vault backup: 2026-10-09 14:42:42

00 - META/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+- 2026-10-09T1442 · [[Hans Speier]]
 - 2026-10-09T1441 · [[Robert M. Brier]]
 - 2026-10-09T1441 · [[Martin Ebon]]
 - 2026-10-09T1440 · [[Project MKUltra]]
@@ -21,7 +22,6 @@
 - 2026-10-09T1335 · [[Wilhelm Reich]]
 - 2026-10-09T1335 · [[Max Ascoli]]
 - 2026-10-09T1334 · [[Research Project on Totalitarian Communication]]
-- 2026-10-09T1334 · [[Hans Speier]]
 - 2026-10-09T1333 · [[CIAA]]
 - 2026-10-09T1333 · [[BBC]]
 - 2026-10-09T1333 · [[Bill Clinton]]

10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Hans Speier.md

@@ -60,41 +60,41 @@ relations:
     role: "head of the German Committee; Propaganda Policy Adviser (Germany) from December 1944"
     start: 1944-05
     end: 1945-08
-    fn: 25
+    fn: 27
   - type: employed_by
     with: "[[U.S. Department of State]]"
     role: "Deputy and Acting Chief, Division for Occupied Areas"
     start: 1946-01
     end: 1947-09
-    fn: 26
+    fn: 28
   - type: employed_by
     with: "[[Rand Corporation]]"
     role: "head of the Social Science Division"
     start: 1948-07
     end: 1960
-    fn: 28
+    fn: 32
   - type: participant_in
     with: "[[Project Troy]]"
     role: "panel member"
     start: 1950-10
     end: 1951-02
-    fn: 35
+    fn: 39
   - type: participant_in
     with: "[[Quantico I and II]]"
     role: "panel member, Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel"
     start: 1955-06
     end: 1955-06
-    fn: 41
+    fn: 45
   - type: employed_by
     with: "[[Ford Foundation]]"
     role: "consultant on the Behavioral Sciences Program"
     start: 1951
-    fn: 39
+    fn: 43
   - type: employed_by
     with: "[[University of Massachusetts Amherst]]"
     role: "professor of sociology"
     start: 1969
-    fn: 43
+    fn: 47
 ---
 
 Hans Speier (February 3, 1905 to February 17, 1990) was a German sociologist who emigrated in 1933, helped found the Graduate Faculty (the University in Exile) at the [[New School for Social Research]], co-directed a Rockefeller-funded study of Nazi radio propaganda, and then moved through the [[Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service]], the [[Office of War Information]] and the [[U.S. Department of State]] into the [[Rand Corporation]], where he headed the Social Science Division from 1948 to 1960. He sat on the State Department's [[Project Troy]] panel in 1950 and 1951 and on the 1955 [[Quantico I and II|Quantico]] panel convened by [[Nelson Rockefeller]], and he drafted the plan that became the [[Ford Foundation]]'s Behavioral Sciences Program and Stanford's [[Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences]].[^1]
@@ -131,63 +131,63 @@ On October 29, 1943, Speier wrote a memorandum predicting the content of Hitler'
 
 ### Dies and Cox
 
-Representative [[Martin Dies]], first chairman of the House Un-American Activities Committee, accused three FBIS employees of "un-American beliefs": Watson, the Soviet specialist Frederick Schuman of Speier's section, and William E. Dodd Jr. of the Report Section. The CIA's staff historian Stephen Mercado writes that Dies may have been provoked by FBIS reports that his statements were being praised in Nazi Germany, which had drawn a public rebuke from Vice President [[Henry Wallace]]. In 1943 Congress, by a rider (Section 304) to the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1943, halted the pay of Watson, Dodd and a third employee, Robert Morss Lovett, after a special subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee under [[John H. Kerr]] reported; the Supreme Court held the measure unconstitutional in United States v. Lovett (1946).[^22] Separately, Representative Eugene Cox of Georgia opened hearings against the FCC in January 1943 and charged that FBIS was "a glorified news agency that provided nothing of value to the military"; the Cox-Lea Committee submitted its final report on January 2, 1945, after concluding that the United States could not conduct an intelligent program for counteracting enemy propaganda without accurate knowledge of that propaganda. Schuman, who had joined FBIS from Williams College in October 1942, had resigned and returned to Williams before the 1943 cutoff. Watson and Dodd resigned a few days after the cutoff date of November 15, 1943, and Speier replaced Watson as Acting Chief Analyst, overseeing thirty people.[^23]
+Representative [[Martin Dies]], first chairman of the House Un-American Activities Committee, accused three FBIS employees of "un-American beliefs": Watson, the Soviet specialist Frederick Schuman of Speier's section, and William E. Dodd Jr. of the Report Section. The CIA's staff historian Stephen Mercado writes that Dies may have been provoked by FBIS reports that his statements were being praised in Nazi Germany, which had drawn a public rebuke from Vice President [[Henry Wallace]]. In 1943 Congress, by a rider (Section 304) to the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1943, halted the pay of Watson, Dodd and a third employee, Robert Morss Lovett, after a special subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee under [[John H. Kerr]] reported; the Supreme Court held the measure unconstitutional in United States v. Lovett (1946).[^22] Separately, Representative Eugene Cox of Georgia opened hearings against the FCC in January 1943 and charged that FBIS was "a glorified news agency that provided nothing of value to the military"; the Cox-Lea Committee submitted its final report on January 2, 1945, after concluding that the United States could not conduct an intelligent program for counteracting enemy propaganda without accurate knowledge of that propaganda. Schuman, who had joined FBIS from Williams College in October 1942, had resigned and returned to Williams before the 1943 cutoff. Watson and Dodd resigned a few days after the cutoff date of November 15, 1943, and Speier replaced Watson as Acting Chief Analyst, overseeing thirty people.[^23] A National Archives records description of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service gives November 15, 1943 as the day [[Theodore Newcomb]] succeeded Watson as Director of the Analysis Division.[^24] Bessner's note cites a letter from Newcomb to Colonel S. A. Greenwell of December 4, 1943 for Speier's replacing Watson as Acting Chief Analyst.[^25]
 
-In February 1944 the appropriations committee cut 30 percent of the FBIS budget. Leigh's newsletter attributed the cut to Cox's opposition to the FCC and to the Dodd-Watson case, and [[William L. Langer]] of the OSS Research and Analysis Branch intervened for the service without result. By April 1944 most analysts had left the Central European Section, George and Kellermann going to the OSS Research and Analysis Branch, and Speier was left with "four inexperienced assistants." Leigh resigned in the summer of 1944.[^24]
+In February 1944 the appropriations committee cut 30 percent of the FBIS budget. Leigh's newsletter attributed the cut to Cox's opposition to the FCC and to the Dodd-Watson case, and [[William L. Langer]] of the OSS Research and Analysis Branch intervened for the service without result. By April 1944 most analysts had left the Central European Section, George and Kellermann going to the OSS Research and Analysis Branch, and Speier was left with "four inexperienced assistants." Leigh resigned in the summer of 1944.[^26]
 
 ### Office of War Information
 
-Speier transferred from FBIS to the OWI's Overseas Operations Branch on May 22, 1944, under Wallace Carroll, as head of the German Committee of Area One, and in December 1944 became Propaganda Policy Adviser for Germany, responsible for planning psychological warfare against Germany and long-range propaganda to be used inside it after defeat. He sat on the interdepartmental German Propaganda Policy Committee, attended the Overseas Planning Board and belonged to the Review Board, and worked with British officials in Washington. In April 1943 the Analysis Division and the OWI's Bureau of Research and Analysis of the Overseas Operations Branch had agreed that the OWI would use the division for analysis of radio broadcasts, and in May 1943 the division moved to OWI headquarters with Watson as its director, in offices contiguous with the branch Speier later joined. Bessner reports that Speier wrote many of the directives for broadcasts to Germany over the [[Voice of America]], which Carroll signed. A central directive of July 1944, as quoted by Winkler, stated that "our propaganda offensive will run boldly in advance of our military offensive" and that "We shall proceed on the implicit assumption that the German will to resist can be broken and will be broken by next December."[^25]
+Speier transferred from FBIS to the OWI's Overseas Operations Branch on May 22, 1944, under Wallace Carroll, as head of the German Committee of Area One, and in December 1944 became Propaganda Policy Adviser for Germany, responsible for planning psychological warfare against Germany and long-range propaganda to be used inside it after defeat. He sat on the interdepartmental German Propaganda Policy Committee, attended the Overseas Planning Board and belonged to the Review Board, and worked with British officials in Washington. In April 1943 the Analysis Division and the OWI's Bureau of Research and Analysis of the Overseas Operations Branch had agreed that the OWI would use the division for analysis of radio broadcasts, and in May 1943 the division moved to OWI headquarters with Watson as its director, in offices contiguous with the branch Speier later joined. Bessner reports that Speier wrote many of the directives for broadcasts to Germany over the [[Voice of America]], which Carroll signed. A central directive of July 1944, as quoted by Winkler, stated that "our propaganda offensive will run boldly in advance of our military offensive" and that "We shall proceed on the implicit assumption that the German will to resist can be broken and will be broken by next December."[^27]
 
 ### Division for Occupied Areas
 
-After the OWI closed, Speier acted as liaison between State and General Robert McClure's Information Control Division of the US military government, and visited Germany in October 1945. At Bad Homburg a weather delay put him in conversation with Assistant Secretary of State [[William Benton]]; an OWI cable of November 20, 1945, relayed Benton's view that Speier was "the best man OWI ever sent to Germany." State offered him a place on the planned Policy Planning Staff; he declined and instead became Acting Deputy Chief of the Division for Occupied Areas in January 1946, and from January 1947 its Associate (Acting) Chief, supervising about twenty-five staff. His paper on licensing political newspapers in the US zone was rejected by General [[Lucius Clay]]. He returned to the New School in September 1947, declining an offer to coordinate all information media for the military government in Berlin.[^26]
+After the OWI closed, Speier acted as liaison between State and General Robert McClure's Information Control Division of the US military government, and visited Germany in October 1945. At Bad Homburg a weather delay put him in conversation with Assistant Secretary of State [[William Benton]]; an OWI cable of November 20, 1945, relayed Benton's view that Speier was "the best man OWI ever sent to Germany." State offered him a place on the planned Policy Planning Staff; he declined and instead became Acting Deputy Chief of the Division for Occupied Areas in January 1946, and from January 1947 its Associate (Acting) Chief, supervising about twenty-five staff. His paper on licensing political newspapers in the US zone was rejected by General [[Lucius Clay]]. He returned to the New School in September 1947, declining an offer to coordinate all information media for the military government in Berlin.[^28]
 
 ### Return to the New School
 
-Back at the New School for 1947 and 1948 he was elected to found a Division of International Studies. He had been in conflict since 1943 with colleagues over the Institute of World Affairs, a research center financed by [[Doris Duke]], and described himself as "used as a pawn in ridiculous faculty politics." The Graduate Faculty extended his leave of absence in 1948, 1949, 1950 and 1951 after he joined RAND.[^27]
+Back at the New School for 1947 and 1948 he was elected to found a Division of International Studies. In October 1943 Albert Salomon asked him to join the council of the [[Institute of World Affairs]]. He told Salomon and [[Adolph Lowe]] that he "would like to be helpful, if I am wanted," and after "repeated inquiries" never received an answer about his duties.[^29] In February 1944 he withdrew his declaration to serve on the council "in principle" pending further information.[^29] [[Daniel Bessner]] describes the Institute as "a research center funded by [[Doris Duke]]," the Institute's funding note names [[Independent Aid]] among its donors, and the Duke University guide to the Independent Aid records states that Duke had "limited direct involvement" with that foundation.[^30] Bessner states that he came to believe he was being "used as a pawn in ridiculous faculty politics."[^31] The Graduate Faculty extended his leave of absence in 1948, 1949, 1950 and 1951 after he joined RAND.[^31]
 
 ### RAND and the Social Science Division
 
-In September 1947 Project RAND held a Conference of Social Scientists in New York to find leaders for its planned Social Science and Economics divisions. A committee of Herbert Goldhamer, Olaf Helmer, Frederick Mosteller, Leo Rosten, W. Allen Wallis, Warren Weaver and Samuel Wilks had begun considering candidates in the summer of 1946. Speier came to RAND's attention through the screenwriter [[Leo Rosten]], whom he had known at the OWI, where Rosten had been the liaison between Washington and Hollywood; he had not heard of RAND and asked State Department colleagues whether it was genuine. The thirty-five participants included RAND's Frank Collbohm, Olaf Helmer and John D. Williams, Charles Dollard of the Carnegie Corporation, Donald Young of the Social Science Research Council, Kris, Franz Neumann, [[Harold Lasswell]], [[Bernard Brodie]], [[Ruth Benedict]], [[Pendleton Herring]] of the Carnegie Corporation, and [[Warren Weaver]] of the Rockefeller Foundation, who told the group that every piece of knowledge in sociology, economics and political science would be forged into "weapons" for the defense of democracy. Collbohm told the group that the Air Force "makes available to RAND information in other fields, intelligence, plans, etc." Speier told the conference that the "fundamental task of American foreign policy [is] to stem Communism anywhere without at the same time playing into the hands of Fascism." Speier consulted for RAND from May 1948 and directed the Social Science Division from July 1948. At his insistence it was based in Washington until 1957.[^28]
+In September 1947 Project RAND held a Conference of Social Scientists in New York to find leaders for its planned Social Science and Economics divisions. A committee of Herbert Goldhamer, Olaf Helmer, Frederick Mosteller, Leo Rosten, W. Allen Wallis, Warren Weaver and Samuel Wilks had begun considering candidates in the summer of 1946. Speier came to RAND's attention through the screenwriter [[Leo Rosten]], whom he had known at the OWI, where Rosten had been the liaison between Washington and Hollywood; he had not heard of RAND and asked State Department colleagues whether it was genuine. The thirty-five participants included RAND's Frank Collbohm, Olaf Helmer and John D. Williams, Charles Dollard of the Carnegie Corporation, Donald Young of the Social Science Research Council, Kris, Franz Neumann, [[Harold Lasswell]], [[Bernard Brodie]], [[Ruth Benedict]], [[Pendleton Herring]] of the Carnegie Corporation, and [[Warren Weaver]] of the Rockefeller Foundation, who told the group that every piece of knowledge in sociology, economics and political science would be forged into "weapons" for the defense of democracy. Collbohm told the group that the Air Force "makes available to RAND information in other fields, intelligence, plans, etc." Speier told the conference that the "fundamental task of American foreign policy [is] to stem Communism anywhere without at the same time playing into the hands of Fascism." Speier consulted for RAND from May 1948 and directed the Social Science Division from July 1948. At his insistence it was based in Washington until 1957.[^32]
 
-RAND became an independent corporation on May 14, 1948. [[H. Rowan Gaither]] and [[Frank Collbohm]] arranged the separation from [[Douglas Aircraft]] with a $100,000 interest-free loan and a $300,000 credit guarantee from [[Henry Ford II]] of the Ford Foundation, later raised to $1,000,000; the Carnegie Corporation, the National Science Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation were among RAND's other early financial supporters.[^29] Speier hired former wartime colleagues, among them [[Alexander George]], Nathan Leites and Phil Davison, recruited the nuclear strategists Bernard Brodie and William Kaufmann, and used Leon Gouré, John Herz and [[Otto Kirchheimer]] as consultants. Speier held a "Q" clearance, the highest nuclear clearance, and visited the North American Air Defense Command and Strategic Air Command headquarters. He opened a RAND office in Wiesbaden. In October 1960 RAND's five divisions were split into eleven departments; [[Herbert Goldhamer]] took over the social science side and Speier joined the Research Council, which he chaired in 1961 and 1962; from 1958 to 1962 he was also a consultant to the USAF Scientific Advisory Board.[^30]
+RAND became an independent corporation on May 14, 1948. [[H. Rowan Gaither]] and [[Frank Collbohm]] arranged the separation from [[Douglas Aircraft]] with a $100,000 interest-free loan and a $300,000 credit guarantee from [[Henry Ford II]] of the Ford Foundation, later raised to $1,000,000; the Carnegie Corporation, the National Science Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation were among RAND's other early financial supporters.[^33] Speier hired former wartime colleagues, among them [[Alexander George]], Nathan Leites and Phil Davison, recruited the nuclear strategists Bernard Brodie and William Kaufmann, and used Leon Gouré, John Herz and [[Otto Kirchheimer]] as consultants. Speier held a "Q" clearance, the highest nuclear clearance, and visited the North American Air Defense Command and Strategic Air Command headquarters. He opened a RAND office in Wiesbaden. In October 1960 RAND's five divisions were split into eleven departments; [[Herbert Goldhamer]] took over the social science side and Speier joined the Research Council, which he chaired in 1961 and 1962; from 1958 to 1962 he was also a consultant to the USAF Scientific Advisory Board.[^34]
 
-Division publications under Speier included Nathan Leites's The Operational Code of the Politburo (1951) and RM-365, "The Exploitation of Superstitions for Purposes of Psychological Warfare," by Jean M. Hungerford, dated April 14, 1950 (Bessner gives April 15), a Project RAND research memorandum marked as a working paper. It surveys superstition in wartime Germany (astrologers, fortune-tellers, crystal-gazers and chain letters, with a Security Service report of May 21, 1942 on chain letters translated in an appendix), in other belligerent countries and in the postwar Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and reports Hitler's and Goebbels's reliance on omens and fortune-tellers, Rudolf Hess's interest in the occult, and a file the FBI was said to have kept on wartime astrologers suspected of being Axis agents. Its section on deliberate manipulation records German agents posing as astrologers in France in 1940, Goebbels's 1942 diary entries on counter-horoscopes and on a plan by Berndt for occultist propaganda, the OSS black radio program Operation Hermit, which used astrology and fortune-telling in broadcasts beamed to Nanking, and British Army magicians in Italy. It concludes that attempts to manipulate superstition would probably be most successful against peasants, old people and the less educated workers of the Soviet Union and its satellites, proposes the use of astrology and fortune-telling to predict dire events likely to befall the enemy and of chain letters that would burden the enemy postal system, and lists questions on timing, on word-of-mouth rumors introduced by agents, and on boomerang effects. Its sources included the FCC's weekly reports on Nazi propaganda for 1943 and early 1944, the Central European Analysis reports of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, and Kris and Speier's German Radio Propaganda; it states that the files of "black" propagandists were not examined.[^31] After the outbreak of the Korean War a group from the division including Goldhamer, George, Davison, Ewald Schnitzer and a Hungerford (Bessner writes "Jay Hungerford"; RM-365 is credited to Jean M. Hungerford, and records found do not establish whether they are the same person) visited Korea; from August 24, 1951, Goldhamer advised the American delegation at the Kaesong armistice talks and circulated Speier's memoranda and Leites's book to the negotiators. Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy was reported to carry the Operational Code on helicopter trips to the conference site.[^32]
+Division publications under Speier included Nathan Leites's The Operational Code of the Politburo (1951) and RM-365, "The Exploitation of Superstitions for Purposes of Psychological Warfare," by Jean M. Hungerford, dated April 14, 1950 (Bessner gives April 15), a Project RAND research memorandum marked as a working paper. It surveys superstition in wartime Germany (astrologers, fortune-tellers, crystal-gazers and chain letters, with a Security Service report of May 21, 1942 on chain letters translated in an appendix), in other belligerent countries and in the postwar Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and reports Hitler's and Goebbels's reliance on omens and fortune-tellers, Rudolf Hess's interest in the occult, and a file the FBI was said to have kept on wartime astrologers suspected of being Axis agents. Its section on deliberate manipulation records German agents posing as astrologers in France in 1940, Goebbels's 1942 diary entries on counter-horoscopes and on a plan by Berndt for occultist propaganda, the OSS black radio program Operation Hermit, which used astrology and fortune-telling in broadcasts beamed to Nanking, and British Army magicians in Italy. It concludes that attempts to manipulate superstition would probably be most successful against peasants, old people and the less educated workers of the Soviet Union and its satellites, proposes the use of astrology and fortune-telling to predict dire events likely to befall the enemy and of chain letters that would burden the enemy postal system, and lists questions on timing, on word-of-mouth rumors introduced by agents, and on boomerang effects. Its sources included the FCC's weekly reports on Nazi propaganda for 1943 and early 1944, the Central European Analysis reports of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, and Kris and Speier's German Radio Propaganda; it states that the files of "black" propagandists were not examined.[^35] After the outbreak of the Korean War a group from the division including Goldhamer, George, Davison, Ewald Schnitzer and a Hungerford (Bessner writes "Jay Hungerford"; RM-365 is credited to Jean M. Hungerford, and records found do not establish whether they are the same person) visited Korea; from August 24, 1951, Goldhamer advised the American delegation at the Kaesong armistice talks and circulated Speier's memoranda and Leites's book to the negotiators. Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy was reported to carry the Operational Code on helicopter trips to the conference site.[^36]
 
-Speier also sat on the Human Relations and Morale subcommittee of the Defense Department's Research and Development Board's Committee on Human Resources, the body that influenced which communication studies were funded.[^33]
+Speier also sat on the Human Relations and Morale subcommittee of the Defense Department's Research and Development Board's Committee on Human Resources, the body that influenced which communication studies were funded.[^37]
 
 ### Psychological Warfare Reconsidered
 
-Truman announced the "Campaign of Truth" in April 1950, after the senator William Benton had called in March for a "Marshall Plan of Ideas." On April 10, 1950, Speier addressed the State Department's Foreign Service Institute on "Propaganda and Its Setting," warning against what he called "the democratic fallacy in propaganda," the belief that power always resides in the masses. In "Psychological Warfare Reconsidered" (RAND P-196, February 5, 1951, reissued in 1951 as a Foreign Service Institute pamphlet) he defined the aim of psychological warfare as "deviant, politically relevant behavior," meaning action that weakens the ability of elites to govern and command, wrote that the population at large "is no rewarding target of conversion propaganda from abroad," and wrote that political warfare "can therefore attack the cooperation among elite members," which depends on "a modicum of mutual trust." Deception, he wrote, is "aimed at creating erroneous estimates of enemy capabilities or intentions," and desertions of elite members, though rare, "provide great opportunities to political warfare"; he cited the defection of Rudolf Hess, which he wrote the British had not exploited. Bessner reads the first of these papers as a rejection of the Campaign of Truth. In a 1950 essay Speier wrote that "popular opinion should [not] govern the actions of governments" in a crisis.[^34]
+Truman announced the "Campaign of Truth" in April 1950, after the senator William Benton had called in March for a "Marshall Plan of Ideas." On April 10, 1950, Speier addressed the State Department's Foreign Service Institute on "Propaganda and Its Setting," warning against what he called "the democratic fallacy in propaganda," the belief that power always resides in the masses. In "Psychological Warfare Reconsidered" (RAND P-196, February 5, 1951, reissued in 1951 as a Foreign Service Institute pamphlet) he defined the aim of psychological warfare as "deviant, politically relevant behavior," meaning action that weakens the ability of elites to govern and command, wrote that the population at large "is no rewarding target of conversion propaganda from abroad," and wrote that political warfare "can therefore attack the cooperation among elite members," which depends on "a modicum of mutual trust." Deception, he wrote, is "aimed at creating erroneous estimates of enemy capabilities or intentions," and desertions of elite members, though rare, "provide great opportunities to political warfare"; he cited the defection of Rudolf Hess, which he wrote the British had not exploited. Bessner reads the first of these papers as a rejection of the Campaign of Truth. In a 1950 essay Speier wrote that "popular opinion should [not] govern the actions of governments" in a crisis.[^38]
 
 ### Project Troy
 
-Barrett, head of the State Department's public affairs office, organized a group of experts, Speier among them, in April 1950 to discuss psychological strategy, tactics and organization; Barrett later claimed that he had drawn on the conclusions of that symposium in helping to prepare Truman's Campaign of Truth speech. The State Department then convened Project Troy after RCA chairman [[David Sarnoff]] complained to President [[Harry Truman]] about the Voice of America; State's James Webb then approached MIT's president [[James Killian]] and dean [[John Burchard]] to host a study of Soviet jamming. Speier was among the roughly twenty participants, who met in Washington in October 1950 and in Cambridge, Massachusetts until January 1951 and included [[Lloyd Berkner]], [[Jerome Bruner]], [[Clyde Kluckhohn]], [[Edward Purcell]], [[Merle Tuve]], [[Jerome Wiesner]] and Robert Morison, a physician of the Rockefeller Foundation. The report to Secretary of State [[Dean Acheson]] is dated February 1, 1951, and Bessner records Acheson's receipt of it on February 15. A State Department progress report of March 1951 describes the project as MIT's assembly of "30 of the nation's top scientists and other experts to explore all means" of penetrating the Iron Curtain, conventional and unconventional. Robert Hooker of the Policy Planning Staff told Paul Nitze on March 26, 1951, that the report "deserves the most serious consideration" and recorded its recommendations to stimulate "mutual distrust" among Soviet leaders "by artificial means, bogus letters, etc." and to increase defection. The report was anonymous; Daniel Bessner infers from the similarity to Speier's writings that Speier was a primary author of its sections on psychological warfare against the Soviet Union.[^35]
+Barrett, head of the State Department's public affairs office, organized a group of experts, Speier among them, in April 1950 to discuss psychological strategy, tactics and organization; Barrett later claimed that he had drawn on the conclusions of that symposium in helping to prepare Truman's Campaign of Truth speech. The State Department then convened Project Troy after RCA chairman [[David Sarnoff]] complained to President [[Harry Truman]] about the Voice of America; State's James Webb then approached MIT's president [[James Killian]] and dean [[John Burchard]] to host a study of Soviet jamming. Speier was among the roughly twenty participants, who met in Washington in October 1950 and in Cambridge, Massachusetts until January 1951 and included [[Lloyd Berkner]], [[Jerome Bruner]], [[Clyde Kluckhohn]], [[Edward Purcell]], [[Merle Tuve]], [[Jerome Wiesner]] and Robert Morison, a physician of the Rockefeller Foundation. The report to Secretary of State [[Dean Acheson]] is dated February 1, 1951, and Bessner records Acheson's receipt of it on February 15. A State Department progress report of March 1951 describes the project as MIT's assembly of "30 of the nation's top scientists and other experts to explore all means" of penetrating the Iron Curtain, conventional and unconventional. Robert Hooker of the Policy Planning Staff told Paul Nitze on March 26, 1951, that the report "deserves the most serious consideration" and recorded its recommendations to stimulate "mutual distrust" among Soviet leaders "by artificial means, bogus letters, etc." and to increase defection. The report was anonymous; Daniel Bessner infers from the similarity to Speier's writings that Speier was a primary author of its sections on psychological warfare against the Soviet Union.[^39]
 
-The project was followed by CENIS, MIT's Center for International Studies, which began operating in the fall of 1951 and whose first director, from February 1952, was Max Millikan, an economist who had spent a year at the CIA.[^36] The Psychological Strategy Board's directive PSB D-31 of November 26, 1952, issued by a panel of State, Defense, CIA and PSB personnel (the board for which Speier would consult), called for increasing suspicion within the communist system "to the point of systematic removal or elimination of personnel in important and effective positions."[^37]
+The project was followed by CENIS, MIT's Center for International Studies, which began operating in the fall of 1951 and whose first director, from February 1952, was Max Millikan, an economist who had spent a year at the CIA.[^40] The Psychological Strategy Board's directive PSB D-31 of November 26, 1952, issued by a panel of State, Defense, CIA and PSB personnel (the board for which Speier would consult), called for increasing suspicion within the communist system "to the point of systematic removal or elimination of personnel in important and effective positions."[^41]
 
 ### Psychological Warfare in Germany
 
-At the request of Shepard Stone of the High Commission for Occupied Germany, Speier and Wallace Carroll visited Germany in autumn 1950 as State Department consultants and delivered on December 1, 1950, "Psychological Warfare in Germany," whose primary recommendation was to "destroy Soviet power in Germany." The report called for propaganda to create the belief that an East German resistance movement was ready to fight, and described later phases of "infiltration of selected Soviet zone organizations, ... sabotage, abduction, direct action against selected, high placed functionaries." After Stalin's note of March 1952 the Psychological Strategy Board's directive PSB D-21 (October 9, 1952) set out tasks including disaffection and defection in the Soviet Zone and non-attributable psychological, political and economic harassment; a later implementation report records financial assistance to a West Berlin publisher to distribute 50,000 fake copies of the East German labor paper Tribuene.[^38]
+At the request of Shepard Stone of the High Commission for Occupied Germany, Speier and Wallace Carroll visited Germany in autumn 1950 as State Department consultants and delivered on December 1, 1950, "Psychological Warfare in Germany," whose primary recommendation was to "destroy Soviet power in Germany." The report called for propaganda to create the belief that an East German resistance movement was ready to fight, and described later phases of "infiltration of selected Soviet zone organizations, ... sabotage, abduction, direct action against selected, high placed functionaries." After Stalin's note of March 1952 the Psychological Strategy Board's directive PSB D-21 (October 9, 1952) set out tasks including disaffection and defection in the Soviet Zone and non-attributable psychological, political and economic harassment; a later implementation report records financial assistance to a West Berlin publisher to distribute 50,000 fake copies of the East German labor paper Tribuene.[^42]
 
 ### The Ford Foundation and the Behavioral Sciences Center
 
-Gaither, who chaired the Ford Foundation study committee of 1949 and had arranged RAND's Ford loan, asked Speier and Donald Marquis in late 1950 for advice on the foundation's Program Five. Speier recommended Bernard Berelson as its director; with Marquis and Berelson he presented in December 1951 a plan proposing an institute for advanced training in the behavioral sciences, a research center on international communication and a study of the stability of totalitarian governments. The Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences opened at Stanford in September 1954 under Ralph Tyler. Speier spent 1956 and 1957 there as a fellow.[^39]
+Gaither, who chaired the Ford Foundation study committee of 1949 and had arranged RAND's Ford loan, asked Speier and Donald Marquis in late 1950 for advice on the foundation's Program Five. Speier recommended Bernard Berelson as its director; with Marquis and Berelson he presented in December 1951 a plan proposing an institute for advanced training in the behavioral sciences, a research center on international communication and a study of the stability of totalitarian governments. The Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences opened at Stanford in September 1954 under Ralph Tyler. Speier spent 1956 and 1957 there as a fellow.[^43]
 
-For the MIT program, Speier visited Millikan in February 1952, and in the spring of 1952 Ford trustees granted CENIS $875,000 for a research program in international communication. Speier chaired the planning committee (Bruner, Carroll, Lasswell, [[Paul Lazarsfeld]], Edward Shils, [[Ithiel de Sola Pool]]), whose June 1953 report recommended study of "communications to and from the wielders of power and influence"; Pool became the program's research director after Speier declined the position.[^40]
+For the MIT program, Speier visited Millikan in February 1952, and in the spring of 1952 Ford trustees granted CENIS $875,000 for a research program in international communication. Speier chaired the planning committee (Bruner, Carroll, Lasswell, [[Paul Lazarsfeld]], Edward Shils, [[Ithiel de Sola Pool]]), whose June 1953 report recommended study of "communications to and from the wielders of power and influence"; Pool became the program's research director after Speier declined the position.[^44]
 
 ### Quantico I
 
-Nelson Rockefeller, then Eisenhower's Special Assistant for Cold War Planning, invited Speier on May 25, 1955. The Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel met at the Marine Corps Schools from June 5 to 10, 1955, with [[Henry Kissinger]] and members of the State and Defense Departments, the CIA, the Operations Coordinating Board and the National Security Council attending some sessions. Its report lists Speier as of the RAND Corporation. Its chairman was [[Walt Rostow]] of MIT; the other members were Frederick Dunn, [[C. D. Jackson]], Ellis Johnson, Paul Linebarger, Max Millikan, Philip Mosely, George Pettee, Stefan Possony, Speier and Charles A. H. Thomson. On June 13, 1955, Rockefeller sent [[Allen Dulles]] a copy (Copy No. 42), thanking him for the participation of members of his agency in the panel discussions; on July 25, 1955, [[Richard Bissell]], Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for Planning and Coordination, sent the Assistant Director for National Estimates a memorandum drawing attention to Ellis Johnson's supporting paper on the requirements for the United States and NATO to win the arms race. Its report, stamped Secret, recommends proposals including "a proposed agreement for mutual inspection of military installations, forces, and armaments" and a convention on the right of aircraft to fly over any country. Speier's memorandum for the panel held that the Soviets would use the Geneva summit for advantage in "the international struggle for power" and that the United States should "force them to retreat." Rockefeller handed Eisenhower a note recommending mutual aerial inspection on July 6 and sent him a memorandum, "Psychological Strategy at Geneva," on July 11. On July 21, 1955, Eisenhower proposed Open Skies, and Rockefeller cabled panel members that they "should be reading newspapers tonight with great pride and satisfaction." Speier did not attend Quantico II (September 25 to 29, 1955), because he was in Germany for RAND; Kissinger attended in his place, and Rockefeller became Kissinger's patron. According to Bessner, Speier never again consulted for the executive branch.[^41]
+Nelson Rockefeller, then Eisenhower's Special Assistant for Cold War Planning, invited Speier on May 25, 1955. The Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel met at the Marine Corps Schools from June 5 to 10, 1955, with [[Henry Kissinger]] and members of the State and Defense Departments, the CIA, the Operations Coordinating Board and the National Security Council attending some sessions. Its report lists Speier as of the RAND Corporation. Its chairman was [[Walt Rostow]] of MIT; the other members were Frederick Dunn, [[C. D. Jackson]], Ellis Johnson, Paul Linebarger, Max Millikan, Philip Mosely, George Pettee, Stefan Possony, Speier and Charles A. H. Thomson. On June 13, 1955, Rockefeller sent [[Allen Dulles]] a copy (Copy No. 42), thanking him for the participation of members of his agency in the panel discussions; on July 25, 1955, [[Richard Bissell]], Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for Planning and Coordination, sent the Assistant Director for National Estimates a memorandum drawing attention to Ellis Johnson's supporting paper on the requirements for the United States and NATO to win the arms race. Its report, stamped Secret, recommends proposals including "a proposed agreement for mutual inspection of military installations, forces, and armaments" and a convention on the right of aircraft to fly over any country. Speier's memorandum for the panel held that the Soviets would use the Geneva summit for advantage in "the international struggle for power" and that the United States should "force them to retreat." Rockefeller handed Eisenhower a note recommending mutual aerial inspection on July 6 and sent him a memorandum, "Psychological Strategy at Geneva," on July 11. On July 21, 1955, Eisenhower proposed Open Skies, and Rockefeller cabled panel members that they "should be reading newspapers tonight with great pride and satisfaction." Speier did not attend Quantico II (September 25 to 29, 1955), because he was in Germany for RAND; Kissinger attended in his place, and Rockefeller became Kissinger's patron. According to Bessner, Speier never again consulted for the executive branch.[^45]
 
 ### The Political Game
 
-With Herbert Goldhamer, Speier developed a free-form political simulation, played four times at RAND in 1955 and 1956 and presented to the Social Science Research Council, the Army War College and West Point. Players took national roles, wrote justifications for each move and met random events refereed by staff; State Department officials joined the fourth game. In 1960 CENIS held the game POLEX II, the Joint War Games Agency adopted it, and in September and October 1961 two Berlin crisis games directed by [[Thomas Schelling]] were played by officials including McGeorge Bundy, Alain Enthoven, Carl Kaysen, Henry Kissinger, Robert Komer and John McNaughton's aide Henry Rowen. Kaysen briefed President Kennedy on the results.[^42]
+With Herbert Goldhamer, Speier developed a free-form political simulation, played four times at RAND in 1955 and 1956 and presented to the Social Science Research Council, the Army War College and West Point. Players took national roles, wrote justifications for each move and met random events refereed by staff; State Department officials joined the fourth game. In 1960 CENIS held the game POLEX II, the Joint War Games Agency adopted it, and in September and October 1961 two Berlin crisis games directed by [[Thomas Schelling]] were played by officials including McGeorge Bundy, Alain Enthoven, Carl Kaysen, Henry Kissinger, Robert Komer and John McNaughton's aide Henry Rowen. Kaysen briefed President Kennedy on the results.[^46]
 
 ### Later Career
 
-Speier remained in RAND's Research Council until 1968, wrote on West Germany and Berlin (Divided Berlin, 1961), held a Senior Fellowship at the [[Council on Foreign Relations]] in 1964 at the request of [[John J. McCloy]], and left for a professorship in sociology at the [[University of Massachusetts Amherst]] in 1969. He later edited with Lasswell and [[Daniel Lerner]] the three-volume Propaganda and Communication in World History (1979 to 1980), and was named professor emeritus of the New School's Graduate Faculty. He died in Sarasota, Florida.[^43]
+Speier remained in RAND's Research Council until 1968, wrote on West Germany and Berlin (Divided Berlin, 1961), held a Senior Fellowship at the [[Council on Foreign Relations]] in 1964 at the request of [[John J. McCloy]], and left for a professorship in sociology at the [[University of Massachusetts Amherst]] in 1969. He later edited with Lasswell and [[Daniel Lerner]] the three-volume Propaganda and Communication in World History (1979 to 1980), and was named professor emeritus of the New School's Graduate Faculty. He died in Sarasota, Florida.[^47]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
@@ -213,24 +213,28 @@ Speier remained in RAND's Research Council until 1968, wrote on West Germany and
 [^20]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 136-137 and notes 66-68 (Speier, "What Hitler Might Say on November 8," Speier Papers Box 8, Folder 6; Watson to Leigh, November 10, 1943, RG 262, Entry 73, Box 32).
 [^21]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 139 and notes 74-76 (Watson to Leigh, May 12, 1943, and Leigh's reply of May 14, 1943, RG 262, Entry 75, Box 49, Folder "New Personnel-German"). The list also named Kurt Mattusch, Eric Dale, Hans W. Weigert, John H. Herz and the Chicago historian Bernadotte Schmitt.
 [^22]: Roop, Part I, p. 193 and note (Section 304 cutoff of November 15, 1943; Watson and Dodd resigned a few days later; Schuman had already resigned and returned to Williams College) and p. 200 (final report of the Lea committee, January 2, 1945), https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947; United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), on Section 304 and the special subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee; Stephen C. Mercado, "FBIS Against the Axis, 1941-1945," Studies in Intelligence 45, no. 5 (2001), on Schuman's departure from Williams College in October 1942.
-[^23]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 142-143 and notes 87-90; Mercado, "FBIS Against the Axis," on the Cox hearings of January 1943 and their ending on January 2, 1945 (the Cox-Lea Committee's conclusion), Dies's accusations of "un-American beliefs" against Watson, Schumann and Dodd, Wallace's criticism of Dies, and the Lovett decision. Both texts spell the name Schumann; the person is the political scientist Frederick L. Schuman of Williams College. Bessner p. 138 for Watson's departure and Speier's thirty subordinates.
+[^23]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 142-143 and notes 87-90; Mercado, "FBIS Against the Axis," on the Cox hearings of January 1943 and their ending on January 2, 1945 (the Cox-Lea Committee's conclusion), Dies's accusations of "un-American beliefs" against Watson, Schumann and Dodd, Wallace's criticism of Dies, and the Lovett decision. Both texts spell the name Schumann; the person is the political scientist Frederick L. Schuman of Williams College. Bessner p. 138 and p. 143 (note 90) for Watson's departure and Speier's thirty subordinates.
-[^24]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 143 and notes 91-94 (Leigh's newsletter of February 15, 1944; Newcomb to Leigh, February 9 and April 3, 1944, RG 262, Entry 73, Box 32), quoting Mercado, "FBIS Against the Axis."
+[^24]: CIA Reading Room, Records of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (compiled by Walter W. Weinstein): "Goodwin Watson was Director of the Division from November 15, 1941, until November 15, 1943, when he was succeeded by Theodore Newcomb." https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp08t00376r000100250001-1
-[^25]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 143-147 and notes 95-110, citing Speier to Carroll, February 2, 1945, RG 208 (OWI), Entry 355, Box 1712, Folder "Wallace Carroll"; Watson to Speier, April 17, 1943, RG 262, Entry 2, Box 66; and Carroll to Bernard, December 4, 1944, Speier Papers Box 2, Folder 3. Allan M. Winkler, The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information, 1942-1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), p. 132 (the July 1944 central directive). Bessner cites Winkler at p. 146 note 106 in connection with the German directives.
+[^25]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 143 and note 90 (RG 262, Entry 73, Box 35; Speier's Application for Federal Employment, Speier Papers, Box 2, Folder 5).
-[^26]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 148-157 and notes 117-148, including the OWI cable of William Stone and Ferdinand Kuhn, November 20, 1945, RG 208, Entry 358, Box 108 (p. 150 note 124), and Speier to Brecht, August 8, 1947 (p. 157). University at Albany, M. E. Grenander Department of Special Collections and Archives, Hans Speier Papers, 1922-1989 (GER-084), finding aid, chronology and box and folder list (archived copy: https://web.archive.org/web/2022id_/https://library.albany.edu/speccoll/findaids/ger084.htm), chronology (trips to Germany for OWI, October 13 to December 2, 1945; Associate Chief of the Division for Occupied Areas, January 1946 to September 1947).
+[^26]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 143 and notes 91-94 (Leigh's newsletter of February 15, 1944; Newcomb to Leigh, February 9 and April 3, 1944, RG 262, Entry 73, Box 32), quoting Mercado, "FBIS Against the Axis."
-[^27]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 164-170 and notes 1-26 (Institute of World Affairs, "a research center funded by Doris Duke," p. 164; "used as a pawn in ridiculous faculty politics," p. 165; Division of International Studies elected December 17, 1947, p. 169; plans never realized, p. 170).
+[^27]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 143-147 and notes 95-110, citing Speier to Carroll, February 2, 1945, RG 208 (OWI), Entry 355, Box 1712, Folder "Wallace Carroll"; Watson to Speier, April 17, 1943, RG 262, Entry 2, Box 66; and Carroll to Bernard, December 4, 1944, Speier Papers Box 2, Folder 3. Allan M. Winkler, The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information, 1942-1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), p. 132 (the July 1944 central directive). Bessner cites Winkler at p. 146 note 106 in connection with the German directives.
-[^28]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 187-195 and notes 76-104, citing U.S. Air Force Project RAND, Conference of Social Scientists, September 14-19, 1947 (RAND R-106, June 9, 1948), pp. 1-8, 95-156, 184, and Speier, The RAND Social Science Program (RAND D-717-PR, February 2, 1950). Participant list at p. 190 note 88; Rosten at pp. 190-191 and note 89.
+[^28]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 148-157 and notes 117-148, including the OWI cable of William Stone and Ferdinand Kuhn, November 20, 1945, RG 208, Entry 358, Box 108 (p. 150 note 124), and Speier to Brecht, August 8, 1947 (p. 157). University at Albany, M. E. Grenander Department of Special Collections and Archives, Hans Speier Papers, 1922-1989 (GER-084), finding aid, chronology and box and folder list (archived copy: https://web.archive.org/web/2022id_/https://library.albany.edu/speccoll/findaids/ger084.htm), chronology (trips to Germany for OWI, October 13 to December 2, 1945; Associate Chief of the Division for Occupied Areas, January 1946 to September 1947).
-[^29]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 187 and note 76 (Ford loan of $100,000, $300,000 credit guarantee, a $150,000 Wells Fargo credit line, extension to $1,000,000 in 1950; other early supporters; RAND became the RAND Corporation on May 14, 1948).
+[^29]: Daniel Bessner, "The Night Watchman: Hans Speier and the Making of the American National Security State" (PhD diss., Duke University, 2013), pp. 164-165 and notes 3, 9 and 11 (Speier to Lowe, February 25, 1944). https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/232a76ac-f2d8-4827-99fe-50b3b109fa6c/content
-[^30]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 194-200 and notes 102-123. University at Albany, M. E. Grenander Department of Special Collections and Archives, Hans Speier Papers, 1922-1989 (GER-084), finding aid, chronology and box and folder list (archived copy: https://web.archive.org/web/2022id_/https://library.albany.edu/speccoll/findaids/ger084.htm), chronology (Research Council 1960 to 1968, chairman 1961 to 1962; consultant to the USAF Scientific Advisory Board 1958 to 1962).
+[^30]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 164 (Doris Duke funding passage; sole source); New School Archives and Special Collections, "Institute of World Affairs records," NS-02-16-01, historical note, https://findingaids.archives.newschool.edu/repositories/3/resources/235 ; Duke University Libraries, "Guide to the Independent Aid, Inc. Records, 1934-1954," https://archives.lib.duke.edu/catalog/uaindaid
-[^31]: Rand Corporation, Research Memorandum RM-365, Jean M. Hungerford, The Exploitation of Superstitions for Purposes of Psychological Warfare (Santa Monica: Project RAND, April 14, 1950; ASTIA Document Number ATI 210637), cover, summary, sections II to V and appendix. Full text at https://archive.org/details/1950-hungerford-exploitation-of-superstitions-for-purposes-of-psychological-warfare (rand.org record: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM365.html). Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 201 note 128 gives the date as April 15, 1950 and the author as J. Hungerford.
+[^31]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 164-170 and notes 1-26 (Institute of World Affairs, "a research center funded by Doris Duke," p. 164; "used as a pawn in ridiculous faculty politics," p. 165; Division of International Studies elected December 17, 1947, p. 169; plans never realized, p. 170).
-[^32]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 205-207 and notes 145-150, citing Goldhamer, The 1951 Korean Armistice Conference: A Personal Memoir, and Robert C. Tucker\'s memoir for the helicopter detail.
+[^32]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 187-195 and notes 76-104, citing U.S. Air Force Project RAND, Conference of Social Scientists, September 14-19, 1947 (RAND R-106, June 9, 1948), pp. 1-8, 95-156, 184, and Speier, The RAND Social Science Program (RAND D-717-PR, February 2, 1950). Participant list at p. 190 note 88; Rosten at pp. 190-191 and note 89.
-[^33]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 186 note 73, citing Christopher Simpson, Science of Coercion (Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 58.
+[^33]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 187 and note 76 (Ford loan of $100,000, $300,000 credit guarantee, a $150,000 Wells Fargo credit line, extension to $1,000,000 in 1950; other early supporters; RAND became the RAND Corporation on May 14, 1948).
-[^34]: Speier, Hans. Psychological Warfare Reconsidered. RAND P-196, February 5, 1951 (DTIC AD0603909). https://archive.org/details/DTIC_AD0603909. Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 209-210 note 164-165 (quoting Speier, "The Historical Development of Public Opinion," American Journal of Sociology 55, January 1950, p. 378), pp. 229-233 and notes 6-27 (Benton's "Marshall Plan of Ideas," Truman's speech of April 1950, the April 10, 1950 Foreign Service Institute address, Speier Papers Box 9, Folder 35, and P-196 pp. 7, 14-15, 17, 30-32). University at Albany, M. E. Grenander Department of Special Collections and Archives, Hans Speier Papers, 1922-1989 (GER-084), finding aid, chronology and box and folder list (archived copy: https://web.archive.org/web/2022id_/https://library.albany.edu/speccoll/findaids/ger084.htm), Series 4 (the 1951 Foreign Service Institute pamphlet).
+[^34]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 194-200 and notes 102-123. University at Albany, M. E. Grenander Department of Special Collections and Archives, Hans Speier Papers, 1922-1989 (GER-084), finding aid, chronology and box and folder list (archived copy: https://web.archive.org/web/2022id_/https://library.albany.edu/speccoll/findaids/ger084.htm), chronology (Research Council 1960 to 1968, chairman 1961 to 1962; consultant to the USAF Scientific Advisory Board 1958 to 1962).
-[^35]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 236-239 and notes 37-50, citing Project Troy, Report to the Secretary of State, Vol. 1, February 1, 1951, RG 59, Lot 52-283, National Archives II. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community, Document 57 (third progress report on NSC 59/1) and Document 59 (Hooker to Nitze, March 26, 1951). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d57 and https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d59. The participant list is at Bessner pp. 237-238 note 41, the April 1950 symposium and Barrett's later claim at p. 236 and p. 237 note 38 (Bessner names the official William Barrett at p. 236 and Edward W. Barrett at p. 230), and Acheson's receipt on February 15 at p. 238 note 41; FRUS Document 57 note states the report was submitted on February 1, 1951. The identification of Speier as primary author of the report's Soviet sections is Bessner's inference.
+[^35]: Rand Corporation, Research Memorandum RM-365, Jean M. Hungerford, The Exploitation of Superstitions for Purposes of Psychological Warfare (Santa Monica: Project RAND, April 14, 1950; ASTIA Document Number ATI 210637), cover, summary, sections II to V and appendix. Full text at https://archive.org/details/1950-hungerford-exploitation-of-superstitions-for-purposes-of-psychological-warfare (rand.org record: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM365.html). Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 201 note 128 gives the date as April 15, 1950 and the author as J. Hungerford.
-[^36]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 256 (CENIS began operating in the fall of 1951; Millikan accepted the directorship in February 1952, an economics professor who had spent a year at the CIA).
+[^36]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 205-207 and notes 145-150, citing Goldhamer, The 1951 Korean Armistice Conference: A Personal Memoir, and Robert C. Tucker\'s memoir for the helicopter detail.
-[^37]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community, Document 139, PSB D-31, "A Strategic Concept for a National Psychological Program with Particular Reference to Cold War Operations under NSC-10/5," November 26, 1952, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d139. Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 240 and notes 51-53 (Strategic Concept Panel; Speier would consult for the PSB).
+[^37]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 186 note 73, citing Christopher Simpson, Science of Coercion (Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 58.
-[^38]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 241-246 and notes 54-76, citing Carroll and Speier, "Psychological Warfare in Germany," December 1, 1950, RG 466, National Archives II, and PSB D-21, FRUS 1952-1954, vol. 7, Document 156; Bessner observes at p. 245 that the appendix tasks echoed the Speier and Carroll report.
+[^38]: Speier, Hans. Psychological Warfare Reconsidered. RAND P-196, February 5, 1951 (DTIC AD0603909). https://archive.org/details/DTIC_AD0603909. Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 209-210 note 164-165 (quoting Speier, "The Historical Development of Public Opinion," American Journal of Sociology 55, January 1950, p. 378), pp. 229-233 and notes 6-27 (Benton's "Marshall Plan of Ideas," Truman's speech of April 1950, the April 10, 1950 Foreign Service Institute address, Speier Papers Box 9, Folder 35, and P-196 pp. 7, 14-15, 17, 30-32). University at Albany, M. E. Grenander Department of Special Collections and Archives, Hans Speier Papers, 1922-1989 (GER-084), finding aid, chronology and box and folder list (archived copy: https://web.archive.org/web/2022id_/https://library.albany.edu/speccoll/findaids/ger084.htm), Series 4 (the 1951 Foreign Service Institute pamphlet).
-[^39]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 247-255 and notes 82-104, citing Speier, Marquis and Berelson, "The Ford Foundation Behavioral Sciences Program: Proposed Plan," December 1951 (Ford Foundation Archives, Report 002072). Speier's CASBS year is given as 1956 to 1957 by Bessner (p. 255) and by University at Albany, M. E. Grenander Department of Special Collections and Archives, Hans Speier Papers, 1922-1989 (GER-084), finding aid, chronology and box and folder list (archived copy: https://web.archive.org/web/2022id_/https://library.albany.edu/speccoll/findaids/ger084.htm); Deutsche Biographie, "Speier, Hans," gives 1957 and 1958. University at Albany, M. E. Grenander Department of Special Collections and Archives, Hans Speier Papers, 1922-1989 (GER-084), finding aid, chronology and box and folder list (archived copy: https://web.archive.org/web/2022id_/https://library.albany.edu/speccoll/findaids/ger084.htm), chronology: "1951 Consultant, Ford Foundation."
+[^39]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 236-239 and notes 37-50, citing Project Troy, Report to the Secretary of State, Vol. 1, February 1, 1951, RG 59, Lot 52-283, National Archives II. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community, Document 57 (third progress report on NSC 59/1) and Document 59 (Hooker to Nitze, March 26, 1951). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d57 and https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d59. The participant list is at Bessner pp. 237-238 note 41, the April 1950 symposium and Barrett's later claim at p. 236 and p. 237 note 38 (Bessner names the official William Barrett at p. 236 and Edward W. Barrett at p. 230), and Acheson's receipt on February 15 at p. 238 note 41; FRUS Document 57 note states the report was submitted on February 1, 1951. The identification of Speier as primary author of the report's Soviet sections is Bessner's inference.
-[^40]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 255-258 and notes 106-116 (trustees' grant "in the spring of 1952"; Pool as research director after Speier declined, p. 257 note 110), citing Speier et al., Research in International Communication: An Advisory Report of the Planning Committee (MIT Center for International Studies, June 1953), and Blackmer, Donald L. M., The MIT Center for International Studies: The Founding Years, 1951-1969 (2002).
+[^40]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 256 (CENIS began operating in the fall of 1951; Millikan accepted the directorship in February 1952, an economics professor who had spent a year at the CIA).
-[^41]: Report of the Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel, June 10, 1955, with Rockefeller's letter to Allen W. Dulles of June 13, 1955 and Richard M. Bissell's memorandum of July 25, 1955 (CIA-RDP86B00269R000800070001-5), CIA Reading Room. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp86b00269r000800070001-5. Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 260-266 and notes 126-148, citing Rockefeller to Speier, May 25, July 21 and August 16, 1955, Rockefeller to Eisenhower, July 11, 1955 (FRUS 1955-1957, vol. 5, Document 154), and Speier, "U.S. Strategy at the Forthcoming Conference," Speier Papers Box 4, Folder 60. University at Albany, M. E. Grenander Department of Special Collections and Archives, Hans Speier Papers, 1922-1989 (GER-084), finding aid, chronology and box and folder list (archived copy: https://web.archive.org/web/2022id_/https://library.albany.edu/speccoll/findaids/ger084.htm), container list (folders for Nelson A. Rockefeller, 1955-1956, and the Rockefeller Foundation, 1944 and 1975, Box 4).
+[^41]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community, Document 139, PSB D-31, "A Strategic Concept for a National Psychological Program with Particular Reference to Cold War Operations under NSC-10/5," November 26, 1952, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d139. Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 240 and notes 51-53 (Strategic Concept Panel; Speier would consult for the PSB).
-[^42]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 266-278 and notes 152-187, citing Goldhamer and Speier, "Some Observations on Political Gaming," World Politics 12, no. 1 (October 1959), and Ghamari-Tabrizi, Sharon, The Worlds of Herman Kahn (Harvard University Press, 2005), chapter 6.
+[^42]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 241-246 and notes 54-76, citing Carroll and Speier, "Psychological Warfare in Germany," December 1, 1950, RG 466, National Archives II, and PSB D-21, FRUS 1952-1954, vol. 7, Document 156; Bessner observes at p. 245 that the appendix tasks echoed the Speier and Carroll report.
-[^43]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 283, 303, 307 (Council on Foreign Relations fellowship at McCloy's request; move to the University of Massachusetts in 1969; Propaganda and Communication in World History). Deutsche Biographie, "Speier, Hans" (NDB 24, 2010; sfz123260), https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/sfz123260.html, dates his Amherst teaching 1969 to 1973 and the RAND Research Council 1960 to 1968, and gives the death as February 17, 1990, in Sarasota, Florida; University at Albany, M. E. Grenander Department of Special Collections and Archives, Hans Speier Papers, 1922-1989 (GER-084), finding aid, chronology and box and folder list (archived copy: https://web.archive.org/web/2022id_/https://library.albany.edu/speccoll/findaids/ger084.htm), adds that he died while vacationing there.
+[^43]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 247-255 and notes 82-104, citing Speier, Marquis and Berelson, "The Ford Foundation Behavioral Sciences Program: Proposed Plan," December 1951 (Ford Foundation Archives, Report 002072). Speier's CASBS year is given as 1956 to 1957 by Bessner (p. 255) and by University at Albany, M. E. Grenander Department of Special Collections and Archives, Hans Speier Papers, 1922-1989 (GER-084), finding aid, chronology and box and folder list (archived copy: https://web.archive.org/web/2022id_/https://library.albany.edu/speccoll/findaids/ger084.htm); Deutsche Biographie, "Speier, Hans," gives 1957 and 1958. University at Albany, M. E. Grenander Department of Special Collections and Archives, Hans Speier Papers, 1922-1989 (GER-084), finding aid, chronology and box and folder list (archived copy: https://web.archive.org/web/2022id_/https://library.albany.edu/speccoll/findaids/ger084.htm), chronology: "1951 Consultant, Ford Foundation."
+[^44]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 255-258 and notes 106-116 (trustees' grant "in the spring of 1952"; Pool as research director after Speier declined, p. 257 note 110), citing Speier et al., Research in International Communication: An Advisory Report of the Planning Committee (MIT Center for International Studies, June 1953), and Blackmer, Donald L. M., The MIT Center for International Studies: The Founding Years, 1951-1969 (2002).
+[^45]: Report of the Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel, June 10, 1955, with Rockefeller's letter to Allen W. Dulles of June 13, 1955 and Richard M. Bissell's memorandum of July 25, 1955 (CIA-RDP86B00269R000800070001-5), CIA Reading Room. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp86b00269r000800070001-5. Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 260-266 and notes 126-148, citing Rockefeller to Speier, May 25, July 21 and August 16, 1955, Rockefeller to Eisenhower, July 11, 1955 (FRUS 1955-1957, vol. 5, Document 154), and Speier, "U.S. Strategy at the Forthcoming Conference," Speier Papers Box 4, Folder 60. University at Albany, M. E. Grenander Department of Special Collections and Archives, Hans Speier Papers, 1922-1989 (GER-084), finding aid, chronology and box and folder list (archived copy: https://web.archive.org/web/2022id_/https://library.albany.edu/speccoll/findaids/ger084.htm), container list (folders for Nelson A. Rockefeller, 1955-1956, and the Rockefeller Foundation, 1944 and 1975, Box 4).
+[^46]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 266-278 and notes 152-187, citing Goldhamer and Speier, "Some Observations on Political Gaming," World Politics 12, no. 1 (October 1959), and Ghamari-Tabrizi, Sharon, The Worlds of Herman Kahn (Harvard University Press, 2005), chapter 6.
+[^47]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 283, 303, 307 (Council on Foreign Relations fellowship at McCloy's request; move to the University of Massachusetts in 1969; Propaganda and Communication in World History). Deutsche Biographie, "Speier, Hans" (NDB 24, 2010; sfz123260), https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/sfz123260.html, dates his Amherst teaching 1969 to 1973 and the RAND Research Council 1960 to 1968, and gives the death as February 17, 1990, in Sarasota, Florida; University at Albany, M. E. Grenander Department of Special Collections and Archives, Hans Speier Papers, 1922-1989 (GER-084), finding aid, chronology and box and folder list (archived copy: https://web.archive.org/web/2022id_/https://library.albany.edu/speccoll/findaids/ger084.htm), adds that he died while vacationing there.