vault backup: 2026-10-15 18:00:57
This commit is contained in:
parent
ead29ac3e3
commit
837c566626
65 changed files with 2818 additions and 1075 deletions
|
|
@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ aliases:
|
|||
- Iran/Contra
|
||||
- Iran-Contra scandal
|
||||
created: 2024-04-25
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-14
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-15
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- Event
|
||||
- Political
|
||||
|
|
@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ relations:
|
|||
start: 1987
|
||||
end: 1988-12
|
||||
role: "Senate subcommittee on Contra drug links and Noriega"
|
||||
fn: 22
|
||||
fn: 23
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[Oliver North]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
|
|
@ -68,21 +68,21 @@ relations:
|
|||
start: 1985-12
|
||||
end: 1986-11
|
||||
role: "national security adviser who authorized the diversion; convicted April 7, 1990, reversed November 15, 1991"
|
||||
fn: 21
|
||||
fn: 22
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[Richard Secord]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 1984
|
||||
end: 1986-11
|
||||
role: "retired Air Force general who ran the Enterprise; pleaded guilty November 8, 1989"
|
||||
fn: 21
|
||||
fn: 22
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[Albert Hakim]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 1984
|
||||
end: 1986-11
|
||||
role: "Enterprise financial manager; pleaded guilty November 21, 1989"
|
||||
fn: 21
|
||||
fn: 22
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[William J. Casey]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
|
|
@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ relations:
|
|||
start: 1987
|
||||
end: 1993
|
||||
role: "14 persons charged, 11 convicted, 2 convictions overturned, 2 pardoned before trial, 1 case dismissed"
|
||||
fn: 21
|
||||
fn: 22
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[Joint Chiefs of Staff]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
|
|
@ -161,17 +161,19 @@ The Joint Chiefs of Staff appear in the independent counsel's record of the Defe
|
|||
|
||||
Walsh's Final Report (August 4, 1993) states that the Iran operations were carried out with the knowledge of Reagan, Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, McFarlane and Poindexter, of whom only Weinberger and Shultz dissented, and that "large volumes of highly relevant, contemporaneously created documents were systematically and willfully withheld from investigators by several Reagan Administration officials." Casey, hospitalized with a fatal illness before the Independent Counsel was appointed, was never formally investigated. Walsh observed that the problems were "not those of rogue operations, but rather those of Executive Branch efforts to evade congressional oversight," and that grants of immunity to North, Poindexter and [[Albert Hakim]] by Congress, and the attorney general's discretion under the [[Classified Information Procedures Act]] to refuse to declassify information, undermined prosecutions.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
The House and Senate committees' majority report of November 1987 (H. Rept. 100-433, S. Rept. 100-216) was accompanied by minority views signed by Representatives [[Dick Cheney]], Broomfield, Hyde, Courter, McCollum and DeWine, and by Senators McClure and Hatch. The staff list names [[Michael J. Malbin]] as minority editor and writer. The minority views argued that the Constitution protects the President's ability "to persuade U.S. citizens to engage voluntarily in otherwise legal activity to serve what they consider to be the national interest," and that "to whatever extent the Boland Amendments tried to prohibit such activity, they were clearly unconstitutional." They quoted [[Federalist No. 70]] that "energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government."[^21]
|
||||
|
||||
### Prosecutions and pardons
|
||||
|
||||
After the Independent Counsel's appointment 14 persons were charged, 11 were convicted (two convictions being overturned on appeal), two were pardoned before trial and one case was dismissed when the Bush administration declined to declassify information needed at trial. Pleas: Carl Channell (April 29, 1987) and Richard Miller (May 6, 1987); McFarlane (March 11, 1988); Secord (November 8, 1989, one felony of false statements to Congress); Hakim (November 21, 1989, a misdemeanor of supplementing North's salary, with Lake Resources Inc. pleading to theft of government property); Fiers (July 9, 1991, two misdemeanors); [[Elliott Abrams]] (October 7, 1991, two misdemeanors, including his solicitation of $10 million from the Sultan of [[Brunei]]). Convictions at trial: Clines (September 18, 1990, four tax-related felonies, 16 months); North (May 4, 1989, three counts, vacated July 20, 1990, dismissed September 16, 1991); Poindexter (April 7, 1990, five felony counts, reversed November 15, 1991, certiorari denied December 7, 1992, indictment dismissed in 1993); George (December 9, 1992, two felonies, pardoned before sentencing). The case against Joseph Fernandez was dismissed on November 24, 1989 after Attorney General [[Richard Thornburgh]] blocked the disclosure of classified information ruled relevant to the defense; the Fourth Circuit upheld that ruling on September 6, 1990.[^21]
|
||||
After the Independent Counsel's appointment 14 persons were charged, 11 were convicted (two convictions being overturned on appeal), two were pardoned before trial and one case was dismissed when the Bush administration declined to declassify information needed at trial. Pleas: Carl Channell (April 29, 1987) and Richard Miller (May 6, 1987); McFarlane (March 11, 1988); Secord (November 8, 1989, one felony of false statements to Congress); Hakim (November 21, 1989, a misdemeanor of supplementing North's salary, with Lake Resources Inc. pleading to theft of government property); Fiers (July 9, 1991, two misdemeanors); [[Elliott Abrams]] (October 7, 1991, two misdemeanors, including his solicitation of $10 million from the Sultan of [[Brunei]]). Convictions at trial: Clines (September 18, 1990, four tax-related felonies, 16 months); North (May 4, 1989, three counts, vacated July 20, 1990, dismissed September 16, 1991); Poindexter (April 7, 1990, five felony counts, reversed November 15, 1991, certiorari denied December 7, 1992, indictment dismissed in 1993); George (December 9, 1992, two felonies, pardoned before sentencing). The case against Joseph Fernandez was dismissed on November 24, 1989 after Attorney General [[Richard Thornburgh]] blocked the disclosure of classified information ruled relevant to the defense; the Fourth Circuit upheld that ruling on September 6, 1990.[^22]
|
||||
|
||||
On December 24, 1992 President Bush pardoned Weinberger (indicted June 16, 1992, trial set for January 5, 1993), [[Duane Clarridge]] (indicted November 26, 1991 on seven counts of perjury and false statements, trial set for March 15, 1993), George, Abrams, Fiers and McFarlane. Fernandez, whose case had been dismissed, was not among those pardoned.[^21]
|
||||
On December 24, 1992 President Bush pardoned Weinberger (indicted June 16, 1992, trial set for January 5, 1993), [[Duane Clarridge]] (indicted November 26, 1991 on seven counts of perjury and false statements, trial set for March 15, 1993), George, Abrams, Fiers and McFarlane. Fernandez, whose case had been dismissed, was not among those pardoned.[^22]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Contra network and drug trafficking
|
||||
|
||||
The Kerry Committee's report of December 1988 stated that "individuals who provided support for the Contras were involved in drug trafficking, the supply network of the Contras was used by drug trafficking organizations, and elements of the Contras themselves knowingly received financial and material assistance from drug traffickers," and that "in each case, one or another agency of the U.S. government had information regarding the involvement either while it was occurring, or immediately thereafter." It found that the State Department paid funds Congress had authorized for humanitarian assistance to traffickers, "in some cases after the traffickers had been indicted by federal law enforcement agencies on drug charges." It found no evidence that the Contra leadership participated directly in narcotics smuggling, but that the FDN "did move Contra funds through a narcotics trafficking enterprise and money laundering operation," and that "some officials may have turned a blind eye." It concluded that "there are serious questions as to whether or not U.S. officials involved in Central America failed to address the drug issue for fear of jeopardizing the war effort against Nicaragua," citing the delay in dealing with [[Manuel Noriega]], the premature public announcement of the DEA's [[Barry Seal]] sting of Sandinista officials shortly before a crucial congressional vote on Contra aid, and the case of the Honduran General [[Jose Bueso Rosa|José Bueso-Rosa]], convicted of a plot to assassinate President [[Roberto Suazo Cordova|Roberto Suazo Córdova]] financed by a $40 million cocaine sale, who received a light sentence after U.S. officials intervened.[^22] The Kerry report also described Contra supply contractors paid by the State Department's Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office, the Contra supply officer [[Mario Calero]]'s agreement with the pilot [[Frank Moss]], and the passage of Contra funds through traffickers.[^22]
|
||||
The Kerry Committee's report of December 1988 stated that "individuals who provided support for the Contras were involved in drug trafficking, the supply network of the Contras was used by drug trafficking organizations, and elements of the Contras themselves knowingly received financial and material assistance from drug traffickers," and that "in each case, one or another agency of the U.S. government had information regarding the involvement either while it was occurring, or immediately thereafter." It found that the State Department paid funds Congress had authorized for humanitarian assistance to traffickers, "in some cases after the traffickers had been indicted by federal law enforcement agencies on drug charges." It found no evidence that the Contra leadership participated directly in narcotics smuggling, but that the FDN "did move Contra funds through a narcotics trafficking enterprise and money laundering operation," and that "some officials may have turned a blind eye." It concluded that "there are serious questions as to whether or not U.S. officials involved in Central America failed to address the drug issue for fear of jeopardizing the war effort against Nicaragua," citing the delay in dealing with [[Manuel Noriega]], the premature public announcement of the DEA's [[Barry Seal]] sting of Sandinista officials shortly before a crucial congressional vote on Contra aid, and the case of the Honduran General [[Jose Bueso Rosa|José Bueso-Rosa]], convicted of a plot to assassinate President [[Roberto Suazo Cordova|Roberto Suazo Córdova]] financed by a $40 million cocaine sale, who received a light sentence after U.S. officials intervened.[^23] The Kerry report also described Contra supply contractors paid by the State Department's Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office, the Contra supply officer [[Mario Calero]]'s agreement with the pilot [[Frank Moss]], and the passage of Contra funds through traffickers.[^23]
|
||||
|
||||
The National Security Archive's briefing book prints North's notebook for July 12, 1985, in which Secord is quoted as saying that "14 M to finance [the arms in a Honduran warehouse] came from drugs," and North's August 9, 1985 entry that a Honduran DC-6 used for runs out of New Orleans "is probably being used for drug runs into U.S."; the briefing book also notes that DEA agents testified on July 28, 1988 that North had wanted $1.5 million in Cartel money carried by a DEA informant given to the Contras.[^15] The Kerry report states that the pilot [[Floyd Carlton]] testified that Noriega was paid $100,000 to $250,000 for each of four cocaine flights he piloted for the [[Medellin Cartel]], and that the same Panamanian general met North in June 1985 and again in [[London]] on September 22, 1986 to discuss sabotage in Nicaragua; when North proposed a meeting on August 23, 1986, Poindexter replied, "I have nothing against him other than his illegal activities," and Walsh records that the decision was made not to pay Noriega the $1 million.[^15][^22][^23]
|
||||
The National Security Archive's briefing book prints North's notebook for July 12, 1985, in which Secord is quoted as saying that "14 M to finance [the arms in a Honduran warehouse] came from drugs," and North's August 9, 1985 entry that a Honduran DC-6 used for runs out of New Orleans "is probably being used for drug runs into U.S."; the briefing book also notes that DEA agents testified on July 28, 1988 that North had wanted $1.5 million in Cartel money carried by a DEA informant given to the Contras.[^15] The Kerry report states that the pilot [[Floyd Carlton]] testified that Noriega was paid $100,000 to $250,000 for each of four cocaine flights he piloted for the [[Medellin Cartel]], and that the same Panamanian general met North in June 1985 and again in [[London]] on September 22, 1986 to discuss sabotage in Nicaragua; when North proposed a meeting on August 23, 1986, Poindexter replied, "I have nothing against him other than his illegal activities," and Walsh records that the decision was made not to pay Noriega the $1 million.[^15][^23][^24]
|
||||
|
||||
Webb wrote that Kerry investigation director [[Jack Blum]] told him: "We were even dumped on by the Iran-Contra Committee. They wouldn't touch this issue with a ten-foot pole," and that during North's July 1987 testimony two men from Baltimore stood with a banner reading "Ask about the cocaine smuggling" before police removed them. Webb also wrote that the plane shot down over Nicaragua was a Fairchild C-123K called The Fat Lady, based at [[Mena, Arkansas]] before Barry Seal sold it, after which it flew weapons for North and the [[FDN]]; that Hasenfus was a former [[Air America]] cargo handler; that congressional records show North was regularly briefed by the CIA on Seal's joint CIA-DEA sting of the Sandinistas and allegedly leaked it to the press shortly before a critical vote on Contra aid; and that the Enterprise's flights from Ilopango reportedly brought cocaine back on return flights, with Hangar No. 4 there used by the CIA until it was turned over to North's operation in 1985. The Committees' account identifies the aircraft only as one belonging to the Enterprise, with a [[Southern Air Transport]] identification card found on the pilot.[^3][^8]
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -201,6 +203,7 @@ The writer Cheri Seymour wrote that the Iran-Contra Affair was a significant com
|
|||
[^18]: Walsh, Part VIII, note 167 (McMahon, memorandum for the record, March 15, 1985, ER 26,187-88 and ER 92-00116-17). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_viii.htm
|
||||
[^19]: Walsh, Part VIII, notes 16-18 (Weinberger diary, August 22, 1985, ALZ 0039606-07; Weinberger calendar, LC-007474; Powell, Select Committees deposition, June 19, 1987, p. 5). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_viii.htm
|
||||
[^20]: Walsh, Part VIII, citing Weinberger diary, November 21, 1985 (ALZ 0039802-03). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_viii.htm
|
||||
[^21]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, "Summary of Prosecutions." https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/summpros.htm
|
||||
[^22]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy*, S. Prt. 100-165 (December 1988), "Summary of Findings," chapters on the Contras and on Panama, and the Conclusions. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
|
||||
[^23]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, "United States v. Elliott Abrams," section on the September 19 and 20, 1986 meetings. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
|
||||
[^21]: *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair,* H. Rept. 100-433, S. Rept. 100-216, November 1987, contents (Section II, "The Minority Report," p. 431), minority views ch. 1, p. 451, ch. 2, p. 460, and staff list. https://archive.org/download/Iran-ContraReport/Report%20of%20the%20Congressional%20Committees%20Investigating%20the%20Iran-Contra%20Affair.pdf
|
||||
[^22]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, "Summary of Prosecutions." https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/summpros.htm
|
||||
[^23]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy*, S. Prt. 100-165 (December 1988), "Summary of Findings," chapters on the Contras and on Panama, and the Conclusions. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
|
||||
[^24]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, "United States v. Elliott Abrams," section on the September 19 and 20, 1986 meetings. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ aliases:
|
|||
- Rockefeller Commission
|
||||
summary: "Presidential commission on CIA activities within the United States, chaired by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller from January to June 1975; the White House removed its assassination section before publication."
|
||||
created: 2026-06-05
|
||||
updated: 2026-09-22
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-15
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Nelson Rockefeller]]"
|
||||
|
|
@ -64,27 +64,27 @@ The commission's most consequential suppression was of its own investigation int
|
|||
|
||||
By June 5, 1975, commission staff had completed an 86-page section documenting CIA plots against [[Fidel Castro]], [[Rafael Trujillo]] of the [[Dominican Republic]], and briefer references to plots against Lumumba and [[Sukarno]] of Indonesia. Commission staff members including public affairs director [[Peter Clapper]] warned in a May 2, 1975 memorandum that suppressing the assassination findings would appear as a cover-up and damage the commission's credibility.[^18]
|
||||
|
||||
The White House removed the entire 86-page section before publication. [[Richard Cheney]], then serving as deputy assistant to the president and deputy to [[Donald Rumsfeld]] as chief of staff, made handwritten edits to the commission's draft report. Cheney's edits removed the section on "Alleged Plans to Assassinate Certain Foreign Leaders," eliminated a provision that would have allowed CIA employees to report improper activities to the CIA's Inspector General, and changed the commission's characterization of several CIA activities from "unlawful" to having "exceeded statutory authority." The White House also suppressed Griswold's footnote recommending public disclosure of the CIA budget.[^19]
|
||||
The White House removed the entire 86-page section before publication. [[Richard Cheney]], then serving as deputy assistant to the president and deputy to [[Donald Rumsfeld]] as chief of staff, made handwritten edits to the commission's draft report. Cheney's edits removed the section on "Alleged Plans to Assassinate Certain Foreign Leaders," eliminated a provision that would have allowed CIA employees to report improper activities to the CIA's Inspector General, and changed the commission's characterization of several CIA activities from "unlawful" to having "exceeded statutory authority." The White House also suppressed Griswold's footnote recommending public disclosure of the CIA budget.[^19] The archive's account of the edits also says the White House text added recommendations that the commission had not voted, and that one of them, on a civilian agency committee to resolve concerns about CIA overhead photography used for domestic purposes, was among the additions.[^20] In the working copy of the report in the Ford Library file (Document 15), the mail-opening conclusion keeps "were unlawful" and strikes "This was improper under the National Security Act," and the Operation CHAOS conclusion keeps "unlawfully exceeded the CIA's statutory authority" and strikes "These activities were improper."[^20] A White House strategy paper prepared in the office of the deputy assistant to the president in early June 1975 argued that giving the Church Committee the minutes and records of covert action groups "would be an unprecedented act."[^21]
|
||||
|
||||
The [[National Security Archive]]'s 2016 posting reproduces the June 5, 1975 commission section on CIA plots to assassinate foreign leaders (Document 19), which was excised from the final report on White House orders. Staff director [[David Belin]] was the main author of the portion on CIA plotting against Fidel Castro, including Operation ZR/RIFLE, and the archive reported that Cheney and White House Counsel [[Philip Buchen]] induced Belin to cancel a press conference on the assassination findings, citing concerns raised by [[Henry A. Kissinger]]. The archive also reported that the commission voted, over its chairman's objection, to include assassination plots in its inquiry; that Cheney's edits replaced the word "unlawful" with language about actions exceeding statutory authority, except for the CIA drug experiments, which the edit called "illegal"; and that Ford's January 1975 remark to newspaper editors had disclosed CIA involvement in assassination plots. The archive's account is its own reading of its documents.[^20]
|
||||
The [[National Security Archive]]'s 2016 posting reproduces the June 5, 1975 commission section on CIA plots to assassinate foreign leaders (Document 19), which was excised from the final report on White House orders. Staff director [[David Belin]] was the main author of the portion on CIA plotting against Fidel Castro, including Operation ZR/RIFLE, and the archive reported that Cheney and White House Counsel [[Philip Buchen]] induced Belin to cancel a press conference on the assassination findings, citing concerns raised by [[Henry A. Kissinger]]. The archive also reported that the commission voted, over its chairman's objection, to include assassination plots in its inquiry; that Cheney's edits replaced the word "unlawful" with language about actions exceeding statutory authority, except for the CIA drug experiments, which the edit called "illegal"; and that Ford's January 1975 remark to newspaper editors had disclosed CIA involvement in assassination plots. The archive's account is its own reading of its documents.[^22]
|
||||
|
||||
Executive Order 11828 required the commission to furnish the Attorney General any evidence it found that might relate to federal offenses, and to present its final report within three months of the order; the transmittal letter is dated June 6, 1975.[^21][^22]
|
||||
Executive Order 11828 required the commission to furnish the Attorney General any evidence it found that might relate to federal offenses, and to present its final report within three months of the order; the transmittal letter is dated June 6, 1975.[^23][^24]
|
||||
|
||||
On October 31, 1975, Ford wrote to [[Frank Church]] urging him to suppress the Church Committee's parallel assassination report. On November 4, 1975, Church rejected Ford's request. The Senate voted to release the Church Committee's "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders" report on November 20, 1975, revealing publicly what the Rockefeller Commission had withheld.[^23]
|
||||
On October 31, 1975, Ford wrote to [[Frank Church]] urging him to suppress the Church Committee's parallel assassination report. On November 4, 1975, Church rejected Ford's request. The Senate voted to release the Church Committee's "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders" report on November 20, 1975, revealing publicly what the Rockefeller Commission had withheld.[^25]
|
||||
|
||||
The commission had also encountered obstruction in its attempts to investigate CIA records. CIA denied commission staff access to NSC records. [[Henry Kissinger]] withheld State Department cooperation. The commission was denied access to minutes of the [[40 Committee]] and its predecessor bodies, meaning it could not document the full chain of authorization for covert operations.[^24]
|
||||
The commission had also encountered obstruction in its attempts to investigate CIA records. CIA denied commission staff access to NSC records. [[Henry Kissinger]] withheld State Department cooperation. The commission was denied access to minutes of the [[40 Committee]] and its predecessor bodies, meaning it could not document the full chain of authorization for covert operations.[^26]
|
||||
|
||||
### Rockefeller's Position
|
||||
|
||||
In 1955, as special assistant to the president, Nelson Rockefeller chaired the [[Planning Coordination Group]], set up under [[NSC 5412]] as the channel for policy approval of CIA covert operations. In May 1955 [[Charles Geschickter]] asked the CIA to contribute $375,000 toward a research building at Georgetown University Hospital, one-sixth of whose beds were to be reserved for the CIA along with cover for three CIA scientists and "human patients and volunteers for experimental use." The journalist John Marks, working from CIA documents released in 1977, wrote that Allen Dulles personally approved the contribution and then took it to "President Eisenhower's special committee to review covert operations," which assented on the understanding that Geschickter could provide "a reasonable expectation" that the agency would have the space.[^25] The historians Gerard Colby and Charlotte Dennett identified the committee's chairman as Rockefeller and wrote that he gave the approval. The 1977 Senate hearing took testimony on the CIA's use of hospital construction money without naming him. Rockefeller initially opposed even permitting the commission to investigate assassination plots, and it was only Belin's persistence and the threat of adverse publicity that extended the commission's mandate into that territory.[^26]
|
||||
In 1955, as special assistant to the president, Nelson Rockefeller chaired the [[Planning Coordination Group]], set up under [[NSC 5412]] as the channel for policy approval of CIA covert operations. In May 1955 [[Charles Geschickter]] asked the CIA to contribute $375,000 toward a research building at Georgetown University Hospital, one-sixth of whose beds were to be reserved for the CIA along with cover for three CIA scientists and "human patients and volunteers for experimental use." The journalist John Marks, working from CIA documents released in 1977, wrote that Allen Dulles personally approved the contribution and then took it to "President Eisenhower's special committee to review covert operations," which assented on the understanding that Geschickter could provide "a reasonable expectation" that the agency would have the space.[^27] The historians Gerard Colby and Charlotte Dennett identified the committee's chairman as Rockefeller and wrote that he gave the approval. The 1977 Senate hearing took testimony on the CIA's use of hospital construction money without naming him. Rockefeller initially opposed even permitting the commission to investigate assassination plots, and it was only Belin's persistence and the threat of adverse publicity that extended the commission's mandate into that territory.[^28]
|
||||
|
||||
### Report Structure and Outcome
|
||||
|
||||
The commission's final report, submitted to President Ford on June 6, 1975, comprised four main parts with 19 chapters plus seven appendices. The chapters covered CIA legal authority, supervision and control mechanisms, mail intercept programs, Operation CHAOS, domestic surveillance of political activists, CIA files on American citizens, and an examination of allegations regarding the assassination of President Kennedy (where the commission upheld the Warren Commission's single-assassin finding). The report contained 27 recommendations, of which 20 were agency-level reforms recommended for immediate implementation and 7 addressed CIA structure, function, and presidential oversight.[^27]
|
||||
The commission's final report, submitted to President Ford on June 6, 1975, comprised four main parts with 19 chapters plus seven appendices. The chapters covered CIA legal authority, supervision and control mechanisms, mail intercept programs, Operation CHAOS, domestic surveillance of political activists, CIA files on American citizens, and an examination of allegations regarding the assassination of President Kennedy (where the commission upheld the Warren Commission's single-assassin finding). The report contained 27 recommendations, of which 20 were agency-level reforms recommended for immediate implementation and 7 addressed CIA structure, function, and presidential oversight.[^29]
|
||||
|
||||
The Ford administration's response to the report was coordinated by a memorandum dated August 9, 1975, from Kissinger, White House counsel Philip Buchen, and [[Office of Management and Budget]] director [[James Lynn]], which argued for prompt action on the domestic-improprieties recommendations while deferring broader intelligence restructuring questions, explicitly noting that congressional committees were simultaneously investigating related matters and that delay risked losing "the initiative entirely."[^28]
|
||||
The Ford administration's response to the report was coordinated by a memorandum dated August 9, 1975, from Kissinger, White House counsel Philip Buchen, and [[Office of Management and Budget]] director [[James Lynn]], which argued for prompt action on the domestic-improprieties recommendations while deferring broader intelligence restructuring questions, explicitly noting that congressional committees were simultaneously investigating related matters and that delay risked losing "the initiative entirely."[^30]
|
||||
|
||||
The commission's records, totaling approximately 41 cubic feet (82,000 pages), are held at the [[Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library]] in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Materials related to Kennedy assassination allegations and anti-Castro activities from 1960 to 1964 were processed for research access following the [[JFK Records Act]]; significant portions of the collection remain classified.[^29]
|
||||
The commission's records, totaling approximately 41 cubic feet (82,000 pages), are held at the [[Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library]] in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Materials related to Kennedy assassination allegations and anti-Castro activities from 1960 to 1964 were processed for research access following the [[JFK Records Act]]; significant portions of the collection remain classified.[^31]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -107,13 +107,15 @@ The commission's records, totaling approximately 41 cubic feet (82,000 pages), a
|
|||
[^17]: National Security Archive, NSAEBB, "Gerald Ford White House Altered Rockefeller Commission Report in 1975." Document 3: David W. Belin Memorandum to Members of the Commission, "Scope of Commission Investigation - Assassinations," March 10, 1975.
|
||||
[^18]: National Security Archive, NSAEBB Document 11: Peter Clapper to David Belin, "Public Affairs Considerations in Report," May 2, 1975.
|
||||
[^19]: National Security Archive, NSAEBB Document 15: Richard Cheney, handwritten comments on draft Rockefeller Commission report, circa June 1975. Cheney served as deputy assistant to the president under Rumsfeld at the time of these edits.
|
||||
[^20]: National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 543, edited by John Prados and Arturo Jimenez-Bacardi, February 29, 2016, Documents 15, 19 and the introductory essay. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/intelligence/2016-02-29/gerald-ford-white-house-altered-rockefeller-commission-report
|
||||
[^21]: Executive Order 11828, January 4, 1975, Sections 3 and 6. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-11828-establishing-commission-cia-activities-within-the-united-states
|
||||
[^22]: Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, transmittal letter dated June 6, 1975. https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/LIBRARY/document/0005/1561495.pdf
|
||||
[^23]: Church Committee, "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders," Senate Report 94-465, released November 20, 1975. Ford's suppression request sent October 31, 1975; Church's rejection November 4, 1975; Senate vote November 20, 1975.
|
||||
[^24]: National Security Archive, NSAEBB Document 10: Mason Cargill to File, "CIA denial of access to records of Special Group Augmented re Cuba," April 30, 1975.
|
||||
[^25]: Marks, John. *The Search for the "Manchurian Candidate": The CIA and Mind Control.* Times Books, 1979, ch. 12, n. 6, as transcribed at https://cryptome.org/mkultra-0005.htm. The Subproject 35 memorandum of November 15, 1954, does not mention the committee: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/32726-document-11-memorandum-director-central-intelligence-project-mkultra-subproject-35
|
||||
[^26]: Colby and Dennett, Ch. 18, 44, and Ch. 18 n. 32, citing MKULTRA Subproject 35-10, May 16, 1955. The book calls the body he chaired the "Special Group." For the Planning Coordination Group, its membership and its role as the "normal channel for giving policy approval" to covert operations: Rowland Hughes memorandum to Eisenhower, March 3, 1955, *FRUS 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community,* Document 210, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d210. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research, *Project MKULTRA, the CIA's Program of Research in Behavioral Modification,* joint hearing, August 3, 1977, testimony of Adm. Stansfield Turner and exchange with Sen. Richard Schweiker, https://archive.org/details/project-mkultra-the-cias-program-of-research-in-behavioral-modification
|
||||
[^27]: Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Topic Guide, "Rockefeller Commission Report, June 1975." FRUS 1969-76, Vol. XXXVIII, Part 2, Document 46, Memorandum on implementation of Rockefeller Commission recommendations, August 9, 1975.
|
||||
[^28]: FRUS 1969-76, Vol. XXXVIII, Part 2, Document 46, August 9, 1975, Kissinger, Buchen, and Lynn to Ford on implementation of Rockefeller Commission recommendations.
|
||||
[^29]: Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Finding Aid, "U.S. President's Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States Files," collection extent approximately 41 cubic feet.
|
||||
[^20]: Prados, John, and Arturo Jimenez-Bacardi, eds. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 543, February 29, 2016, Document 15 (Richard Cheney, handwritten comments on draft Rockefeller Commission report, c. June 1975; Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Richard Cheney Files, Box 8, working copy of Part I with the June 4, 1975 cover memorandum). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/intelligence/2016-02-29/gerald-ford-white-house-altered-rockefeller-commission-report
|
||||
[^21]: Same briefing book, Document 18 (White House, Office of the Deputy Assistant to the President, Richard Cheney, "Briefing Book List on Strategy for Dealing with Intelligence-Political Situation," c. June 4, 1975, Richard Cheney Files, Box 8). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/intelligence/2016-02-29/gerald-ford-white-house-altered-rockefeller-commission-report
|
||||
[^22]: National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 543, edited by John Prados and Arturo Jimenez-Bacardi, February 29, 2016, Documents 15, 19 and the introductory essay. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/intelligence/2016-02-29/gerald-ford-white-house-altered-rockefeller-commission-report
|
||||
[^23]: Executive Order 11828, January 4, 1975, Sections 3 and 6. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-11828-establishing-commission-cia-activities-within-the-united-states
|
||||
[^24]: Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, transmittal letter dated June 6, 1975. https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/LIBRARY/document/0005/1561495.pdf
|
||||
[^25]: Church Committee, "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders," Senate Report 94-465, released November 20, 1975. Ford's suppression request sent October 31, 1975; Church's rejection November 4, 1975; Senate vote November 20, 1975.
|
||||
[^26]: National Security Archive, NSAEBB Document 10: Mason Cargill to File, "CIA denial of access to records of Special Group Augmented re Cuba," April 30, 1975.
|
||||
[^27]: Marks, John. *The Search for the "Manchurian Candidate": The CIA and Mind Control.* Times Books, 1979, ch. 12, n. 6, as transcribed at https://cryptome.org/mkultra-0005.htm. The Subproject 35 memorandum of November 15, 1954, does not mention the committee: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/32726-document-11-memorandum-director-central-intelligence-project-mkultra-subproject-35
|
||||
[^28]: Colby and Dennett, Ch. 18, 44, and Ch. 18 n. 32, citing MKULTRA Subproject 35-10, May 16, 1955. The book calls the body he chaired the "Special Group." For the Planning Coordination Group, its membership and its role as the "normal channel for giving policy approval" to covert operations: Rowland Hughes memorandum to Eisenhower, March 3, 1955, *FRUS 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community,* Document 210, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d210. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research, *Project MKULTRA, the CIA's Program of Research in Behavioral Modification,* joint hearing, August 3, 1977, testimony of Adm. Stansfield Turner and exchange with Sen. Richard Schweiker, https://archive.org/details/project-mkultra-the-cias-program-of-research-in-behavioral-modification
|
||||
[^29]: Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Topic Guide, "Rockefeller Commission Report, June 1975." FRUS 1969-76, Vol. XXXVIII, Part 2, Document 46, Memorandum on implementation of Rockefeller Commission recommendations, August 9, 1975.
|
||||
[^30]: FRUS 1969-76, Vol. XXXVIII, Part 2, Document 46, August 9, 1975, Kissinger, Buchen, and Lynn to Ford on implementation of Rockefeller Commission recommendations.
|
||||
[^31]: Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Finding Aid, "U.S. President's Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States Files," collection extent approximately 41 cubic feet.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue