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10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Richard Babayan.md
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@ -1,30 +1,89 @@
---
aliases:
- Richard Babayan
- Babayan
category: "Arms Dealers & Brokers"
tags:
- Person
- CIA
- PROMIS
- Inslaw
- OctoberSurprise
- IranArms
- Arms
summary: "Richard Babayan was a CIA contract operative and arms broker who received a reported $6 million from Earl Brian on behalf of Hadron, Inc. and who appeared in overlapping accounts of the PROMIS software scandal and Robert Maxwell's Australian operations."
summary: "Richard Babayan is an Iranian national, arms broker and INSLAW affiant whose 1992 testimony on 1980 meetings between William Casey and Iranian officials the House October Surprise Task Force rejected."
created: 2026-05-14
updated: 2026-09-22
updated: 2026-10-07
location: "Florida"
relations:
- type: investigated
with: "[[October Surprise Task Force]]"
start: 1992
end: 1993
role: "deposed witness whose Madrid and Zurich testimony the task force rejected"
reverse: true
fn: 2
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Inslaw]]"
start: 1991
role: "affiant in INSLAW's 1991 bankruptcy court discovery filing (Exhibit 3: PROMIS acquisitions by Libya, Iraq and South Korea)"
fn: 11
---
Richard Babayan was a former arms broker and [[Central Intelligence Agency]] contract operative whose name appears across several of the major scandals investigated in the 1980s and early 1990s.
Richard Babayan is a former arms broker whom the journalist [[Ryan Gallagher]] described in 2011 as a [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] "contract operative."[^1] He was an [[Iran|Iranian]] national who testified in 1992 that he had been told of 1980 meetings between [[William Casey]] and Iranian officials, and the [[October Surprise Task Force]] of the [[House of Representatives]] rejected that testimony.[^2] His name also appears in the [[Inslaw]] litigation over the [[PROMIS]] software and in the accounts of [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] concerning arms and software sales.
### Hadron and PROMIS
### October Surprise testimony
Babayan was identified as a recipient of financial transfers from [[Earl Brian]], head of the government consultancy firm [[Hadron]], Inc. According to accounts assembled by researchers into the [[PROMIS]] scandal, Brian acted on behalf of Hadron - described as a CIA proprietary or cutout - in distributing a modified version of the PROMIS case-management software to foreign governments. Babayan reportedly received a check for approximately $6 million from Brian, an amount investigators connected to the commercialization of the PROMIS program.[^1]
The task force met with Babayan among the living proponents of the allegations, and [[Craig Unger]]'s October 1991 article drew on interviews with him. [^3] In depositions dated September 18 and 19, 1992, Babayan testified that [[Mohsen Baranriz]], whom he identified as an Iranian intelligence official, visited him in [[Paris]] in early August 1980 and told him of meetings that had just concluded in [[Madrid]] at the end of July 1980 involving Casey and Iranian officials. [^4] Babayan said he knew in advance that Baranriz was traveling to Europe for meetings, although he "did not know the nature of these meetings." According to Babayan, Baranriz said that Casey told the Iranians the incoming Reagan administration would resume United States arms shipments to Iran in return for delaying the release of the hostages. Baranriz telephoned him three or four days after leaving Paris to report a second set of meetings involving Casey. [^4] Babayan also testified that he had knowledge that [[Mehdi Karrubi]] and Hassan Karrubi were members of the Iranian delegation to Madrid, and that Baranriz told him he had come to Paris "to brief us on what he had seen" and then had to fly straight back to Madrid for further meetings in August 1980. [^4]
Babayan later stated that Brian played a central role in marketing PROMIS to the governments of Iraq, Libya, and Korea.[^1]
Babayan also testified under oath that he was aware of a September 1980 meeting at the [[Hotel Baur au Lac]] in [[Zurich]], [[Switzerland]], between Iranians and Americans. He named Baranriz, [[Sadegh Tabatabai]] and a "close person to [[Ruhollah Khomeini|Khomeini]]," whom he declined to name, as attending for Iran. He could not identify the Americans present, whom he said had expertise in military material because the meeting concerned Iran's need for spare parts. The task force located Tabatabai, who denied any knowledge of such a meeting, and found "no factual basis" for Babayan's allegations. [^5]
The report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General (March 1993) stated that there was no credible evidence that Hadron had tried to acquire Inslaw or PROMIS, apart from claims by William Hamilton, and declined to pursue Ari Ben-Menashe's allegations of foreign distribution.[^2]
Unger reported in [[Esquire]] in October 1991 that Babayan, whom Unger described as an Iranian who began working for the CIA in the 1970s, knew that an agreement had been reached among the parties to ship United States-made weapons to Iran. The task force states that Unger relied on Babayan's claims to that effect. [^6]
### Maxwell and Australian Connection
### Task force findings
[[Ari Ben-Menashe]] alleged that in 1987 the flow of funds from PROMIS sales extended to [[Robert Maxwell]]'s Australian business operations. According to Ari Ben-Menashe's account, a contribution to the West Australian Labor Party passed through one of Maxwell's Australian companies and was deposited by the Pergamon Press Trust Fund in Moscow, with Babayan and Earl Brian acting on behalf of Hadron in facilitating the transaction.[^3]
The task force found that the only affirmative evidence for the alleged Madrid meetings was hotel records and the testimony of Ben-Menashe and Babayan. Of five people alleged to have independent knowledge of the Madrid meetings, three, [[Ahmed Madani]], [[Arif Durrani]] and [[Heinrich Rupp]], testified under oath that they had no knowledge of them. The task force found the testimony of Babayan and Ben-Menashe "wholly lacking of any credibility," and concluded that there was "wholly insufficient credible evidence of any communications by or on behalf of the [[Ronald Reagan|Reagan]] Presidential campaign with any persons representing or connected with the Iranian government or with those holding American hostages during 1979-1981." [^7]
The task force gave three reasons for finding Babayan not credible. First, no one other than Babayan had named Baranriz in connection with the Madrid meetings, he declined to name other participants or to identify his sources for later Zurich meetings, and the task force found that his testimony about Casey's presence in Madrid was discredited by evidence that Casey was in the United States during the relevant period. Second, Babayan said he had been associated with a CIA "front company" in Switzerland called "Diwan," operated by an alleged CIA asset named "M.K. Moss." The task force determined that neither Babayan nor Moss had ever worked for the CIA, directly or indirectly. Babayan testified that he did not know who Casey was when Baranriz named him, and recognized him only when Moss, his "CIA contact" in Switzerland, showed him a large photograph; on seeing it, he testified, he remembered having seen Casey in Paris several weeks earlier, in June, walking with [[Albert Jobs]]. The task force recorded that when asked whether the Paris sighting could have taken place in July 1980, Babayan "maintained his position that it had occurred in July." The task force believed he was trying to "bootstrap" onto published reports of a trip by Casey, Jobs and [[Richard Allen]] to France and England in early July 1980. The task force also recorded that Babayan could not say where in Madrid the meetings took place, testifying that Baranriz "may have told me but I don't remember," and that, except for Casey, Baranriz gave him no names of other participants at the Madrid meetings. Third, the task force received reliable information from law enforcement that Babayan "has an extensive criminal record, including a history of engaging in criminally fraudulent behavior." [^8]
The [[Senate Foreign Relations Committee|Senate Foreign Relations]] subcommittee ran a parallel inquiry. Its special counsel, [[Reid Weingarten]], released a 156-page report on November 23, 1992, which he described as his preliminary conclusions. It found the evidence insufficient to support the allegation of a secret Reagan-Bush deal with Iran, found that the prime sources had proven wholly unreliable, and found that Casey had been intensely involved in the hostage crisis. [^9]
### Prosecutions
The task force described Babayan as "an Iranian national presently in jail in [[Florida]] on securities fraud charges" at the time of his September 1992 testimony. [^2] A letter of October 27, 1992, from [[Terry O'Connor]], inspector in charge of the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]], to Representative [[Lee Hamilton]] forwarded a criminal record check that the task force summarized as evidencing arrests in Florida for crimes "ranging from insufficient funds to grand larceny, racketeering, securities fraud, and misrepresentation to acquire narcotics." [^10]
The INSLAW filing discussed below described Babayan as "currently awaiting trial in [[Palm Beach]], Florida, state court on criminal charges." It stated, on information and belief, that he had worked on behalf of the [[Department of Justice]] in a "sting" operation against local politicians in [[Miami]] during the 1980s. [^11]
### INSLAW and PROMIS
Babayan entered the INSLAW litigation as an affiant. The Third Supplemental Submission described him as "an Iranian arms dealer" and, in its account of his affidavit (its Exhibit 3), stated that he recounted information about the alleged acquisition and implementation of PROMIS by the governments of Libya, Iraq and South Korea; about the alleged involvement of [[Earl Brian]] in at least the Iraqi and South Korean acquisitions; about the alleged involvement in the Iraqi acquisition of former United States general [[Richard Secord]]; and about an alleged meeting between Brian and [[Robert Gates]] in [[Santiago]], Chile. INSLAW stated, on information and belief, that Gates was then Deputy National Security Advisor and had been Acting Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1988, when the meeting with Brian was alleged to have occurred. [^11] INSLAW's Third Supplemental Submission in Support of Its Motion to Take Limited Discovery, filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia (Case No. 85-00070, Adversary Proceeding No. 86-0069), stated that a telefaxed copy of a notarized Babayan affidavit was then available to counsel, and that the original would be filed when received from Babayan's counsel. [^11] The same submission refers to a claim made in February 1991 by [[Michael Riconosciuto]]. [^11]
The special counsel's report of [[Nicholas J. Bua]] to the Attorney General, dated March 1993, addressed the claims about Brian and [[Hadron]]. It concluded: "In short, there is no credible evidence that Hadron ever tried to acquire Inslaw or PROMIS, except for [[William Hamilton|Hamilton]]'s claim about his conversation with [[Dominic Laiti]] and his claims that [[Ben Cnaan]] told him about a meeting with a businessman with 'ties at the highest level of the Reagan Administration' ..." [^12]
On the claimed international distribution of PROMIS, the Bua report stated that its investigation "has not proceeded past the preliminary stages. We do not believe that it needs to." It added: "We were not disposed to conduct an international search of foreign governments and intelligence operatives on the basis of Ben-Menashe's allegations." [^12]
The Bua report describes two affidavits by Ben-Menashe, dated February 17, 1991 and March 21, 1991, in which he implicated Brian in the international distribution of PROMIS. In the first, Ben-Menashe said Brian stated at a meeting that he owned the rights to PROMIS and had allowed the CIA, the [[National Security Agency|NSA]], the Justice Department and the "Israeli intelligence communities" to use it since 1982, and that in 1987 Brian consummated a sale of PROMIS to the [[Israel|Israeli]] government "for internal use as well." Ben-Menashe also claimed that in 1989, in [[Chile]], [[Carlos Cardoen]] told him that Cardoen had brokered a sale of PROMIS by Brian to a representative of [[Iraqi Military Intelligence]]. [^12] The Bua report states that by 1991, apparently on information supplied by Riconosciuto, Inslaw had adopted the claim that Brian was "given" the right to sell the software. [^12]
According to Gallagher, Babayan said that Brian was instrumental in selling PROMIS to the governments of [[Iraq]], [[Libya]] and [[South Korea|Korea]]. [^1]
The Justice Department release of September 27, 1994, reported that it found no credible evidence that Department officials conspired to steal INSLAW's software, rejected the claim that the company was owed further government payments, concurred with the [[Martinsburg, West Virginia]], police that [[Danny Casolaro]]'s death was a suicide, and recommended that the affair be closed. [^13]
### Maxwell and the Australian contribution
Ben-Menashe alleged that in 1987 the flow of funds from PROMIS sales extended to [[Robert Maxwell]]'s Australian business operations. According to his account, a contribution to the [[West Australian Labor Party]] passed through one of Maxwell's Australian companies and was deposited by the [[Pergamon Press Trust Fund]] in [[Moscow]], with Babayan and Earl Brian acting on behalf of Hadron in facilitating the transaction. [^14]
### Footnotes
[^1]: "Dirtier than Watergate," *New Statesman,* April 2011. https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2011/04/promis-government-inslaw
[^2]: Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc., March 1993, https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
[^3]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network.* TrineDay, 1992.
[^1]: Gallagher, Ryan. "Dirtier than Watergate," *New Statesman*, April 2011. Mirror: https://rjgallagher.co.uk/2011/04/inslaw-case-dirtier-than-watergate.html. Original: https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2011/04/promis-government-inslaw. Sole source for the characterization of Babayan as a former arms broker and CIA contract operative, and for the passage on PROMIS sales to Iraq, Libya and Korea.
[^2]: Joint Report of the Task Force to Investigate Certain Allegations Concerning the Holding of American Hostages by Iran in 1980 ("October Surprise Task Force"), 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, House Calendar No. 634, January 3, 1993, section "(v) Richard Babayan," pp. 76 and 99 (table of contents). https://archive.org/details/6199732-Joint-Report-of-the-October-Surprise-Task-Force
[^3]: Joint Report, introductory section (task force met with Hashemi, Madani, Durrani, Rupp, Ben-Menashe and Babayan) and notes 62 to 66 (Unger, Esquire, October 1991, at 92). https://archive.org/details/6199732-Joint-Report-of-the-October-Surprise-Task-Force
[^4]: Joint Report, section "(v) Richard Babayan," notes 68 to 74, citing the Richard Babayan deposition of September 18 and 19, 1992 (Babayan Dep. at 13 to 16, 25). https://archive.org/details/6199732-Joint-Report-of-the-October-Surprise-Task-Force
[^5]: Joint Report, Zurich section, notes 535 to 538, citing Babayan Dep. at 32 and 33 and the Sadegh Tabatabai interview at 14. https://archive.org/details/6199732-Joint-Report-of-the-October-Surprise-Task-Force
[^6]: Joint Report, notes 62 and 66, citing C. Unger, "October Surprise," *Esquire*, October 1991, at 92. https://archive.org/details/6199732-Joint-Report-of-the-October-Surprise-Task-Force
[^7]: Joint Report, introductory findings on the alleged Madrid meetings. https://archive.org/details/6199732-Joint-Report-of-the-October-Surprise-Task-Force
[^8]: Joint Report, section "(v) Richard Babayan," pp. 99 and following, notes 408 to 415, citing Babayan Dep. at 5, 7, 15 to 18, 27 to 31. https://archive.org/details/6199732-Joint-Report-of-the-October-Surprise-Task-Force
[^9]: Walter Pincus, Washington Post, November 24, 1992, report on the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee special counsel's preliminary conclusions (reprinted by American Cybercasting). https://stuff.mit.edu/afs/net/user/tytso/usenet/americast/wpost/1645
[^10]: Joint Report, note 415, citing letter from Terry O'Connor, inspector in charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Hon. Lee Hamilton, October 27, 1992, and App. at 574 to 580. https://archive.org/details/6199732-Joint-Report-of-the-October-Surprise-Task-Force
[^11]: INSLAW, Inc., Third Supplemental Submission of INSLAW in Support of Its Motion to Take Limited Discovery, United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia, Case No. 85-00070 (Chapter 11), Adversary Proceeding No. 86-0069, undated, footnote on page 7 (affidavit and Palm Beach passage). Refers to February 1991 events. https://archive.org/details/InslawAffairInBriefSupportingDocs. Pages 6 and 7 and footnote 1 on page 7. Sole source for the affidavit summary, the Palm Beach charges and the Miami sting allegation.
[^12]: Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc., March 1993, conclusions on Hadron and international distribution, Ben-Menashe affidavits, and the Michael Riconosciuto section (begins p. 42). https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993
[^13]: "New Report Finds No Credible Basis for INSLAW Case," Department of Justice release, September 27, 1994. https://irp.fas.org/news/1994/940927-555.htm
[^14]: Ari Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network* (TrineDay, 1992). Sole source for the passages so cited.

169
10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Saddam Hussein.md
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@ -5,45 +5,168 @@ tags:
- Person
- Iraq
- CIA
- Ba'ath
summary: "President of Iraq from 1979 to 2003, whose Ba'ath Party took power in a 1963 coup the CIA welcomed, and whose regime received U.S. intelligence during the Iran-Iraq War."
- BaathParty
- IranIraqWar
- BNL
- Cardoen
- IranContra
- Osirak
aliases:
- Saddam Hussein
- Saddam
- Saddam Hussein Abd al-Majid al-Tikriti
- Saddam Husayn
- Saddam Hussein al-Tikriti
- Saddam Hussein Abd al-Majid
summary: "President of Iraq from 1979 to 2003, whose government borrowed billions through the Atlanta branch of the BNL and received American export licenses, credit and intelligence during the Iran-Iraq War."
created: 2026-05-14
updated: 2026-05-14
updated: 2026-10-07
born: 1937-04-28
died: 2006-12-30
location: "Al-Awja, Iraq"
relations:
- type: head_of
with: "[[Iraq]]"
start: 1979-07-16
end: 2003-04-09
role: "President"
fn: 1
- type: member_of
with: "[[Ba'ath Party]]"
start: 1957
fn: 1
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Iran-Iraq War]]"
start: 1980-09-22
end: 1988
fn: 1
- type: relative_of
with: "[[Hussein Kamel]]"
role: "son-in-law"
fn: 17
---
Saddam Hussein Abd al-Majid al-Tikriti was born on April 28, 1937, near the town of Tikrit in central [[Iraq]], the son of a peasant family. He joined the [[Ba'ath Party]] in 1957. On October 7, 1959 Prime Minister [[Abd al-Karim Qassem]] was wounded in the shoulder in an assassination attempt.[^1] The journalist Richard Sale reported in 2003, citing unnamed former U.S. intelligence and diplomatic officials and the writer Adel Darwish, that Saddam Hussein was part of a "CIA-authorized six-man squad" tasked with killing Qasim and was later paid and trained by the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] in Beirut and watched over in Cairo, in [[Egypt]]; the CIA declined to comment, and the historian Bryan Gibson has cited declassified records showing that on October 1, 1959 [[Allen Dulles]] told the National Security Council only that an attempt might be made in the next two months.[^2]
Saddam Hussein Abd al-Majid al-Tikriti was born on April 28, 1937, near the town of [[Tikrit]] in central [[Iraq]], to a landless family, and held the presidency from July 16, 1979 until the [[Iraq War]] of 2003.[^1] He joined the [[Ba'ath Party]] in 1957.[^1]
### CIA and Ba'ath Rise to Power
### The 1959 attempt on Qassim
A Defense Department memorandum of February 8, 1963 quoted White House aide Robert Komer's note to President [[John F. Kennedy]] that the Iraqi coup was "almost certainly a net gain for our side," and the State Department asked on February 9 for authority to recognize the new regime.[^3] Historians disagree about a CIA role in the coup: Brandon Wolfe-Hunnicutt cites "compelling evidence of an American role," while Bryan Gibson concludes the preponderance of evidence shows the CIA was not behind it.[^4] King Hussein of Jordan was reported in September 1963 as saying that a secret radio beamed to Iraq on February 8 supplied the coup plotters with the names and addresses of Communists, and Richard Sale reported in 2003, citing unnamed former U.S. intelligence officials, that the CIA gave Iraqi National Guardsmen lists of suspected communists; the same report quotes a former very senior CIA official as saying the Agency was "absolutely stunned" by the coup, and the CIA declined to comment.[^2][^4]
At a [[National Security Council]] meeting on October 1, 1959, [[Allen Dulles]] said that [[Gamal Abdel Nasser]] "had urged the assassination plotters not to move too fast" and that, although rumors were generally wrong, "it was possible an attempt would be made on Kassem's life in the next two months."[^2] On October 7, 1959 Prime Minister [[Abd al-Karim Qassem]] was wounded in the shoulder in an assassination attempt, and the Director of Intelligence and Research, [[Hugh Cumming]], suggested to Secretary of State [[Christian Herter]] that it might be the beginning of the coup about which the United States had been picking up rumors.[^2] A [[Central Intelligence Agency]] memorandum on the attempt dated October 13, 1959 is printed in the same volume with its text not declassified.[^2]
The Ba'ath Party was ousted from government in the same year and returned to power in a 1968 coup. Saddam served as deputy to President [[Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr]] and was the de facto strongman of the regime through the 1970s. He forced al-Bakr to resign on July 16, 1979, formally assuming the presidency. Within days he convened a party congress at which he personally identified and had arrested dozens of alleged conspirators; hundreds of senior Ba'athists were executed in the following weeks.[^5]
On April 10, 2003 the journalist [[Richard Sale]] reported in [[United Press International]], citing almost a dozen former U.S. diplomats, British scholars and former U.S. intelligence officials, that Saddam Hussein was part of a "CIA-authorized six-man squad" tasked with assassinating Qasim. Sale wrote that a former senior State Department official said Saddam, in his early twenties, was installed in an apartment opposite Qasim's office to observe him, and that the writer [[Adel Darwish]] said the CIA handler was an Iraqi dentist working for the CIA and Egyptian intelligence. According to the report the attempt was "completely botched," Saddam escaped to Tikrit and then crossed into [[Syria]], and was transferred by Egyptian intelligence to [[Beirut]], where "the CIA paid for Saddam's apartment and put him through a brief training course," after which the agency "helped him get to" [[Cairo]], where he was "watched over by CIA and Egyptian intelligence operatives." The report quotes [[Roger Morris]], a former NSC staff member, as saying the CIA chose the Ba'ath Party "as its instrument," and says the CIA veteran [[Miles Copeland]] told UPI in the mid-1980s that the agency had "close ties" with Qasim's ruling Ba'ath Party. The report states that the CIA declined to comment.[^3]
### Iran-Iraq War and Western Support
### The 1963 coup
In September 1980, Saddam launched an invasion of [[Iran]] following the instability created by the [[Iranian Revolution]]. The eight-year [[Iran-Iraq War]] (1980-1988) killed an estimated half million to one million people. A State Department memorandum of October 7, 1983 assumed that the United States was already providing tactical intelligence to Iraq, and on November 29, 1984 Secretary of State [[George Shultz]] told Tariq Aziz that superior intelligence must be an important factor in Iraq's defense.[^6] According to a January 31, 1995 affidavit by former National Security Council staff member Howard Teicher, Director of Central Intelligence [[William Casey]] led efforts to ensure that Iraq received weapons, financial credits, intelligence and strategic military advice.[^6] The administration meanwhile ran the secret arms-for-hostages pipeline to Iran that became the [[Iran-Contra Affair]].
A [[Department of Defense]] memorandum of February 8, 1963 from Stephen O. Fuqua reported that the "consensus of members of State and CIA is that if the coup is successful, relations between the U.S. and Iraq will be considerably improved." A footnote to the memorandum quotes [[Robert W. Komer]]'s note to President [[John F. Kennedy]] of the same date that the Iraqi revolution "is almost certainly a net gain for our side" and that the United States "ought to recognize as soon as we're sure these guys are firmly in the saddle."[^4] On February 9 Secretary of State [[Dean Rusk]] asked Kennedy for contingency authority to recognize the new regime, writing that "it would appear to be in our interest to grant early recognition."[^4]
[[Donald Rumsfeld]] visited Saddam in December 1983 as a special envoy for President [[Ronald Reagan]], cementing the relationship at a moment when U.S. intelligence knew Iraq was using chemical weapons against Iranian forces.[^6] The arms and technology transfers to Iraq during the 1980s, including chemical and biological precursors, were later examined in congressional investigations and linked to the [[BNL scandal]] involving the [[Atlanta]] branch of [[Banca Nazionale del Lavoro]].[^7]
[[Brandon Wolfe-Hunnicutt]] wrote that [[Eric Jacobsen]]'s article in *Diplomatic History* shows that American officials "were indeed in close contact with Iraqi Baathists before, during, and after their 1963 putsch," and that the CIA assisted the Ba'ath in "a systematic purge of Iraqi communists" in the days after February 8; the review quotes [[Peter L. Hahn]] as having written that declassified documents "offer no evidence" of Ba'ath contacts with American officials before the coup.[^5] The historian [[Bryan Gibson]] told [[Rudaw]] in 2015 that "there is enough evidence available today to question whether the US was behind the coup," while stating that U.S. policy from 1958 to 1975 led to "covert operations to support groups inside Iraq that were opposed to Moscow's imperial designs, like the Baath Party in the early 1960s."[^6]
### Arms Procurement Networks
King Hussein of [[Jordan]] told [[Mohamed Hassanein Heikal]], editor of *[[Al-Ahram]]*, in a conversation published on September 27, 1963 that "what happened in Iraq on 8 February had the support of American Intelligence" and that "on 8 February a secret radio beamed to Iraq was supplying the men who pulled the coup with the names and addresses of the Communists there."[^7] The historian [[Hanna Batatu]] wrote that arrests after the coup "were made in accordance with lists prepared beforehand" and that "it cannot be unerringly established where these lists came from or who compiled them"; he gave a Communist reckoning of no fewer than 5,000 killed from February 8 to 10, a figure of 340 Communists from a source in Iraq's Directorate of Security, and about 1,500 from a foreign diplomatic observer.[^7] Sale reported in 2003 that, according to former U.S. intelligence officials, the CIA gave Iraqi National Guardsmen lists of suspected communists who were then "jailed, interrogated, and summarily gunned down." The same report quotes a former very senior CIA official who denied the CIA was behind the coup ("We were absolutely stunned"), and quotes the writer [[Con Coughlin]] as saying that [[James Critchfield]], then a senior CIA Middle East official, regarded the killing of Qasim and the communists "as a great victory."[^3]
Iraq's weapons procurement during the 1980s passed through several networks that intersect with vault subjects. [[Carlos Cardoen]], a Chilean arms manufacturer with CIA connections, supplied cluster bombs to Iraq.[^6] Iraqi procurement agents operated through front companies in Europe, the United States, and the [[United Kingdom]], the exposure of which became known as the [[Arms-to-Iraq affair]] in Britain.[^7]
### The Ba'ath return and the presidency
[[PROMIS]] software was among the products allegedly sold to Iraqi intelligence. [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] and other sources placed Iraq on the list of recipients of the Israeli-distributed, backdoor-equipped version of the software.[^8]
The Ba'athist government of 1963 was overthrown the same year, and a Ba'athist coup in 1968 put [[Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr]] in power. Saddam Hussein replaced al-Bakr as president on July 16, 1979. A few days later he purged party and armed forces members he considered a threat, and "hundreds were shot by firing squads."[^1]
### Gulf War and Fall
### Osirak
Saddam invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. The resulting [[Gulf War]] saw a U.S.-led coalition expel Iraqi forces in February 1991. The regime survived until the 2003 [[Iraq War]], during which U.S. and coalition forces invaded and captured Baghdad in April 2003. Saddam was captured in December 2003, tried by an Iraqi tribunal, and executed by hanging on December 30, 2006.[^5]
On June 7, 1981 aircraft of [[Israel]] attacked the Iraqi nuclear reactor at [[Osirak bombing|Osirak]] near [[Baghdad]], which was under the government of Saddam Hussein.[^8] The [[United Nations Security Council]] adopted Resolution 487 on June 19, 1981. Its first operative paragraph "strongly condemns the military attack by Israel in clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct." Paragraph 5 "calls upon Israel urgently to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards," and paragraph 6 "considers that Iraq is entitled to appropriate redress for the destruction it has suffered, responsibility for which has been acknowledged by Israel."[^8]
### The Iran-Iraq War and the American tilt
On September 22, 1980 Iraq launched an offensive against [[Iran]], and the [[Iran-Iraq War]] ended in 1988 in a stalemate.[^1] A State Department information memorandum of October 7, 1983, from [[Nicholas Veliotes]] and [[Jonathan Howe]] to Under Secretary [[Lawrence Eagleburger]], analyzed a "possible U.S. shift from position of strict neutrality" in the war and set out financial, diplomatic and military options for a "tilt toward Iraq." The memorandum found that financial relief from international institutions was "so meager as not to provide significant relief," and it described Iraq as "the bulwark against Khomeinism," four years after the [[Iranian Revolution]]. It stated that the policy of strict neutrality "has already been modified, except for arms sales, since Iran's forces crossed into Iraq in the summer of 1982."[^9]
On December 7, 1983 the State Department instructed the [[United States Interests Section]] in Baghdad that [[Donald Rumsfeld]] wished to visit, and that he "probably will be carrying a presidential message for Saddam."[^10] On December 20, 1983 Rumsfeld met Saddam Hussein for 90 minutes and presented a letter from [[Ronald Reagan]]. [[Tariq Aziz]] attended on the Iraqi side. The embassy in London reported that Saddam said the United States was "urging other states to curtail arms sales to Iran," and that Rumsfeld told him the two countries had "shared interests in preventing Iranian and Syrian expansion."[^11]
On March 24, 1984 the State Department circulated briefing notes for a second Rumsfeld visit to Baghdad. The notes said relations had been "sharply set back" by "our March 5 condemnation of Iraq for CW use."[^12]
On November 26, 1984 [[George Shultz]] met Aziz in Washington. In the memorandum of conversation Aziz says that Iraq's "superiority in weaponry now assures its defense," and Shultz remarks that "superior intelligence also must be an important factor in Iraq's defense," which Aziz acknowledges "may be true." Shultz told Aziz that the United States would maintain its opposition to "both the use and production of chemical weapons," a position he said "is not directed specifically at Iraq."[^13]
Sale reported in 2003, citing a former [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] official, that during the war the CIA regularly sent a team to Saddam to deliver battlefield intelligence obtained from Saudi AWACS aircraft, and that the same official said he had signed a document sharing U.S. satellite intelligence with both Iraq and Iran "in an attempt to produce a military stalemate." The report also quotes Darwish as saying the CIA and DIA helped the February 1988 assault on the al-Faw peninsula by blinding Iranian radars for three days.[^3]
### The Teicher declaration
[[Howard Teicher]], a former National Security Council staff member, signed a declaration on January 31, 1995 in *United States v. Carlos Cardoen et al.*, Case No. 93-241-CR-HIGHSMITH, U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida. The caption lists as defendants Carlos Cardoen, Industrias Cardoen Limitada, [[Teledyne Industries]] doing business as Teledyne Wah Chang Albany, Edward A. Johnson, Ronald W. Griffin and others.[^14] Teicher states that he served in the United States government from 1977 to 1987 and on its staff from early 1982 to 1987, with responsibility for the Middle East and political-military affairs, and that he had regular contact with Director of Central Intelligence [[William J. Casey]] and Deputy Director [[Robert Gates]].[^14]
Teicher states that in the spring of 1982 Iraq "teetered on the brink of losing its war with Iran," that Iran found a gap in the Iraqi defenses between Baghdad and Basra, and that "United States intelligence, including satellite imagery," detected both the gap and the Iranian massing of troops opposite it. He states that Reagan decided in June 1982 that the United States "could not afford to allow Iraq to lose the war to Iran," and that Reagan formalized the policy in a National Security Decision Directive that Teicher co-authored with another NSC staff member, Geoff Kemp, which Teicher says is classified "even its identifying number."[^14]
Teicher states that Casey "personally spearheaded the effort to ensure that Iraq had sufficient military weapons, ammunition and vehicles to avoid losing the Iran-Iraq war," and that the United States supplied Iraq with "billions of dollars of credits," provided "U.S. military intelligence and advice," and acted "by closely monitoring third country arms sales to Iraq." He states that in 1986 Reagan sent a secret message to Saddam Hussein that Iraq should step up its air war and bombing of Iran, delivered by Vice President [[George H. W. Bush]] to Egyptian President [[Hosni Mubarak]], who passed it to Saddam, and that Teicher wrote Bush's talking points for the meeting with Mubarak.[^14] He states that he attended meetings in which Casey or Gates "noted the need for Iraq to have certain weapons such as cluster bombs and anti-armor penetrators," that Casey was "adamant that cluster bombs were a perfect 'force multiplier,'" and that "the CIA knew of, approved of, and assisted in the sale of non-U.S. origin military weapons, ammunition and vehicles to Iraq."[^14]
Teicher also states that one of the reasons the United States refused to license or sell U.S.-origin weapons to Iraq was that non-U.S. supply "was sufficient to meet Iraq's needs," and that under Casey and Gates the CIA "made sure that non-U.S. manufacturers manufactured and sold to Iraq the weapons needed by Iraq." He states that "the highest levels of the United States government" decided in certain instances to make a key weapon component available to Iraq directly or indirectly, and that the provision of anti-armor penetrators was "a case in point."[^14] He describes a CIA program known as "Bear Spares," under which the United States made sure that spare parts and ammunition for Soviet-style weaponry were available to countries seeking to reduce their dependence on the Soviets, with Israel transferring captured stocks "to third countries or insurgent movements (such as the Afghan rebels and the Contras)" and [[Egypt]] manufacturing Soviet-design weapons and spare parts for Iraq and other countries, which Teicher states the United States "approved, assisted and encouraged."[^14]
In the same declaration Teicher describes a 1984 Israeli approach, made in a meeting in [[Jerusalem]] that he attended with Rumsfeld, in which Israeli Foreign Minister [[Yitzhak Shamir]] asked Rumsfeld whether the United States would deliver a secret offer of Israeli assistance to Iraq. Teicher states that the United States agreed, that he traveled with Rumsfeld to Baghdad and was present when Rumsfeld told Aziz of the offer, and that Aziz "refused even to accept the Israelis' letter to Hussein," because Aziz told them "he would be executed on the spot by Hussein if he did so."[^14]
Teicher states that his National Security Council files are held at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Archives in [[Simi Valley, California]], and that they contain his notes and memoranda from meetings with Casey or Gates.[^14] In the case, Teledyne Wah Chang Albany was charged with illegally providing zirconium to Cardoen Industries and to Iraq.[^14]
### Cardoen and the cluster bombs
According to Teicher, the Chilean manufacturer [[Carlos Cardoen]] supplied cluster bombs to Iraq. Teicher states that "the mere request to a third party to carry out an action did not constitute a 'covert action,' and, accordingly, required no Presidential Finding or reporting to Congress," and that the supply of Cardoen cluster bombs, "which were fitted for use on Soviet, French and NATO aircraft," was "a mere extension of the United States policy of assisting Iraq through all legal means in order to avoid an Iranian victory." He states that under Casey and Gates "the CIA authorized, approved and assisted Cardoen in the manufacture and sale of cluster bombs and other munitions to Iraq."[^14]
Teicher states that the highest levels of the United States government, including the NSC staff and the CIA, "were well aware of Cardoen's arrest in 1983 in Miami in a sting operation relating to the smuggling of night vision goggles to Cuba and Libya," and of the arrest and conviction of two Cardoen employees and Industrias Cardoen. He also states that Casey "directed the Secretaries of State and Commerce Departments that the necessary licenses required by Cardoen were not to be denied."[^14]
The former Israeli intelligence officer [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] wrote in *Profits of War* that Cardoen was introduced in 1982 through a person at the South African arms company [[ARMSCOR]] to the Iraqi deputy chief of the General Staff for Procurement, that by early 1985 Cardoen was selling arms to Iraq "with the support of certain people connected with the U.S. government," among them [[Alan Sanders]], "who had links to the CIA," and that Cardoen was producing cluster bombs "with a covert U.S. license." Ben-Menashe wrote that in August 1988 Prime Minister Shamir convened a task force headed by [[Avi Pazner]] to halt the flow of chemical weapons, missiles and nuclear technology to Iraq from the West, with Cardoen Industries the focus of the group's attention.[^15]
### Commerce Department licenses and the 1994 Riegle hearing
On May 25, 1994 the [[Senate Banking Committee]] held a hearing printed as S. Hrg. 103-900, *United States Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Impact on the Health of the Persian Gulf War Veterans*, on "United States Chemical and Biological Warfare-Related Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Persian Gulf War."[^16] The committee chairman, [[Donald Riegle]], told the witnesses of a hearing in late fall 1992 at which the committee "found that some licenses had been granted by our own Commerce Department to ship certain dual-use items over there," and that "some of them had been shipped directly to Iraqi military installations."[^16]
[[Gordon C. Oehler]], Director of the CIA's Nonproliferation Center, testified for the Intelligence Community that before 1991 "there were four instances in which the Department of Commerce sought information on Iraqi export license applications, all dated in 1986." He said that Commerce asked for review "primarily when the licenses had significance to intelligence collection equities," and that the concern "was not so much Iraq, but whether there was a possibility the equipment would be diverted to the Soviet Union or other communist countries." His prepared statement says Iraqi procurement officers, "knowing full well the licensing thresholds, requested items that fell just under the denial thresholds."[^16] A committee report printed in the same volume lists biological materials provided by the [[American Type Culture Collection]] that were exported to agencies of the government of Iraq under export licenses issued by the Department of Commerce.[^16]
### Banca Nazionale del Lavoro
On August 10, 1992 the chairman of the House Banking Committee, [[Henry B. Gonzalez]], delivered a special order on the House floor, printed in the Congressional Record under the heading "Details on Iraq's Procurement Network." He said that the [[Banca Nazionale del Lavoro]] branch in [[Atlanta]] "loan[ed] over $4 billion to Iraq between 1986 and 1990 without reporting the loans to bank regulators or the bank's headquarters in Rome," and that "over $2 billion of the BNL loans went to Iraq's [[Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization]] otherwise known as MIMI."[^17]
Gonzalez stated that "our Government knew about the network, and as I have shown before, decided to tolerate its activity," and that "the policy was designed to see if Saddam Hussein could be turned into a reliable ally, according to the President, Secretary of State, and other officialdom of this Government." He said that "the Bush administration approved dozens of export licenses that allowed United States and foreign firms to ship sophisticated U.S. dual-use equipment to MIMI-controlled weapons factories." He also said that Saddam had entrusted MIMI to his son-in-law, [[Hussein Kamel]], in 1988, and that the CIA believed Kamil was "probably the second most powerful man in Iraq."[^17]
In the [[BNL Scandal|BNL]] prosecution, the Atlanta branch's manager, [[Christopher Drogoul]], was charged in the Northern District of Georgia with wire fraud, conspiracy and making false statements to government agencies, on the government's allegation that he concealed unauthorized loans and credit extensions totaling several billion dollars to agencies and instrumentalities of Iraq. He pleaded guilty in June 1992 to sixty counts of a 347-count indictment, and the district court allowed him to withdraw the plea on October 1, 1992. On September 2, 1993 the [[United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit]] reversed the district court's denial of the government's motion to take depositions of Italian nationals in Rome.[^18]
### Gerald Bull and Project Babylon
On April 10, 1990 [[HM Customs and Excise]] officers at [[Teesport]] detained eight large steel tubes destined for Iraq. In a statement to the [[House of Commons]] on April 18, 1990 Trade and Industry Secretary [[Nicholas Ridley]] said Ministry of Defence experts advised that the tubes were components of a large-calibre armament, that the goods were "consistent with what is known of Dr. Bull's design" (referring to "the late Dr. Gerald Bull"), and that in 1988 the Department of Trade and Industry had been asked by Walter Somers and Sheffield Forgemasters whether licences were needed and had decided they were not.[^19] The engineer [[Gerald Bull]]'s large gun was the basis of the [[Project Babylon]] program for Iraq.
On April 27, 1990 [[Gordon Brown]] asked in written questions in the House of Commons when the trade department had first been made aware "that Iraq was acquiring export material for a major gun or launcher," and what information it held on "non-military research done by the Space Research Corporation." Ridley answered that, "in the light of charges laid against an individual on 25 April, and in the light of the continuing investigation by Customs and Excise, it would be inappropriate to give any further information."[^20]
### Matrix Churchill and the Scott Inquiry
Gonzalez told the House on August 10, 1992 that [[Matrix Churchill]] Corporation of [[Cleveland, Ohio]] was the United States base of the Al-Arabi Trading Company network, which he described as the mechanism MIMI used to acquire other front companies, and that through the London holding companies Technology Development Group and Technology Engineering Group Iraq controlled more than a dozen [[United Kingdom]] firms including TMG Engineering and Matrix-Churchill Ltd.[^17]
On November 10, 1992 Attorney General Sir [[Nicholas Lyell]] told the House of Commons that prosecution counsel in the Matrix Churchill case had informed the court that, in light of the evidence given by [[Alan Clark]] in cross-examination, it would no longer be right to seek a conviction, and that Lord Justice [[Richard Scott]] had agreed to conduct an independent inquiry.[^21] The [[Scott Inquiry]] into the [[Arms-to-Iraq|export of defence equipment and dual-use goods to Iraq]] reported in February 1996. In the House of Commons debate of February 26, 1996 Trade Secretary [[Ian Lang]] said the Government welcomed "the central conclusions of the report: that there was no plot secretly to arm Saddam Hussein, and no attempt to suppress documents that could have led to a miscarriage of justice." [[Menzies Campbell]] asked whether the Government accepted the report's central conclusion that policy was changed and that the change was deliberately kept from Parliament, and Lang answered: "No, I do not; there is a difference between the Government and Sir Richard on that matter."[^22]
### Bank of Credit and Commerce International
The [[BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report]], published as Senate Print 102-140 in December 1992, states that the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]] "also made loans to Iraq, although of a substantially smaller nature" than those of BNL. The report says BNL "was, according to federal indictments, a significant financial conduit for weapons to Iraq." Its appendix lists the relationship among matters for further investigation, which "could produce further understanding of Saddam Hussein's international network for acquiring weapons."[^23]
### PROMIS
The former Israeli intelligence officer Ari Ben-Menashe wrote in *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network* (1992) that he believed he was arrested in 1989 on an arms charge because he had threatened, on behalf of the Israeli government, to expose "what the Americans were doing with Promis if they continued their support of chemical weapons being supplied to Saddam Hussein's Iraq."[^15] In an affidavit of February 17, 1991 in the [[Inslaw]] litigation, Ben-Menashe stated that in 1989 in Chile Carlos Cardoen told him that Cardoen had brokered a sale of [[PROMIS Software Scandal|PROMIS]] by [[Earl Brian]] to a representative of Iraqi Military Intelligence, as summarized in the report of the [[Department of Justice]] special counsel [[Nicholas Bua]].[^24] The same report, dated March 1993, rejected "conclusively" Inslaw's assertion that Ben-Menashe had personal knowledge of Brian's distribution of Inslaw's software, and stated that Ben-Menashe "makes a number of extraordinary claims, most of which are not subject to corroboration" and that the program he described was a different software said to have been developed by the [[National Security Agency]].[^24]
### Gulf War, Iraq War and execution
On August 2, 1990 the Security Council adopted Resolution 660 on the invasion of [[Kuwait]] by Iraq.[^25] In the [[Gulf War]] a U.S.-led military campaign forced Iraq to withdraw in February 1991, and a U.S.-led invasion in March 2003 toppled his government.[^1] Saddam was captured on December 13, 2003 at ad-Dawr, south of Tikrit, and [[L. Paul Bremer]] announced the capture on December 14.[^26] On November 5, 2006 an Iraqi court sentenced him to death after a trial over the killing of 148 Shias from the town of Dujail in the 1980s, and he was hanged in northern Baghdad on December 30, 2006.[^27]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, vol. XII, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, document 205 (editorial note on the October 7, 1959 attempt) and document 206 (CIA memorandum of October 13, 1959). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v12
[^2]: Richard Sale, "Exclusive: Saddam key in early CIA plot," United Press International, April 10, 2003, https://www.upi.com/Exclusive-Saddam-key-in-early-CIA-plot/65571050017416/ ; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, vol. XII, document 204 (NSC 420th meeting, October 1, 1959); Bryan R. Gibson, *Covert Relationship: American Foreign Policy, Intelligence, and the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1989* (Praeger, 2010).
[^3]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. XVIII, Near East, 1962-1963, documents 153 (memorandum from Stephen O. Fuqua to Sloan, "Iraqi Coup," February 8, 1963) and 154 (Rusk to Kennedy, February 9, 1963). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v18
[^4]: Brandon Wolfe-Hunnicutt, "Embracing Regime Change in Iraq: American Foreign Policy and the 1963 Coup d'Etat in Baghdad," *Diplomatic History* 35, no. 1 (2011); Bryan R. Gibson, *Covert Relationship* (Praeger, 2010); King Hussein's remarks as published in Al-Ahram, September 27, 1963.
[^5]: "Saddam Hussein," *Encyclopaedia Britannica.* https://www.britannica.com/biography/Saddam-Hussein
[^6]: Joyce Battle, ed., "Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein: The U.S. Tilts toward Iraq, 1980-1984," National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82, February 25, 2003, documents 22, 24, 26, 29, 31, 53, 60 and 61 (document 61 is the affidavit of Howard Teicher, United States v. Cardoen, S.D. Fla., January 31, 1995). https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/
[^7]: Friedman, Alan. *Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq.* Bantam Books, 1993.
[^8]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network.* TrineDay, 1992.
[^1]: "Hussein, Saddam," Gale reference entry reproduced at Encyclopedia.com, https://www.encyclopedia.com/people/history/middle-eastern-history-biographies/saddam-hussein (birth April 28, 1937; Ba'ath Party membership in 1957; July 16, 1979 replacement of Bakr; purge and firing squads; offensive on September 22, 1980); BBC News, "Timeline: Iraq," http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/737483.stm (1963 and 1968 coups; 1979 takeover; 1980 to 1988 war; June 1981 Osirak raid; 1990 invasion of Kuwait and February 1991 withdrawal; March 2003 invasion).
[^2]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, vol. XII, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, document 204 (memorandum of discussion at the 420th NSC meeting, October 1, 1959), document 205 (editorial note on the October 7, 1959 attempt) and document 206 (CIA memorandum of October 13, 1959, text not declassified). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v12/d204 and https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v12/d205
[^3]: Richard Sale, "Exclusive: Saddam key in early CIA plot," United Press International, April 10, 2003, https://www.upi.com/Exclusive-Saddam-key-in-early-CIA-plot/65571050017416/ (read at https://web.archive.org/web/2003/https://www.upi.com/Exclusive-Saddam-key-in-early-CIA-plot/65571050017416/). Sole source for the passages so cited.
[^4]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. XVIII, Near East, 1962-1963, document 153 (memorandum from Stephen O. Fuqua to Sloan, "Iraqi Coup," February 8, 1963, with footnote 2 quoting Komer's memorandum to Kennedy) and document 154 (Rusk to Kennedy, February 9, 1963, "Request for Contingency Authority to Recognize the New Iraqi Regime"). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v18/d153 and https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v18/d154
[^5]: Brandon Wolfe-Hunnicutt, review of Eric Jacobsen, "A Coincidence of Interests: Kennedy, U.S. Assistance, and the 1963 Iraqi Ba'th Regime," *Diplomatic History* 37, no. 5 (2013): 1029-59, H-Diplo Article Review (quoting Peter L. Hahn, *Missions Accomplished? The United States and Iraq since World War I*, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 48). https://issforum.org/reviews/PDF/AR455.pdf Wolfe-Hunnicutt's own article is "Embracing Regime Change in Iraq: American Foreign Policy and the 1963 Coup d'Etat in Baghdad," *Diplomatic History* 39, no. 1 (2015): 98-125, DOI 10.1093/dh/dht121.
[^6]: "Scholar: US more supportive of Kurds than was previously believed," Rudaw, April 29, 2015 (interview with Bryan Gibson on his book *Sold Out? US Foreign Policy, Iraq, the Kurds, and the Cold War*). https://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/290420151 Gibson's earlier book is *Covert Relationship: American Foreign Policy, Intelligence, and the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988* (Praeger, 2010).
[^7]: Hanna Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq* (Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 985-987, quoting the conversation of King Hussein of Jordan with Muhammad Hasanein Haikal, *Al-Ahram*, September 27, 1963 (excerpt reproduced at https://users.wfu.edu/cottrell/ope/archive/0305/0019.html). Sole source for the King Hussein quotations.
[^8]: United Nations Security Council, Resolution 487 (1981), adopted at the 2288th meeting, June 19, 1981, preamble and operative paragraphs 1, 2, 5 and 6. https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-177213
[^9]: Department of State, information memorandum from Nicholas A. Veliotes and Jonathan T. Howe to Lawrence S. Eagleburger, "Iran-Iraq War: Analysis of Possible U.S. Shift from Position of Strict Neutrality," October 7, 1983, pp. 1-3, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82, document 22 (the quotation on the modification of neutrality is from the briefing book's description of the document). https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq22.pdf
[^10]: Department of State cable State 346516, "Rumsfeld Visit to Iraq," December 7, 1983, secret, paragraph 2, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82, document 27. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq27.pdf
[^11]: U.S. Embassy London to Department of State, London 27572, "Rumsfeld Mission: December 20 Meeting with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein," December 21, 1983, secret, paragraphs 2 and 3, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82, document 31. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq31.pdf
[^12]: Department of State cable State 086663, Shultz to Embassy Khartoum, "Briefing Notes for Rumsfeld Visit to Baghdad," March 24, 1984, secret, paragraph 2, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82, document 48. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq48.pdf
[^13]: Department of State cable State 352124, memorandum of conversation, "Secretary's Meeting with Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, November 26, 1984," secret, paragraphs 3, 4 and 10 (transmitted November 29, 1984), National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82, document 60. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq60.pdf
[^14]: Declaration of Howard Teicher, *United States v. Carlos Cardoen et al.*, U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, Case No. 93-241-CR-HIGHSMITH, executed January 31, 1995, caption and paragraphs 1 to 18 (paragraph 1 service; 3 and 4 spring 1982; 6 June 1982 decision and NSDD; 7 Casey, credits, 1986 message; 8 cluster bombs; 9 non-U.S. weapons; 10 Israeli offer; 11 non-U.S. manufacturers; 13 Bear Spares; 14 Cardoen cluster bombs; 15 NSC files; 16 Cardoen and the CIA; 17 and 18 Cardoen arrest and licenses), National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82, document 61 (the briefing book's description of the case appears in its document list). https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq61.pdf Sole source for the passages so cited; a sworn declaration of a witness, not an adjudicated finding.
[^15]: Ari Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network* (Sheridan Square Press, 1992; reprinted by TrineDay, 2015), chapter 9, "Promis," and chapter 17, "Agricultural Project." Sole source for the passages so cited.
[^16]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, *United States Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Impact on the Health of the Persian Gulf War Veterans*, hearing of May 25, 1994, S. Hrg. 103-900 (subtitle: *United States Chemical and Biological Warfare-Related Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Persian Gulf War*), including the testimony and prepared statement of Dr. Gordon C. Oehler, the chairman's remarks, and the May 25, 1994 committee report. https://archive.org/details/unitedstatesdual00unit
[^17]: Henry B. Gonzalez, "Details on Iraq's Procurement Network," Special Order, *Congressional Record,* House, August 10, 1992, pp. H7871-H7881 (loans and the "tolerate its activity" passage at H7871; export licenses and Hussein Kamil at H7872; Matrix-Churchill and the holding companies at H7873 and H7875). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920810g.htm (the host page is titled "US Armed Iraq Through BNL").
[^18]: *United States v. Drogoul*, 1 F.3d 1546 (11th Cir. 1993) (No. 93-8964, decided September 2, 1993). https://law.resource.org/pub/us/case/reporter/F3/001/1.F3d.1546.93-8964.html
[^19]: House of Commons, "Gun Components (Iraq)," statement by Nicholas Ridley, HC Deb, April 18, 1990, vol. 170, cc1425-32. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1990/apr/18/gun-components-iraq
[^20]: House of Commons, written answers, "Iraq (Arms Component Exports)," HC Deb, April 27, 1990, vol. 171, cc352-3W. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written_answers/1990/apr/27/iraq-arms-component-exports
[^21]: House of Commons, "Matrix Churchill," statement by Sir Nicholas Lyell, HC Deb, November 10, 1992, vol. 213, cc743-58. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1992/nov/10/matrix-churchill
[^22]: House of Commons, "Scott Report," HC Deb, February 26, 1996, vol. 272, cc589-694 (Lang's opening statement and the exchange with Menzies Campbell at c590). https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1996/feb/26/scott-report The report is Sir Richard Scott, *Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions* (HMSO, HC 115, 1995-96).
[^23]: John Kerry and Hank Brown, *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate,* Senate Print 102-140, December 1992, ch. 24, "Appendix: Matters for Further Investigation." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/24appendic.htm
[^24]: U.S. Department of Justice, *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.,* March 1993, section on Ari Ben-Menashe, including the summary of his affidavit of February 17, 1991 (p. 73). Sole source for the Iraq passages cited to Ben-Menashe.
[^25]: United Nations Security Council, Resolution 660 (1990), adopted at the 2932nd meeting, August 2, 1990. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/94220
[^26]: Kathleen Ridolfo, "Saddam Hussein Captured near Tikrit," *RFE/RL Iraq Report* 6, no. 52, December 15, 2003. https://www.rferl.org/a/1343152.html
[^27]: "Saddam Hussein executed in Iraq," BBC News, December 30, 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6218485.stm

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10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Zafar Iqbal.md
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@ -1,30 +1,170 @@
---
category: "Business & Finance"
created: 2026-10-07
updated: 2026-10-07
tags:
- Person
- BCCI
summary: "Zafar Iqbal took over as head of BCCI in late 1990, after the firing of Agha Hasan Abedi and Swaleh Naqvi."
- Banking
- AbuDhabi
aliases:
- Zafar Iqbal Chaudhry
- Zafar Iqbal Chaudhri
- Iqbal Chaudhry
- Iqbal Chaudhri
summary: "Zafar Iqbal Chaudhry headed BCCI from 1990 to 1991, after Abu Dhabi's shareholders replaced Swaleh Naqvi, and was among those preliminarily charged in Abu Dhabi."
relations:
- type: head_of
with: "Bank of Credit and Commerce Emirates"
role: "head of the United Arab Emirates branch"
fn: 1
- type: head_of
with: "Bank of Credit and Commerce International"
start: "1990-04"
end: "1991-07"
role: "chief executive"
fn: 11
- type: investigated
with: "Federal Reserve Board"
reverse: true
start: "1990-12"
end: "1991-07"
fn: 29
- type: prosecuted
with: "Abu Dhabi"
reverse: true
role: "preliminarily charged with fraudulent activities relating to BCCI"
fn: 37
- type: prosecuted
with: "Abu Dhabi"
reverse: true
start: "1994-06"
role: "convicted with other former BCCI executives"
fn: 41
- type: subject_of
with: "BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report"
fn: 1
- type: subject_of
with: "Bingham Report"
fn: 2
---
Zafar Iqbal took over as head of [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International|BCCI]] in late 1990, after the firing of [[Agha Hasan Abedi]] and [[Swaleh Naqvi]].[^1] He was also responsible for inspecting the "dancing girls" for clients.[^2]
Zafar Iqbal Chaudhry was the chief executive of [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International|BCCI]] in 1990 and 1991, when the bank's majority shareholders, the ruling family and government of [[Abu Dhabi]], moved its management and operations to Abu Dhabi. Before that he had headed the bank's branch in the United Arab Emirates, the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce Emirates]] (BCCE).[^1]
### Role at BCCI
### Abu Dhabi and BCCE
As head of BCCI, Iqbal was the bank's president when [[William Ryback]] of the [[Federal Reserve]] demanded to see the audit reports.[^3] He was forced by Ryback to agree that the audit would not be brought back to the [[United States]], nor would the [[Bank of England]] allow a copy to be taken.[^4]
The [[Bingham Report|Bingham inquiry]] describes him in April 1990 as "formerly the manager of BCC Emirates and believed to be close to the Abu Dhabi shareholders."[^2] The Senate report by [[John Kerry]] and [[Hank Brown]], the [[BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report|Kerry-Brown report]], says he had "a close personal relationship with important members of the ruling family of Abu Dhabi arising out of his provision of intimate personal services for them in Pakistan and elsewhere."[^3] The same report says that within the bank Iqbal "was not considered to be an expert on much besides pleasing the Abu Dhabi ruling family," and that junior officers knew him as the man who had for years provided "singing and dancing girls" to the ruling family.[^3]
### Abu Dhabi Management
The Kerry-Brown report based the "singing and dancing girls" passage on staff interviews with [[Nazir Chinoy]], [[Abdur Sakhia]], [[Akbar Bilgrami]] and [[Masihur Rahman]]. It states that in private BCCI officials described Iqbal's chief role and principal skills as those of a procurer.[^4]
The [[BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report|Kerry-Brown Senate Report]] recorded that after Swaleh Naqvi confessed his errors and resigned as chief executive in March 1990, the new management team "was headed by a long-time Abu Dhabi insider from BCCI itself, Zafar Iqbal, the former head of BCCI's branch in the United Arab Emirates, the Bank of Credit and Commerce Emirates, or BCCE, who had long had a close personal relationship with important members of the ruling family of Abu Dhabi arising out of his provision of intimate personal services for them in Pakistan and elsewhere." It added that within the bank Iqbal "was not considered to be an expert on much besides pleasing the Abu Dhabi ruling family," and that junior officers knew him "as the man who had for years provided 'singing and dancing girls' to the ruling family." Under his management BCCI's operations were moved to [[Abu Dhabi]] without objection from the Bank of England.[^5]
The journalists [[Jonathan Beaty]] and [[S. C. Gwynne]] wrote that BCCI officers procured girls for their clients in [[Lahore]]'s [[Diamond Market]], "the home of the famous 'dancing girls,'" that the girls were as young as twelve, and that "in the middle 1970s the man in charge of inspecting the girls was Zafar Iqbal, who would later become the chief executive officer of BCCI."[^5]
### Sentence
### Appointment and dates
In June 1994 an Abu Dhabi court convicted Zafar Iqbal Chaudhry, then 54, with other former BCCI executives; with Hasan Mahmood Kazmi and Abdul Hafeez Mohammed Ahmed, he received the longest sentence of those present in court, six years.[^6]
Beaty and Gwynne's list of principal figures states that Iqbal "took over as head of BCCI in late 1990, after the firing of Abedi and Naqvi," and their text calls him the man who had recently taken over BCCI when [[Zayed bin Sultan AL-Nahayan|Sheikh Zayed]] summarily fired [[Agha Hasan Abedi]] and [[Swaleh Naqvi]] after seeing the October audit report.[^6] In another passage they wrote that Iqbal had "recently been named by Abu Dhabi to head BCCI," and described him as the arch-rival for power within the Emirates of [[Khalfan al-Mazrui]], head of the Karachi office of Sheikh Zayed's Private Department.[^7] They also wrote that, after [[Sami Masri]] had persuaded Beaty that Zayed was unaware of the bank's true nature, "perhaps Zafar Iqbal was keeping this critical knowledge from the sheikh," and that it was just as likely that [[Ghanim Faris al-Mazrui|Ghanim al-Mazrui]] was withholding information.[^7] Beaty and Gwynne quote Masri as saying that in Karachi, in connection with what the book calls the Black Network, "he would talk to Zafar Iqbal and Sani Ahmed."[^8] The Kerry-Brown report gives the following sequence. A series of meetings beginning in March 1990, in Abu Dhabi and [[Luxembourg]], ended with Naqvi confessing his errors and resigning as chief executive, after which a new team was "headed by" Iqbal.[^9] The same report says that Abu Dhabi had been asked to take over the bank, because Sheikh Zayed and the Al Nayhan family had been major depositors.[^9]
The Kerry-Brown report says that the Abu Dhabi interests took control of BCCI in April 1990, and that Abu Dhabi "immediately removed Naqvi from control of BCCI and replaced him with Zafar Iqbal, then head of the Abu Dhabi operation of BCCI."[^10] The same chapter says that BCCI's operations were moved to Abu Dhabi, along with the bank's most important records, "without objection from the [[Bank of England]]," and that the move of the headquarters from London was made with the encouragement of the [[College of Banking Supervisors|College of Regulators]] so that the majority shareholders could begin to monitor management.[^10]
Bingham records that Iqbal attended a Luxembourg board meeting on April 20, 1990, for the first time at that level, and that in the days that followed he "appeared to have superseded Naqvi in the day to day management of the group."[^11]
A memorandum by [[Robert Altman]] to the file, dated July 6, 1990, describes a meeting that day in [[London]] between Altman, Naqvi and a BCCI lawyer, [[Kim Gagne]]. It records that Altman had briefly seen Iqbal at the bank earlier that day, and that Iqbal said he did not know much about the First American issue in [[New York]] because his focus was solely on BCCI's operations. Iqbal also mentioned that BCCI had loans to some First American shareholders, and expressed confidence in [[Clark Clifford]] and Altman.[^12] Altman's memorandum describes the firm of [[Clifford & Warnke]] as general counsel to [[First American Bank]].[^12]
A memorandum dated July 30, 1990, with the subject "CCAH," is addressed to Naqvi with a copy to Iqbal. It sets out alternative solutions to restrictions on interstate banking, limits on foreign ownership in Virginia and Florida, deposit limits, and the status of the New York operation.[^13]
Bingham records that on October 3, 1990, when [[Price Waterhouse]] delivered its report to the Bank of England, the plans to remove Naqvi and Abedi, appoint Iqbal as acting chief executive officer, and establish an investigating committee were disclosed.[^14]
A report by [[Norton Rose]] to the creditors' committee of BCCI SA, dated May 1, 1992, states that Naqvi, "who had taken over as chief executive from Mr. Abedi in 1988, was replaced by Mr Zafar Iqbal (formerly managing director of the Emirates Division)."[^15]
[[Al Sayegh]], who testified for Abu Dhabi, said he did not know who made the decision to install Iqbal as head of BCCI in April 1990.[^16]
### Federal Reserve review, December 1990
The [[Federal Reserve Board]] reviewed a Price Waterhouse report on loans secured by shares of [[Credit and Commerce American Holdings|CCAH]] at BCCI's London office on December 10, 1990. The Kerry-Brown report says the auditor's report and a conversation that day "with the new chief executive officer of BCCI [Zafar Iqbal]" showed substantial loans outstanding secured by CCAH stock.[^17]
A statement by the majority shareholders, printed in the Senate hearings, gives December 3, 1990, as the date of a London meeting at which "Zafar Iqbal, the acting chief executive officer of BCCI, met with the Board official ... and allowed him to read the Price Waterhouse report."[^18]
A memo by [[Thomas McQueeney]] reports that [[William Ryback]] had met Iqbal "last week," and that Ryback "was very impressed with Iqbal, who offered to open the books of BCCI to us."[^19] The same memo states that Ryback "feels that BCCI has been lying to us for years," and that he did not take a copy of the Price Waterhouse report, for fear that the New York District Attorney's office would subpoena it. The memo is dated December 18, 1990 in the House hearing record and December 11, 1990 in a newspaper article reprinted in the Senate hearings, which describes McQueeney as an assistant chief examiner at the [[Federal Reserve Bank of New York]] and reports that a Fed spokesman, verifying the authenticity of the memo, said it inaccurately characterised what was happening inside the Fed.[^20]
Beaty and Gwynne's account of the same meeting calls Iqbal BCCI's president and says that [[J. Virgil Mattingly|Virgil Mattingly]], the Fed's general counsel, recalled Ryback saying "We demand to see this." They write that Ryback, reading the audit in BCCI's London offices, found more than $1 billion in loans to an entity coded "XYZ Corp.," asked Iqbal whether XYZ was really First American, and that "Iqbal told him he was right." They quote the McQueeney memo, which they date December 18, 1990, and state that "Though Ryback had seen the evidence, he was forced by Iqbal to agree that he would not bring it back home," and that the Bank of England, which possessed the audit, would not let him take a copy.[^21]
A chronology in the House hearings lists a letter of December 13, 1990, from Iqbal, as chief executive, to [[Middleton Martin]] of [[Patton Boggs & Blow]], confirming that BCCI had decided to end its banking business in the [[United States]].[^22]
### Price Waterhouse and the deposits
Bingham records that on October 23, 1990, Iqbal confirmed that Abu Dhabi had been ruled out as a place of incorporation for the group, and suggested that the three banks in London, Abu Dhabi and [[Hong Kong]] be free-standing with no holding company. On November 26, 1990, the Bank of England told him it wished to put this three-bank proposal to the majority shareholders.[^23]
On December 17, 1990, Iqbal met Price Waterhouse. Bingham reports that he said his knowledge of the problems had "only come to his knowledge since 18 April 1990," and listed the means used to solve them, including loans made in the names of individuals who were unaware of them, a $600 million loan portfolio among them, and loans on terms under which the borrower had no obligation to repay.[^24]
On January 4, 1991, Iqbal told the Bank of England that the bank's deposits might be understated by some $580 million, which the government would make good once the customers' claims were verified. Bingham records seven customers, the largest of whom, later code-named "Tumbleweed," was thought to have deposited between $350 million and $575 million for Islamic commodity transactions.[^25]
[[Allen & Overy]] and Price Waterhouse were "extremely disturbed" that Iqbal had not disclosed these deposits earlier. Bingham reports that Iqbal had assured a Price Waterhouse partner in September 1990 that he had disclosed everything, and that in reply to their complaint Iqbal denied that he had known of the unrecorded deposits in April 1990.[^26]
Bingham's summary of the Price Waterhouse work names Iqbal, Chaudhry and Chowdry among those "suspected of questionable conduct."[^27] Bingham's account of Price Waterhouse's questioning of [[Basheer Chowdry]] records that Iqbal had also been involved in the presentation to the shareholders in April 1990 and had been aware of the facts. [[Hasan Mahmood Kazmi]] gave a different explanation.[^28]
### Removal and charges
The Kerry-Brown report says that Federal Reserve investigators worked in the spring of 1991 to have BCCI's top management removed, including Iqbal, who "had close ties to the Abu Dhabi shareholders." It adds that the Bank of England advised Abu Dhabi that Iqbal had to be removed, which led to a temporary stalemate over the restructuring. The stalemate ended with the Bank of England's order closing BCCI on July 5, 1991.[^29]
The report's Abu Dhabi chapter says that by late spring 1991 both United States and [[United Kingdom]] regulators insisted on Iqbal's removal, and that Al Mazrui, who had worked closely with Iqbal for many years, resisted and temporarily paralysed the restructuring plan.[^30] After the consent orders of March 4, 1991, Senate staff had also raised with the Abu Dhabi lawyers at Patton Boggs & Blow their concern that Iqbal would remain in control of the banks throughout the restructuring. The lawyers acknowledged that they shared the concerns about Iqbal and Naqvi.[^31]
Bingham records that Iqbal was told, after the College of supervisors meeting in April 1991, that he was not to continue as chief executive officer.[^32]
The liquidators of [[Credit and Finance Corporation]] (Deloitte Ross Tohmatsu) recorded that the restructuring agreements of May 22, 1991, were signed on behalf of BCCI by Iqbal, with Al Mazrui for Portfolio and an Abu Dhabi official for the government, and were witnessed by Allen & Overy personnel. The same record states that on June 25, 1991, Credit and Finance Corporation wrote to Iqbal, as chief executive officer of the BCCI Group, asking him to press Abu Dhabi to honour its subscription commitment.[^33]
Testimony by Virgil Mattingly, the Federal Reserve Board's general counsel, given on May 14, 1992, recorded that Federal Reserve investigators had spoken to Iqbal when he was in London but had been unable to reach him since the closure. Mattingly confirmed Senator Kerry's statement that Naqvi and Iqbal were under house arrest in Abu Dhabi.[^34]
Masihur Rahman testified that [[Mazhar Abbas]], another BCCI executive, threatened him at a meeting in front of Iqbal Chaudhry, whom Rahman described as "the new CEO after all this crisis." Rahman said he had been pleading with the two men against dismissing executives.[^35]
Iqbal was detained by authorities in Abu Dhabi, along with about thirty other senior BCCI executives.[^36]
In written answers to Senator Kerry in 1992, Al Sayegh listed "Zafar Iqbal Chaudhri" among the individuals held in Abu Dhabi who were "preliminarily charged with fraudulent activities relating to BCCI."[^37] The majority shareholders' own statement to the subcommittee says that, as a result of their complaint and other evidence accumulated by the Federal Prosecutor, eighteen BCCI officials were preliminarily charged and were subject to detention pending final criminal charges, which the shareholders said they believed would include counts of larceny, fraud and forgery.[^38] Beaty and Gwynne wrote in 1993 that seventeen other senior officials, including Naqvi and Zafar Iqbal, were under house arrest in Abu Dhabi.[^39] In the same period Al Sayegh told the subcommittee that Naqvi and Iqbal "and others" would be made available to Senate staff and Justice Department personnel, and that discussions on the terms were under way.[^40]
### Sentencing, 1994
[[United Press International]] reported on June 14, 1994, that Judge Shehab Abdul-Rehman of the Abu Dhabi Court of the First Instance sentenced twelve former BCCI executives to a total of 56 years in prison and ordered them to pay the former Abu Dhabi majority shareholders civil damages of more than $9.13 billion. Of the ten defendants present, the longest sentences went to two Pakistanis, Zafar Iqbal Chaudhry, 54, and Hasan Mahmood Kazmi, 56, and a Canadian, Abdul Hafeez Mohammed Ahmed, 66, each six years.[^41] UPI reported that Naqvi, then 59, received four sentences totaling eleven years while in United States custody, that Abedi received six years in absentia, and that [[Ziauddin Ali Akbar]] was the third defendant sentenced in absentia. Three-year sentences were given to Imtiaz Ahmed, Ameerul Haq Siddiqui, Fakhir Hussain, Mohammed Azmatullah, Bashir Ahmed Tahir and Nasem Hassan Sheikh, and Iqbal Ahmed Rizvi was acquitted.[^41] In the same report, damages were awarded of $6.56 billion to the president's Private Department, $1.347 billion to the [[Abu Dhabi Investment Authority]] and $1.223 billion to the Finance Department. UPI said some eleven of the accused had been held in detention in Abu Dhabi since their arrest in September 1991, on charges including dissipation of shareholders' funds, forging of bank records and granting fictitious loans, and that all the convicted present said they would appeal.[^41]
[[MEED]] reported on June 24, 1994, that twelve senior executives were sentenced to a total of 61 years in prison (the UPI figure is 56 years) by an Abu Dhabi court on June 14. It named Abedi, who was in Pakistan, and Naqvi, who was on trial in the United States, among those sentenced, and reported that the court ordered the twelve convicted executives to pay $9,000 million for their part in the losses.[^42]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 9.
[^2]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 174.
[^3]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 132.
[^4]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 133.
[^5]: Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992, ch. 14, "Abu Dhabi: BCCI's Founding and Majority Stockholders." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/14abudhabi.htm
[^6]: Hussain, Thomas. "UAE jails and fines BCCI executives," United Press International, June 14, 1994. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1994/06/14/UAE-jails-and-fines-BCCI-executives/7650771566400/
[^1]: Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate*. December 1992, ch. 14, "Abu Dhabi: BCCI's Founding and Majority Stockholders." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/14abudhabi.htm
[^2]: *Inquiry into the Supervision of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International*, ordered by the House of Commons to be printed October 22, 1992, paras. 2.198, 2.201. https://archive.org/details/InquiryIntoTheSupervisionOfTheBankOfCreditAndCommerceInternational
[^3]: Kerry and Brown, ch. 14, as in note 1.
[^4]: Kerry and Brown, ch. 14, note 38.
[^5]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 143. Sole source for the passages so cited. https://archive.org/details/outlawbank00jona
[^6]: Beaty and Gwynne, *The Outlaw Bank*, "Cast of Characters," p. xvi (entry for Zafar Iqbal), and p. 103. Sole source for the passages so cited.
[^7]: Beaty and Gwynne, *The Outlaw Bank*, p. 86. Sole source for the passages so cited.
[^8]: Beaty and Gwynne, *The Outlaw Bank*, p. 81 (Masri's statement to Beaty; the book's index lists pp. 81, 86, 103, 143 and 354 under Zafar Iqbal). Sole source for the passages so cited.
[^9]: Kerry and Brown, ch. 10, text on the Abu Dhabi takeover, March 1990. https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/10accounta.htm
[^10]: Kerry and Brown, ch. 14, "Attempt At Restructuring 1990 and 1991." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/14abudhabi.htm
[^11]: *Inquiry into the Supervision of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International*, paras. 2.198, 2.201.
[^12]: Kerry and Brown, ch. 13, note 132, "Altman Memorandum to the File, Clifford and Warnke, July 6, 1990," text at ch. 13, "Altman's Assessment of His Conflict of Interest Pertaining To First American and BCCI." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/13clifford.htm. The memorandum's account of the earlier meeting with Iqbal is also reprinted in *BCCI Hearings before the Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations*, vol. 6 (archive.org copy).
[^13]: Memorandum dated July 30, 1990, subject "CCAH," addressed to Swaleh Naqvi with a copy to Zafar Iqbal, reprinted in *BCCI Hearings before the Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations*, vol. 3 (archive.org copy). https://archive.org/details/BCCIHearingsBeforeTheTerrorismNarcoticsAndInternationalOperationsOfTheCommitteeOnForeignRelations
[^14]: *Inquiry into the Supervision of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International*, para. 2.254.
[^15]: Norton Rose, report to the members of the BCCI SA Creditors' Committee, May 1, 1992, para. 9, printed p. 588, reprinted in *BCCI Hearings before the Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations*, vol. 5 (S. Hrg. 102-350, pt. 5). https://archive.org/details/BCCIHearingsBeforeTheTerrorismNarcoticsAndInternationalOperationsOfTheCommitteeOnForeignRelations
[^16]: Kerry and Brown, ch. 14, note 65, citing Al-Sayegh testimony, S. Hrg. 102-350, pt. 5, pp. 759-770.
[^17]: Kerry and Brown, ch. 12, "The Regulators," text and note 33, citing S. Hrg. 102-379, p. 120. https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/12reg.htm
[^18]: Statement of the majority shareholders, section II, "Cooperation by the Majority Shareholders with U.S. Law Enforcement and Regulatory Investigations," reprinted in *BCCI Hearings before the Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations*, vol. 5 (S. Hrg. 102-350, pt. 5).
[^19]: Electronic mail, "BCCI," from Thomas McQueeney, headed December 18, 1990, in *BCCI Hearings before the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs*, House of Representatives, vol. 2. https://archive.org/details/BCCIHearingsBeforeTheCommitteeOnBankingFinanceAndUrbanAffairs
[^20]: Newspaper article quoting the McQueeney memo as dated December 11, 1990, reprinted in *BCCI Hearings before the Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations*, vol. 2 (archive.org copy).
[^21]: Beaty and Gwynne, *The Outlaw Bank*, p. 103. Sole source for the passages so cited.
[^22]: Chronology, entry for December 13, 1990, in *BCCI Hearings before the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs*, House of Representatives, vol. 1. https://archive.org/details/BCCIHearingsBeforeTheCommitteeOnBankingFinanceAndUrbanAffairs
[^23]: *Inquiry into the Supervision of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International*, paras. 2.272, 2.274.
[^24]: *Inquiry into the Supervision of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International*, para. 2.281.
[^25]: *Inquiry into the Supervision of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International*, para. 2.297.
[^26]: *Inquiry into the Supervision of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International*, paras. 2.299-2.300.
[^27]: *Inquiry into the Supervision of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International*, para. 2.443.
[^28]: *Inquiry into the Supervision of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International*, para. 2.354. Chowdry is identified as the official questioned in the same paragraph, which also refers to Kazmi.
[^29]: Kerry and Brown, ch. 12, text on the spring 1991 removal effort, the Bank of England stalemate, and the order closing BCCI of July 5, 1991. https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/12reg.htm
[^30]: Kerry and Brown, ch. 14, text and note 52 (staff interview with Masihur Rahman, August 26, 1992).
[^31]: Kerry and Brown, ch. 14, text and note 51 (Winer memorandum, March meeting with Patton, Boggs, and Blow).
[^32]: *Inquiry into the Supervision of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International*, paras. 2.360-2.361.
[^33]: Statement of the liquidators of Credit and Finance Corporation Limited (Ian Wight and Robert Axford of Deloitte Ross Tohmatsu), para. 90 (agreements of May 22, 1991) and para. 68 (letter of June 25, 1991), reprinted in *BCCI Hearings before the Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations*, vol. 5 (S. Hrg. 102-350, pt. 5).
[^34]: Testimony of James Virgil Mattingly, Jr., general counsel of the Federal Reserve Board, May 14, 1992, S. Hrg. 102-350, pt. 5, exchange with Senator Kerry.
[^35]: Testimony of Masihur Rahman, former chief financial officer, BCCI, London, *BCCI Hearings before the Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations*, vol. 1 (archive.org copy).
[^36]: Newspaper article reprinted in *BCCI Hearings before the Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations*, vol. 2 (archive.org copy).
[^37]: Written answers by Al Sayegh, answer to question 46, reprinted in S. Hrg. 102-350, pt. 5, p. 832.
[^38]: Statement of the majority shareholders, reprinted in *BCCI Hearings before the Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations*, vol. 5 (S. Hrg. 102-350, pt. 5), p. 754. Position of the majority shareholders.
[^39]: Beaty and Gwynne, *The Outlaw Bank*, p. 354. Sole source for the passages so cited.
[^40]: Kerry and Brown, ch. 14, text and note 70, citing S. Hrg. 102-350, pt. 5, pp. 756-757.
[^41]: Hussain, Thomas. "UAE jails and fines BCCI executives," United Press International, June 14, 1994. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1994/06/14/UAE-jails-and-fines-BCCI-executives/7650771566400/ Sole source for the passages so cited; its twelve-defendant total (56 years) differs from MEED's (61 years).
[^42]: "BCCI executives sentenced," MEED, June 24, 1994. https://www.meed.com/bcci-executives-sentenced/