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@ -25,7 +25,11 @@ The CIA, particularly through its Photographic Intelligence Division, was instru
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The CIA's interest in psi research dates back to the early 1970s, partly in response to rumors of extensive Soviet psi research. Following a number of scandals in the mid-1970s, including revelations of domestic spying, the CIA came under unprecedented scrutiny from Congress. This led to a preference for "clean" spying methods, making psychic intelligence an appealing, low-profile alternative to traditional human intelligence (HUMINT).[^1]
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In 1972, the CIA, through officials like [[Ken Kress]] from the Technical Services Division (TSD) (later the Office of Technical Service, OTS), provided the initial funding for [[Hal Puthoff]]'s psi research program at [[Stanford Research Institute]] (SRI). This funding, initially $50,000 for eight months, was contingent on the researchers demonstrating a repeatable psi phenomenon. The Office of Research and Development (ORD) also jointly managed the funding and contract.[^1] In the late 1960s, the CIA had approached [[Hal Puthoff]] and Russell Targ at Stanford University to develop a program to counter a similar effort in the Soviet Union, which led to the creation of the [[Stargate Project]], a program that trained individuals in [[Remote Viewing]] to spy on foreign targets. The program was reportedly highly successful, and Puthoff reported directly to the Director of the CIA and the White House.[^11]
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In 1972, the CIA, through officials like [[Ken Kress]] from the Technical Services Division (TSD) (later the Office of Technical Service, OTS), provided the initial funding for [[Hal Puthoff]]'s psi research program at [[Stanford Research Institute]] (SRI). This funding, initially $50,000 for eight months, was contingent on the researchers demonstrating a repeatable psi phenomenon. The Office of Research and Development (ORD) also jointly managed the funding and contract.[^1] In the late 1960s, the CIA had approached Hal Puthoff and Russell Targ at Stanford University to develop a program to counter a similar effort in the Soviet Union, which led to the creation of the [[Stargate Project]], a program that trained individuals in [[Remote Viewing]] to spy on foreign targets. The program was reportedly highly successful, and Puthoff reported directly to the Director of the CIA and the White House.[^11]
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### The Search for Behavioral Control
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Since [[World War II]] the CIA searched secretly for ways to control human behavior, an effort that extended the wartime [[Office of Strategic Services|OSS]] quest for a truth drug and echoed both the Nazi experiments at [[Dachau]] and [[Albert Hofmann]]'s discovery of [[LSD]]. The programs were triggered by the 1949 show trial of [[Josef Cardinal Mindszenty]] in [[Hungary]], whose glazed confession convinced Agency officials the Communists had developed a technique to render defendants zombielike; what began as defensive research quickly turned offensive, with documents stressing the goal of "controlling an individual to the point where he will do our bidding against his will and even against such fundamental laws of nature as self-preservation." The effort passed through [[Project Bluebird and Project Artichoke|Project BLUEBIRD]] (1950), ARTICHOKE (1952), and finally [[Project MKUltra|MKULTRA]] under the [[Office of Technical Service|Technical Services Staff]], with [[Richard Helms]] its most important sponsor and his protégé [[Sidney Gottlieb]] running it day to day. The research systematically violated the will of subjects drawn from groups officials considered expendable, mental patients, prostitutes, foreigners, drug addicts, and prisoners; as one Agency psychologist put it, operators lacked "a universal concept of mankind" and were willing to do things to foreigners they would not try on Americans. "It was strictly a patriotic vision," he said.[^16]
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### Notable Operations and Impact
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@ -43,7 +47,7 @@ In 1977, [[Stansfield Turner]], then Director of Central Intelligence, abruptly
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Initially, the KH-11 satellite's images were tightly restricted, even to close allies like [[Great Britain]]. However, [[Jimmy Carter]]'s decision to provide Israel with direct access to the KH-11 in March 1979 disrupted the satellite's careful scheduling and meant less access for some American intelligence agencies. This decision was suspected by some American intelligence officials as a reward for the [[Camp David Accords|Camp David summit]].[^2]
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Following the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor at [[Osirak bombing]] in June 1981, [[William J. Casey]], [[Ronald Reagan]]'s Director of Central Intelligence, ordered a review of Israel's use of the KH-11 intelligence-sharing agreement. The review found that Israel had expanded the agreement to extract virtually any photograph desired, including extensive coverage of western [[Russia]] and [[Moscow]]. This led to anger within the CIA and [[Defense Intelligence Agency|DIA]] over the "very lax" management of the liaison agreement. Despite this, it was agreed that photographs would continue to flow to Israel, but with the initial 1979 restrictions re-enforced.[^2]
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Following the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor at [[Osirak bombing]] in June 1981, [[William J. Casey]], [[Ronald Reagan]]'s Director of Central Intelligence, ordered a review of Israel's use of the KH-11 intelligence-sharing agreement. The review found that Israel had expanded the agreement to extract virtually any photograph desired, including extensive coverage of western [[Russia]] and Moscow. This led to anger within the CIA and [[Defense Intelligence Agency|DIA]] over the "very lax" management of the liaison agreement. Despite this, it was agreed that photographs would continue to flow to Israel, but with the initial 1979 restrictions re-enforced.[^2]
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### Involvement with BCCI
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@ -110,3 +114,4 @@ Multiple CIA officials were indicted during the Iran-Contra investigation. Clarr
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[^13]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom"
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[^14]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue: "The damage that has been done"
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[^15]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 13: "The wrong kind of friends"
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[^16]: John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*. Times Books, 1979, Chapters 1-2.
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