford sent two copies of "the draft Remote Viewing report" to a redacted addressee at the Ames Building in Rosslyn: "The conclusions are solid. However, we do need to have Ray and Jessica check the material."[^902]
+
 ### The Panel
 
-The research review was given to two outside reviewers, [[Jessica Utts]], professor of statistics at the [[University of California, Davis]] and statistical editor of the *Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research*, and [[Ray Hyman]], professor of psychology at the [[University of Oregon]], who had served on the National Research Council committee on human performance; Lincoln Moses of [[Stanford University]] advised on statistics and David Goslin, president of AIR, coordinated. The CIA transferred "all reports and documents relevant to the review," about 80 publications; one document "remained classified during the period of this review," and Michael Mumford of AIR read it and gave the panel an unclassified synopsis. The principal investigator of the research contract, [[Edwin May]], was asked to list the studies "which he believes provide the strongest evidence" and every unique study since the 1988 National Research Council report. Hyman wrote afterward: "May helped identify the ten best studies for Utts and me to evaluate." The operational review was done by AIR's own psychologists, who interviewed seven representatives of customer organizations, three remote viewers, and the program manager in July and August 1995.[^1][^2]
+The research review was given to two outside reviewers, [[Jessica Utts]], professor of statistics at the [[University of California, Davis]] and statistical editor of the *Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research*, and [[Ray Hyman]], professor of psychology at the [[University of Oregon]], who had served on the National Research Council committee on human performance; [[Lincoln Moses]] of [[Stanford University]] advised on statistics and [[David Goslin]], president of AIR, coordinated. The CIA transferred "all reports and documents relevant to the review," about 80 publications; one document "remained classified during the period of this review," and Michael Mumford of AIR read it and gave the panel an unclassified synopsis. The principal investigator of the research contract, [[Edwin May]], was asked to list the studies "which he believes provide the strongest evidence" and every unique study since the 1988 National Research Council report. Hyman wrote afterward: "May helped identify the ten best studies for Utts and me to evaluate." The operational review was done by AIR's own psychologists, who interviewed seven representatives of customer organizations, three remote viewers, and the program manager in July and August 1995.[^1][^2]
 
 ### The Research Reviews
 
@@ -35,7 +39,7 @@ Hyman's report of September 11 confined itself to the ten SAIC experiments, "the
 
 ### The Operational Review
 
-The end users said the information was "stated in broad, vague terms," accurate "with regard to general stereotypical characteristics," inaccurate "with regard to concrete specifics," and inconsistent between viewers; "the viewings were never used as a primary source of evidence in making decisions." The viewers told AIR "that their written reports were occasionally inconsistent with their viewings. They themselves considered it appropriate to make the written reports consistent with known characteristics of the target," and "that previous managers also changed viewers' reports." Customer evaluations had been collected since 1994 for forty viewings: on a six-point accuracy scale the mean was 3.0, on a five-point value scale 3.5, and all three viewers scored within a tenth of a standard deviation of each other. Two organizations, "one concerned with tracking people and one concerned with combat intelligence," reported better results, where "the viewers had substantial general background information concerning the targets." A separate government review of the same forty tasks, printed as an appendix, found that "normally, much of the data provided by the RV(s) is either wrong or irrelevant although one cannot always tell which is which without further investigation," that scores were higher where targets were specific, "e.g., the North Korean targets," and that "as an admitted neophyte in this area of endeavor, I categorize the field as a kind of religion." Its own appendix is marked missing from the declassified copy.[^5]
+The end users said the information was "stated in broad, vague terms," accurate "with regard to general stereotypical characteristics," inaccurate "with regard to concrete specifics," and inconsistent between viewers; "the viewings were never used as a primary source of evidence in making decisions." The viewers told AIR "that their written reports were occasionally inconsistent with their viewings. They themselves considered it appropriate to make the written reports consistent with known characteristics of the target," and "that previous managers also changed viewers' reports." Customer evaluations had been collected since 1994 for forty viewings: on a six-point accuracy scale the mean was 3.0, on a five-point value scale 3.5, and all three viewers scored within a tenth of a standard deviation of each other. Two organizations, "one concerned with tracking people and one concerned with combat intelligence," reported better results, where "the viewers had substantial general background information concerning the targets." A separate government review of the same forty tasks, printed as an appendix, found that "normally, much of the data provided by the RV(s) is either wrong or irrelevant although one cannot always tell which is which without further investigation," that scores were higher where targets were specific, "e.g., the North Korean targets," and that "as an admitted neophyte in this area of endeavor, I categorize the field as a kind of religion." That review, headed "Summary Report. Star Gate Operational Tasking and Evaluation" and released separately by the CIA as an extract, carries no author's name; the invoice of ORD's independent contractor for August 7, 1995, describes "my independent evaluation of the operational tasking records from the Star Gate program supplemented by the results of interviews with the staff of four of the operational organizations that tasked the Star Gate program." Its first sub-appendix is marked "Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt" in the CIA's own copy of the AIR report, released May 22, 2002, and "missing" in the copy posted by the [[National Security Archive]]. The second sub-appendix prints the interview sheets for four customer organizations, lettered A, B, C and E, dated July 7 to August 3, 1995.[^5]
 
 ### Conclusions
 
@@ -47,7 +51,7 @@ The agency's public affairs office had said on September 6, 1995: "As mandated b
 
 ### May's Reply
 
-May's commentary of March 1996 charged that the CIA "set the outcome with regard to intelligence usage before the evaluation had begun," that only one of seventeen members of the program's own oversight bodies was contacted, and that David Goslin of AIR had also administered the NRC's 1988 report; Utts wrote to him on December 19, 1995, that "I was explicitly asked by AIR staff NOT to mention the NRC report in my review!" and that "we were shown very little of the 'operational' remote-viewing work," and that after she asked to contact operational participants she "was contacted by the AIR staff and told that I was NOT to contact any of those individuals." May's conclusion: the evaluators "wanted to demonstrate that AC lacked usefulness for intelligence operations. They did so by construction rather than by careful analysis."[^8]
+May's commentary of March 1996 charged that the CIA "set the outcome with regard to intelligence usage before the evaluation had begun," that only one of seventeen members of the program's own oversight bodies was contacted, and that David Goslin of AIR had also administered the NRC's 1988 report; Utts wrote to him on December 19, 1995, that "I was explicitly asked by AIR staff NOT to mention the NRC report in my review!" and that "we were shown very little of the 'operational' remote-viewing work," and that after she asked to contact operational participants she "was contacted by the AIR staff and told that I was NOT to contact any of those individuals." May's conclusion: the evaluators "wanted to demonstrate that AC lacked usefulness for intelligence operations. They did so by construction rather than by careful analysis."[^8] The independent contractor's invoice to ORD of September 19, 1995, states that he had "attended all specified meetings of the AIR (replacement organization for the NRC), their appointed panel members, and ORD," "participated in the review and editing of all unclassified reports prepared by the AIR, its panel members and ORD," and "assisted in the preparation (writing), review and editing of the interim and final versions of the report from the AIR and its panel."[^901]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
@@ -55,7 +59,10 @@ May's commentary of March 1996 charged that the CIA "set the outcome with regard
 [^2]: Hyman, Ray. "Evaluation of the Military's Twenty-Year Program on Psychic Spying," *Skeptical Inquirer,* March-April 1996, pp. 21-23.
 [^3]: Utts, Jessica. "An Assessment of the Evidence for Psychic Functioning," September 1, 1995, reproduced in the AIR report, pp. 3-2 to 3-40, and published in *Journal of Scientific Exploration,* vol. 10, no. 1, 1996, pp. 3-30. Pages 3-2, 3-3, 3-9, 3-14 to 3-19 of the report.
 [^4]: Hyman, Ray. "Evaluation of Program on Anomalous Mental Phenomena," September 11, 1995, reproduced in the AIR report, pp. 3-41 to 3-75, and published in *Journal of Scientific Exploration,* vol. 10, no. 1, 1996, pp. 31-58. Pages 3-41 to 3-44, 3-67, 3-72 to 3-79 of the report, including Utts's "Response to Ray Hyman's Report of September 11, 1995."
-[^5]: Mumford, Michael D., Andrew M. Rose, and David A. Goslin. *An Evaluation of Remote Viewing: Research and Applications.* American Institutes for Research, September 29, 1995, pp. 4-7 to 4-15 and appendix D, pp. D-12 to D-16.
+[^5]: Mumford, Michael D., Andrew M. Rose, and David A. Goslin. *An Evaluation of Remote Viewing: Research and Applications.* American Institutes for Research, September 29, 1995, pp. 4-7 to 4-15 and appendix D, pp. D-1, D-12 to D-16, D-19 to D-23. The CIA's copy is CIA-RDP96-00791R000200180006-4, approved for release May 22, 2002, read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room; its text matches the National Security Archive copy, and its appendix D opens with the same executive summary as "Summary Report. Star Gate Operational Tasking and Evaluation (An Extract)," CIA-RDP96-00791R000200300002-2.
 [^6]: Mumford, Michael D., Andrew M. Rose, and David A. Goslin. *An Evaluation of Remote Viewing: Research and Applications.* American Institutes for Research, September 29, 1995, pp. 1-4, 3-84, 5-1 to 5-5; Hyman, Ray. "Evaluation of the Military's Twenty-Year Program on Psychic Spying," *Skeptical Inquirer,* March-April 1996, pp. 21-23.; Puthoff, H. E. "CIA-Initiated Remote Viewing Program at Stanford Research Institute," *Journal of Scientific Exploration,* vol. 10, no. 1, 1996, pp. 63-76., note 10 and reference 1; May, Edwin C. "The American Institutes for Research Review of the Department of Defense's STAR GATE Program: A Commentary," *Journal of Parapsychology,* vol. 60, no. 1, 1996, pp. 3-23, abstract only.
 [^7]: Central Intelligence Agency, Public Affairs, statement on remote viewing, September 6, 1995, as reproduced in Victorian, Armen, "Remote Viewing and the US Intelligence Community," *Lobster,* c. 1996; the original release was not seen. "Psychic Spies: Cold War Whimsy or Secret Weapon?," ABC News *Nightline,* November 28, 1995, Radio TV Reports transcript for the CIA Public Affairs Staff, CIA-RDP99-01448R000402140001-7, read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room.
 [^8]: May, Edwin C. "The American Institutes for Research Review of the Department of Defense's STAR GATE Program: A Commentary," *Journal of Parapsychology,* vol. 60, no. 1, March 1996, pp. 3-23. The letter of December 19, 1995, is printed at pp. 15-17 as Utts's reply to May's e-mail of December 17, checked against the page images.
+[^900]: "Star Gate Transfer Chronology: 1995," memorandum for the record, undated, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200190017-9. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection. Director of Research and Development, CIA, memoranda for the Executive Director and the Comptroller, "Response to CDA on Stargate," undated, early 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100040020-2 and CIA-RDP96-00791R000100040021-1; ORD-0150-95, "Status Report to Congress: Star Gate Program," February 27, 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100040006-8; draft memorandum for the Defense Intelligence Agency, "Declassification and Cooperation in Response to Congressionally Directed STAR GATE Program Review," February 21, 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100040019-4; "Transfer of Star Gate Program from DIA to CIA, Status and Terms of Reference," drafts, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100040007-7 and -018-5; "Status of STARGATE Program," drafts faxed March 7 and May 10, 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000100040012-1 and -004-0. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
+[^901]: CIA briefing slides, "Star Gate," 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200080001-8. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection. Office of Research and Development, "Request to Amend Independent Contract," March 7, 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200020008-7; independent contractor's invoices of May 30, 1995 (Task A), August 7, 1995 (Task B) and September 19, 1995 (Tasks C and D), CIA-RDP96-00791R000200020005-0, -016-8 and -001-4. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
+[^902]: "Curriculum Vitae - Michael D. Mumford," CIA-RDP96-00791R000100030046-5, and "Curriculum Vitae - Andrew M. Rose," CIA-RDP96-00791R000100030047-4, released 2003; Mumford, Michael D., to a redacted addressee at the Ames Building, Rosslyn, "Transmittal of Draft Remote Viewing Report," September 22, 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200180003-5. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.