vault backup: 2026-10-14 14:52:51

10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Albert Biderman.md

@@ -9,10 +9,10 @@ tags:
   - Interrogation
   - BehavioralControl
   - BSSR
-summary: "Air Force social scientist at the Bureau of Social Science Research whose 1957 analysis of Communist coercion methods produced the Chart of Coercion, a document later reverse-engineered into SERE training and applied directly at Guantanamo Bay by military interrogators in 2002."
+summary: "Air Force social scientist at the Bureau of Social Science Research whose 1957 analysis of Communist coercion produced the Chart of Coercion, later adapted into SERE training and taught at Guantanamo Bay in 2002."
 location: Washington, D.C.
 created: 2026-06-04
-updated: 2026-06-04
+updated: 2026-10-14
 ---
 Albert D. Biderman was a sociologist at the [[Bureau of Social Science Research]] (BSSR) in [[Washington, D.C.]], who conducted [[United States Air Force|Air Force]]-funded research on the coercive interrogation methods applied to American prisoners during the [[Korean War]]. His analysis identified the psychological mechanisms underlying apparent "brainwashing" and produced the Chart of Coercion, a taxonomy of eight coercive control methods. Originally framed as a defensive document to help American servicemen recognize Communist coercion techniques, the chart was incorporated into [[SERE]] training and in 2002 was taught at [[Guantanamo Bay]] as an interrogation template.
 
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Biderman's contributions to the volume situated the Chart of Coercion within a b
 
 ### KUBARK and CIA Connections
 
-The Bureau of Social Science Research appears in secondary accounts as one of the CIA's conduit organizations for behavioral research funding during the [[MKULTRA]] period. No specific MKULTRA subproject number for Biderman's work has been identified in declassified records.
+The Bureau of Social Science Research appears in secondary accounts as one of the CIA's conduit organizations for behavioral research funding during the [[MKULTRA]] period. No specific MKULTRA subproject number for Biderman's work has been identified in declassified records. The bureau's Air Force Office of Scientific Research contracts include AF 49(638)727, under which it issued Biderman's *Cultural Models of Captivity Relationships* (February 1961), and AF 49(638)1344, under which Biderman's *Chinese "Thought Reform" as a Source of Perspectives toward Western Correctional Practice* (May 1965) was prepared.[^8][^9]
 
 KUBARK's adoption of Biderman's framework placed his taxonomy directly into the Agency's operational interrogation doctrine. The manual used his analysis of the psychological conditions necessary for compliance as the theoretical basis for its guidance on handling resistant sources.
 
@@ -59,3 +59,5 @@ The [[Senate Armed Services Committee]]'s 2008 inquiry into the treatment of det
 [^5]: Central Intelligence Agency, *KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation*, July 1963. Declassified 1997.
 [^6]: Albert D. Biderman, *March to Calumny: The Story of American POW's in the Korean War*. Macmillan, 1963.
 [^7]: Senate Armed Services Committee. *Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody*, November 20, 2008 (released April 22, 2009). https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Detainee-Report-Final_April-22-2009.pdf
+[^8]: Biderman, Albert D., *Cultural Models of Captivity Relationships*, BSSR Research Report 339-4, Bureau of Social Science Research, Washington, D.C., February 1961, Contract No. AF 49(638)727, DTIC AD0257325. https://archive.org/details/DTIC_AD0257325
+[^9]: Biderman, Albert D., *Chinese "Thought Reform" as a Source of Perspectives toward Western Correctional Practice*, AFOSR 65-1205, May 20, 1965, Bureau of Social Science Research, Inc., Contract No. AF 49(638)1344, DTIC AD0623172. https://archive.org/details/DTIC_AD0623172

10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/George Francis Bason, Jr..md

@@ -1,33 +1,209 @@
 ---
 category: "Law Enforcement & Legal"
 created: 2024-04-25
-updated: 2026-05-01
+updated: 2026-10-14
 tags:
   - Person
-  - PROMIS
-  - DoJ
-  - INSLAW
+  - Promis
+  - Doj
+  - Inslaw
   - Judge
-summary: "George Francis Bason Jr. was the D.C. Bankruptcy Court judge who ruled in 1987 that the DOJ stole INSLAW's PROMIS software by trickery, fraud, and deceit, and whose non-reappointment generated allegations of DOJ retaliation."
+  - BankruptcyCourt
+  - Reappointment
+  - AmericanUniversity
+aliases:
+  - George Francis Bason Jr.
+  - George F. Bason
+  - George F. Bason Jr.
+  - George Francis Bason
+  - George Bason
+  - Judge Bason
+summary: "George Francis Bason Jr. was the District of Columbia bankruptcy judge who ruled in 1987 that the Justice Department took INSLAW's PROMIS software by trickery, fraud and deceit, and whose non-reappointment prompted allegations of retaliation."
+relations:
+  - type: employed_by
+    with: "[[American University]]"
+    role: "assistant professor, then associate professor of law"
+    start: 1966
+    end: 1972-06-30
+    fn: 1
+  - type: employed_by
+    with: "[[United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia]]"
+    role: "bankruptcy judge"
+    start: 1984-02-08
+    end: 1988-02-08
+    fn: 2
+  - type: participant_in
+    with: "[[PROMIS Software Scandal]]"
+    role: "presiding judge in the INSLAW adversary proceeding"
+    start: 1987-06
+    end: 1988-01-25
+    fn: 3
 ---
-George Francis Bason Jr. was appointed to the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia on February 8, 1984, to fill a vacancy. His four-year term expired February 8, 1988. The two proceedings he presided over in the [[INSLAW]] case produced the most damaging judicial findings against the [[Department of Justice|DOJ]] in the [[PROMIS Software Scandal]] - findings that were ultimately reversed on jurisdictional grounds but that shaped congressional investigations for years afterward.[^1]
+George Francis Bason Jr. was a law professor at [[American University]] from 1966 to 1972 and a judge of the [[United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia]] from February 8, 1984, to February 8, 1988, filling the vacancy left by [[Roger Whelan]].[^1][^2] The two proceedings he presided over in the [[INSLAW]] case produced the most damaging judicial findings against the [[Department of Justice|DOJ]] in the [[PROMIS Software Scandal]].[^3] The [[United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit|D.C. Circuit]] reversed the adversary ruling in 1991 on jurisdictional grounds.[^4]
+
+### Career Before the Bench
+
+Bason joined the law faculty of American University in 1966 as an assistant professor and became an associate professor in 1969. His reappointments carried favorable comments, and in the fall of 1970 the university's tenure committee voted to offer a one-year terminal contract in place of a recommendation for tenure, with no reasons formally communicated to him. His employment ended June 30, 1972. He sued the university for breach of contract in November 1973. After the trial court granted summary judgment to the university, the D.C. Court of Appeals, with [[Thomas Penfield Jackson]] as his counsel, reversed on April 24, 1980 and remanded for trial, and the parties then settled out of court.[^1][^5] A 1988 magazine profile described him as a Harvard Law School graduate and former law professor, and gave his age as 56.[^6]
+
+An attorney directory lists bar admissions in North Carolina (1956), the District of Columbia (1958) and Maryland (1989), and places him after the bench in a bankruptcy practice in Bethesda, Maryland.[^7] He wrote the bankruptcy volume of West's Legal Forms (second edition, 1984).[^8]
+
+### Early Rulings
+
+In a July 17, 1987 letter to Attorney General [[Edwin Meese]] transmitting one of his orders, Bason pointed to the paragraph inviting the Attorney General "to designate an appropriate official outside" the department to deal with the case.[^9] On July 31, 1987, he denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the adversary proceeding, holding that a complaint may not be dismissed unless it appears "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief."[^10]
 
 ### The Independent Handling Proceeding (June 1987)
 
-In June 1987, after INSLAW filed for independent handling of its bankruptcy case on the grounds that the DOJ could not be trusted to administer it fairly, Bason found that DOJ had "unlawfully, intentionally and willfully" attempted to convert INSLAW's Chapter 11 reorganization into a Chapter 7 liquidation "without justification and by improper means." The ruling was based partly on testimony from Anthony Pasciuto, Deputy Director of the Executive Office of U.S. Trustees, who initially stated that DOJ Director Thomas Stanton had pressured U.S. Trustee [[William White]] to force the company into liquidation. Bason also found that Stanton had struck a bargain with [[C. Madison Brewer]] to achieve this conversion.[^1]
+On February 25, 1987, INSLAW applied to the bankruptcy court for independent handling of its adversary proceeding, asking that the Department conduct the case "completely and entirely independent of any Department of Justice officials who are involved in the allegations." The petition charged that [[C. Madison Brewer]] was biased against the company.[^11] In March 1987 [[Bill Hamilton]] and [[Nancy Hamilton]] met [[Anthony Pasciuto]], deputy director of the [[Executive Office for United States Trustees]]. Pasciuto testified to the Senate subcommittee staff that he told them he had heard from the U.S. Trustee [[William White]] that the office's director, [[Thomas Stanton]], had called White repeatedly to express displeasure with his handling of the case and had pressured him to act against INSLAW. Nancy Hamilton's contemporaneous notes read "St call Wh & sd had to be convertd," while Pasciuto told the staff he did not remember using the word "convert."[^12]
+
+[[Cornelius Blackshear]], the former U.S. Trustee for the Southern District of New York, testified in a March 25, 1987 deposition that White had told him Stanton thought the case should be converted or dismissed and wanted one of Blackshear's assistants detailed to Washington, and answered "Yes" when asked whether White had said he had received pressure from Stanton to have the case converted to Chapter 7. Within two days he signed an affidavit recanting that testimony, stating that after two telephone conversations with White he now recalled that no such discussion took place. White, Stanton and the assistant, Harold Jones, contradicted Pasciuto's account.[^13] The Senate subcommittee staff wrote that facts it obtained, including tape recordings of an American Bar Association conference session, "severely undercut the credibility of Blackshear's recantation."[^14]
+
+At the close of the hearing in June 1987, Bason gave oral findings that Brewer had obtained a commitment from the Executive Office for United States Trustees to convert INSLAW's Chapter 11 reorganization into a Chapter 7 liquidation.[^15] The written findings of January 25, 1988 state that DOJ "unlawfully, intentionally and willfully sought to cause the conversion of INSLAW's Chapter 11 reorganization case to a Chapter 7 liquidation case without justification and by improper means."[^16] Bason found that Stanton had struck a bargain with Brewer under which Stanton would make efforts to liquidate the company, and that Brewer "sought and obtained assistance for his unlawful plan from Thomas Stanton, Director of the Executive Office for U.S. Trustees."[^17]
+
+Deputy Attorney General [[Arnold Burns]] referred allegations of misconduct against Pasciuto to the [[Office of Professional Responsibility]] in July 1987, and on December 18, 1987 the office recommended that Pasciuto be fired. Its memorandum stated: "Mr. Pasciuto's recantation notwithstanding, Judge Bason relied on [Pasciuto's] testimony about his remarks at the breakfast meeting to support his conclusion that Mr. Stanton engaged in misconduct. We have found no evidence that this conclusion was at all correct."[^18] The Special Counsel's report states that the office recommended termination primarily because of Pasciuto's admitted decision to harm Stanton by any means possible, including providing false information to the Hamiltons.[^19] A House Judiciary Committee report states that Pasciuto recanted at trial under strong pressure from senior Department officials, and that his attorney wrote on March 17, 1988 that what Pasciuto had told the Hamiltons was true and that he had backed away at trial because Blackshear and White would not acknowledge the truth and Stanton was pressuring him over an appointment as an Assistant U.S. Trustee.[^20] The Office of Professional Responsibility reported on March 31, 1989 that Bason's independent-handling findings were "clearly erroneous" and that no evidence showed Department employees had tried to pressure White to convert the case.[^21]
 
 ### The Adversary Proceeding (September 1987)
 
-After a two-week liability trial, Bason ruled on September 28, 1987, that the DOJ had "taken, converted, stole, INSLAW's enhanced PROMIS by trickery, fraud, and deceit." He found that [[C. Madison Brewer]] had "developed an intense and abiding hatred" for [[Bill Hamilton]] and had "devised a strategy to have the government 'ruin' INSLAW," with his "poisonous attitude" infecting other DOJ personnel who administered the contract. Bason further concluded that [[Lowell Jensen]]'s "biased attitude toward Inslaw contributed to the situation in which Inslaw's complaints about Brewer and the administration of the PROMIS implementation contract went unheeded." Bason awarded approximately $6.8 million in damages and attorneys' fees against DOJ.[^1]
+After a two-week liability trial in July 1987,[^22] Bason ruled from the bench on September 28, 1987. The transcript of the ruling, reprinted in an appendix to the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations staff study, records him stating that there were two major categories of findings, each standing independently of the other. The first was that Brewer, believing he had been wrongfully discharged by Hamilton and INSLAW, "developed an intense and abiding hatred for Mr. Hamilton and Inslaw" and applied for the project manager position in order "to vent his spleen against Inslaw." The second was that "the Department of Justice took, converted, stole, Inslaw's enhanced PROMIS by trickery, fraud, and deceit," and had used and continued to use the enhanced version in about 45 U.S. Attorney's offices, beyond the 20 in which it was entitled to use a different version.[^23]
 
-The D.C. Circuit Court affirmed Bason's adversary ruling in November 1989, with Judge William Bryant finding "convincing, perhaps compelling support" for the bankruptcy court's conclusions. In May 1991, however, the Court of Appeals reversed all lower court rulings on jurisdictional grounds, finding the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction because DOJ possessed PROMIS under a claim of right at the time of INSLAW's bankruptcy filing. The reversal vacated Bason's findings entirely.[^1]
+In the same ruling Bason said that Brewer's subordinate [[Jack Rugh]] and the contracting officer [[Peter Videnieks]] "were infected with this poisonous attitude by Mr. Brewer and they aided and assisted him." He described the Department's stated concerns about INSLAW's financial viability as "a smoke screen," and said that once the Department obtained the proprietary enhancements it "engaged in an outrageous, deceitful, fraudulent game of cat and mouse, demonstrating contempt for both the law and any principle of fair dealing."[^24] Of the testimony of William Tyson that Brewer's attitude toward INSLAW was "positive, constructive and favorable in every way," he said "that is so ludicrous that there is no way that I can believe anything the man has to say."[^25] Of [[Stuart Schiffer]], with whom he had held an in-chambers discussion on the record, he said it was obvious from his demeanor that "the entire Department of Justice was in a completely defense attitude."[^26] Bason also observed that [[Lowell Jensen]] had acknowledged in deposition the general principle against hiring a person to supervise a contract with his former employer, without any sign that he saw its application to Brewer and INSLAW.[^27]
 
-### Non-Reappointment and Retaliation Allegations
+The written findings of January 25, 1988 state that Brewer "developed an intense and abiding hatred for Hamilton and INSLAW" and applied for the position "with the purpose of using that position to vent his spleen against INSLAW," and that Rugh and Videnieks "were infected by Brewer's poisonous attitude towards Hamilton and INSLAW, and they aided and assisted Brewer in his wrongful efforts to injure INSLAW."[^28] They describe the issues Brewer raised as forming "the basis for Brewer's effort to ruin INSLAW and to bring about DOJ's wrongful use of INSLAW's Enhanced PROMIS software."[^29] As the Special Counsel's report summarized the findings, Bason held that Brewer "devised and implemented a strategy to ruin Inslaw because of his intense hatred of Inslaw," and concluded that Jensen's biased attitude toward INSLAW contributed to the situation in which the company's complaints about Brewer and the administration of the PROMIS contract went unheeded.[^30]
 
-Bason sought early reappointment in 1987, while his Inslaw rulings were pending. The selection committee chose not to reappoint him; his term expired as scheduled in February 1988. Bason subsequently alleged that the DOJ had improperly influenced the selection process in retaliation for his rulings. On January 12, 1988, he sent a 14-page letter to Chief Judge [[Patricia Wald]] alleging DOJ obstruction of his reappointment. The DOJ moved to recuse him from further Inslaw proceedings on the basis of this letter; Bason denied the motion, and the denial was upheld on appeal. Just before leaving office, on February 1, 1988, Bason filed an unsuccessful lawsuit seeking to block his successor, S. Martin Teel Jr., from being sworn in.[^1]
+On February 2, 1988, Bason ordered DOJ to pay INSLAW about $6.8 million in licensing fees and roughly $1 million in legal costs, and postponed a decision on punitive damages.[^31] He told a Barron's reporter that a few days before he left the bench he had restrained the [[Internal Revenue Service]] from going after the Hamiltons personally, by an order lasting ten days.[^32] The award came during the week before he left the bench.[^33]
 
-The Special Counsel's investigation found no evidence that anyone had improperly influenced the selection process, concluding that Bason's allegations rested on speculation and uncorroborated information. The Bua Report found Bason's blanket adverse credibility assessments of DOJ witnesses to be unwarranted and specifically disputed his conclusion that DOJ's financial concerns about INSLAW were pretextual.[^1]
+### Non-Reappointment
+
+Bason asked [[Patricia Wald]], chief judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, for reappointment by letter in May 1987, before the circuit had adopted a selection procedure, and in June 1987 the Circuit Executive sent the chief judges of the district court and the court of appeals a proposed procedure. Chief Judge [[Aubrey Robinson]] of the district court recommended four people for a merit selection panel: District Judge [[Norma Holloway Johnson]], who chaired it, Dean [[Jerome A. Barron]], [[Wesley Williams Jr.]] and [[Thomas C. Papson]]. Wald sent the invitations in the first week of August 1987, as testimony in the INSLAW case was concluding.[^34]
+
+Before Bason's September 28 oral ruling, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia held an INSLAW file but did no substantive work on the case. [[Royce Lamberth]], then chief of its civil division and sworn in as a district judge on November 16, 1987, obtained a transcript of the oral ruling and gave it to Johnson, who circulated it to the panel; it was the only judicial opinion circulated. The Special Counsel recorded that Lamberth had heard about the ruling from an assistant in his division who had preceded Brewer as PROMIS project manager at the [[Executive Office for United States Attorneys]], and that the assistant U.S. Attorney who handled the government's bankruptcy cases told him the government would be better off if Bason were not reappointed. Three panel members told the Special Counsel that the panel discussed the ruling and agreed it should not influence their evaluation.[^35] Schiffer, a deputy assistant attorney general, said he had almost certainly revealed his displeasure with Bason to Lamberth by joking that Lamberth's office should take over the case, and that he never encouraged Lamberth to speak to the panel.[^36]
+
+The panel invited bankruptcy practitioners to appear, and sixteen lawyers, including INSLAW's attorney [[Charles Work]], did so at a hearing on November 11, 1987. DOJ declined to appear.[^37] Roger Whelan, then a practicing bankruptcy attorney, told the panel by telephone that colleagues had complained that Bason was pro-debtor and slow. [[Charles Docter]], an INSLAW attorney, told the House Judiciary Committee that in July 1987 Whelan had complained about Bason's delay in ruling on a fee application and said Senior District Judge [[Irvin Gasch]] would organize opposition to his reappointment; Bason ruled on Whelan's application on July 17, 1987. Whelan acknowledged frustration over the delay and friendship with Gasch, and denied speaking to Docter or applying pressure.[^38]
+
+The panel received twelve applications and found six finalists worthy of further consideration, Bason among them. After a second round of interviews, [[S. Martin Teel Jr.]], an attorney in the Tax Division of the Department of Justice, received the most votes. On or about November 24, 1987, the panel sent the [[Judicial Council of the District of Columbia Circuit|Judicial Council]] a list of four names in order of preference, Teel first and Bason included.[^39] A confidential memorandum to Johnson dated December 8, 1987, unsigned and marked "read and destroy," described each finalist; the section on Bason included the phrases "inclined to make mountains out of molehills," "a pronounced and unrelenting reputation for favoring debtors," and "no inclination to come to grips personally with the management challenge posed by the terrible shortcomings of the Office of the Clerk of our Bankruptcy Court." The House committee reported that a judge and a panel member identified the author as another panel member, who denied writing it.[^40] Bason told the committee on July 22, 1992 that Judge Tim Murphy had served with Johnson on the D.C. Superior Court from 1970 to 1980 and had left the bench on April 15, 1985 to work for [[C. Madison Brewer]] as his assistant director on the Justice Department's PROMIS implementation.[^40]
+
+In an October 29, 1987 memorandum, Schiffer wrote that Bason had scheduled the next INSLAW trial for February 2, 1988 and that "Coincidentally, it has been my understanding that February 1 [1988] is the date on which he [Bason] will either be reappointed or replaced."[^41] Deputy Attorney General Burns had earlier asked the Civil Division to "consider initiatives for achieving a more favorable disposition of this matter," and Schiffer had asked [[Michael Hertz]], director of the Department's Commercial Litigation Branch, to investigate disqualifying Bason.[^41] The Special Counsel reported that Johnson telephoned Schiffer, with whom she had shared an office as a young staff attorney at DOJ in the early 1960s, during the selection process to ask for his candid appraisal of two DOJ candidates on the panel's short list, one of them Teel. Schiffer told the Special Counsel that he advised her DOJ had a sensitive matter pending before Bason, that Johnson replied she did not want to hear about Bason, that he knew nothing about Teel, who worked in the Tax Division, and that he said nothing about Bason. The House committee had stated that it had no information that Johnson talked to Schiffer about INSLAW, Bason or the selection process; it did not interview Schiffer.[^42]
+
+The Judicial Council, consisting of twelve active court of appeals judges and six district judges, met on December 15, 1987 and after about ninety minutes voted to recommend the first three names, Teel and Bason among them. Each finalist was interviewed by seven court of appeals judges, and on December 21, 1987 the judges of the court of appeals voted in person or by telephone; Teel "won by a substantial majority."[^43] Wald informed Bason on December 28, 1987 that he would not be reappointed.[^44] The district court's 1989 opinion dates the court of appeals' decision to January 11, 1988.[^45] A 1988 magazine article reprinted in the Senate staff study reported that only four of 136 federal bankruptcy judges seeking reappointment in the previous four years had been turned down, that the panel was headed by Johnson, "another former Justice Department lawyer," that Wald was "a former Justice Department employee," and that Washington attorneys called the action "shocking" and "eerie."[^46]
+
+Teel served as bankruptcy judge in the District of Columbia from February 8, 1988 until his retirement on March 22, 2020.[^47] In a March 27, 1992 interview with House investigators, he said that before his February 1988 appointment he had been assistant chief of the Tax Division and had supervised the tax portion of both the UPI and INSLAW matters for the Department. He said the decision to ask the court to convert INSLAW's case from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 in 1987 originated with the Internal Revenue Service, not the Department, and he declined to give a sworn statement.[^48] The Senate staff described him as having "made a brief appearance in the INSLAW case on behalf of the IRS."[^49] The House committee described him as a Justice Department attorney heavily involved in the litigation of the INSLAW case, and Bason told the committee that Teel's selection rested on expertise in tax law and that his bankruptcy litigation experience was extremely limited.[^50] A fee claim in the INSLAW bankruptcy was later assigned to a Maryland bankruptcy judge because of Teel's recusal.[^51]
+
+On January 12, 1988, Bason sent a fourteen-page letter to Wald with copies to every judge on the court of appeals, mostly addressing his qualifications and his administrative abilities, the lack of which he said was the only stated reason for the decision.[^52] The letter said that lawyers had suggested "a more sinister, hidden force" behind the decision, and that the Justice Department had undertaken "to influence the judicial selection process as a means of retaliation against me for my recent rulings."[^53] Bason later told the Special Counsel the "lawyers and others" were Nelson Deckelbaum, Marcie Docter and Nelson Kline, none of whom supplied any support for the suspicion.[^54] The [[Washington Post]] and the [[Legal Times]] reported the letter on January 18, 1988.[^55]
+
+### Recusal Motion and the Suit Against Teel
+
+In July 1987 Hertz advised that the facts did not support a legally sufficient case of bias, because the Department had no evidence of an extrajudicial source for what it viewed as Bason's incredible factual conclusions.[^56] On January 19, 1988, after the January 12 letter, the Department moved for Bason's recusal on the ground of bias. The motion relied on the letter, the press reports and an affidavit by Schiffer. The Special Counsel wrote that the letter supplied a satisfactory basis for the motion.[^57] Judge [[William Bryant, Jr.|William Bryant]] later wrote that the affidavit "contains no facts based on personal knowledge" and "recites the press accounts."[^58] Bason heard the motion on January 22 and denied it in a memorandum and order filed January 25, 1988.[^59]
+
+The same day, Chief Judge Robinson denied the Department's application for a writ of mandamus directing Bason to recuse himself. Robinson wrote: "I can't see anything in this record that measures up to the standards that would be applicable to force another judge to take over this case."[^60] Bryant, on appeal, found "no basis in fact to support a motion for recusal."[^61]
+
+On February 1, 1988, seven days before the expiration of his term according to the Special Counsel, Bason filed suit in the federal district court and moved for a temporary restraining order to enjoin Teel from being sworn in. The complaint incorporated the January 12 letter but did not otherwise allege that DOJ interfered with the appointment process. The suit was unsuccessful, and Bason left the bench on February 8, the date Teel's service began.[^62]
+
+### Further Allegations Reported to the House Committee
+
+Bason added details when he testified to and spoke with the House committee. He said that one of Hamilton's children overheard a DOJ attorney say at a March 1987 hearing "We've got to get rid of this judge." He said that [[Chris Welles]] of Business Week told him a high-level DOJ official boasted that DOJ was responsible for his non-reappointment; Welles told the Special Counsel he could not recall saying it and had no such source, and his published article stated that "[T]here is no evidence that Justice influenced the selection made by the Court of Appeals." Bason named former D.C. Superior Court judge [[Tim Murphy]], who had been Johnson's colleague on that court and who left it in 1985 to work for Brewer as assistant director on PROMIS implementation, as another possible channel to Johnson; Murphy told the Special Counsel he had no contact with her about the process.[^63]
+
+Bason also reported hearing third-hand, from Kevin Reynolds, a former aide to Senator [[Christopher Dodd]], that someone at DOJ bragged that accomplishing his non-reappointment was "as easy as turning off a light switch," information Reynolds understood to come from Hamilton. Reynolds could not recall the expression. Hamilton wrote to the Special Counsel that former DOJ security officer [[Garnett Taylor]] knew that [[Anthony Moscato]], who was acting director of the Executive Office for United States Attorneys in 1993, had played an affirmative role in denying the reappointment, and that his source was a senior U.S. government official whom he declined to identify. Moscato told the Special Counsel he had nothing to do with the selection of bankruptcy judges.[^64]
+
+### Appeals
+
+On November 22, 1989, Senior District Judge William Bryant affirmed the bankruptcy findings. He wrote that the record contained "convincing, perhaps compelling support for the findings set forth by the bankruptcy court."[^65] He reduced the compensatory award by $655,200, which he calculated as twelve percent of the license fees.[^66]
+
+On May 7, 1991, the D.C. Circuit reversed, in an opinion by Circuit Judge [[Stephen F. Williams]] for a panel of Judges [[James L. Buckley]], Williams and [[Raymond Randolph]]. The court held that "the automatic stay does not reach the Department's use of property in its possession under a claim of right at the time of the bankruptcy filing." It held that "the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction to hear the claims asserted under § 362(a)," reversed the district court, and remanded with directions "to vacate all orders concerning the Department's alleged violations of the automatic stay and to dismiss Inslaw's complaint against the Department."[^67] Rehearing and rehearing en banc were denied on July 12, 1991.[^68]
+
+The House Judiciary Committee's 1992 conclusions state that the court of appeals "did not dispute the Bankruptcy Court's ruling" that DOJ had taken the software, and that its decision "was based primarily on the narrow question of whether the Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction."[^69]
+
+### Congressional and Senate Inquiries
+
+The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations staff study of 1989 found "no proof that the Department of Justice attempted to influence the selection process so as to deny Judge Bason reappointment."[^70]
+
+On December 5, 1990, the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law held a hearing at which Bason testified.[^71] He told the subcommittee under oath that the Department's actions against its critics may have extended into blocking his reappointment in 1988 because of his ruling in the INSLAW case.[^72] The committee concluded: "The committee was unable to substantiate Judge Bason's charges. If such undue influence did occur, it was subtle and lost in the highly private manner in which judge selection procedures are conducted."[^72]
+
+The committee's interviews with members of the merit selection panel and several members of the Judicial Council echoed the view that the nonreappointment was heavily influenced by the poor administration of the bankruptcy clerk's office. Most of the district and circuit judges interviewed said they had little or no contact with Bason. Nonjudicial panel members said that no statistics were examined, that Bason was not interviewed about the condition of the court, and that neither the clerk nor his staff was interviewed.[^73]
+
+On January 2, 1991, Bason filed a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) with the Judicial Council of the Second Circuit against Blackshear, writing that he had "regretfully concluded that Judge Blackshear recanted not because of an honest mistake but because he made a conscious choice to testify falsely." The council and a special committee declined to address the complaint because the alleged perjury concerned matters outside Blackshear's judicial activities, and it was dismissed on October 3, 1991. Bason gave the House committee a copy on October 24, 1991.[^74]
+
+### The Special Counsel's Findings
+
+The report of Special Counsel [[Nicholas J. Bua]] to the [[Attorney General]] is dated March 1993.[^75] Bua wrote that "we find that there is no credible evidence that DOJ employees sought to improperly influence the selection process that resulted in the decision not to reappoint Bankruptcy Judge Bason." The report found that the only evidence of an attempt by anyone within DOJ to influence the process was that relating to Lamberth, whose conduct it described as proper, and recorded that Johnson and Wald "unequivocally deny" that DOJ obstructed the reappointment.[^76] On the pretext question, Bua wrote that Bason "neither acknowledged nor addressed the inherent tension between his finding" that DOJ's financial concerns about INSLAW in December 1982 were pretextual and the conduct of DOJ employees a month later.[^77]
+
+A September 27, 1994 report of the Department of Justice reviewing Bua's report stated: "We are aware that many of these conclusions are at odds with some conclusions reached by Judge Bason after trial in his court. We cannot explain why Judge Bason reached such very different conclusions." It continued that the decisions "rest in large part on Judge Bason's determinations as to the credibility of the witnesses," that the testimony of Hamilton and a few other INSLAW officials "appears to be the only support for the vast majority of Judge Bason's findings," and: "We disagree with Judge Bason's credibility determinations."[^78]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
-[^1]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993; Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia, *In re Inslaw, Inc.*, Adversary Proceeding No. 86-0069, September 28, 1987; Independent Handling Proceeding, June 1987.
+[^1]: *Bason v. American University*, 414 A.2d 522 (D.C. 1980) (per curiam; first hired as assistant professor of law in 1966; promoted to associate professor in 1969; terminal contract after the fall 1970 committee vote; employment ended June 30, 1972; suit commenced November 1973; summary judgment reversed and remanded). https://static.case.law/a2d/414/cases/0522-01.json
+[^2]: U.S. Department of Justice, *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* (March 1993) ("Bua report"), p. 155 (appointed February 8, 1984 "to fill the vacancy created by the resignation of the District of Columbia's only bankruptcy judge, Roger Whelan"; term four years, expiring February 8, 1988), p. 180 ("He left the bench on February 8."). U.S. Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Governmental Affairs, *Staff Study of Allegations Pertaining to the Department of Justice's Handling of a Contract with INSLAW, Inc.*, S. Prt. 101-58, 101st Cong., 1st sess. (1989) ("PSI staff study"), p. 36 n.182 (appointed in 1984 "to fill the unexpired term of retiring Judge Roger Whalen"; February 4, 1988 given as the date the term was due to expire). https://archive.org/stream/InslawPROMISBuaReport/Inslaw%3APROMIS%20Bua%20Report_djvu.txt ; https://archive.org/details/StaffStudyOfAllegationsPertainingToTheDepartmentOfJusticesHandlingOfAContractWithInslaw
+[^3]: *In re INSLAW, Inc.*, 83 B.R. 89 (Bankr. D.D.C. Jan. 25, 1988) (findings of fact and conclusions of law, Bason, J.). https://cite.case.law/br/83/89/
+[^4]: *United States v. INSLAW, Inc. (In re INSLAW, Inc.)*, 932 F.2d 1467 (D.C. Cir. May 7, 1991). https://cite.case.law/f2d/932/1467/
+[^5]: Bua report, p. 180 n.84 ("Bason filed a similar lawsuit when he was denied tenure by American University College of Law in 1972 ... After summary judgment for the University was reversed and remanded for trial, the parties settled out of court."); 414 A.2d 522 (Thomas Penfield Jackson for appellant).
+[^6]: Maggie Mahar, "Beneath Contempt: Did the Justice Department Deliberately Bankrupt INSLAW?," *Barron's*, Mar. 21, 1988, reprinted in PSI staff study, pp. 91-92 ("a 56-year-old federal bankruptcy judge with a reputation for being meticulous in his judicial approach"; "the Harvard Law School graduate and former law professor").
+[^7]: Avvo attorney directory listing, "George Francis Bason Jr.," Bethesda, Md. (licensed North Carolina 1956, District of Columbia 1958, Maryland 1989; states that he served four years as U.S. Bankruptcy Judge for the District of Columbia and has written several books on bankruptcy law). https://www.avvo.com/attorneys/20814-md-george-bason-4636504.html
+[^8]: Catalog record, *Bankruptcy* by George F. Bason, Jr., West's Legal Forms, vol. 9 (West Publishing Company, 2d ed. 1984), debtor and creditor relations. https://ci.nii.ac.jp/ncid/BA36707572
+[^9]: PSI staff study, p. 9 (July 17, 1987 transmittal letter from Bason to Attorney General Meese, quoting the order's invitation "to designate an appropriate official outside").
+[^10]: *In re INSLAW, Inc.*, 76 B.R. 224 (Bankr. D.D.C. July 31, 1987) (opinion on denial of defendants' motion to dismiss). https://cite.case.law/br/76/224/
+[^11]: PSI staff study, p. 6 (application of February 25, 1987); Bua report, p. 5 (the petition charged that Brewer was biased against the company).
+[^12]: PSI staff study, pp. 6-7 and nn.22-23 (Pasciuto's July 15, 1988 deposition to the staff; Nancy Hamilton's handwritten notes "St call Wh & sd had to be convertd"; Pasciuto's testimony that he did not remember using the word "convert").
+[^13]: PSI staff study, p. 7 (Blackshear deposition of March 25, 1987, at 8-9; recanting affidavit within two days; White, Stanton and Jones contradicted Pasciuto's story).
+[^14]: PSI staff study, p. 30 (Blackshear's recantation; tape recordings of the ABA conference session in which Blackshear made no mention of the UPI case).
+[^15]: Bua report, p. 5 (Bason's oral findings at the conclusion of the independent-handling hearing).
+[^16]: *In re INSLAW, Inc.*, 83 B.R. 89, finding 351(n) (Bankr. D.D.C. Jan. 25, 1988). https://cite.case.law/br/83/89/
+[^17]: Bua report, p. 194 ("Judge Bason found that Stanton struck a bargain with Brewer"); 83 B.R. 89, finding 329.
+[^18]: PSI staff study, pp. 48-49 (OPR referral by Deputy Attorney General Burns in July 1987; OPR memorandum of December 18, 1987 recommending that Pasciuto be fired, quoted at p. 49).
+[^19]: Bua report, p. 197.
+[^20]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, *The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report*, H. Rept. 102-857, 102d Cong., 2d sess. (Sept. 10, 1992) ("House report"), p. 79 ("Mr. Pasciuto's Firing"). https://archive.org/stream/InslawAffairInvestigativeReport/TheInslawAffair_djvu.txt
+[^21]: Bua report, p. 197 (OPR report of March 31, 1989).
+[^22]: Bua report, p. 35 ("in July 1987 Bankruptcy Judge Bason held a two week trial on the liability phase of Inslaw's claims").
+[^23]: PSI staff study, App. D (transcript, *Inslaw, Inc. v. United States*, Adversary Proceeding No. 86-0069, Sept. 28, 1987), p. 70.
+[^24]: PSI staff study, App. D, pp. 70 ("poisonous attitude") and 74 ("smoke screen"; "game of cat and mouse").
+[^25]: PSI staff study, App. D, p. 76.
+[^26]: PSI staff study, App. D, p. 71 (the transcript renders the name "Stewart Shifter").
+[^27]: PSI staff study, App. D, p. 71 (Jensen's deposition; the hiring of Brewer by Tyson and McWhorter).
+[^28]: *In re INSLAW, Inc.*, 83 B.R. 89, findings 125 and 137.
+[^29]: 83 B.R. 89, finding 206.
+[^30]: Bua report, p. 7 (summary of Bason's findings; the sentences are the Special Counsel's summary, not a quotation of the bench ruling).
+[^31]: Mahar, *Barron's*, Mar. 21, 1988, reprinted in PSI staff study, p. 91 (order of February 2, 1988); Mahar, *Barron's*, Apr. 4, 1988, reprinted in PSI staff study, p. 97 ("He postponed a decision on punitive damages"). U.S. Department of Justice, *Report on the Review of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua's Report on the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc.* (Sept. 27, 1994), Part VII, p. 172 (the "$6.8 million awarded it by the Bankruptcy Court").
+[^32]: PSI staff study, p. 92 (Bason quoted: "I restrained the IRS from going after the Hamiltons personally ... But that restraining order lasts only 10 days.").
+[^33]: Bua report, p. 180 ("During the week before his departure, he issued an award of damages and attorneys' fees against DOJ.").
+[^34]: Bua report, pp. 155-156.
+[^35]: Bua report, pp. 156-163 (U.S. Attorney's Office file; Lamberth confirmed November 13 and sworn November 16, 1987; the assistant who preceded Brewer as project manager; Froman's view; transcript delivered to Johnson; panel discussion).
+[^36]: Bua report, p. 158 and n.73.
+[^37]: Bua report, pp. 167-168.
+[^38]: Bua report, pp. 166-167, 169-170 and n.82.
+[^39]: Bua report, p. 171.
+[^40]: Bua report, pp. 172-173; House report, p. 105 (§ VIII.A; panel report dated November 24, 1987; n.329, committee review with Judge Bason, July 22, 1992).
+[^41]: House report, pp. 107-108 (Burns's request; Schiffer's request to Hertz; Schiffer memorandum of October 29, 1987, quoted); Bua report, p. 179.
+[^42]: Bua report, pp. 183-184; House report, p. 105 ("The committee has no information that Judge Johnson talked to Mr. Schiffer about INSLAW, Judge Bason or the bankruptcy judge selection process").
+[^43]: Bua report, pp. 171-172 ("on December 21, 1987, the judges of the Court of Appeals voted either in person or by telephone ... Judge Teel won by a substantial majority").
+[^44]: Bua report, p. 175; PSI staff study, p. 36 ("On December 28, 1987, Judge Bason was informed that he was not being reappointed to the bench.").
+[^45]: *United States v. INSLAW, Inc.*, 113 B.R. 802 (D.D.C. Nov. 22, 1989) ("the decision on January 11, 1988 by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit not to reappoint Judge Bason"). https://cite.case.law/br/113/802/
+[^46]: Mahar, *Barron's*, Mar. 21, 1988, reprinted in PSI staff study, p. 92 (panel headed by Johnson; Wald; "shocking" and "eerie"); Mahar, *Barron's*, Apr. 4, 1988, reprinted in PSI staff study, p. 97 (four of 136).
+[^47]: Office of the Circuit Executive, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, news release, "Bankruptcy Judge Merit Selection Panel Appointed" (Jan. 28, 2020) ("Judge Teel has served as the bankruptcy judge in the District of Columbia since February 8, 1988, and will retire on March 22, 2020"). https://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/sites/dcd/files/BankruptcyJudgeMeritSelectionPanelNewsReleaseJanuary-28-2020.pdf
+[^48]: House report, n.233 (interview of Teel on March 27, 1992).
+[^49]: PSI staff study, p. 36.
+[^50]: House report, p. 12 (§ I.E) and pp. 102-103 (§ VIII.A).
+[^51]: PSI staff study, p. 35 n.176 ("because of the recusal from the case of Judge S. Martin Teel").
+[^52]: Bua report, p. 175 ("On January 12, 1988, Judge Bason sent a 14-page letter to Chief Judge Wald with copies to every judge on the Court of Appeals.").
+[^53]: PSI staff study, p. 36 n.183; Bua report, p. 175 (letter text: "there may be a more sinister, hidden force behind what has happened ... somehow the Department of Justice has undertaken to influence the judicial selection process as a means of retaliation against me for my recent rulings").
+[^54]: Bua report, pp. 175-176.
+[^55]: 113 B.R. 802 ("Washington Post, January 18, 1988; Legal Times, January 18, 1988").
+[^56]: House report, p. 107 (Hertz memorandum of July 1987).
+[^57]: 113 B.R. 802 (January 19, 1988 motion; Schiffer affidavit); Bua report, pp. 176-178.
+[^58]: 113 B.R. 802 ("The deputy assistant attorney general's affidavit contains no facts based on personal knowledge. Instead, the affidavit recites the press accounts.").
+[^59]: 113 B.R. 802 (hearing January 22, 1988; memorandum and order filed January 25, 1988).
+[^60]: House report, p. 108 (Robinson's January 25, 1988 ruling).
+[^61]: House report, p. 108 (Bryant: "This court like the courts before it can find no basis in fact to support a motion for recusal.").
+[^62]: Bua report, p. 180 ("Bason's lawsuit was unsuccessful. He left the bench on February 8."); Circuit Executive release (note 47).
+[^63]: Bua report, pp. 181-182 and 184-185.
+[^64]: Bua report, pp. 185-187 and n.85.
+[^65]: 113 B.R. 802 (Bryant, Senior J.).
+[^66]: 113 B.R. 802 ("twelve percent of the license fees amounts to $655,200. It is by that amount that the compensatory damages award should be reduced.").
+[^67]: 932 F.2d 1467 (opinion by Circuit Judge Williams; panel Buckley, Williams and Randolph).
+[^68]: 932 F.2d 1467 (caption: "Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied in No. 90-5052 July 12, 1991").
+[^69]: House report, p. 112 (Committee conclusions, point 11; majority conclusions, not the dissenting views).
+[^70]: PSI staff study, p. 37 ("The Staff found no proof that the Department of Justice attempted to influence the selection process so as to deny Judge Bason reappointment.").
+[^71]: House report, p. 14 (§ II).
+[^72]: House report, p. 12 (§ I.E).
+[^73]: House report, p. 105 (§ VIII.B).
+[^74]: House report, pp. 78-79 (complaint of January 2, 1991; dismissed October 3, 1991; copy provided October 24, 1991, n.344).
+[^75]: Bua report, cover page and transmittal text.
+[^76]: Bua report, p. 13 (executive summary conclusion); p. 188 (§ VIII.F).
+[^77]: Bua report, p. 131.
+[^78]: U.S. Department of Justice, *Report on the Review of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua's Report on the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc.* (Sept. 27, 1994), Part VII, pp. 185-186 (quoting *In re INSLAW*, 83 B.R. at 156, on Hamilton's testimony), printed in the same volume as the Bua report. https://archive.org/stream/InslawPROMISBuaReport/Inslaw%3APROMIS%20Bua%20Report_djvu.txt

10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/James M. Etheridge.md

@@ -1,18 +1,20 @@
 ---
 category: "Intelligence & Government"
 created: 2024-04-25
-updated: 2026-05-01
+updated: 2026-10-14
 tags:
   - Person
   - PROMIS
   - INSLAW
-summary: "James M. Etheridge served as assistant director for computer systems in the Office of Crime Analysis of the District of Columbia during the original 1969 PROMIS design effort, became acting director of that office in 1970, and served as Deputy Director of the National Center for Prosecution Management from 1974."
+summary: "James M. Etheridge was computer systems assistant director at the Office of Crime Analysis for the 1969 PROMIS design, acting director in 1970, and Deputy Director of the National Center for Prosecution Management from 1974."
 ---
-James M. Etheridge served as assistant director for computer systems in the [[Office of Crime Analysis of the District of Columbia]] during the 1969 effort that produced the [[PROMIS|Prosecutor's Management Information System (PROMIS)]]. The team was co-directed by [[Joan E. Jacoby]] and [[Charles R. Work]], with [[Bill Hamilton]] as project manager at [[Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co]]. Etheridge wrote a 1969 paper, "Design and Development of a Criminal Justice Information and Analysis System in Washington, D.C.," published in the Urban and Regional Information Systems Proceedings, documenting the project.[^2]
+James M. Etheridge served as assistant director for computer systems in the [[Office of Crime Analysis of the District of Columbia]] during the 1969 effort that produced the [[PROMIS|Prosecutor's Management Information System (PROMIS)]]. The team was co-directed by [[Joan E. Jacoby]] and [[Charles R. Work]], and a May 1971 system overview lists Etheridge among its members as an assistant director of the Office of Crime Analysis.[^3] [[Bill Hamilton]] was project manager at [[Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co]]. Etheridge wrote a 1969 paper, "Design and Development of a Criminal Justice Information and Analysis System in Washington, D.C.," published in the Urban and Regional Information Systems Proceedings, documenting the project.[^2]
 
-In 1970, Etheridge served as acting director of the Office of Crime Analysis. By 1974, he was Deputy Director of the [[National Center for Prosecution Management]], working alongside Executive Director [[Joan E. Jacoby]] to expand PROMIS adoption and statistical tools in prosecutor's offices nationwide.[^1]
+In 1970, Etheridge served as acting director of the Office of Crime Analysis. By 1974, he was Deputy Director of the [[National Center for Prosecution Management]], working alongside Executive Director Joan E. Jacoby to expand PROMIS adoption and statistical tools in prosecutor's offices nationwide.[^1] Etheridge and J. D. Bourland are listed with Jacoby as authors of the center's *First Annual Report* (1972).[^4]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
 [^1]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. *The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report.* House Report 102-857, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, September 10, 1992.
 [^2]: Sessions, Vivian S. *Directory of Data Bases in the Social and Behavioral Sciences.* Science Associates International, 1974.
+[^3]: Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., *System Overview and Report Formats for PROMIS* (May 1971), prepared for the District of Columbia Government Office of Crime Analysis under LEAA Grant No. 70-DF-047, note 1 to the passage on the design team, NCJ 32469. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/32469NCJRS.pdf
+[^4]: Jacoby, J. E., Ethridge, J. M. and Bourland, J. D., *First Annual Report of the National Center for Prosecution Management* (Washington, D.C.: National Center for Prosecution Management, 1972), as listed in the bibliography of NCJ 79227. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/79227NCJRS.pdf

10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Robert H. Cain.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ tags:
   - INSLAW
 summary: "Robert H. Cain was a member of the original 1969 PROMIS design team and later joined INSLAW; no additional biographical details have been identified."
 ---
-Robert H. Cain was a member of the original 1969 team assembled to design the [[PROMIS|Prosecutor's Management Information System]], working under co-directors [[Joan E. Jacoby]] and [[Charles R. Work]] with project manager [[Bill Hamilton]] at [[Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co]]. He later joined [[INSLAW]] as a staff member. No additional biographical details have been identified.[^1]
+Robert H. Cain was a member of the original 1969 team assembled to design the [[PROMIS|Prosecutor's Management Information System]], working under co-directors [[Joan E. Jacoby]] and [[Charles R. Work]] with project manager [[Bill Hamilton]] at [[Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co]]. He later joined [[INSLAW]] as a staff member.[^1]
 
 ### Footnotes
 

10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Thomas A. Flannery.md

@@ -1,23 +1,23 @@
 ---
 category: "Law Enforcement & Legal"
 created: 2026-05-01
-updated: 2026-05-01
+updated: 2026-10-14
 tags:
   - Person
   - PROMIS
   - INSLAW
   - Lawyer
   - Judge
-summary: "Thomas A. Flannery was U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia from 1967 to 1970 who, in 1969, directed the commissioning of the computer-based case management system that became PROMIS, and subsequently served as a U.S. District Court Judge for the District of Columbia from 1970 until his death in 1993, including as Chief Judge from 1977."
+summary: "Thomas A. Flannery was U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia from 1967 to 1970, commissioned the system that became PROMIS in 1969, and was a federal district judge from 1970 until 1993."
 born: 1918-01-05
 died: 1993-06-25
 location: "Washington, D.C."
 ---
-Thomas A. Flannery was born January 5, 1918, in Washington, D.C. He served as U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia from 1967 to March 1970, appointed under President [[Lyndon B. Johnson]]. In that capacity, he directed the formation of the team that designed the [[PROMIS|Prosecutor's Management Information System (PROMIS)]] -- the case management software that became the center of the [[PROMIS Software Scandal|INSLAW affair]] a decade later.[^1]
+Thomas A. Flannery was born January 5, 1918, in Washington, D.C. He served as U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia from 1967 to March 1970, appointed under President [[Lyndon B. Johnson]]. In that capacity, he directed the formation of the team that designed the [[PROMIS|Prosecutor's Management Information System (PROMIS)]], the case management software that became the center of the [[PROMIS Software Scandal|INSLAW affair]] a decade later.[^1]
 
 ### Role in PROMIS Development
 
-In 1969, Flannery commissioned a team from [[Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co]] to design a computer-based case management system for the [[U.S. Attorney's office|DC U.S. Attorney's Office]], funded by a $60,000 grant (70-DF-047) from the [[Office of Crime Analysis of the District of Columbia]] administered through the [[LEAA|Law Enforcement Assistance Administration]]. The team was co-directed by [[Joan E. Jacoby]] (Director of the Office of Crime Analysis) and [[Charles R. Work]] (Deputy Chief of the Superior Court Division of the U.S. Attorney's Office), with [[Bill Hamilton]] serving as project manager. The system - named the Prosecutor's Management Information System - was deployed on January 1, 1971.[^1]
+In 1969, Flannery commissioned a team from [[Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co]] to design a computer-based case management system for the [[U.S. Attorney's office|DC U.S. Attorney's Office]], funded by a $60,000 grant (70-DF-047) from the [[Office of Crime Analysis of the District of Columbia]] administered through the [[LEAA|Law Enforcement Assistance Administration]]. The team was co-directed by [[Joan E. Jacoby]] (Director of the Office of Crime Analysis) and [[Charles R. Work]] (Deputy Director of the Superior Court Division of the U.S. Attorney's Office), with [[Bill Hamilton]] serving as project manager.[^1][^3] The system, named the Prosecutor's Management Information System, was deployed on January 1, 1971.[^3]
 
 ### Judicial Career
 
@@ -27,3 +27,4 @@ President [[Richard Nixon]] nominated Flannery to the U.S. District Court for th
 
 [^1]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. *The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report.* House Report 102-857, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, September 10, 1992.
 [^2]: Federal Judicial Center. "Thomas A. Flannery." History of the Federal Judiciary. fjc.gov.
+[^3]: Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., *System Overview and Report Formats for PROMIS* (May 1971), prepared for the District of Columbia Government Office of Crime Analysis under LEAA Grant No. 70-DF-047, note 1 to the passage on the design team, NCJ 32469. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/32469NCJRS.pdf

10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Adolf Hitler.md

@@ -2,17 +2,172 @@
 category: "Political Figure"
 tags:
   - Person
+  - NaziGermany
+  - WorldWarII
+  - OSS
+  - PsychologicalWarfare
+  - Astrology
+  - Occult
+  - DeathRumors
+  - NeoNazism
+  - SiegeCulture
 summary: "Adolf Hitler was the leader of the Nazi Party and the dictator of Nazi Germany from 1934 to 1945."
+aliases:
+  - Adolf Hitler
+  - Adolph Hitler
+  - Hitler
+  - Der Führer
+  - Eric Hanussen
 born: 1889-04-20
 died: 1945-04-30
 location: "Braunau am Inn, Austria"
+created: 2026-10-14
+updated: 2026-10-14
+relations:
+  - type: head_of
+    with: "[[Nazi Germany]]"
+    start: 1934-08-02
+    end: 1945-04-30
+    role: "Führer and Reich Chancellor; the tribunal's judgment describes full power in his hands after the plebiscite that followed"
+    fn: 2
+  - type: spouse_of
+    with: "[[Eva Braun]]"
+    start: 1945-04-29
+    role: "married in the Berlin bunker on the date of his private will, which names her as his wife"
+    fn: 20
+  - type: appointed
+    with: "[[Karl Dönitz]]"
+    start: 1945-04-29
+    role: "named President of the Reich and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces in the political testament"
+    fn: 21
+  - type: appointed
+    with: "[[Martin Bormann]]"
+    start: 1945-04-29
+    role: "named executor of the private will with full legal authority, and Party Minister in the testament's cabinet list"
+    fn: 20
+  - type: subject_of
+    with: "[[Office of Strategic Services]]"
+    start: 1943
+    role: "subject of the 1943 psychoanalytic profile by Walter Langer and the October 1943 personality analysis by Henry Murray, both prepared for the OSS"
+    fn: 10
+  - type: subject_of
+    with: "[[Federal Bureau of Investigation]]"
+    start: 1945-09-21
+    role: "Los Angeles report titled Hitler Hideout, file 105-410, on a claim that he was in hiding in Argentina"
+    fn: 29
+  - type: subject_of
+    with: "[[Central Intelligence Agency]]"
+    start: 1955-10-03
+    role: "Maracaibo station dispatch forwarding a claim that he was alive in South America"
+    fn: 32
 ---
 
+Adolf Hitler (born April 20, 1889, in [[Braunau am Inn]], Austria; died April 30, 1945, in [[Berlin]]) was the leader of the [[Nazi Party]] and the dictator of [[Nazi Germany]] from 1934 to 1945.[^1] He was the central figure in the rise of Nazism, the Holocaust, and World War II.[^2]
 
-Adolf Hitler was the leader of the [[Nazi Germany|Nazi Party]] and the dictator of [[Nazi Germany]] from 1934 to 1945. He was the central figure in the rise of Nazism, the Holocaust, and World War II.[^1]
+The International Military Tribunal at [[Nuremberg]] described the [[SS]] as created in 1925 "nominally to act as his personal bodyguard, but in reality to terrorise political opponents."[^2] The tribunal recorded that [[Hermann Göring]] founded the [[Gestapo]] in [[Prussia]] on April 26, 1933, and confided to its deputy leader that the main task was to eliminate political opponents of National Socialism and Hitler.[^3]
 
-While Hitler himself was reportedly dismissive of mysticism, his regime had a complex relationship with the occult. Figures like [[Heinrich Himmler]] were deeply invested in paranormal research, and the Nazi government's use of astrology and other forms of divination for propaganda purposes is well-documented. Hitler's reaction to [[Rudolf Hess]]'s flight to Scotland, which he attributed to the influence of astrologers, led to a crackdown on occult practices in Germany.[^1]
+### Occult milieu and the Hess flight
+
+Hitler was reportedly dismissive of mysticism. [[Albert Speer]] wrote that when [[Heinrich Himmler]] mythologized the SS, Hitler remarked: "What nonsense! Here we have at last reached an age that has left all mysticism behind it, and now he wants to start that all over again. We might just as well have stayed with the church."[^4] Himmler was deeply invested in paranormal research. The [[Ahnenerbe]], the research body he founded in 1935, investigated extrasensory perception, astrology and map dowsing, according to [[Annie Jacobsen]].[^5] The regime had a complex relationship with the occult, and the Nazi government's use of astrology and other forms of divination for propaganda purposes is well-documented.[^5]
+
+Jacobsen wrote that Hitler's reaction to [[Rudolf Hess]]'s flight to [[Scotland]], which he attributed to the influence of astrologers, led to a crackdown on occult practices in Germany.[^5] Accounts of the flight name two astrologers. [[Karl Krafft]], a Swiss astrologer, is said to have produced a star chart that fixed the date of the flight, and [[Sybil Leek]], a British astrologer working for British intelligence, is said to have written a phony horoscope that drew Hess toward Scotland.[^5] The arrests that followed, under the name [[Special Action Hess|Sonderaktion Heß]], reportedly took in more than 600 astrologers, fortune tellers, clairvoyants and faith healers, among them [[Wilhelm Wulff]], who had become Himmler's personal astrologer.[^5] The historian [[Eric Kurlander]] wrote that the action had the Gestapo round up astrologers, clairvoyants and occultists, that hundreds were detained or arrested, and that thousands of books and items of esoteric paraphernalia were confiscated.[^6]
+
+A CIA-released survey of parapsychology research states that [[Louis Pauwels]] and [[Jacques Bergier]], in [[The Morning of the Magicians]] (1960), maintained that Hitler was clairvoyant and surrounded himself with astrologers and prophets. The same survey says that [[Erik Jan Hanussen]], a stage clairvoyant, was assassinated by the Nazis because his ability to see their secret projects threatened the regime.[^7] A 1930 and 1931 report by the Dutch researcher [[P.A. Dietz]] on a test of Hanussen's psychometric ability appears in an annotated CIA-released abstract. The annotator described Hanussen, who visited the [[Netherlands]] in 1930, as someone who "later would often be consulted by Adolph Hitler."[^8]
+
+### Profiles by the OSS and Harvard
+
+In 1943 [[William J. Donovan|William Donovan]] of the [[Office of Strategic Services]] asked the [[Cambridge, Massachusetts|Cambridge]] psychoanalyst [[Walter Langer]] to analyze Hitler without direct access to him. Langer wrote in his 1972 book that Donovan asked, "What light could psychoanalysis shed on these pressing problems?" and then, "And how would you go about getting it?"[^9] The OSS report of 1943, A Psychological Analysis of Adolph Hitler: His Life and Legend, lists as collaborators [[Henry Murray]] of the Harvard Psychological Clinic, [[Ernst Kris]] of the [[New School for Social Research]] and [[Bertram Lewin]] of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute.[^10]
+
+The 1943 report stated that there was "unanimous agreement among the four psychoanalysts who have studied the material that Hitler is an hysteric bordering on schizophrenia and not a true paranoiac as so frequently supposed."[^11] In the 1972 book the same passage reads "general agreement among the collaborators that Hitler is probably a neurotic psychopath bordering on schizophrenia."[^12] The 1943 report described his behavior as "masochistic in the extreme" and stated that "there is a large feminine component in his physical makeup."[^13] Its eighth prediction read: "Hitler might commit suicide. This is the most plausible outcome."[^14]
+
+In October 1943 Murray of the [[Harvard University|Harvard]] Psychological Clinic completed a memorandum titled *Analysis of the Personality of Adolph Hitler*, marked "O.S.S. Confidential," with predictions of his future behavior and suggestions for dealing with him now and after [[Germany]]'s surrender.[^15] Murray wrote that Hitler's neurotic spells would increase in frequency and duration, and that there was some evidence his mental powers had been deteriorating since November 1942.[^16] He considered it possible that the military command or a revolutionary faction might seize Hitler and immure him in a prison fortress, an outcome that would end the myth of the invincible hero. He judged that Hitler being shot by a German was "possible but not very likely."[^16]
+
+Murray proposed that Hitler might arrange to be killed by a German, perhaps by a Jew, completing the myth of the hero's death at the hand of a trusted follower, on the pattern of Siegfried stabbed by Hagen, Caesar by Brutus, and Christ betrayed by Judas.[^17] On suicide, Murray wrote that Hitler had often vowed he would kill himself if his plans miscarried, but that if he chose that course he would do it at the last moment and in the most dramatic possible manner.[^17] In the closing section Murray named insanity to some extent, dramatic suicide and death at the front as the outcomes that seemed most probable, on the assumption that Hitler's chief concern was the immortality of his legend.[^18]
+
+### Assassination schemes
+
+[[Stanley Lovell]], who headed OSS Research and Development, wrote in his memoir of several schemes to kill Hitler. He took up Langer's idea that Hitler had feminine tendencies and got permission to try to push him over the gender line with female hormones, hoping his moustache would fall off and his voice would rise. The OSS agent network was used to try to slip the hormones into Hitler's food. Other plans included blinding him with mustard gas and a drug to aggravate his suspected epilepsy, and a plan to hypnotize a German prisoner into assassinating him, which a consulting psychiatrist judged unworkable. Lovell also reported that the main problem in these operations was getting Hitler to take the medicine.[^19]
+
+### Marriage, will and testament, April 1945
+
+The document the prosecution at Nuremberg numbered 3569-PS is a translation of a private will and a political testament dated April 29, 1945, with a covering note from Martin Bormann of the same date. In the private will Hitler wrote that he had decided to take as his wife the woman who had entered the besieged city to share his fate, that at her desire she went with him into death, and that he and his wife chose death "in order to escape the disgrace of deposition or capitulation" and wished to be burnt on the spot. He named Bormann executor, and left his picture collections to a gallery in [[Linz]]. The will bears the signatures of Bormann, Dr. Fuhr and [[Nicolaus von Below]] as witnesses.[^20]
+
+In the political testament Hitler attributed the outbreak of the war to international statesmen of Jewish descent or working for Jewish interests, and stated that he would remain in Berlin and choose death. In the second part he expelled Göring and Himmler from the party for secret negotiations with the enemy, appointed Grand Admiral [[Karl Dönitz]] President of the Reich and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, [[Joseph Goebbels]] Chancellor, Bormann Party Minister, and named [[Karl Hanke]] to succeed Himmler as Reichsführer-SS. The testament is witnessed by Josef Fuhr, [[Wilhelm Burgdorf]], Bormann and [[Hans Krebs]]. The editors of the Nuremberg volume noted that the document was not introduced into evidence because there was not sufficient time to verify its authenticity.[^21]
+
+The FBI file on Hitler contains a March 6, 1946 memorandum recording that the Army's Military Intelligence Service had prepared a bound brochure of the marriage certificate, private will and political testament from captured documents, that General Vandenberg wanted the Bureau to compare the signatures with captured official documents, and that the Army asked that its possession of the documents be kept secret until the President announced it. The Bureau's laboratory report of March 13, 1946, addressed to the Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, analyzed paper, condition, typewriting and handwriting. It stated that the paper was consistent in every respect with the ostensible source, that the marriage form had been completed in ink by a registrar, Walter Wagner, and that entries in other inks and hands were evidence of the impromptu nature of the ceremony.[^22]
+
+In notes that Bormann took during the final months, published by [[François Genoud]], Hitler recalled [[Frederick the Great]]'s winter of 1762, when Frederick resolved to take poison if no change came by a date he had fixed. A few days before that date the Tsarina died, and the situation reversed.[^23]
+
+### Death in Berlin and the Soviet record
+
+[[Morris Leikind]], whose medical study of Hitler was released by the CIA, wrote that it is generally believed he shot himself, and that information published in [[Russia]] alleged death by cyanide poisoning rather than a gunshot wound.[^1] Leikind wrote that Hitler died by suicide in his bunker beneath the ruins of the Chancellery on April 30, 1945, with his newly wedded wife, [[Eva Braun]].[^1]
+
+A Soviet forensic commission sitting at [[Berlin-Buch]] on May 8, 1945 examined a fire-damaged male corpse presumed to be Hitler's. It concluded that death was caused by poisoning with cyanide compounds, and the identification that followed rested in part on dental bridgework and jawbone fragments.[^24] The commission's summary reached the same conclusion for the female corpse presumed to be Braun's.[^25] Leikind wrote that, contrary to other published reports, the protocols showed poisoning, with the odor of cyanide still detectable in the mouth and slivers of glass from a capsule present, and that the protocols seemed to have been "edited."[^26]
+
+An OSS cable of August 7, 1945 discussed transmitting a report on Hitler's dentition to Soviet officers, and suggested that [[Allen Dulles]] be instructed to give copies of the reports directly to Russian officers in Berlin. According to the OSS message, the War Department was disturbed over the exchange of communications through [[John R. Deane]].[^27] A related message in the same file concerns fingerprints that were to be obtained from [[Munich]] police records.[^27]
+
+### Claims of survival
+
+On September 21, 1945, the Los Angeles office of the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]] filed a report titled "Hitler Hideout" on information obtained from a [[Hollywood]] source in July 1945. The source reported that a friend, talking in front of the Melody Lane restaurant, said he was one of four men who met Hitler when he landed from two submarines in [[Argentina]] about two and a half weeks after the fall of Berlin. The account described a ranch in the foothills of the southern Andes, six Argentine officials who had aided the party, and a payment of $15,000 for helping in the hiding place. According to the source, Hitler suffered from asthma and ulcers and had shaved off his mustache.[^28] The information was given to a reporter for the [[Los Angeles Examiner]] on July 29, 1945.[^28] The Bureau's summary says that the information could not be verified, that efforts to locate the friend were negative, and that there was no record of Hitler in police or [[Immigration and Naturalization Service]] files.[^29]
+
+The same file holds translations dated July 28, 1948 of two newspaper items from [[Bogotá]], [[Colombia]]. The first summarized a letter dated April 27, 1948 from [[Oranjestad]], [[Aruba]], addressed to the newspaper [[El Tiempo]] and signed "Amigo, amigo, amigo," which stated that Hitler was in Bogotá, had landed from a submarine on the coast of the Guajira on July 19, 1945 with six men and three million dollars, and intended after a war between the United States and the Soviet Union to head a western crusade against Bolshevism.[^30] In El Tiempo of June 20, 1948, under a headline connecting the story to the assassination of [[Jorge Eliécer Gaitán]], a second correspondent who claimed to be Colombian wrote that he had known of Hitler's plans since January 1945 and that the death of Gaitán would have been a master coup against Communism on Hitler's part; the newspaper reported that the first writer had demanded 50,000 dollars to reveal more.[^30] The Director of the Bureau forwarded translations of the clippings to the State Department's Division of Foreign Activity Correlation, with a copy to the Director of Central Intelligence.[^30]
+
+On October 3, 1955, the acting chief of a CIA station forwarded a report to the chief of the [[Western Hemisphere Division]] from a source in [[Maracaibo]], identified by the codename MELODY-3. In the latter part of September 1955 a friend who had served under the source in Europe told him that a former German SS trooper, identified by the codename CITROEN, had said that Hitler was still alive. CITROEN was said to have contacted Hitler about once a month in Colombia while working for a Dutch shipping company in Maracaibo, and to have said that Hitler left Colombia for Argentina around January 1955.[^31] The friend obtained a photograph that CITROEN referred to. On September 29 the source was shown it to obtain his reaction to the possible veracity of the story, and the station made photostats before the photograph went back to its owner the next day. The station's assessment was that the man on the right is "undoubtedly the person which CITROEN claims is HITLER." The reverse carried an inscription with the first name Adolf, a town in Colombia and the year 1954.[^31] The station wrote that neither it nor the source was in a position to give an intelligent evaluation of the information, which was forwarded as of possible interest.[^32]
+
+### Neo-Nazi veneration
+
+[[James Mason]]'s *[[Siege]]*, the collected newsletters of the [[National Socialist Liberation Front]], names Hitler throughout. In an issue dated August 1980 Mason wrote that [[Joseph Tommasi]] "did the very same thing as Adolf Hitler" and that "perhaps his is the closest comparison to Hitler's methodology to date."[^33] The 2021 edition carries a foreword by Mason that closes "Heil Hitler!"[^33] The [[International Centre for Counter-Terrorism]] study by Bethan Johnson and Matthew Feldman states that propaganda of the "Siege Culture" milieu falls into three categories, the first being praise of Nazi and neo-Nazi predecessors, in which images of Hitler, Mason, Tommasi and Charles Manson are often featured in imposing stances.[^34] The same study records that activists of the [[Iron March]] forum released what became the third edition of Siege in 2015, and that [[Atomwaffen Division]], which publicly emerged that year, made the book required reading for new members.[^35] The [[Counter Extremism Project]] reports that the original Siege Culture website's library included Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, and that Atomwaffen Division posted a video in 2017 of masked members raising their arms in a "Heil Hitler" salute before a swastika flag with the message "Join your local Nazis."[^36]
+
+[[Combat 18]], founded in early 1992 by [[Charlie Sargent]] and [[Wilf Browning]] as a stewarding group for the [[British National Party]], takes its name from the initials of Adolf Hitler (A=1, H=8), according to [[Nick Lowles]].[^37] The German [[Federal Ministry of the Interior]] banned the association Combat 18 Deutschland on January 23, 2020; Combat 18 does not appear in Schedule 2 of the Terrorism Act 2000.[^38] [[Jack Reed]] described himself in writing as a "natural sadist" and expressed admiration for Hitler, according to press reports of his case.[^39] [[Jacek Tchorzewski]] kept a collection of extreme right-wing material that praised Hitler, neo-Nazism and Satanism, including antisemitic content calling for genocide, according to the [[Campaign Against Antisemitism]].[^40]
+
+### Postwar continuities
+
+[[Edwin Black]] wrote that after the Nazi government awarded [[Thomas J. Watson]], chairman of [[IBM]], the Merit Cross of the German Eagle with Star in 1937, Watson on May 16, 1940 asked Secretary of State [[Cordell Hull]] whether the government wanted him to return the medal. Hull replied that the decision "will have to rest entirely with you, and is not one upon which this Government would be able to take a position." Watson returned the medal to Hitler on June 6, 1940 with a letter, released to the newspapers, stating that "the present policies of your government are contrary to the causes for which I have been working and for which I received the decoration."[^41]
+
+[[Reinhard Gehlen]], who had headed the [[Wehrmacht]]'s [[Fremde Heere Ost]] directorate, wrote in his memoir that Hitler ordered his dismissal about a month after March 5, 1945, that his staff held a farewell party on April 12, and that he supervised the microfilming and burying of the directorate's files in secret locations in the Bavarian mountains, with three hideouts for his staff in the Alps.[^42] A statement by his deputy [[Gerhard Wessel]], reproduced in a CIA documentary history, records that Hitler relieved Gehlen on April 9, 1945 after Gehlen was presented to him in February or March, and that the microfilmed files were moved to three sites in southern Germany, near Schliersee, the Wilder Kaiser and Marquartstein.[^43]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
-[^1]: Jacobsen, Annie. *Phenomena: The Secret History of the U.S. Government's Investigations into Extrasensory Perception and Psychokinesis*. Little, Brown and Company, 2017.
+[^1]: Leikind, Morris. "Studies in Pathography II: Adolph Hitler." CIA Reading Room document C00416336, released under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00416336
+[^2]: International Military Tribunal, Judgment, October 1, 1946. Avalon Project, Yale Law School. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/judnazi.asp
+[^3]: International Military Tribunal, Judgment, October 1, 1946, section on the Gestapo. Avalon Project, Yale Law School. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/judnazi.asp
+[^4]: Speer, Albert. *Inside the Third Reich*. Translated by Richard and Clara Winston. Macmillan, 1970, pp. 94-95. https://archive.org/details/inside-the-third-reich-memoirs-by-albert-speer
+[^5]: Jacobsen, Annie. *Phenomena: The Secret History of the U.S. Government's Investigations into Extrasensory Perception and Psychokinesis*. Little, Brown and Company, 2017.
+[^6]: Kurlander, Eric. "The Nazi Magicians' Controversy: Enlightenment, 'Border Science,' and Occultism in the Third Reich." *Central European History* 48, no. 4 (December 2015): 498-522, as quoted in Frey, Angelica. "Border Science vs. Commercial Occultism: A Nazi Debate." JSTOR Daily. https://daily.jstor.org/border-science-vs-commercial-occultism-a-nazi-debate/
+[^7]: CIA Reading Room document CIA-RDP96-00788R001200230018-6, p. 208, chapter "New Psychic Frontiers," citing Louis Pauwels and Jacques Bergier, *The Morning of the Magicians* (1960).
+[^8]: Dietz, P.A. "A successful psychometric experiment with the clairvoyant E. Hanussen." *Tijdschrift voor Parapsychologie*, 1930/31, 3, 70-76, as annotated in CIA Reading Room document CIA-RDP96-00792R000700700002-2, item 01377. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00792r000700700002-2
+[^9]: Langer, Walter C. *The Mind of Adolf Hitler: The Secret Wartime Report*. Basic Books, 1972, chapter on the OSS request.
+[^10]: Langer, Walter C. *A Psychological Analysis of Adolph Hitler: His Life and Legend*. Office of Strategic Services, 1943 (title page). CIA Reading Room document C02571145. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-02571145
+[^11]: Langer, *A Psychological Analysis of Adolph Hitler*, 1943, p. 86 as paginated in the CIA copy. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-02571145
+[^12]: Langer, *The Mind of Adolf Hitler*, 1972, chapter on the collaborators' diagnosis.
+[^13]: Langer, *A Psychological Analysis of Adolph Hitler*, 1943, section "Femininity," p. 122 as paginated in the CIA copy. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-02571145
+[^14]: Langer, *A Psychological Analysis of Adolph Hitler*, 1943, p. 155 as paginated in the CIA copy; repeated in *The Mind of Adolf Hitler*, 1972, section "Hitler's Death." https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-02571145
+[^15]: Murray, Henry A. *Analysis of the Personality of Adolph Hitler, with Predictions of His Future Behavior and Suggestions for Dealing with Him Now and after Germany's Surrender*. Harvard Psychological Clinic, October 1943. https://archive.org/details/AnalysisOfThePersonalityOfAdolphHitler. Same text in CIA Reading Room document 02617886.
+[^16]: Murray, *Analysis of the Personality of Adolph Hitler*, pp. 29-30. https://archive.org/details/AnalysisOfThePersonalityOfAdolphHitler
+[^17]: Murray, *Analysis of the Personality of Adolph Hitler*, pp. 30-32. https://archive.org/details/AnalysisOfThePersonalityOfAdolphHitler
+[^18]: Murray, *Analysis of the Personality of Adolph Hitler*, p. 33. https://archive.org/details/AnalysisOfThePersonalityOfAdolphHitler
+[^19]: Lovell, Stanley P. *Of Spies and Stratagems*. Prentice-Hall, 1963. https://archive.org/details/ofspiesstratagem0000stan
+[^20]: Office of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality. *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, vol. VI. Government Printing Office, 1946. Document 3569-PS, translation of the covering letter of Martin Bormann, April 29, 1945, and Hitler's "Private Will and Testament," pp. 257-259. https://archive.org/details/naziconspiracyag06unit
+[^21]: Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. VI, document 3569-PS, "My political Testament" and "Second Part of the Political Testament," pp. 259-262, with the editors' note on authentication. https://archive.org/details/naziconspiracyag06unit
+[^22]: FBI Vault, Adolf Hitler file: office memorandum of March 6, 1946 and Laboratory report of March 13, 1946 on the examination of the bound "Adolf Hitler: Certificate of Marriage, Private Will and Political Testament" for the War Department. https://vault.fbi.gov/adolf-hitler
+[^23]: Martin Bormann's notes of Hitler's conversations, February to April 1945, published as *The Political Testament of Adolf Hitler*, edited by François Genoud (1961 edition). https://archive.org/details/PoliticalTestamentOfAdolfHitler
+[^24]: CIA Reading Room document C00416337, "The Death of Adolf Hitler: Unknown Documents from Soviet Archives," Document No. 12, forensic examination of a male corpse at Berlin-Buch, May 8, 1945. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00416337
+[^25]: CIA Reading Room document C00416337, "The Death of Adolf Hitler: Unknown Documents from Soviet Archives," Document No. 13 and the commission summary. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00416337
+[^26]: Leikind, Morris. "Studies in Pathography II: Adolph Hitler," p. 32. CIA Reading Room document C00416336. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00416336
+[^27]: OSS cable of August 7, 1945, in CIA Reading Room document CIA-RDP13X00001R000100200005-7. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp13x00001r000100200005-7
+[^28]: FBI Vault, "Adolf Hitler (1889-1945)," Part 01 of 04, "Report on Hitler Hideout," Los Angeles file 105-410, September 21, 1945, p. 2. https://vault.fbi.gov/adolf-hitler
+[^29]: FBI Vault, "Adolf Hitler (1889-1945)," Part 01 of 04, "Report on Hitler Hideout," Los Angeles file 105-410, September 21, 1945, p. 1 (synopsis). https://vault.fbi.gov/adolf-hitler
+[^30]: FBI Vault, Adolf Hitler file: translations summarized July 28, 1948 of "Nueva York al Dia," May 22, 1948, and *El Tiempo* (Bogotá), June 20, 1948, with the Director's transmittal to the Division of Foreign Activity Correlation, State Department, copy to the Director of Central Intelligence. https://archive.org/details/fbi-hitler-adolf-ocr
+[^31]: CIA Reading Room document C00460209, dispatch No. 2592 from the acting chief of station to the Chief, WHD, dated October 3, 1955. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00460209
+[^32]: CIA Reading Room document C00460209, dispatch of October 3, 1955, closing paragraph. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00460209
+[^33]: Mason, James. *Siege: The Collected Writings of James Mason*, 2021 edition, foreword and "Serious Steps," *Siege* vol. IX, no. 4 (August 1980). https://archive.org/details/siege-the-collected-writings-james-mason
+[^34]: Johnson, Bethan, and Matthew Feldman. "Siege Culture After Siege: Anatomy of a Neo-Nazi Terrorist Doctrine." International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, p. 12. https://icct.nl/sites/default/files/2022-12/siege-culture-neo-nazi-terrorist-doctrine.pdf
+[^35]: Johnson and Feldman, "Siege Culture After Siege," pp. 12-13. https://icct.nl/sites/default/files/2022-12/siege-culture-neo-nazi-terrorist-doctrine.pdf
+[^36]: Counter Extremism Project. "James Mason's Siege: Ties to Extremists," March 4, 2022. https://www.counterextremism.com/themes/custom/cep/templates/reports/sieges_ties_to_extremists/files/James_Mason_Siege_Ties_to_Extremists_030422.pdf
+[^37]: Lowles, Nick. *White Riot: The Violent Story of Combat 18*. Milo Books, 2001.
+[^38]: Beck-aktuell. "Seehofer verbietet rechtsextremistischen Verein 'Combat 18 Deutschland,'" January 23, 2020. https://www.beck-aktuell.de/heute-im-recht/rechtsgeschehen/seehofer-verbietet-rechtsextremistischen-verein-combat-18-deutschland-2020-01-23; Terrorism Act 2000, Schedule 2, as amended, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/2; Home Office, "Proscribed terrorist groups or organisations," updated July 7, 2026. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/proscribed-terror-groups-or-organisations--2
+[^39]: Enfield Independent. "Nazi terrorist named after judge rejects anonymity bid." 2021. https://www.enfieldindependent.co.uk/news/national/19002125.nazi-terrorist-named-judge-rejects-anonymity-bid/
+[^40]: Campaign Against Antisemitism. "Hitler-loving neo-Nazi who said it was his 'dream' to create a bloodbath arrested at Luton Airport and sentenced to four years." September 2019. https://antisemitism.org/hitler-loving-neo-nazi-who-said-it-was-his-dream-to-create-a-bloodbath-arrested-at-luton-airport-and-sentenced-to-four-years-in-prison
+[^41]: Black, Edwin. *IBM and the Holocaust*. Crown, 2001, chapters on 1940. https://archive.org/details/ibm-and-the-holocaust-the-strategic-alliance-between-nazi-germany-and-americas-m
+[^42]: Gehlen, Reinhard. *The Service: The Memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen*. World Publishing, 1972. https://archive.org/details/theservicethememoirsofgeneralreinhardgehlen
+[^43]: Central Intelligence Agency. *Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1945-49*, vol. I, Document 1, "Statement of Gerhard Wessel on Development of the German Organization," and chronology. https://archive.org/details/CIAANDTHEORIGINSOFTHEBND1945-49VOL1-0001

10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Bill Hamilton.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ---
 category: "Technologists"
 created: 2024-04-25
-updated: 2026-10-12
+updated: 2026-10-14
 tags:
   - KeyFigure
   - Person
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ location: "Laude, Indiana"
 
 William A. Hamilton was born around 1940 and grew up in Laude, Indiana, where he was one of seven brothers. He graduated from Notre Dame with an English degree in 1962 and married [[Nancy Hamilton]] in 1963.[^1]
 
-Hamilton worked as an analyst and Vietnamese linguist for the [[NSA]] for seven years. In 1969, he left federal service and became a management consultant at [[Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co]]. He left the firm in 1971 to improve the software, which by contract rights belonged to the government. He then worked for eighteen months as an independent contractor for the U.S. Attorney's Office in D.C., and he then founded the [[INSLAW|Institute for Law and Social Research]].[^2][^3] He won a contract through a competitive bid to develop what would become [[PROMIS]], working under the direction of [[Joan E. Jacoby]] and [[Charles R. Work]] with [[LEAA|Law Enforcement Assistance Administration]] funding routed through the [[Office of Crime Analysis of the District of Columbia]]. The resulting software, the Prosecutor's Management Information System, debuted on January 1, 1971, in the D.C. U.S. Attorney's Office.[^1]
+Hamilton worked as an analyst and Vietnamese linguist for the [[NSA]] for seven years. In 1969, he left federal service and became a management consultant at [[Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co]]. He left the firm in 1971 to improve the software, which by contract rights belonged to the government. He then worked for eighteen months as an independent contractor for the U.S. Attorney's Office in D.C., and he then founded the [[INSLAW|Institute for Law and Social Research]].[^2][^3] He won a contract through a competitive bid to develop what would become [[PROMIS]], working under the direction of [[Joan E. Jacoby]] and [[Charles R. Work]] with [[LEAA|Law Enforcement Assistance Administration]] funding routed through the [[Office of Crime Analysis of the District of Columbia]]. The resulting software, the Prosecutor's Management Information System, debuted on January 1, 1971, in the D.C. U.S. Attorney's Office.[^1][^7]
 
 In 1973, Hamilton and his wife Nancy founded INSLAW (the Institute for Law and Social Research), a non-profit organization that took over stewardship of PROMIS. INSLAW received additional LEAA funding to enhance PROMIS into a transferable system adoptable by other jurisdictions and oversaw its spread to prosecutors' offices around the country. In January 1981, Hamilton reorganized INSLAW as a for-profit entity and acquired the predecessor organization's assets.[^1]
 
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ In 1973, Hamilton and his wife Nancy founded INSLAW (the Institute for Law and S
 
 In March 1982, INSLAW signed a $10 million, three-year contract with the [[Department of Justice|DOJ's]] [[Executive Office for United States Attorneys]] to install PROMIS in 20 large U.S. Attorneys' offices and word-processor systems in 74 smaller ones. From the contract's earliest days, Hamilton and [[C. Madison Brewer]], the DOJ's project manager, were in conflict: Hamilton alleged Brewer obstructed INSLAW's proprietary rights claims and engineered advance payment disputes to force the company into financial distress. When INSLAW ran out of funds to sustain litigation against the DOJ while fighting to protect its software rights, it filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in February 1985.[^4]
 
-Hamilton and Nancy Hamilton sued the DOJ for non-payment on a version of PROMIS called Modification 12 and for the alleged unauthorized distribution of the enhanced software beyond the contract's authorized sites. In September 1987, [[Bankruptcy Judge George F. Bason]] ruled in their favor, finding DOJ had "taken, converted, stole, INSLAW's enhanced PROMIS by trickery, fraud, and deceit" and awarding approximately $6.8 million in damages. The ruling was affirmed by the district court but reversed on jurisdictional grounds by the Court of Appeals in May 1991.[^4]
+Hamilton and Nancy Hamilton sued the DOJ for non-payment on a version of PROMIS called Modification 12 and for the alleged unauthorized distribution of the enhanced software beyond the contract's authorized sites. In September 1987, [[Bankruptcy Judge George F. Bason]] ruled in their favor, finding that the Department of Justice "took, converted, stole, Inslaw's enhanced PROMIS by trickery, fraud, and deceit" and awarding approximately $6.8 million in damages. The ruling was affirmed by the district court but reversed on jurisdictional grounds by the Court of Appeals in May 1991.[^4]
 
 ### Representation by Elliot Richardson
 
@@ -55,3 +55,4 @@ Hamilton continued to assert that PROMIS was fraudulently stolen and distributed
 [^4]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. *The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report.* House Report 102-857, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, September 10, 1992; U.S. Court of Federal Claims, *Inslaw, Inc. v. United States*, Ruling of Hearing Officer Christine Miller, July 31, 1997.
 [^5]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. *The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report.* House Report 102-857, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, September 10, 1992; Richardson, Elliot L. Testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, 1992.
 [^6]: Seymour, Cheri. *The Last Circle: Danny Casolaro's Investigation into the Octopus and the PROMIS Software Scandal.* TrineDay, 2010.
+[^7]: Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., *System Overview and Report Formats for PROMIS* (May 1971), prepared for the District of Columbia Government Office of Crime Analysis under LEAA Grant No. 70-DF-047, note 1 to the passage on the design team, NCJ 32469. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/32469NCJRS.pdf

10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Fred L. Lander III.md

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ He worked as a classroom teacher, operated an independent real estate and insura
 
 Lander dedicated 30 years of his career to the Federal Government, working at the [[Internal Revenue Service]], the Federal Power Commission, the National Archives and Records Service, and the Department of Justice's [[LEAA]]. 
 
-Fred was part of the original 1969 team creating [[PROMIS]] with [[Joan E. Jacoby]], [[Charles R. Work]], and [[Bill Hamilton]] as part of the [[Office of Crime Analysis of the District of Columbia]] where he was an Assistant Director.
+Fred was part of the original 1969 team creating [[PROMIS]] with [[Joan E. Jacoby]], [[Charles R. Work]], and [[Bill Hamilton]] as part of the [[Office of Crime Analysis of the District of Columbia]] where he was an Assistant Director.[^1]
 
 He later served with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission until his retirement on April 16, 1987. During this time, he also worked as a Crime Analyst and Executive Director of the Pilot District Police Community Relations Project for the District of Columbia and was appointed an Administrative Law Judge for the Civil Service Commission in Dallas, Texas.
 
@@ -29,4 +29,8 @@ He was a 50-year member of the Omega Psi Phi Fraternity, Inc., and received thei
 
 Lander was certified to practice law before all Courts in the State of Texas, the United States District Courts for the Northern and Eastern Districts of Texas, the [[United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit]], and the United States Supreme Court.
 
-Fred L. Lander III passed away in 2001.
+Fred L. Lander III passed away in 2001.
+
+### Footnotes
+
+[^1]: Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., *System Overview and Report Formats for PROMIS* (May 1971), prepared for the District of Columbia Government Office of Crime Analysis under LEAA Grant No. 70-DF-047, note 1 to the passage on the design team, NCJ 32469. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/32469NCJRS.pdf

10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Henry A. Kissinger.md

@@ -3,9 +3,11 @@ title: Henry A. Kissinger
 aliases:
   - Henry A. Kissinger
   - Henry Kissinger
+  - Henry Alfred Kissinger
+  - Heinz Alfred Kissinger
   - Kissinger
 created: 2026-05-14
-updated: 2026-10-12
+updated: 2026-10-14
 category: "Intelligence & Government"
 tags:
   - KeyFigure
@@ -15,9 +17,20 @@ tags:
   - Israel
   - Nuclear
   - ColdWar
+  - Chile
+  - Cambodia
+  - Wiretaps
+  - OperationCondor
+  - EastTimor
+  - BancaNazionaleDelLavoro
+  - Iran
+  - Kurds
+  - BCCI
+  - Pakistan
   - 1960s
   - 1970s
-summary: "National Security Advisor and Secretary of State under Nixon and Ford who endorsed Israel's nuclear program at Dimona and privately argued that Japan and Israel were better served by the bomb than the Non-Proliferation Treaty."
+  - 1980s
+summary: "National Security Advisor and Secretary of State under Nixon and Ford, documented in the NSC wiretaps, Track II against Allende, the Condor demarche, Kurdish covert aid and the BNL advisory board."
 born: 1923-05-27
 died: 2023-11-29
 location: "Fürth, Germany"
@@ -25,103 +38,326 @@ relations:
   - type: employed_by
     with: "[[Rockefeller Brothers Fund]]"
     role: "director, Special Studies Project"
+    start: 1956
     end: 1958-06-30
-    fn: ssp
+    fn: 5
   - type: participant_in
     with: "[[Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel]]"
     role: "attended some sessions, Quantico I"
     start: 1955-06-05
     end: 1955-06-10
-    fn: qp3
+    fn: 4
   - type: participant_in
     with: "[[Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel]]"
     role: "panel member, Quantico II"
     start: 1955-08
     end: 1955-11
-    fn: qp1
+    fn: 4
+  - type: head_of
+    with: "[[National Security Council]]"
+    role: "Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs"
+    start: 1969-01-20
+    end: 1975-11-03
+    fn: 7
+  - type: head_of
+    with: "[[State Department]]"
+    role: "Secretary of State"
+    start: 1973-09-22
+    end: 1977-01-20
+    fn: 7
+  - type: head_of
+    with: "[[40 Committee]]"
+    role: "chairman"
+    start: 1969-01-20
+    end: 1975-11-03
+    fn: 22
+  - type: participant_in
+    with: "[[Project FUBELT]]"
+    role: "principal, Track II"
+    start: 1970-09-15
+    end: 1970-11-30
+    fn: 20
+  - type: founded
+    with: "[[Kissinger Associates]]"
+    role: "co-founder with Brent Scowcroft"
+    start: 1982
+    fn: 63
+  - type: member_of
+    with: "[[Banca Nazionale del Lavoro]]"
+    role: "international advisory board member"
+    start: 1985
+    end: 1991-06
+    fn: 63
+  - type: reported_to
+    with: "[[Richard Nixon]]"
+    role: "Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs"
+    start: 1969-01-20
+    end: 1974-08-09
+    fn: 28
+  - type: reported_to
+    with: "[[Gerald R. Ford]]"
+    role: "National Security Advisor, then Secretary of State"
+    start: 1974-08-09
+    end: 1977-01-20
+    fn: 60
+  - type: employed_by
+    with: "[[Harvard University]]"
+    role: "faculty member, Department of Government and Center for International Affairs"
+    start: 1954
+    end: 1971
+    fn: 3
+  - type: employed_by
+    with: "[[Council on Foreign Relations]]"
+    role: "study director, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy"
+    start: 1955
+    end: 1956
+    fn: 3
+  - type: participant_in
+    with: "[[Halperin v. Kissinger]]"
+    role: "defendant"
+    start: 1973-06
+    end: 1992
+    fn: 11
+  - type: member_of
+    with: "[[Banca Nazionale del Lavoro]]"
+    role: "consulting contract for Kissinger Associates, July 1986 to June 1988"
+    start: 1986-07-01
+    end: 1988-06-30
+    fn: 65
+
 ---
 
-Henry A. Kissinger was an American diplomat and political scientist who served as the [[United States Secretary of State]] and National Security Advisor under Presidents [[Richard Nixon]] and [[Gerald R. Ford]]. In the fall of 1967, while a [[Harvard University]] professor and consultant on [[Vietnam]] to the [[Lyndon B. Johnson|Johnson]] administration, Kissinger visited [[Tel Aviv]] to teach for a week at the Israeli Defense College. At the end of his course, he went to [[William N. Dale]]'s office in the embassy and sent an urgent, top-secret message to the [[White House]], warning about [[Dimona]] and concluding that [[Israel]] was making nuclear warheads.[^1]
+Henry Alfred Kissinger (1923 to 2023) was a German-born American political scientist and diplomat who served as [[United States Secretary of State]] and as National Security Advisor under Presidents [[Richard Nixon]] and [[Gerald R. Ford]]. [[Seymour Hersh]] wrote that in the fall of 1967, while a [[Harvard University]] professor and consultant on [[Vietnam]] to the [[Lyndon B. Johnson|Johnson]] administration, Kissinger visited [[Tel Aviv]] to teach for a week at the Israeli Defense College, and that at the end of that course he went to [[William N. Dale]]'s office in the embassy and sent an urgent, top-secret message to the [[White House]] warning about [[Dimona]] and concluding that [[Israel]] was making nuclear warheads.[^1]
 
-Kissinger approached inauguration day on January 20, 1969, convinced that Israel's nuclear ambitions were justified and understandable. Once in office, he and Nixon endorsed Israel's nuclear ambitions and shared a contempt for the 1968 [[Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty|Nonproliferation Treaty]]. Kissinger told his staff in the first months of 1969 that [[Japan]], as well as Israel, would be better off with the bomb than without it, believing that nuclear weapons were essential to the national security of both nations. His view was pragmatic: most major powers would eventually obtain nuclear weapons, and the [[United States]] could benefit most by helping them do so rather than engaging in futile exercises in morality.[^2]
+Hersh wrote that Kissinger approached inauguration day on January 20, 1969, convinced that Israel's nuclear ambitions were justified and understandable; that once in office he and Nixon endorsed those ambitions and shared a contempt for the 1968 [[Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty|Nonproliferation Treaty]]; and that Kissinger told his staff in the first months of 1969 that [[Japan]], as well as Israel, would be better off with the bomb than without it, believing that nuclear weapons were essential to the national security of both nations. Hersh described Kissinger's view as pragmatic: most major powers would eventually obtain nuclear weapons, and the [[United States]] could benefit most by helping them do so rather than engaging in futile exercises in morality.[^2]
 
-Kissinger's support for Israel's nuclear weapons program was widely known to the Israeli leadership. This was overtly signaled by the decision in 1969 to end the [[Floyd L. Culler, Jr.|Floyd Culler]] inspections of Dimona, a move that became American policy for the next two decades, signifying that Israel had gone nuclear and the United States would not intervene.[^2]
+Hersh wrote that Kissinger's support for Israel's nuclear weapons program was widely known to the Israeli leadership, and that it was signaled by the decision in 1969 to end the [[Floyd L. Culler, Jr.|Floyd Culler]] inspections of Dimona, a move that became American policy for the next two decades, signifying that Israel had gone nuclear and the United States would not intervene.[^2]
 
-### Biographical Record
+### Biography
 
-Heinz Alfred Kissinger was born on May 27, 1923, in [[Fürth]], Bavaria, to a German-Jewish family. The family emigrated to the United States in 1938. Kissinger was naturalized as a U.S. citizen on June 19, 1943, while serving in the [[U.S. Army]]. He earned a B.A. summa cum laude from Harvard College in 1950, an M.A. in 1952, and a Ph.D. in 1954, with a dissertation later published as *A World Restored* (1957).[^bio]
+Heinz Alfred Kissinger was born on May 27, 1923, in [[Fürth]], Bavaria, to a German-Jewish family. The family emigrated to the United States in 1938. He was naturalized as a United States citizen on June 19, 1943, while serving in the [[U.S. Army]].[^3] He earned a B.A. summa cum laude from [[Harvard College]] in 1950, an M.A. in 1952, and a Ph.D. in 1954, with a dissertation later published as *A World Restored* (1957).[^3]
 
-He died on November 29, 2023, at his home in [[Kent, Connecticut]], at the age of 100.[^bio]
+He died on November 29, 2023, at his home in [[Kent, Connecticut]], at the age of 100.
 
 ### Harvard Career
 
-Kissinger's academic career at Harvard ran from 1951 to 1971, with a leave of absence beginning January 1969 when he entered government service. He directed the [[Harvard International Seminar]] from 1951 to 1971, a program that brought rising foreign policy figures from Europe and Asia to Cambridge each summer. Beginning in 1957, he served as Associate Director of Harvard's Center for International Affairs. He directed the [[Harvard Defense Studies Program]] from 1958 to 1971. His last seminar at the Center for International Affairs was held on December 16, 1968, before he departed for [[Washington, D.C.]] to serve as Nixon's National Security Advisor.[^bio]
+Kissinger's Harvard career began in 1951. He was a member of the faculty from 1954 until 1971, with a leave of absence beginning January 1969 when he entered government service.[^3] He directed the [[Harvard International Seminar]] from 1951 to 1971,[^3] a program that brought rising foreign policy figures from Europe and Asia to Cambridge each summer. From 1957 to 1960 he served as Associate Director of Harvard's [[Center for International Affairs]].[^3] He directed the [[Harvard Defense Studies Program]] from 1958 to 1971. His last seminar at the Center for International Affairs was held on December 16, 1968, before he departed for [[Washington, D.C.]] to serve as Nixon's National Security Advisor.
 
-The Harvard International Seminar received funding from at least three [[CIA]] cutouts, including [[The Asia Foundation]], [[The Fairfield Foundation]], and [[American Friends of the Middle East]], the last of which channeled approximately $243,000 to the program. After CIA funding was publicly exposed in 1967, the [[Ford Foundation]] assumed financial support for the program.[^seminar]
+The Harvard International Seminar received funding from at least three [[CIA]] cutouts, including [[The Asia Foundation]], [[The Fairfield Foundation]], and [[American Friends of the Middle East]], the last of which channeled approximately $243,000 to the program. After CIA funding was publicly exposed in 1967, the [[Ford Foundation]] assumed financial support for the program.
 
 ### Quantico Panels, 1955
 
-Kissinger attended some sessions of the first [[Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel]] at the Marine Corps Schools in June 1955, as did members of the State and Defense departments and the Central Intelligence Agency.[^qp3] On August 16, 1955, [[Nelson Rockefeller]] invited him, then a Harvard academic, to a second panel on the psychological aspects of future United States strategy, which is called Quantico II in the record.[^qp1] The panel's twelve members met in Washington in late August and at Quantico in September, with [[Frederick L. Anderson]] designated chairman.[^qp1] Kissinger took the place of [[Hans Speier]], who had planned a trip to Germany for the [[Rand Corporation]]. [[Daniel Bessner]] describes the meeting as crucial to Kissinger's career, and states that Rockefeller became his political patron after it.[^qp4] The [[Rockefeller Archive Center]] describes its folder of Kissinger's Spring 1980 interview in the Nelson A. Rockefeller personal papers as stating that Kissinger "met Nelson Rockefeller while serving on the staff of the Quantico II conference in the mid-1950s"; Bessner, citing Isaacson, places the two men's first meeting at the first panel.[^qp5][^qp4] Kissinger's paper "Psychological and Pressure Aspects of Negotiations with the USSR" appears in the November 1955 source book, which the panel submitted on November 29, 1955.[^qp1][^qp2]
+Kissinger attended some sessions of the first [[Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel]] at the Marine Corps Schools in June 1955, as did members of the State and Defense departments and the CIA.[^4] On August 16, 1955, [[Nelson Rockefeller]] invited him, then a Harvard academic, to a second panel on the psychological aspects of future United States strategy, which is called Quantico II in the record.[^4] The panel's twelve members met in Washington in late August and at Quantico in September, with [[Frederick L. Anderson]] designated chairman. Kissinger took the place of [[Hans Speier]], who had planned a trip to Germany for the [[Rand Corporation]]. [[Daniel Bessner]] describes the meeting as crucial to Kissinger's career and states that Rockefeller became his political patron after it. The [[Rockefeller Archive Center]] describes its folder of Kissinger's Spring 1980 interview in the Nelson A. Rockefeller personal papers as stating that Kissinger "met Nelson Rockefeller while serving on the staff of the Quantico II conference in the mid-1950s"; Bessner, citing Isaacson, places the two men's first meeting at the first panel.[^4] Kissinger's paper "Psychological and Pressure Aspects of Negotiations with the USSR" appears in the November 1955 source book, which the panel submitted on November 29, 1955.
 
 ### Rockefeller Brothers Fund Special Studies Project
 
-Kissinger served as director of the [[Rockefeller Brothers Fund]] Special Studies Project, a policy planning initiative convened by Nelson Rockefeller that ran from 1956 to 1960, with the final publication appearing in 1961. The project produced a volume entitled *Prospect for America: The Rockefeller Panel Reports* (Doubleday, 1961), which sold over 400,000 copies.
+Kissinger served as director of the [[Rockefeller Brothers Fund]] Special Studies Project, a policy planning initiative convened by Nelson Rockefeller that ran from 1956 to 1960, with the final publication appearing in 1961. The project produced a volume entitled *Prospect for America: The Rockefeller Panel Reports* (Doubleday, 1961).[^5] The volume sold over 400,000 copies.
 
-The project was organized into seven panels examining sweeping strategic and domestic issues. [[Dean Rusk]] chaired Panel I (International Objectives and Strategies). Kissinger, director of the whole project until his resignation on June 30, 1958, directed the report of Panel II (International Security: The Military Aspect), whose members included [[Roswell Gilpatric]], [[Townsend Hoopes]], [[Edward Teller]], [[Henry Luce]], and [[Laurance Rockefeller]]. Panel III (International Economic and Social Objectives) was chaired by [[Milton Katz]]. Panel IV (U.S. Economic and Social Policy) was chaired by [[Thomas B. McCabe]]. Panel V (U.S. Utilization of Human Resources) was chaired by [[John W. Gardner]]. Panel VI (U.S. Democratic Process) was chaired by [[James A. Perkins]]. Panel VII (The Moral Framework of National Purpose), chaired by [[Richard McKeon]], produced a report by [[Robert Heilbroner]] that was not published.[^ssp]
+The project was organized into seven panels examining sweeping strategic and domestic issues. [[Dean Rusk]] chaired Panel I (International Objectives and Strategies). Kissinger, director of the whole project until his resignation on June 30, 1958, directed the report of Panel II (International Security: The Military Aspect), whose members included [[Roswell Gilpatric]], [[Townsend Hoopes]], [[Edward Teller]], [[Henry Luce]], and [[Laurance Rockefeller]]. Panel III (International Economic and Social Objectives) was chaired by [[Milton Katz]]. Panel IV (U.S. Economic and Social Policy) was chaired by [[Thomas B. McCabe]]. Panel V (U.S. Utilization of Human Resources) was chaired by [[John W. Gardner]]. Panel VI (U.S. Democratic Process) was chaired by [[James A. Perkins]]. Panel VII (The Moral Framework of National Purpose), chaired by [[Richard McKeon]], produced a report by [[Robert Heilbroner]] that was not published.
 
-The project was Kissinger's primary institutional bridge to the [[Rockefeller family]] network prior to his entry into government. Roswell Gilpatric subsequently served as Deputy Secretary of Defense in the Kennedy administration. Nelson Rockefeller retained Kissinger as his personal foreign policy consultant after the project concluded.[^c1]
+The project was Kissinger's primary institutional bridge to the [[Rockefeller family]] network prior to his entry into government. Roswell Gilpatric subsequently served as Deputy Secretary of Defense in the Kennedy administration. Nelson Rockefeller retained Kissinger as his personal foreign policy consultant after the project concluded. In a telephone conversation of March 13, 1972, [[David Rockefeller]], chairman of the [[Chase Manhattan Bank]], offered Kissinger a plane ride to the next [[Bilderberg Group|Bilderberg]] meeting.[^6]
 
-### *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (1957)
+### Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (1957)
 
-Kissinger's book *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (Harper, 1957) grew out of eighteen months of work with a study group organized by the [[Council on Foreign Relations]] and led by [[Gordon Dean]], former chairman of the [[Atomic Energy Commission]]. The book argued for a doctrine of limited nuclear war as an alternative to massive retaliation, and established Kissinger as a leading voice on strategic doctrine. Panel II of the Rockefeller Special Studies Project built on the same framework.[^nwfp]
+Kissinger's book *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (Harper, 1957) grew out of eighteen months of work with a study group organized by the [[Council on Foreign Relations]] and led by [[Gordon Dean]], former chairman of the [[Atomic Energy Commission]]. The book argued for a doctrine of limited nuclear war as an alternative to massive retaliation, and established Kissinger as a leading voice on strategic doctrine. Panel II of the Rockefeller Special Studies Project built on the same framework.
 
 ### Brazil and 1964 Coup
 
-A week before the April 1964 Brazilian military coup that overthrew [[Joao Goulart]], Nelson Rockefeller's longtime Latin American representative [[Berent Friele]] briefed both Nelson Rockefeller and Kissinger on Brazil's political crisis. Friele, a Norwegian-born coffee dealer who had served as Rockefeller's country director in Brazil during the [[Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs]] (OCIAA) programs in [[World War II]], had maintained a dense network of contacts in Brazilian business and military circles. His briefing dismissed Goulart's constitutional reform proposals as demagoguery and characterized the opposition's plans favorably.[^c2]
+A week before the April 1964 Brazilian military coup that overthrew [[Joao Goulart]], Nelson Rockefeller's longtime Latin American representative [[Berent Friele]] briefed both Nelson Rockefeller and Kissinger on [[Brazil]]'s political crisis. Friele, a Norwegian-born coffee dealer who had served as Rockefeller's country director in Brazil during the [[Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs]] (OCIAA) programs in [[World War II]], had maintained a dense network of contacts in Brazilian business and military circles. His briefing dismissed Goulart's constitutional reform proposals as demagoguery and characterized the opposition's plans favorably.
 
-After the coup, Friele functioned as a back-channel between the Nixon administration and the Brazilian military government. A secret communications channel was established between Nixon and Brazilian President [[Emilio Garrastazu Medici]] through Kissinger, with Brazilian contacts including figures close to Friele.[^friele]
+After the coup, Friele functioned as a back-channel between the Nixon administration and the Brazilian military government. A secret communications channel was established between Nixon and Brazilian President [[Emilio Garrastazu Medici]] through Kissinger, with Brazilian contacts including figures close to Friele.
 
 ### Bay of Pigs
 
-When news of the [[Bay of Pigs invasion]] reached Harvard in April 1961, Kissinger told students who asked his view: "Well, as long as we're there, I don't think it would do us any good to lose."[^c3]
+When news of the [[Bay of Pigs invasion]] reached Harvard in April 1961, Kissinger told students who asked his view: "Well, as long as we're there, I don't think it would do us any good to lose."
 
 ### Government Service
 
-Kissinger was appointed Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs on January 20, 1969, the date of Nixon's inauguration. He was appointed Secretary of State on September 21, 1973, and took office the following day, September 22, 1973. He held both positions concurrently until November 3, 1975, when President Ford removed him as National Security Advisor. He continued as Secretary of State until January 20, 1977.[^state]
+Kissinger was appointed Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs on January 20, 1969, the date of Nixon's inauguration. He was appointed Secretary of State on September 21, 1973, and took office the following day, September 22, 1973. He held both positions concurrently until November 3, 1975, when President Ford removed him as National Security Advisor. He continued as Secretary of State until January 20, 1977.[^7]
 
 ### Cambodia Secret Bombing
 
-On March 15, 1969, Kissinger transmitted Nixon's order to commence the secret bombing of Cambodia (Operation Menu, first phase: Operation Breakfast) to Secretary of Defense [[Melvin Laird]]. Kissinger briefed Nixon on preparations on March 17, 1969, and received a report on the first raid's results on the evening of March 18, 1969, commenting that "the impact must have been something."[^doc11][^doc12][^doc13]
+On March 15, 1969, the President issued the directives for the Breakfast Plan, the first phase of the secret bombing of [[Cambodia]] (Operation Menu, first phase: Operation Breakfast), after a rocket attack on [[Saigon]]. The directives provided that the Department of State and the ambassadors in Saigon would be notified only after the point of no return.[^8] Kissinger's memorandum to Nixon of March 16 set out the political reasons for the action and its possible consequences, including a Cambodian protest.[^9] Kissinger transmitted Nixon's order to commence the secret bombing to Secretary of Defense [[Melvin Laird]], briefed Nixon on preparations on March 17, 1969, and received a report on the first raid's results on the evening of March 18, 1969.
+
+When the first raid was reported, Kissinger suggested that if the North Vietnamese "retaliate without any diplomatic screaming, we are in the driver's seat. Psychologically the impact must have been something."[^10]
 
 ### FBI Wiretap Program
 
-On May 9, 1969, following the publication of a New York Times report by William Beecher on the secret Cambodia bombing, Kissinger contacted FBI Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]] and arranged surveillance on [[Morton Halperin]], an NSC staffer and former Harvard colleague. The following day, General [[Alexander Haig]] went to FBI headquarters on Kissinger's behalf to submit a formal surveillance request covering Halperin and three others, including NSC staffer [[Helmut Sonnenfeldt]] and State Department official [[William Sullivan]]. A May 12, 1969, FBI memorandum documents the "Colonel Alexander M. Haig Technical Surveillance Request." A May 11, 1970, FBI report from Hoover to Nixon summarized results of the surveillance program. Between May 1969 and February 1971, seventeen individuals (thirteen government officials and four journalists) were subjected to wiretapping under this program, which produced no evidence of leaks.[^doc16][^doc17] The litigation arising from the program, *Halperin v. Kissinger*, was settled in 1992 after twenty years.[^halperin]
+On April 25, 1969, Nixon met in his office with Kissinger, Attorney General [[John N. Mitchell]] and FBI Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]] to discuss methods of controlling leaks of classified information. Mitchell, Hoover and Nixon continued the discussion over dinner at [[Camp David]] that evening and developed a program that included wiretaps on private telephones.[^11] A [[New York Times]] report of May 9, 1969 by William Beecher disclosed American bombing of targets in Cambodia. The Court of Appeals recorded that Nixon told Kissinger to ask the FBI to investigate the source, that Hoover told Kissinger that [[Morton H. Halperin]], an NSC staff member and former Harvard colleague, was the "prime suspect" although Halperin had no access to the information in the article, that Hoover and Kissinger spoke by telephone four times that day, and that the wiretap on the Halperin home telephone was in place by evening, after Kissinger had told Halperin earlier that day that he was considered a potential leaker.[^11]
+
+The court wrote that three other private telephones were wiretapped in the attempt to find the source. On the following day, Colonel [[Alexander M. Haig, Jr.]], then Kissinger's assistant, went to FBI headquarters on Kissinger's behalf to submit a formal surveillance request covering Halperin and three others, including NSC staffer [[Helmut Sonnenfeldt]] and [[State Department]] official [[William Sullivan]]. FBI officials and Haig worked out procedures to conduct the surveillance "with no record maintained" in normal FBI files, and the Bureau then formally requested wiretap authorization from the Attorney General, who approved the Halperin tap. A May 12, 1969, FBI memorandum bears the heading "Colonel Alexander M. Haig Technical Surveillance Request." A May 11, 1970, FBI report from Hoover to Nixon summarized the results of the surveillance program.[^11]
+
+According to the court, the FBI observed in May and June 1969 that the Halperin tap was not producing evidence of a leak, and Kissinger requested that the taps be continued. On September 15, 1969, Kissinger requested termination of all wiretaps except Halperin's and one other. Halperin resigned from the NSC staff four days later, continued as a consultant until May 1970, and had no access to classified information during that period. After he resigned as consultant in protest over the invasion of Cambodia, the FBI reports on the wiretap went to [[H. R. Haldeman]] rather than to the National Security Advisor, and the tap continued until February 10, 1971. The plaintiffs cited FBI logs showing that agents overheard more than 600 calls on the Halperin telephone, of which 28 percent were between Halperin and people outside the family. The court wrote that "at first the FBI logs were kept at the Bureau in special files, where Kissinger and Haig reviewed them," and referred to "the 21 months of the Halperin wiretap."[^11]
+
+The [[Church Committee]] reported that seventeen individuals (thirteen government officials and four journalists) were wiretapped between May 1969 and February 1971 and that most of the taps had been requested by Kissinger or Haig rather than by other White House officials.[^12] Nixon described the product as "just gobs of material: gossip and bull." The committee found that the program did not reveal the source of any leak of classified data, which was its ostensible purpose, and that it generated information about the personal lives of the targets.[^12] The litigation arising from the program, *Halperin v. Kissinger*, was settled in 1992 after twenty years.
+
+### Operation CHAOS
+
+On February 18, 1969, [[Richard Helms]] sent Kissinger the CIA's study of student dissidence worldwide, "Restless Youth," which included a section on American students. The covering memorandum states: "This is an area not within the charter of this Agency, so I need not emphasize how extremely sensitive this makes the paper."[^13] The Church Committee described the CIA's collection on student dissent in the United States as "clearly outside the Agency's statutory charter," and recorded that Helms urged Kissinger to treat the matter with extreme sensitivity.[^14] The [[Rockefeller Commission]] heard 51 witnesses in 1975, among them Secretary of State Kissinger.[^13]
 
 ### Chile
 
-Kissinger's documented role in U.S. intervention against Chilean President [[Salvador Allende]] spans the period from Allende's electoral victory in September 1970 through the Pinochet era. A September 12, 1970, telephone conversation between Kissinger and Secretary of State [[William Rogers]] discussed blocking Allende's inauguration. On September 15, 1970, CIA Director [[Richard Helms]]'s handwritten notes from a White House meeting record Nixon ordering the CIA to "make the economy scream" and authorizing a coup. On October 15, 1970, Kissinger met with Helms and General Haig at the White House to discuss coup planning with General [[Roberto Viaux]]; CIA officers assessed Viaux's chances of success at "one in twenty." On November 5, 1970, Kissinger sent Nixon a memorandum arguing Allende posed "one of the most serious challenges" ever to U.S. interests in the hemisphere.
+Kissinger's documented role in U.S. intervention in [[Chile]] against President [[Salvador Allende]] spans the period from Allende's electoral victory in September 1970 through the Pinochet era.
 
-On September 16, 1973, three days after the coup that killed Allende, Kissinger spoke by telephone with Nixon about U.S. involvement. On June 8, 1976, Kissinger met privately with General [[Augusto Pinochet]] in Santiago, telling him "you are a victim of all left-wing groups around the world." These exchanges are documented in NSAEBB No. 437 and in *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXI (Chile, 1969-1973).[^chile]
+On September 12, 1970, Kissinger spoke with Helms by telephone. Kissinger announced that he was calling a [[40 Committee]] meeting for the following Monday and said: "We will not let Chile go down the drain."[^15] On September 14, Secretary of State [[William Rogers]] discussed with Kissinger a CIA paper on Chile and the risk that the paper record would look bad. Kissinger told Rogers: "The President's view is to do the maximum possible to prevent an Allende takeover, but through Chilean sources and with a low posture."[^16] On September 15, 1970, Kissinger, Attorney General John N. Mitchell, and Helms met with Nixon at the White House. Helms's notes of the meeting record "1 in 10 chance perhaps, but save Chile!", "$10,000,000 available, more if necessary," "game plan make the economy scream" and "48 hours for plan of action."[^17][^18] In his August 12, 1975 testimony to the Church Committee, Kissinger said that at that meeting "President Nixon did almost all of the talking" and that Nixon "used the figure of $10 million."[^17]
 
-The post-coup period included Kissinger's endorsement of [[Operation Condor]], the multinational assassination program coordinated by the [[Southern Cone]] military dictatorships. On August 30, 1976, Kissinger received a State Department action memorandum requesting approval for a formal warning to the Condor governments against conducting international assassinations. On September 16, 1976, Kissinger rescinded the proposed warning and ordered "no further action be taken on this matter." Five days later, on September 21, 1976, [[Orlando Letelier]] and [[Ronni Moffitt]] were killed by a car bomb in Washington, D.C.[^condor]
+A CIA memorandum for the record of September 16, 1970, "Genesis of Project FUBELT," states that Helms told CIA officials that "President Nixon had decided that an Allende regime in Chile was not acceptable to the United States," that the President authorized ten million dollars, that the CIA was to carry out the mission without coordination with the Departments of State or Defense, and that Helms had been asked by Kissinger to meet him on September 18 to give the Agency's views on how the mission could be accomplished.[^19] The Church Committee wrote that the September 15 meeting "initiated Track II," that "Track II was initiated by President Nixon on September 15 when he instructed the CIA to play a direct role in organizing a military coup d'etat in Chile," and that "there is no doubt that the U.S. government sought a military coup in Chile," while noting that it had received conflicting testimony about White House officials' awareness of specific coup plans.[^20][^21]
+
+The Church Committee wrote that, by Presidential instruction, Track II "was to be operated without informing the U.S. Ambassador in Santiago, the State Department, or any 40 Committee member save Henry Kissinger."[^22] The committee's chronology records that President Nixon instructed Helms to prevent Allende's accession to office and that the CIA was to play a direct role in organizing a military coup.[^23]
+
+On October 15, 1970, [[Thomas Karamessines]], the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans, met Kissinger and Brigadier General Haig at the White House and gave Kissinger a run-down on [[Roberto Viaux]], the army general at the center of the coup planning. The CIA record of the meeting states that Viaux "did not have more than one chance in twenty" of launching a successful coup. It records that those present decided the CIA must get a message to Viaux that included the words "Preserve your assets. We will stay in touch. The time will come when you with all your other friends can do something. You will continue to have our support," that Kissinger instructed Karamessines to preserve Agency assets in Chile and "maintain the capability for Agency operations against Allende in the future," and that Kissinger closed by saying the Agency should "continue keeping the pressure on every Allende weak spot in sight."[^24] In a telephone conversation with Nixon the same day, Kissinger said: "I saw Karamessines today. That looks hopeless. I turned it off. Nothing would be worse than an abortive coup."[^25]
+
+On October 22, 1970, gunmen shot and seriously wounded Chilean Army Commander General [[Rene Schneider]]. CIA briefing notes of October 23, titled "Track II," begin with the shooting.[^26] A CIA briefing of October 28 states that the military principals in contact with the agency had depended on the abduction of Schneider, probably by Viaux, "as the pretext needed to launch a coup."[^27]
+
+On November 5, 1970, Kissinger sent Nixon a memorandum for the November 6 [[National Security Council]] meeting arguing that the election of Allende "poses for us one of the most serious challenges ever faced in this hemisphere."[^28]
+
+On September 16, 1973, five days after the coup that killed Allende, Kissinger spoke with Nixon by telephone about the U.S. role. Kissinger said that the newspapers were "bleeding because a pro-Communist government has been overthrown." Nixon remarked that "our hand doesn't show on this one," and Kissinger replied: "We didn't do it. I mean we helped them."[^29] These exchanges are documented in NSAEBB No. 437 and in *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXI (Chile, 1969-1973).
+
+On June 8, 1976, Kissinger met General [[Augusto Pinochet]] in Santiago at noon. Pinochet's Foreign Minister Patricio Carvajal and Ambassador Manuel Trucco were among the Chilean participants, and Assistant Secretary [[William D. Rogers]] and an interpreter accompanied Kissinger. Kissinger told Pinochet: "My evaluation is that you are a victim of all left-wing groups around the world, and that your greatest sin was that you overthrew a government which was going Communist." He said that his speech was not aimed at Chile and that he wanted Pinochet to succeed.[^30]
+
+### Operation Condor
+
+On August 3, 1976, [[Harry Shlaudeman]], the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, had reported to Kissinger that the [[Southern Cone]] military regimes saw themselves as embattled and were joining forces to eradicate "subversion."[^31] On August 23, 1976, the State Department cabled the embassies in Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Santiago, and La Paz that "government planned and directed assassinations within and outside the territory of Condor members has most serious implications," and set out how to raise the concern with the governments involved.[^32] On August 24, Ambassador David Popper replied from Santiago that he "seriously" doubted an approach to President Pinochet was the best way to achieve the objective and that, "given Pinochet's sensitivity regarding pressures by USG, he might well take as an insult any inference that he was connected with such assassination plots."[^33]
+
+An unnumbered memorandum from Shlaudeman to Kissinger of August 30, 1976, titled "Operation Condor," stated: "What we are trying to head off is a series of international murders that could do serious damage to the international status and reputation of the countries involved." The memorandum, as the National Security Archive described it, reported that the U.S. ambassador in Montevideo, Ernest Siracusa, had resisted delivering the demarche to the Uruguayan generals for fear for his life and wanted further instructions, and it recommended that Kissinger authorize a message to Siracusa to talk to the Uruguayan Foreign Minister and the commander-in-chief of the army.[^34]
+
+On September 16, 1976, a cable from Kissinger's party in Lusaka, Zambia (SECTO 27128, "Actions Taken"), addressed to the Department for the Secretary's and the Executive Secretary's offices, recorded: "Unnumbered ARA memo dated August 30, 'Operation Condor'. Secretary declined to approve message to Montevideo and has instructed that no further action be taken on this matter."[^34] [[Peter Kornbluh]] of the [[National Security Archive]], who posted the cable in April 2010, said: "The State Department initiated a timely effort to thwart a 'Murder Inc' in the Southern Cone, and Kissinger, without explanation, aborted it."[^34] On September 20, writing from San José, Costa Rica, to his deputy William Luers in Washington, Shlaudeman wrote: "You can simply instruct the ambassadors to take no further action, noting that there have been no reports in some weeks indicating an intention to activate the Condor scheme."[^35]
+
+On September 21, 1976, [[Orlando Letelier]] and [[Ronni Moffitt]] were killed by a car bomb in Washington, D.C. The National Security Council staff's memorandum that morning described one of the dead as tentatively identified as Letelier and noted that no group had claimed the bombing.[^36] On October 8, 1976, Shlaudeman reported to Kissinger on the approach made, on Kissinger's instructions, to Colonel [[Manuel Contreras]], chief of the Chilean National Directorate of Intelligence (DINA), and wrote that the approach "seems to me sufficient action for the time being. The Chileans are the prime movers in Operation Condor."[^37]
 
 ### Argentina
 
-On June 30, 1976, Kissinger rebuked a State Department aide for a demarche criticizing Argentine death squads. On October 7, 1976, in a meeting with Argentine Foreign Minister [[César Augusto Guzzetti]], Kissinger stated: "The quicker you succeed the better." On October 19, 1976, U.S. Ambassador [[Robert Hill]] cabled Washington to protest that Kissinger's approach had emboldened the junta.[^doc32][^doc33]
+On June 10, 1976, in Santiago, Kissinger told Argentine Foreign Minister [[César Augusto Guzzetti]]: "If there are things that have to be done, you should do them quickly. But you must get back quickly to normal procedures."[^38] On June 30, 1976, Kissinger rebuked a State Department aide for a demarche criticizing death squads in [[Argentina]]. On October 7, 1976, in a meeting in New York with Guzzetti, Kissinger stated: "The quicker you succeed the better," and "If you can finish before Congress gets back, the better."[^39] On October 19, 1976, U.S. Ambassador [[Robert Hill]] cabled Washington that Guzzetti had returned from the visit "in a state of jubilation, convinced that there is no real problem with the USG over this issue," and that "it will be unrealistic and ineffective for this Embassy to press representations to the GOA over human rights violations."[^40]
 
 ### East Pakistan / Bangladesh
 
-On April 6, 1971, U.S. Consul General [[Archer Blood]] in Dacca sent what became known as the "Blood Telegram," a dissent channel cable signed by twenty diplomatic staff members condemning the Pakistani military's actions in East Pakistan as genocide and calling U.S. policy "moral bankruptcy." Kissinger's April 28, 1971, memorandum to Nixon presented policy options; Nixon handwrote "Don't squeeze Yahya at this time" in the margin, reflecting the administration's priority of the Pakistan channel to China. Blood was recalled from his post. Casualty estimates for the 1971 conflict in East Pakistan range up to three million civilian deaths.[^doc51][^doc52]
+On March 28, 1971, the American consulate in [[Dacca]] sent a telegram under the subject line "Selective Genocide," describing a reign of terror by the Pakistani military and reporting that the authorities appeared to hold lists of targets.[^41] On April 6, 1971, the consulate sent telegram 1138, "Dissent From U.S. Policy Toward East Pakistan," signed by twenty officers of the Consulate General, USAID and USIS and known as the "Blood Telegram." It stated that the U.S. government "has evidenced what many will consider moral bankruptcy" and that "the overworked term genocide is applicable." [[Archer Blood]], the U.S. Consul General in Dacca, did not sign it, wrote that he supported the right of the officers to voice their dissent, and added that he subscribed to their views.[^42] Blood was recalled from his post.
+
+On April 10, 1971, the Dacca consulate sent a second telegram stating its "specific areas of dissent with current U.S. policy toward East Pakistan" and preparing a series of policy recommendations.[^43]
+
+Kissinger's April 28, 1971, memorandum to Nixon, "Policy Options Toward Pakistan," set out three options: unqualified backing for West Pakistan, neutrality leaning toward the East, and an effort to help [[Yahya Khan]] achieve a negotiated settlement. Nixon approved the third and wrote: "To all hands. Don't squeeze Yahya at this time," underlining "Don't" three times. A note from Haig to Nixon of the same day, attached to another copy of the memorandum, indicates that Kissinger suggested that Nixon include a note to the effect that he did not want any actions taken that would have the effect of squeezing West Pakistan.[^44] Casualty estimates for the 1971 conflict in East Pakistan range up to three million civilian deaths.
+
+### Iran and the Kurds
+
+On May 30, 1972, in [[Tehran]], Nixon and Kissinger met [[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi]], the Shah of Iran, from 5:35 to 6:35 p.m. The memorandum of conversation records the Shah saying he was afraid the Soviets would establish "a coalition of the Kurds, the Baathists, and the Communists." Kissinger asked what could be done. The Shah replied: "Turkey needs strengthening. Iran can help with the Kurds." In the same conversation Kissinger noted that the United States would have to reestablish Pakistan's arms program to make [[Pakistan]] eligible for third-country transfers from Iran, and Nixon agreed.[^45]
+
+A CIA memorandum of June 12, 1972, prepared for Helms ahead of a meeting with representatives of the Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani, states that in March 1972 the policy of non-interference in Kurdish affairs was confirmed "not only by the State Department but by Dr. Kissinger's office as well."[^46] On June 7, 1972, [[Harold Saunders]] of the NSC staff wrote to Kissinger that Helms was the channel for a message from the Shah, on the basis of the Tehran talk, that Kissinger should speak personally with two representatives of Barzani. Saunders wrote that "the balance is fairly fine on the question of whether we should support the Kurds" and advised against Kissinger seeing them, since that "comes so close to involving the President at least by implication."[^47] On July 28, 1972, Haig sent Kissinger a Helms proposal for covert assistance to Barzani of about $3 million in funds over one year and about $2 million in ordnance, and recommended informing only the 40 Committee principals, "but avoid any paper and tell them that the President wants this done."[^48]
+
+In a memorandum to Nixon of September 6, 1973, Kissinger wrote: "You will recall that you initiated financial and military support to the Kurds in August 1972 in response to an appeal from the Shah," and that the Shah had said he was impressed by the material aid supplied: "arms, ammunition, blankets, medical supplies, plus a monthly cash subsidy."[^49] On April 11, 1974, Kissinger wrote to Nixon that the program begun after the Tehran visit had provided a monthly subsidy and small arms "through the Iranians." He wrote: "The underlying purpose was to keep the Iraqi Government tied down and to limit its capacity for adventures abroad."[^50] On June 24, 1974, he recommended that Nixon approve $8.06 million from the Agency Reserve for support to the Kurds in fiscal year 1975.[^51] On March 16, 1975, after the Iran-Iraq agreement, [[Brent Scowcroft]] transmitted a message from Kissinger to Richard Helms, by then Ambassador to Iran, instructing him to answer a message from Barzani with the words "our prayers are with them," to raise with the Iranians "the problem both the Iranian and the U.S. Governments will face in the U.S. and elsewhere if there is a massacre and Barzani charges that he has been let down," and to tell the Shah that the United States was prepared to provide the March subvention.[^52]
+
+### The Shah in New York, 1979
+
+On November 5, 1979, the Special Coordination Committee recorded: "The Rockefeller group, which is managing the Shah's affairs, has increased the security around the Shah."[^53] The *Foreign Relations* editorial note on Iranian withdrawals from Chase Manhattan Bank states that David Rockefeller, "a friend of the Shah, had lobbied for the Shah's acceptance into the United States for medical treatment."[^54] On November 26, 1979, Secretary of State [[Cyrus Vance]] reported to [[Jimmy Carter]] on congressional briefings, writing that an interview by [[George Ball]] "inspired a number of inquiries on Henry Kissinger's advice" and that several members pressed for details on the decision to let the Shah into the country.[^55]
+
+In an undated summary of discussions with Panamanian emissaries about the Shah's presence in [[Panama]], White House Chief of Staff [[Hamilton Jordan]] recorded their account of meetings with Iranian Foreign Minister [[Sadegh Ghotbzadeh]] on January 7. According to that account, Ghotbzadeh described the seizure of the American embassy as an "American conspiracy" involving "Rockefeller, Kissinger and others" who intended to create a crisis for Carter that would lead to the election of a Republican "controlled by Kissinger and Rockefeller."[^56]
 
 ### East Timor
 
-On December 6, 1975, in Jakarta, Kissinger and President Ford met with Indonesian President [[Suharto]] the day before Indonesia's invasion of [[East Timor]]. The meeting is documented in Embassy Jakarta Telegram 1579, classified Secret/Nodis, from Gerald R. Ford Library records. Kissinger told Suharto: "It is important that whatever you do succeeds quickly." He noted that "the use of US-made arms could create problems," but framed this as a question of how the operation was construed legally. Ford stated: "We will understand and will not press you on the issue." The East Timor Truth Commission subsequently concluded that U.S. material support was "fundamental to the Indonesian invasion." Casualty estimates range from 100,000 to 180,000 Timorese deaths. These materials are documented in NSAEBB No. 62.[^doc61]
+On December 6, 1975, in [[Jakarta]], Kissinger and President Ford met with Indonesian President [[Suharto]] the day before Indonesia's invasion of [[East Timor]]. Foreign Minister Adam Malik, Minister of State Sudharmono, Ambassador Newsom and an interpreter were also present. The memorandum of conversation was transmitted by the embassy in Jakarta as telegram 14945, classified Secret/Nodis, and is printed in the Foreign Relations volume for East and Southeast Asia, 1973 to 1976.[^57]
+
+Suharto told Ford: "We want your understanding if we deem it necessary to take rapid or drastic action." Ford replied: "We understand and will not press you on the issue." Kissinger added: "You appreciate that the use of US-made arms could create problems." Ford said: "We could have technical and legal problems." Kissinger said: "It depends on how we construe it. Whether it is in self defense or is a foreign operation. It is important that whatever you do succeeds quickly. We would be able to influence the reaction in America if whatever happens happens after we return."[^57]
+
+The East Timor Truth Commission subsequently concluded that U.S. material support was "fundamental to the Indonesian invasion." Casualty estimates range from 100,000 to 180,000 Timorese deaths. The documents are also posted in the National Security Archive's Electronic Briefing Book No. 62.
+
+### Cyprus
+
+The American response to the [[Cyprus]] crisis of July 1974 was handled through Washington Special Actions Group meetings and Nixon's telephone calls with Kissinger. In a conversation on July 17, 1974, Nixon and Kissinger discussed the European position that [[Makarios]] should be brought back to Cyprus and that the United States should press the Greeks to accept it.[^58] A Washington Special Actions Group meeting on July 20, 1974, discussed the evacuation of civilians from Cyprus and the positioning of the amphibious task force south of the island.[^59] In an April 29, 1975, memorandum to President Ford, Kissinger attributed the Greek request for military assistance in large part to the wish to recoup military losses "suffered during last summer's Cyprus crisis."[^60]
+
+### Israel and the 1973 War
+
+Kissinger's Israeli contacts during the October 1973 war ran principally through Ambassador [[Simcha Dinitz]]. On October 8, 1973, Kissinger and Dinitz discussed Israeli aircraft losses, including a reference to the SAM-6 missiles, which were "very effective against our planes."[^61] On October 13, 1973, Kissinger told Dinitz, "We are going to do three separate things."[^62]
+
+### Kissinger Associates, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro and Iraq
+
+Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft set up [[Kissinger Associates]] in 1982. Scowcroft served as vice chairman and head of the firm's Washington office until he became head of the National Security Council under President [[George H. W. Bush]] in January 1989.[^63] [[Lawrence Eagleburger]] was the firm's president.[^63]
+
+The House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs and its chairman, [[Henry B. Gonzalez]], pursued the relationship between the firm and the [[Banca Nazionale del Lavoro]] during the lending of its [[Atlanta]] branch to [[Iraq]]. Gonzalez told the House that Kissinger was a paid member of the bank's advisory board for international policy between 1985 and June 1991, and that he received at least $10,000 for attending each meeting of the board.[^63] Gonzalez said that Kissinger's contract expired in the summer of 1991, more than four months after the date Kissinger had previously reported for his departure from the board.[^63] Gonzalez inserted into the House hearing record the minutes of the advisory board's meeting in [[Madrid]] on May 4 and 5, 1987, which quote Kissinger giving "the victory of Iran over Iraq at 55 percent" and stating that he would change that estimate.[^64]
+
+[[Christopher Drogoul]], the Atlanta branch manager, testified in 1993 that [[Wafai Dajani]] had told him in 1989 that Kissinger was "the architect of foreign policy in the United States." Drogoul also testified that "it became clear to us that the people at Kissinger and Associates were somehow assisting clients of Iraq in further developing business."[^64] 
+
+The report of the Italian Senate's parliamentary commission of inquiry on the Atlanta branch of BNL, approved on April 22, 1992, states that BNL's executive committee decided in June 1986 to begin a consulting relationship with Kissinger Associates, under a two-year contract at $150,000 a year plus expenses that ran from July 1, 1986 to June 30, 1988; that five meetings took place between officers of the bank and of the firm, with Iraq not among the countries examined; and that Scowcroft attended as a representative of the firm and received no personal compensation, only travel and lodging expenses. The commission gave June 30, 1991 as the end of Kissinger's membership of BNL's international advisory committee under his own consulting contract, which provided $50,000 for the address at the dinner preceding the committee's annual meeting, and noted Gonzalez's statement that the membership continued to August 1991. It reported that Alan Stoga of Kissinger Associates took part in a June 1989 meeting in Baghdad between the US-Iraq Business Forum and Iraqi government officials, and listed among the firm's clients [[American Express]], [[Coca-Cola]], [[Anheuser-Busch]], [[H. J. Heinz]], [[Volvo]], [[Arco]], [[Hunt Oil]], Chase Manhattan Bank, [[American International Group]] and [[Freeport-McMoRan]].[^65]
+
+Gonzalez also reported that Eagleburger was at a meeting between the bank's managers and Kissinger Associates in New York in 1987 or 1988, and that Kissinger had stated that Eagleburger did not handle the BNL account at the firm.[^63]
+
+The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's December 1992 report on [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]] by [[John Kerry]] and [[Hank Brown]] devotes its chapter 20 to Kissinger Associates. It states that from the fall of 1986 through early 1989 BCCI initiated contacts with the firm, which then had five partners (Kissinger, Scowcroft, Eagleburger, Alan Stoga and T. Jefferson Cunningham III); that Stoga and a retired Brazilian ambassador working as a Kissinger Associates consultant, Sergio Correa da Costa, explored ways to link BCCI's banks with the firm's services; and that the discussions "ended in early 1989 at Henry Kissinger's personal insistence," after which Kissinger Associates referred BCCI to its director William D. Rogers and the law firm [[Arnold & Porter]]. Letters of November 3, 1986 set da Costa's terms at $40,000 a year plus 10 to 20 percent of fees on transactions he arranged, and da Costa told Kissinger in them that he would also work for BCCI. In the summer of 1987 da Costa wrote to the firm about "that amusing luncheon with the BNL crowd." On September 20, 1987 da Costa invited Kissinger to a dinner at the plantation of the BCCI shareholder [[Ghaith Pharaon]], suggesting Pharaon as a client; the report states that Kissinger declined the invitation.[^66]
+
+In a letter of January 30, 1992 to Kerry, the firm's attorney [[Lloyd Cutler]] wrote that Kissinger Associates "have never represented or provided any services for BCCI, ICIC, or any BCCI shareholder." The committee wrote that the account "is not untrue" but "does fail to characterize the full extent of the contacts," and that the firm refused to provide its client list to the subcommittee.[^66] A note by Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists on the copy of the report published by that organization states that Hank Brown, "reportedly acting at the behest of Henry Kissinger," pressed after its release for the deletion of a few passages, particularly in chapter 20, so that the Government Printing Office edition differs slightly from the committee's softcopy.[^66]
 
 ### Telephone Transcripts
 
-Beginning in January 1969, Kissinger had his telephone conversations transcribed for his office files, a practice that continued through his tenure as Secretary of State. On October 29, 1976, while still Secretary of State, Kissinger arranged to move the transcripts as personal papers from his State Department office to Nelson Rockefeller's estate in [[Tarrytown, New York]], before arranging a donation to the Library of Congress under terms excluding public access.[^kissrc] State Department lawyers advised in 1975 and 1976 that the transcripts were not subject to the Freedom of Information Act as personal property, despite having been created by government secretaries using government resources. William Safire's January 14, 1976, *New York Times* column, "The Dead-Key Scrolls," first brought the issue to public attention. The [[National Security Archive]] began corresponding with the Archivist of the United States, [[John W. Carlin]], about recovering the transcripts in January 1999. A complaint written by its pro bono counsel at [[Mayer Brown]] was presented to the Archivist and the Secretary of State on January 25, 2001, and its attorneys wrote again to the State Department, the National Archives and the Department of Justice on April 25, 2001. The government recovered copies of the transcripts to the National Archives and State Department in 2001, and a State Department statement of August 8, 2001 credited the Archive with prompting the recovery. On May 26, 2004 the National Archives released about 20,000 pages of the transcripts, covering Kissinger's service from 1969 to August 1974.[^nsa123] These materials are documented in NSAEBB Briefing Book No. 852.[^telcons]
+Beginning in January 1969, Kissinger had his telephone conversations transcribed for his office files, a practice that continued through his tenure as Secretary of State. On October 29, 1976, while still Secretary of State, Kissinger arranged to move the transcripts as personal papers from his State Department office to Nelson Rockefeller's estate in [[Tarrytown, New York]], before arranging a donation to the Library of Congress under terms excluding public access. State Department lawyers advised in 1975 and 1976 that the transcripts were not subject to the Freedom of Information Act as personal property, despite having been created by government secretaries using government resources. William Safire's January 14, 1976, *New York Times* column, "The Dead-Key Scrolls," first brought the issue to public attention. The National Security Archive began corresponding with the Archivist of the United States, [[John W. Carlin]], about recovering the transcripts in January 1999. A complaint written by its pro bono counsel at [[Mayer Brown]] was presented to the Archivist and the Secretary of State on January 25, 2001, and its attorneys wrote again to the State Department, the National Archives and the Department of Justice on April 25, 2001. The government recovered copies of the transcripts to the National Archives and State Department in 2001, and a State Department statement of August 8, 2001 credited the Archive with prompting the recovery. On May 26, 2004 the National Archives released about 20,000 pages of the transcripts, covering Kissinger's service from 1969 to August 1974.[^67] These materials are documented in NSAEBB Briefing Book No. 852.
+
+### Commission Chairmanship, 2002
+
+On November 27, 2002, President [[George W. Bush]] announced his choice of Kissinger to chair the independent commission on the September 11 attacks: "my choice for commission chairman, Dr. Henry Kissinger."[^68]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
-[^1]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 12.
-[^2]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 16.
+[^1]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991, chapter 12.
+[^2]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991, chapter 16.
+[^3]: Nobel Prize Outreach, "Henry Kissinger: Biographical," Nobelprize.org, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1973/kissinger/biographical/. Gives the birth at Fuerth on May 27, 1923, arrival in the United States in 1938, naturalization on June 19, 1943, the Harvard degrees of 1950, 1952 and 1954, membership of the Harvard faculty from 1954 until 1971, the Associate Directorship of the Center for International Affairs from 1957 to 1960, direction of the Harvard International Seminar from 1951 to 1971, study directorship for the Council on Foreign Relations from 1955 to 1956, and the founding of Kissinger Associates.
+[^4]: Rockefeller Archive Center, Nelson A. Rockefeller personal papers, description of the folder for Henry A. Kissinger's Spring 1980 interview, as quoted in the account of Daniel Bessner of the Quantico II panel.
+[^5]: *Prospect for America: The Rockefeller Panel Reports*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1961. Report of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund Special Studies Project, which Kissinger directed.
+[^6]: National Security Archive, "The Kissinger Telcons," Electronic Briefing Book No. 123, edited by Thomas Blanton and William Burr, posted May 26, 2004, telephone conversation of Kissinger and David Rockefeller, March 13, 1972, 11:12 a.m. (Nixon Presidential Materials Project, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 87). https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB123/.
+[^7]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, "Henry Alfred Kissinger," https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/kissinger-henry-alfred. Identifies him as the 56th Secretary of State, 1973 to 1977, while continuing as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
+[^8]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, Volume VI, Vietnam, January 1969 to July 1970, document 39, Memorandum for the Record, Washington, March 15, 1969, "March 16 Rocket Attack on Saigon." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v06/d39.
+[^9]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume VI, document 40, Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, March 16, 1969, "Breakfast Plan." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v06/d40.
+[^10]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume VI, document 41, Editorial Note, quoting Kissinger's remarks after the first raid. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v06/d41.
+[^11]: *Halperin v. Kissinger*, 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Text from the Caselaw Access Project (static.case.law, F.2d volume 606, case 1192). The opinion recounts the April 25, 1969 meeting, the events of May 9 and 10, 1969, the procedures worked out by FBI officials and Colonel Haig, the logs kept in special files where Kissinger and Haig reviewed them, the September 15, 1969 request, the continuation of the tap to February 10, 1971, and the 21 months of the wiretap.
+[^12]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans*, Book II, Final Report, S. Rept. 94-755 (1976), PDF pages 215-216 (the "seventeen" wiretaps, May 1969 to February 1971, Nixon's "gobs of material" remark, and the finding that no leak was identified), PDF pages 222-223 (the authorization and duration of the taps), and PDF page 244, note 2 (taps requested by Kissinger or Haig). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_II.pdf.
+[^13]: Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States (Rockefeller Commission), June 1975, introduction (the commission "heard 51 witnesses," including Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger) and Chapter 11, "Operation CHAOS" (Helms's covering memorandum of February 18, 1969, delivering the first version of "Restless Youth" to Kissinger). https://archive.org/details/Rockefeller-commission-report-to-the-president-by-the-commission-on-cia-activiti.
+[^14]: *Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans*, Book II, S. Rept. 94-755, PDF page 162, on the CIA's student-dissent survey and the letter from Richard Helms to Henry Kissinger, February 18, 1969.
+[^15]: National Security Archive, "Kissinger and Chile: The Declassified Record on Regime Change," Electronic Briefing Book No. 437, document 1, Helms-Kissinger telephone conversation, September 12, 1970, 12:00 noon. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB437/.
+[^16]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXI, Chile, 1969-1973, document 88, Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, September 14, 1970, 12:15 p.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d88.
+[^17]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXI, document 93, Editorial Note, quoting Helms's notes of the September 15, 1970 meeting and Kissinger's August 12, 1975 testimony before the Church Committee. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d93.
+[^18]: National Security Archive, "Kissinger and Chile," EBB No. 437, document 3, handwritten notes of the September 15, 1970 meeting at the White House, with Mitchell and Kissinger listed as present.
+[^19]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXI, Chile, 1969-1973, document 94, Memorandum for the Record, Washington, September 16, 1970, "Genesis of Project FUBELT" (William V. Broe, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d94.
+[^20]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973*, Staff Report, December 1975, PDF page 37 ("Richard Helms' notes from his September 15, 1970, meeting with President Nixon, the meeting which initiated Track II, contain the indication: 'Make the economy scream.'"). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94chile.pdf.
+[^21]: Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973, PDF page 29 (Track II "was initiated by President Nixon on September 15"), and PDF page 14 (the "no doubt" finding and the conflicting testimony).
+[^22]: *Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973*, PDF page 57, on the operating restrictions placed on Track II.
+[^23]: *Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973*, PDF page 62, chronology entry for President Nixon's instruction to CIA Director Helms.
+[^24]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXI, document 152, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, October 15, 1970 (Kissinger, Karamessines and Haig present; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-000012A, Chile Task Force Files). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d152.
+[^25]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXI, document 153, Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, October 15, 1970. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d153.
+[^26]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXI, document 162, Briefing Notes Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, October 23, 1970, "Track II." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d162.
+[^27]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXI, document 168, Briefing Notes Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, October 28, 1970, "Recent Developments: Track II." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d168.
+[^28]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXI, document 172, Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, November 5, 1970, "NSC Meeting, November 6, Chile." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d172.
+[^29]: National Security Archive, "Kissinger and Chile," EBB No. 437, document 7, Kissinger-Nixon telephone conversation, September 16, 1973.
+[^30]: National Security Archive, "Kissinger and Chile," EBB No. 437, document 10, Memorandum of Conversation, Santiago, June 8, 1976, noon (Gerald R. Ford Library copy), participants and Kissinger's statement.
+[^31]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-11, Part II, document 238, Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Shlaudeman) to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, August 3, 1976. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p2/d238.
+[^32]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-11, Part II, Documents on South America, 1973-1976, document 241, Telegram 209192 From the Department of State to the Embassies in Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, and Bolivia, Washington, August 23, 1976. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p2/d241.
+[^33]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-11, Part II, document 242, Telegram 8210 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State, Santiago, August 24, 1976, "Subject: Operation Condor" (signed Popper). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p2/d242.
+[^34]: National Security Archive, "Kissinger Blocked Demarche on International Assassinations to Condor States," Electronic Briefing Book No. 312, edited by Peter Kornbluh, posted April 10, 2010, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB312/index.htm, with document 1 (ARA memorandum of August 30, 1976, "Operation Condor," released in part under FOIA) and document 2 (SECTO 27128, Lusaka, September 16, 1976, Department of State, released 2004 on 25-year review; the cable text is in capitals and is quoted in lowercase). The Siracusa account is the Archive's description of the August 30 memorandum.
+[^35]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-11, Part II, Documents on South America, 1973-1976, document 245, Telegram 4526 From the Embassy in Costa Rica to the Department of State, San José, September 20, 1976, "For ARA-Luers from Shlaudeman" (also National Security Archive EBB No. 312, document 3). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p2/d245.
+[^36]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-11, Part II, document 246, Memorandum From Mary Brownell and Dan Mozeleski of the National Security Council Staff to Les Janka, Washington, September 21, 1976. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p2/d246.
+[^37]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-11, Part II, document 249, Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Shlaudeman) to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, October 8, 1976, "Operation Condor." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p2/d249.
+[^38]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-11, Part II, document 48, Memorandum of Conversation, Santiago, June 10, 1976, 8:10 to 9:15 a.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p2/d48.
+[^39]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-11, Part II, document 56, Memorandum of Conversation, New York, October 7, 1976, "Secretary's Meeting with Argentine Foreign Minister Guzzetti." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p2/d56.
+[^40]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-11, Part II, document 57, Telegram 6871 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State, Buenos Aires, October 19, 1976, "Foreign Minister Guzzetti Euphoric Over Visit to United States" (signed Hill). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p2/d57.
+[^41]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972, document 125, Telegram 959 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State, Dacca, March 28, 1971, "Selective Genocide." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve07/d125.
+[^42]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, document 19, Telegram 1138 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State, Dacca, April 6, 1971, 0730Z. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v11/d19.
+[^43]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-7, document 130, Telegram 1249 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State, Dacca, April 10, 1971, "Specific Areas of Dissent With Current U.S. Policy Toward East Pakistan." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve07/d130.
+[^44]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XI, document 36, Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, April 28, 1971, "Policy Options Toward Pakistan," with the editorial note on Nixon's handwritten annotation (Library of Congress, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 210). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v11/d36.
+[^45]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969-1972, document 200, Memorandum of Conversation, Tehran, May 30, 1972, 5:35 to 6:35 p.m. (participants: the Shah, the President, Kissinger). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d200.
+[^46]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-4, document 315, Memorandum From the Chief of the Near East and South Asia Division, CIA (Waller) to the Director of Central Intelligence (Helms), Washington, June 12, 1972. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d315.
+[^47]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-4, document 313, Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, June 7, 1972, "Message from Shah on Kurds." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d313.
+[^48]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-4, document 321, Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, July 28, 1972, "Kurdish Problem," attaching Helms's memorandum of July 18, 1972. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d321.
+[^49]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXVII, Iran; Iraq, 1973-1976, document 233, Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, September 6, 1973, "Increased Assistance to the Kurds." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d233.
+[^50]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXVII, document 246, Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, April 11, 1974, "Further Support for the Kurds in Iraq." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d246.
+[^51]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXVII, document 254, Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, June 24, 1974, "Fiscal Year 1975 Support for the Kurds." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d254.
+[^52]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXVII, document 281, Backchannel Message From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to the Ambassador to Iran (Helms), Washington, March 16, 1975, 1336Z, WH50453. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d281.
+[^53]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979-September 1980, document 2, Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting, Washington, November 5, 1979. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d2.
+[^54]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 30, Editorial Note (Bani-Sadr announcement of November 14, 1979; John Kifner, "Iran Defends Move To Withdraw Funds," *New York Times*, November 15, 1979). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d30.
+[^55]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 60, Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter, Washington, November 26, 1979. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d60.
+[^56]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 144, Memorandum From the White House Chief of Staff (Jordan) to President Carter, Secretary of State Vance, and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), undated, with Jordan's summary of notes. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d144.
+[^57]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973-1976, document 141, Telegram 14946 From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, Jakarta, December 6, 1975, 1000Z (the telegram header reads "JAKARTA 14945" and "PRIORITY 1579"), "Ford-Suharto Meeting." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve12/d141. The telegram text is in capitals; quotations are rendered in lowercase.
+[^58]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXX, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, 1973-1976, document 93, Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, July 17, 1974, 4:30 p.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v30/d93.
+[^59]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXX, document 105, Minutes of Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group, Washington, July 20, 1974, "Cyprus." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v30/d105.
+[^60]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXX, document 46, Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford, Washington, April 29, 1975. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v30/d46.
+[^61]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, document 126, Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Israeli Ambassador (Dinitz), Washington, October 8, 1973, 1:14 p.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25/d126.
+[^62]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXV, document 168, Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Israeli Ambassador (Dinitz), Washington, October 13, 1973, 1:03 a.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25/d168.
+[^63]: Gonzalez, Henry B. "Kissinger Associates, Scowcroft, Eagleburger, Stoga, Iraq, and BNL," *Congressional Record*, House, April 28, 1992, pp. H2694-H2701. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm.
+[^64]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, *Testimony of Former Employees of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro*, Serial No. 103-95, hearing of November 9, 1993, testimony of Christopher P. Drogoul, with the Madrid advisory board minutes inserted into the record by Chairman Gonzalez. https://archive.org/details/testimonyofforme1994unit.
+[^65]: Senato della Repubblica, X Legislatura, Doc. XXII-bis n. 4, Allegato, Commissione parlamentare d'inchiesta sul caso della filiale di Atlanta della Banca Nazionale del Lavoro e sue connessioni, Relazione conclusiva approvata il 22 aprile 1992, schede di documentazione 30 ("La società Kissinger Associates. Rapporti con la Banca Nazionale del Lavoro") and 31 ("Scowcroft"), pp. 188-189, drawing on BNL document 158 (the consulting contract and renewals) and document 428 (transcript of a CBS interview with Kissinger, March 29, 1992). https://www.senato.it/application/xmanager/projects/leg18/file/DOC%20XXII%20bis%20n.%204%20Allegato.pdf.
+[^66]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, *The BCCI Affair*, report by Senator John Kerry and Senator Hank Brown, S. Prt. 102-140, December 1992, chapter 20, "BCCI and Kissinger Associates," footnote 1 (Cutler letter) and text; the FAS note appears on the index page of the copy. https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/20kiss.htm and https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/index.html.
+[^67]: National Security Archive, "The Kissinger Telcons," Electronic Briefing Book No. 123, edited by Thomas Blanton and William Burr, posted May 26, 2004, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB123/. Describes the release on May 26, 2004 of approximately 20,000 declassified pages (10 cubic feet) spanning 1969 to August 1974.
+[^68]: White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "President Names Henry Kissinger Chairman of Commission," November 27, 2002. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/11/20021127-1.html.

10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Henry Murray.md

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ born: 1893-05-13
 died: 1988-06-23
 location: Cambridge, Massachusetts
 created: 2026-06-03
-updated: 2026-06-03
+updated: 2026-10-14
 ---
 Henry "Harry" Murray was a [[Harvard University|Harvard]] psychology professor who, in 1938, wrote *Explorations of Personality*, a notable book laying out a battery of tests for evaluating individuals. General [[William Donovan]] recruited Murray to create an assessment system for the [[Office of Strategic Services|OSS]] to sort through the masses of recruits being rushed through training. The program's prime objective, according to Murray, was keeping out the "loonies," as well as "sloths, irritants, bad actors, and free talkers." "Spying is attractive to loonies," Murray stated. "Psychopaths, who are people who spend their lives making up stories, revel in the field."[^1]
 
@@ -31,6 +31,14 @@ The OSS assessment program was recognized as a milestone in American psychology,
 
 In the postwar years, Murray would be superseded by a young [[Oklahoma]] psychologist, [[John Gittinger]], who would rise in the [[CIA]] on the strength of his ideas about how to make a hard science out of personality assessment and how to use it to manipulate people. Gittinger would build an office within the Agency that refined both Murray's assessment function and [[Walter Langer]]'s indirect analysis of foreign leaders. Murray was not enthusiastic about the spinoffs from his work: "Some of the things done with it turn your stomach," he declared.[^1]
 
+### The Hitler Analysis, 1943
+
+In October 1943 Murray completed a confidential memorandum for the OSS, *Analysis of the Personality of Adolph Hitler*, with predictions of [[Adolf Hitler]]'s future behavior and suggestions for dealing with him now and after Germany's surrender.[^2] Murray wrote that Hitler's neurotic spells would increase in frequency and duration, and that there was some evidence his mental powers had been deteriorating since November 1942. He considered it possible that the military command or a revolutionary faction might seize Hitler and immure him in a prison fortress, an outcome that would end the myth of the invincible hero.[^3] On suicide, Murray wrote that Hitler had often vowed to kill himself if his plans miscarried, but that if he chose that course he would do it at the last moment and in the most dramatic possible manner.[^4] In the closing sections Murray named insanity to some extent, dramatic suicide and death at the front as the outcomes that seemed most probable, on the assumption that Hitler's chief concern was the immortality of his legend.[^5]
+
 ### Footnotes
 
 [^1]: John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*, Chapter 1.
+[^2]: Murray, Henry A. *Analysis of the Personality of Adolph Hitler, with Predictions of His Future Behavior and Suggestions for Dealing with Him Now and after Germany's Surrender*. Harvard Psychological Clinic, October 1943. https://archive.org/details/AnalysisOfThePersonalityOfAdolphHitler. Same text in CIA Reading Room document 02617886.
+[^3]: Murray, *Analysis of the Personality of Adolph Hitler*, pp. 29-30. https://archive.org/details/AnalysisOfThePersonalityOfAdolphHitler
+[^4]: Murray, *Analysis of the Personality of Adolph Hitler*, pp. 31-32. https://archive.org/details/AnalysisOfThePersonalityOfAdolphHitler
+[^5]: Murray, *Analysis of the Personality of Adolph Hitler*, p. 33. https://archive.org/details/AnalysisOfThePersonalityOfAdolphHitler

10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Joan E. Jacoby.md

@@ -1,33 +1,123 @@
 ---
-category: "Intelligence & Government"
+aliases:
+  - Joan Jacoby
+  - Mrs. Joan E. Jacoby
+category: "Scientists & Researchers"
 created: 2024-04-25
-updated: 2026-05-01
+updated: 2026-10-14
 tags:
   - KeyFigure
   - Person
   - PROMIS
   - INSLAW
   - Criminologist
-summary: "Joan E. Jacoby was Director of the Office of Crime Analysis of the District of Columbia who co-led the 1969 team that designed PROMIS alongside Charles R. Work and project manager Bill Hamilton, and later directed national prosecution research programs at the National Center for Prosecution Management and the Bureau of Social Science Research."
+  - ProsecutionManagement
+  - LEAA
+  - BureauOfSocialScienceResearch
+summary: "Joan E. Jacoby directed the Office of Crime Analysis of the District of Columbia, co-led the 1969 PROMIS design team, and later directed the National Center for Prosecution Management."
+relations:
+  - type: head_of
+    with: "[[Office of Crime Analysis of the District of Columbia]]"
+    role: "director"
+    start: 1969
+    end: 1972
+    fn: 6
+  - type: head_of
+    with: "[[National Center for Prosecution Management]]"
+    role: "executive director"
+    start: 1972
+    fn: 9
+  - type: employed_by
+    with: "[[Bureau of Social Science Research]]"
+    role: "adjunct research associate; project coordinator and project director of prosecution research projects"
+    start: 1975
+    fn: 18
+  - type: participant_in
+    with: "[[PROMIS]]"
+    role: "co-director of the 1969 design team"
+    start: 1969
+    end: 1971
+    fn: 2
 ---
-Joan E. Jacoby received a B.A. in sociology from Boston University and an M.A. in statistics from The American University. She is a published criminologist with work spanning prosecution management, criminal statistics, and information systems design.
+Joan E. Jacoby is a criminologist who directed the [[Office of Crime Analysis of the District of Columbia]], co-led the 1969 team that designed the [[PROMIS|Prosecutor's Management Information System]] with [[Charles R. Work]], and later directed the [[National Center for Prosecution Management]] and the prosecution research projects of the [[Bureau of Social Science Research]]. She received a B.A. in sociology from [[Boston University]] and an M.A. in statistics from [[American University]]. She is a published criminologist with work spanning prosecution management, criminal statistics, and information systems design.
 
-### Role in PROMIS Development
+### PROMIS design team, 1969 to 1971
 
-In 1969, while serving as Director of the [[Office of Crime Analysis of the District of Columbia]], Jacoby co-led the team commissioned by U.S. Attorney [[Thomas A. Flannery]] to design a computer-based case management system for the DC U.S. Attorney's Office, funded by a $60,000 [[LEAA]] grant (70-DF-047) administered through [[Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co]]. The co-directors of the project were Jacoby and [[Charles R. Work]] (then Deputy Chief of the Superior Court Division of the [[U.S. Attorney's office|U.S. Attorney's Office]]), with [[Bill Hamilton]] serving as project manager as a senior consultant at Peat Marwick. The resulting system was named the Prosecutor's Management Information System ([[PROMIS]]) and deployed on January 1, 1971.[^1]
+In 1969 the Office of Crime Analysis of the District of Columbia and the [[U.S. Attorney's office|U.S. Attorney's Office]] assembled a team of prosecutors, criminologists, statisticians and systems analysts to design a computerized case management system for the Superior Court Division. The team was commissioned by U.S. Attorney [[Thomas A. Flannery]] and funded through a $60,000 grant from the [[LEAA|Law Enforcement Assistance Administration]], grant 70-DF-047, administered through the Office of Crime Analysis.[^1] [[Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co]] was engaged to assist in the design and implementation of the system, which became operational on January 1, 1971.[^2] [[Bill Hamilton]] served as project manager as a senior consultant at Peat Marwick. The resulting system was named the Prosecutor's Management Information System (PROMIS).
 
-Jacoby also developed a competing proposal during this period: a 1970 paper titled "Project TRACE - A System for the Tracking, Retrieval and Analysis of Criminal Events," presented at the Urban and Regional Information Systems Proceedings on November 12, 1970. Project TRACE (Tracking Retrieval and Analysis of Criminal Events) shared PROMIS's subject-in-process tracking concept but was not adopted for the federal program.[^2][^3]
+A May 1971 system overview prepared for the Office of Crime Analysis states that the team "was headed by Mrs. Joan E. Jacoby, Director of the Office of Crime Analysis," together with Charles R. Work, deputy director of the Superior Court Division of the U.S. Attorney's Office.[^3] The other members were [[James M. Etheridge]], [[Fred L. Lander III]], [[Soo Lee]] and [[Stanley H. Turner]], assistant directors of the Office of Crime Analysis, and [[Frederick G. Watts]], chief of the Grand Jury Section of the Superior Court Division.[^4]
+
+The Office of Crime Analysis described PROMIS as the critical component of its own project TRACE (Tracking, Retrieval and Analysis of Criminal Events), a system for tracking offenders through the District's criminal justice system from arrest through sentencing and incarceration, and the LEAA provided funding for both TRACE and PROMIS.[^5] Jacoby is listed as director on the 1971 PROMIS system overview and on the Office of Crime Analysis's 1972 *Final Report: Project TRACE*.[^6] A 1974 directory of social and behavioral science data bases lists her 1970 paper "Project TRACE - A System for the Tracking, Retrieval and Analysis of Criminal Events," presented to the Urban and Regional Information Systems proceedings on November 12, 1970.[^7]
+
+The case evaluation systems used in PROMIS, which score the seriousness of the offense with an adaptation of the Sellin and Wolfgang scale and the seriousness of the defendant's record, were originally developed by the Office of Crime Analysis for the U.S. Attorney's office in 1969. By 1976 PROMIS was being implemented in about 22 prosecutors' offices.[^8]
+
+In April 1973 Patrick F. Healy, executive director of the [[National District Attorneys Association]], told a House Judiciary subcommittee that PROMIS "was developed by Joan E. Jacoby who is now the executive director of the National Center for Prosecution Management, and Charles Work," an assistant U.S. attorney.[^9] Healy described the system as developed under a $290,000 LEAA grant and said it had produced a 25-percent increase in convictions for certain serious misdemeanors in the District of Columbia.[^10][^11]
 
 ### National Center for Prosecution Management
 
-After her time at the Office of Crime Analysis, Jacoby served as Executive Director of the [[National Center for Prosecution Management]], a nonprofit corporation established by the [[Department of Justice]] with LEAA funding to provide management and technical assistance to prosecutors nationwide and conduct research on the prosecution function.[^1]
+The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration made a grant to the National District Attorneys Association for the development of standards to measure the efficiency of prosecutors' offices, and the grant created the National Center for Prosecution Management.[^12] The center was established with LEAA funding in December 1971 as a nonprofit corporation to provide technical and management assistance to prosecutors nationwide and to conduct research on the prosecution function. Jacoby served as its executive director.[^9]
 
-### Bureau of Social Science Research
+In fiscal 1973 the center had received about $1 million in grants through the National District Attorneys Association and had been in operation for less than two years, with a staff of 18 located in Washington. The LEAA's fiscal 1973 report lists the [[National College of District Attorneys]] and the [[Institute for Court Management]] as co-sponsors of the center, alongside the association.[^13]
 
-In 1975, Jacoby became a Research Associate at the Bureau of Social Science Research, where she directed national programs of research in prosecution and criminal justice. She subsequently became Executive Director of the Jefferson Institute in Washington, D.C.[^1]
+Jacoby, James M. Etheridge and J. D. Bourland are listed as the authors of the center's *First Annual Report* (Washington, D.C.: National Center for Prosecution Management).[^14] Exhibits to the 1973 hearing include three items under Jacoby's name as executive director: "Capacity and Overload in a Prosecutor's Office," a system for the manual evaluation of case processing in a prosecutor's office, and a manual statistical system to measure case flow.[^15]
+
+### Bureau of Social Science Research, 1975 to 1982
+
+Jacoby joined the Bureau of Social Science Research in 1975, when the bureau took part in a national evaluation of pretrial screening programs.[^16] Her charging-decision monograph, published in January 1977 by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, states that it is a direct result of a Phase I Evaluation of Pretrial Screening conducted by its author. The preface describes the work as based on her experience as executive director of the National Center for Prosecution Management.[^17] The monograph identifies her as an adjunct research associate of the bureau and was supported by Contract Number OM 6-0566-J-LEAA and Grant Number 75-NI-99-0079, awarded to the bureau.[^18]
+
+Under LEAA Grant 78-NI-AX-0006 Jacoby was project director of the bureau's research on prosecutorial decision making, with [[Leonard R. Mellon]] as deputy project director. The executive summary of that research is dated April 1979.[^19] Jacoby and Mellon also published Policy Analysis for Prosecution through the bureau in 1979.[^20] The 1982 National Institute of Justice report Prosecutorial Decisionmaking: A National Study lists Jacoby, Mellon, [[Edward C. Ratledge]] and Stanley H. Turner as authors and was funded under Grants 79-NI-AX-0006 and 79-NI-AX-0034 awarded to the bureau.[^21]
+
+Jacoby's single-author monograph Basic Issues in Prosecution and Public Defender Performance was issued by the National Institute of Justice in 1982 under Grant 78-NI-AX-0091. It applies functions analysis to the measurement of prosecutor and public defender performance.[^22][^23] A January 1982 report, Policy and Prosecution, lists Jacoby with Mellon and [[Walter F. Smith]] as authors and presents a conceptual model for analyzing prosecutive decision making from a policy perspective.[^24] Her book The American Prosecutor: A Search for Identity was published by [[Lexington Books]] in 1980.[^25]
+
+Her 1975 *Judicature* article "Case Evaluation: Quantifying Prosecutorial Policy" and the January 1976 LEAA National Evaluation Program Phase I report *Pre-trial Screening in Perspective* preceded the charging-decision monograph.[^26]
+
+The bureau also held LEAA support before this work. In 1972 it received a short grant, 72-NI-99-0019-G, for an extension of its criminological survey techniques project, under which it added studies to an inventory of public surveys on crime and justice. The inventory was published in January 1973 as an interim report listing 240 studies.[^27]
+
+The bureau had been a military contractor since the 1950s. Under [[Air Force Office of Scientific Research]] contract AF 49(638)727 it issued Research Report 339-4, [[Albert Biderman|Albert D. Biderman]]'s *Cultural Models of Captivity Relationships* (February 1961), and Biderman's 1964 paper *Captivity Lore and Behavior in Captivity* reports research supported in part by the same contract.[^28] Biderman's *Chinese "Thought Reform" as a Source of Perspectives toward Western Correctional Practice* (May 20, 1965), a bureau report, was prepared under contract AF 49(638)1344.[^29] In 1963 the bureau submitted to the Air Force Office of Scientific Research an annotated bibliography of about 200 items on prisoner interrogation, compliance and resistance, prepared for a special conference on training programs for required captivity behavior and supported by the office's Behavioral Sciences Division; a preliminary report on Chinese Communist indoctrination of military prisoners of war by John W. Lewis of [[Cornell University]] was issued for the same conference under the bureau's contract.[^30] A 1963 bureau final report on historical incidents of extreme overcrowding, by Biderman and two co-authors, was written under Office of Civil Defense contract OCD-OS-62-122.[^31]
+
+In October 1965 Elisabeth T. Crawford compiled for the bureau, under an Air Force Office of Scientific Research contract, an annotated bibliography of 150 references, *The Social Sciences in International and Military Policy*.[^32] The 1969 anthology *Social Scientists and International Affairs*, edited by Crawford and Biderman, states that its plan was developed in a research project supported by the Behavioral Sciences Division of the Air Force Office of Scientific Research on the use of social science knowledge in international and military affairs; the same volume contains an article titled "The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot" ([[Project Camelot]]).[^33]
+
+A *Wall Street Journal* report of December 8, 1965 described a different bureau project. According to the report, the private Bureau of Social Science Research was at the [[Pentagon]]'s request embarked on a study project to determine how social science research was being used in making Pentagon and foreign-policy decisions.[^34]
+
+### Jefferson Institute for Justice Studies, 1985 to 1987
+
+In October 1987 the National Institute of Justice published Jacoby's Caseweighting Systems for Prosecutors: Guidelines and Procedures. The report was submitted under subcontract Z-sub-JIJ-12/19/85 from [[Abt Associates]], Inc., by the [[Jefferson Institute for Justice Studies]] of Washington, D.C.[^35] Jacoby later served as executive director of the Jefferson Institute in Washington, D.C. Her 1984 papers "Attorney Effort: A Powerful Descriptor of Operations and Policy" and "Computing Variable Costs in Adjudication," the latter presented to the American Society of Criminology in Cincinnati on November 10, 1984, were both issued by the Jefferson Institute.[^36]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
-[^1]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. *The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report.* House Report 102-857, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, September 10, 1992.
-[^2]: Office of Justice Programs, National Criminal Justice Reference Service. Abstract: "Project TRACE (Tracking, Retrieval and Analysis of Criminal Events) - Final Report." OJP Virtual Library.
-[^3]: Sessions, Vivian S. *Directory of Data Bases in the Social and Behavioral Sciences.* Science Associates International, 1974.
+[^1]: Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., *System Overview and Report Formats for PROMIS* (May 1971), title page, prepared for the District of Columbia Government Office of Crime Analysis under LEAA Grant No. 70-DF-047, NCJ 32469. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/32469NCJRS.pdf
+[^2]: Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., *System Overview and Report Formats for PROMIS (Prosecutor's Management Information System): A Computer-Based System for the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia* (May 1971), passage on the team, the firm's engagement and the January 1, 1971 operational date, NCJ 32469. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/32469NCJRS.pdf
+[^3]: Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., *System Overview and Report Formats for PROMIS* (May 1971), note 1 to the passage on the design team, NCJ 32469. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/32469NCJRS.pdf
+[^4]: Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., *System Overview and Report Formats for PROMIS* (May 1971), note 1 to the passage on the design team, list of members, NCJ 32469. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/32469NCJRS.pdf
+[^5]: Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., *System Overview and Report Formats for PROMIS* (May 1971), abstract and introduction: PROMIS as the critical component of the Office of Crime Analysis's project TRACE, with LEAA funding for both; NCJ 32469. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/32469NCJRS.pdf
+[^6]: Jacoby, Joan E., *Final Report: Project TRACE* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Crime Analysis, Government of the District of Columbia, 1972) and *System Overview and Report Format for PROMIS* (1971), each listed with Jacoby as director in the notes and bibliography of NCJ 35832. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/35832NCJRS.pdf
+[^7]: Sessions, Vivian S., *Directory of Data Bases in the Social and Behavioral Sciences* (Science Associates International, 1974), entry for the Project TRACE paper, presented to the Urban and Regional Information Systems proceedings, November 12, 1970.
+[^8]: Jacoby, Joan E., *The Prosecutor's Charging Decision: A Policy Perspective* (January 1977; copyright 1976), chapter on case evaluation systems, note 1, NCJ 35832. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/35832NCJRS.pdf
+[^9]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee No. 5, *Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Hearings*, Serial No. 4 (1973), statement of Patrick F. Healy, executive director, National District Attorneys Association, April 4, 1973, and the appended listing of the National Center for Prosecution Management, where Jacoby is identified as executive director. https://archive.org/details/lawenforcementas00unit
+[^10]: Same hearing, statement of Patrick F. Healy, April 4, 1973, on the $290,000 LEAA grant. https://archive.org/details/lawenforcementas00unit
+[^11]: Same hearing, statement of Patrick F. Healy, April 4, 1973, on the 25-percent increase in convictions for certain serious misdemeanors. https://archive.org/details/lawenforcementas00unit
+[^12]: Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, *Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1972*, court improvement section, grant to the National District Attorney's Association for standards to measure the efficiency of prosecutors' offices through a new National Center for Prosecution Management. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/148302NCJRS.pdf
+[^13]: Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, *Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1973*, section on prosecutors' offices, describing the grants to the National Center for Prosecution Management, its sponsors and its staff of 18. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/147380NCJRS.pdf
+[^14]: Jacoby, J. E., Ethridge, J. M. and Bourland, J. D., *First Annual Report of the National Center for Prosecution Management* (Washington, D.C.: National Center for Prosecution Management, 1972), as listed in the bibliography of NCJ 79227. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/79227NCJRS.pdf
+[^15]: Same hearing, appendix exhibits by Joan E. Jacoby, Executive Director, National Center for Prosecution Management, including "Capacity and Overload in a Prosecutor's Office," "A System for Manual Evaluation of Case Processing in the Prosecutor's Office," and a manual statistical system to measure case flow. https://archive.org/details/lawenforcementas00unit
+[^16]: Jacoby, Joan E., Mellon, Leonard R., Ratledge, Edward C., and Turner, Stanley H., *Prosecutorial Decisionmaking: A National Study* (1982), passage stating that in 1975 the Bureau of Social Science Research, as part of a national evaluation of pretrial screening programs, added a new dimension to the standard setting task. NCJ 79227. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/79227NCJRS.pdf
+[^17]: Jacoby, Joan E., *The Prosecutor's Charging Decision: A Policy Perspective* (January 1977), preface and acknowledgments, including the statement that the work is a direct result of a Phase I Evaluation of Pretrial Screening conducted by the author, and her description as executive director of the National Center for Prosecution Management. NCJ 35832. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/35832NCJRS.pdf
+[^18]: Jacoby, Joan E., *The Prosecutor's Charging Decision: A Policy Perspective* (National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, January 1977), copyright page and project note: Contract Number OM 6-0566-J-LEAA and Grant Number 75-NI-99-0079 awarded to the Bureau of Social Science Research; staff listing with Jacoby as project coordinator and adjunct research associate. NCJ 35832. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/35832NCJRS.pdf
+[^19]: Jacoby, Joan E., and Mellon, Leonard R., *Research on Prosecutorial Decisionmaking: Executive Summary* (April 1979), LEAA Grant 78 NI-AX-0006 to the Bureau of Social Science Research, project staff listing. NCJ 69512. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/69512NCJRS.pdf
+[^20]: Jacoby, J. E., and Mellon, L. R., *Policy Analysis for Prosecution* (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Social Science Research, 1979), as listed in the bibliography of NCJ 79227. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/79227NCJRS.pdf
+[^21]: Jacoby, Joan E., Mellon, Leonard R., Ratledge, Edward C., and Turner, Stanley H., *Prosecutorial Decisionmaking: A National Study* (National Institute of Justice, 1982), NCJ 79227, grant numbers 79-NI-AX-0006 and 79-NI-AX-0034 to the Bureau of Social Science Research. https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/prosecutorial-decisionmaking-national-study
+[^22]: Jacoby, J. E., *Basic Issues in Prosecution and Public Defender Performance* (Bureau of Social Science Research, 1982), NCJ 84431, Grant Number 78-NI-AX-0091. https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/basic-issues-prosecution-and-public-defender-performance
+[^23]: Jacoby, Joan, *Caseweighting Systems for Prosecutors: Guidelines and Procedures* (October 1987), bibliography entry for Jacoby, Joan E., *Basic Issues in Prosecution and Public Defender Performance* (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 1982). NCJ 109771. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/109771NCJRS.pdf
+[^24]: Jacoby, Joan E., Mellon, Leonard R., and Smith, Walter F., *Policy and Prosecution* (National Institute of Justice, January 1982), abstract: a conceptual model for analyzing prosecutive decisionmaking from a policy perspective. University of Delaware UDSpace record. https://udspace.udel.edu/items/3de0b540-2905-4dd6-8e95-a7bd8092164f/full
+[^25]: Jacoby, Joan E., *The American Prosecutor: A Search for Identity* (Lexington Books, c1980). CiNii catalogue record. https://ci.nii.ac.jp/ncid/BA04306866
+[^26]: Jacoby, Joan E., *The Prosecutor's Charging Decision: A Policy Perspective* (1977), bibliography and notes: *Pre-trial Screening in Perspective*, National Evaluation Program Phase I Report (U.S. Department of Justice, LEAA, January 1976), and "Case Evaluation: Quantifying Prosecutorial Policy," *Judicature* 58:10 (May 1975), NCJ 35832. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/35832NCJRS.pdf
+[^27]: Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, *Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1972*, grant 72-NI-99-0019-G (May 31 to July 13, 1972, $6,796) to the Bureau of Social Science Research, extension of the criminological survey techniques project, with the inventory of 240 studies published January 1973. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/148302NCJRS.pdf
+[^28]: Biderman, Albert D., *Cultural Models of Captivity Relationships*, BSSR Research Report 339-4, Bureau of Social Science Research, Washington, D.C., February 1961, Contract No. AF 49(638)727, DTIC AD0257325 (https://archive.org/details/DTIC_AD0257325); Biderman, *Captivity Lore and Behavior in Captivity*, AFOSR 65-0577 (1964), footnote on AFOSR Contract AF 49(638)727, DTIC AD0615363 (https://archive.org/details/DTIC_AD0615363).
+[^29]: Biderman, Albert D., *Chinese "Thought Reform" as a Source of Perspectives toward Western Correctional Practice*, AFOSR 65-1205, May 20, 1965, Bureau of Social Science Research, Inc., Contract No. AF 49(638)1344, DTIC AD0623172. https://archive.org/details/DTIC_AD0623172
+[^30]: *An Annotated Bibliography on Prisoner Interrogation, Compliance and Resistance*, AFOSR 68-1401, August 1963, Bureau of Social Science Research, Inc., supported by the Behavioral Sciences Division, AFOSR, DTIC AD0670999 (https://archive.org/details/DTIC_AD0670999); Lewis, John W., *Preliminary Report on Chinese Communist Indoctrination of Military Prisoners of War*, AFOSR 68-1410, DTIC AD0671004 (https://archive.org/details/DTIC_AD0671004).
+[^31]: Biderman, Albert D., Louria, Margot, and Bacchus, Joan, *Historical Incidents of Extreme Overcrowding*, BSSR 354-5, Bureau of Social Science Research, Inc., Final Report, Contract No. OCD-OS-62-122, DTIC AD0609752. https://archive.org/details/DTIC_AD0609752
+[^32]: Crawford, Elisabeth T., *The Social Sciences in International and Military Policy: An Analytic Bibliography*, AFOSR 65-1890, October 1965, Bureau of Social Science Research, Inc., prepared under contract with the Air Force Office of Scientific Research, DTIC AD0623841. https://archive.org/details/DTIC_AD0623841
+[^33]: Crawford, Elisabeth T., and Biderman, Albert D., eds., *Social Scientists and International Affairs: A Case for a Sociology of Social Science* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1969), AFOSR 69-1443TR, preface and table of contents, DTIC AD0688759. https://archive.org/details/DTIC_AD0688759
+[^34]: "Research Ripples: Government Farms Out More Studies; Some Reports Draw Criticism," by Edward A. Behr, *Wall Street Journal*, December 8, 1965, as reproduced in the CIA CREST reading room file CIA-RDP73-00475R000102100001-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp73-00475r000102100001-3
+[^35]: Jacoby, Joan, *Caseweighting Systems for Prosecutors: Guidelines and Procedures* (National Institute of Justice, October 1987), NCJ 109771, statement that the report was submitted under a sub-contract with Abt Associates, Inc., Cambridge, Mass. (Z-sub-JIJ-12/19/85), by the Jefferson Institute for Justice Studies, Washington, D.C. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/109771NCJRS.pdf
+[^36]: Jacoby, Joan E., bibliography of *Caseweighting Systems for Prosecutors* (NCJ 109771), entries "Attorney Effort: A Powerful Descriptor of Operations and Policy" (1984a) and "Computing Variable Costs in Adjudication," paper presented to the American Society of Criminology, November 10, 1984, Cincinnati, Ohio (1984b), both Jefferson Institute for Justice Studies. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/109771NCJRS.pdf

10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/John M. Middleton.md

@@ -6,11 +6,10 @@ tags:
   - Person
   - PROMIS
   - INSLAW
-summary: "John M. Middleton was a member of the original 1969 PROMIS design team under Joan E. Jacoby, Charles R. Work, and Bill Hamilton; his subsequent career is difficult to trace due to the commonality of the name."
+summary: "John M. Middleton was a member of the original 1969 PROMIS design team under Joan E. Jacoby, Charles R. Work, and Bill Hamilton."
 ---
 John M. Middleton was a member of the team assembled in 1969 to design the [[PROMIS|Prosecutor's Management Information System]], working under co-directors [[Joan E. Jacoby]] and [[Charles R. Work]] with project manager [[Bill Hamilton]] at [[Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co]].[^1]
 
-His subsequent career has proven difficult to trace. John M. Middleton is a sufficiently common name that multiple individuals matching basic biographical parameters appear in government, STEM, and legal records from the 1960s through the 1990s, making positive identification of the PROMIS team member in later documents uncertain without additional corroborating details.
 
 ### Footnotes
 

10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Max Levchin.md

@@ -31,11 +31,13 @@ relations:
     start: 1998-12
     fn: 1
 created: 2026-09-22
-updated: 2026-09-22
+updated: 2026-10-14
 ---
 
 Max R. Levchin co-founded Confinity, Inc., with [[Peter Thiel]] in December 1998 and was its chief technology officer and a director until March 2000, when Confinity merged with [[Elon Musk]]'s X.com Corporation; he was then chief technology officer and a director of the merged company, renamed [[PayPal]], Inc., in February 2001. Before Confinity he founded NetMeridian Software, a developer of security applications for handheld computers, which he ran from January 1996 to December 1998, and co-founded SponsorNet, a web advertising service. PayPal's registration statement of September 2001 named Thiel and Levchin as the two executives on whose continued work the company depended to a significant degree, and disclosed that a fraud episode between July and October 2000 had cost it 5.7 million dollars in unauthorized charge-backs and that MasterCard had fined it for excessive charge-backs.[^1] In September 2001 Levchin held 2.6 percent of the company's stock. [[eBay]] completed its acquisition of PayPal, valued at about 1.5 billion dollars, on October 3, 2002.[^1][^2]
 
+A [[Newsweek]] article by [[Brad Stone]] published July 16, 2001 quotes Levchin, then chief technology officer: "We came to realize that we would either defeat fraud or fraud would defeat us."[^5] The article reports that PayPal reached this conclusion after its rate of rejected credit-card transactions passed one percent, and that Levchin and Thiel "reduced the maximum payment users could make from $500 to $250."[^5] The article says the company's antifraud team numbered 75 and that it had designed an internal program that "sniffs the 180,000 transactions made every day, looking for abuse."[^5] The article says the team named the software "Igor," "after a Russian mobster who plagued the system last year." The registration statement of September 2001 calls the same system "PayPal's proprietary IGOR system."[^6]
+
 He is counted among the [[PayPal Mafia]], the network of PayPal founders and early executives whose members went on to found or lead [[LinkedIn]], [[Palantir Technologies]], [[Founders Fund]], [[Tesla]] and [[SpaceX]].[^3]
 
 ### Affirm
@@ -48,3 +50,5 @@ Levchin is the founder, chairman and chief executive of [[Affirm]], a consumer l
 [^2]: PayPal, Inc. Form 8-K, October 4, 2002, exhibit 99.1, "eBay Completes PayPal Acquisition." https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1103415/000091205702037693/a2090698zex-99_1.htm
 [^3]: Cameron, Dell, and Yulia Almazova. "Leak Exposes Members of Peter Thiel's Secretive 'Dialog' Society." *WIRED,* June 16, 2026. https://www.wired.com/story/leak-exposes-members-of-peter-thiels-secretive-dialog-society/
 [^4]: Affirm Holdings, Inc. Form S-1 registration statement, filed November 18, 2020. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1820953/000110465920126927/tm2026663-4_s1.htm
+[^5]: Stone, Brad. "Busting the Web Bandits." *Newsweek,* July 16, 2001. https://www.newsweek.com/busting-web-bandits-154463
+[^6]: PayPal, Inc. Form S-1 registration statement, filed September 28, 2001, "Business," subsection "Risk Management." https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1103415/000091205701533855/a2059025zs-1.htm

10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Morton H. Halperin.md

@@ -7,10 +7,24 @@ tags:
 summary: "Close aide to Kissinger on the NSC staff who recalled Kissinger's belief that Israel and Japan would be better off with nuclear weapons."
 born: 1938-06-13
 location: "Brooklyn, New York, USA"
+updated: 2026-10-14
+relations:
+  - type: participant_in
+    with: "[[Halperin v. Kissinger]]"
+    role: "plaintiff"
+    fn: 2
 ---
 
 Morton H. Halperin was a close aide to [[Henry A. Kissinger]] on the [[National Security Council]] staff. He recalled that Kissinger believed it was good to spread nuclear weapons around the world and that if he were the Israelis, he would get nuclear weapons. Kissinger did not believe that the [[United States]] should try to talk them out of it. Halperin also noted that Kissinger believed [[Japan]], as well as [[Israel]], would be better off with the bomb than without it, viewing nuclear weapons as essential to their national security.[^1]
 
+### FBI Wiretap, 1969
+
+On April 25, 1969, [[Richard Nixon]] met Kissinger, Attorney General [[John N. Mitchell]] and FBI Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]] to discuss methods of controlling leaks, and Mitchell, Hoover and Nixon developed a program that included wiretaps on private telephones. After a [[New York Times]] article of May 9, 1969 reported the bombing of [[Cambodia]], Hoover told Kissinger that Halperin, then an NSC staff member, was the "prime suspect," although Halperin had no access to the information in the article. Hoover and Kissinger spoke four times by telephone that day, and the wiretap on Halperin's home telephone was in place by evening.[^2]
+
+FBI officials and Colonel [[Alexander M. Haig, Jr.]] worked out procedures on the following day to conduct the surveillance "with no record maintained" in normal FBI files, and "at first the FBI logs were kept at the Bureau in special files, where Kissinger and Haig reviewed them."[^2] The FBI observed in May and June 1969 that the tap was not producing evidence of a leak, and Kissinger requested that it continue. Halperin resigned from the NSC staff on September 19, 1969, continued as a consultant until May 1970, and the tap remained in place until February 10, 1971. Plaintiffs cited FBI logs showing that agents overheard more than 600 calls, of which 28 percent were between Halperin and people outside his family.[^2] The Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities placed the wiretap among seventeen taps on journalists and government employees that lasted from May 1969 to February 1971, and found that the program did not reveal the source of any leak of classified data.[^3]
+
 ### Footnotes
 
-[^1]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 16.
+[^1]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 16.
+[^2]: *Halperin v. Kissinger*, 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Caselaw Access Project text, F.2d volume 606, case 1192. https://static.case.law/f2d/606/cases/1192-01.json
+[^3]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans*, Book II, S. Rept. 94-755 (1976), PDF pages 215-216 and 222-223. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_II.pdf

10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Richard Helms.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 created: 2026-05-15
-updated: 2026-10-09
+updated: 2026-10-14
 title: Richard Helms
 aliases:
   - Richard McGarrah Helms
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Separately, Helms authorized and expanded the CIA's psychic research program bas
 
 ### Chile: Covert Action and Congressional Perjury
 
-In September 1970, following the election of Socialist candidate Salvador Allende in [[Chile]], President Nixon instructed Helms in a meeting at the [[White House]] to conduct covert operations to prevent Allende from assuming the presidency. Nixon told Helms, in the presence of [[Henry A. Kissinger|Henry Kissinger]] and others, to "make the economy scream." Helms's notes from this meeting, preserved and later produced to investigators, confirmed: "One in 10 chance perhaps, but save Chile!... \$10,000,000 available, more if necessary... make the economy scream."
+In September 1970, following the election of Socialist candidate Salvador Allende in [[Chile]], President Nixon instructed Helms in a meeting at the [[White House]] to conduct covert operations to prevent Allende from assuming the presidency. At the White House meeting of September 15, 1970, attended by [[Henry A. Kissinger|Henry Kissinger]] and Attorney General [[John N. Mitchell]], Helms's notes record "1 in 10 chance perhaps, but save Chile!", "$10,000,000 available, more if necessary" and "game plan make the economy scream." The Church Committee wrote that Nixon instructed the CIA at that meeting to play a direct role in organizing a military coup.[^24][^25] In his August 12, 1975 testimony Kissinger said that at that meeting "President Nixon did almost all of the talking."[^26] On September 12, 1970, Kissinger told Helms by telephone that he was calling a [[40 Committee]] meeting for the following Monday, and said: "We will not let Chile go down the drain."[^27] A CIA memorandum for the record of September 16, 1970, "Genesis of Project FUBELT," records Helms telling CIA officials that "President Nixon had decided that an Allende regime in Chile was not acceptable to the United States."[^28]
 
 The CIA subsequently funded opposition media, political parties, and military factions. General [[Augusto Pinochet]] seized power in a coup on September 11, 1973 - the same year Helms was replaced as DCI and sent as U.S. Ambassador to [[Iran]].
 
@@ -129,3 +129,8 @@ The original 1978 filing with the [[Securities and Exchange Commission]] listed
 [^21]: Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992, ch. 11, "BCCI, the CIA and Foreign Intelligence" (the section on Richard Helms and Mohammed Irvani; text preceding notes 49 to 51). https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/11intel.htm
 [^22]: Kerry and Brown, *The BCCI Affair,* ch. 11 (Safeer's name, its capitalization and the Carlson passages; text following note 51 through note 57; *G&H Montage GmbH v. Irvani*, Superior Court of Gwinnett County, Georgia, 88-A-03571-6). https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/11intel.htm
 [^23]: Kerry and Brown, *The BCCI Affair,* ch. 6, "BCCI in the United States: Initial Entry" (Irvani listed in the original SEC filing as a 5 percent shareholder of CCAH; recruitment by Abedi in early 1978, note 49); ch. 11 (Helms's advice to Irvani on liability). https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/06early.htm
+[^24]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973*, Staff Report, December 1975, PDF pages 29 and 37. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94chile.pdf
+[^25]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, Volume XXI, Chile, 1969-1973, document 93, Editorial Note, with Helms's notes. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d93
+[^26]: Kissinger testimony of August 12, 1975, as quoted in *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXI, document 93, Editorial Note: "President Nixon did almost all of the talking."
+[^27]: National Security Archive, "Kissinger and Chile: The Declassified Record on Regime Change," Electronic Briefing Book No. 437, document 1, Helms-Kissinger telephone conversation, September 12, 1970, 12:00 noon. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB437/
+[^28]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, Volume XXI, document 94, Memorandum for the Record, Washington, September 16, 1970. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d94

10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Soo Lee.md

@@ -1,15 +1,16 @@
 ---
 category: "Intelligence & Government"
 created: 2024-04-25
-updated: 2026-05-01
+updated: 2026-10-14
 tags:
   - Person
   - PROMIS
   - INSLAW
-summary: "Soo Lee was a member of the original 1969 PROMIS design team and by 1974 was a management analyst for the Office of Criminal Justice Plans and Analysis of the DC government; further identification is complicated by the commonality of the name."
+summary: "Soo Lee was a member of the original 1969 PROMIS design team and by 1974 a management analyst for the Office of Criminal Justice Plans and Analysis of the DC government."
 ---
-Soo Lee was a member of the original 1969 team assembled to design the [[PROMIS|Prosecutor's Management Information System]], working under co-directors [[Joan E. Jacoby]] and [[Charles R. Work]] with project manager [[Bill Hamilton]] at [[Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co]]. By 1974, Lee was employed as a management analyst for the Office of Criminal Justice Plans and Analysis (OCJPA) of the DC government, a role consistent with the analytical work the PROMIS team had pioneered. Positive identification of this individual in later records is complicated by the commonality of the name.[^1]
+Soo Lee was a member of the original 1969 team assembled to design the [[PROMIS|Prosecutor's Management Information System]], working under co-directors [[Joan E. Jacoby]] and [[Charles R. Work]] with project manager [[Bill Hamilton]] at [[Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co]]. A May 1971 system overview lists Lee among the team's members as an assistant director of the Office of Crime Analysis.[^2] By 1974, Lee was employed as a management analyst for the Office of Criminal Justice Plans and Analysis (OCJPA) of the DC government, a role consistent with the analytical work the PROMIS team had pioneered. Positive identification of this individual in later records is complicated by the commonality of the name.[^1]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
 [^1]: Sessions, Vivian S. *Directory of Data Bases in the Social and Behavioral Sciences.* Science Associates International, 1974.
+[^2]: Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., *System Overview and Report Formats for PROMIS* (May 1971), prepared for the District of Columbia Government Office of Crime Analysis under LEAA Grant No. 70-DF-047, note 1 to the passage on the design team, NCJ 32469. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/32469NCJRS.pdf

10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Walter Langer.md

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ born: 1899-02-09
 died: 1981-07-05
 location: Boston, Massachusetts
 created: 2026-06-03
-updated: 2026-06-03
+updated: 2026-10-14
 ---
 Walter Langer was a [[Cambridge, Massachusetts]] psychoanalyst whose older brother [[William Langer|William]] had taken leave from a chair of history at [[Harvard University|Harvard]] to head OSS Research and Analysis. General [[William Donovan]] gave Langer the job of psychoanalyzing [[Adolf Hitler]] to uncover vulnerabilities that could be covertly exploited. Donovan told Langer to go ahead despite the obvious limitations of conducting analysis without direct access to the patient.[^1]
 
@@ -20,7 +20,9 @@ Four months before [[Pearl Harbor]], Donovan had enlisted Langer to put together
 
 ### The Hitler Profile
 
-With a small research staff, Langer examined everything he could find on Hitler and interviewed a number of people who had known the German leader. Aware of the severe limitations on his information, but left no choice by General Donovan, Langer plowed ahead and wrote up a final study. It pegged Hitler as a "neurotic psychopath" and proceeded to dissect the Führer's psyche. Langer, since retired to [[Florida]], believed he came "pretty close" to describing the real Adolf Hitler. He was particularly proud of his predictions that the Nazi leader would become increasingly disturbed as [[Germany]] suffered more and more defeats and that he would commit suicide rather than face capture.[^1]
+With a small research staff, Langer examined everything he could find on Hitler and interviewed a number of people who had known the German leader. Aware of the severe limitations on his information, but left no choice by General Donovan, Langer plowed ahead and wrote up a final study. In the wording of the 1972 book it pegged Hitler as a "neurotic psychopath" and proceeded to dissect the Führer's psyche. [[John D. Marks]] wrote that Langer, since retired to [[Florida]], believed he had come "pretty close" to describing the real Adolf Hitler, and that he was particularly proud of his predictions that the Nazi leader would become increasingly disturbed as [[Germany]] suffered more and more defeats and that he would commit suicide rather than face capture.[^1]
+
+The OSS report of 1943, *A Psychological Analysis of Adolph Hitler: His Life and Legend*, stated that there was "unanimous agreement among the four psychoanalysts who have studied the material that Hitler is an hysteric bordering on schizophrenia and not a true paranoiac as so frequently supposed."[^3] The 1972 book prints the same passage as "general agreement among the collaborators that Hitler is probably a neurotic psychopath bordering on schizophrenia."[^4] The report's eighth prediction read: "Hitler might commit suicide. This is the most plausible outcome."[^5] Langer wrote in 1972 that Donovan had asked, "What light could psychoanalysis shed on these pressing problems?"[^6] The report names as collaborators [[Henry Murray]], [[Ernst Kris]] and [[Bertram Lewin]] on its title page.[^3]
 
 ### Operational Applications
 
@@ -32,7 +34,7 @@ Langer's profile noted Hitler's "large feminine component," "extreme sentimental
 
 The full report, titled "A Psychological Analysis of Adolf Hitler: His Life and Legend," remained classified for nearly three decades. Basic Books published it in 1972 as *The Mind of Adolf Hitler: The Secret Wartime Report*, edited by Walter C. Langer himself, with an introduction explaining its original context and subsequent history. The 1972 publication became a bestseller.
 
-The report's most famous predictions proved accurate. Langer's central conclusion was that Hitler would "become more and more neurotic" as Germany's military position deteriorated and that suicide was "the most plausible outcome" when defeat became undeniable. He predicted Hitler would show increasingly rare public appearances, intensifying emotional outbursts, and would contemplate no surrender, capitulation, or peace negotiations. He also identified the possibility of a military coup against Hitler well before the failed July 1944 assassination attempt. The report's diagnosis was "neurotic psychopath bordering on schizophrenia."[^2]
+The report's most famous predictions proved accurate. Langer's central conclusion was that Hitler would "become more and more neurotic" as Germany's military position deteriorated and that suicide was "the most plausible outcome" when defeat became undeniable. He predicted Hitler would show increasingly rare public appearances, intensifying emotional outbursts, and would contemplate no surrender, capitulation, or peace negotiations. He also identified the possibility of a military coup against Hitler well before the failed July 1944 assassination attempt. The 1972 book gives the diagnosis as "neurotic psychopath bordering on schizophrenia."[^2]
 
 ### Gittinger's Extension of Langer's Methods
 
@@ -42,3 +44,7 @@ Langer's indirect analytical method, conducting psychological assessment without
 
 [^1]: John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*, Chapter 1.
 [^2]: Langer, Walter C. *The Mind of Adolf Hitler: The Secret Wartime Report*. Basic Books, 1972. (Original OSS report: "A Psychological Analysis of Adolf Hitler: His Life and Legend," 1943, available at https://archive.org/details/APsychologicalAnalysisofAdolfHitler); Exploring Your Mind, "Psychoanalyst Walter C. Langer and the Mental Study of Hitler." https://exploringyourmind.com/psychoanalyst-walter-c-langer-mental-study-of-hitler/
+[^3]: Langer, Walter C. *A Psychological Analysis of Adolph Hitler: His Life and Legend*. Office of Strategic Services, 1943, title page and p. 86 as paginated in the CIA copy (CIA Reading Room C02571145). https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-02571145
+[^4]: Langer, *The Mind of Adolf Hitler: The Secret Wartime Report*. Basic Books, 1972, chapter on the collaborators' diagnosis.
+[^5]: Langer, 1943 report, p. 155 as paginated in the CIA copy; same text in the 1972 book, section "Hitler's Death."
+[^6]: Langer, *The Mind of Adolf Hitler*, 1972, chapter on the OSS request.

10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/David Sacks.md

@@ -10,18 +10,18 @@ tags:
   - AllInPodcast
   - Trump
   - CryptoCzar
-summary: "David Sacks is a South African-born American entrepreneur and political figure who served as chief operating officer of PayPal, founded Yammer, cohosted the All-In Podcast, and was appointed White House AI and cryptocurrency czar under the second Trump administration."
+summary: "David Sacks is a South African-born entrepreneur who was chief operating officer of PayPal, founded Yammer, cohosted the All-In Podcast, and became White House AI and cryptocurrency czar under the second Trump administration."
 born: 1972-05-25
 location: "Cape Town, South Africa (born)"
 created: 2026-06-18
-updated: 2026-06-18
+updated: 2026-10-14
 ---
 
 [[David Sacks|David Sacks]] (born May 25, 1972, in [[Cape Town|Cape Town]], [[South Africa|South Africa]]) is a [[PayPal Mafia|PayPal Mafia]] principal who served as chief operating officer of [[PayPal]], founded [[Yammer|Yammer]] (the enterprise social network, acquired by [[Microsoft|Microsoft]] in 2012 for 1.2 billion dollars), produced the film *[[Thank You for Smoking|Thank You for Smoking]]* (2005), and was appointed Special Advisor on Artificial Intelligence and Cryptocurrency (the "AI and crypto czar") under the second [[Donald Trump|Trump]] administration. Sacks cohosted the [[All-In Podcast|All-In Podcast]], which became a media channel for the PayPal Mafia cohort's political positions during the 2022-2025 period.[^1][^2]
 
 ### The PayPal COO Role and the Post-PayPal Ventures
 
-Sacks served as chief operating officer at PayPal through the 2002 eBay acquisition, managing the company's operations alongside [[Peter Thiel|Thiel]] (chief executive) and [[Max Levchin|Levchin]] (chief technology officer). The COO role placed Sacks in operational control of the company's day-to-day execution during the period when the anti-fraud architecture was built and the PayPal Mafia cohort was formed. After the eBay sale, Sacks founded Yammer, the enterprise social network that applied consumer-social-networking patterns to corporate communications. Microsoft acquired Yammer in 2012.[^1]
+Sacks joined PayPal in November 1999. The company's registration statement of September 2001 describes him as executive vice president of product since May 2000.[^3] Sacks became chief operating officer of PayPal in February 2002.[^4] He served in that role through the 2002 eBay acquisition, managing the company's operations alongside [[Peter Thiel|Thiel]] (chief executive) and [[Max Levchin|Levchin]] (chief technology officer). The COO role placed Sacks in operational control of the company's day-to-day execution during the period when the anti-fraud architecture was built and the PayPal Mafia cohort was formed. After the eBay sale, Sacks founded Yammer, the enterprise social network that applied consumer-social-networking patterns to corporate communications. Microsoft acquired Yammer in 2012.[^1]
 
 Sacks subsequently founded [[Craft Ventures|Craft Ventures]], a venture capital firm whose portfolio overlaps with the PayPal Mafia and Thiel-network commercial ecosystem. Sacks also produced the film *Thank You for Smoking* (2005), an adaptation of the [[Christopher Buckley|Christopher Buckley]] satirical novel about tobacco-industry lobbying.[^1]
 
@@ -35,3 +35,5 @@ In the second Trump administration, Sacks received the Special Advisor on Artifi
 
 [^1]: For Sacks's PayPal COO role and the post-PayPal ventures, see the PayPal Mafia page and the contemporaneous Silicon Valley press.
 [^2]: For the All-In Podcast and the Trump AI/crypto czar role, see the contemporaneous press coverage of the second Trump administration appointments.
+[^3]: PayPal, Inc. Form S-1 registration statement, filed September 28, 2001, "Management," biography of David O. Sacks. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1103415/000091205701533855/a2059025zs-1.htm
+[^4]: PayPal, Inc. Form 10-K405 for fiscal 2001, filed March 13, 2002, "Management": "David O. Sacks has served as our Chief Operating Officer since February 2002." https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1103415/000091205702009834/a2073071z10-k405.htm

10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Elliot Richardson.md

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ tags:
   - Lawyer
   - Politician
   - DoJ
-summary: "Elliot Richardson served as U.S. Attorney General under Nixon before resigning during the Saturday Night Massacre, and later became INSLAW's lead outside counsel, declaring the PROMIS conspiracy 'far more sinister than anything revealed in Watergate' and publicly stating his belief that Danny Casolaro was murdered."
+summary: "Elliot Richardson was Nixon's Attorney General until he resigned during the Saturday Night Massacre, and later INSLAW's lead outside counsel, calling the PROMIS affair 'far more sinister than anything revealed in Watergate.'"
 born: 1920-07-20
 died: 1999-12-31
 location: "Boston, Massachusetts, USA"
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Under President [[Gerald R. Ford|Ford]], Richardson served as U.S. Ambassador to
 
 ### INSLAW Representation
 
-Richardson was retained as outside counsel by [[INSLAW]] and [[Bill Hamilton|Bill]] and [[Nancy Hamilton]] following the September 1987 bankruptcy court ruling in which Judge [[George Francis Bason, Jr.|George Bason]] found that the [[Department of Justice]] had "taken, converted, stole" INSLAW's enhanced [[PROMIS]] software "by trickery, fraud, and deceit." By March 1989, Richardson was writing to Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman [[Joe Biden]] requesting assurances that DOJ whistleblowers who cooperated with congressional investigators would face no reprisals; Biden responded through an aide, and Richardson challenged the dismissal. Richardson subsequently championed the [[House Committee on the Judiciary|House Judiciary Committee]] investigation led by Representative Jack Brooks, which ran from 1989 through September 1992 and produced House Report 102-857.[^2][^3]
+Richardson was retained as outside counsel by [[INSLAW]] and [[Bill Hamilton|Bill]] and [[Nancy Hamilton]] following the September 1987 bankruptcy court ruling in which Judge [[George Francis Bason, Jr.|George Bason]] found that the [[Department of Justice]] "took, converted, stole" INSLAW's enhanced [[PROMIS]] software "by trickery, fraud, and deceit." By March 1989, Richardson was writing to Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman [[Joe Biden]] requesting assurances that DOJ whistleblowers who cooperated with congressional investigators would face no reprisals; Biden responded through an aide, and Richardson challenged the dismissal. Richardson subsequently championed the [[House Committee on the Judiciary|House Judiciary Committee]] investigation led by Representative Jack Brooks, which ran from 1989 through September 1992 and produced House Report 102-857.[^2][^3]
 
 In congressional testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, Richardson stated:
 

10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Rene Schneider.md

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ summary: "Commander of the Chilean army who held that the military must respect
 died: 1970-10-25
 location: "Santiago, Chile"
 created: 2026-09-21
-updated: 2026-09-21
+updated: 2026-10-14
 ---
 
 General René Schneider was commander in chief of the Chilean army from 1969. In an interview with [[El Mercurio]] on May 8, 1970, he stated that the army would respect the constitutional process and the outcome of that year's presidential election, a position that became known as the [[Schneider Doctrine]]. He was shot in [[Santiago]] on the morning of October 22, 1970, two days before the [[National Congress of Chile|Chilean Congress]] was to confirm [[Salvador Allende]], and died on October 25.[^1]
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ On October 18 the station asked headquarters for "three 45 calibre machine guns
 
 Six hours after the delivery Schneider's car was blocked on his way to work. He drew his pistol and was shot with handguns. A Chilean military court found that two groups of officers, active and retired, had conspired to kidnap him and bring about a coup, and "that the two Generals had been in contact throughout the coup plotting." Viaux was sentenced to twenty years as "intellectual author" of the attempt. Valenzuela was sentenced to three years in exile. Martial law was declared on the day of the shooting and Valenzuela was given command of Santiago province. The CIA's task force log recorded: "The attack on General Schneider has produced developments which closely follow Valenzuela's plan." Director [[Richard Helms]] concluded the next day that "a maximum effort has been achieved." The agency later paid 35,000 dollars to members of the group that had attacked Schneider. Wimert retrieved the machine guns and threw them into the Pacific. General [[Carlos Prats]] succeeded to the command.[^1][^3]
 
+CIA briefing notes prepared on October 23, 1970 under the heading "Track II" begin with the shooting, which occurred at about 8:15 that morning and left the commander seriously wounded.[^7] Briefing notes of October 28 state that the military principals in contact with the agency had depended on the abduction of Schneider, "probably by General Viaux, as the pretext needed to launch a coup."[^8]
+
 ### The Police Report
 
 The report of the military police officer who investigated the shooting, Major Carlos Donoso Perez, makes no mention of a drawn pistol. It states that the car was "surrounded by five individuals, one of whom, making use of a blunt instrument similar to a sledgehammer, broke the rear window and then fired at General Schneider, striking him in the region of the spleen, in the left shoulder, and in the left wrist." The Senate committee reasoned that since none of the machine guns passed to Valenzuela had been used, there was "no evidence of a plan to kill Schneider." [[John Court]], an aide on the [[National Security Council]] staff, recalled Haig telling him that "if we have to take care of somebody, we could do it."[^4]
@@ -53,3 +55,5 @@ René and Raúl Schneider and other members of the family sued Kissinger and the
 [^4]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House*. Summit Books, 1983, pp. 275, 289-290.
 [^5]: Kornbluh, Peter. *The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability*. New Press, 2003, p. 29.
 [^6]: Schneider v. Kissinger, 310 F. Supp. 2d 251 (D.D.C. 2004), affirmed, 412 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 2005); complaint, November 12, 2002, National Security Archive document 23606.
+[^7]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, Volume XXI, Chile, 1969-1973, document 162, Briefing Notes Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, October 23, 1970, "Track II." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d162
+[^8]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, Volume XXI, document 168, Briefing Notes Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, October 28, 1970, "Recent Developments: Track II." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d168

10 - PEOPLE/(T-Z)/Charles R. Work.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ---
 category: "Law Enforcement & Legal"
 created: 2024-04-25
-updated: 2026-10-12
+updated: 2026-10-14
 tags:
   - Person
   - PROMIS
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ In 1966, Work became an Assistant United States Attorney in the criminal trial s
 
 ### Role in PROMIS Development
 
-In 1969, while serving as Deputy Chief of the Superior Court Division, Work co-directed the original [[PROMIS]] design team commissioned by U.S. Attorney [[Thomas A. Flannery]], alongside [[Joan E. Jacoby]] (Director of the [[Office of Crime Analysis of the District of Columbia]]) and project manager [[Bill Hamilton]] (then a senior consultant at [[Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co]]). The team produced the Prosecutor's Management Information System, deployed January 1, 1971, in the DC U.S. Attorney's Office. Work hired INSLAW to write the first version of PROMIS and maintained a close working relationship with Hamilton through the program's early years.[^3]
+In 1969, while serving as Deputy Chief of the Superior Court Division, Work co-directed the original [[PROMIS]] design team commissioned by U.S. Attorney [[Thomas A. Flannery]], alongside [[Joan E. Jacoby]] (Director of the [[Office of Crime Analysis of the District of Columbia]]) and project manager [[Bill Hamilton]] (then a senior consultant at [[Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co]]).[^3] The team produced the Prosecutor's Management Information System, deployed January 1, 1971, in the DC U.S. Attorney's Office.[^4] Work hired INSLAW to write the first version of PROMIS and maintained a close working relationship with Hamilton through the program's early years.[^3]
 
 A May 1971 overview of PROMIS prepared by Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co for the Office of Crime Analysis under LEAA grant 70-DF-047 records that the design team was headed by Joan E. Jacoby, director of the Office of Crime Analysis, and Work, deputy director of the Superior Court Division of the U.S. Attorney's Office.[^4] A 1985 White House announcement lists Work as Deputy Chief and Chief of the Superior Court Division from 1969 to 1973 and as Deputy Administrator of LEAA from 1973 to 1975, and a White House release of January 26, 1976 records that he resigned effective November 21, 1975.[^5] In April 1973 the executive director of the National District Attorneys Association described PROMIS as developed by Jacoby and Work, "assistant U.S. attorney," under a $290,000 LEAA grant.[^6]
 

10 - PEOPLE/(T-Z)/Frederick G. Watts.md

@@ -1,15 +1,16 @@
 ---
 category: "Technologists"
 created: 2024-04-25
-updated: 2026-05-01
+updated: 2026-10-14
 tags:
   - Person
   - PROMIS
   - INSLAW
 summary: "Frederick G. Watts was a member of the original 1969 PROMIS design team; no further biographical details have been identified."
 ---
-Frederick G. Watts was a member of the original 1969 team assembled to design the [[PROMIS|Prosecutor's Management Information System]], working under co-directors [[Joan E. Jacoby]] and [[Charles R. Work]] with project manager [[Bill Hamilton]] at [[Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co]]. No additional biographical details have been identified.[^1]
+Frederick G. Watts was a member of the original 1969 team assembled to design the [[PROMIS|Prosecutor's Management Information System]], working under co-directors [[Joan E. Jacoby]] and [[Charles R. Work]].[^2] [[Bill Hamilton]] served as project manager at [[Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co]].[^1] A May 1971 system overview lists Watts as chief of the Grand Jury Section of the Superior Court Division of the [[U.S. Attorney's office|U.S. Attorney's Office]].[^2]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
 [^1]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. *The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report.* House Report 102-857, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, September 10, 1992.
+[^2]: Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., *System Overview and Report Formats for PROMIS* (May 1971), prepared for the District of Columbia Government Office of Crime Analysis under LEAA Grant No. 70-DF-047, note 1 to the passage on the design team, NCJ 32469. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/32469NCJRS.pdf

10 - PEOPLE/(T-Z)/George Hunter White.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 created: 2026-05-17
-updated: 2026-05-17
+updated: 2026-10-14
 title: George Hunter White
 aliases:
   - George Hunter White
@@ -16,10 +16,15 @@ tags:
   - 1950s
   - 1960s
 category: "Law Enforcement & Legal"
-summary: "George Hunter White was a Federal Bureau of Narcotics agent who operated the CIA's Operation Midnight Climax safe houses in San Francisco and New York City from 1955 to 1963, administering LSD to unwitting civilian subjects for Project MKULTRA while working under CIA contract."
+summary: "George Hunter White was a Federal Bureau of Narcotics agent who ran CIA safe houses of Operation Midnight Climax in San Francisco and New York, 1955 to 1963, dosing unwitting subjects with LSD for MKULTRA."
 born: 1908-01-01
 died: 1975-10-22
 location: "San Francisco, California"
+relations:
+  - type: employed_by
+    with: "[[Office of Strategic Services]]"
+    role: "Army lieutenant colonel attached to the OSS, counterespionage training and operations in India"
+    fn: 4
 ---
 
 George Hunter White (1908 - October 22, 1975) was a senior agent of the [[Federal Bureau of Narcotics]] who simultaneously operated as a [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] contractor from the early 1950s through 1963, running [[Operation Midnight Climax]] - the CIA's program of administering [[LSD]] to unconsenting civilian subjects in safe houses in [[San Francisco]] and [[New York City]]. White managed these operations under the direction of [[Sidney Gottlieb]] of the CIA's [[Technical Services Division]] as part of [[Project MKUltra|MKULTRA]], the agency's classified behavioral research program. His personal diaries, discovered after his death during Freedom of Information Act research by journalist John Marks, provided the primary firsthand account of the Midnight Climax operations and are among the most revealing documents about MKULTRA's operational culture.[^1]
@@ -36,6 +41,12 @@ White was also a personal associate of [[J. Edgar Hoover]], director of the [[Fe
 
 During [[World War II]] White came from the Narcotics Bureau into the [[Office of Strategic Services]], where he joined the truth drug committee's testing program run under [[Stanley Lovell]] in cooperation with the [[Manhattan Project]]. After early tests with vaporized [[marijuana]] at [[St. Elizabeth's Hospital]] in [[Washington, D.C.]] proved insufficient, the group settled on cigarettes laced with marijuana essence. White conducted the first field test on May 27, 1943, dosing New York mobster [[August Del Gracio]] on the reasoning that a criminal would never report the experiment to the police or press. He later tested the technique on suspected Communist soldiers at camps near [[Atlanta]], [[Memphis]], and [[New Orleans]], on one occasion shooting his initials into the ceiling molding of his New Orleans hotel room with a .22 automatic. The Del Gracio logic, that society's marginal people make ideal unwitting subjects because they cannot safely complain, was the principle Gottlieb later built the safe house program around.[^3]
 
+### Testimony on the Luciano Parole
+
+In 1951 the Senate's Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce heard testimony from George H. White, who gave his name as George H. White (the index reads "White, Col. George H., narcotics agent, United States Treasury"), a supervising narcotic agent with seventeen years of service, four of them with the Army. He testified that during the war he was a lieutenant colonel in charge of counterespionage training and later operations in India and parts of the United States, on active duty and attached to the OSS. He testified that in May 1943, while on active Army duty, an intermediary named August Del Grazio came to him on behalf of two attorneys, George Wolf and [[Moses Polakoff]], and of [[Frank Costello]], who were seeking the release of [[Charles Luciano]] from prison. Del Grazio said that Luciano could arrange contacts for undercover American agents in Sicily, and White told him that parole was impossible but that any information would be passed to the military authorities.[^4]
+
+White also testified that a letter from Commander [[Charles R. Haffenden]] of Naval Intelligence in New York to Governor Dewey, stating that Luciano had been of great service to the Armed Forces, was part of the basis for the 1946 parole. He reported that the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and OSS had each categorically denied that Luciano furnished any information.[^5]
+
 ### Recruitment by the CIA
 
 White was recruited to work with the CIA around 1950-1952, initially through the precursor programs Project Bluebird and Project Artichoke before MKULTRA was formally authorized. His recruitment reflected Gottlieb's judgment that the behavioral modification research needed an operational manager who could set up and run field operations rather than a scientist who could only conduct laboratory research. Gottlieb had found White's OSS truth-drug record while reviewing Lovell's old files in 1952, secured the approval of Narcotics Commissioner [[Harry Anslinger]], and made his pitch in New York; White's diary for June 9, 1952 records simply, "Gottlieb proposed I be a CIA consultant, I agree." White had previously been blackballed from the Agency by enemies who considered him "too rough," including New York Governor [[Thomas Dewey]] and Hoover. He was designated MKULTRA Subproject 3.[^3]
@@ -73,3 +84,5 @@ White died before the August 3, 1977 Senate Health Subcommittee hearings at whic
 [^1]: Marks, John. *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate: The CIA and Mind Control.* Times Books, 1979, Chapters 5-6 (primary account of Midnight Climax using surviving MKULTRA documents and White's diaries). Kinzer, Stephen. *Poisoner in Chief: Sidney Gottlieb and the CIA Search for Mind Control.* Henry Holt and Company, 2019. "Project MKULTRA, the CIA's Program of Research in Behavioral Modification." Senate Hearing, August 3, 1977.
 [^2]: White, George Hunter. Diaries, 1940s-1970s. Special Collections, Foothill College Library, Los Altos Hills, California.
 [^3]: John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*. Times Books, 1979, Chapters 1 and 6. The 1963 CIA Inspector General report allocated $10,000 a year to each of the two safe house cities "to cover cost of cultivation of targets and maintenance of a safehouse," and the Agency's auditors accepted canceled checks White cashed himself marked "Stormy" or "Undercover Agent."
+[^4]: U.S. Senate, *Investigation of Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce*, Hearings before the Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, Part 7 (New York-New Jersey) (1951), testimony of George H. White, pp. 1180-1182. https://archive.org/details/investigationofo07unit
+[^5]: *Investigation of Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce*, Part 7, testimony of George H. White, p. 1183 (Haffenden letter; Navy and OSS denials as stated by the witness).

10 - PEOPLE/(T-Z)/Peter Thiel.md

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ summary: "Peter Thiel is the German-born investor who cofounded PayPal, Palantir
 born: 1967-10-11
 location: "Frankfurt, West Germany (born); San Francisco, California (base)"
 created: 2026-06-17
-updated: 2026-10-13
+updated: 2026-10-14
 ---
 
 Peter Thiel (born October 11, 1967, in [[Frankfurt]], [[West Germany]]) is a German-born American billionaire investor and the central figure of the [[PayPal Mafia]], the informal network of founders and early executives of [[PayPal]] who went on to found or lead much of the subsequent generation of [[Silicon Valley]] companies. Thiel cofounded PayPal, founded the venture capital firm [[Founders Fund]], and cofounded and chairs the data-analytics and defense contractor [[Palantir Technologies]]. In 2006 he cofounded the secret society [[Dialog]] with [[Auren Hoffman]]. He is the most prominent documented financial patron of the neoreactionary philosopher [[Curtis Yarvin]], the founder of [[Neoreaction]] (NRx) and co-originator of the [[Dark Enlightenment]], and his political investments extended to funding the covert lawsuit that destroyed [[Gawker Media]] and bankrolling the U.S. Senate and subsequent vice-presidential campaigns of [[JD Vance]].[^1][^2][^3]
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Across these activities Thiel has built a coordinated program for the privatizat
 
 ### PayPal and the PayPal Mafia
 
-Thiel cofounded the online payments company Confinity in 1998, which merged with [[Elon Musk]]'s X.com in 2000 to form PayPal, and Thiel served as chief executive through the company's 2002 initial public offering and acquisition by [[eBay]] for 1.5 billion dollars. The exit dispersed a cohort of founders and early engineers, each capitalised at levels that let them found the subsequent generation of consumer-internet companies, and the cohort acquired the label PayPal Mafia as a recognizable social and commercial network.[^1][^4]
+Thiel cofounded the online payments company Confinity in 1998, which merged with [[Elon Musk]]'s X.com in 2000 to form PayPal, and Thiel served as chief executive through the company's 2002 initial public offering and acquisition by [[eBay]] for 1.5 billion dollars. eBay's announcement of October 3, 2002, the day it completed the acquisition, states: "Peter Thiel announced today that he has resigned as PayPal's CEO," and that Matt Bannick, eBay's senior vice president for global online payments, would assume all of Thiel's responsibilities.[^27] The exit dispersed a cohort of founders and early engineers, each capitalised at levels that let them found the subsequent generation of consumer-internet companies, and the cohort acquired the label PayPal Mafia as a recognizable social and commercial network.[^1][^4]
 
 The PayPal Mafia included [[Max Levchin]] (CTO, later [[Affirm]]), [[Reid Hoffman]] (executive vice president, later [[LinkedIn]]), [[David Sacks]] (COO, later [[Yammer]] and the Trump administration crypto role), [[Ken Howery]] (CFO, later Trump-era ambassador to [[Sweden]]), [[Luke Nosek]] (founding team, later Founders Fund partner), [[Roelof Botha]] (CFO, later [[Sequoia Capital]] partner), [[Keith Rabois]] (executive, later Founders Fund and OpenStore), [[Jeremy Stoppelman]] (later [[Yelp]]), and the three YouTube cofounders [[Chad Hurley]], [[Steve Chen]], and [[Jawed Karim]]. Six members of the network appear on the leaked 2026 Dialog retreat roster, per *WIRED*. The network functions as a recurring capital and endorsement channel: PayPal Mafia founders sit on each other's boards, invest in each other's subsequent companies, and convene, through Dialog, in the same off-the-record setting.[^1][^4]
 
@@ -153,3 +153,4 @@ The citizenship was not publicly disclosed for nearly six years. The February 20
 [^24]: "Former FBI Special Agent Arrested for Disclosure of Confidential Information." *DOJ Office of Inspector General,* 2025. https://oig.justice.gov/news/press-release/former-fbi-special-agent-arrested-disclosure-confidential-information ; "FBI whistleblower claims he tried to get to Musk to warn him he was being targeted by Russia." *The Guardian,* May 22, 2025. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2025/may/22/fbi-whistleblower-musk-russia
 [^25]: "What We Learned About Clearview AI's Hidden 'Co-Founder.'" *New York Times,* March 18, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/18/technology/clearview-facial-recognition-ai.html ; "Business Partner Sues Chuck Johnson for Falsely Presenting as Intelligence Agent." *Semafor,* October 16, 2024. https://www.semafor.com/article/10/16/2024/business-partner-sues-chuck-johnson-for-falsely-presenting-as-intelligence-agent
 [^26]: "Documents reveal how Peter Thiel was granted New Zealand citizenship." *The Guardian,* February 1, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/feb/01/documents-reveal-how-peter-thiel-was-granted-new-zealand-citizenship ; "New Zealand Is 'the Future,' Peter Thiel Said in His Push for Citizenship." *New York Times,* February 1, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/01/business/peter-thiel-new-zealand-citizenship.html
+[^27]: eBay Inc., "eBay Completes PayPal Acquisition," press release, San Jose, October 3, 2002, exhibit 99.1 to PayPal, Inc. Form 8-K filed October 4, 2002. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1103415/000091205702037693/a2090698zex-99_1.htm

10 - PEOPLE/(T-Z)/Richard Thornburgh.md

@@ -1,18 +1,18 @@
 ---
 category: "Law Enforcement & Legal"
 created: 2026-05-01
-updated: 2026-05-01
+updated: 2026-10-14
 tags:
   - Person
   - PROMIS
   - DoJ
   - Lawyer
-summary: "Richard Thornburgh (1932-2020) served as U.S. Attorney General from 1988 to 1991 under Presidents Reagan and Bush, succeeding Edwin Meese, and was named alongside Meese in the House Judiciary Committee's 1992 INSLAW report as having blocked or restricted congressional inquiries into the PROMIS software theft, ignored two court findings against the DOJ, and refused to seek appointment of an independent counsel."
+summary: "Richard Thornburgh (1932-2020) was U.S. Attorney General from 1988 to 1991, named with Edwin Meese in the House Judiciary Committee's 1992 INSLAW report as having blocked congressional inquiries and refused an independent counsel."
 born: 1932-07-16
 died: 2020-12-31
 location: "Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania"
 ---
-Richard Lewis Thornburgh was born July 16, 1932, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. He earned a B.S. in engineering from [[Yale University]] in 1954 and an LL.B. from the University of Pittsburgh School of Law in 1957. He served as [[United States Attorney]] for the Western District of Pennsylvania from 1969 to 1975, appointed by President Nixon, and as Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division under President Ford from 1975 to 1977. He was elected Governor of Pennsylvania in 1978, serving two successive terms from January 16, 1979 to January 20, 1987 -- the first Republican to serve consecutive terms as Pennsylvania governor -- managing the March 1979 [[Three Mile Island]] nuclear incident during his first term. Richard Thornburgh died December 31, 2020, in Oakmont, Pennsylvania, at age 88.[^1]
+Richard Lewis Thornburgh was born July 16, 1932, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. He earned a B.S. in engineering from [[Yale University]] in 1954 and an LL.B. from the University of Pittsburgh School of Law in 1957. He served as [[United States Attorney]] for the Western District of Pennsylvania from 1969 to 1975, appointed by President Nixon, and as Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division under President Ford from 1975 to 1977. He was elected Governor of Pennsylvania in 1978, serving two successive terms from January 16, 1979 to January 20, 1987, the first Republican to serve consecutive terms as Pennsylvania governor, managing the March 1979 [[Three Mile Island]] nuclear incident during his first term. Richard Thornburgh died December 31, 2020, in Oakmont, Pennsylvania, at age 88.[^1]
 
 ### Attorney General
 
@@ -22,9 +22,9 @@ On August 12, 1988, Thornburgh was sworn in as Attorney General of the United St
 
 The [[House Committee on the Judiciary|House Judiciary Committee]]'s September 1992 investigation (House Report 102-857) named both Meese and Thornburgh as the two Attorneys General who had "blocked or restricted congressional inquiries into the matter, ignored the findings of two courts and refused to ask for the appointment of an independent counsel" in connection with the alleged theft of [[INSLAW]]'s [[PROMIS]] software.[^2]
 
-The two court findings at issue were Bankruptcy Judge [[George Francis Bason Jr.]]'s 1987 ruling that the [[Department of Justice]] had stolen PROMIS from INSLAW "tainted by fraud, deceit and overreaching," and the District Court's 1988 affirmance of that ruling on appeal.
+The two court findings at issue were Bankruptcy Judge [[George Francis Bason Jr.]]'s 1987 ruling that the [[Department of Justice]] had stolen PROMIS from INSLAW "tainted by fraud, deceit and overreaching," and the District Court's 1989 affirmance of that ruling on appeal.[^5]
 
-Thornburgh declined to reverse Meese's May 1988 denial of [[Bill Hamilton]] and [[Nancy Hamilton|INSLAW]]'s petition for appointment of an independent counsel under the Ethics in Government Act. [[Elliott Richardson]], INSLAW's attorney and himself a former Attorney General, wrote Thornburgh directly requesting the appointment; Thornburgh did not respond. When the House Judiciary Committee requested Thornburgh's personal testimony on the matter, he declined to appear. When the committee issued subpoenas for hundreds of DOJ internal documents -- including documents from the files of DOJ counsel Sandra Spooner that the committee alleged had been "mysteriously disappeared" -- Thornburgh's DOJ failed to produce all subpoenaed documents, asserting some had been mislaid or accidentally destroyed and claiming the remainder were protected by litigation privilege as part of DOJ's ongoing civil dispute with INSLAW.[^2][^3]
+Thornburgh declined to reverse Meese's May 1988 denial of [[Bill Hamilton]] and [[Nancy Hamilton|INSLAW]]'s petition for appointment of an independent counsel under the Ethics in Government Act. [[Elliott Richardson]], INSLAW's attorney and himself a former Attorney General, wrote Thornburgh directly requesting the appointment; Thornburgh did not respond. When the House Judiciary Committee requested Thornburgh's personal testimony on the matter, he declined to appear. When the committee issued subpoenas for hundreds of DOJ internal documents (including documents from the files of DOJ counsel Sandra Spooner that the committee alleged had been "mysteriously disappeared"), Thornburgh's DOJ failed to produce all subpoenaed documents, asserting some had been mislaid or accidentally destroyed and claiming the remainder were protected by litigation privilege as part of DOJ's ongoing civil dispute with INSLAW.[^2][^3]
 
 ### The BNL Indictment
 
@@ -42,3 +42,4 @@ After leaving the Senate race, Thornburgh was appointed UN Under-Secretary Gener
 [^2]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. *The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report.* House Report 102-857, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, September 10, 1992.
 [^3]: Seymour, Cheri. *The Last Circle: Danny Casolaro's Investigation into the Octopus and the PROMIS Software Scandal.* TrineDay, 2010.
 [^4]: Friedman, Alan. *Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq*. Bantam, 1993, pp. 183-189, 194, 198.
+[^5]: *United States v. INSLAW, Inc.*, 113 B.R. 802 (D.D.C. Nov. 22, 1989). https://cite.case.law/br/113/802/

10 - PEOPLE/(T-Z)/Roger Whelan.md

@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
 ---
+aliases:
+  - Roger Whalen
 category: "Law Enforcement & Legal"
 tags:
   - PROMIS
@@ -6,7 +8,9 @@ tags:
 summary: "Roger Whelan was the bankruptcy judge who preceded Judge Bason in the District of Columbia."
 ---
 
-Roger Whelan was the bankruptcy judge who preceded [[George Francis Bason, Jr.|Judge Bason]] in the District of Columbia. He was appointed on February 8, 1984, and his term expired four years later.
+Roger Whelan was the bankruptcy judge who preceded [[George Francis Bason, Jr.|Judge Bason]] in the District of Columbia. He was the District of Columbia's only bankruptcy judge until he resigned; George F. Bason Jr. was appointed on February 8, 1984 to fill the vacancy.[^2]
+
+The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations staff study of 1989 spells the name Whalen and records that Bason "had been appointed in 1984, to fill the unexpired term of retiring Judge Roger Whalen."[^3] A House report records that Judge Robinson said Bason "inherited a mess (administratively) in the clerk's office" when he took over for Whalen.[^4]
 
 Whelan became involved in the controversy surrounding Judge Bason's non-reappointment. He was a practicing bankruptcy attorney and reportedly received complaints about Bason from several of his colleagues. These attorneys, according to Whelan, shared his view that Bason was pro-debtor and too slow in making decisions. Whelan reported these views to the Merit Selection Panel by telephone. The Special Counsel's investigation noted that Whelan's opposition to Bason's reappointment was significant, as it contributed to the perception that Judge Bason was a poor administrator. This perception, whether accurate or not, was made known to the Panel at least by Whelan and almost certainly by others.[^1]
 
@@ -15,3 +19,6 @@ Whelan became involved in the controversy surrounding Judge Bason's non-reappoin
 ### Footnotes
 
 [^1]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993.
+[^2]: U.S. Department of Justice, *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* (March 1993), p. 155. https://archive.org/stream/InslawPROMISBuaReport/Inslaw%3APROMIS%20Bua%20Report_djvu.txt
+[^3]: U.S. Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, *Staff Study of Allegations Pertaining to the Department of Justice's Handling of a Contract with INSLAW, Inc.*, S. Prt. 101-58 (1989), p. 36 n.182. https://archive.org/details/StaffStudyOfAllegationsPertainingToTheDepartmentOfJusticesHandlingOfAContractWithInslaw
+[^4]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, *The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report*, H. Rept. 102-857 (Sept. 10, 1992), p. 105 (section VIII.B). https://archive.org/stream/InslawAffairInvestigativeReport/TheInslawAffair_djvu.txt

10 - PEOPLE/(T-Z)/Stanley H. Turner.md

@@ -1,15 +1,17 @@
 ---
 category: "Intelligence & Government"
 created: 2024-04-25
-updated: 2026-05-01
+updated: 2026-10-14
 tags:
   - Person
   - PROMIS
   - INSLAW
-summary: "Stanley H. Turner held a doctorate and served as Assistant Director for Research and Analysis at the Office of Crime Analysis of the District of Columbia under Joan E. Jacoby, and was a member of the original 1969 PROMIS design team."
+summary: "Stanley H. Turner held a doctorate, was Assistant Director for Research and Analysis at the Office of Crime Analysis under Joan E. Jacoby, and belonged to the original 1969 PROMIS design team."
 ---
-Stanley H. Turner held a doctorate and served as Assistant Director for Research and Analysis at the [[Office of Crime Analysis of the District of Columbia]] under [[Joan E. Jacoby]]. In that capacity, he was a member of the original 1969 team assembled to design the [[PROMIS|Prosecutor's Management Information System]], working with co-directors [[Joan E. Jacoby]] and [[Charles R. Work]] and project manager [[Bill Hamilton]] at [[Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co]].[^1]
+Stanley H. Turner held a doctorate and served as Assistant Director for Research and Analysis at the [[Office of Crime Analysis of the District of Columbia]] under [[Joan E. Jacoby]]. In that capacity, he was a member of the original 1969 team assembled to design the [[PROMIS|Prosecutor's Management Information System]], working with co-directors Joan E. Jacoby and [[Charles R. Work]] and project manager [[Bill Hamilton]] at [[Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co]].[^1] A May 1971 system overview lists him among the team's members as an assistant director of the Office of Crime Analysis.[^2] He is listed with Jacoby, [[Leonard R. Mellon]] and [[Edward C. Ratledge]] as an author of the 1982 National Institute of Justice report *Prosecutorial Decisionmaking: A National Study*.[^3]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
 [^1]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. *The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report.* House Report 102-857, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, September 10, 1992.
+[^2]: Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., *System Overview and Report Formats for PROMIS* (May 1971), prepared for the District of Columbia Government Office of Crime Analysis under LEAA Grant No. 70-DF-047, note 1 to the passage on the design team, NCJ 32469. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/32469NCJRS.pdf
+[^3]: Jacoby, Joan E., Mellon, Leonard R., Ratledge, Edward C., and Turner, Stanley H., *Prosecutorial Decisionmaking: A National Study* (National Institute of Justice, 1982), NCJ 79227. https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/prosecutorial-decisionmaking-national-study