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20 - ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/INTERNATIONAL/SISMI.md
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@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ The organizational architecture was designed to provide deniable operational cap
### Strategy of Tension Involvement
Gian Adelio Maletti, the head of SID's intelligence division (Ufficio D), was charged with deliberately misdirecting the investigation of the [[Piazza Fontana bombing]] away from the neofascist network by providing false information to investigators. He fled to South Africa in 1981 before his trial and was convicted in absentia. From South Africa he later gave statements acknowledging that SID had possessed information about neofascist responsibility for the Piazza Fontana bombing before it occurred and had not disclosed it.
[[Gian Adelio Maletti]], the head of SID's intelligence division (Ufficio D), was charged with deliberately misdirecting the investigation of the [[Piazza Fontana bombing]] away from the neofascist network by providing false information to investigators. He fled to South Africa in 1981 before his trial and was convicted in absentia. From South Africa he later gave statements acknowledging that SID had possessed information about neofascist responsibility for the Piazza Fontana bombing before it occurred and had not disclosed it.
Following the [[Bologna railway station bombing]] in 1980, former SISMI officer Pietro Musumeci and former SISMI officer Giuseppe Belmonte were convicted of slander and political conspiracy for their roles in planting false evidence intended to deflect the Bologna investigation toward neo-Marxist groups. The conviction established that SISMI had conducted an active disinformation operation against a domestic criminal investigation.[^2]

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20 - ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/USA/CIA Office of Security.md
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@ -30,13 +30,15 @@ In August 1960 [[Richard Bissell]] asked Edwards whether the office had assets f
When Maheu's men were arrested for a wiretap in [[Las Vegas]], Edwards briefed Attorney General [[Robert F. Kennedy|Robert Kennedy]]. "At our request, prosecution was dropped." On May 7, 1962, Edwards and the general counsel, [[Lawrence Houston]], briefed Kennedy on the operation itself. "If you have seen Mr. Kennedy's eyes get steely and his jaw set and his voice get low and precise you get a definite feeling of unhappiness," Houston testified. The inspector general concluded in 1967 that "the Attorney General was not told that the gambling syndicate operation had already been reactivated nor as far as we know was he ever told that CIA had a continuing involvement with U.S. gangster elements."[^1][^2]
In May 1975 the director of security, [[Charles W. Kane]], answered the [[Church Committee]]'s questions from the office's files: the operation "was approved by [[Allen Dulles]], who was DCI at the time"; a memorandum of May 14, 1962, in Roselli's file "reflects that the 'Agency' had authorized $150,000 to accomplish the operation, however, neither the memorandum nor the above files indicate who approved the actual figure"; and an undated, unsigned memorandum in Maheu's file recorded that Varona "had been given $10,000 plus $1,000 worth of communications equipment" before "the 'deal' was called off after the Bay of Pigs." "These files contain only one reference to any actual expenditure of funds in connection with the Castro operation."[^3]
### Nosenko
The [[KGB]] defector Yuri Nosenko was held from August 13, 1965, to October 27, 1967, in a specially built cell, "literally confined in a room with nothing but a cot in it." The compilation records that "this Office together with the Office of General Counsel became increasingly concerned with the illegality of the Agency's position." On the second date he was transferred to the Office of Security under Admiral [[Rufus Taylor]], the deputy director, moved to a safehouse, "and was interviewed under friendly, sympathetic conditions by his Security Case Officer, Mr. [[Bruce Solie]], for more than a year. It soon became apparent that Nosenko was bona fide." The paper called him "the most valuable and economical defector this Agency has ever had."[^1]
### Mail, Dissidents, and Reporters
"Since 1953, this office has operated a mail intercept program of incoming and outgoing Russian mail" at [[John F. Kennedy International Airport|Kennedy Airport]] in [[New York City|New York]], [[SRPOINTER]], which "included not only the photographing of envelopes but also surreptitious opening and photographing of selected items of mail. The bulk of the take involved matters of internal security interest which was disseminated to the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]]." Of the agency's New York mail-opening project, [[HTLINGUAL]], which [[James Jesus Angleton]] defended as "foreign surveillance," Osborn testified in 1975: "We got no benefit from it at all. The product was worthless." At a meeting on May 19, 1971, [[Thomas Karamessines]] argued that "any flap would cause the CIA the worst possible publicity," and Osborn "stated that he thought the operation served mainly a Bureau requirement." [[Richard Helms]] continued it.[^1][^3]
"Since 1953, this office has operated a mail intercept program of incoming and outgoing Russian mail" at [[John F. Kennedy International Airport|Kennedy Airport]] in [[New York City|New York]], [[SRPOINTER]], which "included not only the photographing of envelopes but also surreptitious opening and photographing of selected items of mail. The bulk of the take involved matters of internal security interest which was disseminated to the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]]." Of the agency's New York mail-opening project, [[HTLINGUAL]], which [[James Jesus Angleton]] defended as "foreign surveillance," Osborn testified in 1975: "We got no benefit from it at all. The product was worthless." At a meeting on May 19, 1971, [[Thomas Karamessines]] argued that "any flap would cause the CIA the worst possible publicity," and Osborn "stated that he thought the operation served mainly a Bureau requirement." [[Richard Helms]] continued it.[^1][^4]
From February 1967 to November 1971 an Office of Security proprietary, [[Project MERRIMAC]], "recruited and handled several Agents for the purpose of covertly monitoring dissident groups in the Washington area considered to be potential threats to Agency personnel and installations. One of these Agents so successfully penetrated one dissident group that she was turned over to the FBI for handling." The office gave equipment and training to the police of [[Fairfax County, Virginia|Fairfax]] and [[Arlington County, Virginia|Arlington]] counties and to the intelligence division of the [[Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia|Metropolitan Police Department]].[^1]
@ -44,11 +46,12 @@ From February 1967 to November 1971 an Office of Security proprietary, [[Project
### Private Security Firms
In November 1967 Harvey, leaving the agency for a law practice, asked the bureau's liaison, [[Sam Papich]], for reputable private investigators. Osborn recorded that Papich suggested the [[Wackenhut Corporation]] or the [[Fidelifax]] company. In July 1978 Solie certified that the staff of the [[House Select Committee on Assassinations]] had reviewed the office's Wackenhut file.[^4]
In November 1967 Harvey, leaving the agency for a law practice, asked the bureau's liaison, [[Sam Papich]], for reputable private investigators. Osborn recorded that Papich suggested the [[Wackenhut Corporation]] or the [[Fidelifax]] company. In July 1978 Solie certified that the staff of the [[House Select Committee on Assassinations]] had reviewed the office's Wackenhut file.[^5]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Family Jewels," memorandum of Howard J. Osborn, Director of Security, to the Executive Secretary, CIA Management Committee, May 16, 1973, with attachments, pp. 00002-00006, 00012-00014, 00023, 00026-00030, 00448. Released June 25, 2007.
[^2]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report*. S. Rept. 94-465, 1975, pp. 133-134.
[^3]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. *Final Report, Book III*. S. Rept. 94-755, 1976, pp. 579, 600-602.
[^4]: Osborn, Howard J. Memorandum for the record, November 8, 1967, JFK record 104-10133-10076; Solie, Bruce L. Memorandum, July 18, 1978, JFK record 104-10130-10450. National Archives, JFK Assassination Records Collection.
[^3]: Kane, Charles W., Director of Security. Memorandum for the Inspector General, "Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Operations, Request," May 22, 1975, JFK record 104-10106-10619.
[^4]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. *Final Report, Book III*. S. Rept. 94-755, 1976, pp. 579, 600-602.
[^5]: Osborn, Howard J. Memorandum for the record, November 8, 1967, JFK record 104-10133-10076; Solie, Bruce L. Memorandum, July 18, 1978, JFK record 104-10130-10450. National Archives, JFK Assassination Records Collection.