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20 - ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/INTERNATIONAL/Safari Club.md
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@ -21,23 +21,25 @@ The Safari Club was an informal covert intelligence-sharing and operations netwo
### Formation and Membership
The Safari Club emerged from conversations between de Marenches and Bush following the [[Church Committee]]'s 1975-1976 investigations and the Senate's subsequent restrictions on CIA covert activities. The post-Watergate intelligence environment - which included the firing of CIA Director [[William Colby]], increased congressional oversight, and public scrutiny of assassination plots and domestic surveillance programs - made CIA unilateral operations in the developing world politically dangerous. De Marenches proposed an alternative: a consortium of allied services, each with their own legal authorities, would carry out operations with CIA intelligence and tacit American approval, funded primarily by Saudi petrodollars.[^1]
The Safari Club emerged from conversations between de Marenches and Bush following the Church Committee's 1975-1976 investigations and the Senate's subsequent restrictions on CIA covert activities. The post-Watergate intelligence environment - which included the firing of CIA Director [[William Colby]], increased congressional oversight, and public scrutiny of assassination plots and domestic surveillance programs - made CIA unilateral operations in the developing world politically dangerous. De Marenches proposed an alternative: a consortium of allied services, each with their own legal authorities, would carry out operations with CIA intelligence and tacit American approval, funded primarily by Saudi petrodollars.[^1]
The core membership of the Safari Club was:
- France's SDECE, represented and organized by de Marenches
- Saudi Arabia's General Intelligence Directorate, represented by Kamal Adham (the Saudi intelligence chief and brother-in-law of King Faisal) and later by his successor Prince Turki al-Faisal
- Saudi Arabia's [[General Intelligence Presidency|General Intelligence Directorate]], represented by [[Kamal Adham]] (the Saudi intelligence chief and brother-in-law of King Faisal) and later by his successor Prince [[Turki al-Faisal]]
- Egypt's General Intelligence Service (Mukhabarat), operating under President Anwar Sadat
- Morocco's Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST), under General Ahmed Dlimi
- Iran's SAVAK (Sazeman-e Ettela'at va Amniyat-e Keshvar), under the Shah
Kamal Adham led the Saudi directorate until 1979, according to Gulf News, when King Khalid replaced him with Turki al-Faisal; Arab News and the Washington Institute give 1977 for Turki's accession.[^2][^3]
The CIA participated as a provider of intelligence products, targeting information, and logistics coordination, with Bush maintaining the relationship through DCI channels. The arrangement exploited the fact that congressional restrictions applied to CIA operations, not to those of allied foreign services.[^1]
### Operations
The most extensively documented Safari Club operation was in Angola, where the Club supported Jonas Savimbi's [[UNITA]] movement against the Soviet- and Cuban-backed MPLA government. The Clark Amendment (1976) had prohibited the CIA from providing direct military assistance to factions in the Angolan civil war, but the Safari Club financed UNITA operations through Saudi channels. De Marenches described Angola as "a theater for revolutionary wars prompted and conducted by the Soviet Union." The Club provided an estimated $5 million in funding and logistical support to Savimbi's forces during this period.[^1]
In the Horn of Africa, the Club supported Somalia against the Soviet-backed Ethiopian government during the 1977-1978 Ogaden War, channeling arms and funds to Somali President Siad Barre. Egypt supplied Soviet-compatible weapons that could be denied as American in origin. The operation collapsed when Cuba deployed approximately 15,000 troops to Ethiopia, reversing the Somali military advance.[^2]
In the Horn of Africa, the Club supported Somalia against the Soviet-backed Ethiopian government during the 1977-1978 Ogaden War, channeling arms and funds to Somali President Siad Barre. Egypt supplied Soviet-compatible weapons that could be denied as American in origin. The operation collapsed when Cuba deployed approximately 15,000 troops to Ethiopia, reversing the Somali military advance.[^4]
The Club also coordinated intelligence sharing and low-level operations in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, Sudan, and other African theaters where Soviet and Cuban influence was considered a threat. Saudi funding provided the financial infrastructure for multiple simultaneous operations that would have required substantial CIA appropriations to sustain directly.[^1]
@ -45,7 +47,7 @@ The Club also coordinated intelligence sharing and low-level operations in Rhode
The Safari Club arrangement exploited a structural feature of American oversight: congressional restrictions applied to the CIA, but not to allied services receiving American intelligence support. Bush maintained the CIA's relationship with the consortium through intelligence-sharing channels, providing targeting data and strategic assessments that guided the allied operations. The operational work was then conducted by the allied services, keeping American fingerprints off the direct conduct of operations.[^1]
The arrangement also had internal CIA consequences. CIA officers who had been forced out in the post-Watergate restructuring - including Ted Shackley, Tom Clines, and others associated with [[William Colby]]'s predecessor Richard Helms - found employment and operational roles in the networks that supported Safari Club operations, operating through private channels with Saudi or other national funding. This created a persistent covert network operating outside CIA's formal chain of command.[^2]
The arrangement also had internal CIA consequences. CIA officers who had been forced out in the post-Watergate restructuring - including Ted Shackley, Tom Clines, and others associated with William Colby's predecessor Richard Helms - found employment and operational roles in the networks that supported Safari Club operations, operating through private channels with Saudi or other national funding. This created a persistent covert network operating outside CIA's formal chain of command.[^4]
### Collapse
@ -58,4 +60,6 @@ The Safari Club demonstrated that the constraints imposed on CIA by the Church C
### Footnotes
[^1]: Trento, Joseph. *Prelude to Terror: The Rogue CIA and the Legacy of America's Private Intelligence Network*. Carroll & Graf, 2005, pp. 52-108. De Marenches, Alexandre, and David Andelman. *The Fourth World War: Diplomacy and Espionage in the Age of Terrorism*. Random House, 1992.
[^2]: Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA*. Doubleday, 2007, pp. 353-364. Stockwell, John. *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story*. W.W. Norton, 1978 (on Angola operations and CIA's role in the period).
[^2]: Joseph A. Kechichian, "The man behind the scenes," Gulf News, February 12, 2010. https://gulfnews.com/uae/the-man-behind-the-scenes-1.581564
[^3]: Simon Henderson, "The Saudis: Friend or Foe?", Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 22, 2001. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/saudis-friend-or-foe
[^4]: Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA*. Doubleday, 2007, pp. 353-364. Stockwell, John. *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story*. W.W. Norton, 1978 (on Angola operations and CIA's role in the period).