vault backup: 2026-10-12 21:40:22

20 - ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/USA/Central Intelligence Agency.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ aliases:
   - Central Intelligence Agency
   - CIA
 created: 2025-07-22
-updated: 2026-10-09
+updated: 2026-10-12
 tags:
   - Organization
   - Intelligence
@@ -17,30 +17,36 @@ summary: "The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is the principal U.S. civilian f
 start: 1947-09-18
 location: "Langley, Virginia"
 relations:
+  - type: partner_of
+    with: "[[LEAA]]"
+    role: "Office of Security release of police techniques through LEAA"
+    start: 1970
+    end: 1973
+    fn: 5
   - type: employed_by
     with: "[[Bobby Ray Inman]]"
     reverse: true
     role: "deputy director"
     start: 1981-02
     end: 1982-04
-    fn: 21
+    fn: 32
   - type: participant_in
     with: "[[Psychological Strategy Board]]"
     role: "Member agency; the Director of Central Intelligence chaired meeting M-8"
     start: 1952-01-10
-    fn: 44
+    fn: 55
   - type: employed_by
     with: "[[Max Millikan]]"
     reverse: true
     role: "Assistant Director, Research and Reports (1951); Special Consultant (1952)"
     start: 1951-01
     end: 1952-03
-    fn: 45
+    fn: 56
   - type: funded
     with: "[[Center for International Studies]]"
     role: "agency money reported to have set up the center in 1951; $300,000 reported in 1967"
     start: 1951
-    fn: 52
+    fn: 63
 ---
 The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is a primary intelligence-gathering organization of the United States government. In the context of psychic research, the CIA played a significant, albeit often covert, role in funding and overseeing programs aimed at exploring and utilizing psychic phenomena for intelligence purposes.[^1]
 
@@ -56,13 +62,25 @@ In 1972, the CIA, through officials like [[Kenneth A. Kress|Ken Kress]] from the
 
 Since [[World War II]] the CIA searched secretly for ways to control human behavior, an effort that extended the wartime [[Office of Strategic Services|OSS]] quest for a truth drug and echoed both the Nazi experiments at [[Dachau]] and [[Albert Hofmann]]'s discovery of [[LSD]]. The programs were triggered by the 1949 show trial of [[Josef Cardinal Mindszenty]] in [[Hungary]], whose glazed confession convinced Agency officials the Communists had developed a technique to render defendants zombielike; what began as defensive research quickly turned offensive, with documents stressing the goal of "controlling an individual to the point where he will do our bidding against his will and even against such fundamental laws of nature as self-preservation." The effort passed through [[Project Bluebird and Project Artichoke|Project BLUEBIRD]] (1950), ARTICHOKE (1952), and finally [[Project MKUltra|MKULTRA]] under the [[Office of Technical Service|Technical Services Staff]], with [[Richard Helms]] its most important sponsor and his protégé [[Sidney Gottlieb]] running it day to day. The research systematically violated the will of subjects drawn from groups officials considered expendable, mental patients, prostitutes, foreigners, drug addicts, and prisoners; as one Agency psychologist put it, operators lacked "a universal concept of mankind" and were willing to do things to foreigners they would not try on Americans. "It was strictly a patriotic vision," he said.[^4]
 
+### Police Technique Program Through LEAA
+
+From 1970 the Office of Security used the [[LEAA|Law Enforcement Assistance Administration]] as its channel for releasing agency techniques to police. A June 10, 1970 memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence recommended LEAA as "the best vehicle to expand dissemination of this technique to all public law enforcement officials in the United States" for the Trace Metal Detection Technique, which the Director had declassified.[^5] The memorandum carried the concurrence of the Deputy Director for Plans, [[Thomas Karamessines]]. It stated that the only stipulation placed on recipients was that there be "no public connection between the technique and this Agency."[^5]
+
+Between June 1970 and December 1971 Office of Security representatives demonstrated the technique to approximately 35 police departments, three professional police associations and representatives of 83 other state and local departments. Outside the Washington area they appeared as "consultants" to LEAA, and "no mention was made of the Agency."[^6] The office provided six men to LEAA in 1970 for the same briefings.[^7]
+
+The Explosive Residue Detection Technique was declassified in March 1971, and the Security Office recommended dissemination through LEAA or the LEAA-funded National Bomb Data Center.[^6] On November 10, 1971 agency officers demonstrated it to LEAA staff and then met [[Lester Shubin]] and [[Marc Nerenstone]], whom the memorandum describes as "both witting of the Agency's role in the development of the technique."[^8]
+
+A February 16, 1972 Office of Security memorandum records that LEAA never reimbursed the agency's travel costs "because of their desire to avoid unclassified (i.e. public) reimbursement of the money to CIA" and that "LEAA indicated it did not wish to be publicly affiliated with CIA."[^9] A May 9, 1973 survey of the Office of Research and Development recorded that an adhesive restraint, a non-lethal incapacitation system, had been made available to LEAA in August 1972. It said that "if they developed the system, it would be used for civilian crowd and riot control."[^10] On June 18, 1973 the House adopted by voice vote the Holtzman amendment to H.R. 8152, which the Office of Legislative Counsel summarized as prohibiting LEAA from using the agency's services, equipment, personnel and facilities.[^11]
+
+Section 508 of the Crime Control Act of 1973 authorized LEAA to use federal agency services "(not including the Central Intelligence Agency)," a restriction absent from the 1968 statute.[^12] An Office of General Counsel memorandum of October 15, 1973 concluded that the agency was not required to reject all LEAA requests and would decide each one case by case.[^13] In July 1978 the Office of Legislative Counsel reviewed reauthorization language that would bar any use of CIA services by LEAA, and reported that the agency did not endorse the provision but had no formal objection to it.[^14] On November 14, 1975 an agency officer briefed two staff members of a House select committee on the LEAA liaison. The memorandum records that the agency discontinued liaison with LEAA in 1973 as a result of the Kennedy-Holtzman amendment, and that one staff member asked where the agency fit into the operation of the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit, described as "a communications network between police intelligence agencies"; the officer answered that he knew of no such nationwide network in which the agency had taken part.[^15]
+
 ### The 1977 Notifications to Institutions
 
-In the summer of 1977 the agency located MKULTRA documents it had believed destroyed in 1973, and notified the institutions named in them. Director of Central Intelligence [[Stansfield Turner]] wrote to Senator [[Daniel K. Inouye]] on August 2, 1977 that the agency now held "the names of 185 non-government researchers and assistants" and the names of 80 institutions where the work was done or with which the researchers were affiliated. He listed them as 44 colleges or universities, 15 research foundations or chemical or pharmaceutical companies and the like, 12 hospitals or clinics, and 3 penal institutions. The names went to the Senate committee on a classified basis, and the Director wrote that he had "a legal obligation under the Privacy Act not to publicly disclose the names of the individual researchers without their consent."[^5]
+In the summer of 1977 the agency located MKULTRA documents it had believed destroyed in 1973, and notified the institutions named in them. Director of Central Intelligence [[Stansfield Turner]] wrote to Senator [[Daniel K. Inouye]] on August 2, 1977 that the agency now held "the names of 185 non-government researchers and assistants" and the names of 80 institutions where the work was done or with which the researchers were affiliated. He listed them as 44 colleges or universities, 15 research foundations or chemical or pharmaceutical companies and the like, 12 hospitals or clinics, and 3 penal institutions. The names went to the Senate committee on a classified basis, and the Director wrote that he had "a legal obligation under the Privacy Act not to publicly disclose the names of the individual researchers without their consent."[^16]
 
-General Counsel [[Anthony A. Lapham]] wrote to each institution in August 1977. The letter stated that the institution "is included among the institutions at which some portion of this CIA-sponsored research appears to have been performed or with which one or more individuals performing some aspect of this research were affiliated," and that the agency "does not intend to reveal to the public the identities of any institutions that knowingly or unknowingly were involved in MKULTRA activities, or the names of individual researchers."[^6] On September 7, 1977 A. R. Cinquegrana of the Office of General Counsel sent the president of the [[New School for Social Research]], [[John R. Everett]], copies of the two MKULTRA subproject files relating to the school, with a letter stating that "the name of the School has been reinserted wherever it appears in the original documents."[^7] Lapham's letter of November 7, 1977 asked whether each institution had itself made its correspondence public, and wrote that "Where an institution has itself made public these relationships, there would seem to be little point in our continued refusal to confirm these facts."[^8] On March 17, 1978 Assistant General Counsel Cinquegrana wrote that the agency would presume an institution wished its identity protected if it did not respond by April 15, 1978.[^9]
+General Counsel [[Anthony A. Lapham]] wrote to each institution in August 1977. The letter stated that the institution "is included among the institutions at which some portion of this CIA-sponsored research appears to have been performed or with which one or more individuals performing some aspect of this research were affiliated," and that the agency "does not intend to reveal to the public the identities of any institutions that knowingly or unknowingly were involved in MKULTRA activities, or the names of individual researchers."[^17] On September 7, 1977 A. R. Cinquegrana of the Office of General Counsel sent the president of the [[New School for Social Research]], [[John R. Everett]], copies of the two MKULTRA subproject files relating to the school, with a letter stating that "the name of the School has been reinserted wherever it appears in the original documents."[^18] Lapham's letter of November 7, 1977 asked whether each institution had itself made its correspondence public, and wrote that "Where an institution has itself made public these relationships, there would seem to be little point in our continued refusal to confirm these facts."[^19] On March 17, 1978 Assistant General Counsel Cinquegrana wrote that the agency would presume an institution wished its identity protected if it did not respond by April 15, 1978.[^20]
 
-The Senate Health Subcommittee invited the presidents of 20 institutions to testify on September 20 and 21, 1977. Only one accepted, and that president was not scheduled to testify because the others declined.[^10]
+The Senate Health Subcommittee invited the presidents of 20 institutions to testify on September 20 and 21, 1977. Only one accepted, and that president was not scheduled to testify because the others declined.[^21]
 
 ### Notable Operations and Impact
 
@@ -84,29 +102,29 @@ Following the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor at [[Osirak bombing]]
 
 ### Involvement with BCCI
 
-The CIA used the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International|BCCI]] extensively, particularly in connection with covert U.S. operations in [[Central America]].[^11] Even before [[Oliver North]] established his network for illegal payments to the [[Contras]], the [[National Security Council]] used BCCI to channel money to them through [[Saudi Arabia]].[^11] The CIA maintained accounts in BCCI for covert operations.[^12]
+The CIA used the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International|BCCI]] extensively, particularly in connection with covert U.S. operations in [[Central America]].[^22] Even before [[Oliver North]] established his network for illegal payments to the [[Contras]], the [[National Security Council]] used BCCI to channel money to them through [[Saudi Arabia]].[^22] The CIA maintained accounts in BCCI for covert operations.[^23]
 
-In 1986, the CIA issued a report stating that BCCI had owned [[First American Bank]] since 1982.[^13] In 1991, Acting CIA Director [[Richard J. Kerr]] confirmed that the agency had used BCCI to move money around the world.[^14] The CIA also maintained slush funds at BCCI branches, which were used for payoffs of Pakistani military officers and Afghan rebel leaders.[^15]
+In 1986, the CIA issued a report stating that BCCI had owned [[First American Bank]] since 1982.[^24] In 1991, Acting CIA Director [[Richard J. Kerr]] confirmed that the agency had used BCCI to move money around the world.[^25] The CIA also maintained slush funds at BCCI branches, which were used for payoffs of Pakistani military officers and Afghan rebel leaders.[^26]
 
-William J. Casey, former CIA Director, met secretly with [[Agha Hasan Abedi]] over a three-year period, discussing U.S. arms deals with Iran and the arming of Afghan resistance forces.[^16] The CIA began using BCCI in the bank's earliest days, as it was establishing itself in countries where American intelligence had few assets.[^16]
+William J. Casey, former CIA Director, met secretly with [[Agha Hasan Abedi]] over a three-year period, discussing U.S. arms deals with Iran and the arming of Afghan resistance forces.[^27] The CIA began using BCCI in the bank's earliest days, as it was establishing itself in countries where American intelligence had few assets.[^27]
 
-The [[BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report|Kerry-Brown Senate Report]] recorded that the agency produced several hundred reports on BCCI between 1979 and 1991, including special analyses in 1985, 1986 and 1989. The 1985 report, delivered in January 1985 to the Treasury's intelligence liaison, [[Douglas Mulholland]], who called it "dynamite," stated that BCCI secretly owned First American Bank; the 1986 report went to the [[State Department]], the Defense Intelligence Agency, the [[National Security Agency]], the National Security Council, Commerce and the Treasury, except for "the two agencies which would have had a statutory responsibility to begin investigations in response," the [[Federal Reserve Board|Federal Reserve]] and the [[Department of Justice|Justice Department]]. Acting Director Richard J. Kerr testified on October 25, 1991, that the agency's own use of BCCI had been "limited and routine," and acknowledged "extensive use of First American" for ordinary accounts. The agency denied any relationship between William J. Casey and Agha Hasan Abedi; the report recorded a contrary account from a BCCI official of meetings at the [[Madison Hotel]] in Washington, and the view of the agency's legal department that any such activity by Casey would have been undertaken "in his position as an advisor to the President, rather than in his position as Director of Central Intelligence," outside the agency's records.[^17]
+The [[BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report|Kerry-Brown Senate Report]] recorded that the agency produced several hundred reports on BCCI between 1979 and 1991, including special analyses in 1985, 1986 and 1989. The 1985 report, delivered in January 1985 to the Treasury's intelligence liaison, [[Douglas Mulholland]], who called it "dynamite," stated that BCCI secretly owned First American Bank; the 1986 report went to the [[State Department]], the Defense Intelligence Agency, the [[National Security Agency]], the National Security Council, Commerce and the Treasury, except for "the two agencies which would have had a statutory responsibility to begin investigations in response," the [[Federal Reserve Board|Federal Reserve]] and the [[Department of Justice|Justice Department]]. Acting Director Richard J. Kerr testified on October 25, 1991, that the agency's own use of BCCI had been "limited and routine," and acknowledged "extensive use of First American" for ordinary accounts. The agency denied any relationship between William J. Casey and Agha Hasan Abedi; the report recorded a contrary account from a BCCI official of meetings at the [[Madison Hotel]] in Washington, and the view of the agency's legal department that any such activity by Casey would have been undertaken "in his position as an advisor to the President, rather than in his position as Director of Central Intelligence," outside the agency's records.[^28]
 
 ### Operations and Activities
 
-The CIA sent the [[Inter-Services Intelligence|Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)]] agency enormous quantities of cash to keep things moving through [[Pakistan]] during the [[Soviet-Afghan War]].[^18] The CIA was responsible for obtaining arms and ammunition for the [[Mujahideen]], but once delivered to [[Karachi]], the ISI was responsible for moving the equipment.[^18]
+The CIA sent the [[Inter-Services Intelligence|Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)]] agency enormous quantities of cash to keep things moving through [[Pakistan]] during the [[Soviet-Afghan War]].[^29] The CIA was responsible for obtaining arms and ammunition for the [[Mujahideen]], but once delivered to [[Karachi]], the ISI was responsible for moving the equipment.[^29]
 
-In 1980, Jimmy Carter signed a presidential "finding" authorizing the CIA to aid the Afghan rebels in "harassment" of the Soviet occupying forces through secret supplies of light weapons and limited funds.[^19] This became the largest covert-action program since [[World War Two]].[^19]
+In 1980, Jimmy Carter signed a presidential "finding" authorizing the CIA to aid the Afghan rebels in "harassment" of the Soviet occupying forces through secret supplies of light weapons and limited funds.[^30] This became the largest covert-action program since [[World War Two]].[^30]
 
 ### Deputy Director Bobby Ray Inman, 1981 to 1982
 
-President Ronald Reagan nominated [[Bobby Ray Inman]], then director of the [[NSA]], as deputy director of Central Intelligence in 1981.[^20] The White House announced his resignation on April 21, 1982.[^21] The White House biography gives March 1982 as the date he resigned.[^20]
+President Ronald Reagan nominated [[Bobby Ray Inman]], then director of the [[NSA]], as deputy director of Central Intelligence in 1981.[^31] The White House announced his resignation on April 21, 1982.[^32] The White House biography gives March 1982 as the date he resigned.[^31]
 
-The [[Philadelphia Inquirer]] reported that Inman had submitted his resignation during a "heated internal debate" over a secret counterintelligence study, and that he and other intelligence officials had since narrowed the study's scope. Its sources said two topics that Inman, Casey and FBI Director William Webster had feared might be included, the organization of U.S. counterintelligence agencies and deceptive Soviet missile telemetry, were not on the agenda approved by an interagency working group chaired by John Kohler of the intelligence community staff.[^22] A CBS radio commentary of April 22, 1982 described William J. Casey, the director, as "a professional politician."[^23]
+The [[Philadelphia Inquirer]] reported that Inman had submitted his resignation during a "heated internal debate" over a secret counterintelligence study, and that he and other intelligence officials had since narrowed the study's scope. Its sources said two topics that Inman, Casey and FBI Director William Webster had feared might be included, the organization of U.S. counterintelligence agencies and deceptive Soviet missile telemetry, were not on the agenda approved by an interagency working group chaired by John Kohler of the intelligence community staff.[^33] A CBS radio commentary of April 22, 1982 described William J. Casey, the director, as "a professional politician."[^34]
 
 ### Senior Review Panel
 
-The Senior Review Panel was an advisory body within the Director's area that reviewed draft national intelligence estimates and commented on them to the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and the relevant National Intelligence Officer. In a 1991 letter printed in the Senate report on the nomination of [[Robert Gates]], Gates wrote that "The SRP's sole function was to review draft national estimates and offer comments as a group to the DCI, the Chairman/NIC and the relevant NIO."[^24] The Senate report records that [[James D. Theberge]] served on the panel from January 1986 until his death in January 1988, and that he had been hired on a three-days-per-week basis.[^24] Panel memoranda in the CIA reading room carry his name among the signers of comments dated September 1, September 8, September 24, October 22 and December 1, 1987, alongside [[William Leonhart]], B. McPherson and, on some, [[Richard L. Walker]] or [[Courtland D. Perkins]].[^25]
+The Senior Review Panel was an advisory body within the Director's area that reviewed draft national intelligence estimates and commented on them to the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and the relevant National Intelligence Officer. In a 1991 letter printed in the Senate report on the nomination of [[Robert Gates]], Gates wrote that "The SRP's sole function was to review draft national estimates and offer comments as a group to the DCI, the Chairman/NIC and the relevant NIO."[^35] The Senate report records that [[James D. Theberge]] served on the panel from January 1986 until his death in January 1988, and that he had been hired on a three-days-per-week basis.[^35] Panel memoranda in the CIA reading room carry his name among the signers of comments dated September 1, September 8, September 24, October 22 and December 1, 1987, alongside [[William Leonhart]], B. McPherson and, on some, [[Richard L. Walker]] or [[Courtland D. Perkins]].[^36]
 
 ### UAP Research and Secrecy
 
@@ -118,63 +136,63 @@ In recent years, the CIA has been more involved in the official UAP investigatio
 
 ### Dark Alliance Investigation
 
-The CIA's covert action division, the Directorate of Operations, created and managed the Contra project during the 1980s, with its Latin American Division headed by [[Dewey Clarridge]] from 1981 to 1984. The agency recruited Contra leaders including [[Enrique Bermudez|Enrique Bermúdez]] in 1980 and [[Eden Pastora]] in 1981. The CIA maintained station chiefs in [[Costa Rica]], notably [[Joseph Fernandez|Joseph Fernández]] from 1984 to 1986, who were integral to Oliver North's illegal Contra resupply operation.[^26]
+The CIA's covert action division, the Directorate of Operations, created and managed the Contra project during the 1980s, with its Latin American Division headed by [[Dewey Clarridge]] from 1981 to 1984. The agency recruited Contra leaders including [[Enrique Bermudez|Enrique Bermúdez]] in 1980 and [[Eden Pastora]] in 1981. The CIA maintained station chiefs in [[Costa Rica]], notably [[Joseph Fernandez|Joseph Fernández]] from 1984 to 1986, who were integral to Oliver North's illegal Contra resupply operation.[^37]
 
 ### Contra Drug Trafficking and the Frogman Case
 
-Federal law enforcement records and congressional testimony established that the CIA had reports of [[Cocaine]] being transshipped through Contra-linked facilities, including [[Ilopango Airbase]] in [[El Salvador]]. When defense attorneys in the [[Frogman Case]] obtained letters from CIA assets claiming seized drug money belonged to the Contras, the CIA's Costa Rican station cabled Langley that both men were assets of an organization that had "unwittingly received CIA support." CIA lawyer Lee Strickland flew to [[San Francisco]] and asked the prosecutor to ensure depositions did not go forward. The government returned $36,020 in seized drug money and a CIA cable declared: "CIA equities are fully protected."[^27]
+Federal law enforcement records and congressional testimony established that the CIA had reports of [[Cocaine]] being transshipped through Contra-linked facilities, including [[Ilopango Airbase]] in [[El Salvador]]. When defense attorneys in the [[Frogman Case]] obtained letters from CIA assets claiming seized drug money belonged to the Contras, the CIA's Costa Rican station cabled Langley that both men were assets of an organization that had "unwittingly received CIA support." CIA lawyer Lee Strickland flew to [[San Francisco]] and asked the prosecutor to ensure depositions did not go forward. The government returned $36,020 in seized drug money and a CIA cable declared: "CIA equities are fully protected."[^38]
 
-The pseudonymous agent [[Ivan Gomez|Iván Gómez]], assigned to Costa Rica in 1982 as the CIA's liaison to the Contra armies, admitted during polygraph tests that he had laundered drug money. He was fired in 1989 for repeated polygraph failures concerning drug dealing.[^27]
+The pseudonymous agent [[Ivan Gomez|Iván Gómez]], assigned to Costa Rica in 1982 as the CIA's liaison to the Contra armies, admitted during polygraph tests that he had laundered drug money. He was fired in 1989 for repeated polygraph failures concerning drug dealing.[^38]
 
 ### The Secret 1982 Agreement with the Justice Department
 
-In early 1982, CIA director William J. Casey and Attorney General [[William French Smith]] signed a formal Memorandum of Understanding that exempted the CIA from reporting drug crimes committed by its non-employees - a category including agents, assets, and non-staff employees. Drug offenses were specifically removed from the list of crimes the CIA was required to report. The agreement remained in effect from 1982 to 1995.[^28]
+In early 1982, CIA director William J. Casey and Attorney General [[William French Smith]] signed a formal Memorandum of Understanding that exempted the CIA from reporting drug crimes committed by its non-employees - a category including agents, assets, and non-staff employees. Drug offenses were specifically removed from the list of crimes the CIA was required to report. The agreement remained in effect from 1982 to 1995.[^39]
 
 ### Ilopango Obstruction
 
-When [[DEA]] agent [[Celerino Castillo]] began investigating Contra drug trafficking at Ilopango, the CIA intervened directly.[^29] On April 25, 1986 the El Salvador station replied to a Costa Rica station cable of April 23 about Carlos Amador. The reply asked: "Based on that information, [El Salvador] Station would appreciate [Costa Rica] Station advising [DEA] not to make any inquiries to anyone re: hangar no. 4 at Ilopango since only legitimate [CIA] supported operations were conducted from this facility." The same cable stated that station air operations had moved from Hangar 4 into Hangar 5, which the station still occupied.[^30]
+When [[DEA]] agent [[Celerino Castillo]] began investigating Contra drug trafficking at Ilopango, the CIA intervened directly.[^40] On April 25, 1986 the El Salvador station replied to a Costa Rica station cable of April 23 about Carlos Amador. The reply asked: "Based on that information, [El Salvador] Station would appreciate [Costa Rica] Station advising [DEA] not to make any inquiries to anyone re: hangar no. 4 at Ilopango since only legitimate [CIA] supported operations were conducted from this facility." The same cable stated that station air operations had moved from Hangar 4 into Hangar 5, which the station still occupied.[^41]
 
 ### Inspector General Investigation
 
-CIA Inspector General [[Fred Hitz]] testified before the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence|House Intelligence Committee]] in March 1998 that the CIA "did not, in an expeditious or consistent fashion, cut off relationships with individuals supporting the Contra program who were alleged to have engaged in drug trafficking activity," including trafficking within the United States. His 400-page report documented CIA relationships with more than 50 suspected drug traffickers during the Contra war.[^28]
+CIA Inspector General [[Fred Hitz]] testified before the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence|House Intelligence Committee]] in March 1998 that the CIA "did not, in an expeditious or consistent fashion, cut off relationships with individuals supporting the Contra program who were alleged to have engaged in drug trafficking activity," including trafficking within the United States. His 400-page report documented CIA relationships with more than 50 suspected drug traffickers during the Contra war.[^39]
 
 ### Iran-Contra Indictments
 
-Multiple CIA officials were indicted during the Iran-Contra investigation. Clarridge was indicted on seven counts of perjury. Fernández was indicted on four counts. [[Alan Fiers]] pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress. All were pardoned by former CIA director [[George H.W. Bush]].[^26]
+Multiple CIA officials were indicted during the Iran-Contra investigation. Clarridge was indicted on seven counts of perjury. Fernández was indicted on four counts. [[Alan Fiers]] pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress. All were pardoned by former CIA director [[George H.W. Bush]].[^37]
 
 ### Interrogation videotapes and the 2004 to 2006 directorship
 
-[[Porter Goss]], a former House intelligence chairman, was confirmed by the Senate 77 to 17 on September 22, 2004, was sworn in at the White House on September 24, 2004, and announced his resignation on May 5, 2006.[^31] His executive director, [[Kyle Foggo]], the agency's No. 3 official, resigned in May 2006 while the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] was examining whether he had improperly helped the defense contractor [[Brent Wilkes]] obtain large CIA contracts.[^32] Foggo pleaded guilty in 2008 to one count of defrauding the government and was sentenced on February 26, 2009 to 37 months.[^33]
+[[Porter Goss]], a former House intelligence chairman, was confirmed by the Senate 77 to 17 on September 22, 2004, was sworn in at the White House on September 24, 2004, and announced his resignation on May 5, 2006.[^42] His executive director, [[Kyle Foggo]], the agency's No. 3 official, resigned in May 2006 while the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] was examining whether he had improperly helped the defense contractor [[Brent Wilkes]] obtain large CIA contracts.[^43] Foggo pleaded guilty in 2008 to one count of defrauding the government and was sentenced on February 26, 2009 to 37 months.[^44]
 
-The [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]]'s 2014 study of the detention and interrogation program records that the CIA destroyed videotapes of the interrogations of [[Abu Zubaydah]] and [[Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri]] on November 9, 2005, the day after the Senate's November 8 vote against an amendment to establish an independent commission on detainee treatment.[^34] In an October 31, 2005 email, the CIA attorney [[John Rizzo]] wrote that he needed "to be the skunk at the party again."[^34]
+The [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]]'s 2014 study of the detention and interrogation program records that the CIA destroyed videotapes of the interrogations of [[Abu Zubaydah]] and [[Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri]] on November 9, 2005, the day after the Senate's November 8 vote against an amendment to establish an independent commission on detainee treatment.[^45] In an October 31, 2005 email, the CIA attorney [[John Rizzo]] wrote that he needed "to be the skunk at the party again."[^45]
 
-Emails released by the [[United States Department of Justice|Justice Department]] in April 2010, under a Freedom of Information Act request by the [[American Civil Liberties Union]], state that in November 2005 [[Jose A. Rodriguez Jr.|Jose Rodriguez]] told Goss and others he "felt it was extremely important to destroy the tapes and that if there was any heat, he would take it," and that Goss "laughed and said he'd be the one to take the heat." The same email states: "PG, however, agreed with the decision." NBC News reported that the email is an after-the-fact summary that does not prove Goss approved the destruction, that current and former intelligence officials have said he did not and was angry to find out, and that Rodriguez's lawyer disputed that.[^35] On November 9, 2010, the Justice Department said special prosecutor [[John Durham]] would not bring criminal charges over the destruction.[^36]
+Emails released by the [[United States Department of Justice|Justice Department]] in April 2010, under a Freedom of Information Act request by the [[American Civil Liberties Union]], state that in November 2005 [[Jose A. Rodriguez Jr.|Jose Rodriguez]] told Goss and others he "felt it was extremely important to destroy the tapes and that if there was any heat, he would take it," and that Goss "laughed and said he'd be the one to take the heat." The same email states: "PG, however, agreed with the decision." NBC News reported that the email is an after-the-fact summary that does not prove Goss approved the destruction, that current and former intelligence officials have said he did not and was angry to find out, and that Rodriguez's lawyer disputed that.[^46] On November 9, 2010, the Justice Department said special prosecutor [[John Durham]] would not bring criminal charges over the destruction.[^47]
 
 ### Foreign Broadcast Information Service
 
-The [[Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service]] became a unit of the agency in 1947. The [[War Department]] had sponsored the service from January 2, 1946, and the [[Director of Central Intelligence]] assumed control of it on July 31, 1946, before the [[National Security Act of 1947]] replaced the [[Central Intelligence Group]] with the agency.[^37] The administrative history of the service's record group lists the successor as "Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Intelligence Agency, 1947-."[^38] The service's 1969 history says it came to the agency "almost mature, trained and disciplined, and ready to plunge immediately into the tasks outlined for it."[^39]
+The [[Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service]] became a unit of the agency in 1947. The [[War Department]] had sponsored the service from January 2, 1946, and the [[Director of Central Intelligence]] assumed control of it on July 31, 1946, before the [[National Security Act of 1947]] replaced the [[Central Intelligence Group]] with the agency.[^48] The administrative history of the service's record group lists the successor as "Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Intelligence Agency, 1947-."[^49] The service's 1969 history says it came to the agency "almost mature, trained and disciplined, and ready to plunge immediately into the tasks outlined for it."[^50]
 
-Within the agency the service sat under the [[Assistant Director for Operations]]. In January 1947 the Assistant Director presented a propaganda analysis program to the PRC, approving the proposed program but excluding "interpretative analysis" from its scope, and the requested staff was twelve at $61,000 a year. [[Lawrence K. White]] was announced as deputy chief of the service on January 9, 1947.[^40]
+Within the agency the service sat under the [[Assistant Director for Operations]]. In January 1947 the Assistant Director presented a propaganda analysis program to the PRC, approving the proposed program but excluding "interpretative analysis" from its scope, and the requested staff was twelve at $61,000 a year. [[Lawrence K. White]] was announced as deputy chief of the service on January 9, 1947.[^51]
 
-The service's functions were folded into the [[Open Source Center]] in November 2005. The release announcing the center said the Director of the CIA would administer it on behalf of the DNI.[^41]
+The service's functions were folded into the [[Open Source Center]] in November 2005. The release announcing the center said the Director of the CIA would administer it on behalf of the DNI.[^52]
 
 ### Psychological warfare liaison, 1946 to 1952
 
-In July 1946 the Central Intelligence Group's Central Planning Staff closed out its liaison with the Security Advisory Board of the [[Office of War Information]]. The memorandum designated a liaison officer to the Director, charged him with recommending when appropriate whether the board should be placed under the [[National Intelligence Authority]], and recorded that no further action by the Security Branch was required. The board was being replaced by a new Security Advisory Board under the [[State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee]].[^42]
+In July 1946 the Central Intelligence Group's Central Planning Staff closed out its liaison with the Security Advisory Board of the [[Office of War Information]]. The memorandum designated a liaison officer to the Director, charged him with recommending when appropriate whether the board should be placed under the [[National Intelligence Authority]], and recorded that no further action by the Security Branch was required. The board was being replaced by a new Security Advisory Board under the [[State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee]].[^53]
 
-In July 1947 the Assistant Director of the Office of Research and Evaluation complained to the chief of the Group's Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff that the arrangement for the Group's seat on the coordinating committee's subcommittee for psychological warfare was "not operable." The principal member came from the [[Office of Special Operations]] and the alternate from the Office of Research and Evaluation, and the memorandum was addressed to the Executive Director.[^43]
+In July 1947 the Assistant Director of the Office of Research and Evaluation complained to the chief of the Group's Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff that the arrangement for the Group's seat on the coordinating committee's subcommittee for psychological warfare was "not operable." The principal member came from the [[Office of Special Operations]] and the alternate from the Office of Research and Evaluation, and the memorandum was addressed to the Executive Director.[^54]
 
-On January 10, 1952 the eighth meeting of the [[Psychological Strategy Board]] was chaired by [[Walter Bedell Smith]], the Director of Central Intelligence. Its members were the Deputy Secretary of Defense, William C. Foster, and the Under Secretary of State, James E. Webb. [[Edward W. Barrett]], Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, attended as a participant from the Department of State.[^44]
+On January 10, 1952 the eighth meeting of the [[Psychological Strategy Board]] was chaired by [[Walter Bedell Smith]], the Director of Central Intelligence. Its members were the Deputy Secretary of Defense, William C. Foster, and the Under Secretary of State, James E. Webb. [[Edward W. Barrett]], Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, attended as a participant from the Department of State.[^55]
 
-In a letter stamped January 30, 1951, [[Max Millikan]] wrote that he had "gone on leave from MIT to head up the Office of Research and Reports in this Agency."[^45] On October 29, 1951 he wrote to a prospective recruit that for "the last nine or ten months" he had been "trying to put together for General Smith an organization to do economic research."[^46] A memorandum of conversation dated January 22, 1951 lists "Dr. Max Millikan, Central Intelligence Agency" among the participants in a discussion with State Department officers of psychological intelligence, and records his concern that splitting that work among several organizations would produce the shortcomings of decentralization.[^47] A memorandum of March 6, 1951, addressed to the intelligence chiefs of the State Department, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, was issued "For the Director of Central Intelligence" over Millikan's typed name as Assistant Director, Research and Reports.[^48] A letter he signed as Assistant Director on November 26, 1951 says that "Walt Rostow at the Center for International Studies has sought my assistance in finding him someone to help out with some research."[^49] A letter of March 3, 1952 addresses him as Special Consultant, Central Intelligence Agency.[^50] In an interview note of March 5, 1952 titled "Origin of PSB," a CIA historian recorded that Millikan "participated in a 'contract study,' State and MIT," which the note identifies as the "Troy Project," and that its study "had considerable to do with the creation of the PSB."[^51]
+In a letter stamped January 30, 1951, [[Max Millikan]] wrote that he had "gone on leave from MIT to head up the Office of Research and Reports in this Agency."[^56] On October 29, 1951 he wrote to a prospective recruit that for "the last nine or ten months" he had been "trying to put together for General Smith an organization to do economic research."[^57] A memorandum of conversation dated January 22, 1951 lists "Dr. Max Millikan, Central Intelligence Agency" among the participants in a discussion with State Department officers of psychological intelligence, and records his concern that splitting that work among several organizations would produce the shortcomings of decentralization.[^58] A memorandum of March 6, 1951, addressed to the intelligence chiefs of the State Department, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, was issued "For the Director of Central Intelligence" over Millikan's typed name as Assistant Director, Research and Reports.[^59] A letter he signed as Assistant Director on November 26, 1951 says that "Walt Rostow at the Center for International Studies has sought my assistance in finding him someone to help out with some research."[^60] A letter of March 3, 1952 addresses him as Special Consultant, Central Intelligence Agency.[^61] In an interview note of March 5, 1952 titled "Origin of PSB," a CIA historian recorded that Millikan "participated in a 'contract study,' State and MIT," which the note identifies as the "Troy Project," and that its study "had considerable to do with the creation of the PSB."[^62]
 
-The agency's financing of the [[Center for International Studies]] at MIT is recorded in several places. [[Patrick Oster]] reported in the Washington Post of September 11, 1977 that the agency "secretly financed a research project at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in order to gain data on how to turn Russian scientists into CIA agents," as part of "Project MK-ULTRA," with a foundation as a "front," and that the researcher was affiliated with MIT's Center for International Studies, "which was set up in 1951 with CIA money and had as its first director Max F. Millikan, a former assistant director of the agency."[^52] Time reported on February 24, 1967 "directly and without masquerade" "$300,000 to finance M.I.T.'s topflight Center for International Studies," and that MIT then "terminated the contract 'for practical, not moral reasons.'"[^53] [[Andreas Lowenfeld]], of the State Department's Office of Legal Adviser, testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee's Internal Security Subcommittee, said of the center in 1951 and 1952: "they had some kind of contract with the CIA," and, asked whether he knew it was a CIA operation, "I was never formally told, but it became apparent."[^54]
+The agency's financing of the [[Center for International Studies]] at MIT is recorded in several places. [[Patrick Oster]] reported in the Washington Post of September 11, 1977 that the agency "secretly financed a research project at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in order to gain data on how to turn Russian scientists into CIA agents," as part of "Project MK-ULTRA," with a foundation as a "front," and that the researcher was affiliated with MIT's Center for International Studies, "which was set up in 1951 with CIA money and had as its first director Max F. Millikan, a former assistant director of the agency."[^63] Time reported on February 24, 1967 "directly and without masquerade" "$300,000 to finance M.I.T.'s topflight Center for International Studies," and that MIT then "terminated the contract 'for practical, not moral reasons.'"[^64] [[Andreas Lowenfeld]], of the State Department's Office of Legal Adviser, testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee's Internal Security Subcommittee, said of the center in 1951 and 1952: "they had some kind of contract with the CIA," and, asked whether he knew it was a CIA operation, "I was never formally told, but it became apparent."[^65]
 
-The third progress report on NSC 59/1 records that the CIA had been assigned a continuing study of balloons as propaganda carriers and "instructed to stockpile one thousand large-sized propaganda balloons of the best type presently available."[^55] The [[Project Troy]] report had placed balloon work inside political warfare, stating that "The balloon problem is a part of political warfare. It cannot be handled by a separate balloon shop."[^56]
+The third progress report on NSC 59/1 records that the CIA had been assigned a continuing study of balloons as propaganda carriers and "instructed to stockpile one thousand large-sized propaganda balloons of the best type presently available."[^66] The [[Project Troy]] report had placed balloon work inside political warfare, stating that "The balloon problem is a part of political warfare. It cannot be handled by a separate balloon shop."[^67]
 
-In February 1961 [[Allen Dulles|Allen W. Dulles]] wrote to Millikan, then director of the center, that he was "very deeply interested in the proposal in your letter of January 23," and expected to attend at least part of the meetings of May 18 to 21, 1961, at which the center would review its first ten years.[^57]
+In February 1961 [[Allen Dulles|Allen W. Dulles]] wrote to Millikan, then director of the center, that he was "very deeply interested in the proposal in your letter of January 23," and expected to attend at least part of the meetings of May 18 to 21, 1961, at which the center would review its first ten years.[^68]
 
-A CIA document titled "Principles Governing Budgetary Relationships Between CENIS and CIA" describes an annual contract under which research projects were "mutually agreed upon case by case" between the agency and the Center for International Studies, within an annual authorization of $500,000. The document is undated.[^58] A CIA list of recipients of Office of Research and Reports unclassified studies names Max Millikan, [[Walt Rostow]], [[Wilfred Malenbaum]], [[Everett Hagen]], [[Evsey Domar]] and [[Thomas Schelling]], each listed under the Center for International Studies.[^59] A CIA memorandum dated February 16, 1959, forwarding a [[National Review]] Bulletin item, carries the item's text stating that [[Richard Bissell]] and [[Robert Amory]] "lean ideologically on CIA's outriding auxiliary at MIT, the Center for International Studies," and that they have been influenced by the theories of "W. W. Rostow, director of the Center."[^60] The MIT President's report for 1962 to 1963 refers to "Max F. Millikan, Director of the Center for International Studies."[^61] A CIA Office of Legislative Counsel journal entry of March 3, 1967 records that "the Agency has Senator Fulbright's letter concerning a Center for International Studies, MIT, and is preparing a response."[^62]
+A CIA document titled "Principles Governing Budgetary Relationships Between CENIS and CIA" describes an annual contract under which research projects were "mutually agreed upon case by case" between the agency and the Center for International Studies, within an annual authorization of $500,000. The document is undated.[^69] A CIA list of recipients of Office of Research and Reports unclassified studies names Max Millikan, [[Walt Rostow]], [[Wilfred Malenbaum]], [[Everett Hagen]], [[Evsey Domar]] and [[Thomas Schelling]], each listed under the Center for International Studies.[^70] A CIA memorandum dated February 16, 1959, forwarding a [[National Review]] Bulletin item, carries the item's text stating that [[Richard Bissell]] and [[Robert Amory]] "lean ideologically on CIA's outriding auxiliary at MIT, the Center for International Studies," and that they have been influenced by the theories of "W. W. Rostow, director of the Center."[^71] The MIT President's report for 1962 to 1963 refers to "Max F. Millikan, Director of the Center for International Studies."[^72] A CIA Office of Legislative Counsel journal entry of March 3, 1967 records that "the Agency has Senator Fulbright's letter concerning a Center for International Studies, MIT, and is preparing a response."[^73]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
@@ -182,61 +200,72 @@ A CIA document titled "Principles Governing Budgetary Relationships Between CENI
 [^2]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991.
 [^3]: Elizondo, Luis. *Imminent*. William Morrow, 2024.
 [^4]: John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*. Times Books, 1979, Chapters 1-2.
-[^5]: Turner, Stansfield, Director of Central Intelligence, letter to Senator Daniel K. Inouye, chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, August 2, 1977, in New School digital object NS010102_000027, PDF pp. 96-103 (figures at p. 101; Privacy Act at p. 102). https://digital.archives.newschool.edu/index.php/Detail/objects/NS010102_000027
-[^6]: Lapham, Anthony A., General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, letter to John R. Everett, August 1977 (stamped August 15, 1977), in NS010102_000027, PDF pp. 94-95.
-[^7]: Cinquegrana, A. R., Office of General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, letter to John R. Everett, September 7, 1977, in NS010102_000027, PDF p. 7. https://digital.archives.newschool.edu/index.php/Detail/objects/NS010102_000027
-[^8]: Lapham, Anthony A., General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, letter to John R. Everett, November 7, 1977, in NS010102_000027, PDF p. 3.
-[^9]: Cinquegrana, A. R., Assistant General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, letter to John R. Everett, March 17, 1978, in NS010102_000027, PDF p. 1.
-[^10]: Thomas, Jo, "Extent of University Work for C.I.A. Is Hard to Pin Down," New York Times, October 9, 1977, CIA reading room clipping CIA-RDP88-01315R000300390007-3.
-[^11]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 126.
-[^12]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 147.
-[^13]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 12.
-[^14]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 9.
-[^15]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 149.
-[^16]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 347.
-[^17]: Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992, ch. 11, "BCCI, the CIA and Foreign Intelligence." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/11intel.htm
-[^18]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 334.
-[^19]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 341.
-[^20]: White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Biography of Bobby Ray Inman," December 16, 1993. https://clintonwhitehouse6.archives.gov/1993/12/1993-12-16-biography-of-bobby-ray-inman.html
-[^21]: George C. Wilson and George Gardner Jr., "Leaving for Private Industry: Inman Quitting," *The Washington Post*, April 22, 1982, CIA CREST copy CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230020-3. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230020-3
-[^22]: Michael J. Sniffen, *Philadelphia Inquirer*, April 1982, CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230017-7. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230017-7
-[^23]: CBS Radio network commentary, April 22, 1982, "Admiral Inman Resigns," CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230019-5. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230019-5
-[^24]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence*, S. Exec. Rept. 102-19, 102d Cong., 1st sess., October 24, 1991, section 5, PDF pages 186 to 188. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-10219.pdf
-[^25]: CREST Senior Review Panel memoranda CIA-RDP93T00837R000400110005-3 (NIC-03024-87, September 1, 1987), CIA-RDP93T01222R000100010013-9 (NIC-03595-87, September 8, 1987), CIA-RDP92T00306R000300090020-0 (September 24, 1987), CIA-RDP93T00451R000300080006-5 (NIC-04228-87, October 22, 1987) and CIA-RDP93T00451R000400110014-1 (December 1, 1987). https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t00837r000400110005-3, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t01222r000100010013-9, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp92t00306r000300090020-0, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t00451r000300080006-5, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t00451r000400110014-1
-[^26]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Prologue and Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom"
-[^27]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom"
-[^28]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue: "The damage that has been done"
-[^29]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 13: "The wrong kind of friends"
-[^30]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.2 (Carlos Amador: CIA cables of April 23 and April 25, 1986). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
-[^31]: Congressional Record, Senate, September 22, 2004, Rollcall Vote No. 187 (yeas 77, nays 17). https://irp.fas.org/congress/2004_cr/goss092204.html ; "Porter Goss Sworn in As New CIA Director," PBS NewsHour, September 24, 2004 (sworn in by Andrew Card in the Oval Office). https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/government_programs-july-dec04-cia_09-24 ; Norris, "Goss Is Latest to Leave Bush Administration," NPR transcript, May 5, 2006. https://www.npr.org/transcripts/5387220
-[^32]: JURIST, "FBI probes CIA defense contracts after top official resigns," May 2006 (FBI probe of Foggo's possible help to ADCS). https://www.jurist.org/news/2006/05/fbi-probes-cia-defense-contracts-after ; Paul Blumenthal, "MSNBC: Foggo Gone," Sunlight Foundation, May 8, 2006 (resignation reported Monday). https://sunlightfoundation.com/2006/05/08/msnbc-foggo-gone/
-[^33]: NBC News, "Ex-CIA executive gets 37 months in prison," February 26, 2009 (one count of fraud, 27 counts dropped, Judge James Cacheris, 37 months as requested). https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna29413971 ; Associated Press, "CIA officer gets jail time for fraud," Philadelphia Inquirer, February 27, 2009. https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/nation_world/20090227_CIA_officer_gets_jail_time_for_fraud.html
-[^34]: Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program, S. Rept. 113-288 (December 2014), executive summary and findings, sections on the 2005 videotapes ("The CIA destroyed the CIA interrogation videotapes the following day"; Rizzo's October 31, 2005 email). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CRPT-113srpt288.pdf
-[^35]: NBC News, "Ex-CIA chief agreed with tape destruction," April 2010 (e-mails released by the Justice Department under an ACLU FOIA request; "PG, however, agreed with the decision"; the disputed account). https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna36589750
-[^36]: JURIST, "No charges to be filed in CIA videotape destruction case: DOJ," November 2010 (spokesman Matthew Miller on Durham's decision; Durham appointed 2008 by Attorney General Michael Mukasey). https://www.jurist.org/news/2010/11/no-charges-to-be-filed-in-cia-videotape-destruction-case/
-[^37]: Joseph E. Roop, "Foreign Broadcast Information Service. History. Part I: 1941-1947" (Central Intelligence Agency, approved for release April 1969), pp. 279, 299-300 and 303. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
-[^38]: National Archives and Records Administration, Guide to Federal Records, Record Group 262, administrative history. https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/262.html.
-[^39]: Roop, Part I, p. 2. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
-[^40]: Roop, Part II (CIA Directorate of Intelligence, August 1970), pp. 2 and 151-152. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06741690.
-[^41]: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "ODNI Announces Establishment of Open Source Center," News Release No. 6-05, November 8, 2005. https://irp.fas.org/news/2005/11/odni110805.html.
-[^42]: Central Intelligence Group, Central Planning Staff, memorandum "Liquidation of Security Advisory Board, OWI (C.I.G. Liaison with New Security Advisory Board under SWNCC)," July 22, 1946. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP78-04007A000300040024-9. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-04007a000300040024-9
-[^43]: Central Intelligence Group, Chief, ICAPS, to the Executive Director, memorandum "CIG Membership on SWNCC Subcommittee for Psychological Warfare," July 21, 1947. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP84-00022R000400100046-0. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp84-00022r000400100046-0
-[^44]: Central Intelligence Agency, Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB M-8), January 10, 1952, membership and other participants. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP80-01065A000500100033-6. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-01065a000500100033-6
-[^45]: Max F. Millikan, letter stamped January 30, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003100150032-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003100150032-1
-[^46]: Max F. Millikan, letter of October 29, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP79-01157A000200020002-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp79-01157a000200020002-2
-[^47]: CIA, memorandum of conversation, "Psychological Intelligence," January 22, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003500180026-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003500180026-1
-[^48]: CIA, "Report of Intelligence Project Initiations, February 1951," memorandum of March 6, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP60-00213A000200030008-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp60-00213a000200030008-3
-[^49]: Max F. Millikan, letter of November 26, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003000200096-6. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003000200096-6
-[^50]: Stuart A. Rice, Assistant Director for Statistical Standards, Bureau of the Budget, letter to Max F. Millikan, March 3, 1952, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00662R000300120004-5. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00662r000300120004-5
-[^51]: A. B. Darling, note of interview with Max Millikan, "Origin of PSB," March 5, 1952, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP83-00036R000400050039-0. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83-00036r000400050039-0
-[^52]: Patrick Oster, "CIA Envisioned Soviet Scientists as U.S. Agents," Chicago Sun-Times, reprinted in the Washington Post, September 11, 1977, p. A-9, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP88-01315R000400460003-8. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp88-01315r000400460003-8
-[^53]: Time, February 24, 1967, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP84-00161R000400210135-8. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp84-00161r000400210135-8
-[^54]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Internal Security Subcommittee, extracts from hearings (Part 3) on State Department security and passport regulations, testimony of Andreas F. Lowenfeld, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00149R000400560007-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00149r000400560007-3
-[^55]: FRUS, The Intelligence Community, 1950-1955, Document 57 (third progress report on NSC 59/1), paragraph 12. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d57
-[^56]: CIA reading room document CIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8, excerpt of the Project Troy report to the Secretary of State, February 1, 1951 (balloon chapter). https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8
-[^57]: Allen W. Dulles, letter to Max F. Millikan, February 27, 1961, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80B01676R003500160028-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80b01676r003500160028-9
-[^58]: CIA, "Principles Governing Budgetary Relationships Between CENIS and CIA" (undated; released 2000), CIA reading room document CIA-RDP67-00059A000200090016-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp67-00059a000200090016-2
-[^59]: CIA, "Recipients for ORR Unclassified Studies" (undated list), CIA reading room document CIA-RDP63-00314R000100180007-7. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp63-00314r000100180007-7
-[^60]: CIA memorandum from the Assistant to the Director, February 16, 1959, forwarding a National Review Bulletin item, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00001R000100260064-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00001r000100260064-9
-[^61]: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, President's Report Issue for the year ending July 1, 1963, p. 165, MIT Libraries, DSpace. https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/160055
-[^62]: CIA Office of Legislative Counsel, journal entry, "Friday, 3 March 1967," CIA reading room document CIA-RDP69B00369R000200020044-4. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp69b00369r000200020044-4
+[^5]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, "Release of Trace Metal Detection Technique to Law Enforcement Officials," June 10, 1970, CIA-RDP83B00823R000600150029-5. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83b00823r000600150029-5
+[^6]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security, memorandum on the relationship with LEAA, CIA CREST document C01435053. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01435053
+[^7]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security, "Relationship with Police," CIA CREST document C01435041. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01435041
+[^8]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security memorandum, "Technology Transfer of ERDT to LEAA," November 10, 1971, CIA-RDP83B00823R000600150007-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83b00823r000600150007-9
+[^9]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security, memorandum for the Deputy Director of Security, "LEAA Request for Agency Support, Where's What," February 16, 1972, CIA-RDP83B00823R000200060130-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83b00823r000200060130-3
+[^10]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Research and Development, "Survey of ORD for Non-Foreign Intelligence Activities," May 9, 1973, CIA CREST document 01430445, entry on LEAA. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01430445
+[^11]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Legislative Counsel, summary of the Holtzman Amendment, CIA-RDP76M00527R000700190003-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp76m00527r000700190003-1
+[^12]: Crime Control Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-83, sec. 508, 87 Stat. 211 (August 6, 1973). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-87/pdf/STATUTE-87-Pg197.pdf
+[^13]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of General Counsel, memorandum for the record, "CIA Action on LEAA Requests," OGC 73-1954, October 15, 1973, CIA-RDP75-00793R000300160026-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00793r000300160026-2
+[^14]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Legislative Counsel memorandum, "Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Reauthorization Legislation," July 12, 1978, CIA-RDP81M00980R001800050017-0. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp81m00980r001800050017-0
+[^15]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum for the Review Staff, "Briefing of House Select Committee Staff re LEAA Relationships," November 14, 1975, CIA-RDP89B00552R000100110024-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp89b00552r000100110024-1
+[^16]: Turner, Stansfield, Director of Central Intelligence, letter to Senator Daniel K. Inouye, chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, August 2, 1977, in New School digital object NS010102_000027, PDF pp. 96-103 (figures at p. 101; Privacy Act at p. 102). https://digital.archives.newschool.edu/index.php/Detail/objects/NS010102_000027
+[^17]: Lapham, Anthony A., General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, letter to John R. Everett, August 1977 (stamped August 15, 1977), in NS010102_000027, PDF pp. 94-95.
+[^18]: Cinquegrana, A. R., Office of General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, letter to John R. Everett, September 7, 1977, in NS010102_000027, PDF p. 7. https://digital.archives.newschool.edu/index.php/Detail/objects/NS010102_000027
+[^19]: Lapham, Anthony A., General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, letter to John R. Everett, November 7, 1977, in NS010102_000027, PDF p. 3.
+[^20]: Cinquegrana, A. R., Assistant General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, letter to John R. Everett, March 17, 1978, in NS010102_000027, PDF p. 1.
+[^21]: Thomas, Jo, "Extent of University Work for C.I.A. Is Hard to Pin Down," New York Times, October 9, 1977, CIA reading room clipping CIA-RDP88-01315R000300390007-3.
+[^22]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 126.
+[^23]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 147.
+[^24]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 12.
+[^25]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 9.
+[^26]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 149.
+[^27]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 347.
+[^28]: Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992, ch. 11, "BCCI, the CIA and Foreign Intelligence." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/11intel.htm
+[^29]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 334.
+[^30]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 341.
+[^31]: White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Biography of Bobby Ray Inman," December 16, 1993. https://clintonwhitehouse6.archives.gov/1993/12/1993-12-16-biography-of-bobby-ray-inman.html
+[^32]: George C. Wilson and George Gardner Jr., "Leaving for Private Industry: Inman Quitting," *The Washington Post*, April 22, 1982, CIA CREST copy CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230020-3. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230020-3
+[^33]: Michael J. Sniffen, *Philadelphia Inquirer*, April 1982, CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230017-7. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230017-7
+[^34]: CBS Radio network commentary, April 22, 1982, "Admiral Inman Resigns," CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230019-5. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230019-5
+[^35]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence*, S. Exec. Rept. 102-19, 102d Cong., 1st sess., October 24, 1991, section 5, PDF pages 186 to 188. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-10219.pdf
+[^36]: CREST Senior Review Panel memoranda CIA-RDP93T00837R000400110005-3 (NIC-03024-87, September 1, 1987), CIA-RDP93T01222R000100010013-9 (NIC-03595-87, September 8, 1987), CIA-RDP92T00306R000300090020-0 (September 24, 1987), CIA-RDP93T00451R000300080006-5 (NIC-04228-87, October 22, 1987) and CIA-RDP93T00451R000400110014-1 (December 1, 1987). https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t00837r000400110005-3, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t01222r000100010013-9, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp92t00306r000300090020-0, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t00451r000300080006-5, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t00451r000400110014-1
+[^37]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Prologue and Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom"
+[^38]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom"
+[^39]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue: "The damage that has been done"
+[^40]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 13: "The wrong kind of friends"
+[^41]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.2 (Carlos Amador: CIA cables of April 23 and April 25, 1986). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
+[^42]: Congressional Record, Senate, September 22, 2004, Rollcall Vote No. 187 (yeas 77, nays 17). https://irp.fas.org/congress/2004_cr/goss092204.html ; "Porter Goss Sworn in As New CIA Director," PBS NewsHour, September 24, 2004 (sworn in by Andrew Card in the Oval Office). https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/government_programs-july-dec04-cia_09-24 ; Norris, "Goss Is Latest to Leave Bush Administration," NPR transcript, May 5, 2006. https://www.npr.org/transcripts/5387220
+[^43]: JURIST, "FBI probes CIA defense contracts after top official resigns," May 2006 (FBI probe of Foggo's possible help to ADCS). https://www.jurist.org/news/2006/05/fbi-probes-cia-defense-contracts-after ; Paul Blumenthal, "MSNBC: Foggo Gone," Sunlight Foundation, May 8, 2006 (resignation reported Monday). https://sunlightfoundation.com/2006/05/08/msnbc-foggo-gone/
+[^44]: NBC News, "Ex-CIA executive gets 37 months in prison," February 26, 2009 (one count of fraud, 27 counts dropped, Judge James Cacheris, 37 months as requested). https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna29413971 ; Associated Press, "CIA officer gets jail time for fraud," Philadelphia Inquirer, February 27, 2009. https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/nation_world/20090227_CIA_officer_gets_jail_time_for_fraud.html
+[^45]: Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program, S. Rept. 113-288 (December 2014), executive summary and findings, sections on the 2005 videotapes ("The CIA destroyed the CIA interrogation videotapes the following day"; Rizzo's October 31, 2005 email). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CRPT-113srpt288.pdf
+[^46]: NBC News, "Ex-CIA chief agreed with tape destruction," April 2010 (e-mails released by the Justice Department under an ACLU FOIA request; "PG, however, agreed with the decision"; the disputed account). https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna36589750
+[^47]: JURIST, "No charges to be filed in CIA videotape destruction case: DOJ," November 2010 (spokesman Matthew Miller on Durham's decision; Durham appointed 2008 by Attorney General Michael Mukasey). https://www.jurist.org/news/2010/11/no-charges-to-be-filed-in-cia-videotape-destruction-case/
+[^48]: Joseph E. Roop, "Foreign Broadcast Information Service. History. Part I: 1941-1947" (Central Intelligence Agency, approved for release April 1969), pp. 279, 299-300 and 303. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
+[^49]: National Archives and Records Administration, Guide to Federal Records, Record Group 262, administrative history. https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/262.html.
+[^50]: Roop, Part I, p. 2. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
+[^51]: Roop, Part II (CIA Directorate of Intelligence, August 1970), pp. 2 and 151-152. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06741690.
+[^52]: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "ODNI Announces Establishment of Open Source Center," News Release No. 6-05, November 8, 2005. https://irp.fas.org/news/2005/11/odni110805.html.
+[^53]: Central Intelligence Group, Central Planning Staff, memorandum "Liquidation of Security Advisory Board, OWI (C.I.G. Liaison with New Security Advisory Board under SWNCC)," July 22, 1946. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP78-04007A000300040024-9. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-04007a000300040024-9
+[^54]: Central Intelligence Group, Chief, ICAPS, to the Executive Director, memorandum "CIG Membership on SWNCC Subcommittee for Psychological Warfare," July 21, 1947. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP84-00022R000400100046-0. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp84-00022r000400100046-0
+[^55]: Central Intelligence Agency, Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB M-8), January 10, 1952, membership and other participants. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP80-01065A000500100033-6. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-01065a000500100033-6
+[^56]: Max F. Millikan, letter stamped January 30, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003100150032-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003100150032-1
+[^57]: Max F. Millikan, letter of October 29, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP79-01157A000200020002-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp79-01157a000200020002-2
+[^58]: CIA, memorandum of conversation, "Psychological Intelligence," January 22, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003500180026-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003500180026-1
+[^59]: CIA, "Report of Intelligence Project Initiations, February 1951," memorandum of March 6, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP60-00213A000200030008-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp60-00213a000200030008-3
+[^60]: Max F. Millikan, letter of November 26, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003000200096-6. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003000200096-6
+[^61]: Stuart A. Rice, Assistant Director for Statistical Standards, Bureau of the Budget, letter to Max F. Millikan, March 3, 1952, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00662R000300120004-5. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00662r000300120004-5
+[^62]: A. B. Darling, note of interview with Max Millikan, "Origin of PSB," March 5, 1952, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP83-00036R000400050039-0. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83-00036r000400050039-0
+[^63]: Patrick Oster, "CIA Envisioned Soviet Scientists as U.S. Agents," Chicago Sun-Times, reprinted in the Washington Post, September 11, 1977, p. A-9, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP88-01315R000400460003-8. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp88-01315r000400460003-8
+[^64]: Time, February 24, 1967, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP84-00161R000400210135-8. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp84-00161r000400210135-8
+[^65]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Internal Security Subcommittee, extracts from hearings (Part 3) on State Department security and passport regulations, testimony of Andreas F. Lowenfeld, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00149R000400560007-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00149r000400560007-3
+[^66]: FRUS, The Intelligence Community, 1950-1955, Document 57 (third progress report on NSC 59/1), paragraph 12. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d57
+[^67]: CIA reading room document CIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8, excerpt of the Project Troy report to the Secretary of State, February 1, 1951 (balloon chapter). https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8
+[^68]: Allen W. Dulles, letter to Max F. Millikan, February 27, 1961, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80B01676R003500160028-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80b01676r003500160028-9
+[^69]: CIA, "Principles Governing Budgetary Relationships Between CENIS and CIA" (undated; released 2000), CIA reading room document CIA-RDP67-00059A000200090016-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp67-00059a000200090016-2
+[^70]: CIA, "Recipients for ORR Unclassified Studies" (undated list), CIA reading room document CIA-RDP63-00314R000100180007-7. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp63-00314r000100180007-7
+[^71]: CIA memorandum from the Assistant to the Director, February 16, 1959, forwarding a National Review Bulletin item, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00001R000100260064-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00001r000100260064-9
+[^72]: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, President's Report Issue for the year ending July 1, 1963, p. 165, MIT Libraries, DSpace. https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/160055
+[^73]: CIA Office of Legislative Counsel, journal entry, "Friday, 3 March 1967," CIA reading room document CIA-RDP69B00369R000200020044-4. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp69b00369r000200020044-4

20 - ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/USA/Department of Justice.md

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ aliases:
   - U.S. Department of Justice
   - "United States Department of Justice"
 created: 2026-05-17
-updated: 2026-09-22
+updated: 2026-10-12
 tags:
   - Organization
   - USGovernment
@@ -20,33 +20,35 @@ tags:
   - CIA
   - DarkAllianceInvestigation
 category: "U.S. Government"
-summary: "The federal department of prosecutors, the FBI, the DEA and the U.S. Attorneys, in the vault the defendant in the INSLAW case, the obstructor found by the BCCI and BNL inquiries, the CIA's partner in the 1954 and 1982 understandings on prosecution, and the investigator of The Finders."
+summary: "The federal department of prosecutors, the FBI, the DEA and the U.S. Attorneys, defendant in the INSLAW case and subject of the BCCI, BNL and Finders inquiries."
 start: 1870-07-01
 location: "Washington, D.C."
 ---
 
-The Department of Justice, established in 1870 under the Attorney General, contains the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]], the [[DEA]], the [[Executive Office for United States Attorneys]] and the ninety-odd [[U.S. Attorney's office|United States Attorneys]], the Criminal, Civil and Civil Rights Divisions, the [[Office of Special Investigations]], the Office of Legal Counsel, the [[Office of Professional Responsibility]] and, until 1982, the [[LEAA]], whose grants funded the case-tracking software that became [[PROMIS]].[^1]
+The Department of Justice, established in 1870 under the Attorney General, contains the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]], the [[DEA]], the [[Executive Office for United States Attorneys]] and the ninety-odd [[U.S. Attorney's office|United States Attorneys]], the Criminal, Civil and Civil Rights Divisions, the [[Office of Special Investigations]], the Office of Legal Counsel, the [[Office of Professional Responsibility]] and, until the Justice Assistance Act of 1984 replaced its statutory authority, the [[LEAA|Law Enforcement Assistance Administration]], whose grants funded the case-tracking software that became [[PROMIS]]. Its grant programs had ended in practice after fiscal 1980.[^1][^2][^3]
 
 ### INSLAW and PROMIS
 
-In March 1982 the Executive Office for United States Attorneys contracted with [[INSLAW]], the company of [[Bill Hamilton]] and [[Nancy Hamilton]], to install PROMIS in the largest U.S. Attorneys' offices; within a month the department's project manager [[C. Madison Brewer]] and contracting officer [[Peter Videnieks]] were disputing INSLAW's proprietary claims, payments were withheld, and in 1985 the company entered Chapter 11. Deputy Attorney General [[Arnold Burns]] told the Office of Professional Responsibility in 1986 that INSLAW's claim was "legitimate" and that the government "would probably lose the case in court," yet the litigation continued. On September 28, 1987, Bankruptcy Judge [[George Francis Bason, Jr.|George Bason]] found that the department had "taken, converted, stole, INSLAW's enhanced PROMIS by trickery, fraud, and deceit"; the district court affirmed in 1988 and the D.C. Circuit reversed on jurisdiction in 1991. Bason was not reappointed, the transcript of his ruling having reached the selection panel's chair, Judge [[Norma H. Johnson]], from the U.S. Attorney's civil chief [[Royce Lamberth]]. [[Elliot Richardson]], retained by INSLAW, called the affair "a high-tech Watergate." The [[House Committee on the Judiciary]] under [[Jack Brooks]] opened its investigation in 1989 and reported in September 1992 "strong evidence" that the department "acted willfully and fraudulently"; INSLAW alleged that [[Earl Brian]], a friend of Attorney General [[Edwin Meese]], had been given the software to sell to foreign intelligence services, and a document on department letterhead dated May 14, 1985, and signed by [[William Bradford Reynolds]] was later produced as a plan to distribute a modified PROMIS in the [[Middle East]]. [[Ronald LeGrand]] of the [[Senate Judiciary Committee]] relayed a career department source's judgment that INSLAW "is a lot dirtier for the Department of Justice, in its breadth and depth, than Watergate." Attorney General [[William Barr]] appointed [[Nicholas J. Bua]] special counsel in 1991; his report of March 1993 found no credible evidence of wrongdoing, and Attorney General [[Janet Reno]]'s review of September 1994 concurred, after Associate Attorney General [[Webster Hubbell]] had announced a nationwide investigation of [[Danny Casolaro]]'s death. The Senate referred INSLAW's claims to the [[United States Court of Federal Claims]], where Judge [[Christine Odell Cook Miller]] ruled in July 1997 that every version of PROMIS was in the public domain. The writer Gordon Thomas and [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] said that [[Rafael Eitan]] of [[LAKAM]] acquired a copy through back-channel contacts with the department in the early 1980s, and the department's own successor system, the Integrated Case Management System, employed one of PROMIS's original designers, [[Dennis W. Wright]].[^2]
+In March 1982 the Executive Office for United States Attorneys contracted with [[INSLAW]], the company of [[Bill Hamilton]] and [[Nancy Hamilton]], to install PROMIS in the largest U.S. Attorneys' offices; within a month the department's project manager [[C. Madison Brewer]] and contracting officer [[Peter Videnieks]] were disputing INSLAW's proprietary claims, payments were withheld, and in 1985 the company entered Chapter 11. Deputy Attorney General [[Arnold Burns]] told the Office of Professional Responsibility in 1986 that INSLAW's claim was "legitimate" and that the government "would probably lose the case in court," yet the litigation continued. On September 28, 1987, Bankruptcy Judge [[George Francis Bason, Jr.|George Bason]] found that the department had "taken, converted, stole, INSLAW's enhanced PROMIS by trickery, fraud, and deceit"; the district court affirmed in 1988 and the D.C. Circuit reversed on jurisdiction in 1991. Bason was not reappointed, the transcript of his ruling having reached the selection panel's chair, Judge [[Norma H. Johnson]], from the U.S. Attorney's civil chief [[Royce Lamberth]]. [[Elliot Richardson]], retained by INSLAW, called the affair "a high-tech Watergate." The [[House Committee on the Judiciary]] under [[Jack Brooks]] opened its investigation in 1989 and reported in September 1992 "strong evidence" that the department "acted willfully and fraudulently"; INSLAW alleged that [[Earl Brian]], a friend of Attorney General [[Edwin Meese]], had been given the software to sell to foreign intelligence services, and a document on department letterhead dated May 14, 1985, and signed by [[William Bradford Reynolds]] was later produced as a plan to distribute a modified PROMIS in the [[Middle East]]. [[Ronald LeGrand]] of the [[Senate Judiciary Committee]] relayed a career department source's judgment that INSLAW "is a lot dirtier for the Department of Justice, in its breadth and depth, than Watergate." Attorney General [[William Barr]] appointed [[Nicholas J. Bua]] special counsel in 1991; his report of March 1993 found no credible evidence of wrongdoing, and Attorney General [[Janet Reno]]'s review of September 1994 concurred, after Associate Attorney General [[Webster Hubbell]] had announced a nationwide investigation of [[Danny Casolaro]]'s death. The Senate referred INSLAW's claims to the [[United States Court of Federal Claims]], where Judge [[Christine Odell Cook Miller]] ruled in July 1997 that every version of PROMIS was in the public domain. The writer Gordon Thomas and [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] said that [[Rafael Eitan]] of [[LAKAM]] acquired a copy through back-channel contacts with the department in the early 1980s, and the department's own successor system, the Integrated Case Management System, employed one of PROMIS's original designers, [[Dennis W. Wright]].[^4]
 
 ### The CIA and Prosecution
 
-In 1954 the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] "pointed out to the Department of Justice that, in many cases involving CIA, prosecution would require public disclosure of sensitive Agency operations and procedures"; under the understanding that resulted, described in the [[Rockefeller Commission 1975|Rockefeller Commission]] report, the agency's general counsel [[Lawrence Houston]] recorded that if prosecution "would be precluded by the need to reveal sensitive information, then the Agency should so indicate in its files and not refer the case to the Department of Justice." In early 1982 Director [[William J. Casey]] and Attorney General [[William French Smith]] signed a memorandum of understanding under which crimes by people "acting for" an intelligence agency no longer had to be reported, and drug offenses were specifically removed from the list; it remained in force until 1995, and the CIA inspector general [[Fred Hitz]] testified that in those years "there was no official requirement to report on allegations of drug trafficking with respect to non-employees of the agency." In that period the department reduced [[Danilo Blandon|Danilo Blandón]]'s sentence from life to about twenty-eight months, dropped the charges against his wife and released him as a "full-time paid informant" on the motions of Assistant U.S. Attorney [[LJ Oneale]], who then prosecuted [[Ricky Ross]] in [[San Diego]] and moved to bar any mention of the CIA at trial: "This matter, if true, would be classified." A former assistant U.S. attorney, [[Eric Swenson]], said [[Norwin Meneses]]'s work with the [[Contras]] was known to the department because he had reported it himself. After 2002 the Office of Legal Counsel gave the CIA its authorizations for "enhanced interrogation techniques." Department lawyer Walter May told a court in the 1970s that [[Hal Hendrix]] of ITT had informed the CIA of his intent to withhold his agency contacts from a Senate committee; the department investigated [[Harold Geneen]], Edward Gerrity and [[Robert Berrellez]] for perjury in 1977 and examined [[Edward Korry]]'s charges of false testimony about [[Chile]].[^3]
+In 1954 the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] "pointed out to the Department of Justice that, in many cases involving CIA, prosecution would require public disclosure of sensitive Agency operations and procedures"; under the understanding that resulted, described in the [[Rockefeller Commission 1975|Rockefeller Commission]] report, the agency's general counsel [[Lawrence Houston]] recorded that if prosecution "would be precluded by the need to reveal sensitive information, then the Agency should so indicate in its files and not refer the case to the Department of Justice." In early 1982 Director [[William J. Casey]] and Attorney General [[William French Smith]] signed a memorandum of understanding under which crimes by people "acting for" an intelligence agency no longer had to be reported, and drug offenses were specifically removed from the list; it remained in force until 1995, and the CIA inspector general [[Fred Hitz]] testified that in those years "there was no official requirement to report on allegations of drug trafficking with respect to non-employees of the agency." In that period the department reduced [[Danilo Blandon|Danilo Blandón]]'s sentence from life to about twenty-eight months, dropped the charges against his wife and released him as a "full-time paid informant" on the motions of Assistant U.S. Attorney [[LJ Oneale]], who then prosecuted [[Ricky Ross]] in [[San Diego]] and moved to bar any mention of the CIA at trial: "This matter, if true, would be classified." A former assistant U.S. attorney, [[Eric Swenson]], said [[Norwin Meneses]]'s work with the [[Contras]] was known to the department because he had reported it himself. After 2002 the Office of Legal Counsel gave the CIA its authorizations for "enhanced interrogation techniques." Department lawyer Walter May told a court in the 1970s that [[Hal Hendrix]] of ITT had informed the CIA of his intent to withhold his agency contacts from a Senate committee; the department investigated [[Harold Geneen]], Edward Gerrity and [[Robert Berrellez]] for perjury in 1977 and examined [[Edward Korry]]'s charges of false testimony about [[Chile]].[^5]
 
 ### BCCI and BNL
 
-The [[BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report|Kerry-Brown report]] on the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International|BCCI]] concluded that the department had obstructed the investigation. [[Charles Saphos]], chief of the Criminal Division's narcotics section, wrote to Florida's comptroller [[Gerald Lewis]] asking that the bank be allowed to stay open; Manhattan District Attorney [[Robert Morgenthau]] accused federal authorities of hindering his inquiry; Customs Commissioner [[William von Raab]] testified that the department had denied knowledge of the Ali Mirza tapes; the criminal division under [[Robert Mueller]] indicted [[Swaleh Naqvi]], [[Ghaith R. Pharaon]] and [[David L. Paul]] over CenTrust and the Independence Bank in 1991 and 1992. In the [[BNL Scandal]], the [[Atlanta]] bank's officers believed in March 1990 that the department had taken the case away from the local U.S. Attorney; Attorney General [[Richard Thornburgh]]'s legislative chief [[Lee Rawls]] advised him on "our best attempt to thwart any further congressional inquiry by the [[House Banking Committee]]" of [[Henry B. Gonzalez]], and Judge Marvin Shoob publicly criticized the department's handling of the case.[^4]
+The [[BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report|Kerry-Brown report]] on the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International|BCCI]] concluded that the department had obstructed the investigation. [[Charles Saphos]], chief of the Criminal Division's narcotics section, wrote to Florida's comptroller [[Gerald Lewis]] asking that the bank be allowed to stay open; Manhattan District Attorney [[Robert Morgenthau]] accused federal authorities of hindering his inquiry; Customs Commissioner [[William von Raab]] testified that the department had denied knowledge of the Ali Mirza tapes; the criminal division under [[Robert Mueller]] indicted [[Swaleh Naqvi]], [[Ghaith R. Pharaon]] and [[David L. Paul]] over CenTrust and the Independence Bank in 1991 and 1992. In the [[BNL Scandal]], the [[Atlanta]] bank's officers believed in March 1990 that the department had taken the case away from the local U.S. Attorney; Attorney General [[Richard Thornburgh]]'s legislative chief [[Lee Rawls]] advised him on "our best attempt to thwart any further congressional inquiry by the [[House Banking Committee]]" of [[Henry B. Gonzalez]], and Judge Marvin Shoob publicly criticized the department's handling of the case.[^6]
 
 ### Letelier, The Finders and After
 
-Assistant U.S. Attorney [[Eugene Propper]] prosecuted the [[Orlando Letelier]] murder, and the department sent [[Michael Townley]]'s confessions to Chile with its request for the extradition of [[Manuel Contreras]] and [[Pedro Espinoza]]. [[Walter Sheridan]] had worked under Robert Kennedy at the department before his NBC assignment on [[Jim Garrison]]; Houston recorded of the agency's handling of the Clay Shaw trial that "the Department of Justice has seen and agrees." [[Michael Abbell]], director of the Criminal Division's Office of International Affairs from 1979 to 1982, went on to represent the [[Cali Drug Cartel]]. In 1993 the department opened an inquiry into CIA involvement with [[The Finders]] after receiving the Customs memorandum of Special Agent [[Ramon J. Martinez]] on the 1987 raids; [[Marion Pettie]]'s late wife [[Isabelle Pettie]] had worked for the agency, a son for [[Air America]], and [[Future Enterprises]] had trained agency employees; the findings were never released in full. The Criminal Division's [[Mark M. Richard]] told the Bua inquiry that the Office of Special Investigations worked with intelligence agencies only to locate war criminals. In the 2020s the National Security Division returned no documents on [[Rinaldo Nazzaro]]'s contracting, a State Department source called him a department "matter," and the department disclosed a payment to an informant in the [[2023 Baltimore Power Grid Conspiracy]] six weeks after [[Brandon Russell]]'s conviction.[^5]
+Assistant U.S. Attorney [[Eugene Propper]] prosecuted the [[Orlando Letelier]] murder, and the department sent [[Michael Townley]]'s confessions to Chile with its request for the extradition of [[Manuel Contreras]] and [[Pedro Espinoza]]. [[Walter Sheridan]] had worked under Robert Kennedy at the department before his NBC assignment on [[Jim Garrison]]; Houston recorded of the agency's handling of the Clay Shaw trial that "the Department of Justice has seen and agrees." [[Michael Abbell]], director of the Criminal Division's Office of International Affairs from 1979 to 1982, went on to represent the [[Cali Drug Cartel]]. In 1993 the department opened an inquiry into CIA involvement with [[The Finders]] after receiving the Customs memorandum of Special Agent [[Ramon J. Martinez]] on the 1987 raids; [[Marion Pettie]]'s late wife [[Isabelle Pettie]] had worked for the agency, a son for [[Air America]], and [[Future Enterprises]] had trained agency employees; the findings were never released in full. The Criminal Division's [[Mark M. Richard]] told the Bua inquiry that the Office of Special Investigations worked with intelligence agencies only to locate war criminals. In the 2020s the National Security Division returned no documents on [[Rinaldo Nazzaro]]'s contracting, a State Department source called him a department "matter," and the department disclosed a payment to an informant in the [[2023 Baltimore Power Grid Conspiracy]] six weeks after [[Brandon Russell]]'s conviction.[^7]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
 [^1]: Justice System Improvement Act of 1979, Public Law 96-157; the organizational entries in the *United States Government Manual.*
-[^2]: As cited on the linked pages: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, *The INSLAW Affair,* H. Rept. 102-857, September 10, 1992; U.S. Department of Justice, *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua,* March 1993, and the department's review of September 27, 1994; Richardson, Elliot, "A High-Tech Watergate," *New York Times,* October 21, 1991; Seymour, Cheri, *The Last Circle,* TrineDay, 2010; Thomas, Gordon, *Gideon's Spies,* St. Martin's, 1999; Federal Judicial Center, *1990 Annual Report;* Webb, Gary, *Dark Alliance,* Seven Stories, 1998, ch. 6; and the pages linked.
-[^3]: As cited on the linked pages: Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, *Report to the President,* June 1975; Webb, *Dark Alliance,* chs. 1, 24, 26 and epilogue; Associated Press, "CIA Knew of False Testimony," and "2 ITT Men Charged with Senate Lies," March 21, 1978, CIA Reading Room; Trento, Joseph, "JFK Began Chile Bribes, Envoy Says," *Sunday News Journal,* November 28, 1976.
-[^4]: As cited on the linked pages: Beaty, Jonathan, and S. C. Gwynne, *The Outlaw Bank,* Random House, 1993; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *The BCCI Affair,* 1992; Gonzalez, Henry B., "The Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Scandal" and "Continuing Saga of Attempts to Thwart BNL Investigation," *Congressional Record,* 1992-93; Friedman, Alan, *Spider's Web,* Bantam, 1993, pp. 193-194.
-[^5]: As cited on the linked pages: Kornbluh, Peter, ed., "The Pinochet Dictatorship Declassified: Confessions of a DINA Hit Man," National Security Archive; Holland, Max, "The Lie That Linked CIA to the Kennedy Assassination," *Studies in Intelligence,* 2001; Houston, Lawrence R., memorandum, "Clay L. Shaw's Trial and the Central Intelligence Agency"; Dovey, S., *Eye of the Chickenhawk,* 2023; Wilson, Jason, *VICE News,* 2021, and MuckRock FOIA logs; *The Daily Record,* May 2, 2025.
+[^2]: Justice Assistance Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, title II, ch. VI, sec. 603 (part A of title I, Office of Justice Programs), 98 Stat. 2078. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-98/pdf/STATUTE-98-Pg1837.pdf
+[^3]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Juvenile Justice, Oversight of the Office of Justice Assistance, Research and Statistics, hearing of October 28, 1981, Serial No. J-97-74 (1982), Justice Department statement. https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152817_0256
+[^4]: As cited on the linked pages: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, *The INSLAW Affair,* H. Rept. 102-857, September 10, 1992; U.S. Department of Justice, *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua,* March 1993, and the department's review of September 27, 1994; Richardson, Elliot, "A High-Tech Watergate," *New York Times,* October 21, 1991; Seymour, Cheri, *The Last Circle,* TrineDay, 2010; Thomas, Gordon, *Gideon's Spies,* St. Martin's, 1999; Federal Judicial Center, *1990 Annual Report;* Webb, Gary, *Dark Alliance,* Seven Stories, 1998, ch. 6; and the pages linked.
+[^5]: As cited on the linked pages: Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, *Report to the President,* June 1975; Webb, *Dark Alliance,* chs. 1, 24, 26 and epilogue; Associated Press, "CIA Knew of False Testimony," and "2 ITT Men Charged with Senate Lies," March 21, 1978, CIA Reading Room; Trento, Joseph, "JFK Began Chile Bribes, Envoy Says," *Sunday News Journal,* November 28, 1976.
+[^6]: As cited on the linked pages: Beaty, Jonathan, and S. C. Gwynne, *The Outlaw Bank,* Random House, 1993; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *The BCCI Affair,* 1992; Gonzalez, Henry B., "The Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Scandal" and "Continuing Saga of Attempts to Thwart BNL Investigation," *Congressional Record,* 1992-93; Friedman, Alan, *Spider's Web,* Bantam, 1993, pp. 193-194.
+[^7]: As cited on the linked pages: Kornbluh, Peter, ed., "The Pinochet Dictatorship Declassified: Confessions of a DINA Hit Man," National Security Archive; Holland, Max, "The Lie That Linked CIA to the Kennedy Assassination," *Studies in Intelligence,* 2001; Houston, Lawrence R., memorandum, "Clay L. Shaw's Trial and the Central Intelligence Agency"; Dovey, S., *Eye of the Chickenhawk,* 2023; Wilson, Jason, *VICE News,* 2021, and MuckRock FOIA logs; *The Daily Record,* May 2, 2025.

20 - ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/USA/LEAA.md

@@ -1,35 +1,242 @@
 ---
 created: 2024-04-26
-updated: 2026-05-17
+updated: 2026-10-12
 title: LEAA
+aliases:
+  - LEAA
+  - Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
+  - Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA)
 tags:
   - Organization
+  - USGovernment
+  - LawEnforcement
   - PROMIS
   - INSLAW
-description: The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration funded PROMIS and its national expansion through grants to INSLAW and adopting jurisdictions. Its abolition in 1982 forced INSLAW into the DOJ contract that led to the company's bankruptcy and the PROMIS Software Scandal.
+  - CIA
+  - BehaviorModification
+  - PoliceIntelligence
+  - NCJRS
+description: The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration funded PROMIS and its national expansion, carried the CIA's police technique program through the early 1970s, and financed the behavior-control research that a Senate subcommittee examined in 1974.
 category: "U.S. Government"
-summary: The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration was a federal agency created by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 that provided hundreds of millions of dollars in grants for law enforcement and judicial assistance programs, including the original PROMIS case management software.
+summary: "The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration was a Justice Department grant agency created in 1968 that funded the PROMIS software and, through the 1970s, behavior-control research that the Senate later examined."
 start: 1968
-end: 1982
+end: 1984
 location: "Washington, D.C."
+relations:
+  - type: head_of
+    with: "[[Jerris Leonard]]"
+    reverse: true
+    start: 1971
+    end: 1973
+    role: Administrator
+    fn: 2
+  - type: head_of
+    with: "[[Donald E. Santarelli]]"
+    reverse: true
+    start: 1973
+    end: 1974
+    role: Administrator
+    fn: 3
+  - type: employed_by
+    with: "[[Charles R. Work]]"
+    reverse: true
+    start: 1973
+    end: 1975
+    role: Deputy Administrator
+    fn: 16
+  - type: founded
+    with: "[[National Criminal Justice Reference Service]]"
+    start: 1971
+    fn: 2
+  - type: funded
+    with: "[[INSLAW]]"
+    start: 1973
+    end: 1981
+    fn: 10
+  - type: funded
+    with: "[[Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit]]"
+    start: 1973
+    fn: 27
+  - type: funded
+    with: "[[Neuro-Research Foundation]]"
+    start: 1972
+    fn: 43
+  - type: funded
+    with: "[[American Justice Institute]]"
+    start: 1970
+    fn: 42
+  - type: employed_by
+    with: "[[Alvin Ash]]"
+    reverse: true
+    start: 1977
+    role: Systems Development Division
+    fn: 17
+  - type: funded
+    with: "[[Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co]]"
+    start: 1970
+    end: 1971
+    fn: 13
+  - type: funded
+    with: "[[National Center for Prosecution Management]]"
+    start: 1971
+    fn: 15
+  - type: funded
+    with: "[[National Bureau of Standards]]"
+    start: 1972
+    fn: 41
+  - type: partner_of
+    with: "[[Central Intelligence Agency]]"
+    start: 1970
+    end: 1973
+    fn: 29
+  - type: funded
+    with: "[[Office of Crime Analysis of the District of Columbia]]"
+    start: 1970
+    end: 1971
+    fn: 13
+  - type: investigated
+    with: "[[Senate Judiciary Committee]]"
+    reverse: true
+    start: 1973
+    end: 1974
+    fn: 24
 ---
-The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) was a federal agency created by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, signed by President [[Lyndon B. Johnson]]. It provided grants for programs to further law enforcement and judicial assistance across the United States, disbursing hundreds of millions of dollars to state and local criminal justice agencies, research organizations, and technology projects over its operational life.[^1]
+The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) was a grant-making agency within the [[Department of Justice]], created by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and signed by President [[Lyndon B. Johnson]] on June 19, 1968.[^1] It made block and discretionary grants to state and local police, courts and corrections agencies, financed research, and paid for the development of the [[PROMIS]] case-management software. Its grant programs had been winding down since 1980, and its authorizing statute was replaced in 1984.
 
-### PROMIS and INSLAW Funding
+### Creation and structure
 
-LEAA funded the original [[PROMIS]] software development, beginning with an exploratory grant to the [[U.S. Attorney's office|DC U.S. Attorney's Office]] in 1969 to create a case management system. After PROMIS was declared an "exemplary project," LEAA invested heavily in expanding the system, funding [[INSLAW]] (the [[Institute for Law and Social Research]]) for enhancements and providing transfer grants to municipalities adopting the software. At peak, LEAA grants accounted for up to 80 percent of INSLAW's operating income. In August 1971, LEAA Administrator [[Jerris Leonard]] wrote to approximately 1,300 prosecutors nationwide encouraging adoption of PROMIS-style systems.[^1]
+Part A of Title I placed the agency "within the Department of Justice, under the general authority of the Attorney General," under an Administrator and two Associate Administrators appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.[^1] The agency's third annual report says it "formally came into being" on October 21, 1968, when its first administrators took office under recess appointments. It began with a staff of 25, and by December 19, 1968, every state had created a State Criminal Justice Planning Agency.[^2]
 
-[[Charles R. Work]] - who had served as a co-director of the original PROMIS development project alongside [[Joan E. Jacoby]] and [[Bill Hamilton]] - later became a senior LEAA official and promoted PROMIS adoption through both the [[National Center for Prosecution Management]] and direct grants to INSLAW and adopting municipalities.[^1]
+[[Jerris Leonard]], the Administrator-designate, appointed an eight-member task force that began work on March 29, 1971. The task force followed a decision by Attorney General [[John N. Mitchell]] to endorse an internal review of the agency's operations.[^2] Leonard led the agency until 1973, when [[Donald E. Santarelli]] became Administrator; Santarelli served until 1974.[^3] In March 1973 Associate Administrators [[Richard W. Velde]] and [[Clarence M. Coster]] accompanied Attorney General [[Richard Kleindienst]] at the House Judiciary Committee's oversight hearings on the agency.[^4] Santarelli's February 14, 1974 announcement described a reorganization he had set in motion ten months earlier, after becoming Administrator.[^5]
 
-LEAA also funded the PROMIS Research Project, a multi-year empirical criminal justice research initiative through three successive grants (74-NI-99-0008, 75-NI-99-0111, 76-NI-99-0118) that produced 17 published research reports analyzing approximately 100,000 cases processed through the District of Columbia court system.[^2]
+### Appropriations
 
-### Reorganization and Abolition
+Congress appropriated $63,000,000 for fiscal 1969, $268,119,000 for fiscal 1970, $529,000,000 for fiscal 1971 ($480 million in the regular appropriation and $49 million in a supplemental), $698,919,000 for fiscal 1972, $855,597,000 for fiscal 1973, $870,675,000 for fiscal 1974, $895,000,000 for fiscal 1975, $809,638,000 for fiscal 1976, $204,960,000 for the transition quarter of July to September 1976 and $753,000,000 for fiscal 1977, a total of $5,947,908,000 that included appropriations under the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974. The fiscal 1978 appropriation was $647,250,000.[^6][^7] The Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970 had authorized $650 million for fiscal 1971, $1.15 billion for fiscal 1972 and $1.75 billion for fiscal 1973. It required that from fiscal 1972 not less than 20 percent of action funds go to a new corrections program.[^7] LEAA's own 1976 summary gives the Safe Streets Act appropriations as $856 million for 1973, $871 million for 1974 and $880 million for 1975, adds $25 million for 1975 under the Juvenile Justice Act ($15 million new and $10 million reprogrammed from LEAA funds), and describes the fiscal 1976 budget of $809.6 million as about 10 percent below the previous year's.[^8] The Justice Department's statement at a 1981 Senate hearing gave $895 million in 1975 as the highest level the agency reached, and the figure fell in each later year. The Crime Control Act of 1973 and the Crime Control Act of 1976 each extended the authorization for three years and added administrative requirements.[^9]
 
-By the late 1970s, Congress had begun reassessing LEAA's effectiveness and cost. The Justice System Improvement Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-157) restructured LEAA's functions and created successor entities. LEAA was formally abolished and its programs were transferred to the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), and the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), all under the [[Department of Justice]], in 1982.[^1]
+### PROMIS, INSLAW and prosecutor management
 
-The loss of LEAA funding created a crisis for [[INSLAW]]. Without the grants that had sustained the company's operations, [[Bill Hamilton]] incorporated INSLAW as a for-profit Delaware corporation in January 1981 and sought to commercialize PROMIS. The company's search for replacement revenue led directly to the March 1982 implementation contract with the DOJ's [[Executive Office for United States Attorneys]] - the contract whose execution became the central dispute in the [[PROMIS Software Scandal]].[^2]
+The House Judiciary Committee's 1992 report on the INSLAW affair states that in the 1970s LEAA "funded the development by INSLAW" of the PROMIS software, and that the original version "was funded entirely with Government funds and was in the public domain."[^10] The report describes [[INSLAW]] itself as "a nonprofit corporation funded almost entirely through Government grants and contracts."[^10]
+
+A 1979 PROMIS dataset for [[St. Louis]], deposited with the [[Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research]], states that PROMIS "was first used in 1971 in the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia," and that LEAA then "awarded a grant to the [[Institute for Law and Social Research]] (INSLAW)" to make the system transferable to other jurisdictions.[^11]
+
+LEAA funded the original PROMIS software development, beginning with an exploratory grant to the DC U.S. Attorney's Office in 1969 to create a case management system.[^12] The design work was done under LEAA grant 70-DF-047, administered by the [[Office of Crime Analysis of the District of Columbia]] and carried out by [[Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co]], and PROMIS became operational in the [[U.S. Attorney's office|DC U.S. Attorney's Office]] on January 1, 1971. A May 1971 Peat Marwick overview prepared for the Office of Crime Analysis under that grant records that the team was headed by [[Joan E. Jacoby]], the office's director, and [[Charles R. Work]], deputy director of the Superior Court Division of the U.S. Attorney's Office.[^13] The grant is reported as $60,000, paid to Peat Marwick for the design work at the direction of U.S. Attorney [[Thomas A. Flannery]], with [[Bill Hamilton]] as project manager.[^12] In April 1973 [[Patrick Healy]], executive director of the [[National District Attorneys Association]], told the House Judiciary Committee's subcommittee that PROMIS was "Developed under a $290,000 LEAA grant," that it had led to a 25-percent increase in convictions for certain serious misdemeanors in the District of Columbia, and that Jacoby, by then executive director of the [[National Center for Prosecution Management]], and Work, whom he called an assistant U.S. attorney, had developed it.[^14] The National Center for Prosecution Management appears in LEAA's fiscal 1971 grant list as grant 71-DF-1093 for $292,925, made through the Maryland State Planning Agency to the National District Attorneys Association as subgrantee to develop guidelines and minimum standards for measuring the efficiency of prosecutors' offices.[^15] LEAA's push to spread the system ran through several channels. In August 1971 LEAA Administrator Leonard wrote to approximately 1,300 prosecutors encouraging adoption of PROMIS-style systems. At peak, LEAA grants accounted for up to 80 percent of INSLAW's operating income.[^12] Work was deputy chief and then chief of the Superior Court Division from 1969 to 1973 and served as LEAA Deputy Administrator from 1973 to 1975; a White House announcement of January 26, 1976 recorded that he had resigned effective November 21, 1975.[^16] As Deputy Administrator he continued grants to INSLAW and promoted adoption through the National Center for Prosecution Management, which was established with LEAA funding in December 1971 with Jacoby as its first executive director.[^12]
+
+LEAA also funded a three-grant research project run by the Institute for Law and Social Research (grants 74-NI-99-0008, 75-NI-99-0111 and 76-NI-99-0118). The project's 1977 highlights volume states that the grants were awarded under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, and describes its data as covering about 100,000 street-crime cases received by District of Columbia prosecutors.[^17] The volume lists 17 publications from the project, and credits Charles R. Work with the program's origination, saying that his "creative imagination and determination were indispensable to the origination and growth of the whole PROMIS program."[^17]
+
+Bankruptcy Judge [[George Francis Bason, Jr.]] found in the INSLAW adversary proceeding that during the 1970s the Institute for Law and Social Research obtained cost-plus grants and contracts largely from LEAA, that LEAA "designated PROMIS as an exemplary project" and encouraged state and local governments to implement it, that in 1979 LEAA awarded the Institute a three-year cost-plus contract for PROMIS upkeep and upgrade services, that in 1980 the Institute received notice that LEAA funding would be extinguished beginning in May 1981, and that "when LEAA was liquidated" in 1981 the contract was assigned to the Justice Department's newly created [[Bureau of Justice Statistics]], which lacked funds for its final year.[^18] A 1989 Senate staff study states that the software "had been developed originally under grants from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration."[^19]
+
+A May 6, 1983 memorandum by [[Jack Rugh]], deputy project manager for the Justice Department's PROMIS contract, recorded that [[C. Madison Brewer]] had instructed him "to make a copy of an LEAA version of PROMIS available to Dr. Ben Orr, a representative of the Government of Israel."[^20] The House report also records that [[Statistics Canada]], a Canadian government agency, had admitted using a public domain PROMIS version, and that according to officials contacted by Hamilton the version "was obtained through the LEAA in the late 1970's."[^21]
+
+The House report describes a computer procurement in which government-owned versions of PROMIS were made available to potential bidders for benchmarking, and it lists the four LEAA versions, for DEC, [[IBM]], Wang and Burroughs, among those supplied.[^22] In February 1973 U.S. Attorney [[Harold H. Titus Jr.]] made the decision to upgrade PROMIS from batch processing to a real-time online system capable of tracking more than 160 variables per case.[^23] The 1977 highlights volume credits [[Alvin Ash]] of LEAA's Systems Development Division with "farsighted and steadfast support of PROMIS," including its development, nationwide transfer and research potential.[^17] Ash, a programmer and systems analyst at [[Computer Usage Company]] who had helped develop PROMIS for the U.S. Attorney's Office, later worked at LEAA and sat on the INSLAW advisory board. [[DALITE]], a case-management system developed in [[Alameda County]] while [[Lowell Jensen]] was district attorney, competed with PROMIS during LEAA's late-1970s evaluation of transferable prosecutor systems. The 1989 Senate staff study records an Alameda County assistant district attorney's statement that both the county's pilot research program and the development of DALITE were funded by the State of California with grant money provided from LEAA. It also records a Los Angeles County employee's account of feeling pressure from Alameda County employees to use DALITE, which he compared to the kind "you feel on a used car lot," and his statement that Jensen had seemed "hopeful and anxious" that Los Angeles would select it; the staff reported that none of the other employees it spoke to knew of any pressure on anyone to select DALITE and that it found no information to support a theory that Jensen held a bias against Hamilton, INSLAW or PROMIS.[^19]
+
+### National Criminal Justice Reference Service
+
+In fiscal 1971 LEAA "made plans" to establish a [[National Criminal Justice Reference Service]], an information service meant to collect research and development reports and to document action project results sponsored by LEAA and other agencies.[^2] The NCJRS now hosts a digitized copy of the 1974 Senate subcommittee print on behavior modification.[^24]
+
+### Police intelligence and organized crime
+
+The organized crime section of the fiscal 1971 report, prepared by the agency's Organized Crime Program Division, set out goals for that year. One of them read "Intelligence. Knowledge is the key factor in any effort against organized crime," and the section called for a statewide intelligence capability and multi-state systems that could pool information across jurisdictions.[^25]
+
+In December 1976 [[Penthouse]] described the [[Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit]] as "a little-known organization" that "links the intelligence squads of almost every major police force in the United States and [[Canada]]," and said it was a private club not answerable to voters, taxpayers or elected officials.[^26]
+
+At the House Judiciary Committee's hearing of March 15, 1973, Associate Administrator Velde testified that LEAA's current statistics budget held $1 million for an operational automated organized crime information system, which "will be given to the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit, LEIU," supporting about 135 terminals and a computer system with the index operated by the [[Michigan State Police]]. He said the system held public record information only and that "There is no direct Federal involvement other than the LEAA money."[^27] LEAA's grant classification scheme, reprinted in a November 1977 [[General Accounting Office]] overview, carried an "Intelligence Unit" category defined as units collecting information for the evaluation of crime and criminals, such as the structure and workings of organized crime and illegal narcotics operations, and a "Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)" category defined as "An independent unit organized, trained, and equipped to function during emergency situations," covering "Civil disorders, riots, snipers, the taking of hostages."[^6] A [[Washington Post]] piece of November 28, 1972, "Street Crime in Newark and Elsewhere," printed in the 1973 hearing record, reported the criticism that LEAA had "squandered its money mindlessly on hardware," citing "three tanks for Birmingham and a plane for the Indiana State Police."[^28]
+
+### CIA dissemination of police techniques
+
+The Office of Security of the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] used LEAA as a channel for dispersing police techniques from 1970. A June 10, 1970 memorandum to the [[Director of Central Intelligence]], [[Richard Helms]], proposed releasing the Trace Metal Detection Technique to law enforcement. The memorandum recommended LEAA over a police professional association, which it said represented only a portion of the national police community. It also said that friction between that association and [[J. Edgar Hoover]] meant "it is probable that Mr. Hoover would resent our use of the Association in invading what he has traditionally considered his exclusive domain."[^29] The memorandum recorded the concurrence of [[Thomas Karamessines]]. The only stipulation imposed on recipients, it said, was that there be "no public connection between the technique and this Agency."[^29]
+
+A later Office of Security summary records that the technique was demonstrated to approximately 35 police departments, three professional police associations and representatives of 83 other state and local departments between June 1970 and December 1971. Outside the Washington area, the CIA representatives were identified as "consultants" to LEAA, and "no mention was made of the Agency."[^30] The summary says the office provided six men to LEAA in 1970 to brief police and local officials on the technique.[^31]
+
+An August 27, 1971 status report to the Director of Central Intelligence said that 19 police departments had used the technique in criminal investigations. It said LEAA had distributed 3,000 manuals from the initial printing and 800 from the second, and that more than 2,000 people had been trained. It quoted LEAA's assessment that "We consider the entire program from its inception to date to have been an unqualified success."[^32]
+
+The same office moved its explosive residue method into the same channel. In March 1971 the Director of Central Intelligence declassified the Explosive Residue Detection Technique, and the Security Office recommended dissemination through LEAA or the LEAA-funded [[National Bomb Data Center]].[^30] On November 10, 1971 agency officers demonstrated the technique to LEAA staff, and then held two more hours of discussion with [[Lester Shubin]] and [[Marc Nerenstone]], whom the memorandum describes as "both witting of the Agency's role in the development of the technique." It says LEAA appeared likely to farm the technique out as a grant.[^33]
+
+A February 16, 1972 Office of Security memorandum records an LEAA request that the agency reprint, at LEAA expense and for LEAA distribution, the classified edition of the book "Where's What," written under [[Brookings Institution]] sponsorship; an LEAA consultant had recommended against making the request. The memorandum states that during the first year of the Trace Metal Detection Technique transfer LEAA never reimbursed the agency's travel costs because of "their desire to avoid unclassified (i.e. public) reimbursement of the money to CIA," that "LEAA indicated it did not wish to be publicly affiliated with CIA," and that "CIA has complied with this desire." It recommended that the agency decline.[^34]
+
+A May 9, 1973 survey of the Office of Research and Development recorded that an ORD-developed adhesive restraint, a non-lethal incapacitation system, had been made available to LEAA in August 1972. It said: "If they developed the system, it would be used for civilian crowd and riot control." The survey names Shubin as the LEAA contact.[^35]
+
+On June 18, 1973 the House adopted by voice vote, without committee consideration, an amendment by Representative [[Elizabeth Holtzman]] to H.R. 8152, the bill amending title I of the 1968 act. The agency's Office of Legislative Counsel summarized its effect as prohibiting LEAA from using the services, equipment, personnel and facilities of the agency, and recorded that the sponsor's statement included an allegation that the agency had been involved in the bugging of Dr. Fielding's office; an agency position paper stated that the Director of Central Intelligence had directed that such activities be undertaken in future only in the most compelling circumstances and with his personal approval, and opposed a flat statutory prohibition.[^36] The statutory basis for this relationship changed in 1973. Section 508 of the Crime Control Act of 1973 authorized LEAA to use the services of federal agencies "(not including the Central Intelligence Agency)."[^37] The 1968 text contains no such exclusion. An Office of General Counsel memorandum of October 15, 1973, "CIA Action on LEAA Requests," recorded a call from an LEAA legal office official about the agency's authority under sections 508 and 513 of the Crime Control Act of 1973, and concluded that the agency had not decided that it was required to reject all requests from LEAA; each request would be decided at the appropriate command level.[^38] In July 1978 the agency reviewed proposed reauthorization language that would bar any use of CIA services by LEAA. The Office of Legislative Counsel told the Office of Security that the agency did not endorse the provision but would have no formal objection to its inclusion.[^39] On November 14, 1975 an agency officer who had been present at the start and the end of the relationship briefed two staff members of a House select committee on it. The memorandum of the briefing records that the agency discontinued liaison with LEAA in 1973 as a result of the Kennedy-Holtzman amendment; that one staff member said he had recently developed information about the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit, "a communications network between police intelligence agencies," and asked where the agency fit into its operation; and that the officer answered that he had never heard of the organization and knew of no such nationwide network in which the agency had taken part.[^40]
+
+### Equipment, jail records and crowd control
+
+The 1972 police equipment survey, prepared for LEAA's National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice by the Law Enforcement Standards Laboratory of the [[National Bureau of Standards]], asked departments about helmets with built-in communications. Half of the 139 departments that expressed a need for them gave crowd control or riots as their reason.[^41]
+
+LEAA's fiscal 1971 report lists a $2,751 grant to the [[American Justice Institute]] of Sacramento, supplementing an earlier grant, to examine a prison adjustment center for inmates who become violent or present discipline problems.[^42] The agency's Office of Criminal Justice Programs made a later grant to the institute for the [[Jail Information System]]. The system grew out of the need the institute perceived during its LEAA-funded Jail Overcrowding and Pretrial Detainee Program.
+
+### Behavior modification and the 1974 Senate inquiry
+
+The [[Senate Judiciary Committee]]'s Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, chaired by [[Sam J. Ervin]], began its inquiry into behavior control technology in late 1971, when several unrelated programs appeared to point toward a new technology of behavior control. The psychosurgery controversy was reappearing at the time. A study of the relationship between brain disease and violence at [[Boston City Hospital]] was funded jointly by LEAA and the [[Department of Health, Education, and Welfare]]. The subcommittee also learned of the [[Federal Bureau of Prisons]] proposed Center for Behavioral Research at [[Butner]], [[North Carolina]], which it described as financed in part by LEAA, and wrote that a presidential veto of the appropriations bill that provided additional funds for the Boston City Hospital project added to speculation that similar programs might be reinstated at Butner.[^24] The same print names Massachusetts General Hospital as the site of an LEAA-funded study of the causes and predictors of violence that tested whether fingerprint classifications and a particular chromosome configuration indicate a greater proneness to violence.[^43] LEAA's letter of October 27, 1972, printed in the appendix, states that the project, "the Medical Epidemiology of Criminals," was funded under a grant to the Neuro Research Foundation of Boston, "of which Dr. William Sweet is President," and awarded through the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, LEAA's research arm; the Senate letter it answers asked about LEAA funding for work by Sweet "at Boston City Hospital."[^43]
+
+The subcommittee said that LEAA, "because of its law enforcement mission and large appropriations, attracted a wide variety of grant requests dealing with this type of research." Among the projects it described was a study titled "The Medical Epidemiology of Criminals," prepared by the Neuro-Research Foundation of Boston, which tested dermatoglyphic patterns and chromosome configurations as indicators of violent tendencies.[^44]
+
+The most prominent proposal was the Center for the Study and Reduction of Violence at the [[University of California, Los Angeles]] Neuropsychiatric Institute, which first drew the subcommittee's attention to LEAA's behavioral programs. Its September 1, 1972 project description listed five lines of research, including biological, neurological and psychological studies. A memorandum by a staff psychologist at [[Atascadero State Hospital]], one of the institutions participating in the planned center, described an electro-physiological laboratory able to record heart rate, galvanic skin response, penis volume and brain waves in response to audio-visual stimuli. Its planned satellite facilities included the state hospitals at Atascadero, Camarillo and [[Vacaville]], and the subcommittee noted that Vacaville and Atascadero had attracted substantial notoriety for allegedly unethical procedures. The proposed director, [[Louis Jolyon West]], discussed acquiring an old Nike missile base in the [[Santa Monica Mountains]] for the center.[^45] A memorandum of April 5, 1973 from the [[Committee Opposing Psychiatric Abuse of Prisoners]], printed in the subcommittee's appendix, recorded that [[Ronald Reagan]] had announced in his January 1973 State of the State message the formation of a Center for the Reduction of Life-Threatening Behavior. It said a proposal had been submitted to the [[California Council on Criminal Justice]] and would be considered by the Senate Health and Welfare Committee on April 11.[^45] LEAA told the subcommittee that it had not received the UCLA project for funding consideration.[^5] LEAA also told the subcommittee that its policy on the rights of human subjects consisted solely of a requirement of prior LEAA approval for medical research not specifically detailed in state plans; the subcommittee set that single sentence beside the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare's forty pages of guidelines.[^45]
+
+Santarelli had been special counsel to Ervin's subcommittee from 1968 to 1969.[^3] In January 1974 Ervin asked Santarelli for a moratorium on LEAA support for behavioral research until the agency had guidelines comparable to those then under consideration by Congress and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. On February 14, 1974 Santarelli announced that he had banned LEAA funds for medical research, chemotherapy, psychosurgery and behavior modification. He said there "are no technical skills on the staff to screen, evaluate, or monitor such projects."[^5] In response to the subcommittee's request, the agency produced an April 10, 1974 computer printout describing 537 projects that dealt in some way with the modification of behavior. In an August 29, 1974 letter LEAA reported that 390 of the 537 had ended before the guideline took effect, that 110 of the remaining 147 involved no medical procedures, and that 35 involved only routine medical procedures.[^5]
+
+The subcommittee's account of the Bureau of Prisons is separate from its account of LEAA. Project START (Special Treatment and Rehabilitative Training) was a Bureau program at the Federal Medical Center for Prisoners at [[Springfield, Missouri]] that required roughly fifteen prisoners to take part involuntarily, placing them in solitary cells with privileges earned through "good days," and no attempt was made to obtain their consent. The print dates the Bureau's operations memorandum October 25, 1972 and states that the Bureau quietly cancelled the program in February 1974.[^46] A federal court opinion records that START was initiated on September 11, 1972, that 99 individuals were considered for it, 26 were found appropriate referrals and 19 participated, and that Bureau Director [[Norman A. Carlson]] informed the court by letter of February 11, 1974 that it would be terminated on or before March 1, 1974. On July 31, 1974 Judge John W. Oliver of the [[United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri]] granted the prisoners partial summary judgment on whether transfer into START without notice, charges and hearing denied due process, and dismissed the other issues as moot.[^47] The Butner facility, then called the Federal Center for Correctional Research and originally named the Center for Behavioral Research, was to be a separate institution in the same compound, and the psychiatrist [[Martin Groder]] was named to head it. The subcommittee wrote that its mail indicated "the specter had been raised of an isolated enclave in which various forms of radical experimentation would be conducted using prisoners as subjects," recorded repeated assurances that no psychosurgery, no chemotherapy and no aversive conditioning of any kind would be tested or used there, and recorded Groder's statement that all participants would be volunteers.[^46]
+
+### Abolition and successors
+
+The Justice System Improvement Act of 1979 separated LEAA into four agencies: the Office of Justice Assistance, Research, and Statistics (OJARS), the [[National Institute of Justice]], the Bureau of Justice Statistics, and LEAA itself. The statute set up OJARS under the general policy control of the Attorney General.[^48] The Juvenile Justice Amendments of 1980 removed the [[Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention]] from LEAA.[^9]
+
+The administration proposed phasing LEAA out three months after the 1979 act was signed, and requested no fiscal 1981 appropriation for state and local criminal justice programs. Congress appropriated no fiscal 1981 funds for LEAA, and funded the National Institute of Justice, the Bureau of Justice Statistics and the juvenile office at a combined $146 million.[^9] The Justice Department's statement at the October 28, 1981 hearing recorded that LEAA had no program funds after fiscal 1980 and had only administrative funds to close out previously funded programs.[^9]
+
+The loss of LEAA funding created a crisis for INSLAW. Without the grants that had sustained the company's operations, Bill Hamilton incorporated INSLAW as a for-profit Delaware corporation in January 1981 and sought to commercialize PROMIS.[^10] The House report says that in March 1982 the Justice Department awarded INSLAW a $10 million, three-year contract to implement the public domain version of PROMIS; the company's search for replacement revenue led directly to that contract.[^10] On March 13, 1985, [[Elliot Richardson]] and Santarelli, described as the former LEAA Administrator, met Acting Deputy Attorney General Lowell Jensen and asked him to authorize negotiations with INSLAW and to appoint someone to investigate its complaints.[^49]
+
+The House report calls the selection of C. Madison Brewer from the [[Executive Office for United States Attorneys]] to serve as PROMIS project manager a curious choice, since Brewer had worked for Bill Hamilton between 1974 and 1976 as general counsel of the Institute for Law and Social Research.[^50] The dispute over the contract is known as the [[PROMIS Software Scandal]].
+
+The Justice Assistance Act of 1984 replaced Part A of Title I with an Office of Justice Programs headed by an Assistant Attorney General. Functions that had been carried out by LEAA were assigned to the [[Bureau of Justice Assistance]], and references to LEAA in other laws were to be read as references to the Bureau where they applied to those functions.[^51]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
-[^1]: Justice System Improvement Act of 1979, Public Law 96-157, 93 Stat. 1167 (December 27, 1979); Office of Justice Programs, National Criminal Justice Reference Service, historical records.
-[^2]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. *The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report.* House Report 102-857, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, September 10, 1992.
+[^1]: Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-351, title I, part A, sec. 101, 82 Stat. 197, 198 (June 19, 1968). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-82/pdf/STATUTE-82-Pg197.pdf
+[^2]: U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Third Annual Report of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Fiscal Year 1971 (December 31, 1971), on the agency's start, staff, task force, and National Criminal Justice Reference Service. https://archive.org/details/ERIC_ED072215
+[^3]: The American Presidency Project, announcement of the intention to nominate Donald Eugene Santarelli to the Board of Directors of the U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation, June 5, 1981 (Administrator of LEAA 1973 to 1974; special counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee on Constitutional Rights, Senator Sam Ervin, chairman, 1968 to 1969; associate deputy attorney general 1969 to 1972). https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/nomination-donald-eugene-santarelli-be-member-the-board-directors-the-united-states
+[^4]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee No. 5, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Hearings, 93d Cong., 1st sess., Serial No. 4 (March 15 to April 5, 1973), witness list and testimony of March 15, 1973. https://archive.org/details/lawenforcementas00unit
+[^5]: Individual Rights and the Federal Role in Behavior Modification, pp. 39-40 (Ervin letter of January 1974; LEAA announcement of February 14, 1974; LEAA printout of April 10, 1974 with 537 projects; LEAA letter of August 29, 1974), and appendix, LEAA response that it had not received the UCLA project.
+[^6]: U.S. General Accounting Office, Overview of Activities Funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, GGD-78-21 (November 29, 1977), appropriation history table (fiscal years 1969 to 1977 and fiscal 1978) and appendix action-category definitions, Intelligence Unit and Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT), pp. 105-106 of the appendix, NCJ 60372. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/60372NCJRS.pdf
+[^7]: Third Annual Report of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Fiscal Year 1971, "LEAA Appropriations History" and the text on the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-644). https://archive.org/details/ERIC_ED072215
+[^8]: Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration: A Partnership for Crime Control (1976), "LEAA Budget History" and fiscal year 1976 budget, ERIC ED 126270. https://archive.org/details/ERIC_ED126270
+[^9]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Juvenile Justice, Oversight of the Office of Justice Assistance, Research and Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, hearing of October 28, 1981, Serial No. J-97-74 (Washington: GPO, 1982). https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152817_0256
+[^10]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report, H. Rept. 102-857, 102d Cong., 2d sess. (September 10, 1992), section I, "Summary," pp. 1-2. https://archive.org/details/InslawAffairInvestigativeReport
+[^11]: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, ICPSR 8225, Prosecutor's Management Information System (PROMIS), St. Louis, 1979, principal investigator Institute for Law and Social Research, Inc., codebook introduction. https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR08225.v1
+[^12]: Justice System Improvement Act of 1979, Public Law 96-157, 93 Stat. 1167 (December 27, 1979); Office of Justice Programs, National Criminal Justice Reference Service, historical records.
+[^13]: Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., System Overview and Report Formats for PROMIS (Prosecutor's Management Information System): A Computer-Based System for the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, prepared for the District of Columbia Government Office of Crime Analysis under LEAA Grant No. 70-DF-047 (May 1971), title page, abstract and introductory note 1, NCJ 32469. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/32469NCJRS.pdf
+[^14]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee No. 5, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Hearings, Serial No. 4 (1973), statement of Patrick Healy, executive director, National District Attorneys Association, April 4, 1973, p. 454. https://archive.org/details/lawenforcementas00unit
+[^15]: Third Annual Report of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Fiscal Year 1971, grant list, grant 71-DF-1093, Maryland SPA, subgrantee National District Attorneys Association, "National Center for Prosecution Management," $292,925. https://archive.org/details/ERIC_ED072215
+[^16]: The American Presidency Project, announcement of the intention to appoint Charles R. Work to the District of Columbia Commission on Judicial Disabilities and Tenure, June 10, 1985 (Deputy Chief and Chief, Superior Court Division, Office of the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, 1969 to 1973; Deputy Administrator, LEAA, 1973 to 1975), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/260238; White House Office of the Press Secretary, release of January 26, 1976 (Paul K. Wormeli to succeed Work, who resigned effective November 21, 1975), Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, https://fordlibrarymuseum.gov/sites/default/files/pdf_documents/library/document/0248/whpr19760126-013.pdf
+[^17]: Institute for Law and Social Research, PROMIS Research Project Highlights (1977), NCJ-40229, copyright page, acknowledgments and project summary. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/40229NCJRS.pdf
+[^18]: In re INSLAW, Inc., 83 B.R. 89 (Bankr. D.D.C. January 25, 1988), findings of fact 2, 7, 11 and 13. https://static.case.law/br/83/cases/0089-01.json
+[^19]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, staff study of the Department of Justice's dealings with INSLAW, Inc., Committee Print, 101st Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: GPO, 1989), summary section and the section on Jensen and DALITE (pp. 16-17, with note 10, staff interview of Donald G. Ingraham, May 31, 1988). https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152832_0145
+[^20]: U.S. House of Representatives, The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report, H. Rept. 102-857, section on the LEAA versions of PROMIS and the Rugh memorandum of May 6, 1983 (p. 48).
+[^21]: U.S. House of Representatives, The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report, H. Rept. 102-857, p. 58, passage on the Statistics Canada use of a public domain PROMIS version.
+[^22]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report, H. Rept. 102-857 (September 10, 1992), pp. 46-47, on the benchmarking copies of PROMIS. https://archive.org/details/InslawAffairInvestigativeReport
+[^23]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report, H. Rept. 102-857, 102d Cong., 2d sess. (September 10, 1992).
+[^24]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Individual Rights and the Federal Role in Behavior Modification, committee print (Washington: GPO, November 1974), pp. 18-19 (printed page numbers), NCJRS digitization, NCJ 142690. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/142690NCJRS.pdf
+[^25]: Third Annual Report of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Fiscal Year 1971, Organized Crime Program Division, goals for FY 1971, p. 62. https://archive.org/details/ERIC_ED072215
+[^26]: Penthouse, "America's Secret Police Network," December 1976, text preserved in CIA CREST document CIA-RDP90-01208R000100200015-5. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-01208r000100200015-5
+[^27]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee No. 5, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Hearings, Serial No. 4 (1973), testimony of March 15, 1973, p. 83 (Velde on the automated organized crime information system and the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit). https://archive.org/details/lawenforcementas00unit
+[^28]: "Street Crime in Newark and Elsewhere," Washington Post, November 28, 1972, reprinted in U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee No. 5, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Hearings, Serial No. 4 (1973), p. 502. https://archive.org/details/lawenforcementas00unit
+[^29]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, "Release of Trace Metal Detection Technique to Law Enforcement Officials," June 10, 1970, CIA-RDP83B00823R000600150029-5. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83b00823r000600150029-5
+[^30]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security, memorandum on the relationship with LEAA, CIA CREST document C01435053, on the Explosive Residue Detection Technique entries. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01435053
+[^31]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security, "Relationship with Police," CIA CREST document C01435041, covering May 1966 to January 1973. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01435041
+[^32]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum, "Trace Metal Detection Technique - Law Enforcement Assistance Administration: A Status Report," August 27, 1971, CIA-RDP83B00823R000600150008-8, with attachments. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP83B00823R000600150008-8
+[^33]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security memorandum, "Technology Transfer of ERDT to LEAA," November 10, 1971, CIA-RDP83B00823R000600150007-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83b00823r000600150007-9
+[^34]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security, memorandum for the Deputy Director of Security, "LEAA Request for Agency Support, Where's What," February 16, 1972, CIA-RDP83B00823R000200060130-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83b00823r000200060130-3
+[^35]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Research and Development, "Survey of ORD for Non-Foreign Intelligence Activities," May 9, 1973, CIA CREST document 01430445, entry on LEAA. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01430445
+[^36]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Legislative Counsel, summary of the Holtzman Amendment to H.R. 8152 (status as of June 22, 1973), CIA-RDP76M00527R000700190003-1, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp76m00527r000700190003-1; "The So-Called Holtzman Amendment," CIA-RDP75B00380R000100060091-9, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75b00380r000100060091-9
+[^37]: Crime Control Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-83, sec. 508, 87 Stat. 211 (August 6, 1973). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-87/pdf/STATUTE-87-Pg197.pdf
+[^38]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of General Counsel, memorandum for the record, "CIA Action on LEAA Requests," OGC 73-1954, October 15, 1973, CIA-RDP75-00793R000300160026-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00793r000300160026-2
+[^39]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Legislative Counsel memorandum, "Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Reauthorization Legislation," July 12, 1978, CIA-RDP81M00980R001800050017-0. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp81m00980r001800050017-0
+[^40]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum for the Review Staff, "Briefing of House Select Committee Staff re LEAA Relationships," November 14, 1975, CIA-RDP89B00552R000100110024-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp89b00552r000100110024-1
+[^41]: National Bureau of Standards, LEAA Police Equipment Survey of 1972, vol. II, Equipment and Supplies, NBS Special Publication 480-2 (June 1977), crowd control and helmet communications section. https://archive.org/details/leaapoliceequip00lawe
+[^42]: Third Annual Report of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Fiscal Year 1971, grant NI 71-023-G, Prison Adjustment Center, American Justice Institute, Sacramento, December 8, 1970 to February 15, 1971. https://archive.org/details/ERIC_ED072215
+[^43]: Individual Rights and the Federal Role in Behavior Modification, p. 36 (Massachusetts General Hospital) and appendix Items III.A.1 and III.A.2 (Ervin letter and LEAA letter of October 27, 1972). https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/142690NCJRS.pdf
+[^44]: Individual Rights and the Federal Role in Behavior Modification, p. 18 (the Boston study and the Neuro-Research Foundation final report) and p. 35 (LEAA section).
+[^45]: Individual Rights and the Federal Role in Behavior Modification, pp. 36-38 (Center for the Study and Reduction of Violence, project description of September 1, 1972, the Atascadero staff psychologist's memorandum, the West letter, and LEAA review procedures); appendix memorandum of the Committee Opposing Psychiatric Abuse of Prisoners, April 5, 1973.
+[^46]: Individual Rights and the Federal Role in Behavior Modification, pp. 32-34 (Bureau of Prisons, Project START, and the Federal Center for Correctional Research at Butner), with the Project START operations memorandum of October 25, 1972 printed in the appendix.
+[^47]: Clonce v. Richardson, 379 F. Supp. 338 (W.D. Mo. July 31, 1974) (Oliver, J.). https://static.case.law/f-supp/379/cases/0338-01.json
+[^48]: Justice System Improvement Act of 1979, Pub. L. 96-157, sec. 2 (part A, sec. 101), 93 Stat. 1167, 1170 (December 27, 1979), and sec. 801 (Office of Justice Assistance, Research, and Statistics), 93 Stat. 1201. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-93/pdf/STATUTE-93-Pg1167.pdf
+[^49]: U.S. House of Representatives, The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report, H. Rept. 102-857, pp. 82-83, section on the March 13, 1985 meeting with D. Lowell Jensen.
+[^50]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report, H. Rept. 102-857 (September 10, 1992), p. 19, on the selection of C. Madison Brewer from the Executive Office for United States Attorneys. https://archive.org/details/InslawAffairInvestigativeReport
+[^51]: Justice Assistance Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, title II, ch. VI, sec. 603 (part A of title I, Office of Justice Programs), 98 Stat. 2078; sec. 609I (references to LEAA), 98 Stat. 1837 et seq. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-98/pdf/STATUTE-98-Pg1837.pdf

20 - ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/USA/Senate Judiciary Committee.md

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     role: "sought information on his interactions with Supreme Court justices and records on his donor-group network; his counsel declined"
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     end: 2025-01-03
     role: "chairman"
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@@ -147,65 +147,69 @@ On June 12, 1962, the subcommittee, with Eastland as chairman, [[Thomas J. Dodd]
 
 In 1980 the committee held a hearing on S. 2216, the Intelligence Identities Protection Act. Deputy [[Director of Central Intelligence]] [[Frank Carlucci]] testified that the problem "had its inception with faithless Government employees who went public with the names of CIA personnel, the most prominent of whom, of course, is [[Philip Agee|Phillip Agee]]." He added that the activity had since been "picked up by a number of people who are not former Government employees."[^10]
 
+### Behavior Modification Inquiry, 1974, and LEAA Oversight, 1981
+
+The Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, chaired by [[Sam J. Ervin]], examined federally funded behavior control research in 1974. Its staff print of November 1974, Individual Rights and the Federal Role in Behavior Modification, records LEAA's inquiry into a proposed UCLA center for the study and reduction of violence, the agency's February 14, 1974 ban on funding for psychosurgery, medical research, chemotherapy and behavior modification, and an April 10, 1974 LEAA printout listing 537 behavior-related projects.[^11] LEAA's Administrator at the time, Donald E. Santarelli, had been special counsel to the same subcommittee from 1968 to 1969.[^12] On October 28, 1981 the Subcommittee on Juvenile Justice held an oversight hearing on the Office of Justice Assistance, Research and Statistics, the office created in 1979 to coordinate the [[LEAA|Law Enforcement Assistance Administration]], the National Institute of Justice and the Bureau of Justice Statistics. The Justice Department's statement at that hearing recorded that LEAA had had no program funds after fiscal 1980.[^13]
+
 ### INSLAW
 
-In mid-1979, when the FBI sought approval to buy a new front-end processor, the committee commissioned technical analyses from the [[OTA|Office of Technology Assessment]] and from [[INSLAW]].[^11] The Office of Technology Assessment report on a national criminal history system, issued in October 1982, was prepared at the request of the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary. It records that in 1979 and 1980 Congress conditioned approval of the [[National Crime Information Center]] technology upgrade, including its front-end processor and mainframe computer, on a strict prohibition of message switching.[^11]
+In mid-1979, when the FBI sought approval to buy a new front-end processor, the committee commissioned technical analyses from the [[OTA|Office of Technology Assessment]] and from [[INSLAW]].[^14] The Office of Technology Assessment report on a national criminal history system, issued in October 1982, was prepared at the request of the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary. It records that in 1979 and 1980 Congress conditioned approval of the [[National Crime Information Center]] technology upgrade, including its front-end processor and mainframe computer, on a strict prohibition of message switching.[^14]
 
-In late April 1988 [[Ronald LeGrand]], then the committee's chief investigator, telephoned [[Bill Hamilton]], president of INSLAW, and asked for a full briefing on the company's disputes with the department. Hamilton and his wife, [[Nancy Hamilton]], briefed him at the company's offices on the morning of May 11. Two days later LeGrand telephoned Hamilton with information that he said a trusted source had asked him to convey. LeGrand described the source as a senior career official in the department "with a title" whom he had known for 15 years.[^12]
+In late April 1988 [[Ronald LeGrand]], then the committee's chief investigator, telephoned [[Bill Hamilton]], president of INSLAW, and asked for a full briefing on the company's disputes with the department. Hamilton and his wife, [[Nancy Hamilton]], briefed him at the company's offices on the morning of May 11. Two days later LeGrand telephoned Hamilton with information that he said a trusted source had asked him to convey. LeGrand described the source as a senior career official in the department "with a title" whom he had known for 15 years.[^15]
 
-According to Hamilton's December 1989 affidavit, as quoted in the [[Nicholas J. Bua|Bua report]], the source said that "the INSLAW case was a lot dirtier for the Department of Justice than Watergate was, both in its breadth and in its depth," and that the "Justice Department has been compromised on the INSLAW case at every level." Hamilton's account of the message, as set out by [[Cheri Seymour]], begins with the words "What you think happened, did happen," and has the source describe the Criminal Division as the center of the effort to drive the company out of business.[^13]
+According to Hamilton's December 1989 affidavit, as quoted in the [[Nicholas J. Bua|Bua report]], the source said that "the INSLAW case was a lot dirtier for the Department of Justice than Watergate was, both in its breadth and in its depth," and that the "Justice Department has been compromised on the INSLAW case at every level." Hamilton's account of the message, as set out by [[Cheri Seymour]], begins with the words "What you think happened, did happen," and has the source describe the Criminal Division as the center of the effort to drive the company out of business.[^16]
 
-The affidavit, as quoted in the Bua report, names [[Lowell Jensen]], the Deputy Attorney General, as the official who engineered INSLAW's problems and who relied principally on [[Miles Matthews]], [[James Knapp]] and [[James Johnston]]. Matthews was quoted as saying, in the source's presence, that "Lowell [Jensen] wants to get INSLAW out of the way and give the business to friends." The source said that [[John Keeney]], [[Mark M. Richard|Mark Richard]] and [[Philip White]] knew "all about" Jensen's conduct and were "pretty upset," but would disclose what they knew only under subpoena and oath. The source believed that documents relating to [[Project Eagle]] were shredded inside the department.[^12]
+The affidavit, as quoted in the Bua report, names [[Lowell Jensen]], the Deputy Attorney General, as the official who engineered INSLAW's problems and who relied principally on [[Miles Matthews]], [[James Knapp]] and [[James Johnston]]. Matthews was quoted as saying, in the source's presence, that "Lowell [Jensen] wants to get INSLAW out of the way and give the business to friends." The source said that [[John Keeney]], [[Mark M. Richard|Mark Richard]] and [[Philip White]] knew "all about" Jensen's conduct and were "pretty upset," but would disclose what they knew only under subpoena and oath. The source believed that documents relating to [[Project Eagle]] were shredded inside the department.[^15]
 
-LeGrand, a former Drug Enforcement Administration agent, was asked by House Judiciary Committee investigators to identify the trusted source so that they could contact that person, and he declined. He said he would consider giving a sworn statement if the committee made a request to Chairwoman [[Cardiss Collins]] of the House Government Operations Subcommittee on Government Activities and Transportation, to which he had moved from the Senate committee; the committee's chairman wrote to Collins on July 20, 1990. Investigators then made numerous attempts to schedule the statement, LeGrand left the Washington area without informing the committee, and the committee wrote to him again on November 20, 1990. On February 14, 1991, he gave a sworn statement in which, in the House report's words, he provided "little corroboration" of the Hamiltons' allegations. He attributed the discrepancy to "the unintentional merging of comments from different persons" that the Hamiltons had credited to the trusted source, and said that he had gathered information from several individuals during his inquiry.[^14] Asked whether the source had said that the INSLAW case was "a lot dirtier" than Watergate "both in its breadth and in its depth," he answered that the source had said there was more to the matter than people were aware of and had made a comparison to Watergate, but that he did not recall those words. He again declined to name the source.[^14]
+LeGrand, a former Drug Enforcement Administration agent, was asked by House Judiciary Committee investigators to identify the trusted source so that they could contact that person, and he declined. He said he would consider giving a sworn statement if the committee made a request to Chairwoman [[Cardiss Collins]] of the House Government Operations Subcommittee on Government Activities and Transportation, to which he had moved from the Senate committee; the committee's chairman wrote to Collins on July 20, 1990. Investigators then made numerous attempts to schedule the statement, LeGrand left the Washington area without informing the committee, and the committee wrote to him again on November 20, 1990. On February 14, 1991, he gave a sworn statement in which, in the House report's words, he provided "little corroboration" of the Hamiltons' allegations. He attributed the discrepancy to "the unintentional merging of comments from different persons" that the Hamiltons had credited to the trusted source, and said that he had gathered information from several individuals during his inquiry.[^17] Asked whether the source had said that the INSLAW case was "a lot dirtier" than Watergate "both in its breadth and in its depth," he answered that the source had said there was more to the matter than people were aware of and had made a comparison to Watergate, but that he did not recall those words. He again declined to name the source.[^17]
 
-On October 11, 1988, [[Elliot Richardson]], counsel to INSLAW, had sent a memorandum summarizing LeGrand's statements to [[Robin Ross]], an assistant to Attorney General [[Richard Thornburgh]].[^15] Hamilton's December 22, 1989 affidavit states that LeGrand had confirmed what he told Hamilton on several occasions after May 1988.[^16] LeGrand told House investigators and Special Counsel Bua that, as far as he knew, none of the information from his source was obtained first-hand, and he confirmed to both that he believed the source had given him some of the information reflected in Hamilton's affidavit.[^16] When Bua's team contacted LeGrand, who no longer worked for the Senate, he said he would describe the source's information but would not disclose the source's identity.[^12]
+On October 11, 1988, [[Elliot Richardson]], counsel to INSLAW, had sent a memorandum summarizing LeGrand's statements to [[Robin Ross]], an assistant to Attorney General [[Richard Thornburgh]].[^18] Hamilton's December 22, 1989 affidavit states that LeGrand had confirmed what he told Hamilton on several occasions after May 1988.[^19] LeGrand told House investigators and Special Counsel Bua that, as far as he knew, none of the information from his source was obtained first-hand, and he confirmed to both that he believed the source had given him some of the information reflected in Hamilton's affidavit.[^19] When Bua's team contacted LeGrand, who no longer worked for the Senate, he said he would describe the source's information but would not disclose the source's identity.[^15]
 
-LeGrand later gave a different account. At the Department of Justice's request, he submitted an affidavit, filed as a declaration in INSLAW's bankruptcy case (Case No. 85-0070), refuting INSLAW's claim that he had conveyed "highly specific" allegations to the Hamiltons. He stated that he had told them of "general allegations, rumors," and of information heard from different sources about various persons in the department. The House report describes the affidavit's assertion that the source had no personal knowledge of the department's handling of the matter as "striking," coming after several years of LeGrand's statements to William Hamilton, to the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and to the House committee. His sworn statement of February 14, 1991 to House investigators, his acknowledgment to House investigators and to Bua that the source had given him some of the information in Hamilton's affidavit, and the October 11, 1988 memorandum remain in the record beside the affidavit. The House report adds that Hamilton later alleged to the committee that Roger Pauley, a Justice Department official, was LeGrand's contact within the department.[^14]
+LeGrand later gave a different account. At the Department of Justice's request, he submitted an affidavit, filed as a declaration in INSLAW's bankruptcy case (Case No. 85-0070), refuting INSLAW's claim that he had conveyed "highly specific" allegations to the Hamiltons. He stated that he had told them of "general allegations, rumors," and of information heard from different sources about various persons in the department. The House report describes the affidavit's assertion that the source had no personal knowledge of the department's handling of the matter as "striking," coming after several years of LeGrand's statements to William Hamilton, to the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and to the House committee. His sworn statement of February 14, 1991 to House investigators, his acknowledgment to House investigators and to Bua that the source had given him some of the information in Hamilton's affidavit, and the October 11, 1988 memorandum remain in the record beside the affidavit. The House report adds that Hamilton later alleged to the committee that Roger Pauley, a Justice Department official, was LeGrand's contact within the department.[^17]
 
-The source gave a further account on February 7, 1994, to the Justice Department review team that Attorney General [[Janet Reno]] ordered to examine Bua's report. The source had refused to be interviewed by Bua and by the House investigators; the review's report states that he agreed to be interviewed by the review team because of his respect for and confidence in Reno. The interview took place in a private dining room at a local club, with LeGrand and Morgan Frankel, Assistant Legal Counsel of the United States Senate, present. The source identified himself to the team, which stated that it verified that he is a long-time career employee of the department, and said that he had known LeGrand for about 20 years (Hamilton's affidavit gives 15). He told the team that he had no first-hand knowledge of any misconduct by anyone in relation to PROMIS or INSLAW and had heard no rumors he would consider credible; that the subject of INSLAW came up in a friendly conversation with LeGrand in 1987 or 1988; that he suggested LeGrand contact Miles Matthews because he did not particularly like or trust Matthews; and that he never mentioned Lowell Jensen, Mark Richard, Philip White, James Johnston or James Knapp to LeGrand. When the review team read him the passage from Hamilton's affidavit, he said that none of the statements or beliefs attributed to him were accurate, and that he had no reason to believe that documents relating to Project Eagle were improperly shredded.[^16] The review team wrote that it had concluded there was no credible evidence of a conspiracy involving Jensen or other senior department officials. In its own account Bua's report had recorded that Matthews, Knapp, Johnston, White, Keeney and Richard each denied knowledge of the wrongdoing described in Hamilton's affidavit.[^16] INSLAW's rebuttal to the Bua report had criticized the special counsel for not investigating the allegations attributed to the source.[^16]
+The source gave a further account on February 7, 1994, to the Justice Department review team that Attorney General [[Janet Reno]] ordered to examine Bua's report. The source had refused to be interviewed by Bua and by the House investigators; the review's report states that he agreed to be interviewed by the review team because of his respect for and confidence in Reno. The interview took place in a private dining room at a local club, with LeGrand and Morgan Frankel, Assistant Legal Counsel of the United States Senate, present. The source identified himself to the team, which stated that it verified that he is a long-time career employee of the department, and said that he had known LeGrand for about 20 years (Hamilton's affidavit gives 15). He told the team that he had no first-hand knowledge of any misconduct by anyone in relation to PROMIS or INSLAW and had heard no rumors he would consider credible; that the subject of INSLAW came up in a friendly conversation with LeGrand in 1987 or 1988; that he suggested LeGrand contact Miles Matthews because he did not particularly like or trust Matthews; and that he never mentioned Lowell Jensen, Mark Richard, Philip White, James Johnston or James Knapp to LeGrand. When the review team read him the passage from Hamilton's affidavit, he said that none of the statements or beliefs attributed to him were accurate, and that he had no reason to believe that documents relating to Project Eagle were improperly shredded.[^19] The review team wrote that it had concluded there was no credible evidence of a conspiracy involving Jensen or other senior department officials. In its own account Bua's report had recorded that Matthews, Knapp, Johnston, White, Keeney and Richard each denied knowledge of the wrongdoing described in Hamilton's affidavit.[^19] INSLAW's rebuttal to the Bua report had criticized the special counsel for not investigating the allegations attributed to the source.[^19]
 
-The Justice Department's 1994 review, which affirmed the special counsel's findings, concluded that there was "no credible evidence" that department officials conspired to steal the software developed by INSLAW, and recommended that the affair be closed. The same release reaffirmed police findings that the death of [[Danny Casolaro]], a free-lance journalist investigating the INSLAW matter, was a suicide.[^17]
+The Justice Department's 1994 review, which affirmed the special counsel's findings, concluded that there was "no credible evidence" that department officials conspired to steal the software developed by INSLAW, and recommended that the affair be closed. The same release reaffirmed police findings that the death of [[Danny Casolaro]], a free-lance journalist investigating the INSLAW matter, was a suicide.[^20]
 
 ### Nominations
 
-On January 11, 1977, the committee began hearings on the nomination of [[Griffin Bell]] as Attorney General. The hearings continued on January 12, 13, 14, 17, 18 and 19 under Chairman James Eastland. Eastland told Bell on the first day: "Judge, you have been an outstanding lawyer and an outstanding member of the judiciary. You are honest and honorable. I will vote to confirm you."[^18]
+On January 11, 1977, the committee began hearings on the nomination of [[Griffin Bell]] as Attorney General. The hearings continued on January 12, 13, 14, 17, 18 and 19 under Chairman James Eastland. Eastland told Bell on the first day: "Judge, you have been an outstanding lawyer and an outstanding member of the judiciary. You are honest and honorable. I will vote to confirm you."[^21]
 
-On June 27, 1985, the committee voted 10 to 8 to reject President [[Ronald Reagan]]'s nomination of [[William Bradford Reynolds]] as associate attorney general and declined to send it to the Senate floor.[^19][^20][^21] The committee then had ten Republicans and eight Democrats.[^20] Before the vote, Senator [[Dennis DeConcini]] had told Reynolds, "It is an issue of whether you told the truth here."[^20] Reagan's statement that day said that some members of the committee had used the confirmation process "to conduct an ideological assault on so superbly qualified a candidate."[^19]
+On June 27, 1985, the committee voted 10 to 8 to reject President [[Ronald Reagan]]'s nomination of [[William Bradford Reynolds]] as associate attorney general and declined to send it to the Senate floor.[^22][^23][^24] The committee then had ten Republicans and eight Democrats.[^23] Before the vote, Senator [[Dennis DeConcini]] had told Reynolds, "It is an issue of whether you told the truth here."[^23] Reagan's statement that day said that some members of the committee had used the confirmation process "to conduct an ideological assault on so superbly qualified a candidate."[^22]
 
-On September 27, 2018, under Chairman [[Chuck Grassley]], the committee continued its confirmation hearing on the nomination of [[Brett Kavanaugh]] to the Supreme Court with two witnesses, Kavanaugh and a woman who had alleged in a letter to the ranking member, Senator [[Dianne Feinstein]], that Kavanaugh sexually assaulted her at a party when both were in high school. Grassley said in his opening statement that none of six FBI background investigations of Kavanaugh since 1993 contained an issue of inappropriate sexual behavior. Kavanaugh testified: "I categorically and unequivocally deny the allegation against me."[^22]
+On September 27, 2018, under Chairman [[Chuck Grassley]], the committee continued its confirmation hearing on the nomination of [[Brett Kavanaugh]] to the Supreme Court with two witnesses, Kavanaugh and a woman who had alleged in a letter to the ranking member, Senator [[Dianne Feinstein]], that Kavanaugh sexually assaulted her at a party when both were in high school. Grassley said in his opening statement that none of six FBI background investigations of Kavanaugh since 1993 contained an issue of inappropriate sexual behavior. Kavanaugh testified: "I categorically and unequivocally deny the allegation against me."[^25]
 
-On July 15, 2026, the committee questioned [[Todd Blanche]], then acting Attorney General and the president's nominee for the permanent post, at his confirmation hearing.[^23]
+On July 15, 2026, the committee questioned [[Todd Blanche]], then acting Attorney General and the president's nominee for the permanent post, at his confirmation hearing.[^26]
 
 ### Joint Narcotics Hearings
 
-The committee and the [[Caucus on International Narcotics Control]] held joint hearings on [[Jamaica]]'s proposed comprehensive international anti-narcotics plan and on drug policy in the Andean nations on November 6, 1989, and on January 18 and March 27, 1990. The record was published in 1991.[^24]
+The committee and the [[Caucus on International Narcotics Control]] held joint hearings on [[Jamaica]]'s proposed comprehensive international anti-narcotics plan and on drug policy in the Andean nations on November 6, 1989, and on January 18 and March 27, 1990. The record was published in 1991.[^27]
 
 ### Able Danger
 
-On September 21, 2005, the committee, under Chairman [[Arlen Specter]], held a hearing titled "Able Danger and Intelligence Information Sharing" on a Defense Department counterterrorism data-analysis program.[^25] Representative [[Curt Weldon]] testified that Captain Philpott had "identified absolutely Mohammed Atta as a part of the Brooklyn cell" in January and February 2000. He said that [[Erik Kleinsmith]], a former Army major and chief of intelligence, would testify that he had been ordered to destroy all Able Danger material, 2.5 terabytes of it.[^25] The FBI, the Defense Department and Kleinsmith, then of [[Lockheed Martin]], also presented testimony. Attorney [[Mark Zaid]] told the committee that Able Danger never identified Atta in the United States, and that a chart listed Atta under "Brooklyn, New York," which prompted apprehension among Army lawyers and policy staff about compiling data on United States persons. He also said that most of his testimony was hearsay, because it rested on what he had been told by people associated with the program.[^25]
+On September 21, 2005, the committee, under Chairman [[Arlen Specter]], held a hearing titled "Able Danger and Intelligence Information Sharing" on a Defense Department counterterrorism data-analysis program.[^28] Representative [[Curt Weldon]] testified that Captain Philpott had "identified absolutely Mohammed Atta as a part of the Brooklyn cell" in January and February 2000. He said that [[Erik Kleinsmith]], a former Army major and chief of intelligence, would testify that he had been ordered to destroy all Able Danger material, 2.5 terabytes of it.[^28] The FBI, the Defense Department and Kleinsmith, then of [[Lockheed Martin]], also presented testimony. Attorney [[Mark Zaid]] told the committee that Able Danger never identified Atta in the United States, and that a chart listed Atta under "Brooklyn, New York," which prompted apprehension among Army lawyers and policy staff about compiling data on United States persons. He also said that most of his testimony was hearsay, because it rested on what he had been told by people associated with the program.[^28]
 
 ### Cambridge Analytica
 
-On May 16, 2018, the committee held a hearing titled "Cambridge Analytica and the Future of Data Privacy."[^26] [[Christopher Wylie]], a former employee of [[Cambridge Analytica]], testified. His written statement said that the firm was created by [[SCL Group|SCL]] with funding from [[Robert Mercer]], and that [[Steve Bannon]] was installed as its vice president. It said Bannon "engaged SCL, a foreign military contractor, to build an arsenal of informational weapons he could deploy on the American population."[^27] The statement also said that after a request for information from executives of [[Lukoil]] in the spring of 2014, Cambridge Analytica discussed with Lukoil its experience with "foreign disinformation, rumour campaigns, microtargeting and its American data assets."[^27]
+On May 16, 2018, the committee held a hearing titled "Cambridge Analytica and the Future of Data Privacy."[^29] [[Christopher Wylie]], a former employee of [[Cambridge Analytica]], testified. His written statement said that the firm was created by [[SCL Group|SCL]] with funding from [[Robert Mercer]], and that [[Steve Bannon]] was installed as its vice president. It said Bannon "engaged SCL, a foreign military contractor, to build an arsenal of informational weapons he could deploy on the American population."[^30] The statement also said that after a request for information from executives of [[Lukoil]] in the spring of 2014, Cambridge Analytica discussed with Lukoil its experience with "foreign disinformation, rumour campaigns, microtargeting and its American data assets."[^30]
 
 ### Child Safety
 
-On November 20, 2023, Chairman [[Dick Durbin]] and Ranking Member [[Lindsey Graham]] announced subpoenas to the chief executives of [[Discord]], [[Snap Inc.]] and [[X Corp.]] to testify at a December 6 full committee hearing on online child sexual exploitation.[^28] The hearing was held on January 31, 2024, under the title "Big Tech and the Online Child Sexual Exploitation Crisis." [[Jason Citron]], chief executive and co-founder of Discord, testified.[^29]
+On November 20, 2023, Chairman [[Dick Durbin]] and Ranking Member [[Lindsey Graham]] announced subpoenas to the chief executives of [[Discord]], [[Snap Inc.]] and [[X Corp.]] to testify at a December 6 full committee hearing on online child sexual exploitation.[^31] The hearing was held on January 31, 2024, under the title "Big Tech and the Online Child Sexual Exploitation Crisis." [[Jason Citron]], chief executive and co-founder of Discord, testified.[^32]
 
 ### Leonard Leo
 
-Under Chairman Durbin the committee sought the records and testimony of [[Leonard Leo]] on his network of conservative donor groups.[^30] On July 11, 2023, Durbin and [[Sheldon Whitehouse]], chair of the Federal Courts subcommittee, wrote to Leo requesting information about his interactions with Supreme Court justices.[^31] Leo's counsel, [[David B. Rivkin Jr.]] of [[Baker & Hostetler]], replied on July 25, 2023, that the inquiry exceeded the constitutional limits on the committee's investigative authority and infringed Leo's First Amendment rights. The letter argued that the inquiry was motivated by hostility to Leo's views and quoted Whitehouse's description of Leo as "the little spider that you find at the center of the dark money web." It also said that the committee's ethics bill, S. 359, which the committee ordered reported on July 20, 2023, raised separation-of-powers objections. The letter declined to provide the requested information and closed: "We will not be part of that journey."[^31]
+Under Chairman Durbin the committee sought the records and testimony of [[Leonard Leo]] on his network of conservative donor groups.[^33] On July 11, 2023, Durbin and [[Sheldon Whitehouse]], chair of the Federal Courts subcommittee, wrote to Leo requesting information about his interactions with Supreme Court justices.[^34] Leo's counsel, [[David B. Rivkin Jr.]] of [[Baker & Hostetler]], replied on July 25, 2023, that the inquiry exceeded the constitutional limits on the committee's investigative authority and infringed Leo's First Amendment rights. The letter argued that the inquiry was motivated by hostility to Leo's views and quoted Whitehouse's description of Leo as "the little spider that you find at the center of the dark money web." It also said that the committee's ethics bill, S. 359, which the committee ordered reported on July 20, 2023, raised separation-of-powers objections. The letter declined to provide the requested information and closed: "We will not be part of that journey."[^34]
 
 ### Credit Suisse
 
-On February 3, 2026, the committee held a hearing titled "The Truth Revealed: Hidden Facts Regarding Nazis and Swiss Banks." The hearing's chairman was Grassley and its ranking member was Durbin. [[Neil M. Barofsky]], the independent ombudsperson overseeing [[Credit Suisse]], testified that the bank had maintained previously unreported, and in one instance underreported, wartime account relationships with several instrumentalities of the Nazi government. These included the [[German Foreign Office]], which held at least four accounts at Credit Suisse under a pseudonym. He said that to date the investigation had determined that 628 individuals and 262 legal entities within its scope had account relationships with the bank, and he described a wartime account held by [[Leo Volk]], a senior SS officer and convicted war criminal, who used it to hold hundreds of thousands of Swiss francs. Barofsky described the bank as providing banking services, and premises, to an Argentine ratline, a smuggling operation organized by the Argentine government from an office in Bern called the "Argentine Immigration Office." He told the committee that [[UBS]] had begun a privilege review that withheld materials from his team, and that he expected the investigation to be completed within six months, with a final report to follow a few months after that.[^32]
+On February 3, 2026, the committee held a hearing titled "The Truth Revealed: Hidden Facts Regarding Nazis and Swiss Banks." The hearing's chairman was Grassley and its ranking member was Durbin. [[Neil M. Barofsky]], the independent ombudsperson overseeing [[Credit Suisse]], testified that the bank had maintained previously unreported, and in one instance underreported, wartime account relationships with several instrumentalities of the Nazi government. These included the [[German Foreign Office]], which held at least four accounts at Credit Suisse under a pseudonym. He said that to date the investigation had determined that 628 individuals and 262 legal entities within its scope had account relationships with the bank, and he described a wartime account held by [[Leo Volk]], a senior SS officer and convicted war criminal, who used it to hold hundreds of thousands of Swiss francs. Barofsky described the bank as providing banking services, and premises, to an Argentine ratline, a smuggling operation organized by the Argentine government from an office in Bern called the "Argentine Immigration Office." He told the committee that [[UBS]] had begun a privilege review that withheld materials from his team, and that he expected the investigation to be completed within six months, with a final report to follow a few months after that.[^35]
 
 ### Epstein Files Oversight
 
-On July 7, 2025, the Justice Department and the FBI released an unsigned memorandum on what it called an "exhaustive review of investigative holdings relating to Jeffrey Epstein." Its findings included that the review "revealed no incriminating 'client list.'" On July 18, Durbin, the committee's ranking member, wrote to [[Pam Bondi]] that the finding contradicted public statements she had made in February 2025. He wrote that, according to information his office had received, she had pressured the FBI to assign about 1,000 personnel in its Information Management Division to review roughly 100,000 Epstein-related records on 24-hour shifts. He wrote that his office had been told that personnel were instructed to "flag" any records in which President Trump was mentioned.[^33] The same day he wrote to [[Kash Patel]], the FBI director, with the same question about the flagging and about why the memorandum was unsigned.[^34]
+On July 7, 2025, the Justice Department and the FBI released an unsigned memorandum on what it called an "exhaustive review of investigative holdings relating to Jeffrey Epstein." Its findings included that the review "revealed no incriminating 'client list.'" On July 18, Durbin, the committee's ranking member, wrote to [[Pam Bondi]] that the finding contradicted public statements she had made in February 2025. He wrote that, according to information his office had received, she had pressured the FBI to assign about 1,000 personnel in its Information Management Division to review roughly 100,000 Epstein-related records on 24-hour shifts. He wrote that his office had been told that personnel were instructed to "flag" any records in which President Trump was mentioned.[^36] The same day he wrote to [[Kash Patel]], the FBI director, with the same question about the flagging and about why the memorandum was unsigned.[^37]
 
-The [[Epstein Files Transparency Act]], enacted on November 19, 2025 as Public Law 119-38, required the attorney general, within fifteen days of completing the release of Epstein-related records, to report to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees the categories of records released and withheld, a summary of redactions and their legal basis, and a list of government officials and politically exposed persons named in the released material, with no redactions permitted on that list.[^35] On February 14, 2026, Pam Bondi and Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche sent the Section 3 report on Department of Justice letterhead to Chairman Grassley, Ranking Member Durbin and the chairman and ranking member of the House Judiciary Committee ([[Jim Jordan]] and [[Jamie Raskin]]). The letter stated that the department had released all records relating to nine categories, among them flight logs, communications about decisions to charge or not charge Epstein and his associates, communications concerning the destruction or concealment of records, and documentation of Epstein's detention and death. It stated that information covered by deliberative-process, work-product and attorney-client privileges was redacted in a limited amount, and that no material was redacted or withheld on the basis that it was properly classified in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. It stated that "politically exposed persons" was not defined in the Act and that reviewers were told to note all government officials and politically exposed persons named or referenced in any document, video or image. The list that follows, in alphabetical order, runs to several hundred names of persons whose names appear in the released files "at least once," among them Steve Bannon, [[Ehud Barak]], [[Julian Assange]], [[William Barr]] and [[Donald Trump]]. The letter states that some of those listed had extensive direct email contact with Epstein or [[Ghislaine Maxwell]], while others are mentioned only in a portion of a document, including press reporting, that on its face is unrelated to the Epstein and Maxwell matters.[^36]
+The [[Epstein Files Transparency Act]], enacted on November 19, 2025 as Public Law 119-38, required the attorney general, within fifteen days of completing the release of Epstein-related records, to report to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees the categories of records released and withheld, a summary of redactions and their legal basis, and a list of government officials and politically exposed persons named in the released material, with no redactions permitted on that list.[^38] On February 14, 2026, Pam Bondi and Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche sent the Section 3 report on Department of Justice letterhead to Chairman Grassley, Ranking Member Durbin and the chairman and ranking member of the House Judiciary Committee ([[Jim Jordan]] and [[Jamie Raskin]]). The letter stated that the department had released all records relating to nine categories, among them flight logs, communications about decisions to charge or not charge Epstein and his associates, communications concerning the destruction or concealment of records, and documentation of Epstein's detention and death. It stated that information covered by deliberative-process, work-product and attorney-client privileges was redacted in a limited amount, and that no material was redacted or withheld on the basis that it was properly classified in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. It stated that "politically exposed persons" was not defined in the Act and that reviewers were told to note all government officials and politically exposed persons named or referenced in any document, video or image. The list that follows, in alphabetical order, runs to several hundred names of persons whose names appear in the released files "at least once," among them Steve Bannon, [[Ehud Barak]], [[Julian Assange]], [[William Barr]] and [[Donald Trump]]. The letter states that some of those listed had extensive direct email contact with Epstein or [[Ghislaine Maxwell]], while others are mentioned only in a portion of a document, including press reporting, that on its face is unrelated to the Epstein and Maxwell matters.[^39]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
@@ -219,29 +223,32 @@ The [[Epstein Files Transparency Act]], enacted on November 19, 2025 as Public L
 [^8]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Legislative Counsel, memorandum for the record, "Telephone Call From Mr. J. Sourwine, Chief Counsel, Senate Internal Security Subcommittee," January 21, 1972, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP74B00415R000200140126-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp74b00415r000200140126-2
 [^9]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *State Department Security: The New Passport Regulations*, hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, 87th Congress, Part 3, May 16, June 7, 12 and 19, 1962 (GPO, 1962), testimony of Andreas F. Lowenfeld, June 12, 1962 (index p. 329; the passage quoted is at p. 331 as excerpted in CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00149R000400560007-3). CIA reading room copy of the volume: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp66b00403r000500120001-1 ; extract: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00149r000400560007-3
 [^10]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Intelligence Identities Protection Act, S. 2216*, hearing, Serial No. 96-86 (1980), testimony of Frank C. Carlucci. CIA reading room document CIA-RDP85-00003R000200080003-5. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp85-00003r000200080003-5
-[^11]: Office of Technology Assessment, *An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System* (Washington, October 1982), prepared at the request of the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary; on congressional conditions on the NCIC technology upgrade in 1979 and 1980, see the report's discussion of message switching. https://ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/86624NCJRS.pdf
-[^12]: U.S. Department of Justice, *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc.*, March 1993, section 10, "Ronald LeGrand," pp. 113-114, quoting William Hamilton's affidavit of December 1989. Copy: https://archive.org/stream/InslawPROMISBuaReport/Inslaw%3APROMIS%20Bua%20Report_djvu.txt
-[^13]: Seymour, Cheri. *The Last Circle: Danny Casolaro's Investigation into the Octopus and the PROMIS Software Scandal.* TrineDay, 2010.
-[^14]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, *The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report*, H. Rept. 102-857 (1992), section 7, "Ronald LeGrand Denies INSLAW's Assertions," pp. 62-64 (including the footnote on Hamilton's allegation concerning Roger Pauley and the citation of LeGrand's declaration in Bankruptcy Case No. 85-0070). https://archive.org/stream/InslawAffairInvestigativeReport/TheInslawAffair_djvu.txt
-[^15]: Bua report, section 10, p. 113, quoting Hamilton's December 1989 affidavit on the October 11, 1988 memorandum from Elliot Richardson to Robin Ross.
-[^16]: U.S. Department of Justice, *Report on the Review of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua's Report on the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc.*, September 27, 1994, section IV.B.1, "Ronald LeGrand's Confidential Source," pp. 22-28, quoting Hamilton's affidavit of December 22, 1989 and citing Bua Report 113-120 and INSLAW Rebuttal 44-46; bound with the Bua report at https://archive.org/stream/InslawPROMISBuaReport/Inslaw%3APROMIS%20Bua%20Report_djvu.txt
-[^17]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, "New Report Finds No Credible Basis for INSLAW Case, Recommends Matter Be Closed," September 27, 1994. https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/Pre_96/September94/555.txt.html
-[^18]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Griffin B. Bell: Hearings on the prospective nomination of Griffin B. Bell, of Georgia, to be Attorney General*, 95th Congress, 1st session, January 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18 and 19, 1977 (GPO, 1977), opening day statement of Chairman Eastland. https://archive.org/details/griffinbbellhear00unit
-[^19]: Ronald Reagan, "Statement on Senate Action on the Nomination of William Bradford Reynolds To Be Associate Attorney General," June 27, 1985. The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/259520
-[^20]: "Senate confirmation for senior Justice Department official is in jeopardy," *Christian Science Monitor*, June 20, 1985. https://www.csmonitor.com/1985/0620/arey.html
-[^21]: "Assistant Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds says a Senate...," *United Press International*, August 28, 1985 ("The Senate Judiciary Committee, on a 10-8 vote, rejected Reynold's nomination"). https://www.upi.com/Archives/1985/08/28/Assistant-Attorney-General-William-Bradford-Reynolds-says-a-Senate/8603494049600/ ; see also the Reagan statement of June 27, 1985.
-[^22]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Brett M. Kavanaugh to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States*, S. Hrg. 115-545, Parts 1-2 (hearings of September 4-7 and September 27, 2018), continuation of the hearing, Thursday, September 27, 2018: opening statement of Chairman Grassley and testimony of Judge Kavanaugh. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115shrg32765/html/CHRG-115shrg32765.htm
-[^23]: National Public Radio, "Todd Blanche's high-stakes confirmation hearing for attorney general is underway," July 15, 2026. https://www.npr.org/2026/07/15/nx-s1-5894750/todd-blanches-high-stakes-confirmation-hearing-for-attorney-general-is-underway
-[^24]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary and Caucus on International Narcotics Control, joint hearings on Jamaica's proposed comprehensive international anti-narcotics plan and on drug policy in the Andean nations, November 6, 1989, and January 18 and March 27, 1990, S. Hrg. 101-1228 (Government Printing Office, 1991). Catalog record: https://search.law.villanova.edu/Record/88328
-[^25]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Able Danger and Intelligence Information Sharing*, hearing, September 21, 2005, S. Hrg. 109-311, Serial No. J-109-39, testimony of Representative Curt Weldon (p. 5 and following), Gary M. Bald, William Dugan, Erik Kleinsmith, and Mark S. Zaid (pp. 21-22). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-109shrg25409/pdf/CHRG-109shrg25409.pdf
-[^26]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, hearing "Cambridge Analytica and the Future of Data Privacy," May 16, 2018. https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/committee-activity/hearings/cambridge-analytica-and-the-future-of-data-privacy
-[^27]: Christopher Wylie, written statement, "In the Matter of Cambridge Analytica and Other Related Issues," Senate Committee on the Judiciary, May 16, 2018, paragraphs 8, 9 and 32. https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/06/03/2026/05-16-18-wylie-testimony
-[^28]: Senate Committee on the Judiciary, press release, "Durbin, Graham Announce Subpoenas to Big Tech CEOs to Testify About Their Failure to Protect Children Online," November 20, 2023. https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/press/releases/durbin-graham-announce-subpoenas-to-big-tech-ceos-to-testify-about-their-failure-to-protect-children-online
-[^29]: Jason Citron, testimony, "Big Tech and the Online Child Sexual Exploitation Crisis," hearing before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, January 31, 2024. https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/2024-01-31-testimony-citron
-[^30]: "Inside the 'Private and Confidential' Conservative Group That Promises to 'Crush Liberal Dominance,'" *ProPublica*, March 15, 2023.
-[^31]: David B. Rivkin Jr., Baker & Hostetler, letter to Senators Richard J. Durbin and Sheldon Whitehouse, July 25, 2023, responding to the committee's letter of July 11, 2023. https://levin-center.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/2023-7-25-Leo-counsels-ltr-to-Senate-Judiciary-declining-to-produce-requested-information.pdf
-[^32]: Testimony of Neil M. Barofsky, Independent Ombudsperson for Credit Suisse AG, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, "The Truth Revealed: Hidden Facts Regarding Nazis and Swiss Banks," February 3, 2026. https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/95317009-9c96-3e8f-f63d-04b7f29ef02f/2026-02-03_Testimony_Barofsky.pdf
-[^33]: Senator Richard J. Durbin, Ranking Member, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, letter to Attorney General Pam Bondi, July 18, 2025. https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/2025-07-18-rjd-letter-to-ag-bondi-re-epstein?download=1
-[^34]: Senator Richard J. Durbin, Ranking Member, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, letter to FBI Director Kash Patel, July 18, 2025. https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/2025-07-18-rjd-letter-to-fbi-director-patel-re-epstein?download=1
-[^35]: Epstein Files Transparency Act, Public Law 119-38, 139 Stat. 656, sections 2 and 3, approved November 19, 2025. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-119publ38/pdf/PLAW-119publ38.pdf
-[^36]: Pamela J. Bondi, Attorney General, and Todd Blanche, Deputy Attorney General, letter to the chairmen and ranking members of the Senate and House Committees on the Judiciary, "Epstein Files Transparency Act: Section 3 Report to Congress," February 14, 2026, pp. 1-6. https://www.justice.gov/opa/media/1434856/dl ; coverage: "Justice Department lists hundreds of prominent people named in Epstein files in letter to Congress," *CNN*, February 15, 2026. https://www.cnn.com/2026/02/15/politics/doj-epstein-files-prominent-people
+[^11]: Individual Rights and the Federal Role in Behavior Modification (Washington: GPO, November 1974), pp. 35-40. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/142690NCJRS.pdf
+[^12]: The American Presidency Project, nomination of Donald Eugene Santarelli to the Board of Directors of the U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation, June 5, 1981. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/nomination-donald-eugene-santarelli-be-member-the-board-directors-the-united-states
+[^13]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Juvenile Justice, Oversight of the Office of Justice Assistance, Research and Statistics, hearing of October 28, 1981, Serial No. J-97-74 (1982). https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152817_0256
+[^14]: Office of Technology Assessment, *An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System* (Washington, October 1982), prepared at the request of the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary; on congressional conditions on the NCIC technology upgrade in 1979 and 1980, see the report's discussion of message switching. https://ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/86624NCJRS.pdf
+[^15]: U.S. Department of Justice, *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc.*, March 1993, section 10, "Ronald LeGrand," pp. 113-114, quoting William Hamilton's affidavit of December 1989. Copy: https://archive.org/stream/InslawPROMISBuaReport/Inslaw%3APROMIS%20Bua%20Report_djvu.txt
+[^16]: Seymour, Cheri. *The Last Circle: Danny Casolaro's Investigation into the Octopus and the PROMIS Software Scandal.* TrineDay, 2010.
+[^17]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, *The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report*, H. Rept. 102-857 (1992), section 7, "Ronald LeGrand Denies INSLAW's Assertions," pp. 62-64 (including the footnote on Hamilton's allegation concerning Roger Pauley and the citation of LeGrand's declaration in Bankruptcy Case No. 85-0070). https://archive.org/stream/InslawAffairInvestigativeReport/TheInslawAffair_djvu.txt
+[^18]: Bua report, section 10, p. 113, quoting Hamilton's December 1989 affidavit on the October 11, 1988 memorandum from Elliot Richardson to Robin Ross.
+[^19]: U.S. Department of Justice, *Report on the Review of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua's Report on the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc.*, September 27, 1994, section IV.B.1, "Ronald LeGrand's Confidential Source," pp. 22-28, quoting Hamilton's affidavit of December 22, 1989 and citing Bua Report 113-120 and INSLAW Rebuttal 44-46; bound with the Bua report at https://archive.org/stream/InslawPROMISBuaReport/Inslaw%3APROMIS%20Bua%20Report_djvu.txt
+[^20]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, "New Report Finds No Credible Basis for INSLAW Case, Recommends Matter Be Closed," September 27, 1994. https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/Pre_96/September94/555.txt.html
+[^21]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Griffin B. Bell: Hearings on the prospective nomination of Griffin B. Bell, of Georgia, to be Attorney General*, 95th Congress, 1st session, January 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18 and 19, 1977 (GPO, 1977), opening day statement of Chairman Eastland. https://archive.org/details/griffinbbellhear00unit
+[^22]: Ronald Reagan, "Statement on Senate Action on the Nomination of William Bradford Reynolds To Be Associate Attorney General," June 27, 1985. The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/259520
+[^23]: "Senate confirmation for senior Justice Department official is in jeopardy," *Christian Science Monitor*, June 20, 1985. https://www.csmonitor.com/1985/0620/arey.html
+[^24]: "Assistant Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds says a Senate...," *United Press International*, August 28, 1985 ("The Senate Judiciary Committee, on a 10-8 vote, rejected Reynold's nomination"). https://www.upi.com/Archives/1985/08/28/Assistant-Attorney-General-William-Bradford-Reynolds-says-a-Senate/8603494049600/ ; see also the Reagan statement of June 27, 1985.
+[^25]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Brett M. Kavanaugh to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States*, S. Hrg. 115-545, Parts 1-2 (hearings of September 4-7 and September 27, 2018), continuation of the hearing, Thursday, September 27, 2018: opening statement of Chairman Grassley and testimony of Judge Kavanaugh. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115shrg32765/html/CHRG-115shrg32765.htm
+[^26]: National Public Radio, "Todd Blanche's high-stakes confirmation hearing for attorney general is underway," July 15, 2026. https://www.npr.org/2026/07/15/nx-s1-5894750/todd-blanches-high-stakes-confirmation-hearing-for-attorney-general-is-underway
+[^27]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary and Caucus on International Narcotics Control, joint hearings on Jamaica's proposed comprehensive international anti-narcotics plan and on drug policy in the Andean nations, November 6, 1989, and January 18 and March 27, 1990, S. Hrg. 101-1228 (Government Printing Office, 1991). Catalog record: https://search.law.villanova.edu/Record/88328
+[^28]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Able Danger and Intelligence Information Sharing*, hearing, September 21, 2005, S. Hrg. 109-311, Serial No. J-109-39, testimony of Representative Curt Weldon (p. 5 and following), Gary M. Bald, William Dugan, Erik Kleinsmith, and Mark S. Zaid (pp. 21-22). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-109shrg25409/pdf/CHRG-109shrg25409.pdf
+[^29]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, hearing "Cambridge Analytica and the Future of Data Privacy," May 16, 2018. https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/committee-activity/hearings/cambridge-analytica-and-the-future-of-data-privacy
+[^30]: Christopher Wylie, written statement, "In the Matter of Cambridge Analytica and Other Related Issues," Senate Committee on the Judiciary, May 16, 2018, paragraphs 8, 9 and 32. https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/06/03/2026/05-16-18-wylie-testimony
+[^31]: Senate Committee on the Judiciary, press release, "Durbin, Graham Announce Subpoenas to Big Tech CEOs to Testify About Their Failure to Protect Children Online," November 20, 2023. https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/press/releases/durbin-graham-announce-subpoenas-to-big-tech-ceos-to-testify-about-their-failure-to-protect-children-online
+[^32]: Jason Citron, testimony, "Big Tech and the Online Child Sexual Exploitation Crisis," hearing before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, January 31, 2024. https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/2024-01-31-testimony-citron
+[^33]: "Inside the 'Private and Confidential' Conservative Group That Promises to 'Crush Liberal Dominance,'" *ProPublica*, March 15, 2023.
+[^34]: David B. Rivkin Jr., Baker & Hostetler, letter to Senators Richard J. Durbin and Sheldon Whitehouse, July 25, 2023, responding to the committee's letter of July 11, 2023. https://levin-center.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/2023-7-25-Leo-counsels-ltr-to-Senate-Judiciary-declining-to-produce-requested-information.pdf
+[^35]: Testimony of Neil M. Barofsky, Independent Ombudsperson for Credit Suisse AG, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, "The Truth Revealed: Hidden Facts Regarding Nazis and Swiss Banks," February 3, 2026. https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/95317009-9c96-3e8f-f63d-04b7f29ef02f/2026-02-03_Testimony_Barofsky.pdf
+[^36]: Senator Richard J. Durbin, Ranking Member, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, letter to Attorney General Pam Bondi, July 18, 2025. https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/2025-07-18-rjd-letter-to-ag-bondi-re-epstein?download=1
+[^37]: Senator Richard J. Durbin, Ranking Member, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, letter to FBI Director Kash Patel, July 18, 2025. https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/2025-07-18-rjd-letter-to-fbi-director-patel-re-epstein?download=1
+[^38]: Epstein Files Transparency Act, Public Law 119-38, 139 Stat. 656, sections 2 and 3, approved November 19, 2025. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-119publ38/pdf/PLAW-119publ38.pdf
+[^39]: Pamela J. Bondi, Attorney General, and Todd Blanche, Deputy Attorney General, letter to the chairmen and ranking members of the Senate and House Committees on the Judiciary, "Epstein Files Transparency Act: Section 3 Report to Congress," February 14, 2026, pp. 1-6. https://www.justice.gov/opa/media/1434856/dl ; coverage: "Justice Department lists hundreds of prominent people named in Epstein files in letter to Congress," *CNN*, February 15, 2026. https://www.cnn.com/2026/02/15/politics/doj-epstein-files-prominent-people

20 - ORGANIZATIONS/INTERNATIONAL/United Nations.md

@@ -191,7 +191,9 @@ On July 7, 1978, Grenada's Deputy Permanent Representative asked for the inclusi
 
 On November 27, 1978, Gairy introduced to the Special Political Committee draft resolution A/SPC/33/L.20, which would have recommended that the United Nations, in consultation with the appropriate specialized agencies, "initiate, conduct and co-ordinate research into the nature and origin of unidentified flying objects," asked the Secretary-General to invite Member States, specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations to submit information and proposals by May 31, 1979, and provided for a group of experts to meet during the sessions of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. After consultations the Committee agreed by consensus on a draft decision, and Grenada did not press the draft resolution to a vote.[^89] The decision, adopted by consensus by the General Assembly on December 18, 1978 as decision 33/426, took note of Grenada's statements and draft resolutions, invited interested Member States to co-ordinate at the national level scientific research and investigation into extraterrestrial life, including unidentified flying objects, requested the Secretary-General to transmit the Grenada statements and documentation to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space for its 1979 session, and provided that the Committee would permit Grenada, at its request, to present its views.[^91]
 
-In 1994, [[Laurance Rockefeller]] wrote to the White House science adviser, [[John H. Gibbons]], that preliminary talks had been held about a United Nations conference on extraterrestrial intelligence.[^92]
+The committee's summary record of the 35th meeting, on November 27, 1978, lists Gairy, Grenada's Minister of Education Wellington Friday, and Hynek (designated as speaking for Grenada), followed by [[Jacques Vallee]], whose entry carries no delegation designation, and by Lt. Col. Coyne on an October 18, 1973 helicopter encounter over Ohio. Gairy told the committee that several scientists formed part of Grenada's delegation and that Grenada had invited scientists who had taken part in the First International Congress on the UFO Phenomenon (Acapulco, April 1977) to make statements. Hynek said UFO reports had been assembled from 133 countries. Vallee said the phenomenon had a physical, a psycho-physiological and a social-belief aspect and that he had studied reports from France and the United States for over 15 years.[^92] The committee approved the four-paragraph text of the decision by consensus at its 47th meeting on December 8, 1978.[^93]
+
+In 1994, [[Laurance Rockefeller]] wrote to the White House science adviser, [[John H. Gibbons]], that preliminary talks had been held about a United Nations conference on extraterrestrial intelligence.[^94]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
@@ -286,4 +288,6 @@ In 1994, [[Laurance Rockefeller]] wrote to the White House science adviser, [[Jo
 [^89]: United Nations General Assembly, 33rd session, document A/33/512, "Establishment of an agency or a department of the United Nations for undertaking, co-ordinating and disseminating the results of research into unidentified flying objects and related phenomena: Report of the Special Political Committee," December 16, 1978, paragraphs 1 to 9. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F33%2F512&l=en&t=pdf
 [^90]: United Nations General Assembly, 33rd session, plenary meeting record A/33/PV.32, October 12, 1978, statement of Sir Eric Gairy, paragraphs 225 to 236. Verbatim record: https://un-project.org/debate/33/3504/
 [^91]: United Nations General Assembly, 33rd session, 87th plenary meeting, December 18, 1978, record A/33/PV.87, report of the Special Political Committee on agenda item 126 (A/33/512), decision 33/426. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F33%2FPV.87&l=en&t=pdf
-[^92]: Melvin R. Laird to Laurance Rockefeller, May 9, 1994, and Rockefeller to John H. Gibbons, June 1, 1994, attached to http://www.paradigmresearchgroup.org/Rockefeller%20Documents/RID-6-13-94.htm
+[^92]: United Nations General Assembly, 33rd session, Special Political Committee, summary record of the 35th meeting, November 27, 1978, A/SPC/33/SR.35, paras. 1-22. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2FSPC%2F33%2FSR.35&l=en&t=pdf
+[^93]: United Nations General Assembly, 33rd session, document A/33/512, December 16, 1978, para. 9; Special Political Committee, 47th meeting, December 8, 1978, A/SPC/33/SR.47, para. 7. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/660888
+[^94]: Melvin R. Laird to Laurance Rockefeller, May 9, 1994, and Rockefeller to John H. Gibbons, June 1, 1994, attached to http://www.paradigmresearchgroup.org/Rockefeller%20Documents/RID-6-13-94.htm

20 - ORGANIZATIONS/PRIVATE/Capcom.md

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ relations:
     with: "[[Manuel Noriega]]"
     role: "laundered 20.5 million dollars of his funds, 1988"
     fn: 2
-updated: 2026-09-23
+updated: 2026-10-12
 ---
 Capcom was a commodities futures firm based in [[London]] and [[Chicago]] that operated from 1984 to 1988, created by [[Syed Ziauddin Ali Akbar|Ziauddin Akbar]], the head of the treasury of the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International|BCCI]], and owned largely by BCCI's Saudi shareholders.[^1][^2] The [[BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report|Kerry-Brown Senate Report]] said that "in the entire BCCI affair, perhaps no entity is more mysterious and yet more central to BCCI's collapse and criminality than Capcom," and it moved "billions of dollars" through the futures markets "in a largely anonymous fashion."[^2]
 
@@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ The Senate report called Capcom's handling of the money of General [[Manuel Nori
 
 Citing a [[Peat Marwick]] report, the Senate report linked Capcom to Shakarchi Trading of Zurich, the gold dealer of Mohammed Shakarchi, to which it made a payment of 150,000 dollars on the instruction of Ahmed Tawfik in February 1988; Swiss and American investigators later linked Shakarchi to the brothers Jean and Barkev Magharian, who admitted that part of the 2 billion Swiss francs they moved between 1985 and 1988 came from drug transactions. About 44 percent of Capcom's American clients were West German accounts; the most important, Ambros Holdings, a Panama-registered company with offices in Germany and [[Liechtenstein]] whose president, Richard Sax, traded under the name "Richard Wagner," accounted for half to seventy percent of Capcom Futures' commissions in September and October 1988, and went bankrupt in 1991.[^2] The subcommittee said it had been unable to determine why Capcom was created, listing "misappropriation of BCCI assets for personal enrichment," laundering money from the Middle East, and siphoning assets out of BCCI as possibilities.[^2]
 
+The report describes [[Ian Glendinning Watt]] as a chartered accountant of Peat Marwick McLintock who was appointed to investigate Capcom's trading. The subcommittee wrote that Watt characterized the profits of the Capital Fund as "artificial" (Watt affidavit at 25). In his affidavit of January 20, 1989 he found the explanations of Capcom's managing director, [[S. M. Akbar]], "unsatisfactory" (at 44) and "most curious" (at 46). The report's notes cite a Peat Marwick McLintock audit of Capcom prepared for the [[Chicago Board of Trade]] and dated May 4, 1989.[^2]
+
 ### Footnotes
 
 [^1]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 12.

20 - ORGANIZATIONS/PRIVATE/Industrias Cardoen.md

@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ The product list includes demolition charges, Bangalore torpedo charges, hand gr
 
 ### Miami arrest, 1983
 
-[[Kenneth R. Timmerman]] wrote that on August 2, 1983, [[U.S. Customs]] officers arrested Cardoen in Miami over night-vision goggles bound for Chile, and that the case ended in a plea bargain with a fine of 100,000 dollars on his company.[^3] Timmerman quoted Thomas L. Flannery, who investigated [[James Guerin]] for the Lancaster Intelligencer Journal, as saying that by the time fuzes for cluster bombs made by [[International Signal and Control]] were shipped to Iraq in 1984, Guerin and Cardoen were old friends who had made a sweeping agreement "to split the world cluster bomb market in two," with Cardoen taking Latin America and "special" countries such as Iraq and Guerin the rest of the Gulf, Pakistan and South Africa.[^4] A declaration signed by [[Howard Teicher]], a former [[National Security Council]] staff member, on January 31, 1995 dated the arrest to 1983 in Miami in a sting operation concerning the smuggling of night-vision goggles to Cuba and Libya and stated that the highest levels of the U.S. government, including the NSC staff and the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]], were well aware of it.[^5] In a corrective declaration of October 3, 1996 Teicher wrote that, although he understood Cardoen had been arrested, "the other information in this paragraph is incorrect."[^6]
+[[Kenneth R. Timmerman]] wrote that on August 2, 1983, [[U.S. Customs]] officers arrested Cardoen in Miami over night-vision goggles bound for Chile, and that the case ended in a plea bargain with a fine of 100,000 dollars on his company.[^3] Timmerman quoted Thomas L. Flannery, who investigated [[James Guerin]] for the Lancaster Intelligencer Journal, as saying that by the time fuzes for cluster bombs made by [[International Signal and Control]] were shipped to Iraq in 1984, Guerin and Cardoen were old friends who had made a sweeping agreement "to split the world cluster bomb market in two," with Cardoen taking Latin America and "special" countries such as Iraq and Guerin the rest of the Gulf, Pakistan and South Africa.[^4] A declaration signed by [[Howard Teicher]], a former [[National Security Council]] staff member, on January 31, 1995 dated the arrest to 1983 in Miami in a sting operation concerning the smuggling of night-vision goggles to Cuba and Libya and stated that the highest levels of the U.S. government, including the NSC staff and the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]], were well aware of it.[^5] In a corrective declaration of October 31, 1996 Teicher wrote that, although he understood Cardoen had been arrested, "the other information in this paragraph is incorrect."[^6]
 
 ### Iraqi sales and the Israeli approach
 
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ The district court found no evidence supporting the theory that the CIA had secr
 
 On January 31, 1995, Howard Teicher signed a declaration under penalty of perjury in case No. 93-241-CR, captioned for Judge Highsmith. It states that he was on the NSC staff from 1982 to 1987, that "the CIA authorized, approved and assisted Cardoen in the manufacture and sale of cluster bombs," and that CIA Director Casey directed the secretaries of State and Commerce on the necessary licenses. The declaration opens by stating that nothing in it is classified. [[Robert Parry]] reported that Teicher named Casey and his deputy Gates as having "authorized, approved and assisted" the delivery of cluster bombs to Iraq, that the defense attorney [[Gerald Houlihan]] angered prosecutors by publicly filing it, that the government sealed it as a state secret while attacking Teicher's credibility, and that Teicher was blocked from testifying and his statements kept from the jury on grounds of relevance. [[Consortium News]] added that a federal grand jury had begun hearing testimony on a related complaint over the submission of a defense affidavit.[^5][^22][^23]
 
-The United States served a corrective declaration signed by Teicher on October 3, 1996, with a notice of filing served November 8, 1996. In it Teicher wrote that attorneys for Teledyne had prepared the January 31, 1995 declaration and faxed it to him; that he had not reviewed or indexed his National Security Council files since 1987; that his statements in paragraphs 15 through 18, which refer to what his files "will contain," reflected his best memory and belief and were not intended as "categorical statements of fact"; and that he has no actual knowledge that his files contain such information. He wrote that he is "not aware of any specific evidence that the United States government or any government official or agency took steps to help Cardoen obtain any U.S.-origin components for use in cluster bombs," and is not aware of specific evidence that any such official or agency helped Cardoen supply munitions to Iraq in any other way. As to paragraph 17, he wrote that although he understood Cardoen had been arrested, "the other information in this paragraph is incorrect." The corrective declaration does not address paragraphs 1 through 14 of the January text, including paragraph 14, which describes the supply of Cardoen's cluster bombs to Iraq as an "extension" of United States policy toward Iraq.[^6]
+The United States served a corrective declaration signed by Teicher on October 31, 1996, with a notice of filing served November 8, 1996. In it Teicher wrote that attorneys for Teledyne had prepared the January 31, 1995 declaration and faxed it to him; that he had not reviewed or indexed his National Security Council files since 1987; that his statements in paragraphs 15 through 18, which refer to what his files "will contain," reflected his best memory and belief and were not intended as "categorical statements of fact"; and that he has no actual knowledge that his files contain such information. He wrote that he is "not aware of any specific evidence that the United States government or any government official or agency took steps to help Cardoen obtain any U.S.-origin components for use in cluster bombs," and is not aware of specific evidence that any such official or agency helped Cardoen supply munitions to Iraq in any other way. As to paragraph 17, he wrote that although he understood Cardoen had been arrested, "the other information in this paragraph is incorrect." The corrective declaration does not address paragraphs 1 through 14 of the January text, including paragraph 14, which describes the supply of Cardoen's cluster bombs to Iraq as an "extension" of United States policy toward Iraq.[^6]
 
 ### Extradition, 2019 and 2020
 
@@ -144,8 +144,8 @@ The sales sheet is one of five items in the "Promotional Material" folder, a sin
 [^2]: *United States v. Cardoen*, 898 F. Supp. 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (Highsmith, J.), reissued order on hearing under section 6 of the Classified Information Procedures Act, No. 93-241-CR, decided August 29, 1995 (original order December 28, 1994; hearing November 18 and 23, 1994), https://static.case.law/f-supp/898/cases/1563-01.json.
 [^3]: Kenneth R. Timmerman, *The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991), pp. 166-170.
 [^4]: Kenneth R. Timmerman, *The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991), pp. 168-169. The quotation is Timmerman's quotation of Thomas L. Flannery.
-[^5]: Declaration of Howard Teicher, executed January 31, 1995, *United States v. Cardoen*, No. 93-241-CR-HIGHSMITH (S.D. Fla.), paragraphs 14 to 18, as transcribed at http://spikethenews.blogspot.com/2016/01/the-teicher-affidavit.html (January 2016). The declaration was reported sealed in the court file.
-[^6]: Declaration of Howard R. Teicher (corrective), *United States v. Carlos Cardoen et al.*, No. 93-241-CR-Highsmith (S.D. Fla.), dated October 3, 1996, with the United States' notice of filing served November 8, 1996, paragraphs 2 to 7, https://archive.org/details/utf-893cr-241-de-679. Addresses paragraphs 15 to 18 of the January 31, 1995 declaration.
+[^5]: Declaration of Howard Teicher, executed January 31, 1995, *United States v. Cardoen*, No. 93-241-CR-HIGHSMITH (S.D. Fla.), paragraphs 14 to 18 (filed copy), National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82, document 61, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq61.pdf. The declaration was reported sealed in the court file.
+[^6]: Declaration of Howard R. Teicher (corrective), *United States v. Carlos Cardoen et al.*, No. 93-241-CR-Highsmith (S.D. Fla.), dated October 31, 1996, with the United States' notice of filing served November 8, 1996, paragraphs 2 to 7, https://archive.org/details/utf-893cr-241-de-679. Addresses paragraphs 15 to 18 of the January 31, 1995 declaration.
 [^7]: Ari Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network* (New York: Sheridan Square Press, 1992; TrineDay reprint, 2015).
 [^8]: Alan Friedman, *Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq* (New York: Bantam, 1993), pp. 46-54, 64.
 [^9]: Rep. Henry B. Gonzalez, "Update on BNL Investigation," *Congressional Record*, House of Representatives, January 21, 1993, p. H140 (reprinted article by William Tuohy and Douglas Frantz, "Three British Executives Cleared in Iraq Arms Sale Case"). https://irp.fas.org/congress/1993_cr/h930121-bnl.htm

20 - ORGANIZATIONS/PRIVATE/International Signal and Control.md

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ tags:
 summary: "Lancaster defense contractor merged into Ferranti in 1987, whose fictitious contracts cost Ferranti 215 million pounds and whose South African shipments led to the 1991 indictments and a 1997 Armscor plea."
 location: "Lancaster, Pennsylvania"
 created: 2026-10-08
-updated: 2026-10-08
+updated: 2026-10-12
 relations:
   - type: owned
     with: "[[James Guerin]]"
@@ -88,13 +88,13 @@ Timmerman wrote that ISC had developed the fuze for the Rockeye cluster bomb on
 
 ### London listing and the Ferranti merger, 1987 to 1989
 
-Guerin listed the company in London rather than on the New York Stock Exchange. British investors never warmed to the stock, and after it fell in 1987 he merged the company with Ferranti.[^1] The merger was announced in September 1987, and Ferranti acquired ISC in November 1987.[^6][^7] The Lancaster newspaper reports a price of 670 million dollars in its 2005 account and a 1.5 billion dollar deal in its 2022 account.[^4][^8] Ferranti's chairman [[Derek Alun-Jones]] remained chairman and Guerin became deputy chairman.[^1] [[Peat Marwick]], ISC's accountants during the merger, and the London merchant bank [[Robert Fleming & Co.|Robert Fleming]], financial adviser to the company, were expected in 1989 to be asked how they failed to detect any phantom contracts.[^1]
+Guerin listed the company in London rather than on the New York Stock Exchange. British investors never warmed to the stock, and after it fell in 1987 he merged the company with Ferranti.[^1] The merger was announced in September 1987, and Ferranti acquired ISC in November 1987.[^6][^7] The Lancaster newspaper reports a price of 670 million dollars in its 2005 account and a 1.5 billion dollar deal in its 2022 account.[^4][^8] Ferranti's chairman [[Derek Alun-Jones]] remained chairman and Guerin became deputy chairman.[^1] The [[Washington Post]] reported in 1989 that [[Peat Marwick]] had been ISC's accountants during the merger, and that Peat Marwick and [[Robert Fleming & Co.|Robert Fleming]], financial adviser to the company, were expected to be asked how they failed to detect any phantom contracts.[^1]
 
 A Ministry of Defence letter of September 12, 1989 told the Prime Minister's office that when the merger was announced, Sir [[Clive Whitmore]] and Sir [[Peter Levene]] sought an explanation from Alun-Jones, whose account was "sufficiently unconvincing" for the [[Ministry of Defence]] to order secret enquiries. The enquiries showed that ISC and Guerin "had close contacts with the South African government," and that ISC had been involved in "a certain amount of two-way trade in missile equipment and technology." The [[Department of Trade and Industry]] was told in May 1988, and Alun-Jones was told of the ministry's concerns in July 1988. The letter states that the divestment of ISC Technologies by Ferranti and Guerin's resignation were, in the ministry's belief, partly a result of that warning, that Ferranti had expected ISC Technologies to take its overseas contracts with it, and that Guerin was unable to raise the funds to finance the acquisition. It records "an alleged connection between ISC and a UK company involved in the European network of companies providing technology for the CONDOR missile programme."[^6]
 
 ### Ferranti's discovery, 1989
 
-Guerin resigned in May 1989 after seeking unsuccessfully to buy back ISC.[^1] Ferranti suspended trading in its shares on September 11, 1989, and told shareholders that its board had come to "suspect significant irregularities" in overseas contracts of ISC Technologies, appointing [[Coopers & Lybrand]] to investigate.[^6][^9] The Ministry of Defence letter records that Alun-Jones put the sums at issue at about 200 million pounds, enough to put Ferranti's loan agreement with its bankers in default, and that the contract was supposed to be with Pakistan for "missile know-how," through a series of intermediaries, with the work supposed to have been done in South Africa. The letter describes the nature and substance of the contract as "in considerable doubt," and states that the ministry's Secretary of State regarded it as a matter of considerable concern that a major British company might have links with South Africa in the defense field.[^6]
+Guerin resigned in May 1989 after seeking unsuccessfully to buy back ISC.[^1] Ferranti suspended trading in its shares on September 11, 1989, and told shareholders that its board had come to "suspect significant irregularities" in overseas contracts of ISC Technologies, appointing [[Coopers & Lybrand]] to investigate, "and not Peat Marwick, who are Ferranti's auditors."[^6][^9] The Ministry of Defence letter records that Alun-Jones put the sums at issue at about 200 million pounds, enough to put Ferranti's loan agreement with its bankers in default, and that the contract was supposed to be with Pakistan for "missile know-how," through a series of intermediaries, with the work supposed to have been done in South Africa. The letter describes the nature and substance of the contract as "in considerable doubt," and states that the ministry's Secretary of State regarded it as a matter of considerable concern that a major British company might have links with South Africa in the defense field.[^6]
 
 According to British press reports, [[Pakistan]] officials claimed the contract never existed, while Guerin's longtime associate [[Clyde Ivy]] claimed it did. A former Pakistani official said ISC had held a contract with the Pakistani Air Force for cluster bombs or cluster-bomb technology in 1985 and 1986 that was completed.[^1] A Prime Minister's private office note of October 2, 1989 on a meeting of ministers records that the [[Serious Fraud Office]] was awaiting the Coopers & Lybrand findings, that Ferranti would probably have to write off about 215 million pounds, some of which might be recovered from Peat Marwick, who had advised Ferranti on ISC's financial position before the merger, and that "there were allegations that ISC had been involved in supplying defence equipment to South Africa, China and [[Iran]] among others, although it seemed likely that these activities were confined to the US."[^6]
 

20 - ORGANIZATIONS/PRIVATE/National Institute for Discovery Science.md

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ relations:
     role: "deputy administrator, molecular biology and biochemistry (2000 to 2003 captures); administrator (February 2004 capture)"
     start: 1996
     end: 2004
-    fn: 6
+    fn: 7
 ---
 The [[National Institute for Discovery Science]] (NIDS) was a privately funded research organization founded by billionaire [[Robert Bigelow]] in 1995. The organization was dedicated to the scientific study of [[Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena]] (UAP) and other paranormal phenomena.[^1]
 
@@ -31,13 +31,13 @@ One of the most well-known projects undertaken by NIDS was the investigation of
 
 ### Science Advisory Board and staff
 
-The institute's personnel page as captured on December 6, 2000 listed a Science Advisory Board of [[Warren Burggren]] (chairman), [[Douglas P. Ferraro]], [[Albert A. Harrison]], [[Edgar Mitchell]], [[Melvin Morse]], [[Martin Piltch]], [[Hal Puthoff]], [[Theodore Rockwell]], [[John F. Schuessler]], [[Jessica Utts]], [[Jacques Vallee]] and [[Jim Whinnery]]. The staff list named Robert Bigelow as president and founder, [[Colm Kelleher]] as deputy administrator (molecular biology and biochemistry), [[John B. Alexander]] as "Discrete Project Scout," [[Eric W. Davis]] (aerospace physics and astrophysics), [[George E. Onet]] (veterinary pathology) and [[Marcel Kuijsten]] (communications officer and webmaster).[^3]
+The institute's personnel page as captured on December 6, 2000 listed a Science Advisory Board of [[Warren Burggren]] (chairman), [[Douglas P. Ferraro]], [[Albert A. Harrison]], [[Edgar Mitchell]], [[Melvin Morse]], [[Martin Piltch]], [[Hal Puthoff]], [[Theodore Rockwell]], [[John F. Schuessler]], [[Jessica Utts]], [[Jacques Vallee]] and [[Jim Whinnery]]. The staff list named Robert Bigelow as president and founder, [[Colm Kelleher]] as deputy administrator (molecular biology and biochemistry), [[John B. Alexander]] as "Discrete Project Scout," [[Eric W. Davis]] (aerospace physics and astrophysics), [[George E. Onet]] (veterinary pathology) and [[Marcel Kuijsten]] (communications officer and webmaster).[^3] The capture of June 22, 2000 includes [[Peter A. Sturrock]] on the board as well, and Jacques Vallee remains on the Science Advisory Board in the captures of August 6, 2001, October 4, 2002, April 2, 2004 and May 9, 2008.[^4]
 
-The capture of October 21, 2001 lists Colm Kelleher with the same title and Hal Puthoff as chairman of the board.[^4] The capture of February 6, 2003 still lists Kelleher as deputy administrator. The capture of February 4, 2004 lists him as administrator for molecular biology and biochemistry, names [[Bruce Cornet]] as deputy administrator for geology, botany and earth history, names Marcel Kuijsten as the only other staff member, and moves John B. Alexander to the science advisory board; Puthoff is again chairman.[^5] The 2017 offering circular of [[To The Stars Academy of Arts & Science]] states that Kelleher "worked for eight years as Deputy Director of the National Institute for Discovery Science (NIDS)."[^6] His Goodreads author biography and a May 2023 episode description of the Micah Hanks Program give 1996 to 2004 as the years he led the NIDS team at Skinwalker Ranch.[^7]
+The capture of October 21, 2001 lists Colm Kelleher with the same title and Hal Puthoff as chairman of the board.[^5] The capture of February 6, 2003 still lists Kelleher as deputy administrator. The capture of February 4, 2004 lists him as administrator for molecular biology and biochemistry, names [[Bruce Cornet]] as deputy administrator for geology, botany and earth history, names Marcel Kuijsten as the only other staff member, and moves John B. Alexander to the science advisory board; Puthoff is again chairman.[^6] The 2017 offering circular of [[To The Stars Academy of Arts & Science]] states that Kelleher "worked for eight years as Deputy Director of the National Institute for Discovery Science (NIDS)."[^7] His Goodreads author biography and a May 2023 episode description of the Micah Hanks Program give 1996 to 2004 as the years he led the NIDS team at Skinwalker Ranch.[^8]
 
 ### Press Report of April 1997
 
-The *[[Deseret News]]* reporter [[Zack Van Eyck]] wrote in April 1997 (reprinted in *The [[Uintah Basin Standard]]* on April 29) that research scientists who had taken control of a 480-acre [[Uintah County, Utah|Uintah County]] ranch near [[Randlett, Utah|Randlett]] the previous fall remained there although they had not seen the phenomena that its former owners, [[Terry Sherman|Terry]] and [[Gwen Sherman|Gwen]] Sherman, described. A spokesman for the [[Las Vegas]]-based institute said the researchers had yet to see flying craft, cattle mutilations or the "balls of light" that the Shermans said killed dogs. John B. Alexander, identified as the institute's director for scientific liaison, was quoted: "There have been some minor observations, but nothing you would stand behind." The story described Bigelow as a Las Vegas real estate magnate who founded the institute and who bought the ranch in September 1996, three months after the Shermans first told their account publicly in the *Deseret News*; it said two scientists and a veterinarian had set up an observation post, that the institute had not released details to other UFO researchers who were frustrated by that, and that Alexander said findings would be posted on the institute's web page (accessnv.com/nids).[^8]
+The *[[Deseret News]]* reporter [[Zack Van Eyck]] wrote in April 1997 (reprinted in *The [[Uintah Basin Standard]]* on April 29) that research scientists who had taken control of a 480-acre [[Uintah County, Utah|Uintah County]] ranch near [[Randlett, Utah|Randlett]] the previous fall remained there although they had not seen the phenomena that its former owners, [[Terry Sherman|Terry]] and [[Gwen Sherman|Gwen]] Sherman, described. A spokesman for the [[Las Vegas]]-based institute said the researchers had yet to see flying craft, cattle mutilations or the "balls of light" that the Shermans said killed dogs. John B. Alexander, identified as the institute's director for scientific liaison, was quoted: "There have been some minor observations, but nothing you would stand behind." The story described Bigelow as a Las Vegas real estate magnate who founded the institute and who bought the ranch in September 1996, three months after the Shermans first told their account publicly in the *Deseret News*; it said two scientists and a veterinarian had set up an observation post, that the institute had not released details to other UFO researchers who were frustrated by that, and that Alexander said findings would be posted on the institute's web page (accessnv.com/nids).[^9]
 
 ### Connection to AATIP
 
@@ -48,8 +48,9 @@ The work of NIDS was a precursor to the research conducted by the [[Advanced Aer
 [^1]: Elizondo, Luis. *Imminent*. William Morrow, 2024.
 [^2]: George Knapp, "Statement to Congress," July 26, 2023 hearing record, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/GO/GO06/20230726/116282/HHRG-118-GO06-20230726-SD004.pdf
 [^3]: National Institute for Discovery Science, "Personnel," capture of December 6, 2000, https://web.archive.org/web/20001206032200/http://www.nidsci.org/personnel.html
-[^4]: National Institute for Discovery Science, "Personnel and Science Advisory Board," Internet Archive capture of October 21, 2001, https://web.archive.org/web/20011021020155/http://www.nidsci.org/personnel.html
-[^5]: National Institute for Discovery Science, "Personnel and Science Advisory Board," captures of February 6, 2003 (https://web.archive.org/web/20030206081535/http://www.nidsci.org/personnel.html) and February 4, 2004 (https://web.archive.org/web/20040204181441/http://www.nidsci.org/personnel.html)
-[^6]: To The Stars Academy of Arts & Science, Form 253G2 offering circular, September 29, 2017, EDGAR accession 0001144204-17-050693. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1710274/000114420417050693/
-[^7]: Colm A. Kelleher, author biography, Goodreads, https://www.goodreads.com/author/show/162220 ; Micah Hanks, "Colm Kelleher: AAWSAP and the Skinwalker Enigma," The Debrief, May 25, 2023, https://thedebrief.org/colm-kelleher-aawsap-and-the-skinwalker-enigma/
-[^8]: Zack Van Eyck, "No UFOs or ETs have dropped in at spooky ranch," *The Uintah Basin Standard* (Roosevelt, Utah; reprinted from the *Deseret News*), April 29, 1997, p. 2, https://www.newspapers.com/image/725294178/.
+[^4]: National Institute for Discovery Science, personnel page, Internet Archive captures of June 22, 2000 (https://web.archive.org/web/20000622040455/http://www.nidsci.org/personnel.html), August 6, 2001 (https://web.archive.org/web/20010806075913/http://www.nidsci.org/personnel.html), October 4, 2002 (https://web.archive.org/web/20021004033623/http://www.nidsci.org/personnel.html), April 2, 2004 (https://web.archive.org/web/20040402072119/http://www.nidsci.org/personnel.html) and May 9, 2008 (https://web.archive.org/web/20080509140330/http://www.nidsci.org/personnel.php).
+[^5]: National Institute for Discovery Science, "Personnel and Science Advisory Board," Internet Archive capture of October 21, 2001, https://web.archive.org/web/20011021020155/http://www.nidsci.org/personnel.html
+[^6]: National Institute for Discovery Science, "Personnel and Science Advisory Board," captures of February 6, 2003 (https://web.archive.org/web/20030206081535/http://www.nidsci.org/personnel.html) and February 4, 2004 (https://web.archive.org/web/20040204181441/http://www.nidsci.org/personnel.html)
+[^7]: To The Stars Academy of Arts & Science, Form 253G2 offering circular, September 29, 2017, EDGAR accession 0001144204-17-050693. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1710274/000114420417050693/
+[^8]: Colm A. Kelleher, author biography, Goodreads, https://www.goodreads.com/author/show/162220 ; Micah Hanks, "Colm Kelleher: AAWSAP and the Skinwalker Enigma," The Debrief, May 25, 2023, https://thedebrief.org/colm-kelleher-aawsap-and-the-skinwalker-enigma/
+[^9]: Zack Van Eyck, "No UFOs or ETs have dropped in at spooky ranch," *The Uintah Basin Standard* (Roosevelt, Utah; reprinted from the *Deseret News*), April 29, 1997, p. 2, https://www.newspapers.com/image/725294178/.

20 - ORGANIZATIONS/PRIVATE/Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.md

@@ -1,28 +1,220 @@
 ---
 category: "Private Organization"
-created: 2024-04-26
-updated: 2026-05-01
 start: 1911
-end: 1986
+end: 1987
 location: "New York City, USA"
+aliases:
+  - Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co
+  - Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
+  - Peat Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
+  - Peat Marwick, Mitchell and Co.
+  - Peat Marwick, Mitchell
+  - Peat Marwick Mitchell
+  - Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co
+  - Peat Marwick & Mitchell
+  - Peat Marwick
+  - Peat Marwick & Mitchell Co.
+  - Peat Marwick Main & Co.
+  - Peat Marwick McLintock
+  - Peat Marwick International
+  - PMM
+  - PM&M
+  - PMMC
+  - PMM&C
+  - PMM&Co.
+  - KPMG Peat Marwick
+  - Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler
 tags:
   - Organization
+  - Accounting
+  - Auditing
   - PROMIS
   - INSLAW
-  - Accounting
-summary: "Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. was the international accounting firm that held the original 1969 LEAA grant to design PROMIS - with Bill Hamilton serving as project manager - before successive mergers in 1978 and 1986 transformed it into KPMG."
+  - Capcom
+  - BCCI
+  - PennSquareBank
+  - InternationalSignalAndControl
+  - NationalStudentMarketing
+  - PennCentral
+  - KPMG
+summary: "Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. held the 1969 LEAA-funded PROMIS design contract, settled SEC charges over five audits in 1975 and audited Penn Square Bank before combining with KMG into KPMG."
+relations:
+  - type: contractor_to
+    with: "[[Office of Crime Analysis of the District of Columbia]]"
+    role: "1969 design grant 70-DF-047 for the PROMIS case-management system"
+    start: 1969
+    end: 1971
+    fn: 2
+  - type: employed_by
+    with: "[[Bill Hamilton]]"
+    reverse: true
+    role: "management consultant and project manager on PROMIS"
+    start: 1969
+    end: 1971
+    fn: 10
+  - type: prosecuted
+    with: "[[Securities and Exchange Commission]]"
+    reverse: true
+    role: "respondent in Accounting Series Release 173 (Penn Central, Republic National Life, Talley, National Student Marketing, Stirling Homex); offer of settlement accepted July 2, 1975"
+    start: 1975
+    end: 1975
+    fn: 11
+  - type: prosecuted
+    with: "[[Securities and Exchange Commission]]"
+    reverse: true
+    role: "defendant in SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp.; consent judgment of permanent injunction"
+    start: 1972
+    end: 1975
+    fn: 14
+  - type: investigated
+    with: "[[Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation]]"
+    reverse: true
+    role: "defendant in the FDIC receiver's suit over the 1981 audit of Penn Square Bank; settled July 18, 1986"
+    start: 1984
+    end: 1986
+    fn: 19
+  - type: investigated
+    with: "[[Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation]]"
+    reverse: true
+    role: "1994 global settlement with FDIC, RTC and OTS"
+    start: 1994
+    end: 1994
+    fn: 22
+  - type: prosecuted
+    with: "[[Securities and Exchange Commission]]"
+    reverse: true
+    role: "respondent in administrative proceeding over the Porta Systems audit (File No. 3-9500)"
+    start: 1997
+    end: 2001
+    fn: 5
+created: 2024-04-26
+updated: 2026-10-12
 ---
-Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (variously abbreviated PMM, PM&M, PMMC, and PMM&C in contemporaneous government documents) was an international accounting and consulting firm founded in the late nineteenth century. By the mid-1970s it had grown to more than 25,000 U.S. clients across over 300 offices in 50 countries, making it the largest accounting firm worldwide by some measures, with 21,000 employees and 1,400 partners globally. Sixty-five percent of its revenue derived from audit, 20 percent from tax, and 15 percent from consulting. In 1978 the firm restructured into Peat Marwick International, and in 1986 it merged with KMG to form [[KPMG]].[^1]
+Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (abbreviated PMM, PM&M, PMMC, PMM&C and PMM&Co. in contemporaneous government documents) was an international accounting and consulting firm founded in the late nineteenth century.[^1] By the mid-1970s it had grown to more than 25,000 U.S. clients across over 300 offices in 50 countries, making it the largest accounting firm worldwide by some measures, with 21,000 employees and 1,400 partners globally. Sixty-five percent of its revenue derived from audit, 20 percent from tax and 15 percent from consulting.[^2] In December 1976 a Senate subcommittee staff study described it as "the largest of the 'Big Eight' accounting firms in terms of revenue and operations."[^3] The firm held the [[LEAA|Law Enforcement Assistance Administration]]-funded contract that produced the [[PROMIS|Prosecutor's Management Information System]], settled [[Securities and Exchange Commission]] charges arising from five audits in 1975, audited banks and futures brokers in the United States and abroad, and combined with [[Klynveld Main Goerdeler|KMG]] into [[KPMG]] in 1986 and 1987.
 
-### Role in PROMIS Development
+### Partnership history and the 1987 combination
 
-In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. held federal contracts developing computerized management systems for multiple government departments including the [[Department of Defense]], [[Department of Transportation]], and the [[Small Business Administration]], in addition to the [[LEAA|Law Enforcement Assistance Administration]].[^2]
+The firm's history dates the origin of the name to 1911, when Peat and Mitchell "had hammered out a plan to join forces" on a transatlantic crossing.[^1] In 1978 the firm implemented a new structure and was renamed [[Peat Marwick International]]. The Klynveld Main Goerdeler network was formed in 1979 from [[Klynveld Kraayenhof & Co.]], [[DTG]] and [[McLintock Main Lafrentz]].[^1] Peat Marwick International merged with KMG in 1986, and on January 1, 1987 the joint companies took the name Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler, from which the initials KPMG derive.[^1]
 
-In 1969, the [[Office of Crime Analysis of the District of Columbia]] administered a $60,000 LEAA grant (70-DF-047) to the firm to design a computer-based case management system for the [[U.S. Attorney's office|DC U.S. Attorney's Office]], at the direction of U.S. Attorney [[Thomas A. Flannery]]. The project team was co-directed by [[Joan E. Jacoby]] (Director of the Office of Crime Analysis) and [[Charles R. Work]] (Deputy Chief of the Superior Court Division of the DC U.S. Attorney's Office), with [[Bill Hamilton]] serving as project manager. Hamilton was then a senior consultant at the firm and a former [[NSA]] analyst. The resulting system -- the Prosecutor's Management Information System ([[PROMIS]]) - was deployed January 1, 1971.[^1][^2]
+The United States partnership kept the Peat Marwick name in the courts for another decade. A 1996 Fifth Circuit opinion names "Peat Marwick Main & Co." and "KPMG Peat Marwick" as co-defendants.[^4] A 2000 SEC initial decision names the respondent as KPMG Peat Marwick L.L.P., and a 2001 Commission order identifies it as KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, now KPMG LLP.[^5][^6]
 
-By 1972 the LEAA had paid PM&M $667,400 in aggregate grants related to PROMIS and related criminal justice programs. After PROMIS was deployed and declared an LEAA "exemplary project," the firm received further grants to create training manuals and technical documentation to facilitate adoption of the system by other jurisdictions.[^1]
+### Size and federal clients in 1975
+
+In January 1976 [[Walter E. Hanson]], the firm's senior partner, answered a questionnaire from Senator [[Lee Metcalf]]'s Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management. The answers reported 100 offices in the United States (in 42 states, Guam, Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia), 199 foreign offices, 791 partners, 90 principals and 8,277 other employees. The clients included 220 companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange, 115 on the American Stock Exchange, 745 other publicly held corporations and 22,500 non-public clients. The firm reported a $200,000 annual contribution to the Financial Accounting Standards Board.[^7] The staff study's own count gave the firm the most partners of any "Big Eight" firm in the United States (791, against 348 at Price Waterhouse) and the most non-CPA principals (90).[^3]
+
+The same questionnaire listed the federal departments and agencies for which the firm performed services in 1975, together with about 1,500 state, municipal and other government clients. The list names the Department of the Army, the Department of Justice, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Transportation, the Environmental Protection Administration, the Federal Highway Administration, the Federal Home Loan Board, the Federal Railroad Administration, the General Accounting Office, the General Services Administration, Health, Education and Welfare, Housing and Urban Development, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the National Science Foundation, the Office of Alien Property, the Office of Economic Opportunity, the Office of Management and Budget and the United States Price Commission.[^7]
+
+In the late 1960s and early 1970s the firm held federal contracts developing computerized management systems for multiple government departments including the [[Department of Defense]], the [[Department of Transportation]] and the [[Small Business Administration]], in addition to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.[^8]
+
+### PROMIS and the 1969 design team
+
+In 1969 the [[Office of Crime Analysis of the District of Columbia]] administered a $60,000 grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (70-DF-047) to the firm, to design a computer-based case-management system for the [[U.S. Attorney's office|DC U.S. Attorney's Office]] at the direction of U.S. Attorney [[Thomas A. Flannery]].[^2] The co-directors were [[Joan E. Jacoby]], then director of the Office of Crime Analysis, and [[Charles R. Work]], deputy chief of the Superior Court Division. The project manager was [[Bill Hamilton]], a senior consultant at the firm who had been an analyst at the [[NSA]]. Team members named in the record include [[Sidney H. Brounstein]], [[Robert H. Cain]], [[Joyce H. Deroy]], [[James M. Etheridge]], [[John L. Gizzarelli]], [[Fred L. Lander III]], [[Soo Lee]], [[Dean C. Merrill]], [[John M. Middleton]], [[Stanley H. Turner]], [[Dennis W. Wright]], [[Frederick G. Watts]] and [[Robert Whitaker]]. The system was deployed on January 1, 1971.[^2]
+
+By 1972 the LEAA had paid PM&M $667,400 in aggregate grants related to PROMIS and related criminal justice programs, and the firm received later grants to write training manuals after PROMIS was declared an LEAA "exemplary project."[^2] A February 1977 LEAA publication signed by Hamilton as president of the [[INSLAW|Institute for Law and Social Research]] states that the LEAA "had funded the development of PROMIS" and began a program to transfer the software to state and local agencies.[^9]
+
+[[Mitchell Pacelle]] and [[Robert Safian]] wrote in a profile of Hamilton in [[The American Lawyer]] that he had joined the "management consulting department" of the firm in 1969, that within a few months he started the case-tracking project for the U.S. Attorney's Office, and that in 1971 he "left Peat Marwick to improve the software, which by contract rights belonged to the government." After 18 months as an independent contractor for the U.S. Attorney's Office, they wrote, he created the not-for-profit Institute for Law and Social Research.[^10]
+
+The [[Department of Justice]], the client in the later dispute with INSLAW, appears on the firm's own 1975 list of federal clients.[^7][^10]
+
+### Accounting Series Release 173 and the 1975 settlement
+
+On July 2, 1975 the SEC issued Accounting Series Release No. 173, "In the matter of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.," an opinion and order in a Rule 2(e) proceeding. Between February 1972 and March 1974 the Commission had filed four civil injunctive complaints against the firm over its examinations of the financial statements of [[National Student Marketing Corporation]], [[Talley Industries]], [[Penn Central Company|Penn Central]] and [[Republic National Life Insurance Company]]; a fifth matter, [[Stirling Homex Corporation]], had been investigated. The firm submitted an offer of settlement, and without admitting or denying the Commission's statements it agreed to the institution of the proceeding and the order.[^11]
+
+The release states that in the Penn Central matter the firm "did not place sufficient emphasis on the economic substance of several transactions," and that the inclusion of all of them produced financial statements that did not communicate the company's financial position. It states that in the National Student Marketing matter there was inadequate communication between the predecessor auditor and the firm, which was unaware of the predecessor's doubts about the integrity of management, and that in Stirling Homex a partner's statements to the Commission staff were "unacceptable professional behavior in practice before the Commission."[^11]
+
+The settlement terms were a comprehensive examination of the firm's audit practice by a committee whose compensation and expenses the firm bore, two annual reviews in 1976 and 1977 at the firm's expense, and an order prohibiting the firm from accepting audit engagements for new SEC clients from May 1 to October 31, 1975, with listed exceptions.[^11] [[Arthur Young & Co.]], hired by the firm for a review reported to cost $500,000, wrote to the partners on November 21, 1975 on the firm's quality control procedures for the period from April 1, 1974 to March 31, 1975, covering 18 of its 100 U.S. operating offices.[^12]
+
+The Metcalf subcommittee staff study listed the firm as one of three "Big Eight" firms officially disciplined by the SEC, with Arthur Andersen and Touche Ross. It wrote that the firm's materials showed "a relatively minor amount of questionable or improper activities," and, separately, that the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants had taken no action against partners of the firm after Release 173 other than ending the membership of a few individuals who had been convicted in the courts.[^3][^13]
+
+### National Student Marketing and the 1969 comfort letter
+
+Peat Marwick was the outside accountant of National Student Marketing Corporation (NSMC) and, in the period of the merger, of [[Interstate National Corporation]], an insurance holding company. The merger closed in October 1969.[^14] In mid-October 1969 the firm began drafting a comfort letter on NSMC's unaudited interim financial statements for the nine months ended May 31, 1969, which had reported a profit of about $700,000. The firm's representatives concluded that a $500,000 adjustment to deferred costs, a $300,000 write-off of unbilled receivables and an $84,000 adjustment to paid-in capital were required, and that with them the period would show a loss.[^14]
+
+The court found that although the firm discussed the proposed adjustments with NSMC's representatives, neither the accountants nor NSMC told Interstate of them before the closing, which was set for 2 p.m. on October 31, 1969 at the New York offices of [[White & Case]]. When the letter had not arrived by about 2:15 p.m., the firm's Washington partner in charge, [[Anthony M. Natelli]], dictated a letter over the telephone to the secretary of the White & Case partner [[Marion J. Epley III]]. [[Max E. Meyer]], a director of Interstate and a partner of [[Lord, Bissell & Brook]], which was Interstate's outside counsel, said that Interstate would close if the White & Case partner assured them that the document was the comfort letter and that a signed copy would follow from the firm. Epley gave that assurance, and the closing went ahead on an unsigned letter.[^14] The opinion adds that during the afternoon the firm's representatives telephoned Epley about the propriety of proceeding in light of the adjustments, and that Epley did not tell Interstate of an additional paragraph the firm dictated.[^14]
+
+The SEC's civil action named the NSMC defendants, Peat Marwick and two of its partners, Interstate officers, and two law firms. The court's 1978 memorandum opinion records that NSMC consented to a permanent injunction on July 27, 1972 and that similar judgments were entered against other defendants on dates running to 1977, with Natelli's on January 25, 1977. Entry of a judgment of permanent injunction against Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. is dated July 2, 1975, the date of Release 173. The court wrote that each of the remaining defendants had violated the securities laws in specific instances, and it dismissed the complaint against them, holding that the SEC had not made the "proper showing" that injunctive relief was necessary to prevent further violations.[^14]
+
+### Penn Square Bank
+
+The Senate Banking Committee held a hearing on the failure of [[Penn Square Bank]] of Oklahoma City on December 10, 1982. [[Wendell Sebastian]], executive director of the [[National Credit Union Administration]], testified for the agency's chairman. He said that the information a credit union decision-maker had on the bank's financial condition included, as he understood it, "a satisfactory 1981 year-end audit from Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co." as well as other traditional financial information; the agency's 139 federally insured credit unions had $111.5 million in uninsured deposits in the bank.[^15]
+
+[[William M. Isaac]], chairman of the [[Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation]], told the committee that primary responsibility for the failure lay with the shareholders, the directors, the management the directors selected, "the accounting firm which issued an unqualified statement on that bank after an earlier accounting firm had issued a qualified statement," and the correspondent banks, savings and loans and credit unions that funded it. He added that the FDIC had been "pretty aggressive in recent years in terms of pursuing officers and directors, accounting firms and others after a bank fails."[^16] The FDIC's statement to the hearing said that its personnel had been examining the bank's records since July 5, 1982, and that it was investigating potential claims against former officers and directors of the bank and the bank's accounting firm.[^17]
+
+A 1986 federal opinion recites the allegations of a credit union investor: that the firm agreed in the latter part of 1981 to audit the bank as of December 31, 1981, that it issued a report on March 19, 1982, and that the investor's adviser received the firm's opinion and audited statements on or about April 16, 1982 and began recommending the bank's certificates of deposit. The investor placed over $4 million in short-term certificates from May 25, 1982 and lost about $2.5 million when the Comptroller closed the bank on July 5, 1982. It sued the firm and 17 of its partners under civil RICO and state law; the court held that the alleged mailings of the audit opinion and management report were a single scheme and not a pattern of racketeering activity, and dismissed the state claims for want of diversity jurisdiction.[^18]
+
+In June 1984 the FDIC, as receiver of the bank, sued former officers and directors, and in December 1984 it amended the complaint to add the firm as a defendant on claims of negligence and breach of contract in the audit of the bank's 1981 financial statements.[^19] In August 1985 Judge [[Lee R. West]] of the Western District of Oklahoma dismissed the firm's third-party action against the FDIC in its corporate capacity and the [[Office of the Comptroller of the Currency]], in which the firm had alleged that the agencies' examinations and the decision to liquidate the bank caused the losses for which it was sued.[^20] In a separate discovery dispute the Tenth Circuit in November 1984 denied the firm's petition for mandamus against an order compelling production of a "general counsel study" of the Penn Square audit.[^21] On July 18, 1986 the FDIC settled its claims against the firm, as the Tenth Circuit recorded in 1987.[^19]
+
+On August 9, 1994 the FDIC, the [[Resolution Trust Corporation]] and the [[Office of Thrift Supervision]] announced that KPMG Peat Marwick would pay $186.5 million in a global settlement of federal claims: $128 million in cash to the RTC, $58.5 million to the FDIC, of which $23.5 million was cash and $35 million a two-year note, and a cease and desist order from the OTS requiring specific changes in accounting policies for audits of insured institutions over the next five years. The settlement resolved five RTC suits, two FDIC suits and all claims for professional work done for institutions that failed on or before April 4, 1994.[^22]
+
+### Capcom and the Peat Marwick report
+
+The Senate subcommittee report on the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]] (BCCI) cited a "Peat, Marwick report" for the account of [[Capcom]], the BCCI commodities trading affiliate. The report states that on February 10, 1988 Capcom received a telex from [[Ahmed Tawfik]] instructing a payment of $150,000 to [[Shakarchi Trading]] of Zurich, a gold and currency dealer.[^23] The subcommittee added that it was hard to understand why British regulators, "in light of the Peat Marwick report," had allowed Capcom UK to continue operations.[^24]
+
+The report also records that [[Ian Glendinning Watt]], a chartered accountant of Peat Marwick McLintock, was appointed to investigate Capcom's trading. The subcommittee wrote that Watt characterized the profits of the Capital Fund as "artificial," explaining that through "matched" and "back to back" transactions money from at least 17 accounts, an estimated $3,334,480, was transferred into the fund; the source cited is page 25 of his affidavit.[^25] In the same affidavit, dated January 20, 1989, Watt found the explanations of Capcom's managing director, [[S. M. Akbar]], "unsatisfactory" (at 44), "deficien[t]" (at 45), "most curious," "illogical" and "not capable of corroboration" (at 46).[^25] The report's notes cite a Peat Marwick McLintock audit of Capcom prepared for the [[Chicago Board of Trade]] and dated May 4, 1989.[^26]
+
+The auditor named for BCCI itself in the report is [[Price Waterhouse]], which the report calls "BCCI's own auditors" when it describes the June 22, 1991 Sandstorm report.[^27] The Peat Marwick passages concern Capcom and its counterparties.
+
+### International Signal and Control and Ferranti
+
+In September 1989 the board of [[Ferranti]] said that it had come to suspect significant irregularities in overseas contracts of [[International Signal and Control]] (ISC) Technologies, and that it had commissioned [[Coopers & Lybrand]] to carry out an urgent investigation, "and not Peat Marwick, who are Ferranti's auditors."[^28] A Prime Minister's private office note of October 2, 1989 records that some of Ferranti's expected write-off of about 215 million pounds "might eventually be recovered from Peat Marwick (who had advised Ferranti on ISC's financial position before the merger) and their insurers."[^28]
+
+The [[Washington Post]] reported in 1989 that the firm had been ISC's accountant during the merger and that it and [[Robert Fleming & Co.]], the financial adviser, were expected to be asked how they failed to detect the phantom contracts.[^29] In 1990 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania restrained a Lancaster bank account under the racketeering forfeiture statute on a showing by a task force investigator that ISC's founder [[James Guerin]] had engaged in racketeering, including front companies, Swiss and American bank accounts and false status reports that inflated ISC's stock and helped obtain the Ferranti merger.[^30]
+
+In June 1992 Ferranti reached "a full litigation settlement with Peat Marwick, which assisted in Ferranti's acquisition of International Signal." The trade press reported that Peat Marwick had paid Ferranti 40 million pounds in compensation.[^31]
+
+### Scottish Heritable Trust and Rangaire
+
+The firm audited the financial statements of [[Rangaire]] from 1962 to 1990. The Scottish Heritable Trust, PLC, a British conglomerate, bought a controlling interest in Rangaire between August and December 1988 and sued the firm over unqualified audit reports for the years ended July 31, 1987 and July 31, 1988.[^4] A jury found the firm liable for negligent misrepresentation in those reports. In 1996 the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Texas law did not permit recovery on the facts, and wrote that it would "render a take-nothing judgment in favor of Peat Marwick."[^4]
+
+### SEC proceedings over the Porta Systems audit
+
+The SEC's administrative proceeding against the firm concerned its audit of the 1995 year-end financial statements of [[Porta Systems]] Corp., with an audit report dated March 22, 1996. The Commission instituted proceedings by an order of December 4, 1997 under Section 21C of the Exchange Act and Rule 102(e). The order alleged that the firm lacked independence because it had loaned $100,000 to the president and chief operating officer of its audit client, had capitalized businesses he owned, and was entitled to a percentage of the client's earnings, inventory disposals and debt restructuring.[^5]
+
+Administrative Law Judge [[Robert G. Mahony]] held a hearing in June 1998. On May 21, 1998 he had ruled that scienter was the standard for the Rule 102(e) charges, and in his initial decision of January 21, 2000 he dismissed the proceeding insofar as it alleged improper professional conduct under Rule 102(e).[^5][^6]
+
+On January 19, 2001 the Commission opinion found that the firm was not independent of the registrant when it audited the registrant's statements, with a loan outstanding to an officer of the registrant and a right to a fee contingent on the registrant's financial success, and that it acted negligently. The Commission ordered the firm to cease and desist from causing violations of Section 13(a) and Rule 13a-1 and of Rule 2-02(b) of Regulation S-X, and did not sustain the Rule 102(e) charges because the law judge had applied a scienter standard. A March 8, 2001 order (Release No. 44050, AAER No. 1374) denied reconsideration.[^6]
+
+### Caracas and the Blandon group
+
+[[Gary Webb]] wrote in [[Dark Alliance]] that in late 1986 the [[Frente Democratico Nicaraguense]] appointed a blue-ribbon commission to examine newspaper allegations that the Contras were squandering humanitarian aid money, and that its members included the exiled Nicaraguan judge [[Jose Macario]] and an accountant, Rene Gonzalez, of the Peat Marwick & Mitchell office in Caracas, Venezuela. After the commission exonerated the FDN, Webb wrote, both men became business partners of [[Danilo Blandon]] in Mex-US Import and Export Inc., whose other directors included Sergio Guerra and the Panamanian banker Jose Fernando Soto, the longtime representative of the Swiss Bank Corporation in Panama.[^32]
+
+### Tax shelter prosecution of KPMG
+
+In August 2005 [[KPMG LLP]], the firm that succeeded the U.S. partnership, admitted criminal wrongdoing and agreed to pay $456 million in fines, restitution and penalties under a deferred prosecution agreement. The Justice Department said that the firm had engaged in a fraud that generated at least $11 billion in phony tax losses, and that nine individuals, including six former KPMG partners and the former deputy chairman of the firm, were being prosecuted in relation to the tax shelters. The investigation and prosecution were supervised by the chief counsel to the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York.[^33][^34]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
-[^1]: U.S. House of Representatives, Intermediate Report of the Committee on Government Operations, 1972. (Google Books, OCLC record.)
-[^2]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. *The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report.* House Report 102-857, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, September 10, 1992.
+[^1]: KPMG, "Our history," kpmg.com/lv/en/about/governance/our-history.html. The page places the 1911 "plan to join forces," the 1978 renaming to Peat Marwick International, the 1979 formation of Klynveld Main Goerdeler, the 1986 merger of PMI with KMG and the January 1, 1987 name change.
+[^2]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Government Operations. *Intermediate Report*, 1972, on the grant number, the January 1, 1971 deployment and the $667,400 total. Google Books, OCLC record.
+[^3]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management, *The Accounting Establishment: A Staff Study*, Committee Print, 94th Congress, 2d Session (Washington: GPO, December 1976), p. 32 (partners: Peat Marwick 791, Price Waterhouse 348), p. 34 (90 "principals"), p. 62 (the Peat Marwick section), archive.org item accstabl00unit.
+[^4]: *Scottish Heritable Trust, PLC v. Peat Marwick Main & Co.*, 81 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 1996) (Wiener, J.). https://static.case.law/f3d/81/cases/0606-01.json.
+[^5]: *In the Matter of KPMG Peat Marwick L.L.P.*, Initial Decision Release No. 157, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-9500 (SEC, January 21, 2000) (Mahony, ALJ), the order instituting proceedings of December 4, 1997 and the dismissal of the Rule 102(e) allegations. https://www.sec.gov/litigation/aljdec/id157rgm.htm.
+[^6]: Securities and Exchange Commission, Release No. 44050, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1374, *In the Matter of KPMG Peat Marwick LLP*, Order Denying Request for Reconsideration, March 8, 2001, describing the Commission's opinion of January 19, 2001 (File No. 3-9500). https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-44050.htm.
+[^7]: Letter of Walter E. Hanson to Senator Lee Metcalf, January 23, 1976, and the firm's answers to the Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management questionnaire (items 1 to 6, 9 to 11, 13 and 14), in *The Accounting Establishment*, appendix pp. 324 to 326, archive.org item accstabl00unit.
+[^8]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. *The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report.* House Report 102-857, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, September 10, 1992.
+[^9]: Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, *PROMIS: An Exemplary Project of LEAA* (Washington: U.S. Department of Justice, February 1977), foreword by William A. Hamilton, president of the Institute for Law and Social Research. Archive.org item PROMISAnExemplaryProjectOfLEAA.
+[^10]: Mitchell Pacelle and Robert Safian, "Vendetta," *The American Lawyer*, December (year not printed in the reprint), the section "The Rise and Fall of INSLAW," as reprinted in U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, *Staff Study of Allegations Pertaining to the Department of Justice's Handling of a Contract with INSLAW, Inc.*, Committee Print, 101st Congress, 1st Session (Washington: GPO, 1989). Archive.org item micro_IA41152832_0145. The House Judiciary Committee report is H. Rept. 102-857, *The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report*, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, September 10, 1992.
+[^11]: Securities and Exchange Commission, Accounting Series Release No. 173, *In the matter of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.*, July 2, 1975, Rule 2(e) opinion and order, reprinted in *The Accounting Establishment*, appendix pp. 736 to 787 (introduction and footnote 1 at 736 to 737; Penn Central, National Student Marketing and Stirling Homex discussions; the settlement terms in the conclusion at 785 to 787).
+[^12]: Letter of Arthur Young & Company to the partners of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., November 21, 1975, in *The Accounting Establishment*, appendix p. 788; the staff study reports the $500,000 cost "according to news reports" at p. 62.
+[^13]: *The Accounting Establishment*, p. 62 (the "relatively minor amount" sentence and the three disciplined firms) and pp. 126 to 127 (the AICPA's failure to act after Accounting Series Release 173).
+[^14]: *SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp.*, 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978) (Parker, J.), memorandum opinion: the October 1969 comfort letter and closing, the footnote listing consent judgments (Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., July 2, 1975; Natelli, January 25, 1977) and the dismissal of the complaint against the remaining defendants. https://static.case.law/f-supp/457/cases/0682-01.json.
+[^15]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. *Failure of Penn Square Bank: Hearing*, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, December 10, 1982, statement of Wendell Sebastian, executive director, National Credit Union Administration, pp. 48 to 50 (the "satisfactory 1981 year-end audit" sentence at p. 50). Archive.org item micro_IA41152659_0922.
+[^16]: Same hearing, testimony of William M. Isaac, chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, pp. 106 to 107 (the accounting firm sentence) and pp. 97 to 98 (the "pretty aggressive" sentence).
+[^17]: Same hearing, FDIC statement, section "Bond Claims and Directors Liability Matters," p. 45.
+[^18]: *Eastern Corporate Federal Credit Union v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.*, 639 F. Supp. 1532 (D. Mass. July 30, 1986). https://static.case.law/f-supp/639/cases/1532-01.json.
+[^19]: *Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Jennings*, 816 F.2d 1488 (10th Cir. Apr. 29, 1987) (Logan, J.), reciting the June 1984 suit, the December 1984 amendment adding the firm and the July 18, 1986 settlement. https://static.case.law/f2d/816/cases/1488-01.json.
+[^20]: *Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Jennings*, 615 F. Supp. 465 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 15, 1985), No. CIV-84-1612-W (West, J.). https://static.case.law/f-supp/615/cases/0465-01.json.
+[^21]: *Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. West*, 748 F.2d 540 (10th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). https://static.case.law/f2d/748/cases/0540-01.json.
+[^22]: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Resolution Trust Corporation and Office of Thrift Supervision, joint release PR-52-94, "Peat Marwick Settles with FDIC, RTC and OTS for $186.5 Million," August 9, 1994. https://archive.fdic.gov/view/fdic/478/fdic_478_DS1.pdf.
+[^23]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. John Kerry and Hank Brown, *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate*, December 1992, ch. 21, "Capcom: A Case Study of Money Laundering," the "Capcom and Shakarchi" section. https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/21capcom.htm.
+[^24]: Kerry and Brown, *The BCCI Affair*, ch. 21, the closing remarks on Capcom UK and the British regulators.
+[^25]: Kerry and Brown, *The BCCI Affair*, ch. 21, the Capital Fund section and notes 38, 101 and 102 (Watt affidavit, January 20, 1989, at 25, 44, 45 and 46, reprinted in S. Hrg. 102-350).
+[^26]: Kerry and Brown, *The BCCI Affair*, ch. 21, notes 111, 114 and 164, "Peat Marwick McLintock Audit of Capcom for CBOT, May 4, 1989," at p. 21(b).
+[^27]: Kerry and Brown, *The BCCI Affair*, ch. 4, "BCCI's Criminality," the Sandstorm Report section. https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/04crime.htm.
+[^28]: Ministry of Defence letter of 12 September 1989 to Charles Powell, Downing Street, and the Prime Minister's private office note of 2 October 1989 on the meeting about Ferranti, Prime Minister's papers, file PO-CH-NL 0500 PART A, Margaret Thatcher Foundation archive. https://archive.margaretthatcher.org/HMTPO/PO-CH-NL%200500%20PART%20A.pdf.
+[^29]: Glenn Frankel, "British Firm Claims It Was Duped by Pa. Arms Maker," *Washington Post*, September 29, 1989.
+[^30]: *In re Assets of Parent Industries, Inc.*, 739 F. Supp. 248 (E.D. Pa. June 1, 1990), order restraining Fulton Bank account No. 9902-93316 under 18 U.S.C. § 1963. https://static.case.law/f-supp/739/cases/0248-01.json.
+[^31]: "Ferranti gets losses under control but it will be a long, hard climb out of the pit," *Computer Business Review* (Tech Monitor), June 23, 1992. https://www.techmonitor.ai/?p=184616.
+[^32]: Gary Webb, *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion* (New York: Seven Stories Press, 1998), the passage on the 1986 FDN commission and Mex-US Import and Export Inc.
+[^33]: Department of Justice, press release 05-433, "KPMG to Pay $456 Million for Criminal Violations in Relation to Largest-Ever Tax Shelter Fraud Case," August 29, 2005. https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2005/August/05_ag_433.html.
+[^34]: Internal Revenue Service, news release IR-05-083, August 29, 2005, announcing the same agreement jointly with the Justice Department. https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-05-083.pdf.