vault backup: 2026-10-16 01:25:00

20 - ORGANIZATIONS/PRIVATE/Standard Oil.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 created: 2026-06-13
-updated: 2026-10-14
+updated: 2026-10-15
 title: Standard Oil
 aliases:
   - Standard Oil Company
@@ -59,34 +59,34 @@ relations:
     reverse: true
     start: 1942-03-25
     role: "criminal information, complaint and consent decree of March 25, 1942"
-    fn: 35
+    fn: 36
   - type: investigated
     with: "[[Federal Trade Commission]]"
     reverse: true
     start: 1949-12-02
     end: 1951-10
     role: "international petroleum cartel staff investigation; staff report filed October 1951"
-    fn: 40
+    fn: 41
   - type: prosecuted
     with: "[[Department of Justice]]"
     reverse: true
     start: 1953-04-14
     role: "civil antitrust complaint in the international petroleum cartel case, Civil No. 86-27"
-    fn: 56
+    fn: 57
   - type: owned
     with: "[[Creole Petroleum Company]]"
     role: "Venezuelan subsidiary; Nelson Rockefeller sat on its board"
-    fn: 71
+    fn: 72
   - type: partner_of
     with: "[[Arabian American Oil Company]]"
     start: 1948-12
     role: "30 percent stake in Aramco from December 1948; Socony-Vacuum held 10 percent"
-    fn: 50
+    fn: 51
   - type: participant_in
     with: "[[Iranian Consortium]]"
     start: 1954-04-01
     role: "eight percent share of the 1954 consortium"
-    fn: 63
+    fn: 64
 ---
 
 Standard Oil was the petroleum monopoly founded in 1870 by [[John D. Rockefeller]] that controlled roughly ninety percent of American oil refining before the [[Supreme Court of the United States|U.S. Supreme Court]] ordered its dissolution in 1911 under the [[Sherman Antitrust Act]]. The breakup created successor companies, including Standard Oil of [[New Jersey]] (later [[Exxon]]), Standard Oil of New York ([[Mobil]]), and Standard Oil of California ([[Chevron]]), whose combined assets preserved the [[Rockefeller Foundation|Rockefeller]] family's financial power.[^1] Between 1929 and 1942 the New Jersey company's patent and licensing arrangements ran through the German chemical combine [[I.G. Farben]]; after the war it held a 30 percent interest in the [[Arabian American Oil Company]] (Aramco) and an 8 percent share of the 1954 [[Iranian Consortium]].
@@ -123,57 +123,57 @@ The company issued a release on the day of the consent decree, introduced as Exh
 
 ### Ethyl, aviation fuel and the German plants
 
-Standard and [[General Motors]] each held 50 per cent of the [[Ethyl Gasoline Corporation]], described in the 1942 criminal information as sole producer of the tetraethyl lead used in nearly all American motor fuels.[^29] Howard's February 6, 1940 letter reported that [[Ethyl G.m.b.H.]], a German company owned half by the [[British Associated Ethyl Company]] and half by I.G. Farbenindustrie, paid in full a debt of nearly $900,000 owed to the Ethyl Gasoline Corporation about one month after the war began, although it could have deferred payment for two more months.[^30]
+Standard and [[General Motors]] each held 50 per cent of the [[Ethyl Gasoline Corporation]], described in the 1942 criminal information as sole producer of the tetraethyl lead used in nearly all American motor fuels.[^29] In 1940 the Supreme Court recorded that Standard "owns one-half of the capital stock" of Ethyl and that "The remainder is owned by General Motors Corporation and E. I. du Pont de Nemours Company."[^30] Howard's February 6, 1940 letter reported that [[Ethyl G.m.b.H.]], a German company owned half by the [[British Associated Ethyl Company]] and half by I.G. Farbenindustrie, paid in full a debt of nearly $900,000 owed to the Ethyl Gasoline Corporation about one month after the war began, although it could have deferred payment for two more months.[^31]
 
-The committee's summary states that Standard, through the New Jersey company as well as its subsidiary, helped build an aviation gasoline plant for Germany at [[Hamburg]] as late as 1939. It cites a memorandum signed by E.J. Gohr dated August 1, 1939 describing I.G. representatives leaving [[New York City|New York]] on August 4 for a week in the South and [[Indiana]] and returning to New York for discussions on the detailed design of the plant, and a letter of August 11, 1939 from R.P. Russell of the Standard Oil Development Company stating that the company was "not only willing but anxious to do everything we can to assist the Kellogg and I. G. gentlemen in preparing the process design."[^31] Farish's statement of March 31, 1942 answered the charge that the German subsidiary D.A.P.G. had planned a plant at Hamburg in 1938 or 1939 with the words "This is true and as a German corporation, operating in Germany, with which country we were not then at war, it could not have done otherwise," and called the charge that Standard shipped to Italian and German air lines in [[Brazil]] contrary to the wishes of the State Department "unfounded."[^32]
+The committee's summary states that Standard, through the New Jersey company as well as its subsidiary, helped build an aviation gasoline plant for Germany at [[Hamburg]] as late as 1939. It cites a memorandum signed by E.J. Gohr dated August 1, 1939 describing I.G. representatives leaving [[New York City|New York]] on August 4 for a week in the South and [[Indiana]] and returning to New York for discussions on the detailed design of the plant, and a letter of August 11, 1939 from R.P. Russell of the Standard Oil Development Company stating that the company was "not only willing but anxious to do everything we can to assist the Kellogg and I. G. gentlemen in preparing the process design."[^32] Farish's statement of March 31, 1942 answered the charge that the German subsidiary D.A.P.G. had planned a plant at Hamburg in 1938 or 1939 with the words "This is true and as a German corporation, operating in Germany, with which country we were not then at war, it could not have done otherwise," and called the charge that Standard shipped to Italian and German air lines in [[Brazil]] contrary to the wishes of the State Department "unfounded."[^33]
 
-The summary also quotes a memorandum from Howard to Teagle and Farish on the effect of the cartel agreement on fuels for the [[Army Air Corps]]: "To meet the very proper desires of the Air Corps as expressed to us we shall have to violate our agreements and perhaps forfeit the confidence of our associates, both American and foreign." The summary concludes that Standard "met with difficulties in developing aviation gasoline for our own Army because of the cartel agreement."[^33]
+The summary also quotes a memorandum from Howard to Teagle and Farish on the effect of the cartel agreement on fuels for the [[Army Air Corps]]: "To meet the very proper desires of the Air Corps as expressed to us we shall have to violate our agreements and perhaps forfeit the confidence of our associates, both American and foreign." The summary concludes that Standard "met with difficulties in developing aviation gasoline for our own Army because of the cartel agreement."[^34]
 
-Standard's Brazilian subsidiary and the German-controlled line [[Condor Syndikat|Condor]] and the [[Lineas Aereas Transcontinentales Italianas|Lati]] line, which ran from [[Italy]] to Brazil, were the subject of testimony by [[Adolf Berle]], the assistant secretary of state. Berle said the Secretary of State requested in March 1941 that Standard Oil of New Jersey make no sales to the two lines except from New York or [[Aruba]]; that the department had reason to believe, and Standard had reported, that the lines were drawing supplies from the Brazilian subsidiary; and that after a conference on April 14, 1941 the company agreed to supply them, if at all, only through that subsidiary, which would deliver only with the approval of the American ambassador in [[Rio de Janeiro]].[^34]
+Standard's Brazilian subsidiary and the German-controlled line [[Condor Syndikat|Condor]] and the [[Lineas Aereas Transcontinentales Italianas|Lati]] line, which ran from [[Italy]] to Brazil, were the subject of testimony by [[Adolf Berle]], the assistant secretary of state. Berle said the Secretary of State requested in March 1941 that Standard Oil of New Jersey make no sales to the two lines except from New York or [[Aruba]]; that the department had reason to believe, and Standard had reported, that the lines were drawing supplies from the Brazilian subsidiary; and that after a conference on April 14, 1941 the company agreed to supply them, if at all, only through that subsidiary, which would deliver only with the approval of the American ambassador in [[Rio de Janeiro]].[^35]
 
 ### The 1942 consent decree
 
-On March 25, 1942 the [[Department of Justice]] filed a criminal information and a complaint against Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) and entered a consent decree with it. The information named as defendants the New Jersey company, the Delaware corporation of similar name, the Standard Oil Development Company, the Standard Oil Company of Louisiana, the Standard Catalytic Company, Jasco, Inc., the [[Hydro Engineering and Chemical Company]], and Teagle, Farish and Howard.[^29] Arnold told the committee on March 27 that the company pleaded nolo contendere and paid fines of $50,000. Asked by [[Harry S. Truman]], the committee's chairman, why the fines were so small, Arnold said the department judged that getting the patents loose was more important than fines large enough to involve years of litigation. The chairman remarked that the fines were "rather out of proportion with other fines," and Arnold answered, "I have to confess they are somewhat out of proportion." Arnold said he had not been present at the New York negotiations, which covered a period of weeks, and that "when the smoke all cleared away and the matter reached my office, it was simply a take-it-or-leave-it proposition, and at that point, after consultation with a number of people, I finally took it." Asked by the committee's chief counsel, [[Hugh A. Fulton]], whether the company had held back the butyl patents during the negotiations, Arnold said: "Butyl had not been made available."[^35]
+On March 25, 1942 the [[Department of Justice]] filed a criminal information and a complaint against Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) and entered a consent decree with it. The information named as defendants the New Jersey company, the Delaware corporation of similar name, the Standard Oil Development Company, the Standard Oil Company of Louisiana, the Standard Catalytic Company, Jasco, Inc., the [[Hydro Engineering and Chemical Company]], and Teagle, Farish and Howard.[^29] Arnold told the committee on March 27 that the company pleaded nolo contendere and paid fines of $50,000. Asked by [[Harry S. Truman]], the committee's chairman, why the fines were so small, Arnold said the department judged that getting the patents loose was more important than fines large enough to involve years of litigation. The chairman remarked that the fines were "rather out of proportion with other fines," and Arnold answered, "I have to confess they are somewhat out of proportion." Arnold said he had not been present at the New York negotiations, which covered a period of weeks, and that "when the smoke all cleared away and the matter reached my office, it was simply a take-it-or-leave-it proposition, and at that point, after consultation with a number of people, I finally took it." Asked by the committee's chief counsel, [[Hugh A. Fulton]], whether the company had held back the butyl patents during the negotiations, Arnold said: "Butyl had not been made available."[^36]
 
-Arnold said the decree compelled Standard to license anyone royalty-free under the crucial rubber patents and the other patents involved in the conspiracy, including the toluol patents, and required the company to transfer the know-how for them; he said he was reluctant to sign because the decree had no provision allowing the Attorney General or the court to pass on future relations between I.G. Farben and Standard. He said the company had indicated its willingness to make restitution "in the sum of millions of dollars and at the cost of its future domination of the industry."[^36] He put the cost of the royalty-free licensing to the company at possibly $10,000,000, and said the company's release gave $6,000,000.[^37] The final judgment required the defendants to dissolve the [[Hydro Patents Company]] and the Hydro Engineering and Chemical Company within one year, enjoined them from entering into patent transfer arrangements with I.G. Farben without notice to the Attorney General, and recorded the Alien Property Custodian's consent to the decree, including limits on royalties and compulsory licensing under the patents.[^38] The information had described the Hydro Patents Company as the vehicle for the hydrogenation process in the United States under the Mutual Licensing Plan of July 11, 1930.[^39]
+Arnold said the decree compelled Standard to license anyone royalty-free under the crucial rubber patents and the other patents involved in the conspiracy, including the toluol patents, and required the company to transfer the know-how for them; he said he was reluctant to sign because the decree had no provision allowing the Attorney General or the court to pass on future relations between I.G. Farben and Standard. He said the company had indicated its willingness to make restitution "in the sum of millions of dollars and at the cost of its future domination of the industry."[^37] He put the cost of the royalty-free licensing to the company at possibly $10,000,000, and said the company's release gave $6,000,000.[^38] The final judgment required the defendants to dissolve the [[Hydro Patents Company]] and the Hydro Engineering and Chemical Company within one year, enjoined them from entering into patent transfer arrangements with I.G. Farben without notice to the Attorney General, and recorded the Alien Property Custodian's consent to the decree, including limits on royalties and compulsory licensing under the patents.[^39] The information had described the Hydro Patents Company as the vehicle for the hydrogenation process in the United States under the Mutual Licensing Plan of July 11, 1930.[^40]
 
 ### The Federal Trade Commission staff report
 
-The Federal Trade Commission resolved on December 2, 1949 to investigate agreements among American petroleum companies and with their foreign partners; the Department of Justice deferred its own investigation to avoid duplicating the commission's work, and the commission's staff filed its report in October 1951.[^40] Published in 1952 as a committee print of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, the report listed Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey) as one of seven international companies, with crude production in 1949 of 1,317.7 thousand barrels daily.[^41] It recorded that Creole Petroleum Corp. was a subsidiary of the New Jersey company and that the company owned 30 percent of the Trans-Arabian Pipe Line.[^42] It described the board of Aramco as three members each from Standard Oil Co. (N.J.), Standard Oil Co. of California and Texas Co., one from Socony-Vacuum and one with no listed affiliation, and stated that the directors of Standard of New Jersey and Socony-Vacuum who determined Aramco policy also shaped the behavior of the Iraq Petroleum Company.[^43]
+The Federal Trade Commission resolved on December 2, 1949 to investigate agreements among American petroleum companies and with their foreign partners; the Department of Justice deferred its own investigation to avoid duplicating the commission's work, and the commission's staff filed its report in October 1951.[^41] Published in 1952 as a committee print of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, the report listed Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey) as one of seven international companies, with crude production in 1949 of 1,317.7 thousand barrels daily.[^42] It recorded that Creole Petroleum Corp. was a subsidiary of the New Jersey company and that the company owned 30 percent of the Trans-Arabian Pipe Line.[^43] It described the board of Aramco as three members each from Standard Oil Co. (N.J.), Standard Oil Co. of California and Texas Co., one from Socony-Vacuum and one with no listed affiliation, and stated that the directors of Standard of New Jersey and Socony-Vacuum who determined Aramco policy also shaped the behavior of the Iraq Petroleum Company.[^44]
 
-The Justice Department report to the National Security Council of January 1953 stated that "an indictment could have been returned on the basis of the Federal Trade Commission's staff report and a small number of documents in the possession of the Department of Justice," and that the pending investigation was being conducted "with the aid of a committee composed of representatives of State, CIA, Defense and Justice."[^44] The commission's evidence also covered the domestic side of the cartel, including production curtailment on the Gulf Coast and the profit Standard of California earned on its Middle East oil at prices charged to the [[United States Navy|Navy]].[^45]
+The Justice Department report to the National Security Council of January 1953 stated that "an indictment could have been returned on the basis of the Federal Trade Commission's staff report and a small number of documents in the possession of the Department of Justice," and that the pending investigation was being conducted "with the aid of a committee composed of representatives of State, CIA, Defense and Justice."[^45] The commission's evidence also covered the domestic side of the cartel, including production curtailment on the Gulf Coast and the profit Standard of California earned on its Middle East oil at prices charged to the [[United States Navy|Navy]].[^46]
 
 ### Aramco and the Saudi concessions
 
-Standard of California obtained a petroleum concession in Saudi Arabia in 1933, located wholly within the territory of the 1928 [[Red Line Agreement]]; the concession passed to Aramco, which was owned by Standard of California and The Texas Company.[^46] The Achnacarry Agreement, which Walter Teagle of Standard, Sir [[Henri Deterding]] of Royal Dutch Shell and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company made in September 1928, aimed to eliminate competition among the parties, prevent overproduction and divide world markets on an "as is" basis.[^47]
+Standard of California obtained a petroleum concession in Saudi Arabia in 1933, located wholly within the territory of the 1928 [[Red Line Agreement]]; the concession passed to Aramco, which was owned by Standard of California and The Texas Company.[^47] The Achnacarry Agreement, which Walter Teagle of Standard, Sir [[Henri Deterding]] of Royal Dutch Shell and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company made in September 1928, aimed to eliminate competition among the parties, prevent overproduction and divide world markets on an "as is" basis.[^48]
 
-Aramco's production rose from 21,296 barrels daily in 1944 to 58,386 in 1945, most of it for military use, and its owners sought a permanent market.[^48] Discussions between Standard of New Jersey, Socony-Vacuum and the two owners began before mid-1946; an agreement in principle was reached in December 1946, and formal agreements were signed on March 12, 1947 giving Jersey a 30 percent and Socony a 10 percent interest in Aramco and the Trans-Arabian Pipe Line, conditional on a favorable settlement of the red-line controversy by March 12, 1951.[^49] Jersey was to pay $76,500,000 and Socony $25,500,000 for their stock, and both guaranteed $102,000,000 in bank loans. The agreements became effective in December 1948, after the withdrawal in November 1948 of the suit brought by the [[Compagnie Française des Pétroles]]; the Commission's staff put the total financial cost to the two companies for their 40 percent interest at nearly one-half billion dollars, and noted that they obtained a veto over amendments to Aramco's bylaws.[^50] The 1974 print's account of operations under the Red Line agreement states that, on the excuse that Aramco's owners were "unable to finance" a pipeline to the Mediterranean, Jersey and Socony-Vacuum were admitted to partnership; that both agreed to guarantee loans totaling $273,000,000 and became parties to joint contracts for oil from Aramco for eighteen years in the ratio 3:3:3:1; and that this "provided for the transfer of effective control of Aramco to the two American companies, Jersey and Socony."[^46]
+Aramco's production rose from 21,296 barrels daily in 1944 to 58,386 in 1945, most of it for military use, and its owners sought a permanent market.[^49] Discussions between Standard of New Jersey, Socony-Vacuum and the two owners began before mid-1946; an agreement in principle was reached in December 1946, and formal agreements were signed on March 12, 1947 giving Jersey a 30 percent and Socony a 10 percent interest in Aramco and the Trans-Arabian Pipe Line, conditional on a favorable settlement of the red-line controversy by March 12, 1951.[^50] Jersey was to pay $76,500,000 and Socony $25,500,000 for their stock, and both guaranteed $102,000,000 in bank loans. The agreements became effective in December 1948, after the withdrawal in November 1948 of the suit brought by the [[Compagnie Française des Pétroles]]; the Commission's staff put the total financial cost to the two companies for their 40 percent interest at nearly one-half billion dollars, and noted that they obtained a veto over amendments to Aramco's bylaws.[^51] The 1974 print's account of operations under the Red Line agreement states that, on the excuse that Aramco's owners were "unable to finance" a pipeline to the Mediterranean, Jersey and Socony-Vacuum were admitted to partnership; that both agreed to guarantee loans totaling $273,000,000 and became parties to joint contracts for oil from Aramco for eighteen years in the ratio 3:3:3:1; and that this "provided for the transfer of effective control of Aramco to the two American companies, Jersey and Socony."[^47]
 
-In April 1945, when Standard of California and Texas still owned Aramco, Assistant Secretary of State [[William L. Clayton]] wrote to Assistant Secretary [[James C. Dunn]] on ways of helping the government of [[Saudi Arabia]] meet its budget deficit that the department "should avoid putting the Arabian American Oil Company in an embarrassing position without giving it every opportunity to stand on its own feet."[^51] In June 1945 the American minister in Saudi Arabia, [[William A. Eddy]], predicted that the king's alternative to American assistance would be "to bleed Aramco for loans to stabilize his economy," and wrote that the company's opinion was that "Aramco is the substance and the Legation the shadow."[^52] In August 1945 the State Department described a proposed arrangement under which Navy oil would carry a royalty of 15 cents a barrel, against the 23 cents specified in the existing Aramco concession.[^53]
+In April 1945, when Standard of California and Texas still owned Aramco, Assistant Secretary of State [[William L. Clayton]] wrote to Assistant Secretary [[James C. Dunn]] on ways of helping the government of [[Saudi Arabia]] meet its budget deficit that the department "should avoid putting the Arabian American Oil Company in an embarrassing position without giving it every opportunity to stand on its own feet."[^52] In June 1945 the American minister in Saudi Arabia, [[William A. Eddy]], predicted that the king's alternative to American assistance would be "to bleed Aramco for loans to stabilize his economy," and wrote that the company's opinion was that "Aramco is the substance and the Legation the shadow."[^53] In August 1945 the State Department described a proposed arrangement under which Navy oil would carry a royalty of 15 cents a barrel, against the 23 cents specified in the existing Aramco concession.[^54]
 
 ### The grand jury and the cartel case
 
-The Attorney General's report to the National Security Council of January 1953 stated that the cartel had existed since 1928 and that seven of the major oil companies controlled all major oil producing areas outside the United States, all foreign refining operations and the patents covering refining processes, divided world markets and maintained non-competitive world prices. It stated that a decision to terminate the investigation "would be regarded by the world as a confession that our abhorrence of monopoly and restrictive cartel activities does not extend to the world's most important single industry."[^40][^54] [[Frank Church]]'s preface to the 1974 print records the sequence: the Attorney General announced a grand jury investigation on July 17, 1952, subpoenas went to 21 companies in August, and the State Department had opposed the investigation from the outset (Acheson memorandum of April 16, 1952).[^55] On January 12, 1953, in the last days of the Truman administration, Truman wrote to Attorney General [[James P. McGranery]] directing a civil suit instead of the grand jury, conditioned on the voluntary production of documents; the department filed a civil complaint on April 14, 1953 in the District Court for the District of Columbia naming Standard Oil of New Jersey, Socony-Vacuum, Standard Oil of California, The Texas Company and Gulf Oil, alleging violations of the Sherman Act from 1928, and the case was transferred to the Southern District of New York at the defendants' request.[^56]
+The Attorney General's report to the National Security Council of January 1953 stated that the cartel had existed since 1928 and that seven of the major oil companies controlled all major oil producing areas outside the United States, all foreign refining operations and the patents covering refining processes, divided world markets and maintained non-competitive world prices. It stated that a decision to terminate the investigation "would be regarded by the world as a confession that our abhorrence of monopoly and restrictive cartel activities does not extend to the world's most important single industry."[^41][^55] [[Frank Church]]'s preface to the 1974 print records the sequence: the Attorney General announced a grand jury investigation on July 17, 1952, subpoenas went to 21 companies in August, and the State Department had opposed the investigation from the outset (Acheson memorandum of April 16, 1952).[^56] On January 12, 1953, in the last days of the Truman administration, Truman wrote to Attorney General [[James P. McGranery]] directing a civil suit instead of the grand jury, conditioned on the voluntary production of documents; the department filed a civil complaint on April 14, 1953 in the District Court for the District of Columbia naming Standard Oil of New Jersey, Socony-Vacuum, Standard Oil of California, The Texas Company and Gulf Oil, alleging violations of the Sherman Act from 1928, and the case was transferred to the Southern District of New York at the defendants' request.[^57]
 
 ### Iran and the 1954 consortium
 
-Church wrote that in March 1951 [[Iran]] had nationalized all local assets of the [[Anglo-Iranian Oil Company]], that Secretary of State [[Dean Acheson]] had considered developing an American capability to restore Iranian production even in the absence of the company, and that the Justice Department believed the cooperation of the established major American companies was not required.[^55][^56] [[Herbert Hoover Jr.]] was appointed the new administration's special representative on the Iranian problem. On August 6, 1953 National Security Council Action Memorandum No. 875b designated the Attorney General to "develop a solution which would protect the interests of the free world in the Near East as a vital source of petroleum supplies," and in October 1953 overall authority was transferred from the Attorney General to the Secretary of State.[^56][^57] Church wrote that the American majors, encouraged by the downgrading of the cartel case to a civil action, stated that they would be willing to participate in a solution because of the "large national security interests involved" (letter from [[Orvil Harden]], December 4, 1953).[^57]
+Church wrote that in March 1951 [[Iran]] had nationalized all local assets of the [[Anglo-Iranian Oil Company]], that Secretary of State [[Dean Acheson]] had considered developing an American capability to restore Iranian production even in the absence of the company, and that the Justice Department believed the cooperation of the established major American companies was not required.[^56][^57] [[Herbert Hoover Jr.]] was appointed the new administration's special representative on the Iranian problem. On August 6, 1953 National Security Council Action Memorandum No. 875b designated the Attorney General to "develop a solution which would protect the interests of the free world in the Near East as a vital source of petroleum supplies," and in October 1953 overall authority was transferred from the Attorney General to the Secretary of State.[^57][^58] Church wrote that the American majors, encouraged by the downgrading of the cartel case to a civil action, stated that they would be willing to participate in a solution because of the "large national security interests involved" (letter from [[Orvil Harden]], December 4, 1953).[^58]
 
-Representatives of eight companies, namely the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Royal Dutch Shell, Compagnie Française des Pétroles, Standard Oil France, Standard of California, Texas, Gulf and Socony, met in [[London]] on December 14, 15 and 17, 1953 at the invitation of the Anglo-Iranian company, with Hoover attending as an observer at the request of the Justice Department.[^58] [[John Foster Dulles]]'s memorandum of January 8, 1954 records that after the meeting of the National Security Council that day he, Wilson, Humphrey, Attorney General [[Herbert Brownell Jr.]] and Anderson discussed legal clearance for the American companies, and that the Attorney General "felt that he could give some sort of agreement not to sue" if requested in the national interest, and that the pending lawsuit would be continued in a way that would avoid undesirable publicity, which "would require some cooperation from the attorneys for the oil companies."[^59] On January 13, 1954 the assistant attorney general [[Stanley N. Barnes]] and the antitrust attorney [[Leonard Emmerglick]] gave Brownell the division's two primary objections to the consortium agreement: the possible use of a veto by the Anglo-Iranian company, the British government and the Iranian government, and the lack of freedom to set prices and markets.[^60] The National Security Council decided on January 14 that the security interests of the United States required the American petroleum companies to participate in an international consortium.[^57]
+Representatives of eight companies, namely the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Royal Dutch Shell, Compagnie Française des Pétroles, Standard Oil France, Standard of California, Texas, Gulf and Socony, met in [[London]] on December 14, 15 and 17, 1953 at the invitation of the Anglo-Iranian company, with Hoover attending as an observer at the request of the Justice Department.[^59] [[John Foster Dulles]]'s memorandum of January 8, 1954 records that after the meeting of the National Security Council that day he, Wilson, Humphrey, Attorney General [[Herbert Brownell Jr.]] and Anderson discussed legal clearance for the American companies, and that the Attorney General "felt that he could give some sort of agreement not to sue" if requested in the national interest, and that the pending lawsuit would be continued in a way that would avoid undesirable publicity, which "would require some cooperation from the attorneys for the oil companies."[^60] On January 13, 1954 the assistant attorney general [[Stanley N. Barnes]] and the antitrust attorney [[Leonard Emmerglick]] gave Brownell the division's two primary objections to the consortium agreement: the possible use of a veto by the Anglo-Iranian company, the British government and the Iranian government, and the lack of freedom to set prices and markets.[^61] The National Security Council decided on January 14 that the security interests of the United States required the American petroleum companies to participate in an international consortium.[^58]
 
-On January 20, 1954 Brownell advised the National Security Council that the consortium, if organized as described and with the freedom of each member to sell oil at prices it determined, did not violate the antitrust laws. The opinion was given "subject to the express reservation of all rights of the United States" to continue prosecuting the action against Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and others, pending in the Southern District of New York as Civil No. 86-27.[^61] Hoover wrote on January 21 that the "five United States companies now named in the Cartel antitrust case are the only ones from this country who meet such a criteria" for participation in an Iranian settlement.[^62]
+On January 20, 1954 Brownell advised the National Security Council that the consortium, if organized as described and with the freedom of each member to sell oil at prices it determined, did not violate the antitrust laws. The opinion was given "subject to the express reservation of all rights of the United States" to continue prosecuting the action against Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and others, pending in the Southern District of New York as Civil No. 86-27.[^62] Hoover wrote on January 21 that the "five United States companies now named in the Cartel antitrust case are the only ones from this country who meet such a criteria" for participation in an Iranian settlement.[^63]
 
-The consortium's composition as set out on April 1, 1954 gave the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 40 per cent, Royal Dutch Shell 14 per cent, Compagnie Française des Pétroles 6 per cent, and 8 per cent each to Jersey Standard, Socony-Vacuum, California Standard, Gulf Oil and Texas, making the American share 40 per cent; its negotiating representatives for [[Tehran]] were Harden of Jersey Standard, Snow of the Anglo-Iranian company and Loudon of Royal Dutch Shell.[^63] By May 1954 the consortium insisted that it control extraction and refining as principals, while the Iranians insisted that management remain under the [[National Iranian Oil Company]], and Ambassador [[Loy Henderson]] reported that the two sides were moving toward an agency arrangement.[^64] A joint Iranian-British statement of August 5, 1954 set compensation at 25 million pounds payable over ten years, free of interest, with payments beginning no earlier than January 1, 1957.[^65] On September 21, 1954 the Finance Minister, [[Ali Amini]], introduced into the [[Majlis]] a single-article bill to ratify an agreement signed by Iran and the National Iranian Oil Company on one side and by Gulf, Socony Vacuum, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, Standard Oil Company of California, the Texas Oil Company, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, N.V. Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij and Compagnie Française des Pétroles on the other.[^66] The Iranian Senate ratified the agreement on October 28, 1954 by 41 votes to 4, with 3 abstentions.[^67]
+The consortium's composition as set out on April 1, 1954 gave the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 40 per cent, Royal Dutch Shell 14 per cent, Compagnie Française des Pétroles 6 per cent, and 8 per cent each to Jersey Standard, Socony-Vacuum, California Standard, Gulf Oil and Texas, making the American share 40 per cent; its negotiating representatives for [[Tehran]] were Harden of Jersey Standard, Snow of the Anglo-Iranian company and Loudon of Royal Dutch Shell.[^64] By May 1954 the consortium insisted that it control extraction and refining as principals, while the Iranians insisted that management remain under the [[National Iranian Oil Company]], and Ambassador [[Loy Henderson]] reported that the two sides were moving toward an agency arrangement.[^65] A joint Iranian-British statement of August 5, 1954 set compensation at 25 million pounds payable over ten years, free of interest, with payments beginning no earlier than January 1, 1957.[^66] On September 21, 1954 the Finance Minister, [[Ali Amini]], introduced into the [[Majlis]] a single-article bill to ratify an agreement signed by Iran and the National Iranian Oil Company on one side and by Gulf, Socony Vacuum, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, Standard Oil Company of California, the Texas Oil Company, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, N.V. Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij and Compagnie Française des Pétroles on the other.[^67] The Iranian Senate ratified the agreement on October 28, 1954 by 41 votes to 4, with 3 abstentions.[^68]
 
-Church's preface describes the later course of the consortium and the cartel case. Clause 28 of the Participants Agreement, which he printed for the first time, permitted companies holding an aggregate of 31 percent or more of the equity to set crude production at any level below the desires of the rest of the members; the Antitrust Division attorney Emmerglick wrote on August 19, 1954 that the "plan goes beyond the premises upon which the Attorney General's opinion delivered to the National Security Council was based." The Attorney General, who "felt that he had already crossed this bridge on January 20," approved the plan, and on September 15, 1954 "agreed that approval of the consortium was inconsistent with the cartel case as the complaint is drawn and that necessarily the case must proceed with emphasis on the marketing aspects and not on the production control aspects."[^57][^68] The Statement of Claims prepared in 1961 concerned marketing; consent decrees were entered against Gulf, Exxon and Texaco, and the case against Mobil and Socal was dismissed without prejudice. Church wrote that the National Security Council "perverted the law" and that "nowhere is there any reference to consultation with the United States Congress."[^68]
+Church's preface describes the later course of the consortium and the cartel case. Clause 28 of the Participants Agreement, which he printed for the first time, permitted companies holding an aggregate of 31 percent or more of the equity to set crude production at any level below the desires of the rest of the members; the Antitrust Division attorney Emmerglick wrote on August 19, 1954 that the "plan goes beyond the premises upon which the Attorney General's opinion delivered to the National Security Council was based." The Attorney General, who "felt that he had already crossed this bridge on January 20," approved the plan, and on September 15, 1954 "agreed that approval of the consortium was inconsistent with the cartel case as the complaint is drawn and that necessarily the case must proceed with emphasis on the marketing aspects and not on the production control aspects."[^58][^69] The Statement of Claims prepared in 1961 concerned marketing; consent decrees were entered against Gulf, Exxon and Texaco, and the case against Mobil and Socal was dismissed without prejudice. Church wrote that the National Security Council "perverted the law" and that "nowhere is there any reference to consultation with the United States Congress."[^69]
 
 ### Guatemala, June 1954
 
-On June 16, 1954, in a telephone call recorded by Secretary of State Dulles's secretary, [[Allen Dulles]], the Director of Central Intelligence, told John Foster Dulles that he was seeing that morning "men from Standard of NJ" who would "lay before him their position with regard to the small country down south," and that besides finding out their position he would "possibly slow things up without formalized action." The call concerned the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] operation against the government of [[Jacobo Arbenz]] in [[Guatemala]]; the Secretary asked whether [[Bourke B. Hickenlooper]] might introduce a sanctions bill in the Senate.[^69]
+On June 16, 1954, in a telephone call recorded by Secretary of State Dulles's secretary, [[Allen Dulles]], the Director of Central Intelligence, told John Foster Dulles that he was seeing that morning "men from Standard of NJ" who would "lay before him their position with regard to the small country down south," and that besides finding out their position he would "possibly slow things up without formalized action." The call concerned the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] operation against the government of [[Jacobo Arbenz]] in [[Guatemala]]; the Secretary asked whether [[Bourke B. Hickenlooper]] might introduce a sanctions bill in the Senate.[^70]
 
 ### Latin America and the Rockefeller Network
 
-Standard Oil of New Jersey's extensive holdings in [[Venezuela]] and across [[Latin America]] made the region central to the family's interests, and the young [[Nelson Rockefeller]] became a director of the company's Venezuelan subsidiary, Creole Petroleum, in the 1930s. His effort to manage the political risk to those holdings led to his 1940 appointment as [[Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs]], the wartime office that fused commercial interests, intelligence collection, and propaganda across the hemisphere.[^70] Creole Petroleum Corp. was a subsidiary of Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey) in 1949.[^71] Executive Order 8840 of July 30, 1941 established the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs within the Executive Office of the President and defined its functions and duties.[^72]
+Standard Oil of New Jersey's extensive holdings in [[Venezuela]] and across [[Latin America]] made the region central to the family's interests, and the young [[Nelson Rockefeller]] became a director of the company's Venezuelan subsidiary, Creole Petroleum, in the 1930s. His effort to manage the political risk to those holdings led to his 1940 appointment as [[Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs]], the wartime office that fused commercial interests, intelligence collection, and propaganda across the hemisphere.[^71] Creole Petroleum Corp. was a subsidiary of Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey) in 1949.[^72] Executive Order 8840 of July 30, 1941 established the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs within the Executive Office of the President and defined its functions and duties.[^73]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
@@ -206,46 +206,47 @@ Standard Oil of New Jersey's extensive holdings in [[Venezuela]] and across [[La
 [^27]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, *Investigation of the National Defense Program*, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), Arnold statement, p. 4307 (Exhibit 359, release issued by Standard Oil on March 25, 1942, appendix p. 4560-4561; "The developments made under these agreements have advanced the progress of American industry and its ability to meet the war emergency"). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit
 [^28]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, *Investigation of the National Defense Program*, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), Arnold statement, p. 4308 (refusal to let the British have a rubber sample as late as 1941). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit
 [^29]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, *Investigation of the National Defense Program*, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), Exhibit 441, information in the District Court of the United States for the District of New Jersey, appendix pp. 4693-4697 (defendants; Standard and General Motors each owning 50 per cent of the Ethyl Gasoline Corporation, "sole producer of tetraethyl lead," p. 4697). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit
-[^30]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, *Investigation of the National Defense Program*, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), Howard letter of February 6, 1940 (Exhibit 371), appendix pp. 4589-4590 (Ethyl G.m.b.H. "owned 50% by the British Associated Ethyl Co. and 50% by I. G. Farbenindustrie," payment of "nearly $900,000"). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit
-[^31]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, *Investigation of the National Defense Program*, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), committee summary, pp. 4825-4826 (memorandum signed by E.J. Gohr, August 1, 1939, Exhibit S. 69, appendix p. 4907; letter of R.P. Russell to E.V. Murphree, August 11, 1939, on the process design of the "D. A. P. G. catalytic cracking plant"). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit
-[^32]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, *Investigation of the National Defense Program*, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), Farish statement, March 31, 1942, p. 4360 (items 3 and 4 of the charges Farish listed; "This is true and as a German corporation, operating in Germany ... it could not have done otherwise"). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit
-[^33]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, *Investigation of the National Defense Program*, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), committee summary, pp. 4827-4828 (memorandum of Frank A. Howard to Messrs. Teagle and Farish, Exhibit S. 75, appendix p. 4916; "Thus Standard met with difficulties in developing aviation gasoline for our own Army because of the cartel agreement," p. 4828). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit
-[^34]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, *Investigation of the National Defense Program*, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), testimony of Adolf A. Berle Jr., Assistant Secretary of State, April 3, 1942, pp. 4506-4508 (Lati and Condor; request of March 1941; conference of April 14, 1941). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit
-[^35]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, *Investigation of the National Defense Program*, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), Arnold, March 27, 1942, p. 4345 (information, complaint and consent decree filed "day before yesterday"; nolo contendere; fines of $50,000; exchange with the chairman); consent decree of March 25, 1942 indexed at p. 4346. https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit
-[^36]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, *Investigation of the National Defense Program*, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), Arnold, pp. 4346-4347 (royalty-free licensing under the rubber and toluol patents; transfer of know-how; no provision for the Attorney General or the court to pass on future relations with I.G.; "in the sum of millions of dollars and at the cost of its future domination of the industry," p. 4347). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit
-[^37]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, *Investigation of the National Defense Program*, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), Arnold, p. 4328 (royalty-free licensing and compulsory licensing after the war; cost to the company "possibly $10,000,000. I think their release says $6,000,000"). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit
-[^38]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, *Investigation of the National Defense Program*, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), Exhibit 440, "Final Judgment," United States v. Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) et al., District Court of the United States for the District of New Jersey, appendix pp. 4677-4687 (defendants named at p. 4677; paragraph (14), dissolution of Hydro Patents Co. and Hydro Engineering and Chemical Co. one year after entry, p. 4684; Alien Property Custodian consent and compulsory licensing, p. 4686). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit
-[^39]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, *Investigation of the National Defense Program*, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), Exhibit 441, information, paragraphs 34 and 35 (Hydro Patents Company and the Mutual Licensing Plan of July 11, 1930), appendix p. 4702. https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit
-[^40]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, *The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security* (committee print, February 21, 1974), pp. 29-33 (Report of the Attorney General to the National Security Council relative to the grand jury investigation of the international oil cartel, January 1953): pp. 29-30 (Federal Trade Commission resolution of December 2, 1949; subpoenas duces tecum of January 1950; staff report filed October 1951; instruction of June 23, 1952); p. 31 (cartel since 1928); p. 32 (committee of State, CIA, Defense and Justice). https://archive.org/details/TheInternationalPetroleumCartelTheIranianConsortiumAndU.S.NationalSecurity
-[^41]: U.S. Federal Trade Commission, *The International Petroleum Cartel*, Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission Submitted to the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select Committee on Small Business, United States Senate, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Committee Print No. 6 (Washington: GPO, 1952), p. 24, Table 9 (crude oil production of seven international companies, 1949: Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey) 1,317.7 thousand barrels daily). https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP57-00384R000700130001-2
-[^42]: U.S. Federal Trade Commission, *The International Petroleum Cartel*, Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission Submitted to the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select Committee on Small Business, United States Senate, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Committee Print No. 6 (Washington: GPO, 1952), pp. 27-28 (pipeline ownership: Creole Petroleum Corp., "a subsidiary of Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey)"; Trans-Arabian Pipe Line, Jersey 30 per cent, Texas 30, Standard of California 30, Socony-Vacuum 10; Interprovincial Pipe Line and Imperial Oil). https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP57-00384R000700130001-2
-[^43]: U.S. Federal Trade Commission, *The International Petroleum Cartel*, Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission Submitted to the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select Committee on Small Business, United States Senate, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Committee Print No. 6 (Washington: GPO, 1952), pp. 31-32 (interlocking directorates; Aramco board of three members each from Standard Oil Co. (N.J.), Standard Oil Co. of California and Texas Co., one from Socony-Vacuum and one unaffiliated; summary: four of the seven companies own all the shares of Aramco). https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP57-00384R000700130001-2
-[^44]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, *The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security* (committee print, February 21, 1974), p. 32 (Justice Department report of January 1953: "an indictment could have been returned on the basis of the Federal Trade Commission's staff report and a small number of documents in the possession of the Department of Justice"). https://archive.org/details/TheInternationalPetroleumCartelTheIranianConsortiumAndU.S.NationalSecurity
-[^45]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, *The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security* (committee print, February 21, 1974), pp. 5-6 and 29 (Federal Trade Commission material on production curtailment and on Navy prices). https://archive.org/details/TheInternationalPetroleumCartelTheIranianConsortiumAndU.S.NationalSecurity
-[^46]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, *The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security* (committee print, February 21, 1974), p. 10 (1933 Saudi concession; Standard of New Jersey 30 per cent and Socony 10 per cent of Aramco stock; loans totaling $273,000,000; eighteen-year contracts; ratio 3:3:3:1). https://archive.org/details/TheInternationalPetroleumCartelTheIranianConsortiumAndU.S.NationalSecurity
-[^47]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, *The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security* (committee print, February 21, 1974), p. 7 (Achnacarry Agreement of September 1928; Walter Teagle of Standard, Sir Henri Deterding of Shell and Anglo-Persian; "as is" basis; "Standard's fear of the American antitrust laws" and the parties' decision not to sign the final agreement). https://archive.org/details/TheInternationalPetroleumCartelTheIranianConsortiumAndU.S.NationalSecurity
-[^48]: U.S. Federal Trade Commission, *The International Petroleum Cartel*, Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission Submitted to the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select Committee on Small Business, United States Senate, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Committee Print No. 6 (Washington: GPO, 1952), pp. 118-119 (Aramco in 1944 to 1946; Standard of California and Texas as owners; Ras Tanura refinery; production of 21,296 barrels daily in 1944 and 58,386 in 1945). https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP57-00384R000700130001-2
-[^49]: U.S. Federal Trade Commission, *The International Petroleum Cartel*, Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission Submitted to the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select Committee on Small Business, United States Senate, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Committee Print No. 6 (Washington: GPO, 1952), pp. 119-121 (agreement in principle in December 1946; formal agreements of March 12, 1947; condition of settlement of the red-line controversy by March 12, 1951). https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP57-00384R000700130001-2
-[^50]: U.S. Federal Trade Commission, *The International Petroleum Cartel*, Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission Submitted to the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select Committee on Small Business, United States Senate, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Committee Print No. 6 (Washington: GPO, 1952), pp. 122-124 (stock subscription agreements of March 12, 1947; Jersey $76,500,000 and Socony $25,500,000; guaranty of $102,000,000 in bank loans; effective December 1948 after the withdrawal of the Compagnie Francaise des Petroles suit in November 1948; limited veto; "nearly one-half billion dollars"). https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP57-00384R000700130001-2
-[^51]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945*, Volume VIII, *The Near East and Africa*, Document 850, Clayton to Dunn, April 7, 1945. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d850
-[^52]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945*, Volume VIII, *The Near East and Africa*, Document 892, Eddy to the Secretary of State, Jidda, June 21, 1945. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d892
-[^53]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945*, Volume VIII, *The Near East and Africa*, Document 920, Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, August 8, 1945. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d920
-[^54]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, *The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security* (committee print, February 21, 1974), p. 33 ("A decision at this time to terminate the pending investigation would be regarded by the world as a confession that our abhorrence of monopoly and restrictive cartel activities does not extend to the world's most important single industry"; letter of Harry S. Truman to Attorney General James P. McGranery, January 12, 1953). https://archive.org/details/TheInternationalPetroleumCartelTheIranianConsortiumAndU.S.NationalSecurity
-[^55]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, *The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security* (committee print, February 21, 1974), preface by Senator Frank Church, p. V (policies of "prosecution of the International Petroleum Cartel Case" and "creation of the Iranian Consortium"; announcement of July 17, 1952; subpoenas of August 1952 against 21 companies; Acheson memorandum of April 16, 1952). https://archive.org/details/TheInternationalPetroleumCartelTheIranianConsortiumAndU.S.NationalSecurity
-[^56]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, *The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security* (committee print, February 21, 1974), preface by Senator Frank Church, p. VI (Truman letter of January 12, 1953; civil complaint filed April 14, 1953 in the District Court for the District of Columbia naming Standard Oil of New Jersey, Socony-Vacuum, Standard Oil Company of California, The Texas Company and Gulf Oil; transfer to the Southern District of New York at the defendants' request; Hoover appointed; National Security Council Action Memorandum No. 875b of August 6, 1953). https://archive.org/details/TheInternationalPetroleumCartelTheIranianConsortiumAndU.S.NationalSecurity
-[^57]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, *The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security* (committee print, February 21, 1974), preface by Senator Frank Church, p. VII (transfer of authority in October 1953; letter from Harden, December 4, 1953; National Security Council decision of January 14, 1954; opinion of January 20, 1954; clause 28 of the Participants Agreement; Emmerglick memorandum of August 19, 1954). https://archive.org/details/TheInternationalPetroleumCartelTheIranianConsortiumAndU.S.NationalSecurity
-[^58]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, Volume X, *Iran, 1951-1954*, Document 397, Butterworth to the Department of State, London, December 18, 1953. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d397
-[^59]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, *The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security* (committee print, February 21, 1974), p. 61 (memorandum of John Foster Dulles, January 8, 1954, following the meeting of the National Security Council). https://archive.org/details/TheInternationalPetroleumCartelTheIranianConsortiumAndU.S.NationalSecurity
-[^60]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, *The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security* (committee print, February 21, 1974), p. 62 (memorandum to the files, Stanley N. Barnes, January 13, 1954). https://archive.org/details/TheInternationalPetroleumCartelTheIranianConsortiumAndU.S.NationalSecurity
-[^61]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, Volume X, *Iran, 1951-1954*, Document 411, Brownell to the National Security Council, January 20, 1954 (action pending as Civil No. 86-27, Southern District of New York). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d411
-[^62]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, Volume X, *Iran, 1951-1954*, Document 413, Hoover to the Secretary of State, January 21, 1954. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d413
-[^63]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, Volume X, *Iran, 1951-1954*, Document 449, Aldrich to the Department of State, London, April 1, 1954. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d449
-[^64]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, Volume X, *Iran, 1951-1954*, Document 458, Henderson to the Department of State, Tehran, May 8, 1954. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d458
-[^65]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, Volume X, *Iran, 1951-1954*, Document 490, Henderson to the Department of State, Tehran, August 5, 1954 (joint Iranian-British statement: compensation of 25 million pounds payable over ten years, free of interest, payments not to begin before January 1, 1957). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d490
-[^66]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, Volume X, *Iran, 1951-1954*, Document 496, Henderson to the Department of State, Tehran, September 21, 1954 (single-article bill introduced by Finance Minister Amini). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d496
-[^67]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, Volume X, *Iran, 1951-1954*, Document 502, Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran, October 28, 1954, editorial note (agreement in principle signed August 5, 1954 between the Government of Iran and the International Oil Consortium; ratified by the Iranian Senate on October 28, 1954, 41 votes to 4, with 3 abstentions). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d502
-[^68]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, *The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security* (committee print, February 21, 1974), preface by Senator Frank Church, p. VIII (memorandum to Barnes, September 15, 1954; Statement of Claims of 1961; consent decrees against Gulf, Exxon and Texaco; dismissal as to Mobil and Socal without prejudice; Emmerglick, September 15, 1954). https://archive.org/details/TheInternationalPetroleumCartelTheIranianConsortiumAndU.S.NationalSecurity
-[^69]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, Guatemala, Document 189, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, Washington, June 16, 1954, 11:20 a.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54Guat/d189
-[^70]: Colby, Gerard, and Charlotte Dennett. *Thy Will Be Done: The Conquest of the Amazon: Nelson Rockefeller and Evangelism in the Age of Oil.* HarperCollins, 1995.
-[^71]: U.S. Federal Trade Commission, *The International Petroleum Cartel*, Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission Submitted to the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select Committee on Small Business, United States Senate, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Committee Print No. 6 (Washington: GPO, 1952), p. 27 (Creole Petroleum Corp., a subsidiary of Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey)). https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP57-00384R000700130001-2
-[^72]: Executive Order 8840, "Establishing the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs in the Executive Office of the President and Defining Its Functions and Duties," July 30, 1941. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-8840-establishing-the-office-the-coordinator-inter-american-affairs-the
+[^30]: Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940), Harvard Caselaw Access Project, https://static.case.law/us/309/cases/0436-01.json.
+[^31]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, *Investigation of the National Defense Program*, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), Howard letter of February 6, 1940 (Exhibit 371), appendix pp. 4589-4590 (Ethyl G.m.b.H. "owned 50% by the British Associated Ethyl Co. and 50% by I. G. Farbenindustrie," payment of "nearly $900,000"). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit
+[^32]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, *Investigation of the National Defense Program*, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), committee summary, pp. 4825-4826 (memorandum signed by E.J. Gohr, August 1, 1939, Exhibit S. 69, appendix p. 4907; letter of R.P. Russell to E.V. Murphree, August 11, 1939, on the process design of the "D. A. P. G. catalytic cracking plant"). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit
+[^33]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, *Investigation of the National Defense Program*, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), Farish statement, March 31, 1942, p. 4360 (items 3 and 4 of the charges Farish listed; "This is true and as a German corporation, operating in Germany ... it could not have done otherwise"). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit
+[^34]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, *Investigation of the National Defense Program*, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), committee summary, pp. 4827-4828 (memorandum of Frank A. Howard to Messrs. Teagle and Farish, Exhibit S. 75, appendix p. 4916; "Thus Standard met with difficulties in developing aviation gasoline for our own Army because of the cartel agreement," p. 4828). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit
+[^35]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, *Investigation of the National Defense Program*, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), testimony of Adolf A. Berle Jr., Assistant Secretary of State, April 3, 1942, pp. 4506-4508 (Lati and Condor; request of March 1941; conference of April 14, 1941). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit
+[^36]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, *Investigation of the National Defense Program*, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), Arnold, March 27, 1942, p. 4345 (information, complaint and consent decree filed "day before yesterday"; nolo contendere; fines of $50,000; exchange with the chairman); consent decree of March 25, 1942 indexed at p. 4346. https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit
+[^37]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, *Investigation of the National Defense Program*, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), Arnold, pp. 4346-4347 (royalty-free licensing under the rubber and toluol patents; transfer of know-how; no provision for the Attorney General or the court to pass on future relations with I.G.; "in the sum of millions of dollars and at the cost of its future domination of the industry," p. 4347). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit
+[^38]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, *Investigation of the National Defense Program*, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), Arnold, p. 4328 (royalty-free licensing and compulsory licensing after the war; cost to the company "possibly $10,000,000. I think their release says $6,000,000"). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit
+[^39]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, *Investigation of the National Defense Program*, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), Exhibit 440, "Final Judgment," United States v. Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) et al., District Court of the United States for the District of New Jersey, appendix pp. 4677-4687 (defendants named at p. 4677; paragraph (14), dissolution of Hydro Patents Co. and Hydro Engineering and Chemical Co. one year after entry, p. 4684; Alien Property Custodian consent and compulsory licensing, p. 4686). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit
+[^40]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, *Investigation of the National Defense Program*, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), Exhibit 441, information, paragraphs 34 and 35 (Hydro Patents Company and the Mutual Licensing Plan of July 11, 1930), appendix p. 4702. https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit
+[^41]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, *The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security* (committee print, February 21, 1974), pp. 29-33 (Report of the Attorney General to the National Security Council relative to the grand jury investigation of the international oil cartel, January 1953): pp. 29-30 (Federal Trade Commission resolution of December 2, 1949; subpoenas duces tecum of January 1950; staff report filed October 1951; instruction of June 23, 1952); p. 31 (cartel since 1928); p. 32 (committee of State, CIA, Defense and Justice). https://archive.org/details/TheInternationalPetroleumCartelTheIranianConsortiumAndU.S.NationalSecurity
+[^42]: U.S. Federal Trade Commission, *The International Petroleum Cartel*, Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission Submitted to the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select Committee on Small Business, United States Senate, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Committee Print No. 6 (Washington: GPO, 1952), p. 24, Table 9 (crude oil production of seven international companies, 1949: Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey) 1,317.7 thousand barrels daily). https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP57-00384R000700130001-2
+[^43]: U.S. Federal Trade Commission, *The International Petroleum Cartel*, Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission Submitted to the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select Committee on Small Business, United States Senate, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Committee Print No. 6 (Washington: GPO, 1952), pp. 27-28 (pipeline ownership: Creole Petroleum Corp., "a subsidiary of Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey)"; Trans-Arabian Pipe Line, Jersey 30 per cent, Texas 30, Standard of California 30, Socony-Vacuum 10; Interprovincial Pipe Line and Imperial Oil). https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP57-00384R000700130001-2
+[^44]: U.S. Federal Trade Commission, *The International Petroleum Cartel*, Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission Submitted to the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select Committee on Small Business, United States Senate, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Committee Print No. 6 (Washington: GPO, 1952), pp. 31-32 (interlocking directorates; Aramco board of three members each from Standard Oil Co. (N.J.), Standard Oil Co. of California and Texas Co., one from Socony-Vacuum and one unaffiliated; summary: four of the seven companies own all the shares of Aramco). https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP57-00384R000700130001-2
+[^45]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, *The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security* (committee print, February 21, 1974), p. 32 (Justice Department report of January 1953: "an indictment could have been returned on the basis of the Federal Trade Commission's staff report and a small number of documents in the possession of the Department of Justice"). https://archive.org/details/TheInternationalPetroleumCartelTheIranianConsortiumAndU.S.NationalSecurity
+[^46]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, *The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security* (committee print, February 21, 1974), pp. 5-6 and 29 (Federal Trade Commission material on production curtailment and on Navy prices). https://archive.org/details/TheInternationalPetroleumCartelTheIranianConsortiumAndU.S.NationalSecurity
+[^47]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, *The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security* (committee print, February 21, 1974), p. 10 (1933 Saudi concession; Standard of New Jersey 30 per cent and Socony 10 per cent of Aramco stock; loans totaling $273,000,000; eighteen-year contracts; ratio 3:3:3:1). https://archive.org/details/TheInternationalPetroleumCartelTheIranianConsortiumAndU.S.NationalSecurity
+[^48]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, *The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security* (committee print, February 21, 1974), p. 7 (Achnacarry Agreement of September 1928; Walter Teagle of Standard, Sir Henri Deterding of Shell and Anglo-Persian; "as is" basis; "Standard's fear of the American antitrust laws" and the parties' decision not to sign the final agreement). https://archive.org/details/TheInternationalPetroleumCartelTheIranianConsortiumAndU.S.NationalSecurity
+[^49]: U.S. Federal Trade Commission, *The International Petroleum Cartel*, Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission Submitted to the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select Committee on Small Business, United States Senate, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Committee Print No. 6 (Washington: GPO, 1952), pp. 118-119 (Aramco in 1944 to 1946; Standard of California and Texas as owners; Ras Tanura refinery; production of 21,296 barrels daily in 1944 and 58,386 in 1945). https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP57-00384R000700130001-2
+[^50]: U.S. Federal Trade Commission, *The International Petroleum Cartel*, Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission Submitted to the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select Committee on Small Business, United States Senate, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Committee Print No. 6 (Washington: GPO, 1952), pp. 119-121 (agreement in principle in December 1946; formal agreements of March 12, 1947; condition of settlement of the red-line controversy by March 12, 1951). https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP57-00384R000700130001-2
+[^51]: U.S. Federal Trade Commission, *The International Petroleum Cartel*, Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission Submitted to the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select Committee on Small Business, United States Senate, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Committee Print No. 6 (Washington: GPO, 1952), pp. 122-124 (stock subscription agreements of March 12, 1947; Jersey $76,500,000 and Socony $25,500,000; guaranty of $102,000,000 in bank loans; effective December 1948 after the withdrawal of the Compagnie Francaise des Petroles suit in November 1948; limited veto; "nearly one-half billion dollars"). https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP57-00384R000700130001-2
+[^52]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945*, Volume VIII, *The Near East and Africa*, Document 850, Clayton to Dunn, April 7, 1945. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d850
+[^53]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945*, Volume VIII, *The Near East and Africa*, Document 892, Eddy to the Secretary of State, Jidda, June 21, 1945. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d892
+[^54]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945*, Volume VIII, *The Near East and Africa*, Document 920, Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, August 8, 1945. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d920
+[^55]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, *The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security* (committee print, February 21, 1974), p. 33 ("A decision at this time to terminate the pending investigation would be regarded by the world as a confession that our abhorrence of monopoly and restrictive cartel activities does not extend to the world's most important single industry"; letter of Harry S. Truman to Attorney General James P. McGranery, January 12, 1953). https://archive.org/details/TheInternationalPetroleumCartelTheIranianConsortiumAndU.S.NationalSecurity
+[^56]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, *The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security* (committee print, February 21, 1974), preface by Senator Frank Church, p. V (policies of "prosecution of the International Petroleum Cartel Case" and "creation of the Iranian Consortium"; announcement of July 17, 1952; subpoenas of August 1952 against 21 companies; Acheson memorandum of April 16, 1952). https://archive.org/details/TheInternationalPetroleumCartelTheIranianConsortiumAndU.S.NationalSecurity
+[^57]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, *The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security* (committee print, February 21, 1974), preface by Senator Frank Church, p. VI (Truman letter of January 12, 1953; civil complaint filed April 14, 1953 in the District Court for the District of Columbia naming Standard Oil of New Jersey, Socony-Vacuum, Standard Oil Company of California, The Texas Company and Gulf Oil; transfer to the Southern District of New York at the defendants' request; Hoover appointed; National Security Council Action Memorandum No. 875b of August 6, 1953). https://archive.org/details/TheInternationalPetroleumCartelTheIranianConsortiumAndU.S.NationalSecurity
+[^58]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, *The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security* (committee print, February 21, 1974), preface by Senator Frank Church, p. VII (transfer of authority in October 1953; letter from Harden, December 4, 1953; National Security Council decision of January 14, 1954; opinion of January 20, 1954; clause 28 of the Participants Agreement; Emmerglick memorandum of August 19, 1954). https://archive.org/details/TheInternationalPetroleumCartelTheIranianConsortiumAndU.S.NationalSecurity
+[^59]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, Volume X, *Iran, 1951-1954*, Document 397, Butterworth to the Department of State, London, December 18, 1953. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d397
+[^60]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, *The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security* (committee print, February 21, 1974), p. 61 (memorandum of John Foster Dulles, January 8, 1954, following the meeting of the National Security Council). https://archive.org/details/TheInternationalPetroleumCartelTheIranianConsortiumAndU.S.NationalSecurity
+[^61]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, *The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security* (committee print, February 21, 1974), p. 62 (memorandum to the files, Stanley N. Barnes, January 13, 1954). https://archive.org/details/TheInternationalPetroleumCartelTheIranianConsortiumAndU.S.NationalSecurity
+[^62]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, Volume X, *Iran, 1951-1954*, Document 411, Brownell to the National Security Council, January 20, 1954 (action pending as Civil No. 86-27, Southern District of New York). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d411
+[^63]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, Volume X, *Iran, 1951-1954*, Document 413, Hoover to the Secretary of State, January 21, 1954. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d413
+[^64]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, Volume X, *Iran, 1951-1954*, Document 449, Aldrich to the Department of State, London, April 1, 1954. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d449
+[^65]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, Volume X, *Iran, 1951-1954*, Document 458, Henderson to the Department of State, Tehran, May 8, 1954. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d458
+[^66]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, Volume X, *Iran, 1951-1954*, Document 490, Henderson to the Department of State, Tehran, August 5, 1954 (joint Iranian-British statement: compensation of 25 million pounds payable over ten years, free of interest, payments not to begin before January 1, 1957). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d490
+[^67]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, Volume X, *Iran, 1951-1954*, Document 496, Henderson to the Department of State, Tehran, September 21, 1954 (single-article bill introduced by Finance Minister Amini). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d496
+[^68]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, Volume X, *Iran, 1951-1954*, Document 502, Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran, October 28, 1954, editorial note (agreement in principle signed August 5, 1954 between the Government of Iran and the International Oil Consortium; ratified by the Iranian Senate on October 28, 1954, 41 votes to 4, with 3 abstentions). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d502
+[^69]: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, *The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security* (committee print, February 21, 1974), preface by Senator Frank Church, p. VIII (memorandum to Barnes, September 15, 1954; Statement of Claims of 1961; consent decrees against Gulf, Exxon and Texaco; dismissal as to Mobil and Socal without prejudice; Emmerglick, September 15, 1954). https://archive.org/details/TheInternationalPetroleumCartelTheIranianConsortiumAndU.S.NationalSecurity
+[^70]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, Guatemala, Document 189, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, Washington, June 16, 1954, 11:20 a.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54Guat/d189
+[^71]: Colby, Gerard, and Charlotte Dennett. *Thy Will Be Done: The Conquest of the Amazon: Nelson Rockefeller and Evangelism in the Age of Oil.* HarperCollins, 1995.
+[^72]: U.S. Federal Trade Commission, *The International Petroleum Cartel*, Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission Submitted to the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select Committee on Small Business, United States Senate, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Committee Print No. 6 (Washington: GPO, 1952), p. 27 (Creole Petroleum Corp., a subsidiary of Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey)). https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP57-00384R000700130001-2
+[^73]: Executive Order 8840, "Establishing the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs in the Executive Office of the President and Defining Its Functions and Duties," July 30, 1941. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-8840-establishing-the-office-the-coordinator-inter-american-affairs-the