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60 - PLACES/MILITARY_INSTALLATIONS/Dimona.md

@@ -1,59 +1,89 @@
----
+---
+aliases:
+  - Dimona
+  - Negev Nuclear Research Center
+  - Nuclear Research Center Negev
+  - Dimona reactor
+  - Dimona facility
+created: 2025-01-09
+updated: 2026-10-05
+title: Dimona
 tags:
   - Place
   - Israel
   - Nuclear
   - NegevDesert
   - Intelligence
+  - SamsonOption
+  - Vanunu
+  - VelaIncident
+  - ArmsControl
 category: "Military Installation"
-summary: "The Dimona facility, officially known as the Negev Nuclear Research Center, stands as a deeply clandestine and pivotal complex within Israel's national security apparatus, nestled in the arid Negev Desert south of Jerusalem."
+summary: "Israel's Negev Nuclear Research Center near Beersheba, built from 1958 with French help and discovered by the United States in 1960, visited but never inspected by American teams until July 1969."
 start: 1958
 location: "Negev Desert, Israel"
 ---
-The [[Dimona]] facility, officially known as the Negev Nuclear Research Center, stands as a deeply clandestine and pivotal complex within [[Israel]]'s national security apparatus, nestled in the arid [[Negev Desert]] south of [[Jerusalem]]. Its existence and operations are central to Israel's undeclared nuclear weapons program, embodying the nation's commitment to [[The Samson Option (GFE)]], a doctrine of last resort that envisions massive nuclear retaliation in the face of an existential threat. This facility is not merely a research center but a fully operational industrial complex dedicated to the production of weapons-grade plutonium and the development of advanced nuclear armaments.
+Dimona is the site in the [[Negev Desert]] of [[Israel]], south-east of [[Beersheba]], of the Negev Nuclear Research Center: a heavy water reactor, a chemical reprocessing plant and associated buildings that [[France]] helped build from 1958. The Israeli government's own description of its purpose was for years a series of cover stories; the American record of the reactor consists of intelligence discovery in 1960, ten years of negotiated "visits" ending in July 1969, and a 1986 account by the technician [[Mordecai Vanunu]].
 
-### History and Construction
+### Origins and French construction
 
-The genesis of Dimona can be traced back to the early 1950s, driven by the unwavering vision of Israeli leaders such as Prime Minister [[David Ben-Gurion]], Defense Minister [[Shimon Peres]], and the brilliant scientist [[Ernst David Bergmann]]. Bergmann, often hailed as the "scientific father of the Israeli bomb," tirelessly championed the pursuit of nuclear capabilities, believing it to be the ultimate guarantor of Israel's survival in a hostile region. [[France]] emerged as Israel's indispensable partner in this ambitious endeavor, providing critical expertise and resources. Israeli scientists were granted unprecedented access to French nuclear facilities, including [[Marcoule]] and [[Saclay]], gaining invaluable knowledge and experience. This collaboration culminated in late 1955 when Ben-Gurion formally sought French assistance in constructing a large nuclear reactor and a chemical reprocessing plant on Israeli soil. The agreement was reportedly solidified in the aftermath of the 1956 [[Suez Crisis]], with [[Guy Mollet|French Prime Minister Guy Mollet]] famously declaring, "I owe the bomb to them" [^1]. The [[Saint-Gobain|French]] chemical firm, Saint-Gobain, was subsequently contracted to undertake the construction of the crucial underground reprocessing facility.
+[[Avner Cohen]] and [[William Burr]] wrote that in 1955, after [[David Ben-Gurion]] returned as prime minister and defense minister, he delegated a feasibility effort to [[Shimon Peres]], then director general of the Defense Ministry; that Israeli Atomic Energy Commission chairman [[Ernst David Bergmann]] favored self-reliance while Peres sought a foreign supplier; and that by 1958 the plan had France as supplier, [[Norway]] (with the British) supplying heavy water, and the United States supplying a small "Atoms for Peace" package that could serve as camouflage.[^1] A secret Israel-Norway agreement of June 1959 provided for the sale of heavy water through the United Kingdom; it was reported by the political officer at the American embassy in Oslo, Richard Kerry, the father of [[John Kerry]].[^1] [[Seymour Hersh]] wrote that [[Guy Mollet]], "obsessed with the consequences of France's failure" at Suez, "was quoted as telling an aide" at the time of the talks with Peres and [[Golda Meir]]: "I owe the bomb to them. I owe the bomb to them"; that the formal French-Israeli agreement has never been made public; and that the firm [[Saint-Gobain]], which had worked at [[Marcoule]], was chosen to build the reprocessing facility underground, its engineers being "stunned" that the reactor's cooling ducts and waste facilities suggested operation at two to three times the 24 megawatts of thermal power the agreement specified.[^2] Hersh wrote that the French-Israeli work made the Negev site a "French boom town," with upward of 2,500 French men, women and children living there, and that the reactor "went critical sometime in 1962" and "was capable of being operated at more than seventy megawatts."[^3] The French foreign minister, Maurice Couve de Murville, told Secretary of State [[Christian Herter]] on December 16, 1960 that France had helped Israel build a "replica of [the] Marcoule plant" and that under the bilateral agreement France would supply raw materials and receive any plutonium produced.[^1]
 
-Groundbreaking for the EL-102 reactor commenced in early 1958, marking the physical manifestation of Israel's nuclear aspirations. The remote Negev Desert site rapidly transformed into a bustling "French boom town," as hundreds of French engineers and technicians, eventually numbering up to 2,500, arrived to oversee and execute the complex construction. By the end of 1960 [[Ian Smart]], third secretary of the British embassy in [[Tel Aviv]], was reporting his "suspicion" that the site looked like a nuclear reactor, prompted by its visible progress and the French presence in [[Beersheba]] [^2]. The reactor achieved criticality in 1962, demonstrating its capacity to operate at over 70 megawatts (MW), significantly higher than the publicly acknowledged 24 MW. This enhanced operational capacity was vital for producing larger quantities of plutonium, a key ingredient for nuclear weapons. In December 1963 [[Shimon Yiftach]], director of scientific programs at the defense ministry, stated publicly that the reactor would produce plutonium as a by-product and that the government had no plans to build a separate reprocessing plant; French construction companies had by then restarted work on the underground reprocessing plant [^7]. By mid-1964, the underground reprocessing plant, a marvel of engineering with its remote-controlled laboratories and computer-driven machinery, was largely completed and poised to begin extracting weapons-grade plutonium from the reactor's spent uranium fuel rods. This progress continued despite [[Charles de Gaulle|French President Charles de Gaulle]]'s public attempts to distance France from the project [^2]. The immense financial undertaking of Dimona, estimated to cost billions of dollars, was partially sustained through covert fundraising efforts led by figures like Shimon Peres and [[Abraham Feinberg]], who solicited contributions from wealthy [[American]] and [[European]] Jews [^2].
+Hersh wrote that Ben-Gurion's decision to finance Dimona outside the Israeli budget led Peres, "sometime in 1960," to form, according to Israeli sources, a group of donors called the Committee of Thirty, among them Baron Edmund de Rothschild of Paris and [[Abraham Feinberg]] of New York, president of the [[Israel Bond Organization]]; Hersh quoted Peres as saying that "not one penny [for Dimona] came from the government budget," and wrote that the project later cost "upward of $500 million a year" in the 1960s, more than 10 percent of the Israeli military budget, according to a former aide to [[Levi Eshkol]].[^4] Cohen and Burr recorded that the financing of Dimona, "through both the diversion of U.S. government aid and the use of tax-deductible individual charities," played an important role in the internal deliberations of the Eisenhower administration when it learned of the site.[^1]
 
-### Operational Details and Facilities (Based on Mordecai Vanunu's Revelations)
+### Discovery, 1960
 
-The intricate workings of Dimona were brought to light in 1986 through the detailed revelations and photographs provided by [[Mordecai Vanunu]], a former technician at the facility. His disclosures offered an unprecedented glimpse into Israel's advanced nuclear capabilities. The complex comprises the main reactor and at least eight other specialized buildings, or Machons, each serving a distinct function in the nuclear fuel cycle.
+Cohen and Burr, publishing declassified documents in 2015, wrote that the first known reference to Dimona in American records was in late July 1960, when a "U.S. corporate official" learned of it from an Israeli oil executive and told diplomats in [[Tel Aviv]] that the site would be a power reactor; that Henry Gomberg, a University of Michigan nuclear engineering professor, learned on a November 1960 trip that Israel had a secret reactor project involving plutonium experiments; and that in September 1960, on a helicopter flight near the site with Ambassador [[Ogden Reid]], the senior Treasury Ministry official Addy Cohen answered a question about the construction by saying "that's a textile plant," later telling an embassy officer that "that was our story at the time" and that "we have been misbehaving."[^1] The British diplomat [[Ian Smart]], third secretary in Tel Aviv, told Hersh that "there was a lot of talk by the end of 1960 about Dimona," that Israeli officials told the British embassy in turn that the site was a desert grasslands research institute and, at a military checkpoint, a "manganese-processing plant," and that during his last year he reported the "suspicion" that it looked like a nuclear reactor.[^5] [[Dino Brugioni]], a [[Central Intelligence Agency]] photo interpreter, told Hersh that officers watched the fencing, new road and subterranean digging on [[U-2 Spy Plane|U-2]] imagery.[^6]
 
-[[Machon 1]] houses the large, silver-domed reactor, a prominent structure 60 feet in diameter, visible even from nearby highways. This heavy-water moderated reactor utilizes uranium fuel rods, which remain within its core for approximately three months. The heavy water coolant is, in turn, cooled by ordinary water flowing through a heat exchanger, generating steam that, unlike in a conventional power plant, is vented directly into the atmosphere, creating a radioactive cloud [^3].
+Special National Intelligence Estimate 100-8-60 of December 8, 1960 stated that "Israel is engaged in construction of a nuclear reactor complex in the Negev near Beersheba" and that "plutonium production for weapons is at least one major purpose of this effort," and estimated that Israel would produce some weapons-grade plutonium in 1963 to 1964, possibly as early as 1962; a large part of the estimate remains classified. At a meeting of December 19, 1960 President [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] discussed Israeli fundraising in the United States and plans to encourage visits and [[International Atomic Energy Agency]] safeguards.[^1] Hersh wrote that [[Arthur Krock]] sent the New York Times reporter [[John W. Finney]] to the Atomic Energy Commission chairman [[John McCone]], who told him "They lied to us. The Israelis. They told us it was a textile plant," and that Finney's article appeared on the front page of December 19, 1960.[^7] Cohen and Burr called the late discovery "a major blunder," "an intelligence failure," and, from the Israeli side, "a tremendous counterintelligence success."[^1] The vault's pages on [[John L. Hadden]], [[Robert T. Webber]] and [[Carmelo Alba]] describe the American embassy's later efforts: Hersh wrote that Alba, then the U.S. Army's military attache, photographed the site monthly with a telescopic camera until a picture showed "smoke coming out of the dome," and that Hadden, the CIA station chief from 1963, sent Alba to Beersheba to count French names on mailboxes.[^8]
 
-The most sensitive and critical component of Dimona is [[Machon 2]], the chemical reprocessing plant, informally known as "The Tunnel." This six-level underground facility is where plutonium is meticulously extracted through chemical processes from the highly radioactive spent uranium rods. Operating around the clock for 34 weeks annually, "The Tunnel" is a testament to advanced engineering and stringent security. Within this facility, an observation area in the control room, affectionately dubbed "Golda's Balcony," commemorates [[Golda Meir|Prime Minister Golda Meir]]'s frequent visits during her tenure [^3]. On level five of "The Tunnel," weapons-grade plutonium is precisely molded into hemispheres for warheads within sealed glove boxes, alongside the fabrication of other crucial chemicals like lithium and beryllium. Vanunu's accounts indicated a steady weekly production of 1.2 kilograms of pure plutonium [^3].
+### American visits, 1961 to 1969
 
-Beyond the core reprocessing functions, other Machons contribute to the overall operation. [[Machon 3]] is responsible for converting lithium-6 into a solid form suitable for nuclear warheads and for processing natural uranium for the reactor. [[Machon 4]] manages the waste treatment processes for the radioactive residues generated by Machon 2. [[Machon 5]] applies an aluminum coating to the uranium rods, prepared in Machon 3, before their insertion into the reactor. [[Machon 6]] provides essential basic services and power to the entire Dimona complex. Advanced research and development take place in [[Machon 8]], which notably includes [[Special Unit 840]], where Israeli scientists pioneered a gas centrifuge method for uranium enrichment. Further enrichment capabilities are housed in [[Machon 9]], a laser-isotope-reprocessing facility. Finally, [[Machon 10]] is dedicated to the chemical isolation of depleted uranium, which is then prepared for military applications or commercial sale [^3]. The facility also includes specialized units for tritium production, with Unit 92 having removed tritium from heavy water since the 1960s, and Unit 93, opened in 1984, focusing on large-scale tritium production. Tritium is a vital component for "boosted" fission weapons and neutron bombs, underscoring Israel's pursuit of sophisticated nuclear designs [^3].
+Hersh wrote that Ben-Gurion insisted that inspection by the [[International Atomic Energy Agency]] would violate Israeli sovereignty, and that [[John F. Kennedy]]'s White House agreed to an American team on terms by which it "would have to schedule its visits well in advance, and with the full acquiescence of Israel. There would be no spot checks permitted."[^9] He wrote that [[Floyd L. Culler, Jr.]] dated the first inspection to 1962 and that Culler's teams made the visits.[^10] According to Hersh, the Israeli scheme "based on plans supplied by the French" built a false control room at Dimona "complete with false control panels and computer-driven measuring devices that seemed to be gauging the thermal output of a twenty-four-megawatt reactor"; Culler told him he reported to the White House that the reactor was a "standard reactor," and when informed of the false room replied, "It's possible to make a system appear that it's controlling something when it's not." A former member of the Israeli General Staff Reconnaissance Unit told Hersh that weeks before an inspection soldiers brought "eight semitrailers loaded with grass. It was sod, all for camouflage," to cover walks and bunkers.[^11] The CIA photo interpreter Brugioni told Hersh that the sudden grass "just spotlights activity."[^11]
 
-### Security and Secrecy
+The documents of 1969 give the American side. On March 17, 1969 Secretary of Defense [[Melvin Laird]] wrote to the Secretary of State, the national security adviser and the Director of Central Intelligence, under the subject "Stopping the Introduction of Nuclear Weapons Into the Middle East," that he had seen "additional evidence of activity" (the object is redacted), referred to export licenses granted the previous June and October for two Control Data 6400 computers and one IBM 360/65 computer, and endorsed [[David Packard]]'s recommendation that shipment of the second CDC 6400 be withheld.[^12] The visit of July 10 to 13, 1969 was, in a State Department memorandum of June 12, 1970, "the last 'visit' to Dimona"; the memorandum added that "no one in the U.S. community has been satisfied with the restrictions and conditions Israel has imposed."[^13] In a memorandum of conversation of August 13, 1969 between Dr. Charles H. Reichardt, the AEC's Director of Intelligence, his deputy Charles A. Sommer, George B. Pleat, chief of the Dimona inspection team, and a State Department officer, the team was said to have drawn "the inference that the US government is not prepared to support a real 'inspection' effort," to have been "cautioned to avoid controversy" and to "be gentlemen," and to have been "criticized roundly" by the Israelis on one occasion "for having 'acted like inspectors'"; the State officer added that "visits conducted under these approaches may even be counter-productive."[^14] A State Department background paper of September 19, 1969 for the visit of Golda Meir, drafted by Robert H. Munn and cleared by [[Joseph Sisco]], [[Rodger Davies]], the Atomic Energy Commission and a CIA officer named Chamberlain, stated: "Our 'visits' to Dimona have shed virtually no light on the role that site may play in a weapons program," that "we have actually learned very little from the standpoint of a weapons program," that Israel had since about 1963 "moved as rapidly as possible" on strategic missiles and warheads, that "all the facilities required for production of plutonium have been identified with the exception of a separation plant," that "others feel confident that Israel already has one or more complete nuclear weapons now," and that Israel's formula was "Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Near East."[^15] [[Henry Kissinger]]'s memorandum of October 7, 1969, "Discussions with the Israelis on Nuclear Matters," was written after the meeting of [[Richard Nixon]] and Meir.[^16] Hersh wrote that the Israeli leadership "correctly interpreted the end of the Culler inspections as an American carte blanche."[^17]
 
-From its inception, Dimona has been shrouded in an unparalleled veil of secrecy, a testament to Israel's determination to conceal its nuclear ambitions. The Israeli government consistently maintained elaborate cover stories, publicly asserting that the facility was solely dedicated to peaceful purposes such as scientific research, seawater desalinization, or agricultural development [^4]. This narrative was meticulously crafted to deflect international scrutiny.
+### Facilities, as described by Vanunu
 
-Despite these denials, American intelligence, particularly through [[U-2 Spy Plane|U-2]] spy plane overflights beginning in the late 1950s, gathered early evidence of the clandestine construction. From 1962 to 1969, American inspection teams, notably led by [[Floyd L. Culler, Jr.]], conducted scheduled visits to Dimona. However, these inspections were largely a "whitewash," as Israel employed sophisticated deception tactics. This included the construction of a false control room, complete with fake panels and measuring devices designed to mimic a 24 MW research reactor, and the use of elaborate camouflage, such as covering bunkers with sod, to mislead inspectors [^5]. The inspections ultimately ceased in 1969 under the [[Nixon Administration]], which implicitly acknowledged Israel's nuclear status without public declaration.
+Mordecai Vanunu, a technician, gave photographs and an account to the London Sunday Times in 1986 that Hersh summarized as follows. The complex has a main reactor and at least eight other buildings (machons). Machon 1 houses the silver-domed reactor, 60 feet in diameter and visible from a nearby highway, with uranium rods left in the core about three months, heavy water cooled by ordinary water through a heat exchanger, and steam vented into the atmosphere. Machon 2, "the Tunnel," is the six-level underground reprocessing plant where plutonium is extracted; its control room contains an observation area called "Golda's Balcony" for Meir's visits after 1969; plutonium is molded into hemispheres in glove boxes on level five, with lithium compounds and beryllium; and Vanunu gave the output as a weekly average of nine "buttons" of plutonium weighing 1.2 kilograms. Machon 3 converts lithium 6 and processes natural uranium; Machon 4 treats waste; Machon 5 coats rods with aluminum; Machon 6 supplies services and power; Machon 8 holds a test laboratory and Special Unit 840, "where Israeli scientists have developed a gas centrifuge method of enriching uranium for weapons use"; Machon 9 holds a laser-isotope facility; Machon 10 isolates depleted uranium. Unit 92 had been removing tritium from heavy water since the 1960s and Unit 93, opened in 1984, produced tritium on a large scale. The reactor ran 34 weeks a year.[^18] Vanunu's account is the sole source for these passages; Hersh's note states that the nuclear physicist Frank Barnaby spent two days with Vanunu for the Sunday Times and concluded that the account "is totally convincing." The vault's pages on [[Machon 1]], [[Machon 2]], [[Machon 3]], [[Machon 4]], [[Machon 5]], [[Machon 6]], [[Machon 8]], [[Machon 9]] and [[Machon 10]] carry the individual descriptions.
 
-The protection of Dimona's secrets was a paramount concern, leading to the creation of the Office of Special Tasks (later known as [[LAKAM]]), an intelligence agency specifically tasked with this mission. Led by figures like [[Binyamin Blumberg]], LAKAM agents operated globally, collecting technical information and establishing front companies to acquire high-tech equipment that would otherwise be denied to Israel due to export controls [^3]. Israeli security forces maintained constant vigilance, actively monitoring and deterring any attempts at unauthorized photography or infiltration, engaging in a prolonged "cat-and-mouse game" with American intelligence [^6].
+### The security apparatus
 
-### Nuclear Arsenal and Testing
+Hersh wrote that [[Binyamin Blumberg]], a former military intelligence officer chosen by Peres, headed the Office of Special Tasks, later known as [[LAKAM]], placed in the Defense Ministry to protect the nuclear project, collect technical information abroad and set up front companies for restricted equipment.[^19] He wrote that Israeli forces watched for photography, that aircraft, "including those belonging to the Israeli Air Force," are forbidden to overfly the site, and that in 1967 an Israeli Mirage was shot down in its airspace.[^20]
 
-Dimona's operational success paved the way for Israel's emergence as a nuclear power. Well-placed Israeli sources indicate that at least one successful low-yield nuclear test was conducted in an underground cavern in the Negev Desert during the mid-1960s [^7]. By early 1968, Dimona had transitioned to full-scale production, manufacturing an estimated 4 to 5 warheads annually. By the time of the [[Yom Kippur War]] in September 1973, Israel's nuclear arsenal comprised, according to Seymour Hersh, at least 20 warheads.[^8]
+### Output and tests, as reported by Hersh
 
-A significant event in Israel's nuclear history occurred on September 22, 1979, when Israel, in conjunction with [[South Africa]], conducted a low-yield nuclear test over the [[South Indian Ocean]]. This event was detected by the [[VELA Satellite|U.S. VELA satellite]], providing concrete evidence of Israel's nuclear capability [^9]. Vanunu's later revelations further underscored the sophistication of Israel's nuclear program, suggesting its capacity to manufacture advanced thermonuclear weapons, including low-yield neutron bombs [^3].
+Hersh wrote that "sometime early in 1968, Dimona finally was ordered into full-scale production and began turning out four or five warheads a year," and, in another chapter, that by 1973 "according to former Israeli government officials, the Israeli nuclear arsenal totaled at least twenty warheads"; his chapter on the Tunnel states a figure of more than twenty-five by the Yom Kippur War.[^21] He wrote that "well-placed Israeli sources" said that technicians conducted "at least one successful low-yield nuclear test sometime in the mid-1960s at an underground cavern" in the Negev.[^22]
 
-### Strategic Significance
+On September 22, 1979 the Vela 6911 satellite recorded a double flash over the South Indian Ocean; the technicians of the [[Air Force Technical Applications Center]] at [[Patrick Air Force Base]] had seen 41 earlier double flashes, each confirmed as a nuclear explosion.[^23] Hersh wrote that "former Israeli government officials, whose information on other aspects of Dimona's activities has been corroborated," said the event was a low-yield Israeli artillery shell tested with the South African Navy observing and was the third such test over the ocean; he wrote that the presidential science adviser [[Frank Press]] wanted the review panel to buy time and that an aide recalled Press "did not want that panel to conclude there had been a nuclear explosion."[^24] The panel chaired by [[Jack Ruina]], which included [[Richard Garwin]], [[Luis Alvarez]] and [[Wolfgang Panofsky]], concluded in May 1980 that the signal was more likely a meteoroid striking the satellite and sunlight reflecting off the ejected particles, while reports from [[Los Alamos National Laboratory]], [[SRI International]], [[Sandia National Laboratories]], the [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] and the [[Aerospace Corporation]] published in 2006 included several that held a nuclear test most probable.[^23] See [[VELA Satellite]] and [[Nuclear Intelligence Panel]].
 
-The existence and output of Dimona form the bedrock of Israel's nuclear deterrent strategy. The facility's continuous production of plutonium and its capability to develop advanced warheads have enabled Israel to maintain a policy of "strategic ambiguity" regarding its nuclear capabilities. This deliberate lack of official confirmation, coupled with the implied threat of a nuclear arsenal, serves to enhance Israel's perceived security in a volatile and often hostile region. The The Samson Option (GFE), deeply intertwined with Dimona's capabilities, represents Israel's ultimate assurance against existential threats, a powerful and silent guarantor of its survival.
+### Doctrine and deterrence
+
+Hersh's title phrase, [[The Samson Option (GFE)|the Samson Option]], is treated on its own page. The official Israeli formula quoted in the American record of 1969, that Israel "will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Near East," was, in the State Department paper, a position on which Ambassador [[Yitzhak Rabin]] "failed to go beyond this position, or to agree to any refinement of understanding of the word 'introduce,'" and Israel made no reply to the American interpretation, put in a letter of November 27, 1968 by Assistant Secretary of Defense [[Paul Warnke]], that it meant "possess."[^15]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
-[^1]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991, Chapter 3.
-[^2]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991, Chapter 5.
-[^3]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991, Chapter 15.
-[^4]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991, Chapter 6.
-[^5]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991, Chapter 8.
-[^6]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991, Chapter 4.
-[^7]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991, Chapter 10.
-[^8]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991, Chapter 13.
-[^9]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991, Chapter 20.
+[^1]: Cohen, Avner, and William Burr, "The Eisenhower Administration and the Discovery of Dimona: March 1958-January 1961," National Security Archive, Nuclear Proliferation International History Project and Center for Nonproliferation Studies, April 15, 2015 (National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 510), with documents including SNIE 100-8-60 and the Eisenhower meeting record of December 19, 1960. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb510/
+[^2]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy.* Random House, 1991, chapter 3, "The French Connection." Full text read at https://archive.org/details/Sampson_Option
+[^3]: Hersh, *The Samson Option,* chapter 5, "Internal Wars" (French residents) and chapter 9, "Years of Pressure" (criticality in 1962).
+[^4]: Hersh, *The Samson Option,* chapter 5, "Internal Wars" (Committee of Thirty); chapter 8, "A Presidential Struggle" (Feinberg); chapter 10, "The Samson Option" (annual cost).
+[^5]: Hersh, *The Samson Option,* chapter 5, "Internal Wars," interview with Ian Smart, New York, July 23, 1989.
+[^6]: Hersh, *The Samson Option,* chapter 4, "First Knowledge."
+[^7]: Hersh, *The Samson Option,* chapter 6, "Going Public."
+[^8]: Hersh, *The Samson Option,* chapter 12, "The Ambassador," pp. 163-164.
+[^9]: Hersh, *The Samson Option,* chapter 8, "A Presidential Struggle," pp. 110-111.
+[^10]: Hersh, *The Samson Option,* chapter 8 (Culler's account of the first inspection in 1962).
+[^11]: Hersh, *The Samson Option,* chapter 8 (false control room; Culler) and chapter 10, pp. 131-132 (sod; Brugioni's comment is in the footnote on p. 131).
+[^12]: Laird, Melvin R., memorandum for the Secretary of State, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Director of Central Intelligence, "Stopping the Introduction of Nuclear Weapons Into the Middle East," March 17, 1969, sanitized, in National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 189, document 6. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-06.pdf
+[^13]: Munn, Robert H., to Sisco through Davies, "Scheduling of Visit to Dimona Reactor," June 12, 1970, EBB 189, document 29. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-29.pdf
+[^14]: Department of State, memorandum of conversation, "1969 Dimona Visit," August 13, 1969, EBB 189, document 16b. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-16b.pdf
+[^15]: Department of State, "Background: Israel's Nuclear Weapon and Missile Programs," enclosed in Executive Secretary Theodore L. Eliot to Henry Kissinger, September 19, 1969, EBB 189, document 21 (pp. 2 to 8, with drafting and clearance box). https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-21.pdf ; Cohen, Avner, and William Burr, "Israel crosses the threshold," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* May/June 2006.
+[^16]: Kissinger, Henry A., to the President, "Discussions with the Israelis on Nuclear Matters," October 7, 1969, EBB 189, document 22 (title and date; the National Security Archive's index describes it as written "in the wake of the Nixon-Meir meeting"). https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-22.pdf
+[^17]: Hersh, *The Samson Option,* chapter 16, "Prelude to War," on the end of the Culler inspections.
+[^18]: Hersh, *The Samson Option,* chapter 15, "The Tunnel."
+[^19]: Hersh, *The Samson Option,* chapter 5, "Internal Wars," and chapter 10 (Office of Special Tasks).
+[^20]: Hersh, *The Samson Option,* chapter 10, p. 131 and its footnote.
+[^21]: Hersh, *The Samson Option,* chapter 13, "An Israeli Decision" (1968 production; more than twenty-five bombs), and chapter 16, "Prelude to War" (at least twenty warheads by 1973).
+[^22]: Hersh, *The Samson Option,* chapter 10, p. 131.
+[^23]: Richelson, Jeffrey T., ed., "The Vela Incident: Nuclear Test or Meteoroid?" National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 190, May 5, 2006. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB190/index.htm
+[^24]: Hersh, *The Samson Option,* chapter 20, "An Israeli Test," pp. 271-273.

60 - PLACES/MILITARY_INSTALLATIONS/Fort Meade.md

@@ -1,23 +1,71 @@
 ---
+aliases:
+  - Fort Meade
+  - Fort George G. Meade
+  - Fort George Meade
+  - Ft. Meade
+  - Ft Meade
+  - Fort George G Meade
 created: 2025-07-22
-updated: 2025-07-22
+updated: 2026-10-05
 title: Fort Meade
 tags:
-  - Organization
-  - Government
-  - Military
-  - Intelligence
-  - USA
+  - MilitaryInstallation
   - Maryland
-description: Fort George G. Meade is a United States Army installation in Maryland, serving as a key center for intelligence and security operations, and a primary location for the Stargate Project.
+  - NSA
+  - INSCOM
+  - StargateProject
+  - GrillFlame
+  - CenterLane
+  - SunStreak
+  - RemoteViewing
+  - Intelligence
+description: Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, the Army post that has housed the National Security Agency since 1957 and hosted the Army and Defense Intelligence Agency remote viewing unit from 1977 to 1995.
 category: "Military Installation"
-summary: "Fort Meade is a sprawling U.S. Army installation in Maryland that houses the NSA, INSCOM, and was the home base for the STARGATE remote viewing unit from 1977 to 1995."
+location: "Maryland"
+summary: "Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, headquarters of the National Security Agency since 1957, was the site of the Army and Defense Intelligence Agency remote viewing unit from 1977 until its 1995 closure."
 ---
-[[Fort Meade]] (officially Fort George G. Meade) is a [[United States Army]] installation located in Maryland, approximately twenty-five miles northeast of Washington, D.C. It is a sprawling, town-like base that houses, among other things, the [[NSA]], the U.S. First Army, and a part of the Army's [[United States Army Intelligence and Security Command|Intelligence and Security Command]] (INSCOM).[^1]
+Fort George G. Meade, Maryland (postal address Fort Meade, MD 20755 on [[United States Army Intelligence and Security Command]] correspondence) became the headquarters of the [[NSA]] after a site board chose it in February 1952; the first personnel to arrive were 149 Marine guards, about 2,000 employees worked in barracks on Canine Road before construction ended, and the Operations 1 building was completed in 1957, after which the agency's communications intelligence staff moved in.[^1] The post also held the headquarters of the [[U.S. First Army]], named in a Grill Flame session report as "First Army Headquarters, Ft Meade MD."[^2] On the fort the [[U.S. Army]]'s 902d Military Intelligence Group, the Operations Security Group and the Systems Exploitation Detachment worked in numbered buildings, among them the Command SCIF in Building 4554.[^3][^4]
 
-Fort Meade served as a primary location for the [[Stargate Project]], the U.S. Army's secret psychic research program. The remote viewing unit, initially codenamed Gondola Wish and later Grill Flame, was established here in 1977. The unit's offices were initially located in building 4554, and later moved to buildings 2560 and 2561 on Llewellyn Street, which were refurbished by the remote viewers themselves to create quiet, secure spaces for their sessions.[^1]
+### Gondola Wish and the Army unit, 1976 to 1979
 
-Key figures in the Stargate Project, such as [[Frederick Atwater|Skip Atwater]], [[Murray Watt|Scotty Watt]], [[Mel Riley]], [[Joe McMoneagle]], and [[Ken Bell]], were stationed at Fort Meade. The base served as the operational hub for many of the remote viewing missions, with tasking requests originating from various offices throughout the U.S. intelligence community.[^1]
+[[Jim Schnabel]] wrote that [[Mel Riley]] was posted to the [[Operations Security Group]] at Fort Meade in 1976 and that the Systems Exploitation Team, set up by Brigadier General [[Edmund Thompson]] of the [[Army Intelligence Agency]], had offices down the hall in Building 4554; Lieutenant [[Frederick Atwater]] arrived in the summer of 1977, when the Army Intelligence Agency and the [[Army Security Agency]] were merged into the Intelligence and Security Command.[^3] The project Atwater proposed was given the code name Gondola Wish, with a few thousand dollars in travel money, cramped space in Building 4554 and Major [[Murray Watt]] as commanding officer; Schnabel placed the viewers' first quarters directly under a women's lavatory, and wrote that after complaints (including a howitzer salute on the parade ground that startled [[Ken Bell]] out of a session) the unit moved to Buildings 2560 and 2561 on Llewellyn Street, former bakery school and mess hall huts of the Second World War, which the viewers refurbished themselves, [[Joe McMoneagle]] painting a deep-space mural on a disused oven shield in 2561.[^3]
+
+An Army legal chronology shows a different date for the program's formal limits. Its entry for September 26, 1978 records a 902d Military Intelligence Group memorandum in which the Army staff office DAMI-ISH "cancelled GONDOLA WISH" because the [[Monroe Institute of Applied Sciences]] training was not cleared and "could be categorized as experimenting with human use"; the same chronology follows the Army General Counsel's opinion of February 1979 that [[Grill Flame]] could involve "testing on human subjects," a Surgeon General's subcommittee ruling of March 1979 that the Army protocol was "NO RISK, NO HUMAN USE," and the Under Secretary of the Army's concurrence, in early 1980, in continuing the in-house INSCOM program.[^5] The Defense Intelligence Agency's own history states that INSCOM assembled a unit in 1979, held its first operational sessions in September 1979 after a summer training phase at [[Stanford Research Institute]], and in December 1979 declared the in-house unit operational "having the capability to remote view targets of intelligence interest."[^6]
+
+### Visitors, 1982
+
+On February 9, 1982 Brigadier General [[James L. Dozier]], after his kidnapping, was briefed on Grill Flame at the Command SCIF (Building 4554) and asked to review viewers' sketches for correlation to places surrounding his kidnapping; the project manager, Lieutenant Colonel [[Robert Jachim]], decided not to have him sign a briefing certificate.[^7] A letter of April 14, 1982 from the Defense Intelligence Agency's Intelligence Programs office to the staff director of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence arranged for up to six members and staff to visit "Army's GRILL FLAME facility at Fort Meade," adding that "much of the concern should be laid to rest by the Fort Meade trip."[^8] On May 4, 1982 Annette Smiley of the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence]] staff was briefed at Building T-2561, where McMoneagle presented completed evaluated projects and Atwater walked her through Building T-2560; the record states that she explained that the only reason she was there was "the strong support for GRILL FLAME" by a committee member from North Carolina (the name is withheld), and that Grill Flame "had been cut in the Senate."[^9] On June 29, 1982 three Senate Appropriations Committee staff members, with [[Jack Vorona]] of the Defense Intelligence Agency, were briefed at T-2561.[^10]
+
+### Center Lane and Sun Streak
+
+A Center Lane information paper for the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, dated March 7, 1985, lists initial orientation training of one to two months at Fort Meade, advanced training in which the Monroe "Discovery" series was "done at Fort Meade to screen personnel" before a Gateway program in Virginia, "applications training" in "specially designed hemi-sync environments" at Fort Meade, and states that facilities at Kimbrough Army Hospital, Fort Meade, "are available if required."[^11] After the Defense Intelligence Agency took the unit in 1986 under [[Sun Streak]], with twelve billets authorized, a December 1992 staff study called its project, then named [[Stargate Project|Star Gate]], one "housed in temporary facilities at Fort George G. Meade."[^12]
+
+That staff study, prepared after the fiscal 1993 defense authorization conference report directed the agency to study moving Star Gate to the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center at [[Fort Detrick]], records visits by Star Gate managers to the center on October 9 and 22, 1992, a meeting of the center's director, deputy, chief scientist and life sciences chief on October 14, and an inspection of the Fort Meade facility by the center's deputy director on October 29. Arguments for the move included that "Fort Meade is an open military post; Fort Detrick has controlled access through a guarded gate," that the Star Gate building was "a substandard World War II pre-fabricated frame structure," that the project reached the Defense Intelligence Agency's electronic mail only by "commercial telephone and facsimile service," and that the medical center had a reserve attorney who could assess human use compliance. Arguments against included an AFMIC concern that Star Gate methods "might damage AFMIC's credibility," a concern about a repeat of the "Yellow Rain" controversy, and the project manager's opinion that "the Fort Meade facility is ideal." A later Defense Intelligence Agency summary states that "a decision was made to retain the project at Fort Meade."[^12][^13]
+
+### Closure, 1995
+
+The Central Intelligence Agency's transfer chronology for 1995 records an all-day visit by the agency and a representative of its Office of Military Affairs to "Ft. Meade to meet all program personnel and discuss transfer" on March 15, an independent contractor hired to compile bibliographies who began work at Fort Meade "immediately," a memorandum of understanding between the U.S. Army and the agency in April with funds "officially transferred to Pentagon," and a May entry in which the Defense Intelligence Agency told the agency it would reassign the Star Gate personnel because the review would not end by July 1.[^14] An agency memorandum of April 11, 1995 states that unclassified reports were moved to the agency's Office of Research and Development, classified reports were retained "in appropriate containers at the Star Gate facility," and "all additional or duplicate copies of contractor reports at the facility were destroyed."[^15]
+
+### Later contracts paid at Fort Meade
+
+The Defense Intelligence Agency's 2008 award HHM402-08-C-0072 to [[Bigelow Aerospace Advanced Space Studies]], issued by the [[Virginia Contracting Activity]] at [[Bolling Air Force Base]], names the NSA Finance and Accounting Office at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755-6856, as the office making payment.[^16]
 
 ### Footnotes
-[^1]: Schnabel, Jim. *Remote Viewers*. Dell, 1997.
+
+[^1]: National Security Agency, "The Move to Fort Meade," Cryptologic Almanac article. https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/nsa/cryptoalmanac/The_Move_to_Fort_Meade.pdf
+[^2]: INSCOM Grill Flame session report noting "First Army Headquarters, Ft Meade MD," CIA-RDP96-00788R000900410001-8. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection.
+[^3]: Schnabel, Jim. *Remote Viewers: The Secret History of America's Psychic Spies.* Dell, 1997, chapters on Riley, Atwater and Gondola Wish.
+[^4]: Memorandum for the record, "Conversation with BG Dozier," February 22, 1982, CIA-RDP96-00788R000700130019-2 (Command SCIF, Building 4554); INSCOM message traffic addressed to "CDR 902D MI GP FT MEADE MD," CIA-RDP96-00788R000100250011-3.
+[^5]: "Human Use Chronology," Army staff, CIA-RDP96-00788R001100430001-3. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection (the scan's columns are misaligned; entries are as legible).
+[^6]: Defense Intelligence Agency, *Government-Sponsored Research in Psychoenergetics,* February 1989, section on INSCOM, CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9.
+[^7]: Memorandum for the record, "Conversation with BG Dozier," February 22, 1982, CIA-RDP96-00788R000700130019-2.
+[^8]: Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Programs, letter to Robert R. Simmons, Staff Director, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, April 14, 1982, CIA-RDP96-00788R001100400017-9.
+[^9]: Memorandum for the record, "Briefing of Ms. Annette Smiley," May 7, 1982, CIA-RDP96-00788R001100190010-0.
+[^10]: Memorandum for ADCSOPS-HUMINT, "Briefing for Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) Staffers," July 7, 1982, CIA-RDP96-00788R001100290001-9.
+[^11]: *Center Lane Information Papers for Director, Defense Intelligence Agency,* March 7, 1985, CIA-RDP96-00788R000400060001-2.
+[^12]: Defense Intelligence Agency, Staff Study, "Transfer of Project Star Gate to the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center," December 1992, CIA-RDP96-00789R002500130001-0.
+[^13]: Defense Intelligence Agency, "Senate Appropriations Committee Congressionally Directed Action: Star Gate," CIA-RDP96-00789R002900010001-9.
+[^14]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Star Gate Transfer Chronology: 1995," CIA-RDP96-00791R000200190017-9.
+[^15]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Research and Development, memorandum for the record, "Status of Contractor Reports and Annotated Bibliographies," April 11, 1995, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200170009-0.
+[^16]: Defense Intelligence Agency, Standard Form 1449, order HHM402-08-C-0072, September 22, 2008, released in FOIA-00269-2018. https://documents2.theblackvault.com/documents/dia/AAWSAP/FOIA-00269-2018-.pdf