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7
40 - EVENTS/INTELLIGENCE_SCANDALS/Condon Committee.md
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@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ relations:
role: "review panel under Gerald M. Clemence"
fn: 21
created: 2026-10-01
updated: 2026-10-01
updated: 2026-10-12
---
The Condon Committee was the University of Colorado's Scientific Study of Unidentified Flying Objects, conducted from 1966 to 1968 under a contract with the [[Air Force Office of Scientific Research]] and directed by the physicist [[Edward Condon]]. Its report, transmitted to the Secretary of the Air Force on 31 October 1968, stated that "nothing has come from the study of UFOs in the past 21 years that has added to scientific knowledge." A review by a panel of the [[National Academy of Sciences]] and the report were the stated bases for the termination of [[Project Blue Book]] on 17 December 1969.[^1][^2]
@ -145,6 +145,10 @@ The report went to Secretary of the Air Force [[Harold Brown]] under cover of Sm
Hynek had told the [[House Armed Services Committee]] on 5 April 1966 that "the body of data accumulated since 1948 through the Air Force investigations deserves close scrutiny by a civilian panel of physical and social scientists."[^22] An Air Force action memorandum of 20 October 1969, with the signature block of Brigadier General [[C. H. Bolender]], cited the report and the Academy review as reasons that continuation of Blue Book "cannot be justified, either on the ground of national security or in the interest of science."[^2]
### Citation of Challenge to Science
The report's discussion of UFO reports near Martian oppositions cites the 1966 book *Challenge to Science* by Jacques Vallee and Janine Vallee, quoting it as "Vallee and Vallee, 1966, p. 138." The report says that the claimed correlation "is quite unfounded" and that the idea "is not supported by observational data."[^23]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Edward U. Condon, ed., Scientific Study of Unidentified Flying Objects (University of Colorado, 1968), Preface and Letter of Transmittal (J. R. Smiley to Harold Brown, 31 October 1968, citing Contract No. F44620-67-C-0035), http://files.ncas.org/condon/text/preface.htm and http://files.ncas.org/condon/text/covrletr.htm; Section I, p. 2, http://files.ncas.org/condon/text/sec-i.htm.
@ -169,3 +173,4 @@ Hynek had told the [[House Armed Services Committee]] on 5 April 1966 that "the
[^20]: Condon, Section I, "Conclusions and Recommendations," pp. 2 and 6-7, http://files.ncas.org/condon/text/sec-i.htm.
[^21]: "Review of the University of Colorado Report on Unidentified Flying Objects by a Panel of the National Academy of Sciences," 1969 (Gerald M. Clemence, chairman; H. R. Crane, David M. Dennison, Wallace O. Fenn, H. Keffer Hartline, E. R. Hilgard, Mark Kac, Francis W. Reichelderfer, William W. Rubey, C. D. Shane, Oswald G. Villard Jr.), Attachment 2, pp. 8-9, in the Navy UFO fact-sheet compilation at https://www.physics.smu.edu/pseudo/UFOs/dod174.pdf.
[^22]: Condon, Section V, chapter 2, pp. 909-910 (Hynek's opening statement at the House Armed Services Committee hearing of 5 April 1966), http://files.ncas.org/condon/text/s5chap02.htm.
[^23]: University of Colorado (Edward U. Condon, director), *Scientific Study of Unidentified Flying Objects*, vol. 1 (1968), discussion of Martian oppositions. https://archive.org/details/DTIC_AD0680975

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40 - EVENTS/MAJOR_CONFLICTS/Iran-Iraq War.md
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
---
---
category: "Major Conflict"
tags:
- Event
@ -6,40 +6,233 @@ tags:
- Iraq
- CIA
- ChemicalWeapons
- Halabja
- IranContra
- ArmsToIraq
- Iraqgate
- ColdWar
summary: "The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) was an eight-year conflict in which Western powers, the CIA, and Gulf states covertly supported Saddam Hussein's Iraq while the Reagan administration simultaneously ran secret arms to Iran; the war produced massive casualties, extensive use of chemical weapons against Iranian and Kurdish populations, and the arms procurement networks at the center of the Iran-Contra affair."
- TankerWar
- USSStark
- IranAir655
- TeicherDeclaration
aliases:
- Iran-Iraq War
- Iran-Iraq war
- Iran Iraq War
- Iran-Iraq conflict
summary: "The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) was an eight-year conflict in which American credits and intelligence, British machine tools and Chilean cluster bombs reached Iraq while Israeli shipments of American weapons reached Iran."
location: "Persian Gulf"
created: 2026-05-14
updated: 2026-05-17
updated: 2026-10-12
relations:
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Iraq]]"
reverse: true
role: "belligerent"
start: 1980-09-22
end: 1988-08-20
fn: 2
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Iran]]"
reverse: true
role: "belligerent"
start: 1980-09-22
end: 1988-08-20
fn: 2
- type: funded
with: "[[Commodity Credit Corporation]]"
reverse: true
role: "export credit guarantees for Iraqi purchases"
start: 1983
end: 1990
fn: 17
- type: investigated
with: "[[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]]"
reverse: true
role: "BNL affair report, S. Prt. 103-12"
start: 1993-02
fn: 20
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Israel]]"
reverse: true
role: "transfers of U.S.-supplied weapons to Iran"
start: 1985-08-20
end: 1985-11-24
fn: 41
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Carlos Cardoen]]"
reverse: true
role: "cluster-bomb supplier to Iraq"
start: 1983
end: 1988
fn: 26
- type: prosecuted
with: "[[Edward A. Johnson]]"
reverse: true
role: "convicted over zirconium exports to Chile for Iraqi cluster bombs"
start: 1993-05-26
end: 1998-04-28
fn: 26
---
The Iran-Iraq War was an armed conflict fought between [[Iraq]] and [[Iran]] from September 22, 1980, to August 20, 1988. [[Saddam Hussein]]'s Iraqi forces invaded Iran along a broad front following the instability created by the [[Iranian Revolution]] of 1979, which had deposed the Shah [[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi]] and brought the [[Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini|Islamic Republic]] to power. The war lasted eight years, killed an estimated 500,000 to one million people, and ended in a UN-brokered ceasefire with no territorial changes. It is among the most costly conflicts of the late twentieth century.[^1]
The Iran-Iraq War was an armed conflict between [[Iraq]] and [[Iran]] that began on September 22, 1980, and ended with a ceasefire that took effect at 0300 GMT on August 20, 1988.[^1][^2] The Security Council described the conflict in January 1987 as "now more than six years old."[^3] It is the setting for the arms networks that supplied both belligerents, and several procurement scandals of the 1980s, including the [[BNL Scandal]], the [[Arms-to-Iraq]] affair and the [[Iran-Contra Affair]], draw on it.
### Origins and Opening Phase
### Origins and opening phase
Saddam Hussein invaded Iran on September 22, 1980, intending a rapid victory against a government he believed had been weakened by revolution and the purge of its military officers. Iraqi forces advanced rapidly into [[Khuzestan]] province, capturing portions of territory and besieging the city of [[Khorramshahr]]. Iranian resistance stiffened, however, and within months the Iraqi advance had stalled. By 1982, Iran had expelled Iraqi forces from most captured territory and launched counteroffensives into Iraqi territory, including toward [[Basra]].[^1]
[[Saddam Hussein]] ordered the invasion of Iran on September 22, 1980, intending a rapid victory against a government he believed had been weakened by revolution and the purge of its military officers. The [[Iranian Revolution]] of 1979 had deposed the Shah [[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi]] and brought the [[Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini|Islamic Republic]] to power. Iraqi forces advanced into [[Khuzestan]] province and besieged [[Khorramshahr]], and within months the Iraqi advance had stalled. By 1982 Iranian forces had pushed Iraqi forces out of most captured territory and carried the fighting into Iraq, toward [[Basra]]. The war killed an estimated 500,000 to one million people; a Library of Congress study counts "about 1 million casualties." It ended with a ceasefire under [[United Nations Security Council]] Resolution 598, which called for withdrawal of all forces to the internationally recognized boundaries.[^3][^4]
### Western Support for Iraq
### The American tilt toward Iraq
From approximately 1982 onward, the [[Reagan administration]] tilted toward Iraq as a counterweight to [[Iran]], whose Islamic Revolutionary regime Washington viewed as a greater threat. The [[Central Intelligence Agency]] began providing Iraq with satellite imagery of Iranian military positions and signals intelligence. The CIA also passed battlefield assessments to Iraqi commanders. U.S. agricultural credits through the [[Commodity Credit Corporation]] were extended to Iraq and used to free up Iraqi hard currency for arms purchases.[^2]
From approximately 1982 onward, the [[Reagan administration]] tilted toward Iraq as a counterweight to Iran, whose Islamic Revolutionary regime Washington viewed as a greater threat. Alan Friedman wrote that the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] began providing Iraq with satellite imagery of Iranian military positions and signals intelligence, passed battlefield assessments to Iraqi commanders, and that U.S. agricultural credits through the [[Commodity Credit Corporation]] were extended to Iraq and used to free up Iraqi hard currency for arms purchases.[^5]
[[Donald Rumsfeld]] visited Saddam Hussein in Baghdad in December 1983 as President Reagan's special envoy, a visit documented in State Department cables released decades later. The visit cemented the relationship at a moment when U.S. intelligence was tracking Iraqi chemical weapons use against Iranian troops. The Reagan administration continued to provide intelligence and credits despite this knowledge.
An information memorandum of October 7, 1983, from [[Nicholas Veliotes]] and [[Jonathan Howe]] to Under Secretary [[Lawrence Eagleburger]] carried the subject line "Iran-Iraq War: Analysis of Possible U.S. Shift from Position of Strict Neutrality." It listed four results of the neutrality policy: it had "avoided direct great power involvement," "prevented spread of the war beyond the territory of the combatants to threaten Gulf oil supplies," "contributed to the current military stalemate" and "preserved the possibility of developing a future relationship with Iran while minimizing openings for expansion of Soviet influence." Under the heading "A Tilt Toward Iraq: What It Might Include," it set Iraq's annual foreign exchange expenditure at 12 billion dollars for military and 6 billion for commercial imports against oil earnings of 6 billion, and recorded that financing from [[Saudi Arabia]] and the Gulf states had fallen from about 1 billion dollars monthly in the first half of the war to less than half of that rate, a shortfall Iraq had met "by nearly exhausting its reserves, deferring payments and by obtaining additional supplier credits." The memorandum referred to Iraq as "the bulwark against Khomeinism" and recorded that Eagleburger had told the Iraqi Under Secretary [[Ismat Kittani]] "directly that Iraq's defeat by Iran would not be in the U.S. interest." Among the military options it listed "Permit U.S.-controlled equipment to reach Iraq through third parties," with the observation that supply would be restricted by "the prohibition on supplying arms through a third party which we cannot supply directly."[^6]
The [[BNL scandal]] - involving the [[Atlanta]] branch of [[Banca Nazionale del Lavoro]] - grew out of Iraq's use of loans to purchase weapons and dual-use technology during the war. British arms dealer networks, later examined in the [[Arms-to-Iraq]] affair and the [[Scott Inquiry]], similarly supplied Iraq with equipment during this period.
The assessment section of the memorandum reads: "Our policy of strict neutrality has already been modified, except for arms sales, since Iran's forces crossed into Iraq in the summer of 1982. The steps we have taken toward the conflict since then have progressively favored Iraq. (We assume that other actions not discussed here, such as providing tactical intelligence, would continue as necessary.)" It described "the qualified tilt which we have in fact practiced for over a year" and listed among the effects of a further tilt that it would "support our objective of avoiding Iraq's collapse before revolutionary Iran without going so far as to alarm Israel."[^6]
### Chemical Weapons
A State Department action memorandum of November 21, 1983, from Howe and [[Richard W. Murphy]] to Eagleburger, titled "Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons," put the question whether to instruct the U.S. Interests Section in Baghdad to raise the issue and urge cessation. It stated: "We have recently received additional information confirming Iraqi use of chemical weapons," and "We also know that Iraq has acquired a CW production capability, primarily from Western firms, including possibly a U.S. foreign subsidiary." The recommendation to approve carries an approval mark dated November 22, 1983.[^7]
Iraq used chemical weapons extensively against Iranian forces and, in March 1988, against the Kurdish town of [[Halabja]], killing an estimated 3,200 to 5,000 people. Halabja was the largest chemical weapons attack against a civilian population in history. The weapons used included mustard gas and nerve agents, the precursors for which had been supplied in part through Western dual-use technology transfers. The Reagan administration suppressed State Department condemnation of the Halabja attack for diplomatic reasons.[^2]
On November 26, 1983 [[Ronald Reagan]] approved National Security Decision Directive 114, "U.S. Policy Toward the Iran-Iraq War." The directive ordered consultations with allies and [[Gulf Cooperation Council|Gulf Arab states]] on planning to deter or defend against attacks on non-belligerent shipping and on critical oil facilities in the [[Persian Gulf]]. It stated that "It is present United States policy to undertake whatever measures may be necessary to keep the Strait of Hormuz open to international shipping."[^8]
### Iran-Contra Intersection
On December 20, 1983 [[Donald Rumsfeld]], as special envoy of the President, met Saddam Hussein in Baghdad for ninety minutes. The U.S. Embassy in [[London]] reported the meeting in secret telegram 27572 of December 21, 1983. [[Tariq Aziz]], an interpreter and a notetaker attended for Iraq and [[William L. Eagleton Jr.|Eagleton]] and [[Robert H. Pelletreau Jr.|Pelletreau]] for the United States, and Rumsfeld delivered a letter from Reagan. The cable's summary records that Rumsfeld told Saddam that the two countries "had shared interests in preventing Iranian and Syrian expansion" and that the United States "was urging other states to curtail arms sales to Iran and believed it had successfully closed off US-controlled exports by third countries to Iran." In the body of the cable Rumsfeld is reported to have said that the United States agreed it was not in the interest of the region or the West for the outcome of the war "to be one which weakened Iraq's role or enhanced interests and ambitions of Iran," and that "We believe we have been successful in closing off exports of US-controlled equipment to Iran." Saddam interjected that Libya and Syria had been intermediaries on such deals, "like the recent Spanish ammunition sale." The cable also reports Saddam as saying that the United States had originally acted with indifference toward the Gulf war, "for which it decided to 'let this group of lunatics bash each other,'" and that "Zionism was in fact encouraging it to burn." A section on the pipeline to [[Aqaba]] records Saddam's concern that Israel would disrupt a route through [[Jordan]] and Rumsfeld's agreement that Iraq should not depend on one route.[^9] The visit came at a moment when U.S. intelligence was tracking Iraqi chemical weapons use against Iranian troops, and the Reagan administration continued to provide intelligence and credits.
Simultaneously with its public support for Iraq, the Reagan administration secretly approved arms transfers to [[Iran]] in the arms-for-hostages arrangement that became the [[Iran-Contra Affair]]. Israel transferred TOW anti-tank missiles and HAWK surface-to-air missiles to Iran beginning in August 1985, with American acquiescence arranged by National Security Advisor [[Robert McFarlane]] following [[David Kimche]]'s approach. Arms continued to flow through 1986. The profits from the weapons sales were diverted to the [[Contra]] insurgency in [[Nicaragua]]. The paradox of arming both sides of the same war was central to the Iran-Contra scandal's political impact when it became public in November 1986.[^1]
Rumsfeld had met Aziz alone on the evening before, and telegram 27592 of December 21 reports that meeting. Aziz said he felt the war "was over in the strategic sense in that Iraq will not lose," and that "the best result for nations interested in stability was for Iran to lose the war." Rumsfeld wrote that he told Aziz "that there was no question but that the U.S. opposed other countries supplying weapons to Iran" and asked for specifics, set out "our efforts to halt illegal transfers of U.S.-controlled equipment to Iran and our conviction that such equipment is not now reaching Iran," and offered "our willingness to do more." He wrote: "I made clear that our efforts to assist were inhibited by certain things that made it difficult for us, citing the use of chemical weapons, possible escalation in the Gulf, and human rights." The cable also reports Aziz's expression of appreciation for U.S. support of Security Council Resolution 540.[^10]
### Ceasefire and Aftermath
On March 5, 1984 the State Department issued a press statement, drafted at the request of the White House. It said: "The United States has concluded that the available evidence substantiates Iran's charges that Iraq has used chemical weapons. The United States strongly condemns the prohibited use of chemical weapons wherever it occurs. There can be no justification for their use by any country." A further paragraph read: "While condemning Iraq's resort to chemical weapons, the United States also calls on the Government of Iran to accept the good offices proffered by a number of countries and international organizations to put an end to the bloodshed. The United States finds the present Iranian regime's intransigent refusal to deviate from its avowed objective of eliminating the legitimate government of neighboring Iraq to be inconsistent with the accepted norms of behavior among nations and the moral and religious basis which it claims."[^11] Briefing notes of March 24, 1984 (State 086663), prepared for a second Rumsfeld visit to Baghdad, said that "bilateral relations were sharply set back by our March 5 condemnation of Iraq for CW use, despite our repeated warnings that this issue would emerge sooner or later," and that given its wartime preoccupations and "its distress at our CW statement, the Iraqi leadership probably will have little interest in discussing Lebanon."[^12]
Iran accepted UN Security Council Resolution 598 on July 20, 1988, which had been passed in July 1987. Iraq accepted on August 8, 1988. The ceasefire took effect August 20, 1988. Both sides had been economically and demographically devastated. Iraq's massive debt - including to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Western creditors - and its large standing military became factors in Saddam Hussein's subsequent decision to invade Kuwait in 1990.[^2]
On March 29, 1984 the Iraqi chargé [[Nizar Hamdoon]] called on [[James Placke]] at the State Department to present Iraq's views on Security Council consideration of the chemical weapons report. A cable of the meeting records that Hamdoon preferred a presidential statement to a resolution and asked that it contain a "reference to CW without mentioning any specific country." Placke "emphasized firm USG opposition to use of CW" and said the United States "could accept Iraqi elements and presidential statement if that was consensus of UNSC," and he informed Hamdoon that on March 30 the United States would begin licensing exports to both Iran and Iraq of five chemicals that could be used in chemical weapons production.[^13] A U.S. mission cable of March 28 reported that the Iraqi ambassador had asked Ambassador [[Jeane Kirkpatrick]] for "restraint" in handling the issue.[^14]
On April 5, 1984 Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 139, "Measures to Improve U.S. Posture and Readiness to Respond to Developments in the Iran-Iraq War." The directive called for "a plan of action designed to avert an Iraqi collapse," including "an evaluation of Iraqi military needs and measures which could be taken to facilitate indirect security assistance (e.g., from [[Egypt]])" and "approaches to friendly states (e.g., [[France]] and Jordan) capable of providing overt and covert military support to Iraq." It also directed that the condemnation of chemical weapons use be "unambiguous and consistent with the 1925 Geneva protocol" and that it place "equal stress" on dissuading Iran.[^15]
On November 26, 1984 [[George Shultz]] met Aziz in Washington, in the first official meeting of Aziz's visit for the resumption of diplomatic relations. Aziz said Iraq was satisfied that the U.S. analysis of the war's threat to regional stability was "in agreement in principle" with Iraq's, thanked the United States for its efforts "to stop the flow of Western arms to Iran," and said that "Iraq's superiority in weaponry now assures its defense." Shultz remarked that "superior intelligence also must be an important factor in Iraq's defense," and the cable records that Aziz "acknowledged that this may be true." Aziz said Iraq viewed the event as "the establishment, rather than the re-establishment, of diplomatic relations." Shultz told Aziz that Iraq could expect the United States "to maintain its opposition to both the use and production of chemical weapons," a position he said "is not directed specifically at Iraq." On Iran's arms supply he called curbing the flow of Western arms "an insoluble problem" on which the United States must keep working, by securing agreements from other countries and then going back to them with information on specific sales.[^16]
The Commodity Credit Corporation guaranteed export credits for Iraqi purchases of American farm goods. A General Accounting Office testimony of March 14, 1991 reported that export credit guarantees approved for Iraq rose from about $400 million in fiscal year 1983 to about $1.1 billion in fiscal years 1988 and 1989, and were $500 million in fiscal year 1990.[^17] The Los Angeles Times reported in November 1992 that a criminal investigation concerned "$5 billion in secret loans to Iraq by the [[Atlanta]] branch" of the [[Banca Nazionale del Lavoro]].[^18] Representative [[Henry Gonzalez]], chairman of the [[House Banking Committee]], told the House that the Commodity Credit Corporation program backed about $5 billion of Iraqi purchases and that the BNL was its largest participant.[^19]
The FBI raided the BNL's Atlanta branch on August 4, 1989.[^20] Gonzalez reprinted branch cables in a House speech of September 14, 1992.[^21] Its branch manager, [[Christopher Drogoul]], pleaded guilty to sixty counts in June 1992 and withdrew the plea on October 1, 1992. The [[United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit]] decided his appeal in 1993.[^22] The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence's 1993 report on the affair examined CIA analyses of the loans from January 1990 and November 1991.[^20]
### The Teicher declarations
[[Howard Teicher]] served in the national security bureaucracy from 1977 to 1987 and on the staff of the [[National Security Council]] from early 1982 to 1987, with responsibility for the Middle East and political-military affairs. His declaration of January 31, 1995, filed in *United States v. Carlos Cardoen et al.*, No. 93-241-CR-Highsmith, in the Southern District of Florida, was attached to a defense motion by [[Edward A. Johnson]], an employee of [[Teledyne Industries|Teledyne Wah Chang Albany]], and filed on February 1, 1995. Its eighteen paragraphs state the following under penalty of perjury "to the best of my memory and recollection."[^23]
Paragraph 3: "In the Spring of 1982, Iraq teetered on the brink of losing its war with Iran." In May and June 1982 the Iranians found a gap in the Iraqi defenses between Baghdad and Basra and massed an invasion force opposite it, and U.S. intelligence, including satellite imagery, detected both (paragraph 4). Reagan chose between strict neutrality and assistance to Iraq (paragraph 5) and in June 1982 decided that the United States "could not afford to allow Iraq to lose the war to Iran"; Teicher states that he co-authored a National Security Decision Directive to this effect with the NSC staff member [[Geoffrey Kemp|Geoff Kemp]] and that "The NSDD, including even its identifying number, is classified" (paragraph 6).[^23]
Paragraph 7: "CIA Director Casey personally spearheaded the effort to ensure that Iraq had sufficient military weapons, ammunition and vehicles to avoid losing the Iran-Iraq war." The United States supplied "billions of dollars of credits," military intelligence and advice, and closely monitored third-country arms sales to Iraq; in 1986 Reagan sent a secret message through Vice President [[George H.W. Bush]] to President [[Hosni Mubarak]], for passage to Saddam Hussein, telling Iraq to step up its air war and bombing of Iran, and Teicher states that he "authored Bush's talking points for the 1986 meeting with Mubarak." Paragraph 8: he attended meetings in which [[William J. Casey|Casey]] or [[Robert Gates]] noted Iraq's need for cluster bombs and anti-armor penetrators, Casey being "adamant that cluster bombs were a perfect 'force multiplier'" against "human waves" of Iranian attackers, and he recorded the comments in the minutes of National Security Planning Group meetings.[^23]
Paragraphs 9 to 14: the CIA "knew of, approved of, and assisted in the sale of non-U.S. origin military weapons, ammunition and vehicles to Iraq"; in 1984 Israeli Foreign Minister [[Yitzhak Shamir]] asked Rumsfeld in Jerusalem whether the United States would deliver a secret offer of Israeli assistance to Iraq, the United States agreed, and Teicher states that he was present in Baghdad when Rumsfeld told Aziz of the offer, whereupon Aziz "refused even to accept the Israelis' letter to Hussein offering assistance" because he "would be executed on the spot by Hussein if he did so"; the CIA "made sure that non-U.S. manufacturers manufactured and sold to Iraq the weapons needed by Iraq," and the highest levels of the government decided to make a key component, anti-armor penetrators, available "directly or indirectly" to Iraq; the CIA and the United States maintained a "Bear Spares" program through which Soviet-style spare parts and ammunition reached third countries, with Israel and Egypt as suppliers; and "The supply of Cardoen cluster bombs, which were fitted for use on Soviet, French and NATO aircraft, was a mere extension of the United States policy of assisting Iraq through all legal means in order to avoid an Iranian victory."[^23]
Paragraphs 15 to 18 concern [[Carlos Cardoen]]. Teicher states that his NSC files, held at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, "will contain" his notes and memoranda of meetings with Casey or Gates that included discussions of Cardoen's manufacture and sale of cluster bombs to Iraq, together with cable traffic on the subject (paragraph 15). Paragraph 16: "Under CIA Director Casey and Deputy Director Gates, the CIA authorized, approved and assisted Cardoen in the manufacture and sale of cluster bombs and other munitions to Iraq." Paragraph 17 states that the NSC staff and the CIA were aware of Cardoen's 1983 arrest in Miami "in a sting operation relating to the smuggling of night vision goggles to Cuba and Libya," and of the arrest and conviction of two of his employees and his company. Paragraph 18 states that Casey, aware of the arrest and convictions, "directed the Secretaries of the State and Commerce Departments that the necessary licenses required by Cardoen were not to be denied."[^23]
Teicher stated in a later declaration that he had been retained in December 1994 by attorneys for Teledyne, a co-defendant, "as an expert consultant on U.S. policy in the Middle East, specifically Iraq, and how the national security decision-making process operates," and that on January 31, 1995 "the attorneys for Teledyne prepared and faxed me a declaration, which I signed."[^24]
[[Robert Parry]] wrote in *Extra!* in May and June 1995 that federal prosecutors "attacked Teicher's affidavit as a lie" and classified it as a state secret, and that they then persuaded the trial judge to block Teicher's testimony as irrelevant to the trial of the two Teledyne employees.[^25] In its 1998 opinion in Johnson's appeal the Eleventh Circuit described the "CIA" defense, that the intelligence community had arranged for the zirconium shipments to bypass export regulations, and stated that the district court had held a hearing under the Classified Information Procedures Act, reviewed classified CIA documents in camera and "found no evidence supporting Johnson's theory that the CIA had secretly arranged to supply Cardoen with zirconium"; the appeals court reviewed the same materials and agreed that the government had withheld no evidence supporting the theory.[^26] In a pretrial order on that hearing, Judge [[Shelby Highsmith]] recorded the testimony of a CIA Directorate of Operations employee, identified as Linda C., who reviewed the agency's file on Cardoen for 1984 to 1993 and testified that Cardoen "was not an agent or source of intelligence for the United States government" but "a target." The same order quoted the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence's 1991 report on the Gates nomination: "Between 1984 and 1988 Cardoen Industries was of significant intelligence interest to the CIA which believed that Cardoen was the primary supplier of cluster bombs to the Iraqi government and an important supplier of other categories of ordnance to Iraq and other Middle Eastern States." The report also found that a relationship between Cardoen Industries and James D. Theberge, a member of the CIA Senior Review Panel from January 1986 to January 1988, "may have constituted a conflict of interest and a security concern at worst or an awkward appearance at best." The order records a January 1984 CIA debriefing of a Teledyne employee, who said Teledyne had supplied 13 million zirconium pellets to Cardoen and that the size of the order made military ordnance the most likely use.[^27]
On October 31, 1996 Teicher signed a second declaration, which the United States Attorney's office for the Southern District of Florida filed on November 8, 1996, through Assistant U.S. Attorney Frank H. Tamen, as a "Notice of Filing Corrective Declaration." The notice states that the declaration "corrects a declaration previously filed" with Johnson's emergency motion of February 1, 1995.[^24] In the corrective declaration Teicher states that "Shortly after this declaration was filed, I carefully reviewed it and determined that several statements were inaccurate or were overly broad," and that he wished to clarify statements in "paragraphs 15 through 17" (paragraph 3). He states that his understanding in signing "was that I was providing information that was based partially on my knowledge and partially on my beliefs. I did not intend these statements to be categorical statements of fact. Because I now understand that they are being interpreted this way, I want to correct the record" (paragraph 4). He states that in paragraphs 15 through 18 the references to his files and what they "will contain" reflected a belief that his files, or documents he had seen, "might contain information relevant to Carlos Cardoen and the manufacture of cluster bombs"; that he "did not review or index my files" when he resigned from the NSC staff and has not seen most of them since leaving government service in 1987; and that "I do not have actual knowledge that these files contain such information" (paragraph 5). He states that "I am not aware of any specific evidence" that the United States government or any official or agency "took steps to help Cardoen obtain any U.S.-origin components for use in cluster bombs," and none that the government "in any other way helped Cardoen supply munitions to Iraq" (paragraph 6). On paragraph 17 he states that "although I understood Cardoen had been arrested, the other information in this paragraph is incorrect" (paragraph 7).[^24]
The corrective declaration addresses paragraphs 15 through 18 of the 1995 declaration. Paragraphs 1 to 14, which contain the accounts of Iraq's position in spring 1982, the June 1982 directive, the credits, the intelligence and advice, the 1986 message through Mubarak, the Casey and Gates statements on cluster bombs and penetrators, the 1984 Israeli offer carried by Rumsfeld, the CIA's role in non-U.S. weapons sales and the "Bear Spares" program, are not mentioned in it. Paragraph 3 of the corrective refers to paragraphs 15 through 17, and its paragraphs 5 and 6 refer to paragraphs 15 through 18.[^24]
### Chemical weapons and Halabja
Iran alleged on November 3, 1983 that Iraq was using chemical weapons. The Secretary-General's first team of specialists reported on March 26, 1984, and the report was transmitted to the Security Council as S/16433.[^28] A further mission in February and March 1986 reported "positive evidence of the presence of mustard gas" in the field.[^29]
On January 16, 1987 the President of the Security Council, speaking after consultations, said that the members were "Deeply dismayed by the unanimous conclusions of the specialists that there has been repeated use of chemical weapons against Iranian forces by Iraqi forces, that civilians in Iran also have been injured by chemical weapons, and that Iraqi military personnel have sustained injuries from chemical warfare agents."[^3] The Secretary-General's note of August 17, 1988, transmitting a further specialists' report, quoted their conclusion that "chemical weapons have been used against Iranian civilians in an area adjacent to an urban centre lacking any protection against that kind of attack."[^30]
On March 16, 1988 Iraqi forces bombed the Kurdish town of [[Halabja]], and Human Rights Watch (then Middle East Watch) wrote in 1993 that "between 3,200 and 5,000 residents died," in what it called "the largest chemical attack of all" in the 1987 to 1989 campaigns against the Kurds. Its report lists mustard gas and the nerve agent GB, or Sarin, among the weapons used against Halabja and dozens of Kurdish villages, and states that the raid was carried out in reprisal for the capture of the town by peshmerga supported by Iranian Revolutionary Guards.[^31]
On March 23, 1988 State Department spokesman [[Charles Redman]] said that Iraq appeared to have used chemical weapons and that "there are indications that Iran may also have used chemical artillery shells in this fighting." On the same day the Special Security Offices of the [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] circulated an update of the war which stated in paragraph 6: "Most of the casualties in Halabjah were reportedly caused by cyanogen chloride. This agent has never been used by Iraq, but Iran has shown interest in it. Mustard gas casualties in the town were probably caused by Iraqi weapons because Iran has never been noted using that agent."[^32] A 1990 study published by the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute and written by [[Stephen Pelletiere]], Douglas Johnson and Leif Rosenberger stated that the Iranians had perpetrated the attack, and *The Washington Post* reported on May 3, 1990 that a Defense Department reconstruction had assembled what analysts called conclusive intelligence that Halabja was caused by chemical bombardments from both belligerents.[^32][^33] The Security Council's response was Resolution 612 of May 9, 1988, adopted unanimously, which "Condemns vigorously the continued use of chemical weapons in the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq contrary to the obligations under the Geneva Protocol" and "Expects both sides to refrain from the future use of chemical weapons"; the resolution names neither Iraq nor Halabja.[^34]
[[Andrew Cockburn]] wrote in a review of [[Joost Hiltermann]]'s study of the attack that "Within a week of the attack, US diplomats began publicizing the canard that the Halabjans had died from Iranian chemical weapons, thereafter eliciting a Security Council resolution with no specific condemnation of Iraq that urged both sides to refrain from use of chemical weapons." Cockburn also quoted the State Department's March 1984 condemnation of "the prohibited use of chemical weapons wherever it occurs" and wrote that Rumsfeld was then sent back to Baghdad to pass the word that the condemnation had been essentially pro forma.[^35] [[Alan Friedman]] wrote that the Reagan administration suppressed State Department condemnation of the Halabja attack for diplomatic reasons.[^5]
### Matrix Churchill and Arms-to-Iraq
[[Matrix Churchill]], a machine-tool company in [[Coventry]], was acquired by Iraqi interests in 1987. Three of its directors were prosecuted in [[United Kingdom|Britain]] in 1992 for breaching export controls. A written answer to the Commons on November 18, 1992 stated that "The papers were supplied to the defence for the purposes of the trial. Lord Justice Scott will have access to them."[^36] The prosecution ended in November 1992 after disclosures about ministers' public interest immunity certificates, and the government commissioned the [[Scott Inquiry]].
On February 15, 1996 the President of the Board of Trade, [[Ian Lang]], told the Commons that Sir [[Richard Scott]] had concluded that "following the ceasefire in 1988, but not before, Government policy towards the export of non-lethal military goods changed in a way that he believes should have been drawn to the attention of the House." Lang reported that Scott accepted that ministers and officials believed they were applying policy within the existing guidelines, found that a number of ministers' letters and answers to parliamentary questions were inaccurate because they restated what ministers understood the policy to be, and found that the ministers who signed the certificates had done so "without any impropriety."[^37]
### Cardoen cluster bombs and Chilean supply
Carlos Cardoen, a Chilean arms manufacturer, operated [[Industrias Cardoen]] and supplied munitions to Iraq through the 1980s. A grand jury in the Southern District of Florida returned a twenty-one count indictment on May 26, 1993 against Cardoen, Industrias Cardoen, Swissco Management Group, Edward A. Johnson, [[Ronald W. Griffin]] and Teledyne, among others, over exports of zirconium and fuze components to Chile that were allegedly destined for cluster bombs sold to Iraq.[^27] The Eleventh Circuit described the zirconium chain in a 1998 opinion: between 1983 and 1988 the Albany unit of Teledyne exported over $3.5 million worth of zirconium to [[Chile]], and "The zirconium was used as an incendiary agent in cluster bombs that Cardoen was selling to Iraq for use in the Iran-Iraq war." Johnson was convicted.[^26]
[[Kenneth R. Timmerman]] wrote that [[International Signal and Control]] developed the fuze for the Rockeye cluster bomb on a second-source contract for the U.S. Navy and that its biggest customers were Cardoen and the South African Armaments Corporation, and that Cardoen bought fuzes from it despite the United Nations embargo on Chile; he wrote that on August 2, 1983 U.S. Customs officers arrested Cardoen in Miami over night-vision goggles bound for Chile and that the case ended in a plea bargain with a 100,000 dollar fine on his company.[^38] Teicher's 1995 paragraph 17 gives the destination of the goggles as Cuba and Libya, and his 1996 corrective states that the other information in that paragraph is incorrect.[^23][^24]
[[Ari Ben-Menashe]] wrote that according to Israeli intelligence Cardoen was introduced in 1982 through a person in [[ARMSCOR]] to the Iraqi deputy chief of the General Staff for Procurement, and that by early 1985 he was selling arms to Iraq with the help of Armscor and "certain people connected with the U.S. government," among them [[Alan Sanders]], whose cover was [[ITICO]] and who supplied blueprints for cluster bombs. He wrote that in late 1985 Sanders told him "Cardoen will sell the bombs to anyone who pays him," that the arms dealer [[Richard Babayan]] confirmed Cardoen would sell to Israel, and that the fuzes for the cluster bombs were sold to Cardoen by the Gamma Corporation, "a CIA cut-out." He wrote that in 1985 Mossad director [[Nachum Admoni]] raised U.S. support for Cardoen with Gates, and that Cardoen's German-made artillery shells for chemical weapons were procured through [[Ihsan Barbouti]]. According to Ben-Menashe, at a meeting in the Carrera Hotel in Santiago in late 1986, attended by Cardoen, Gates, Senator [[John Tower]], a former South African military intelligence chief, an Armscor representative, the Chilean police chief Rodolfo Stange and himself, Gates "was quite clear. The United States wanted to maintain the channel of arms to Iraq," and "It was also understood that the Israelis would continue to supply the Iranians, and the South Africans would supply the Iraqis." He wrote in the afterword that after newspaper stories on Cardoen's Iraq dealings the Customs Service began an investigation and "in April 1992, charges against him were filed in Miami."[^39] The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence recorded in 1991 that Gates denied specific allegations by Ben-Menashe at his confirmation hearing and that FBI and CIA Inspector General reviews of Gates's calendar and travel records found no credible evidence confirming them; it also recorded that Cardoen denied meeting Gates in a letter of July 16, 1991.[^40]
### Israeli arms to Iran
[[Lawrence Walsh]]'s final report on the Iran-Contra matters states that [[Israel]] sent U.S.-supplied weapons to Iran on three occasions in 1985, with U.S. approval and, in one instance, with U.S. participation, and that the first shipment took place August 20, 1985.[^41] The discussions began when [[David Kimche]], director general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, met [[Robert McFarlane]] at the White House on July 3, 1985. Kimche proposed that Iranians in contact with Israel would show good faith by using their influence over groups in [[Lebanon]] to obtain the release of American hostages, and that a reciprocal gesture from the United States, most likely military equipment, would be expected.[^41] On July 13, 1985 [[Michael Ledeen]] told McFarlane that [[Al Schwimmer]], an adviser to Prime Minister [[Shimon Peres]], had said that Israel's principal Iranian contact had told Kimche and Schwimmer that the Iranians needed 100 American-made TOW anti-tank missiles.[^41]
The first shipment, of 96 TOW missiles, arrived in Iran on August 20, 1985; a second shipment of 408 TOWs followed on September 14, and the Reverend Benjamin Weir was released in Beirut on September 15. Walsh dates President Reagan's decision to no later than August 23, 1985, when Reagan wrote in his diary that he had received a "secret phone" call from McFarlane and "had some decisions to make about a few points but they were easy to make"; according to McFarlane, the approval included a commitment to replenish Israel's supply of missiles sent to Iran, and McFarlane conveyed it to Kimche, with no notification to Congress.[^41] The [[Tower Commission]] report of February 26, 1987 describes Israel as having managed the August and September 1985 deliveries to Iran.[^42] In November 1985 an Israeli shipment of HAWK missiles, planned at 80, ran into denied clearances in a European country and was completed with a CIA proprietary aircraft that landed in Tehran on November 24; only 18 HAWKs were delivered. Walsh states that the United States delivered missiles and missile parts to Iran on five occasions in 1986, after Reagan signed an intelligence Finding, that proceeds were diverted to the [[Contra]] resupply operation in [[Nicaragua]], and that the matter became public after a Lebanese publication, *Al-Shiraa*, reported McFarlane's trip to Tehran on November 3, 1986.[^41] The Reagan administration was at that time extending credits and intelligence to Iraq while Israeli shipments of American weapons reached Iran, and the arrangement became public in November 1986.
Ben-Menashe wrote of an earlier channel. According to his account, Israel held 4,000 TOW missiles whose power supplies were due to run out in 1985; in late 1983 [[Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani]], then speaker of the Iranian Parliament, told him "We want your TOW missiles"; the price agreed with Sayeed Mehdi Kashani was 13,000 dollars each, plus 800 dollars per missile paid into a separate account in Europe; Gates gave explicit permission for the sale by telephone to a member of the Israeli-Iranian "Joint Committee," in a call taped in the committee's office; and the missiles were shipped from Israel to Bandar Abbas on a Liberian-registry ship while a staged detention of two arms dealers in Tel Aviv made it appear that Israel had refused the sale.[^43] He also wrote that the foreign editor of the *Daily Mirror*, [[Nicholas Davies]], introduced himself to suppliers as a representative of the Ora Group, "an Israeli company based in London," and arranged purchases for Iranian requests; Davies, reached by telephone in 1991, acknowledged knowing Ben-Menashe, denied any involvement in arms sales and said Ben-Menashe was a news source.[^44] The special counsel to Senators [[Terry Sanford]] and [[James Jeffords]] reported on November 19, 1992 that Ben-Menashe "undoubtedly had real connections with Israeli intelligence and had access to some highly classified information" and called him "a wholly unreliable witness" whose testimony the report declined to credit without independent corroboration.[^45]
### USS Stark
On May 17, 1987 the [[USS Stark]], a guided-missile frigate on routine patrol in the central Persian Gulf, was hit by two [[Exocet]] missiles fired from a single Iraqi [[Mirage F1]] fighter. Thirty-seven enlisted members of the crew died.[^46] A formal investigation was convened on May 26, 1987, and the Chief of Naval Operations forwarded its record to the Secretary of Defense on June 12, 1987. The investigating officer's executive summary described the attack as "unprovoked and indiscriminate" and recorded that the Stark had been "in international waters, well outside the Iraqi and Iranian declared war zones."[^46]
### Operation Earnest Will
In March 1987 the Reagan administration agreed to a request from [[Kuwait]] to reflag Kuwaiti tankers as American and protect them with the U.S. Navy, a decision that became [[Operation Earnest Will]].[^47] A 2021 article in the [[Naval War College Review]] by [[Richard Mobley]] used recently declassified British records to describe London's misgivings about the reflagging and escort of Kuwaiti tankers.[^48]
### United Nations Security Council Resolution 598
The Security Council adopted Resolution 598 on July 20, 1987, at its 2750th meeting.[^3] On July 17, 1988 the President of Iran, [[Ali Khamenei]], wrote to the Secretary-General that Iran had decided to declare officially that it accepted Security Council Resolution 598, citing among his reasons the shooting down of an Iranian airliner by an American warship in the Persian Gulf.[^1] On August 8, 1988 the Secretary-General's announcement that the ceasefire would come into effect at 0300 GMT on August 20 and that direct talks would begin on August 25 was endorsed by the Council, and on August 9 the Council set up the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group.[^2]
Joseph McGhee, deputy director of the State Department's Northern Gulf desk from 1989 to 1991, said in an oral history that the Kuwaitis had financed the Iraqi war effort "to the tune of some ten billion dollars in loans paid out of Kuwaiti oil revenues," that a number of Arab countries that had helped pay for the war had written off their loans to Iraq, and that Kuwait refused to do so and pressed for a repayment schedule.[^49] Friedman wrote that Iraq's debt, including to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Western creditors, and its large standing military became factors in Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Kuwait in 1990.[^5] Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990.
### Iran Air Flight 655
On July 3, 1988 the guided-missile cruiser [[USS Vincennes]], operating with the [[AEGIS]] combat system in the Persian Gulf, shot down [[Iran Air Flight 655]] in its assigned air corridor near the Strait of Hormuz. The formal investigation by Rear Admiral [[William Fogarty]], a letter of July 28, 1988, stated that "various sources have established that some 290 persons from six nations, were on board" the aircraft, and noted that Iran had released no passenger manifest.[^50] The endorsements on the investigation run to August 19, 1988.[^50]
Iran brought the matter to the [[International Court of Justice]] with an application of May 17, 1989 in *Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America)*. The case was discontinued by order of February 22, 1996, after the parties signed a settlement agreement of February 9, 1996.[^51]
### Footnotes
[^1]: "Iran-Iraq War," *Encyclopaedia Britannica.* https://www.britannica.com/event/Iran-Iraq-War
[^2]: Friedman, Alan. *Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq.* Bantam Books, 1993.
[^1]: Letter dated 17 July 1988 from the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Secretary-General, transmitted by the Acting Permanent Representative of Iran, United Nations document S/20020, July 18, 1988 (the letter states that the war was started on 22 September 1980 and announces Iran's acceptance of Security Council resolution 598 (1987)). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S/20020&l=en&t=pdf
[^2]: United Nations Security Council, *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1988*, decision of August 8, 1988 (statement by the President endorsing the Secretary-General's announcement of a ceasefire at 0300 GMT on August 20, 1988 and talks from August 25) and resolution 619 (1988) of August 9, 1988 establishing UNIIMOG. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S/RES/619(1988)&l=en&t=pdf
[^3]: United Nations Security Council, statement by the President of the Security Council made after consultations, January 16, 1987, and Resolution 598 (1987), adopted at the 2750th meeting on July 20, 1987, as reproduced in the Council's decisions. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S/RES/598(1987)&l=en&t=pdf
[^4]: Glenn E. Curtis and Eric Hooglund, eds., *Iran: A Country Study*, 5th ed. (Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 2008), chronology (1988 entry, "about 1 million casualties") and p. 69 (Iran's acceptance of Resolution 598 on July 18, 1988, "a cease-fire in place"). https://archive.org/details/iran-a-country-study-2008
[^5]: Alan Friedman, *Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq* (New York: Bantam Books, 1993).
[^6]: Department of State, information memorandum from Nicholas A. Veliotes and Jonathan T. Howe to Lawrence S. Eagleburger, "Iran-Iraq War: Analysis of Possible U.S. Shift from Position of Strict Neutrality," October 7, 1983, secret/sensitive, pp. 1-8. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82, document 22. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq22.pdf
[^7]: Department of State, action memorandum from Jonathan T. Howe and Richard W. Murphy to Lawrence S. Eagleburger, "Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons," November 21, 1983. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82, document 25. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq25.pdf
[^8]: National Security Council, National Security Decision Directive 114, "U.S. Policy Toward the Iran-Iraq War," November 26, 1983, secret. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/archives/reference/scanned-nsdds/nsdd114.pdf
[^9]: U.S. Embassy London, telegram 27572, "Rumsfeld Mission: December 20 Meeting with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein," December 21, 1983, secret, sections 1 to 6, paragraphs 2, 3, 8, 9, 14 and 19. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82, document 31. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq31.pdf
[^10]: U.S. Embassy London, telegram 27592, "Rumsfeld One-on-One Meeting with Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz," December 21, 1983, secret, paragraphs 12, 13, 15 and 21. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82, document 32. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq32.pdf
[^11]: Department of State, cover note from the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs and press statement, "Iraq's Use of Chemical Weapons," for use March 5, 1984. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82, document 43. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq43.pdf
[^12]: Department of State cable State 086663, Shultz to Embassy Khartoum, "Briefing Notes for Rumsfeld Visit to Baghdad," March 24, 1984, secret, paragraph 2. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82, document 48. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq48.pdf
[^13]: Department of State cable State 094420, "Chemical Weapons: Meeting with Iraqi Charge," April 3, 1984, reporting the meeting of March 29, 1984, paragraphs 2 to 4. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82, document 54. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq54.pdf
[^14]: U.S. Mission to the United Nations, cable USUN 626, "UN Report on Chemical Weapons Use in Iran/Iraq War: Consideration in Security Council," March 28, 1984, paragraph 5. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82, document 50. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq50.pdf
[^15]: National Security Council, National Security Decision Directive 139, "Measures to Improve U.S. Posture and Readiness to Respond to Developments in the Iran-Iraq War," April 5, 1984, sensitive. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/archives/reference/scanned-nsdds/nsdd139.pdf
[^16]: Department of State cable State 352124, "Memcon: Secretary's Meeting with Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, November 26, 1984, 10:00 a.m.," November 29, 1984, secret, paragraphs 2 to 4, 9 and 10. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82, document 60. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq60.pdf
[^17]: U.S. General Accounting Office, *Iraq's Participation in the Commodity Credit Corporation's GSM-102/103 Export Credit Guarantee Programs*, testimony T-NSIAD-91-13, March 14, 1991. https://gao.justia.com/department-of-justice/1991/3/iraq-s-participation-in-the-commodity-credit-corporation-s-gsm-102-103-export-credit-guarantee-programs-t-nsiad-91-13
[^18]: Douglas Frantz, "Probe of U.S. Aid to Iraqis Is Stepped Up," *Los Angeles Times*, November 13, 1992. Copy at https://stuff.mit.edu/afs/net/user/tytso/usenet/americast/latimes/news/282
[^19]: Rep. Henry B. Gonzalez, "Kissinger Associates, Scowcroft, Eagleburger, Stoga, Iraq, and BNL," *Congressional Record*, House of Representatives, April 28, 1992, pp. H2694-H2701. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm
[^20]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *The Intelligence Community's Involvement in the BNL Affair*, S. Prt. 103-12, February 1993, pp. 5, 10 and 29-30. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/publications/10312.pdf
[^21]: Rep. Henry B. Gonzalez, "The BNL Scandal: High-Level Politics Try to Hide the Evidence," *Congressional Record*, House of Representatives, September 14, 1992, pp. H8349-H8356. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920914g.htm
[^22]: *United States v. Drogoul*, 1 F.3d 1546 (11th Cir. 1993), No. 93-8964. https://static.case.law/f3d/1/cases/1546-01.json
[^23]: Declaration of Howard Teicher, executed January 31, 1995, *United States v. Carlos Cardoen et al.*, No. 93-241-CR-Highsmith (S.D. Fla.), paragraphs 1 to 18 (pp. 1-7 of the filed copy; paragraph 3 at p. 2, paragraph 7 at pp. 2-3, paragraph 10 at p. 4, paragraphs 14 to 16 at p. 6, paragraphs 17 and 18 and signature at p. 7). National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82, document 61. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq61.pdf
[^24]: Notice of Filing Corrective Declaration, United States Attorney William A. Keefer by Assistant U.S. Attorney Frank H. Tamen, with Declaration of Howard R. Teicher dated October 31, 1996, *United States v. Carlos Cardoen et al.*, No. 93-241-CR-Highsmith (S.D. Fla.), docket entry 679, certificate of service dated November 8, 1996, paragraphs 1 to 7. https://archive.org/details/utf-893cr-241-de-679 (full text https://archive.org/download/utf-893cr-241-de-679/UTF-893cr241%20de%20679_djvu.txt)
[^25]: Robert Parry, "Iraqgate: Confession and Cover-up," *Extra!*, May/June 1995, reprinted at https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0212/S00074.htm
[^26]: *United States v. Edward A. Johnson*, No. 95-5021 (11th Cir. April 28, 1998), published opinion, pp. 1-2, 9-12. https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/19955021.OPN.pdf
[^27]: *United States v. Cardoen*, 898 F. Supp. 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (Highsmith, J.), No. 93-241-CR, reissued order on hearing held pursuant to section 6 of the Classified Information Procedures Act (hearing of November 18 and 23, 1994; original order December 28, 1994), procedural history and findings on the Cardoen file. https://static.case.law/f-supp/898/cases/1563-01.json
[^28]: Report of the specialists appointed by the Secretary-General to investigate allegations by the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning the use of chemical weapons, S/16433, March 26, 1984. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S/16433&l=en&t=pdf
[^29]: Report of the mission dispatched by the Secretary-General to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq, S/17911 (1986). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S/17911&l=en&t=pdf
[^30]: Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the mission dispatched to the Islamic Republic of Iran, S/20134, August 17, 1988. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S/20134&l=en&t=pdf
[^31]: Human Rights Watch/Middle East Watch, *Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds* (1993), introduction. https://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/ANFALINT.htm
[^32]: Jean Pascal Zanders, "Allegations of Iranian Use of Chemical Weapons in the 1980-88 Gulf War: Halabja," *The Trench*, quoting the statement of Charles Redman (Reuters, "Iran chemical war threat," *The Guardian*, March 24, 1988, p. 24) and United States Defense Intelligence Agency, Special Security Offices, "Iran-Iraq: war update," March 23, 1988, paragraph 6, and describing Pelletiere, Johnson and Rosenberger, *Iraqi Power and U.S. Security in the Middle East* (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1990), p. 52. https://www.the-trench.org/allegations-of-iranian-use-of-chemical-weapons-in-the-1980-88-gulf-war-halabja
[^33]: Roger Trilling, "Fighting Words," *The Village Voice*, April 30, 2002, quoting the Strategic Studies Institute study ("Since the Iraqis have no history of using these two agents, and the Iranians do, we conclude that the Iranians perpetrated this attack") and Patrick Tyler, *The Washington Post*, May 3, 1990. https://www.villagevoice.com/fighting-words-2/
[^34]: United Nations Security Council, Resolution 612 (1988), adopted unanimously at the 2812th meeting, May 9, 1988, on the report of the mission of April 25, 1988 (S/19823). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S/RES/612(1988)&l=en&t=pdf
[^35]: Andrew Cockburn, review of Joost Hiltermann's study of the Halabja attack, "What Happened in Halabja," *History News Network*. https://www.historynewsnetwork.org/article/42547
[^36]: House of Commons, written answer on Matrix Churchill, November 18, 1992, HC Deb vol. 214, cols. 216-7W. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written_answers/1992/nov/18/matrix-churchill
[^37]: Ian Lang, statement on the Scott Report, House of Commons, February 15, 1996, HC Deb vol. 271, cols. 1139-64. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1996/feb/15/scott-report
[^38]: Kenneth R. Timmerman, *The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991), pp. 168-169.
[^39]: Ari Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network* (New York: Sheridan Square Press, 1992; Atlanta: Trine Day, 2015), chapter 16 ("Never Again," Cardoen, Sanders, Gamma Corporation, Barbouti and the Santiago meeting) and afterword (Customs investigation of Cardoen). https://archive.org/details/profits-of-war-1992-ari-ben-menashe
[^40]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence*, S. Exec. Rept. 102-19, 102d Cong., 1st sess. (October 24, 1991), section 5. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-10219.pdf
[^41]: Lawrence E. Walsh, *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters*, vol. I, Part I, "The Underlying Facts" (August 4, 1993), sections "The Summer 1985 Shipments," "The November 1985 HAWK Shipment" and "The Diversion." https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_i.htm
[^42]: *The Tower Commission Report: The Full Text of the President's Special Review Board* (Bantam Books and Times Books, 1987), report of February 26, 1987. https://archive.org/details/towercommission00unit
[^43]: Ari Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War* (Trine Day, 2015), chapter 8 ("The Ora Group," the 1983 TOW missile sale to Iran, the 1983 TOW missile sale to Iran). https://archive.org/details/profits-of-war-1992-ari-ben-menashe
[^44]: Ari Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War* (Trine Day, 2015), chapter 8 ("The Ora Group," Davies and the London office); response of Nicholas Davies as reported in Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option* (New York: Random House, 1991), pp. 310-311.
[^45]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *The "October Surprise" Allegations and the Circumstances Surrounding the Release of the American Hostages Held in Iran: Report of the Special Counsel to Senator Terry Sanford and Senator James M. Jeffords*, S. Prt. 102-125, November 19, 1992, p. 113. https://hdl.handle.net/2027/pst.000021071829
[^46]: Chief of Naval Operations, Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Attack on the USS Stark (FFG 31) on 17 May 1987, Ser 00/8-0487, June 12, 1987 (enclosure with the JAGMAN investigation, released under FOIA), executive summary and finding 92. https://documents2.theblackvault.com/documents/navy/USSSTARK-NAVYJAG.pdf
[^47]: "Revisiting the Tanker War," *War on the Rocks*, 2024. https://warontherocks.com/revisiting-the-tanker-war/
[^48]: Richard A. Mobley, "London and Washington: Maintaining Naval Cooperation despite Strategic Differences during Operation EARNEST WILL," *Naval War College Review* 74, no. 2 (2021), article 9. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss2/9
[^49]: Joseph McGhee, interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy, August 1997, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, excerpted in "Igniting Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait: Loans, Land, Oil and Access." https://adst.org/2016/09/sparking-iraqs-invasion-kuwait-loans-land-oil-access/
[^50]: Rear Adm. William Fogarty, *Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Downing of Iran Air Flight 655 on 3 July 1988*, letter of July 28, 1988, with endorsements through August 19, 1988. https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/dod/readingroom/10/172.pdf
[^51]: International Court of Justice, *Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America)*, application of May 17, 1989; settlement agreement of February 9, 1996; order of February 22, 1996 removing the case from the list. https://www.icj-cij.org/case/79

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@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ A CIA document dated October 30, 1973, titled "Soviet Nuclear Weapons in Egypt?,
### Aftermath
Marwan died in June 2007 after falling from the balcony of his apartment in [[London]]. A coroner's inquest was held to determine whether he died by suicide, accident or foul play.[^30] Coroner [[William Dolman]] handed down an open verdict on July 14, 2010, and said there was no evidence to support a verdict of either suicide or unlawful killing.[^30] Dolman described claims about the death as belonging to "the murky and secretive world of espionage."[^30] Marwan's widow, [[Mona Nasser]], told the inquest that her husband had never spoken of suicide but had expressed fears that he might be killed.[^30] Historians and intelligence agents have accused Marwan of being an Israeli spy who passed on vital information before the 1973 war, or of being a double agent loyal to Egypt.[^30]
Marwan died in June 2007 after falling from the balcony of his apartment in [[London]]. A coroner's inquest was held to determine whether he died by suicide, accident or foul play.[^30] Coroner [[William Dolman]] handed down an open verdict in July 2010, and said there was no evidence to support a verdict of either suicide or unlawful killing.[^30] Dolman described claims about the death as belonging to "the murky and secretive world of espionage."[^30] Marwan's widow, [[Mona Nasser]], told the inquest that her husband had never spoken of suicide but had expressed fears that he might be killed.[^30] Historians and intelligence agents have accused Marwan of being an Israeli spy who passed on vital information before the 1973 war, or of being a double agent loyal to Egypt.[^30]
### Footnotes
@ -166,4 +166,4 @@ Marwan died in June 2007 after falling from the balcony of his apartment in [[Lo
[^27]: Memorandum for the Record, CJCS Memo M-88-73, NSC/JCS meeting of October 24 and 25, 1973, from the records of Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXV, Document 269, including notes 11 and 13, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25
[^28]: Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (1982), pages 588 to 589, as quoted in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXV, Document 269, note 10, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25
[^29]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, Document 269, memorandum for the record by Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, October 26, 1973, Washington, October 24/25, 1973, 10:30 p.m. to 3:30 a.m., editorial notes (Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, pp. 586-587; Cline, "Policy Without Intelligence," *Foreign Policy*, no. 17, Winter 1974-1975, p. 128). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25/d269
[^30]: "Inquest: Egyptian spy suspect's death unexplained," report of the British coroner's ruling of July 14, 2010, reprinted at The Herald (heraldnet.com), https://www.heraldnet.com/?p=177620, and ynetnews, https://www.ynetnews.com/article/3919938
[^30]: "Inquest: Egyptian spy suspect's death unexplained," report of the British coroner's ruling of July 2010, reprinted at The Herald (heraldnet.com), https://www.heraldnet.com/?p=177620, and ynetnews, https://www.ynetnews.com/article/3919938