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@ -76,9 +76,10 @@ relations:
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fn: 16
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- type: director_of
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with: "[[Ford Foundation]]"
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end: 1965
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role: "chairman of the board of trustees"
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fn: 22
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start: 1959
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end: 1965-12
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role: "chairman of the board of trustees (trustee from 1953)"
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fn: 26
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- type: head_of
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with: "[[Council on Foreign Relations]]"
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start: 1953
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@ -112,36 +113,36 @@ relations:
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- type: represented
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with: "[[ExxonMobil]]"
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role: "counsel to the Seven Sisters oil companies"
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fn: 29
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fn: 30
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- type: represented
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with: "[[Mobil]]"
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role: "counsel to the Seven Sisters oil companies"
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fn: 29
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fn: 30
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- type: represented
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with: "[[Gulf Oil]]"
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role: "counsel to the Seven Sisters oil companies"
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fn: 29
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fn: 30
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- type: represented
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with: "[[Texaco]]"
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role: "counsel to the Seven Sisters oil companies"
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fn: 29
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fn: 30
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- type: represented
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with: "[[Standard Oil of California]]"
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role: "counsel to the Seven Sisters oil companies"
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fn: 29
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fn: 30
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- type: represented
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with: "[[BP]]"
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role: "counsel to the Seven Sisters oil companies"
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fn: 29
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fn: 30
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- type: represented
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with: "[[Royal Dutch Shell]]"
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role: "counsel to the Seven Sisters oil companies"
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fn: 29
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fn: 30
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- type: participant_in
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with: "[[Libyan Producers Agreement]]"
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start: 1971-01
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role: "counsel to whom the Business Review letters were addressed"
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fn: 34
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fn: 35
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- type: participant_in
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with: "[[Cuban Missile Crisis]]"
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start: 1962-10
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@ -152,9 +153,9 @@ relations:
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with: "[[Warren Commission]]"
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start: 1963-11-29
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role: "commissioner"
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fn: 50
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fn: 51
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created: 2026-10-01
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updated: 2026-10-01
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updated: 2026-10-09
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---
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John Jay McCloy (born in [[Philadelphia]] on March 31, 1895; died in [[Stamford, Connecticut]], on March 11, 1989) was an American lawyer, banker and government official. He served as Assistant Secretary of War, president of the [[World Bank]], U.S. Military Governor and High Commissioner for [[Germany]], chairman of the [[Chase Manhattan Bank]], the [[Ford Foundation]] and the [[Council on Foreign Relations]], counsel to the major international oil companies, chairman of the [[General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament]] and a member of the [[Warren Commission]]. [[Amherst College]], which holds his papers, records his name at birth as John McCloy, with "Snader" used as a middle name in college records until about 1935 and "Jay" thereafter.[^1]
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@ -205,71 +206,71 @@ McCloy was brought into the Ford Foundation as a consultant by [[Henry Ford II]]
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On April 29, 1953, McCloy, on Council on Foreign Relations letterhead, wrote Allen Dulles, by then Director of Central Intelligence, that he was "delighted to have a report from Shep Stone" that Dulles would join a Council study group on relations between the democratic nations and the [[Soviet Union]], "undertaken at the Council on Foreign Relations under a grant of the Ford Foundation," with a full-time staff under [[Henry L. Roberts]] of [[Columbia University]]. "Though the group will be entirely unofficial, its findings will be made available to our government," he wrote, adding that the CIA's [[Robert Amory]] would attend the first dinner meeting on May 6, 1953.[^23] In a letter of February 25, 1954, quoted by the historian [[Volker Berghahn]] and cited by Harm Langenkamp, Stone wrote McCloy about the [[Congress for Cultural Freedom]]: "you know the sources of funds that have hitherto been supplied to the Congress, but in our conversation with these gentlemen [Nabokov and Rougemont] we should not reveal what we know."[^24]
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A memorandum of May 21, 1954 by [[Don K. Price]] set the Foundation's policy on government-sponsored programs: such projects could be recommended if "worth support on their merits, regardless of any official interest," and with the prior approval of three trustees, "the Chairman, the President, and 'Mr. McCloy.'" Langenkamp, citing Price's 1972 oral history and McCloy's interview with [[Kai Bird]], writes that McCloy and Price later defended the arrangement as a means of limiting the [[Central Intelligence Agency]]'s access to Foundation officers and grantees, quotes McCloy as saying the Foundation could not keep its "shirts clean" had it closed the door on the Agency entirely, and quotes Price's warning to Dulles and [[Frank Wisner]]: "The first time you meddle with our boys, we'll quit this whole program." In 1958 Dulles invited Foundation officers to Washington for a briefing on Agency operations, and in 1959 Price reached an understanding allowing the CIA to approach Foundation fellows after their grants expired; in the early 1960s Foundation president [[Henry T. Heald]] repeated the Foundation's position to Director [[John McCone]].[^24] Writing of 1962, when Stone sought a five-year guarantee of some $2,000,000 a year to free the Congress for Cultural Freedom from the CIA's treasury, Langenkamp describes McCloy as Stone's "staunchest ally" and as having by then assumed the chairmanship of the board. The Congress, which the CIA had tried from the outset to transfer to the Ford and Rockefeller foundations, reached self-sufficiency through Ford's 1957 to 1962 grant at the moment the cover of the Agency's network of front organizations was blown; Stone's 1962 proposal itself foundered.[^25]
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A memorandum of May 21, 1954 by [[Don K. Price]] set the Foundation's policy on government-sponsored programs: such projects could be recommended if "worth support on their merits, regardless of any official interest," and with the prior approval of three trustees, "the Chairman, the President, and 'Mr. McCloy.'" Langenkamp, citing Price's 1972 oral history and McCloy's interview with [[Kai Bird]], writes that McCloy and Price later defended the arrangement as a means of limiting the [[Central Intelligence Agency]]'s access to Foundation officers and grantees, quotes McCloy as saying the Foundation could not keep its "shirts clean" had it closed the door on the Agency entirely, and quotes Price's warning to Dulles and [[Frank Wisner]]: "The first time you meddle with our boys, we'll quit this whole program." In 1958 Dulles invited Foundation officers to Washington for a briefing on Agency operations, and in 1959 Price reached an understanding allowing the CIA to approach Foundation fellows after their grants expired; in the early 1960s Foundation president [[Henry T. Heald]] repeated the Foundation's position to Director [[John McCone]].[^24] Writing of 1962, when Stone sought a five-year guarantee of some $2,000,000 a year to free the Congress for Cultural Freedom from the CIA's treasury, Langenkamp describes McCloy as Stone's "staunchest ally" and as having by then assumed the chairmanship of the board. The Congress, which the CIA had tried from the outset to transfer to the Ford and Rockefeller foundations, reached self-sufficiency through Ford's 1957 to 1962 grant at the moment the cover of the Agency's network of front organizations was blown; Stone's 1962 proposal itself foundered.[^25] The foundation's 1965 annual report states that McCloy served on the board of trustees from 1953 and as its chairman from 1959, retiring on December 31, 1965, and that [[Julius A. Stratton]], president of the [[Massachusetts Institute of Technology]] and a trustee since 1955, was elected chairman to replace him.[^26]
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McCloy was chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations from 1953 to 1971.[^1]
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### Chase Manhattan
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McCloy was chairman of the board of the Chase National Bank from January 1953 to December 1960; the bank merged with the [[Bank of the Manhattan Company]] in April 1955 to form the Chase Manhattan Bank.[^1] His papers include six volumes of appointment and telephone logs kept as chairman from 1953 to 1958, consisting mostly of names with almost no notation of subject matter, and correspondence of March 1960 concerning his retirement from the bank.[^26] On April 20, 1962, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence [[Marshall S. Carter]] wrote him at One Chase Manhattan Plaza that he was being briefed that afternoon on "the other matter" they had discussed by telephone and would come back with "a substantive proposal."[^27]
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McCloy was chairman of the board of the Chase National Bank from January 1953 to December 1960; the bank merged with the [[Bank of the Manhattan Company]] in April 1955 to form the Chase Manhattan Bank.[^1] His papers include six volumes of appointment and telephone logs kept as chairman from 1953 to 1958, consisting mostly of names with almost no notation of subject matter, and correspondence of March 1960 concerning his retirement from the bank.[^27] On April 20, 1962, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence [[Marshall S. Carter]] wrote him at One Chase Manhattan Plaza that he was being briefed that afternoon on "the other matter" they had discussed by telephone and would come back with "a substantive proposal."[^28]
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### Counsel to the Oil Companies
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From 1961 McCloy was a name partner of Milbank, Tweed, Hope, Hadley & McCloy.[^1] For much of the 1960s and 1970s he advised the "McCloy Group," representatives of most of the major American oil companies and several European and British firms, on legal questions and on foreign and domestic policy, and advocated on their behalf in the Justice Department, the State Department and Congress. His files on the group include representation agreements dated March 20 to August 2, 1962. He kept the Antitrust Division informed of oil group meetings and negotiations, sought specific clearance for actions that might have been construed as violations of the antitrust laws, and "made a point of holding briefing meetings with each new Attorney General to ensure a continuity of contact and goodwill with the Department."[^28]
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From 1961 McCloy was a name partner of Milbank, Tweed, Hope, Hadley & McCloy.[^1] For much of the 1960s and 1970s he advised the "McCloy Group," representatives of most of the major American oil companies and several European and British firms, on legal questions and on foreign and domestic policy, and advocated on their behalf in the Justice Department, the State Department and Congress. His files on the group include representation agreements dated March 20 to August 2, 1962. He kept the Antitrust Division informed of oil group meetings and negotiations, sought specific clearance for actions that might have been construed as violations of the antitrust laws, and "made a point of holding briefing meetings with each new Attorney General to ensure a continuity of contact and goodwill with the Department."[^29]
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From the early 1960s McCloy represented the Seven Sisters ([[Gulf Oil|Gulf]], [[Royal Dutch Shell|Shell]], [[BP]], [[ExxonMobil|Exxon]], [[Standard Oil of California|Socal]], [[Texaco]] and [[Mobil]]) and was engaged by other companies operating in the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean. He testified to the [[Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations]] of the [[Senate Foreign Relations Committee|Senate Committee on Foreign Relations]], chaired by Senator [[Frank Church]], that while an adviser to President [[John F. Kennedy]] he raised the possibility of joint action by the companies against the combined pressure of the producing countries, and that the President arranged a meeting with Attorney General [[Robert Kennedy|Robert F. Kennedy]]. Asked whether the understanding was ever formalized, he answered: "No, I don't believe I ever got a letter from him in regard to it." He informed Deputy Attorney General [[Byron White]] and Attorneys General [[Nicholas Katzenbach]], [[Ramsey Clark]] and [[John N. Mitchell|John Mitchell]] of his concerns about [[OPEC]] in informal conversations.[^29]
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From the early 1960s McCloy represented the Seven Sisters ([[Gulf Oil|Gulf]], [[Royal Dutch Shell|Shell]], [[BP]], [[ExxonMobil|Exxon]], [[Standard Oil of California|Socal]], [[Texaco]] and [[Mobil]]) and was engaged by other companies operating in the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean. He testified to the [[Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations]] of the [[Senate Foreign Relations Committee|Senate Committee on Foreign Relations]], chaired by Senator [[Frank Church]], that while an adviser to President [[John F. Kennedy]] he raised the possibility of joint action by the companies against the combined pressure of the producing countries, and that the President arranged a meeting with Attorney General [[Robert Kennedy|Robert F. Kennedy]]. Asked whether the understanding was ever formalized, he answered: "No, I don't believe I ever got a letter from him in regard to it." He informed Deputy Attorney General [[Byron White]] and Attorneys General [[Nicholas Katzenbach]], [[Ramsey Clark]] and [[John N. Mitchell|John Mitchell]] of his concerns about [[OPEC]] in informal conversations.[^30]
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On January 11, 1967, as the [[Internal Revenue Service]] questioned the industry's pricing practices, McCloy wrote Secretary of State [[Dean Rusk]] about an IRS audit of the tax returns of the five American majors: "I believe that the Department of State has a particular responsibility to make known to the Treasury Department the implications of its proposed attack on crude oil prices," because the system of royalties and creditable local income taxes "was recommended to the oil companies and to the foreign governments involved in the Department of State and the Treasury Department," and without it "large amounts of direct foreign aid might well be required." The subcommittee found that the failure of the IRS to reverse its original ruling after posted and realized prices diverged in 1957 "has cost the U.S. Treasury billions of dollars in revenues"; in 1973 Exxon paid an effective rate of 11.2 percent on earnings of $2.98 billion, Mobil 5 percent and Texaco 2.3 percent.[^30]
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On January 11, 1967, as the [[Internal Revenue Service]] questioned the industry's pricing practices, McCloy wrote Secretary of State [[Dean Rusk]] about an IRS audit of the tax returns of the five American majors: "I believe that the Department of State has a particular responsibility to make known to the Treasury Department the implications of its proposed attack on crude oil prices," because the system of royalties and creditable local income taxes "was recommended to the oil companies and to the foreign governments involved in the Department of State and the Treasury Department," and without it "large amounts of direct foreign aid might well be required." The subcommittee found that the failure of the IRS to reverse its original ruling after posted and realized prices diverged in 1957 "has cost the U.S. Treasury billions of dollars in revenues"; in 1973 Exxon paid an effective rate of 11.2 percent on earnings of $2.98 billion, Mobil 5 percent and Texaco 2.3 percent.[^31]
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On December 9, 1969, McCloy joined [[David Rockefeller]] and the men listed as [[J. K. Jamieson|Jamieson]], Anderson, [[Rawleigh Warner|Warner]] and [[John Swearingen|Swearingen]] in a meeting with President [[Richard Nixon]] and [[Henry A. Kissinger|Henry Kissinger]] on the [[Middle East]]; Kissinger's briefing memorandum titled it "Your Meeting with the David Rockefeller Group."[^31]
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On December 9, 1969, McCloy joined [[David Rockefeller]] and the men listed as [[J. K. Jamieson|Jamieson]], Anderson, [[Rawleigh Warner|Warner]] and [[John Swearingen|Swearingen]] in a meeting with President [[Richard Nixon]] and [[Henry A. Kissinger|Henry Kissinger]] on the [[Middle East]]; Kissinger's briefing memorandum titled it "Your Meeting with the David Rockefeller Group."[^32]
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### The Libyan Producers Agreement and the Business Review Letters
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On September 25, 1970, McCloy attended, as attorney for several of the major companies, a meeting at which Under Secretary of State [[U. Alexis Johnson]] told the companies operating in [[Libya]] that United States intervention with the Libyan government would be "ineffective at best."[^32] On September 29, 1970, [[Peter Flanigan]], the President's Assistant for International Economic Affairs, recorded that McCloy, "representative of the International Oil Company," had spoken with Johnson; that Flanigan had cleared with Attorney General Mitchell that the companies could discuss a Libyan proposal together "if they were to sit down together with a member of the Justice Department"; and that "[t]his information was given to John McCloy who also spoke to Mitchell." Flanigan suggested to McCloy that the penalties of a break with Libya were greater than those of a settlement, reasoning that a settlement's cost increase would fall on all European and Japanese supplies but only a small part of American supplies, so that "the result would be a competitive benefit to the United States"; he told McCloy the government would expect the companies "to follow the course that they and he thought best."[^33] On January 7, 1971, Johnson met representatives of Esso, Mobil, Gulf, Texaco and Socal and "attorney John McCloy" on OPEC's demands; McCloy said the producers' cartel was in "very strong bargaining position" and asked whether the State Department "could be helpful with Department of Justice in obtaining permission under anti-trust laws for companies to coordinate response."[^34] [[James Akins]] of the State Department and [[Dudley Chapman]] of the Antitrust Division were detailed to work with the companies and McCloy on the documents.[^29]
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On September 25, 1970, McCloy attended, as attorney for several of the major companies, a meeting at which Under Secretary of State [[U. Alexis Johnson]] told the companies operating in [[Libya]] that United States intervention with the Libyan government would be "ineffective at best."[^33] On September 29, 1970, [[Peter Flanigan]], the President's Assistant for International Economic Affairs, recorded that McCloy, "representative of the International Oil Company," had spoken with Johnson; that Flanigan had cleared with Attorney General Mitchell that the companies could discuss a Libyan proposal together "if they were to sit down together with a member of the Justice Department"; and that "[t]his information was given to John McCloy who also spoke to Mitchell." Flanigan suggested to McCloy that the penalties of a break with Libya were greater than those of a settlement, reasoning that a settlement's cost increase would fall on all European and Japanese supplies but only a small part of American supplies, so that "the result would be a competitive benefit to the United States"; he told McCloy the government would expect the companies "to follow the course that they and he thought best."[^34] On January 7, 1971, Johnson met representatives of Esso, Mobil, Gulf, Texaco and Socal and "attorney John McCloy" on OPEC's demands; McCloy said the producers' cartel was in "very strong bargaining position" and asked whether the State Department "could be helpful with Department of Justice in obtaining permission under anti-trust laws for companies to coordinate response."[^35] [[James Akins]] of the State Department and [[Dudley Chapman]] of the Antitrust Division were detailed to work with the companies and McCloy on the documents.[^30]
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The [[United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division|Antitrust Division]] under Assistant Attorney General [[Richard W. McLaren]] issued [[Business Review letter|Business Review letters]] to McCloy covering a joint "[[Message to OPEC]]" and the [[Libyan Producers Agreement]] (the Safety Net Agreement), under which Libyan producers would replace the production of any company shut in for resisting Libyan demands, with Persian Gulf production to be shared under specified circumstances. The letters stated that the Department "does not presently intend to institute any proceedings under the antitrust laws." The subcommittee's report dates the letters January 19, 1971, and in the next paragraph places a January 15 meeting of McCloy and the chief executives with Secretary of State [[William P. Rogers]] and Under Secretary [[John N. Irwin II]] "two days after the issuance of the Business Review letters." At that meeting the companies sought a high-level mission to the producing countries; asked by Church whether he had suggested Irwin, McCloy answered: "No. As long as it was a person of dignity, with clout, to use that expression." Irwin, sent with Nixon's authorization, recommended from [[Tehran]] that the companies negotiate with the Gulf states separately; Rogers communicated the recommendation to McCloy, who informed the chief executives, and the subcommittee found that the State Department had thereby abandoned the strategy of a single global negotiation that lay at the heart of the Message to OPEC and the Business Review letters.[^34] [^35]
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The [[United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division|Antitrust Division]] under Assistant Attorney General [[Richard W. McLaren]] issued [[Business Review letter|Business Review letters]] to McCloy covering a joint "[[Message to OPEC]]" and the [[Libyan Producers Agreement]] (the Safety Net Agreement), under which Libyan producers would replace the production of any company shut in for resisting Libyan demands, with Persian Gulf production to be shared under specified circumstances. The letters stated that the Department "does not presently intend to institute any proceedings under the antitrust laws." The subcommittee's report dates the letters January 19, 1971, and in the next paragraph places a January 15 meeting of McCloy and the chief executives with Secretary of State [[William P. Rogers]] and Under Secretary [[John N. Irwin II]] "two days after the issuance of the Business Review letters." At that meeting the companies sought a high-level mission to the producing countries; asked by Church whether he had suggested Irwin, McCloy answered: "No. As long as it was a person of dignity, with clout, to use that expression." Irwin, sent with Nixon's authorization, recommended from [[Tehran]] that the companies negotiate with the Gulf states separately; Rogers communicated the recommendation to McCloy, who informed the chief executives, and the subcommittee found that the State Department had thereby abandoned the strategy of a single global negotiation that lay at the heart of the Message to OPEC and the Business Review letters.[^35] [^36]
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The companies formed a [[London Policy Group]], with a parallel group in New York. Each London Policy Group meeting, on dates from January 20 to June 18, 1971, "was attended by a partner or associate from the firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, counsel for the oil companies, whose function was to assure that the discussions remained within the terms of the Message to OPEC, the Libyan Producers Agreement, and the pertinent business review letters from the Antitrust Division." "No member of the Departments of Justice or State attended any of these meetings; instead, both Departments relied upon ex post-factor [sic] oral reports by oil company executives to Akins and written reports from McCloy to McLaren."[^35] The subcommittee found "no evidence of any Department of Justice monitoring of the negotiations"; not until October 1973, after subcommittee staff began to inquire, did anyone at the Department read the cable record of the company-OPEC negotiations.[^36] The February 14, 1971 [[Tehran Agreement]] raised the Gulf governments' take by an estimated $11.7 billion over five years, a cost McCloy described to McLaren as "extremely high."[^35]
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The companies formed a [[London Policy Group]], with a parallel group in New York. Each London Policy Group meeting, on dates from January 20 to June 18, 1971, "was attended by a partner or associate from the firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, counsel for the oil companies, whose function was to assure that the discussions remained within the terms of the Message to OPEC, the Libyan Producers Agreement, and the pertinent business review letters from the Antitrust Division." "No member of the Departments of Justice or State attended any of these meetings; instead, both Departments relied upon ex post-factor [sic] oral reports by oil company executives to Akins and written reports from McCloy to McLaren."[^36] The subcommittee found "no evidence of any Department of Justice monitoring of the negotiations"; not until October 1973, after subcommittee staff began to inquire, did anyone at the Department read the cable record of the company-OPEC negotiations.[^37] The February 14, 1971 [[Tehran Agreement]] raised the Gulf governments' take by an estimated $11.7 billion over five years, a cost McCloy described to McLaren as "extremely high."[^36]
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On October 15, 1971, McCloy informed McLaren that Libya had taken unilateral steps on exchange rates, and on October 19 he asked for further Business Review letters covering joint negotiation on currency parity and participation and an extension of the sharing agreement; the Department issued new letters addressed to him.[^37] At a State Department meeting on January 3, 1972 attended by the chairmen of the major companies, [[Nelson Bunker Hunt]] and McCloy, the Under Secretary of State proposed an industry advisory body; on January 20 McCloy and Akins agreed that an informal body was acceptable, and McCloy reported that some executives were "disturbed" by Akins's insistence that the companies change their relationship with the producing countries by 1976.[^38]
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On October 15, 1971, McCloy informed McLaren that Libya had taken unilateral steps on exchange rates, and on October 19 he asked for further Business Review letters covering joint negotiation on currency parity and participation and an extension of the sharing agreement; the Department issued new letters addressed to him.[^38] At a State Department meeting on January 3, 1972 attended by the chairmen of the major companies, [[Nelson Bunker Hunt]] and McCloy, the Under Secretary of State proposed an industry advisory body; on January 20 McCloy and Akins agreed that an informal body was acceptable, and McCloy reported that some executives were "disturbed" by Akins's insistence that the companies change their relationship with the producing countries by 1976.[^39]
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The Business Review letters required the companies to report to the Justice Department through McCloy. In March 1973 a suit by the [[Corporate Accountability Research Group]] for the documents was pending against the Justice Department, "[a] similar request by [[New York Times|The New York Times]] in 1971 had been averted under the [[Freedom of Information Act]]," and the companies told State Department officials that the sharing agreement was a "form of insurance" that had allowed Bunker Hunt Oil Company to "stand firm" against Libyan demands. On March 23, 1973, [[Warren Clark]] of the North African Office in the Bureau of African Affairs wrote that release would show Libya that the companies had banded together to "denationalize" part of British Petroleum, and that the matter was "very sensitive from a domestic political point of view. The State Department and the USG have sanctioned in these Business Review Letters a strengthening of the international cartel of seven Anglo-Saxon oil companies." A Senate subcommittee "would fry the State Department if it was revealed that we classified these documents in order to protect the 'cartel,' and that we had taken the position that what was good for the cartel was good for US national security." Clark approved keeping the agreement and the letters classified on the narrow ground of proprietary interest.[^39]
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The Business Review letters required the companies to report to the Justice Department through McCloy. In March 1973 a suit by the [[Corporate Accountability Research Group]] for the documents was pending against the Justice Department, "[a] similar request by [[New York Times|The New York Times]] in 1971 had been averted under the [[Freedom of Information Act]]," and the companies told State Department officials that the sharing agreement was a "form of insurance" that had allowed Bunker Hunt Oil Company to "stand firm" against Libyan demands. On March 23, 1973, [[Warren Clark]] of the North African Office in the Bureau of African Affairs wrote that release would show Libya that the companies had banded together to "denationalize" part of British Petroleum, and that the matter was "very sensitive from a domestic political point of view. The State Department and the USG have sanctioned in these Business Review Letters a strengthening of the international cartel of seven Anglo-Saxon oil companies." A Senate subcommittee "would fry the State Department if it was revealed that we classified these documents in order to protect the 'cartel,' and that we had taken the position that what was good for the cartel was good for US national security." Clark approved keeping the agreement and the letters classified on the narrow ground of proprietary interest.[^40]
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### Oil Diplomacy in 1973 and 1974
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[[William J. Casey]] sat on McCloy's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament; the committee's letterheads of June 1970 and March and May 1971 list him among the members.[^40] On September 5, 1973, McCloy met Casey, by then Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and asked that the government send a strong note on the illegality of Libya's nationalization, work with the Europeans "to make the Libyan expropriation attempt fail" by obtaining agreement not to buy oil from fields operated by the majors, and lift the environmental sulphur restriction as a demonstration of political determination. [[John Knubel]] of the [[National Security Council]] staff recorded for Kissinger McCloy's estimate that the net shortfall to the United States would be "about 50,000 barrels per day" if the majors stopped pumping Libyan oil, "a manageable amount (according to McCloy)".[^41] On October 12, 1973, during the [[October War]], McCloy sent [[Alexander Haig]] a memorandum by the chairmen of Exxon, Mobil, Texaco and Standard Oil of California, stating that the "chief ARAMCO shareholders" wished it "placed in the President's hands as soon as possible"; the memorandum warned that OPEC's demands could raise the free world's oil cost from the Persian Gulf alone by $15 billion a year, and a notation on Kissinger's covering memorandum of November 3 indicates that Nixon saw it.[^42]
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[[William J. Casey]] sat on McCloy's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament; the committee's letterheads of June 1970 and March and May 1971 list him among the members.[^41] On September 5, 1973, McCloy met Casey, by then Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and asked that the government send a strong note on the illegality of Libya's nationalization, work with the Europeans "to make the Libyan expropriation attempt fail" by obtaining agreement not to buy oil from fields operated by the majors, and lift the environmental sulphur restriction as a demonstration of political determination. [[John Knubel]] of the [[National Security Council]] staff recorded for Kissinger McCloy's estimate that the net shortfall to the United States would be "about 50,000 barrels per day" if the majors stopped pumping Libyan oil, "a manageable amount (according to McCloy)".[^42] On October 12, 1973, during the [[October War]], McCloy sent [[Alexander Haig]] a memorandum by the chairmen of Exxon, Mobil, Texaco and Standard Oil of California, stating that the "chief ARAMCO shareholders" wished it "placed in the President's hands as soon as possible"; the memorandum warned that OPEC's demands could raise the free world's oil cost from the Persian Gulf alone by $15 billion a year, and a notation on Kissinger's covering memorandum of November 3 indicates that Nixon saw it.[^43]
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On November 20, 1973, Kissinger met ten oil industry executives and McCloy, listed as "Milbank and Tweed," with Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust [[Thomas Kauper]] among the officials present; Kissinger told McCloy he wanted to meet him "and a group of Atlanticists" about the Europeans, and the next day [[Brent Scowcroft]] reported that McCloy was prepared to assemble Americans and Europeans for the purpose. On February 8, 1974, Kissinger telephoned McCloy that "[w]e cannot have the Community organized against us as anti-American."[^43] Opening a meeting with the oil company heads on March 29, 1974, Kissinger said he had called it "after talking with Jack McCloy," and that "[t]he transcript taken here isn't going to go anywhere, except into my own personal files." When Deputy Secretary of Defense [[William Clements]] described the encouragement of technology and industry transfers into [[Saudi Arabia]] and the [[Atlantic Richfield]] chairman, [[Robert O. Anderson]], added, "In exchange for which we get a preferential position," McCloy said: "In other words, pick up the Yamani offer."[^44]
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On November 20, 1973, Kissinger met ten oil industry executives and McCloy, listed as "Milbank and Tweed," with Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust [[Thomas Kauper]] among the officials present; Kissinger told McCloy he wanted to meet him "and a group of Atlanticists" about the Europeans, and the next day [[Brent Scowcroft]] reported that McCloy was prepared to assemble Americans and Europeans for the purpose. On February 8, 1974, Kissinger telephoned McCloy that "[w]e cannot have the Community organized against us as anti-American."[^44] Opening a meeting with the oil company heads on March 29, 1974, Kissinger said he had called it "after talking with Jack McCloy," and that "[t]he transcript taken here isn't going to go anywhere, except into my own personal files." When Deputy Secretary of Defense [[William Clements]] described the encouragement of technology and industry transfers into [[Saudi Arabia]] and the [[Atlantic Richfield]] chairman, [[Robert O. Anderson]], added, "In exchange for which we get a preferential position," McCloy said: "In other words, pick up the Yamani offer."[^45]
|
||||
|
||||
In a letter of September 21, 1973 to Kauper, McCloy listed his clients and reported that the producing states were again demanding changes to the Tehran and Tripoli agreements. In a later letter to Church he stated that American companies in the Middle East had made an affirmative contribution of over $2 billion to the 1972 balance of payments; the subcommittee found that the Commerce Department estimates on which he relied had "recently been found to be substantially in error" because they were computed on posted rather than realized prices.[^45] The McCloy Group appears to have been inactive from June 1973 to February 1979.[^28]
|
||||
In a letter of September 21, 1973 to Kauper, McCloy listed his clients and reported that the producing states were again demanding changes to the Tehran and Tripoli agreements. In a later letter to Church he stated that American companies in the Middle East had made an affirmative contribution of over $2 billion to the 1972 balance of payments; the subcommittee found that the Commerce Department estimates on which he relied had "recently been found to be substantially in error" because they were computed on posted rather than realized prices.[^46] The McCloy Group appears to have been inactive from June 1973 to February 1979.[^29]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Critchfield Reports and the Oil Files
|
||||
|
||||
The International Oil series of his papers contains sub-series I, "Critchfield Reports, 1968-1973," consisting of 49 "perspectives on development" and 16 special reports on Middle East issues. The Amherst archivists state that "[m]ost, if not all," were prepared by [[Basic Resources International]], a [[Falls Church, Virginia]], consulting firm "headed by [[James H. Critchfield]], formerly CIA bureau chief for the Middle East," and that Report 60 is a prospectus for the firm. Sub-series K of the same series holds a folder titled "Chase Manhattan Bank. Financial analysis of thirty-one petroleum companies" among oil company reports for 1964 to 1966. Other folders in the series hold a draft legal brief on taxes on oil company income and drafts of a proposed letter from President Nixon to the Shah of Iran.[^46]
|
||||
The International Oil series of his papers contains sub-series I, "Critchfield Reports, 1968-1973," consisting of 49 "perspectives on development" and 16 special reports on Middle East issues. The Amherst archivists state that "[m]ost, if not all," were prepared by [[Basic Resources International]], a [[Falls Church, Virginia]], consulting firm "headed by [[James H. Critchfield]], formerly CIA bureau chief for the Middle East," and that Report 60 is a prospectus for the firm. Sub-series K of the same series holds a folder titled "Chase Manhattan Bank. Financial analysis of thirty-one petroleum companies" among oil company reports for 1964 to 1966. Other folders in the series hold a draft legal brief on taxes on oil company income and drafts of a proposed letter from President Nixon to the Shah of Iran.[^47]
|
||||
|
||||
### Brazil and the McCone File
|
||||
|
||||
On February 21, 1964, Ambassador [[Lincoln Gordon]] reported from [[Rio de Janeiro]] that President [[Joao Goulart|João Goulart]] "said looking forward to McCloy visit and thought Hanna case could have constructive solution." On February 29, 1964, McCloy, then a partner of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy, met Goulart in Rio to discuss the status of the M.A. [[Hanna Mining Company]].[^47] On April 9, 1964, at 11:10 a.m., Director of Central Intelligence John McCone and McCloy spoke by telephone; four pages of the source text of the transcript, filed in McCone's "Eyes Only" telephone records, have not been declassified. The same day the three military ministers, [[Artur da Costa e Silva|Artur Costa e Silva]], [[Francisco de Assis Correia de Melo]] and [[Augusto Rademaker|Augusto Hamann Rademaker Grünewald]], signed Brazil's [[Institutional Act]].[^48] On June 10, 1964, President [[Humberto Castelo Branco]] showed Gordon a staff report on "areas of friction abroad," including the Hanna case, and said work on resolving all of them was going forward rapidly.[^49]
|
||||
On February 21, 1964, Ambassador [[Lincoln Gordon]] reported from [[Rio de Janeiro]] that President [[Joao Goulart|João Goulart]] "said looking forward to McCloy visit and thought Hanna case could have constructive solution." On February 29, 1964, McCloy, then a partner of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy, met Goulart in Rio to discuss the status of the M.A. [[Hanna Mining Company]].[^48] On April 9, 1964, at 11:10 a.m., Director of Central Intelligence John McCone and McCloy spoke by telephone; four pages of the source text of the transcript, filed in McCone's "Eyes Only" telephone records, have not been declassified. The same day the three military ministers, [[Artur da Costa e Silva|Artur Costa e Silva]], [[Francisco de Assis Correia de Melo]] and [[Augusto Rademaker|Augusto Hamann Rademaker Grünewald]], signed Brazil's [[Institutional Act]].[^49] On June 10, 1964, President [[Humberto Castelo Branco]] showed Gordon a staff report on "areas of friction abroad," including the Hanna case, and said work on resolving all of them was going forward rapidly.[^50]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Warren Commission
|
||||
|
||||
[[Lyndon B. Johnson]] created the Commission by [[Executive Order 11130]] of November 29, 1963, and selected from private life two lawyers, Allen Dulles, former Director of Central Intelligence, and McCloy; Chief Justice [[Earl Warren]], Senators [[Richard B. Russell]] and [[John Sherman Cooper]], and Representatives [[Hale Boggs]] and [[Gerald R. Ford]] completed its membership. Its first meeting was on December 5, 1963.[^50] A transcript titled "Report of Meeting of Members of Staff," dated July 9, 1964, records a meeting attended by General Counsel [[J. Lee Rankin]], staff, McCloy and Dulles, at which Drs. [[Dale C. Cameron]], [[Howard P. Rome]] and [[David A. Rothstein]] gave "an informal colloquy, interrogation, and explanation" on a psychiatric interpretation of [[Lee Harvey Oswald]]; its pages, 7821 to 8071, indicate that it was volume 57 of the Commission's transcripts.[^51] Rankin's files, donated to the JFK Collection, include memoranda and handwritten changes to draft chapters of the report that Ford, McCloy and Dulles, among others, recommended.[^52]
|
||||
[[Lyndon B. Johnson]] created the Commission by [[Executive Order 11130]] of November 29, 1963, and selected from private life two lawyers, Allen Dulles, former Director of Central Intelligence, and McCloy; Chief Justice [[Earl Warren]], Senators [[Richard B. Russell]] and [[John Sherman Cooper]], and Representatives [[Hale Boggs]] and [[Gerald R. Ford]] completed its membership. Its first meeting was on December 5, 1963.[^51] A transcript titled "Report of Meeting of Members of Staff," dated July 9, 1964, records a meeting attended by General Counsel [[J. Lee Rankin]], staff, McCloy and Dulles, at which Drs. [[Dale C. Cameron]], [[Howard P. Rome]] and [[David A. Rothstein]] gave "an informal colloquy, interrogation, and explanation" on a psychiatric interpretation of [[Lee Harvey Oswald]]; its pages, 7821 to 8071, indicate that it was volume 57 of the Commission's transcripts.[^52] Rankin's files, donated to the JFK Collection, include memoranda and handwritten changes to draft chapters of the report that Ford, McCloy and Dulles, among others, recommended.[^53]
|
||||
|
||||
Among the papers of Director McCone, the [[Assassination Records Review Board]] found a notation for a meeting of May 19, 1964, participants "DCI, J.J. McCloy," a dinner at the Director's residence, "Re: Oswald," annotated "Destroyed 1-28-72"; CIA historians had found the document missing when they reviewed the files in 1986, along with a record of a November 26, 1963 meeting between McCone and [[McGeorge Bundy]] on the assassination. The Board designated the notations as assassination records.[^53]
|
||||
Among the papers of Director McCone, the [[Assassination Records Review Board]] found a notation for a meeting of May 19, 1964, participants "DCI, J.J. McCloy," a dinner at the Director's residence, "Re: Oswald," annotated "Destroyed 1-28-72"; CIA historians had found the document missing when they reviewed the files in 1986, along with a record of a November 26, 1963 meeting between McCone and [[McGeorge Bundy]] on the assassination. The Board designated the notations as assassination records.[^54]
|
||||
|
||||
### Disarmament and the Cuban Missile Crisis
|
||||
|
||||
On January 27, 1961, Kennedy designated McCloy his adviser on disarmament and arms control, including the nuclear test ban, with offices in the [[White House]] and the State Department. On February 7, 1961, Dulles answered a McCloy letter on the test ban by naming [[Herbert Scoville]], the CIA's Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence, as the Agency's point of contact.[^54] In July 1961 McCloy and [[Valerian Zorin]] conducted bilateral disarmament talks in Moscow; McCloy reported "little point in continuing while Zorin talks about plans and I talk about principles."[^55] McCloy chaired the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament from 1961 to 1974, and the committee's sessions drew briefings from CIA officers including [[Arthur Lundahl]] of the National Photographic Interpretation Center and [[David Brandwein]], chairman of the Guided Missile Committee; in November 1969 he asked Director [[Richard Helms]] for a CIA specialist on Chinese strategic questions, noting that the content of the committee's discussions "is classified and should not be revealed beyond the Committee."[^40]
|
||||
On January 27, 1961, Kennedy designated McCloy his adviser on disarmament and arms control, including the nuclear test ban, with offices in the [[White House]] and the State Department. On February 7, 1961, Dulles answered a McCloy letter on the test ban by naming [[Herbert Scoville]], the CIA's Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence, as the Agency's point of contact.[^55] In July 1961 McCloy and [[Valerian Zorin]] conducted bilateral disarmament talks in Moscow; McCloy reported "little point in continuing while Zorin talks about plans and I talk about principles."[^56] McCloy chaired the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament from 1961 to 1974, and the committee's sessions drew briefings from CIA officers including [[Arthur Lundahl]] of the National Photographic Interpretation Center and [[David Brandwein]], chairman of the Guided Missile Committee; in November 1969 he asked Director [[Richard Helms]] for a CIA specialist on Chinese strategic questions, noting that the content of the committee's discussions "is classified and should not be revealed beyond the Committee."[^41]
|
||||
|
||||
In the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] McCloy chaired the Coordinating Committee and negotiated with the Soviet representative [[Vasily Kuznetsov]] in New York. On October 26, 1962, he joined [[Adlai Stevenson]] in talks with the [[United Nations]] Secretary-General and his aides on inspection and the removal of the missiles and IL-28 aircraft. A draft United States declaration headed "McCloy draft" and dated November 21, 1962 conditioned an assurance against invading Cuba on the withdrawal of offensive weapons. On January 2 and 3, 1963, McCloy and Kuznetsov negotiated the joint letter withdrawing the matter from the Security Council.[^56]
|
||||
In the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] McCloy chaired the Coordinating Committee and negotiated with the Soviet representative [[Vasily Kuznetsov]] in New York. On October 26, 1962, he joined [[Adlai Stevenson]] in talks with the [[United Nations]] Secretary-General and his aides on inspection and the removal of the missiles and IL-28 aircraft. A draft United States declaration headed "McCloy draft" and dated November 21, 1962 conditioned an assurance against invading Cuba on the withdrawal of offensive weapons. On January 2 and 3, 1963, McCloy and Kuznetsov negotiated the joint letter withdrawing the matter from the Security Council.[^57]
|
||||
|
||||
### Iran
|
||||
|
||||
From 1979 to 1981 McCloy was a member of a "Special Project Team" working to gain asylum in the United States for the deposed [[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi|Shah of Iran]]; the team was headed by David Rockefeller, then chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank, and included Kissinger and Chase vice president [[Joseph Verner Reed Jr.]] The team lobbied the President and the Secretary of State for the Shah's admission; he was admitted in October 1979 for cancer treatment, which was followed by the November 1979 seizure of the United States embassy in Tehran. Rockefeller in particular "was accused of helping the Shah out of self-interest, because of the millions of dollars of Iranian loans and assets held by the Chase Manhattan Bank."[^57]
|
||||
From 1979 to 1981 McCloy was a member of a "Special Project Team" working to gain asylum in the United States for the deposed [[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi|Shah of Iran]]; the team was headed by David Rockefeller, then chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank, and included Kissinger and Chase vice president [[Joseph Verner Reed Jr.]] The team lobbied the President and the Secretary of State for the Shah's admission; he was admitted in October 1979 for cancer treatment, which was followed by the November 1979 seizure of the United States embassy in Tehran. Rockefeller in particular "was accused of helping the Shah out of self-interest, because of the millions of dollars of Iranian loans and assets held by the Chase Manhattan Bank."[^58]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Papers
|
||||
|
||||
McCloy gave his papers to Amherst College, where he was a trustee from 1947 to 1989, by a deed of gift in July 1985. Before their transfer, "roughly half of the papers underwent a national security review by the Department of State"; the bulk arrived in May 1986, "with several batches sent later following clearance by the relevant government agency," and a second installment received in June 1990, after his death, was reviewed by the State Department and legal counsel. The collection holds only photocopies of his War Department diaries; the originals are at the [[National Archives and Records Administration]]. Names or other details were removed from some entries to protect the privacy of individuals, and "there are a few places where information was removed from the original by an unknown party prior to the diaries' transfer to Amherst College."[^58]
|
||||
McCloy gave his papers to Amherst College, where he was a trustee from 1947 to 1989, by a deed of gift in July 1985. Before their transfer, "roughly half of the papers underwent a national security review by the Department of State"; the bulk arrived in May 1986, "with several batches sent later following clearance by the relevant government agency," and a second installment received in June 1990, after his death, was reviewed by the State Department and legal counsel. The collection holds only photocopies of his War Department diaries; the originals are at the [[National Archives and Records Administration]]. Names or other details were removed from some entries to protect the privacy of individuals, and "there are a few places where information was removed from the original by an unknown party prior to the diaries' transfer to Amherst College."[^59]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -298,36 +299,37 @@ McCloy gave his papers to Amherst College, where he was a trustee from 1947 to 1
|
|||
[^23]: John J. McCloy, Council on Foreign Relations, to Allen W. Dulles, April 29, 1953, CIA-RDP80R01731R001200020045-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r001200020045-2
|
||||
[^24]: Langenkamp, Rockefeller Archive Center Research Reports (2021), notes 50 (Stone to McCloy, February 25, 1954, cited by Volker Berghahn), 56 (Price memorandum of May 21, 1954; Price oral history, June 22, 1972, p. 70; McCloy interview in Bird, *The Chairman*, p. 427) and 57 (John B. Howard oral history; Henry T. Heald oral history). https://rockarch.issuelab.org/resources/38323/38323.pdf
|
||||
[^25]: Langenkamp, Rockefeller Archive Center Research Reports (2021), abstract, text at notes 58 and 59, and conclusion. https://rockarch.issuelab.org/resources/38323/38323.pdf
|
||||
[^26]: Amherst finding aid MA.00035, Series 2, sub-series F and G (Chase Manhattan Bank appointment records and telephone logs) and Series 1 (retirement from Chase Manhattan, 1960 Mar). https://www.amherst.edu/media/view/393545/original/McCloy%2BPapers.pdf
|
||||
[^27]: Marshall S. Carter, Lieutenant General, USA, to John J. McCloy, April 20, 1962, CIA-RDP80B01676R001300050094-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80b01676r001300050094-2
|
||||
[^28]: Amherst finding aid MA.00035, Series 20: International Oil, 1946-1981, scope note and sub-series B, C and E. https://www.amherst.edu/media/view/393545/original/McCloy%2BPapers.pdf
|
||||
[^29]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, *Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, report together with individual views, 93d Cong., 2d sess., committee print, January 2, 1975, pp. 126 to 127. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CPRT-93SPRT77795O
|
||||
[^30]: *Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, pp. 13 and 92 to 93 (McCloy to Rusk, January 11, 1967, Multinational Corporations hearings, Part 9). https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CPRT-93SPRT77795O
|
||||
[^31]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVI, *Energy Crisis, 1969-1974*, Document 21, note 6, and Document 24 (Kissinger to Nixon, December 8, 1969) and note 5. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v36/pdf/frus1969-76v36.pdf
|
||||
[^32]: *Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, p. 125. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CPRT-93SPRT77795O
|
||||
[^33]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVI, Document 57 (memorandum for the files by Peter Flanigan, September 29, 1970), pp. 130 to 131. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v36/pdf/frus1969-76v36.pdf
|
||||
[^34]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVI, Document 66 (telegram 3565 from the Department of State, January 8, 1971), pp. 167 to 168; *Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, pp. 127 to 129. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v36/pdf/frus1969-76v36.pdf ; https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CPRT-93SPRT77795O
|
||||
[^35]: *Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, pp. 129 to 133. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CPRT-93SPRT77795O
|
||||
[^36]: *Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, p. 17. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CPRT-93SPRT77795O
|
||||
[^37]: *Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, pp. 134 to 135. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CPRT-93SPRT77795O
|
||||
[^38]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVI, Document 104 (memorandum of conversation, Washington, January 3, 1972) and note 2, pp. 246 to 247. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v36/pdf/frus1969-76v36.pdf
|
||||
[^39]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVI, Document 173 (editorial note), pp. 438 to 440. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v36/pdf/frus1969-76v36.pdf
|
||||
[^40]: General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament letterheads and correspondence: McCloy to Arthur Lundahl, June 5, 1970, CIA-RDP78B05703A000400090083-2, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp78b05703a000400090083-2 ; McCloy to David S. Brandwein, March 26, 1971, CIA-RDP81R00560R000100110004-6, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp81r00560r000100110004-6 ; McCloy to Richard Helms, May 28, 1971, CIA-RDP74B00681R000100160009-6, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp74b00681r000100160009-6 ; McCloy to Richard Helms, November 10, 1969, CIA-RDP80B01495R000100010004-9, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80b01495r000100010004-9
|
||||
[^41]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVI, Document 201 (memorandum from John Knubel to Kissinger, September 5, 1973), pp. 548 to 549. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v36/pdf/frus1969-76v36.pdf
|
||||
[^42]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVI, Document 212 (memorandum by the chairmen of Exxon, Mobil, Texaco and Standard Oil of California, New York, October 12, 1973) and note 1. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v36/pdf/frus1969-76v36.pdf
|
||||
[^43]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVI, Document 243 (memorandum of conversation, November 20, 1973, 5 p.m.) and note 8, pp. 684 to 690; Document 311 (Kissinger and David Rockefeller, February 8, 1974), note 3. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v36/pdf/frus1969-76v36.pdf
|
||||
[^44]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVI, Document 345 (memorandum of conversation, March 29, 1974, 5:15 p.m.), pp. 954 to 977. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v36/pdf/frus1969-76v36.pdf
|
||||
[^45]: *Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, pp. 14, 127 and 169. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CPRT-93SPRT77795O
|
||||
[^46]: Amherst finding aid MA.00035, Series 20: International Oil, sub-series B, I (Critchfield Reports, 1968-1973, Reports 1 to 65) and K (Oil Company Annual Reports, 1964-1966). https://www.amherst.edu/media/view/393545/original/McCloy%2BPapers.pdf
|
||||
[^47]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. XXXI, *South and Central America; Mexico*, Document 183 (telegram 1761 from the Embassy in Brazil, Rio de Janeiro, February 21, 1964), paragraph 8 and note 10, pp. 402 to 403. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1964-68v31/pdf/frus1964-68v31.pdf
|
||||
[^48]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. XXXI, Document 210 (transcript of telephone conversation between Director of Central Intelligence McCone and John J. McCloy, April 9, 1964, 11:10 a.m.; source: CIA, Job 80-B01285A, DCI (McCone) Files, Telephone Calls, Eyes Only), p. 461, and Document 211 (telegram 2235 from Rio de Janeiro, April 10, 1964), note 2. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1964-68v31/pdf/frus1964-68v31.pdf
|
||||
[^49]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. XXXI, Document 214 (telegram 2790 from Rio de Janeiro, June 10, 1964). https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1964-68v31/pdf/frus1964-68v31.pdf
|
||||
[^50]: *Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy*, Foreword, p. ix, National Archives. https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/warren-commission-report/foreword
|
||||
[^51]: National Archives, "Inventory of the Warren Commission's Records," Entry 46 ("Report of Meeting of Members of Staff," July 9, 1964, National Archives Identifier 607521). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/warren-commission-report/inventory
|
||||
[^52]: Assassination Records Review Board, *Final Report* (September 1998), chapter 6, "J. Lee Rankin: Warren Commission Papers." https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/review-board/report/arrb-final-report.txt
|
||||
[^53]: Assassination Records Review Board, *Final Report* (September 1998), chapter 6, "John McCone." https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/review-board/report/arrb-final-report.txt
|
||||
[^54]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. VII, *Arms Control and Disarmament*, Document 2 (Kennedy to McCloy, January 27, 1961) and note 1, https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1961-63v07/ebook/frus1961-63v07.epub ; Allen W. Dulles to John J. McCloy, February 7, 1961, CIA-RDP80B01676R000800050039-9, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80b01676r000800050039-9
|
||||
[^55]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. VII, Document 41 (editorial note). https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1961-63v07/ebook/frus1961-63v07.epub
|
||||
[^56]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. XI, *Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath*, Documents 86 (telegram 1484 from the Mission to the United Nations, October 26, 1962) and 263 (editorial note), https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1961-63v11/ebook/frus1961-63v11.epub ; "McCloy Draft," 11/21/62, CIA-RDP80B01676R001900100035-5, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80b01676r001900100035-5
|
||||
[^57]: Amherst finding aid MA.00035, Series 28: Shah of Iran, 1979-1981, scope note. https://www.amherst.edu/media/view/393545/original/McCloy%2BPapers.pdf
|
||||
[^58]: Amherst finding aid MA.00035, "History of the Collection," "Processing Information" and Series 2: Diaries and Communication Logs, notes. https://www.amherst.edu/media/view/393545/original/McCloy%2BPapers.pdf
|
||||
[^26]: Ford Foundation, "Annual Report 1965" (fiscal year ended September 30, 1965), opening review by the president, on the retirement of John J. McCloy as chairman effective December 31, 1965 ("as a member of the Board since 1953 and as chairman since 1959") and the election of Julius A. Stratton as chairman. https://www.fordfoundation.org/media/2435/1965-annual-report.pdf
|
||||
[^27]: Amherst finding aid MA.00035, Series 2, sub-series F and G (Chase Manhattan Bank appointment records and telephone logs) and Series 1 (retirement from Chase Manhattan, 1960 Mar). https://www.amherst.edu/media/view/393545/original/McCloy%2BPapers.pdf
|
||||
[^28]: Marshall S. Carter, Lieutenant General, USA, to John J. McCloy, April 20, 1962, CIA-RDP80B01676R001300050094-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80b01676r001300050094-2
|
||||
[^29]: Amherst finding aid MA.00035, Series 20: International Oil, 1946-1981, scope note and sub-series B, C and E. https://www.amherst.edu/media/view/393545/original/McCloy%2BPapers.pdf
|
||||
[^30]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, *Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, report together with individual views, 93d Cong., 2d sess., committee print, January 2, 1975, pp. 126 to 127. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CPRT-93SPRT77795O
|
||||
[^31]: *Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, pp. 13 and 92 to 93 (McCloy to Rusk, January 11, 1967, Multinational Corporations hearings, Part 9). https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CPRT-93SPRT77795O
|
||||
[^32]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVI, *Energy Crisis, 1969-1974*, Document 21, note 6, and Document 24 (Kissinger to Nixon, December 8, 1969) and note 5. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v36/pdf/frus1969-76v36.pdf
|
||||
[^33]: *Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, p. 125. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CPRT-93SPRT77795O
|
||||
[^34]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVI, Document 57 (memorandum for the files by Peter Flanigan, September 29, 1970), pp. 130 to 131. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v36/pdf/frus1969-76v36.pdf
|
||||
[^35]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVI, Document 66 (telegram 3565 from the Department of State, January 8, 1971), pp. 167 to 168; *Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, pp. 127 to 129. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v36/pdf/frus1969-76v36.pdf ; https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CPRT-93SPRT77795O
|
||||
[^36]: *Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, pp. 129 to 133. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CPRT-93SPRT77795O
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[^37]: *Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, p. 17. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CPRT-93SPRT77795O
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[^38]: *Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, pp. 134 to 135. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CPRT-93SPRT77795O
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[^39]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVI, Document 104 (memorandum of conversation, Washington, January 3, 1972) and note 2, pp. 246 to 247. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v36/pdf/frus1969-76v36.pdf
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[^40]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVI, Document 173 (editorial note), pp. 438 to 440. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v36/pdf/frus1969-76v36.pdf
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[^41]: General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament letterheads and correspondence: McCloy to Arthur Lundahl, June 5, 1970, CIA-RDP78B05703A000400090083-2, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp78b05703a000400090083-2 ; McCloy to David S. Brandwein, March 26, 1971, CIA-RDP81R00560R000100110004-6, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp81r00560r000100110004-6 ; McCloy to Richard Helms, May 28, 1971, CIA-RDP74B00681R000100160009-6, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp74b00681r000100160009-6 ; McCloy to Richard Helms, November 10, 1969, CIA-RDP80B01495R000100010004-9, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80b01495r000100010004-9
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[^42]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVI, Document 201 (memorandum from John Knubel to Kissinger, September 5, 1973), pp. 548 to 549. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v36/pdf/frus1969-76v36.pdf
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[^43]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVI, Document 212 (memorandum by the chairmen of Exxon, Mobil, Texaco and Standard Oil of California, New York, October 12, 1973) and note 1. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v36/pdf/frus1969-76v36.pdf
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[^44]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVI, Document 243 (memorandum of conversation, November 20, 1973, 5 p.m.) and note 8, pp. 684 to 690; Document 311 (Kissinger and David Rockefeller, February 8, 1974), note 3. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v36/pdf/frus1969-76v36.pdf
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[^45]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXVI, Document 345 (memorandum of conversation, March 29, 1974, 5:15 p.m.), pp. 954 to 977. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v36/pdf/frus1969-76v36.pdf
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[^46]: *Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, pp. 14, 127 and 169. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CPRT-93SPRT77795O
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[^47]: Amherst finding aid MA.00035, Series 20: International Oil, sub-series B, I (Critchfield Reports, 1968-1973, Reports 1 to 65) and K (Oil Company Annual Reports, 1964-1966). https://www.amherst.edu/media/view/393545/original/McCloy%2BPapers.pdf
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[^48]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. XXXI, *South and Central America; Mexico*, Document 183 (telegram 1761 from the Embassy in Brazil, Rio de Janeiro, February 21, 1964), paragraph 8 and note 10, pp. 402 to 403. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1964-68v31/pdf/frus1964-68v31.pdf
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[^49]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. XXXI, Document 210 (transcript of telephone conversation between Director of Central Intelligence McCone and John J. McCloy, April 9, 1964, 11:10 a.m.; source: CIA, Job 80-B01285A, DCI (McCone) Files, Telephone Calls, Eyes Only), p. 461, and Document 211 (telegram 2235 from Rio de Janeiro, April 10, 1964), note 2. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1964-68v31/pdf/frus1964-68v31.pdf
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[^50]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. XXXI, Document 214 (telegram 2790 from Rio de Janeiro, June 10, 1964). https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1964-68v31/pdf/frus1964-68v31.pdf
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[^51]: *Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy*, Foreword, p. ix, National Archives. https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/warren-commission-report/foreword
|
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[^52]: National Archives, "Inventory of the Warren Commission's Records," Entry 46 ("Report of Meeting of Members of Staff," July 9, 1964, National Archives Identifier 607521). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/warren-commission-report/inventory
|
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[^53]: Assassination Records Review Board, *Final Report* (September 1998), chapter 6, "J. Lee Rankin: Warren Commission Papers." https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/review-board/report/arrb-final-report.txt
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[^54]: Assassination Records Review Board, *Final Report* (September 1998), chapter 6, "John McCone." https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/review-board/report/arrb-final-report.txt
|
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[^55]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. VII, *Arms Control and Disarmament*, Document 2 (Kennedy to McCloy, January 27, 1961) and note 1, https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1961-63v07/ebook/frus1961-63v07.epub ; Allen W. Dulles to John J. McCloy, February 7, 1961, CIA-RDP80B01676R000800050039-9, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80b01676r000800050039-9
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[^56]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. VII, Document 41 (editorial note). https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1961-63v07/ebook/frus1961-63v07.epub
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[^57]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. XI, *Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath*, Documents 86 (telegram 1484 from the Mission to the United Nations, October 26, 1962) and 263 (editorial note), https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1961-63v11/ebook/frus1961-63v11.epub ; "McCloy Draft," 11/21/62, CIA-RDP80B01676R001900100035-5, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80b01676r001900100035-5
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[^58]: Amherst finding aid MA.00035, Series 28: Shah of Iran, 1979-1981, scope note. https://www.amherst.edu/media/view/393545/original/McCloy%2BPapers.pdf
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[^59]: Amherst finding aid MA.00035, "History of the Collection," "Processing Information" and Series 2: Diaries and Communication Logs, notes. https://www.amherst.edu/media/view/393545/original/McCloy%2BPapers.pdf
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