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@ -10,19 +10,31 @@ summary: "Brzezinski dismissed suggestions from Prime Minister Begin that the U.
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born: 1928-03-28
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died: 2017-05-26
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location: "Warsaw, Poland"
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relations:
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- type: participant_in
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with: "[[VELA Satellite]]"
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role: "national security adviser during the White House response to the Vela event"
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start: 1979-09-22
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end: 1980-12-01
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fn: 4
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---
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[[Zbigniew Brzezinski]] was the [[United States|U.S.]] National Security Adviser during the [[Jimmy Carter|Carter]] administration, playing a key role in foreign policy decisions during a period of significant Middle Eastern upheaval.
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### Iran Policy
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Brzezinski dismissed suggestions from [[Menachem Begin|Prime Minister Begin]] that the [[United States|U.S.]] should support [[Mehdi Bazargan|Mehdi Bazargan's]] government in [[Iran]] against the growing [[Iraq|Iraqi]] threat. Instead, Brzezinski and the [[Jimmy Carter|Carter]] administration believed [[Iran]] should be allowed to disintegrate until a [[United States|U.S.]]-supported leader emerged.[^1]
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Brzezinski dismissed suggestions from [[Menachem Begin|Prime Minister Begin]] that the U.S. should support [[Mehdi Bazargan|Mehdi Bazargan's]] government in [[Iran]] against the growing [[Iraq|Iraqi]] threat. Instead, Brzezinski and the Carter administration believed Iran should be allowed to disintegrate until a U.S.-supported leader emerged.[^1]
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### VELA Satellite Nuclear Incident
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On September 22, 1979, a [[VELA Satellite]] recorded two distinctive bright flashes of light over the South Indian Ocean, probable evidence of a nuclear explosion. This event, suspected to be a joint Israeli-South African nuclear test, was reported to Brzezinski and President [[Jimmy Carter]]. [[Gerald G. Oplinger]], Brzezinski's aide for global issues, recalled that Brzezinski was present at an urgent meeting in the [[White House]] situation room where the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] and [[Defense Intelligence Agency|DIA]] stated that the odds were at least ninety percent that it had been a nuclear explosion. Brzezinski had little to say during this meeting.[^2]
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On September 22, 1979, a [[VELA Satellite]] recorded two distinctive bright flashes of light from a region of about 3,000 miles in diameter that included the southern Atlantic, the Indian Ocean, the southern tip of Africa and part of Antarctica. The signal was a double flash of the kind associated with a nuclear explosion; a presidential science panel later judged it probably not nuclear.[^2] This event, suspected to be a joint Israeli-South African nuclear test, was reported to Brzezinski and President Jimmy Carter. [[Seymour Hersh]] wrote that [[Gerald G. Oplinger]], Brzezinski's aide for global issues, recalled that Brzezinski was present at an urgent meeting in the [[White House]] situation room where the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] and [[Defense Intelligence Agency|DIA]] stated that the odds were at least ninety percent that it had been a nuclear explosion, and that Brzezinski had little to say during this meeting.[^3] The summary of conclusions of the mini-Special Coordination Committee meeting held in the Situation Room on September 22, 1979 lists [[Henry Owen]] (chairman), William E. Odom, Jerry Schecter and Gerald Funk for the National Security Council. Owen "summed up the evidence as follows: Strong positive evidence. No negative evidence." The summary records that the meeting began with an intelligence briefing.[^4]
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In September 1977 Brzezinski wrote to the secretary of state that, in response to Ambassador [[Samuel Lewis]]' cable from [[Tel Aviv]], the president "stated that it is obvious that past cooperation is excluded, and that we shouldn't push it any more for now." [[Gerard C. Smith]] replied on September 17, 1977 that the response was confined to the present and that "we could find it difficult to explain why we had accepted so reserved a response."[^5]
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### Footnotes
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[^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. _Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network_. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
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[^2]: Hersh, Seymour M. _The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy_. Random House, 1991. Chapter 20.
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[^2]: Richelson, Jeffrey T., ed., "The Vela Incident: Nuclear Test or Meteoroid?" National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 190, May 5, 2006, narrative. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB190/index.htm ; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, vol. XVI, Southern Africa, Document 362, September 23, 1979 ("south Atlantic, southern Indian Ocean, southern Africa, or Antarctica"). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v16/d362
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[^3]: Hersh, Seymour M. _The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy_. Random House, 1991. Chapter 20.
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[^4]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, vol. XVI, Southern Africa, Document 361. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v16/d361
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[^5]: Brzezinski, Zbigniew, memorandum to the Secretary of State, "Possible Israeli-South African Nuclear Connection," September 13, 1977, Secret, and Smith, Gerard C., memorandum to Brzezinski, September 17, 1977. Documents 2 and 3 in Burr, William, and Avner Cohen, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 570, December 6, 2016. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2016-12-06/vela-incident-south-atlantic-mystery-flash-september-1979-raised-questions-about-nuclear-test
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