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10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Jonathan Pollard.md
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@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ aliases:
- Jonathan J. Pollard
- Pollard
created: 2026-10-12
updated: 2026-10-12
updated: 2026-10-15
born: 1954-08-07
location: "Galveston, Texas"
summary: "Jonathan Jay Pollard was a Navy civilian intelligence analyst who spied for Israel from 1984 to 1985, was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1987, and was paroled in 2015."
@ -164,33 +164,35 @@ Ben-Menashe's claim that Robert McFarlane had been recruited by Rafael Eitan and
The opinion describes Ben-Menashe as "a self-professed former Israeli spy and a major source for conspiracy theorists," and records that the Esquire article quoted intelligence officials and journalists calling him a "fake" and a "con man."[^62] The same opinion notes that "[i]n Pollard's case there were persistent allegations about another, unnamed American who secretly worked for the Israelis."[^63]
In *McFarlane v. Sheridan Square Press*, decided August 16, 1996, the same court affirmed summary judgment for the publisher of Ben-Menashe's 1992 book *Profits of War* on the ground that McFarlane could not show actual malice. The opinion summarizes the book's allegation that McFarlane played an important role in the October Surprise negotiations and was an Israeli spy, and states that "the entire October Surprise story was thoroughly discredited" in the joint report of the House task force that investigated the allegations, H.R. Rep. No. 102-1102 (1993).[^64]
### Israeli Inquiries
After Pollard's arrest, the top Israeli leadership denied having any knowledge of his activities. Pollard himself argued that his Israeli handlers told him that "Israel's dependence upon a 'special source'" had been mentioned at Israeli cabinet meetings. He also stated that he was routinely provided with lists of intelligence items wanted, coordinated and prioritized by the heads of all the various military intelligence services. Much of the material he supplied, such as satellite photographs and communication intercepts, was clearly not being transferred through official channels.[^64]
After Pollard's arrest, the top Israeli leadership denied having any knowledge of his activities. Pollard himself argued that his Israeli handlers told him that "Israel's dependence upon a 'special source'" had been mentioned at Israeli cabinet meetings. He also stated that he was routinely provided with lists of intelligence items wanted, coordinated and prioritized by the heads of all the various military intelligence services. Much of the material he supplied, such as satellite photographs and communication intercepts, was clearly not being transferred through official channels.[^65]
The [[Los Angeles Times]] reported on November 29, 1985 that Prime Minister [[Shimon Peres]], Defense Minister [[Yitzhak Rabin]] and Foreign Minister Shamir had been meeting daily to review the internal investigation, and that the essential elements of the case were believed to be clear to the three.[^65] In late February 1987 the Israeli embassy spokesman [[Yossi Gal]] said that Shamir had reiterated on a recent visit to Washington "that this was a rogue operation that was not authorized and against the will of the government."[^66] In a report from Jerusalem published March 11, 1987, [[Thomas L. Friedman]] quoted Shamir: "The State of Israel has no connection with Pollard or his family."[^67]
The [[Los Angeles Times]] reported on November 29, 1985 that Prime Minister [[Shimon Peres]], Defense Minister [[Yitzhak Rabin]] and Foreign Minister Shamir had been meeting daily to review the internal investigation, and that the essential elements of the case were believed to be clear to the three.[^66] In late February 1987 the Israeli embassy spokesman [[Yossi Gal]] said that Shamir had reiterated on a recent visit to Washington "that this was a rogue operation that was not authorized and against the will of the government."[^67] In a report from Jerusalem published March 11, 1987, [[Thomas L. Friedman]] quoted Shamir: "The State of Israel has no connection with Pollard or his family."[^68]
The Knesset's intelligence subcommittee, chaired by [[Abba Eban]], and a two-member cabinet panel chaired by Tel Aviv lawyer [[Yehoshua Rotenstreich]] reported on May 26, 1987. The Post reported that neither panel found evidence that the leadership knew of the operation, but that both found the senior political leadership responsible for failing to uncover and end it. The seven-member subcommittee singled out Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin and his predecessor [[Moshe Arens]], and said that Shimon Peres, Shamir and Rabin shared responsibility for the government's failure to live up to commitments made to the United States after Pollard's arrest. The Post reported that, contrary to government statements at the time, the subcommittee's report said the affair was "not a rogue operation" but one conducted by Israeli officials using official resources.[^68] The subcommittee accused Eitan of "a gross excess of authority" and said Sella "excessively involved himself on his own initiative." It indicated that Sella may have lied in his testimony about the extent of his role, and it criticized the Army Chief of Staff, [[Moshe Levy]], and [[Amos Lapidot]] for allowing Sella leave to take part in what they surmised was a sensitive espionage mission.[^69] The Rotenstreich panel contended that the "ruling troika" of Peres, Shamir and Rabin "did not take care to clarify facts sufficiently before transferring them to the U.S. authorities." The Post reported that the troika had reportedly pressed Rotenstreich to hand in his report after learning that Eban's was to be released, in the hope that his findings would be milder.[^70] Shamir told reporters that the government had no intention of resigning and that "the mountain was really a molehill and the earth did not move."[^71]
The Knesset's intelligence subcommittee, chaired by [[Abba Eban]], and a two-member cabinet panel chaired by Tel Aviv lawyer [[Yehoshua Rotenstreich]] reported on May 26, 1987. The Post reported that neither panel found evidence that the leadership knew of the operation, but that both found the senior political leadership responsible for failing to uncover and end it. The seven-member subcommittee singled out Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin and his predecessor [[Moshe Arens]], and said that Shimon Peres, Shamir and Rabin shared responsibility for the government's failure to live up to commitments made to the United States after Pollard's arrest. The Post reported that, contrary to government statements at the time, the subcommittee's report said the affair was "not a rogue operation" but one conducted by Israeli officials using official resources.[^69] The subcommittee accused Eitan of "a gross excess of authority" and said Sella "excessively involved himself on his own initiative." It indicated that Sella may have lied in his testimony about the extent of his role, and it criticized the Army Chief of Staff, [[Moshe Levy]], and [[Amos Lapidot]] for allowing Sella leave to take part in what they surmised was a sensitive espionage mission.[^70] The Rotenstreich panel contended that the "ruling troika" of Peres, Shamir and Rabin "did not take care to clarify facts sufficiently before transferring them to the U.S. authorities." The Post reported that the troika had reportedly pressed Rotenstreich to hand in his report after learning that Eban's was to be released, in the hope that his findings would be milder.[^71] Shamir told reporters that the government had no intention of resigning and that "the mountain was really a molehill and the earth did not move."[^72]
The Israeli Cabinet adopted the Rotenstreich findings, which held the entire government collectively responsible for failure to know that a secret spy unit in the Defense Ministry had hired Pollard.[^72] Rabin and Peres attacked the subcommittee as politically tainted. The subcommittee's report accused Rabin of failing "to follow up or increase supervision as he should have done" during the fourteen months when Pollard was active, and the Post reported that it criticized the promotions of Sella and Eitan, who became chairman of the country's largest state-owned company.[^70]
The Israeli Cabinet adopted the Rotenstreich findings, which held the entire government collectively responsible for failure to know that a secret spy unit in the Defense Ministry had hired Pollard.[^73] Rabin and Peres attacked the subcommittee as politically tainted. The subcommittee's report accused Rabin of failing "to follow up or increase supervision as he should have done" during the fourteen months when Pollard was active, and the Post reported that it criticized the promotions of Sella and Eitan, who became chairman of the country's largest state-owned company.[^71]
The Post reported that Sella had been indicted by a federal grand jury in Washington in March 1987 for his role in the affair.[^73] Hersh wrote that after American protests Sella was instead named head of the Israel Defense Forces staff college, and that he later retired from the air force.[^74] The Post reported that Sella's promotion to command one of Israel's largest air bases had set off a storm of controversy in the United States, and that he eventually resigned from the new post, citing his concern for U.S.-Israeli relations.[^75]
The Post reported that Sella had been indicted by a federal grand jury in Washington in March 1987 for his role in the affair.[^74] Hersh wrote that after American protests Sella was instead named head of the Israel Defense Forces staff college, and that he later retired from the air force.[^75] The Post reported that Sella's promotion to command one of Israel's largest air bases had set off a storm of controversy in the United States, and that he eventually resigned from the new post, citing his concern for U.S.-Israeli relations.[^76]
The Israeli officials most tarnished by the affair were Eitan and Sella. Eitan did not suffer financially. He was subsequently named to a high administrative position with the Israel Chemicals Company, an appointment authorized by Ariel Sharon.[^76] Hersh wrote that Sella was promoted to brigadier general after his return from the United States and assigned as commander of [[Tel Nof]], the site of Israel's nuclear-ready air force squadron.[^77] The Christian Science Monitor reported that the committees criticized the government for appointing Sella commander of Tel Nof Air Force Base after his involvement in the affair became known.[^78]
The Israeli officials most tarnished by the affair were Eitan and Sella. Eitan did not suffer financially. He was subsequently named to a high administrative position with the Israel Chemicals Company, an appointment authorized by Ariel Sharon.[^77] Hersh wrote that Sella was promoted to brigadier general after his return from the United States and assigned as commander of [[Tel Nof]], the site of Israel's nuclear-ready air force squadron.[^78] The Christian Science Monitor reported that the committees criticized the government for appointing Sella commander of Tel Nof Air Force Base after his involvement in the affair became known.[^79]
### Aftermath and Sella's Account
Pollard refused to cooperate with the U.S. Attorney's Office in Washington for six months before finally giving up Sella's name as part of a plea bargain. It is not known whether prosecutors realized at the time that Sella's mission was linked to nuclear intelligence. Hersh wrote that Sella was indicted in absentia in March 1987 and declared a fugitive from justice in June 1990, and that the Israeli government refused U.S. demands for his extradition.[^79]
Pollard refused to cooperate with the U.S. Attorney's Office in Washington for six months before finally giving up Sella's name as part of a plea bargain. It is not known whether prosecutors realized at the time that Sella's mission was linked to nuclear intelligence. Hersh wrote that Sella was indicted in absentia in March 1987 and declared a fugitive from justice in June 1990, and that the Israeli government refused U.S. demands for his extradition.[^80]
Sella has given friends and colleagues an account of his involvement that is more credible, but still far short of the whole story. He claimed he was recruited to try to control Pollard, who was drowning the Israeli intelligence bureaucracy in documents. Sella, who had almost completed his Ph.D. in computer science at [[New York University]], believed his technical training would be an asset in evaluating and perhaps winnowing down Pollard's materials. He knew that Pollard had been recruited long before 1984, but was eager for the assignment, believing it would advance his career. He checked with his superior, Major General Lapidot, who assured him that Pollard was not a rogue and that clearance for his new assignment had been obtained from the defense minister, Yitzhak Rabin. Once involved, Sella complained that Pollard "was running crazy" and "was giving him things he didn't want and didn't need."[^80]
Sella has given friends and colleagues an account of his involvement that is more credible, but still far short of the whole story. He claimed he was recruited to try to control Pollard, who was drowning the Israeli intelligence bureaucracy in documents. Sella, who had almost completed his Ph.D. in computer science at [[New York University]], believed his technical training would be an asset in evaluating and perhaps winnowing down Pollard's materials. He knew that Pollard had been recruited long before 1984, but was eager for the assignment, believing it would advance his career. He checked with his superior, Major General Lapidot, who assured him that Pollard was not a rogue and that clearance for his new assignment had been obtained from the defense minister, Yitzhak Rabin. Once involved, Sella complained that Pollard "was running crazy" and "was giving him things he didn't want and didn't need."[^81]
[[Leonard Garment]], hired by Israel to represent Sella, attempted to resolve the affair. He was pressured by a six-man Israeli delegation, including [[Chaim Joseph Zadok]], [[Meir Rosenne]], [[Elyakim Rubinstein]], [[Ram Caspi]], [[Avraham Shalom]], and [[Hanan Bar-on]], to file a factual proffer that downplayed Sella's involvement. Garment eventually withdrew from the case, stating he was unsure whether his client was Sella or the Israeli government. With his withdrawal, the Israeli government ended its attempt to protect Sella, effectively ending Sella's career.[^81]
[[Leonard Garment]], hired by Israel to represent Sella, attempted to resolve the affair. He was pressured by a six-man Israeli delegation, including [[Chaim Joseph Zadok]], [[Meir Rosenne]], [[Elyakim Rubinstein]], [[Ram Caspi]], [[Avraham Shalom]], and [[Hanan Bar-on]], to file a factual proffer that downplayed Sella's involvement. Garment eventually withdrew from the case, stating he was unsure whether his client was Sella or the Israeli government. With his withdrawal, the Israeli government ended its attempt to protect Sella, effectively ending Sella's career.[^82]
### Parole and Departure
Pollard was released from prison on November 20, 2015 and placed on parole. His conditions included a curfew, an electronic monitor that tracked his location, limits on the jobs he could take, and a prohibition on leaving the United States.[^56][^82] On November 20, 2020 the Justice Department announced that he had completed his parole. The Parole Commission said there was "no evidence to conclude that he is likely to violate the law." His lawyers, Eliot Lauer and Jacques Semmelman, said that he was "now a free man in all respects."[^83]
Pollard was released from prison on November 20, 2015 and placed on parole. His conditions included a curfew, an electronic monitor that tracked his location, limits on the jobs he could take, and a prohibition on leaving the United States.[^56][^83] On November 20, 2020 the Justice Department announced that he had completed his parole. The Parole Commission said there was "no evidence to conclude that he is likely to violate the law." His lawyers, Eliot Lauer and Jacques Semmelman, said that he was "now a free man in all respects."[^84]
On December 30, 2020 Pollard and his wife Esther arrived at Ben Gurion International Airport on a private plane provided by the casino owner [[Sheldon Adelson]]. Prime Minister [[Benjamin Netanyahu]] greeted them and presented them with Israeli identity cards. Pollard said, "We are ecstatic to be home at last after 35 years."[^84]
On December 30, 2020 Pollard and his wife Esther arrived at Ben Gurion International Airport on a private plane provided by the casino owner [[Sheldon Adelson]]. Prime Minister [[Benjamin Netanyahu]] greeted them and presented them with Israeli identity cards. Pollard said, "We are ecstatic to be home at last after 35 years."[^85]
### Footnotes
@ -257,24 +259,25 @@ On December 30, 2020 Pollard and his wife Esther arrived at Ben Gurion Internati
[^61]: *McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine*, 74 F.3d 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1996), No. 94-7137, decided January 30, 1996. https://static.case.law/f3d/74/cases/1296-01.json Affirmance of the judgment for Esquire and the dismissal of the claim against Unger.
[^62]: *McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine*, 74 F.3d 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1996), No. 94-7137, decided January 30, 1996. https://static.case.law/f3d/74/cases/1296-01.json Description of Ben-Menashe and of the Esquire article's treatment of his credibility.
[^63]: *McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine*, 74 F.3d 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1996), No. 94-7137, decided January 30, 1996. https://static.case.law/f3d/74/cases/1296-01.json The opinion's note on persistent allegations about an unnamed second American.
[^64]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Pollard's account of what his handlers told him about cabinet discussion and intelligence priorities.
[^65]: "Pollard" report, *Los Angeles Times*, November 29, 1985. CIA CREST copy: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00965r000504890020-7
[^66]: *The Washington Post*, February 28, 1987. CIA CREST copy: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00965r000403620005-5
[^67]: Thomas L. Friedman, "Shamir Says Pollard's Fate Is No Concern of Israel," *The New York Times*, March 11, 1987. CIA CREST copy: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00965r000302120009-8
[^68]: Glenn Frankel, "Israeli Spy Probes Fault Leadership," *Washington Post*, May 27, 1987 (Jerusalem dateline May 26). CIA CREST copy: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302080002-0 The two reports of May 26, 1987; the subcommittee's statement that the affair was not a rogue operation.
[^69]: Glenn Frankel, "Israeli Spy Probes Fault Leadership," *Washington Post*, May 27, 1987 (Jerusalem dateline May 26). CIA CREST copy: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302080002-0 The subcommittee's findings on Eitan and Sella, and its criticism of Levy and Lapidot.
[^70]: Glenn Frankel, "Israeli Spy Probes Fault Leadership," *Washington Post*, May 27, 1987 (Jerusalem dateline May 26). CIA CREST copy: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302080002-0 The Rotenstreich report's statement on the troika; the pressure to file it; Rabin and Peres's response to the subcommittee; criticism of Rabin's supervision and of the Sella and Eitan promotions.
[^71]: Glenn Frankel, "Israeli Spy Probes Fault Leadership," *Washington Post*, May 27, 1987 (Jerusalem dateline May 26). CIA CREST copy: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302080002-0 Shamir's remark to reporters.
[^72]: "Israel hopes that book is now closed on Pollard spy case," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 28, 1987. https://www.csmonitor.com/1987/0528/omary.html Cabinet adoption of the Rotenstreich findings and the collective-responsibility finding.
[^73]: Glenn Frankel, "Israeli Spy Probes Fault Leadership," *Washington Post*, May 27, 1987 (Jerusalem dateline May 26). CIA CREST copy: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302080002-0 Indictment of Sella by a federal grand jury in Washington in March 1987.
[^74]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Sella's assignment to the staff college after American protests, and his later retirement.
[^75]: Glenn Frankel, "Israeli Spy Probes Fault Leadership," *Washington Post*, May 27, 1987 (Jerusalem dateline May 26). CIA CREST copy: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302080002-0 Sella's promotion and his resignation from the Tel Nof post.
[^76]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Eitan's post at the Israel Chemicals Company and the Sharon authorization.
[^77]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Sella's promotion to brigadier general and his assignment to Tel Nof.
[^78]: "Israel hopes that book is now closed on Pollard spy case," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 28, 1987. https://www.csmonitor.com/1987/0528/omary.html Committees' criticism of Sella's appointment to command Tel Nof Air Force Base.
[^79]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Sella's fugitive status in June 1990 and the Israeli refusal of extradition.
[^80]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Sella's account of his role as Hersh relates it, and Pollard's conduct once Sella was involved.
[^81]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Garment's engagement, the Israeli delegation, and his withdrawal.
[^82]: National Security Archive, "Jonathan Pollard: Revisiting a Still Sensitive Case," Electronic Briefing Book (Richelson, December 14, 2012; reposted November 24, 2020). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/intelligence/2012-12-14/jonathan-pollard-spy-case-cias-1987-damage-assessment-declassified Parole conditions, including the travel restriction, as stated in the November 24, 2020 posting.
[^83]: Matthew S. Schwartz, "Jonathan Pollard, Who Sold Cold War Secrets To Israel, Completes Parole," NPR, carried by *Georgia Public Broadcasting*, November 21, 2020. https://www.gpb.org/news/2020/11/21/jonathan-pollard-who-sold-cold-war-secrets-israel-completes-parole Parole Commission statement and the lawyers' statement.
[^84]: Associated Press, "Reports convicted US spy Pollard arrives in Israel," December 30, 2020. https://www.clickondetroit.com/news/world/2020/12/30/reports-convicted-us-spy-pollard-arrives-in-israel/ Arrival on December 30, 2020, the reception and Israeli identity cards.
[^64]: *McFarlane v. Sheridan Square Press, Inc.*, 91 F.3d 1501 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 16, 1996), Williams, Ginsburg and Rogers, JJ. https://static.case.law/f3d/91/cases/1501-01.json
[^65]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Pollard's account of what his handlers told him about cabinet discussion and intelligence priorities.
[^66]: "Pollard" report, *Los Angeles Times*, November 29, 1985. CIA CREST copy: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00965r000504890020-7
[^67]: *The Washington Post*, February 28, 1987. CIA CREST copy: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00965r000403620005-5
[^68]: Thomas L. Friedman, "Shamir Says Pollard's Fate Is No Concern of Israel," *The New York Times*, March 11, 1987. CIA CREST copy: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00965r000302120009-8
[^69]: Glenn Frankel, "Israeli Spy Probes Fault Leadership," *Washington Post*, May 27, 1987 (Jerusalem dateline May 26). CIA CREST copy: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302080002-0 The two reports of May 26, 1987; the subcommittee's statement that the affair was not a rogue operation.
[^70]: Glenn Frankel, "Israeli Spy Probes Fault Leadership," *Washington Post*, May 27, 1987 (Jerusalem dateline May 26). CIA CREST copy: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302080002-0 The subcommittee's findings on Eitan and Sella, and its criticism of Levy and Lapidot.
[^71]: Glenn Frankel, "Israeli Spy Probes Fault Leadership," *Washington Post*, May 27, 1987 (Jerusalem dateline May 26). CIA CREST copy: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302080002-0 The Rotenstreich report's statement on the troika; the pressure to file it; Rabin and Peres's response to the subcommittee; criticism of Rabin's supervision and of the Sella and Eitan promotions.
[^72]: Glenn Frankel, "Israeli Spy Probes Fault Leadership," *Washington Post*, May 27, 1987 (Jerusalem dateline May 26). CIA CREST copy: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302080002-0 Shamir's remark to reporters.
[^73]: "Israel hopes that book is now closed on Pollard spy case," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 28, 1987. https://www.csmonitor.com/1987/0528/omary.html Cabinet adoption of the Rotenstreich findings and the collective-responsibility finding.
[^74]: Glenn Frankel, "Israeli Spy Probes Fault Leadership," *Washington Post*, May 27, 1987 (Jerusalem dateline May 26). CIA CREST copy: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302080002-0 Indictment of Sella by a federal grand jury in Washington in March 1987.
[^75]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Sella's assignment to the staff college after American protests, and his later retirement.
[^76]: Glenn Frankel, "Israeli Spy Probes Fault Leadership," *Washington Post*, May 27, 1987 (Jerusalem dateline May 26). CIA CREST copy: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302080002-0 Sella's promotion and his resignation from the Tel Nof post.
[^77]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Eitan's post at the Israel Chemicals Company and the Sharon authorization.
[^78]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Sella's promotion to brigadier general and his assignment to Tel Nof.
[^79]: "Israel hopes that book is now closed on Pollard spy case," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 28, 1987. https://www.csmonitor.com/1987/0528/omary.html Committees' criticism of Sella's appointment to command Tel Nof Air Force Base.
[^80]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Sella's fugitive status in June 1990 and the Israeli refusal of extradition.
[^81]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Sella's account of his role as Hersh relates it, and Pollard's conduct once Sella was involved.
[^82]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Garment's engagement, the Israeli delegation, and his withdrawal.
[^83]: National Security Archive, "Jonathan Pollard: Revisiting a Still Sensitive Case," Electronic Briefing Book (Richelson, December 14, 2012; reposted November 24, 2020). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/intelligence/2012-12-14/jonathan-pollard-spy-case-cias-1987-damage-assessment-declassified Parole conditions, including the travel restriction, as stated in the November 24, 2020 posting.
[^84]: Matthew S. Schwartz, "Jonathan Pollard, Who Sold Cold War Secrets To Israel, Completes Parole," NPR, carried by *Georgia Public Broadcasting*, November 21, 2020. https://www.gpb.org/news/2020/11/21/jonathan-pollard-who-sold-cold-war-secrets-israel-completes-parole Parole Commission statement and the lawyers' statement.
[^85]: Associated Press, "Reports convicted US spy Pollard arrives in Israel," December 30, 2020. https://www.clickondetroit.com/news/world/2020/12/30/reports-convicted-us-spy-pollard-arrives-in-israel/ Arrival on December 30, 2020, the reception and Israeli identity cards.