vault backup: 2026-10-08 12:20:40

40 - EVENTS/INTELLIGENCE_SCANDALS/Moscow Signal.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 created: 2025-07-23
-updated: 2026-05-17
+updated: 2026-10-08
 title: Moscow Signal
 aliases:
   - Moscow Signal
@@ -25,6 +25,14 @@ The [[United States]] suspected the Moscow Signal was an electromagnetic weapon
 
 Despite official denials and attempts to downplay its effects, the Moscow Signal became a public controversy in the mid-1970s, leading to lawsuits from embassy employees and further debate among scientists about the reality and dangers of electromagnetic weapons.[^1]
 
+### ARPA measurements, 1967
+
+A memorandum of the [[DARPA|Advanced Research Projects Agency]] dated September 27, 1967 and signed by [[Richard S. Cesaro]] reports that "New measurements with ARPA instrumentation of the 'Moscow Signal' on site has now been completed," with a partial mapping of the power density, and that "The latest data on power levels recorded in the Moscow Embassy were always below 50 microwatts/cm2 (. 05 mw/cm2)." The memorandum states that "The electromagnetic frequency and modulation used for these preliminary tests simulated a portion of the 'Moscow Signal'" and that "The intent of the 'Moscow Signal' has not been established by the experiments conducted to date." It recommends that "A thorough analysis of this new signal data should now be undertaken to define the 'Moscow Signal' characteristics."[^2]
+
+A DARPA letter of September 15, 1977 to Senator [[Warren G. Magnuson]] states that Project Pandora was classified at the direction of the Department of State and the United States Intelligence Board "because of the sensitivity of the radiation problem of the United States Embassy in Moscow at that time."[^3]
+
 ### Footnotes
 
 [^1]: Jacobsen, Annie. *Phenomena: The Secret History of the U.S. Government's Investigations into Extrasensory Perception and Psychokinesis*. Little, Brown and Company, 2017.
+[^2]: ARPA memorandum ARPA-AS-TS-67-20, "Project BIZARRE," September 27, 1967, signed Richard S. Cesaro, Acting Director, Advanced Sensors, declassified copy, National Security Archive. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/rhwvuj-tzy4b/08.pdf
+[^3]: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, letter to Senator Warren G. Magnuson, September 15, 1977, National Security Archive. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/rhwvuj-tzy4b/14.pdf

40 - EVENTS/MAJOR_CONFLICTS/Six-Day War.md

@@ -1,18 +1,161 @@
 ---
+category: "Major Conflict"
+aliases:
+  - Six-Day War
+  - Six Day War
+  - June War
+  - 1967 Arab-Israeli War
+  - Third Arab-Israeli War
+created: 2026-10-08
+updated: 2026-10-08
 tags:
   - Event
   - Conflict
-  - Middle East
-category: "Major Conflict"
-summary: "1967 conflict in which Israel launched a preemptive strike against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, capturing the Sinai, Gaza, West Bank, and Golan Heights."
+  - MiddleEast
+  - Israel
+  - Egypt
+  - Syria
+  - Jordan
+  - NuclearWeapons
+  - Dimona
+  - USSLiberty
+  - Mossad
+  - CentralIntelligenceAgency
+  - NationalSecurityAgency
+  - SovietUnion
+summary: "The June 1967 war in which Israel struck Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, with documented American intelligence warnings, the Israeli nuclear dimension, the Soviet role, and the USS Liberty attack."
 start: 1967-06-05
 end: 1967-06-10
 location: "Middle East"
+relations:
+  - type: participant_in
+    with: "[[Israel]]"
+    reverse: true
+    start: 1967-06-05
+    end: 1967-06-10
+    fn: 1
+  - type: participant_in
+    with: "[[Egypt]]"
+    reverse: true
+    start: 1967-06-05
+    end: 1967-06-10
+    fn: 1
+  - type: participant_in
+    with: "[[Jordan]]"
+    reverse: true
+    start: 1967-06-05
+    end: 1967-06-10
+    fn: 1
+  - type: participant_in
+    with: "[[Syria]]"
+    reverse: true
+    start: 1967-06-05
+    end: 1967-06-10
+    fn: 1
+  - type: participant_in
+    with: "[[Meir Amit]]"
+    reverse: true
+    start: 1967-05-31
+    end: 1967-06-02
+    role: "Israeli intelligence chief, Washington visit before the war"
+    fn: 5
 ---
-The Six-Day War was a conflict fought between [[Israel]] and a coalition of Arab states (primarily [[Egypt]], [[Syria]], and [[Jordan]]) from June 5 to June 10, 1967. [[Israel]] launched a preemptive strike against the increasing Arab buildup in the [[Sinai]] and achieved a stunning victory, humiliating the Soviet-supplied Arabs and seizing [[Egypt]]'s [[Sinai Peninsula]], the [[Gaza Strip]], [[Jordan]]'s [[West Bank]], and [[Syria]]'s [[Golan Heights]]. The war also resulted in the Old City of [[Jerusalem]] coming under Jewish control.[^1]
+The Six-Day War was fought between [[Israel]] and a coalition of Arab states, primarily [[Egypt]], [[Syria]], and [[Jordan]], from June 5 to June 10, 1967. Israel opened the war on June 5 with air strikes on Egypt, which its government presented as a preemptive response to the Arab buildup in the [[Sinai Peninsula]], and in six days defeated the [[Soviet Union|Soviet]]-supplied Arab armies and seized Egypt's [[Sinai]], the [[Gaza Strip]], Jordan's [[West Bank]], and Syria's [[Golan Heights]]. The Old City of [[Jerusalem]] came under Israeli control in the same war.[^1]
 
-Following the war, [[Charles de Gaulle]] responded by accusing [[Israel]] of being the aggressor and canceling all of [[France]]'s arms sales to [[Israel]], abrogating twelve years of close French support. He also delayed the pending shipment of fifty previously purchased Mirage III jet fighters.[^1]
+### Pre-war assessments
+
+On the morning of May 23, 1967, the day after Egypt closed the Gulf of Aqaba, [[Lyndon B. Johnson]] summoned [[Richard Helms]] from a congressional briefing and asked for an assessment. Four hours later Helms had two [[Central Intelligence Agency]] papers, "US Knowledge of Egyptian Alert" and "Overall Arab and Israeli Military Capabilities," the second of which stated that Israel could "defend successfully against simultaneous Arab attacks on all fronts . . . or hold on any three fronts while mounting successfully a major offensive on the fourth."[^2]
+
+On May 25 the White House received an Israeli intelligence estimate, headed "Israeli Intelligence Estimate of the Israeli-Arab Crisis," which stated the conclusion that the United Arab Republic was now actively seeking war and that the opportunity for Israel to take the initiative would soon be gone. [[Walt Rostow]] sent it to Johnson with a CIA appraisal attached that "throws a great deal of cold water on the Israeli estimate."[^3] The appraisal, prepared in the Office of National Estimates, stated: "We do not believe that the Israeli appreciation . . . was a serious estimate of the sort they would submit to their own high officials. We think it is probably a gambit intended to influence the US to do one or more of the following: (a) provide military supplies, (b) make more public commitments to Israel, (c) approve Israeli military initiatives, and (d) put more pressure on Nasser." It also stated: "We believe the Soviet aim is still to avoid military involvement and to give the US a black eye among the Arabs by identifying it with Israel."[^3] [[David S. Robarge]], the CIA's chief historian, describes the Israeli paper as a [[Mossad]] estimate that claimed the Israeli military was badly outgunned by a Soviet-backed Arab force, and writes that the Israelis may have been trying to exploit the special relationship they had with [[James Jesus Angleton]], the chief of CIA counterintelligence. Robarge writes that Angleton had for years run the Israeli account out of his Counterintelligence Staff without involving the Directorate of Plans's Near East Division, and that this arrangement may have given Tel Aviv a sense that Washington accorded its analyses special import.[^2]
+
+Robarge writes that the Soviet-aim judgment, which ran contrary to Tel Aviv's suspicions, caused [[Dean Rusk]] to remark to Helms, "if this is a mistake, it's a beaut."[^2] On May 26 the [[Board of National Estimates]] issued the paper "Military Capabilities of Israel and the Arab States" and a second paper, "The Middle Eastern Crisis."[^2] Robarge describes the Military Capabilities paper as a memorandum rather than a Special National Intelligence Estimate, and says that drafts which gave the Israelis seven to nine days to reach the Suez Canal lost that precision in coordination.[^2] Johnson later recalled telling the Israeli foreign minister, [[Abba Eban]], on May 26: "All of our intelligence people are unanimous that if the UAR attacks, you will whip hell out of them."[^2]
+
+Major General [[Meir Amit]], the head of Mossad, visited Washington from May 31 to June 2. On the afternoon of June 1 he met Secretary of Defense [[Robert S. McNamara]]. The memorandum of the conversation was written by Vice Admiral [[Rufus Taylor]], the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and carries the handling caption "Personal and Eyes Only for the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence."[^4] The memorandum records that Amit described the blockade of the [[Strait of Tiran]] as "window dressing" for a Soviet-backed grand design that he called the "Domino Effect," said that time was against Israel, that Israel had mobilized 100,000 people, and that a pre-emptive air attack by the United Arab Republic on the Israeli Air Force was a main worry, and estimated that with air superiority Israel could take the Sinai at the cost of somewhere in the neighborhood of 4,000 casualties. It records that he said "there were no differences between the U.S. and the Israelis on the military intelligence picture or its interpretation," that "the Russian story of a planned attack against Syria was a sheer fabrication," and that his remarks were informal and not an official representation of the Israeli government. McNamara told him he would be seeing the President shortly and would convey Amit's views.[^4] At a conference on the war in June 1992, Amit stated that his objectives included "to tell the Americans, I, Meir Amit, am going to recommend that our government strike," and recalled that McNamara answered "it was all right, the president knows that you are here and I have a direct line to the president."[^4]
+
+Robarge reports, citing published accounts, that Helms met on June 1 with a senior Israeli official who hinted that Israel could no longer avoid a decision, said its restraint was due to American pressure, and said that the delay had cost Israel the advantage of surprise. According to Robarge, the official abruptly left the United States on June 2 along with the Israeli ambassador, and that morning Helms wrote an "Eyes Only" letter to Johnson forewarning that Israel probably would start a war within a few days.[^2]
+
+Helms was awakened at 3:00 a.m. on June 5 by a call from the CIA Operations Center, after the [[Foreign Broadcast Information Service]] picked up reports that Israel had launched its attack. Robarge adds that the Office of Current Intelligence soon concluded that the Israelis, contrary to their claims, had fired first. Johnson was able to tell congressional leaders later that day that he had been expecting Israel's move.[^2] The Israeli prime minister [[Levi Eshkol]]'s message to Johnson of the same day listed bombardments of Kisufim, Nahal Oz and Tsur Maon by Egypt as among the acts of aggression. A telegram from [[Tel Aviv]] of June 5 reported a meeting among Amit, the American ambassador [[Walworth Barbour]], and the presidential special counsel Harry C. McPherson, Jr.; Rostow's covering note to Johnson stated that Amit's argument was that there had been artillery fire on three Israeli villages and air incursions, and then the Israelis had "punched all the buttons," and added: "At least that's his story."[^5]
+
+During the war Helms went to the White House every day but one. He recalled that "in the midst of one meeting" Johnson asked him how accurate his intelligence was on the progress of the war, and that he answered: "It's accurate just as long as the Israelis are winning."[^2]
+
+### Israel's nuclear program in the crisis
+
+A Control Group paper, dated June 17, 1967 by the editors of the Foreign Relations of the United States volume, states that "The most significant feature of the role of nuclear capabilities during the Arab-Israeli hostilities was the absence of direct impact."[^6] Its annex states that the French-built reactor at [[Dimona]] has a capacity of 25 MW, is not under [[International Atomic Energy Agency]] safeguards but has been inspected by the United States, and "is capable of producing enough plutonium for approximately one nuclear weapon per year." The annex states that the spent fuel rods "are still at Dimona and have not been subjected to chemical separation," and that prior to the crisis the Israelis "had probably not made a decision to develop nuclear weapons, but probably had decided to keep that option open." It says that if they made a decision then, it would probably be 18 months or longer before they could have a first weapon. The paper also records that Israel had a contract with the French firm [[Dassault Company|Dassault]] for the MD-620 missile.[^6]
+
+On June 27, 1967, the American ambassador, Barbour, reported from Tel Aviv in telegram 4311, answering a State Department request of June 24 for an estimate of the impact of recent events on Israeli nuclear and missile policy. He wrote that the embassy had not discussed the subject with Israelis since the crisis began, that Israeli officials had not raised it in his many talks with them, and that there had been no press speculation. He wrote that Israelis "who have technical capability to build bomb, would, it may be argued, be foolish not to produce extra-conventional weapons against enemies whose total conventional military capabilities conceivably could outstrip Israel's within another decade." He wrote that the recent increase in popularity of [[Moshe Dayan]], who had been associated with those favoring nuclear weapons development, and any rise in the standing of Dayan's associates [[Shimon Peres]] and [[David Ben-Gurion]], "who made the decisions to build Dimona," could lead Israel closer to the nuclear route and the development of the necessary vehicles. He also wrote that if the French arms embargo continued and delivery of the Dassault missile were precluded, the "quite possible effect would be to stimulate Israeli missile production," and that he did not believe there was "any compelling reason at present time for change in" the Israeli government's policy of abstinence from nuclear weapons and missile production.[^7]
+
+[[Seymour Hersh]] writes that after the war the intelligence about Dimona became highly compartmentalized as the White House decided to side more openly with Israel, and quotes an unnamed American official: "We knew about the yellowcake, but we weren't allowed to keep a file on it."[^8] Hersh also writes that at the end of the war Barbour told his deputy, Bill Dale, that the embassy's military attachés were no longer to report on Dimona, and quotes Barbour as saying "Israel is going to be our main ally."[^9] Hersh, citing Israeli officials, writes that Dimona was ordered into full-scale production early in 1968 and began turning out four or five warheads a year, with more than twenty-five bombs in the arsenal by the 1973 war, and that Mossad arranged the March 1968 purchase of uranium ore through a German agent for transfer at sea from the vessel renamed the Scheersberg A. Hersh states that the sale was approved by [[Euratom]] in October 1968.[^10]
+
+The [[Atomic Energy Commission]] had by then recorded unexplained losses of highly enriched uranium at the [[Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation]] plant at [[Apollo, Pennsylvania|Apollo]], Pennsylvania, owned by [[Zalman Mordecai Shapiro]]. A General Accounting Office report to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of June 20, 1967, stated that cumulative losses of U-235 through December 31, 1966 totaled about 260 kilograms, or about 1.2 percent of receipts.[^11] On April 2, 1968, Helms wrote to Attorney General [[Ramsey Clark]] asking that the FBI "initiate a discreet intelligence investigation of an all source nature of Dr. Shapiro in order to establish the nature and extent of his relationship with the Government of Israel," and asked that the letter be returned to him once the Attorney General had acted.[^11] On September 10, 1968, NUMEC received a visit by four Israelis, among them Avraham Hermoni, scientific counselor at the Israeli embassy, and [[Rafael Eitan|Raphael Eitan]] of the Israeli Ministry of Defense; the National Security Archive identifies Hermoni as the [[LAKAM]] station chief in Washington and Eitan as deputy chief of operations of the Mossad and organizer of the 1968 Plumbat uranium operation.[^11] Hersh writes that [[Carl E. Duckett]] and Helms shared the view of the CIA station chief [[John L. Hadden]] that Shapiro had to be the source of Israeli progress in nuclear weaponry, and states his own conclusion that Shapiro did not divert uranium to Israel.[^12]
+
+[[Avner Cohen]], whose account rests on interviews with the late [[Yitzhak Ya'akov]], describes an assembly in May 1967 of two or three rudimentary nuclear explosives, and a plan, called [[Operation Shimshon]], to detonate them in the Egyptian desert as a last resort.[^13] The [[Wilson Center]], which released Cohen's collection in June 2017, described Ya'akov's testimony as revealing "for the first time the existence of a crash effort to assemble Israel's first nuclear device."[^14]
+
+### Soviet role
+
+[[Isabella Ginor]] and [[Gideon Remez]] argue in *Foxbats over Dimona: The Soviets' Nuclear Gamble in the Six-Day War* that Soviet MiG-25 "Foxbat" aircraft overflew the Dimona reactor in May 1967. The authors argue that the flights were meant to encourage Israel to launch a war, and to ensure that the site could be destroyed during a planned joint Arab-Soviet counterattack.[^15] In August 2007 the [[Russian Air Force]] spokesman Colonel [[Aleksandr Drobyshevsky|Aleksandr V. Drobyshevsky]] confirmed in writing that Soviet pilots had flown MiG-25 aircraft over Dimona in May 1967, according to the authors, who called this official confirmation of the central exhibit of their book.[^16] Hersh writes that after the war the Soviet Union severed relations with Israel, that Soviet arms shipments to Egypt began within weeks, and that the Soviet fleet deployed in greater force in the Mediterranean.[^17]
+
+### USS Liberty
+
+A [[National Security Agency]] review of the Technical Research Ship Program, declassified in 2017 after a mandatory declassification review, states that on May 23 the NSA asked the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] to authorize diverting the [[USS Liberty Incident|USS Liberty]] from Abidjan to an operating area off Port Said for SIGINT coverage of the crisis; that on June 7 the Joint Chiefs initiated a message increasing the ship's closest point of approach to the United Arab Republic to 100 nautical miles after Arab allegations that the United States had participated in Israeli air strikes; and that, as later proven, the Liberty did not receive the order to move.[^18]
+
+On June 8, 1967, the Liberty, a Navy signals intelligence ship, was attacked in the waters off the Sinai Peninsula. A CIA intelligence memorandum of June 13, 1967, compiled from the reports then available, states that unidentified jet aircraft made six strafing runs beginning at 3:05 p.m. local time, that three torpedo boats approached about twenty minutes later, and that one torpedo struck the starboard side in the spaces occupied by the SIGINT collectors. The memorandum records the hull number 206-T on one of the boats, and says that some fifty minutes later two Israeli helicopters arrived.[^19] The memorandum states that intercepted conversations between the helicopter pilots and the control tower at [[Hatzor Air Base|Hatzor]] "leave little doubt that the Israelis failed to identify" the ship as American before or during the attack. The control tower told helicopter 815 that "there is a warship there which we attacked. The men jumped into the water from it. You will try to rescue them." The memorandum records that the tower later identified the ship as Egyptian, that the weather was clear, that the hull number GTR 5 was prominently displayed, and that an American flag was flying. It gives the casualties as 10 killed, 90 wounded, and 22 missing.[^19]
+
+A report of the National Security Agency to the White House of June 22, 1967, based on Israeli plain-language radio traffic intercepted on June 8 between 1229Z and 1328Z, states that it deals solely with the aftermath of the attack and that there are no COMINT reflections of the actual attack itself. It records the control tower telling the helicopters at about 1235Z, "Pay attention: the ship is now identified as Egyptian, you can return home now," helicopter 815 reporting at 1312Z that it had sighted an American flag on the ship, and the tower asking the helicopter to make another pass to check "if this is really an American flag."[^20]
+
+Helms's notes of the June 12 meeting of the [[National Security Council]] Special Committee record that the President requested a special study on the strafing and torpedoing of the ship, covering pilot conversations and "everything we can get" from the NSA. Rostow sent a preliminary version of the report to Johnson on June 13, calling it the "CIA's first cut at the problem" and noting: "They do not find evidence of U.S. identification before the attack."[^19] Notes of the NSC Special Committee meeting of June 9, 1967 record [[Clark Clifford]] saying: "My concern is that we're not tough enough. Handle as if Arabs or USSR had done it. Manner egregious. Inconceivable that it was accident. 3 strafing passes, 3 torpedo boats. Set forth facts. Punish Israelis responsible." A marginal notation by the note-taker, [[Harold H. Saunders]], next to Clifford's remarks reads: "President subscribed 100%." The notes record under the initials "DR": "Do what is normal. 1) Reparation. 2) Punish. 3) No repetition."[^21] Hersh writes that a declassified cable in the [[Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library|LBJ Library]] shows that hours after the attack Barbour reported that Israel did not intend to admit to the incident and added: "Urge strongly that we too avoid publicity," and that Barbour wrote that the ship's "proximity to scene could feed Arab suspicions of U.S.-Israel collusion."[^22]
+
+A CIA memorandum of June 21, 1967, on the Israeli statement, states: "It is now known, however, that the IDF Headquarters had identified the Liberty, probably more than four hours before the attack."[^23] The United States Navy Court of Inquiry, convened by Admiral [[John S. McCain, Jr.]] and presided over by Rear Admiral [[Isaac C. Kidd, Jr.]], conducted classified hearings in London and aboard the ship in Malta from June 11 to 17. A memorandum from Rostow to Johnson of June 26 forwarding the proposed public summary states that it was the judgment, "not flatly stated in the Report," that the attack was an accident, quotes the report's statement that "It was not the responsibility of the Court to rule on the culpability of the attackers, and no evidence was heard from the attacking nation," and reports that [[Cyrus Vance]] told Rostow that the members of the court, on the evidence available to them, believed the attack resulted from a failure within the Israeli communications system and not from premeditation, but that in his view, on the evidence the government had, it should not so state.[^24] The New York Times reported in 1980 that the court had said the Liberty was in international waters, "properly marked as to identify and nationality," that the attack had been unprovoked, and that the court had insufficient information to make a judgment about the reasons for it.[^25] The Judge Advocate General's endorsement on the record states that the record discloses beyond any doubt that the Liberty was engaged in peaceful operations in international waters and that the attack was entirely unprovoked and unexpected; it also states that the Israeli government had admitted a tragic accident and agreed to make amends, and that 34 deaths and 171 injuries resulted.[^26]
+
+In a 2004 affidavit introduced into the [[Congressional Record]], Captain [[Ward Boston]], the senior legal counsel to the Court of Inquiry, stated: "Both Admiral Kidd and I believed with certainty that this attack, which killed 34 American sailors and injured 172 others, was a deliberate effort to sink an American ship and murder its entire crew." He stated that he knew "from personal conversations I had with Admiral Kidd that President Lyndon Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ordered him to conclude that the attack was a case of 'mistaken identity' despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary."[^27]
+
+The NSA's oral history interviews with personnel aboard the ship, conducted in 1980 and posted with the agency's USS Liberty release, contain divergent recollections. Terry McFarland, asked about the helicopter, answered "It was an Israeli helicopter," and said that he learned from others on the bridge, sometime after the helicopter left, that the attackers were Israeli.[^28] James O'Connor, asked whether the helicopter was well marked as Israeli, answered "Yes, I think it was." He also recounted a story, which he said he could not confirm, that "supposedly only a couple of us on the ship knew that there was an Israeli submarine out there."[^29] Richard Harvey, asked whether there was a feeling at the time that the attack might have been deliberate, answered "There was speculation but, I don't know that anybody had really any substance to base it on." The interviewer, Henry Millington, said in the same exchange that among the documentation collected was a report the Israelis turned over to the State Department in which, in his words, they "frankly admit that their reconnaissance forces did know, before the attack, that that was a U.S. ship," and that "the word never got down to the operating forces." Harvey replied that he had heard the claim, and that the speculation he had heard rested on the view that Israeli intelligence was too good not to know what the ship was.[^30]
+
+The Independent Commission of Inquiry chaired by Admiral [[Thomas H. Moorer]], whose findings were introduced into the Congressional Record by [[John Conyers]], issued findings in October 2003. Its fourth finding is that "there is compelling evidence that Israel's attack was a deliberate attempt to destroy an American ship and kill her entire crew." Its sixth finding is that the White House "deliberately prevented the U.S. Navy from coming to the defense of the Liberty by recalling Sixth Fleet military rescue support while the ship was under attack." The commission's published biographies describe Moorer as chairman of the Liberty Alliance, an organization dedicated to obtaining an investigation of the attack.[^27]
+
+On June 14, Commodore [[Shlomo Erell]], commander of the Israeli Navy, presented apologies to the American naval attaché and said the incident was a "great mistake."[^31] On June 17 an aide to the Israeli chief of staff, [[Yitzhak Rabin]], gave the American naval attaché the synopsis of the findings of the Israeli court of inquiry, read from a Hebrew document. The synopsis stated that "the attack on USS Liberty was not in malice; there was no criminal negligence and the attack was made by innocent mistake," attributed the attack to a chain of three mistakes, and stated that "the officers who knew of the identification of Liberty early the same morning did not connect Liberty with the unidentified ships said to be shelling El-Arish." It also stated, in the words of the inquiry officer, that "a grave additional mistake not less decisive than the three above mistakes made by IDF was made by the Liberty itself." The aide mentioned that the Israeli government had received a statement from the United States saying that the Liberty had been identified six hours before the attack rather than one hour as stated in an earlier American communication. The attaché's own evaluation, in the same telegram, called the Israeli standing order to attack any ship moving at more than 20 knots "incomprehensible" and described two of the Israeli justifications as mutually contradictory.[^32] A CIA memorandum of June 21 reported the preliminary findings of the Israeli court as "not in malice" and "innocent mistake."[^23]
+
+On December 18, 1980, the United States and Israel announced the settlement of American claims for the damage to the ship. The [[New York Times]] reported that Israel would pay $6 million over three years, in addition to nearly $7 million already paid ($3,323,500 in 1968 for the families of those killed and $3,452,275 in 1969 for wounds sustained by 75 crew members), and that Israel had maintained the attack was an accident. The paper also reported that [[James M. Ennes Jr.|James M. Ennes]], a retired Navy officer wounded in the attack, had charged in his book *Assault on the Liberty* that the court of inquiry and public statements by the government amounted to a cover-up, and that messages ordering the Liberty out of the area were not received by the vessel in time.[^25]
+
+### Military and arms context
+
+[[Charles de Gaulle]] responded to the war by accusing Israel of being the aggressor and canceling all of [[France]]'s arms sales to Israel, abrogating twelve years of close French support. He also delayed the pending shipment of fifty previously purchased Mirage III jet fighters, and claimed to newsmen that he had not known of Dassault's contract with Israel until the first field test in 1967 of the Jericho I.[^33] A footnote to a Central Intelligence Agency estimate of August 10, 1967, states that France imposed an embargo on shipments of military items to the Middle East on June 2, 1967, but that the embargo did not apply to spare parts previously contracted for, and that there probably had been some evasion of the ban.[^34]
+
+Hersh reports that after the war, according to [[James H. Critchfield]], then chief of the CIA's Near East Division, Dayan and [[Zvi Zamir]] joined him and Angleton in an attempt to reach a quick accord with Jordan's King [[King Hussein|Hussein]] before Israeli settlement began, and that they were told at a White House meeting with [[McGeorge Bundy]] to "knock it off."[^35]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
-[^1]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 12, 13.
+[^1]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 12, "The Ambassador," pp. 166-167. Sole source for the passages so cited.
+[^2]: Robarge, David S. "Getting it Right: CIA Analysis of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War." *Studies in Intelligence* 49, no. 1 (March 2005), reprinted in *Studies in Intelligence* 62, no. 2 (June 2018). https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/static/CIA-Analysis-1967-War.pdf. The Robarge account cites Freshwater, "Policy and Intelligence: The Arab-Israeli War," *Studies in Intelligence* 13, no. 1 (1969); Helms, *A Look Over My Shoulder*; Oren, *Six Days of War* (2002), p. 146, citing Meir Amit; Johnson, *The Vantage Point*, p. 293; Mangold, *Cold Warrior* (1989), pp. 49, 362, for the Angleton arrangement. Helms's quoted recollection and the Eban quotation are Robarge's quotations of those books. Robarge's source for the June 1 to 2 passage is the work of Michael B. Oren, who cites an interview with and writings of Meir Amit.
+[^3]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 61, Memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson, May 25, 1967, with attached CIA appraisal. The text of the Israeli estimate is not printed; the editors' note summarizes it. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d61
+[^4]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 124, Memorandum for the Record, June 1, 1967 (prepared June 2), Conversation between Major General Meir Amit and Secretary McNamara, by Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor, with editors' note quoting Amit's remarks at the conference of June 3-5, 1992, published in Richard B. Parker, ed., *The Six-Day War: A Retrospective* (University Press of Florida, 1996), pp. 139-140. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d124
+[^5]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 158, Telegram 3935 from the Embassy in Israel, June 5, 1967 (Eshkol's message), editors' note describing telegram 3937 and Rostow's covering memorandum. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d158
+[^6]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 305, Paper Submitted by the Control Group, undated (dated June 17, 1967 by the editors). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d305
+[^7]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 326, Telegram 4311 from the Embassy in Israel (Barbour) to the Department of State, June 27, 1967. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d326
+[^8]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 11, p. 156. Sole source for the passages so cited; the official is unnamed.
+[^9]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 12, p. 168, relying on an interview with Bill Dale. Sole source for the passages so cited.
+[^10]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 13, "An Israeli Decision," pp. 179-181, relying on unnamed Israeli officials and published accounts. Sole source for the passages so cited.
+[^11]: National Security Archive, "The NUMEC Affair: Did Highly Enriched Uranium from the U.S. Aid Israel's Nuclear Weapons Program?" (November 2, 2016), Documents 7, 8 and 10 (AEC New York Security Office report of September 6, 1968 on the September 10 visit, with the posting's identifications of the visitors): Comptroller General of the United States, "Review of Accountability Controls Over Special Nuclear Materials, Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation," June 20, 1967 (University of Arizona Special Collections, Morris Udall Papers, MS 325, Box 364, Folder 7); Letter from Richard Helms to Ramsey Clark, April 2, 1968 (ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-062). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2016-11-02/numec-affair-did-highly-enriched-uranium-us-aid-israels-nuclear-weapons-program
+[^12]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 18, "Injustice," pp. 240-248. The passage on Duckett, Helms and Hadden is Hersh's account; the conclusion on diversion is Hersh's own.
+[^13]: Cohen, Avner. "Israel's Secret Plan to Nuke the Egyptian Desert." Politico Magazine, June 5, 2017, republished by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Middlebury Institute of International Studies. https://nonproliferation.org/israels-secret-plan-to-nuke-the-egyptian-desert/. Sole source for the passages so cited; Cohen relays the testimony of Ya'akov.
+[^14]: Wilson Center, "Wilson Center Archive Sheds New Light on 1967 Six-Day War," June 5, 2017. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/wilson-center-archive-sheds-new-light-1967-six-day-war
+[^15]: Ginor, Isabella, and Gideon Remez. *Foxbats over Dimona: The Soviets' Nuclear Gamble in the Six-Day War*. Yale University Press, 2007. Sole source for the overflight claim. https://www.historynewsnetwork.org/article/42140 summarizes the authors' argument.
+[^16]: Ginor and Remez, as reported in the Russian Air Force confirmation of August 2007. Sole source for the confirmation, attributed to the authors. https://www.historynewsnetwork.org/article/42140
+[^17]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 13, pp. 175-176.
+[^18]: National Security Agency, "A Review of the Technical Research Ship Program, 1961-1969," released under MDR-85456, February 22, 2017, section on USN-855 (USS Liberty). https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/terrorism/AReviewoftheTechnicalResearchShipProgram-postMDR.pdf
+[^19]: Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Memorandum, "The Israeli Attack on the USS Liberty," June 13, 1967 (SC No. 01415/67), in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 284, with source note reporting Helms's notes of the June 12 NSC Special Committee meeting and Rostow's covering memorandum of June 13. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d284
+[^20]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 319, Telegram from the Director of the National Security Agency (Carter) to the White House, June 22, 1967, SIGINT Readiness Bravo "Crayon" Report Nr. 2149. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d319
+[^21]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 236, Notes of a Meeting of the Special Committee of the National Security Council, June 9, 1967, 6:30 p.m. (Saunders' handwritten notes). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d236
+[^22]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 12, pp. 167-168, quoting a declassified cable in the LBJ Library. Sole source for the cable text.
+[^23]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 317, Intelligence Memorandum, June 21, 1967 (SC 08384-67). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d317
+[^24]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 324, Memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson, June 26, 1967. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d324
+[^25]: Gwertzman, Bernard. "Israeli Payment to Close the Book On '67 Attack on U.S. Navy Vessel." New York Times, December 19, 1980. CIA Reading Room, CREST document CIA-RDP90-00965R000302640098-3, copy at https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302640098-3. The article spells the name Ennis.
+[^26]: Judge Advocate General of the Navy, Third Endorsement and Enclosure (1), Summary of Events, on the Record of Proceedings, Court of Inquiry into the armed attack on USS Liberty (AGTR-5), 1967, pp. 1-2 of the endorsement (Navy JAG file 131). Scanned copy of the record at https://libertyincident.com/USNcourt.html (a website maintained by A. Jay Cristol).
+[^27]: Congressional Record, Extensions of Remarks, Findings of the Independent Commission of Inquiry into the Israeli Attack on the USS Liberty and Affidavit of Captain Ward Boston, USN, JAG (Ret.), introduced by Representative John Conyers, Jr., dated October 7, 2004, in the issue of October 11, 2004 (Volume 150, Number 130, pp. E1886-E1889). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CREC-2004-10-11/html/CREC-2004-10-11-pt1-PgE1886-3.htm. Sole source for the finding texts and the affidavit text; the findings are the commission's and the affidavit is Boston's.
+[^28]: National Security Agency, Oral History Interview with Terry L. McFarland, June 23, 1980 (OH-1980-26). https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/18/2002804900/-1/-1/0/INTERVIEW_T_MCFARLAND.PDF. Copy of the NSA USS Liberty gallery, captured by the Wayback Machine, at https://web.archive.org/web/20210928195052/https://www.nsa.gov/Helpful-Links/NSA-FOIA/Declassification-Transparency-Initiatives/Historical-Releases/USS-Liberty/
+[^29]: National Security Agency, Oral History Interview NSA-OH-21-80 with CDR James G. O'Connor, May 22, 1980. https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/18/2002804901/-1/-1/0/INTERVIEW_J_OCONNER.PDF. Sole source for the submarine story, which O'Connor recounts as a story passed among the crew.
+[^30]: National Security Agency, Oral History Interview with Richard Harvey, July 16, 1980 (OH-1980-29). https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/18/2002804909/-1/-1/0/INTERVIEW_R_HARVEY.PDF. The Millington statement appears in the interviewer's question in the same transcript.
+[^31]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 289, Telegram from the Defense Attache Office, Tel Aviv, June 15, 1967, reporting Erell's June 14 presentation of apologies. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d289
+[^32]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 307, Telegram from the Defense Attache Office in Israel to the White House, June 18, 1967, "Israeli Court of Inquiry in USS Liberty incident." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d307
+[^33]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 13, p. 175. Sole source for the de Gaulle statements and the fifty Mirage III aircraft.
+[^34]: Central Intelligence Agency, Special National Intelligence Estimate, August 10, 1967, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 414, footnote 3. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d414
+[^35]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 14, "A Presidential Gift," p. 185, footnote, quoting Critchfield. Hersh's footnote calls Zamir the head of Mossad at the time; Katzenbach, Hersh writes, had no recollection of the meeting. Sole source for the passages so cited.

40 - EVENTS/MAJOR_CONFLICTS/USS Liberty Incident.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ aliases:
   - USS Liberty Incident
   - USS Liberty attack
 created: 2026-05-17
-updated: 2026-05-17
+updated: 2026-10-08
 tags:
   - Event
   - Military
@@ -19,6 +19,60 @@ The USS Liberty Incident refers to the attack on the U.S. Navy intelligence ship
 
 [[Walworth Barbour]], the American ambassador to Israel, urged [[Washington, D.C.]] to downplay the incident, reporting that Israel did not intend to admit to it and suggesting that publicity could feed Arab suspicions of U.S.-Israel collusion. He noted that the Israelis were "obviously shocked by error and tender sincere apologies."[^1]
 
+### Orders and operating area
+
+A [[NSA|National Security Agency]] review of the Technical Research Ship Program, declassified in 2017 after a mandatory declassification review, states that on May 23 the NSA asked the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] to authorize diverting the USS Liberty from Abidjan to an operating area off Port Said for SIGINT coverage of the crisis; that on June 7 the Joint Chiefs initiated a message increasing the ship's closest point of approach to the United Arab Republic to 100 nautical miles after Arab allegations that the United States had participated in Israeli air strikes; and that, as later proven, the Liberty did not receive the order to move.[^2]
+
+### Attack in the CIA record
+
+On June 8, 1967, the Liberty, a Navy signals intelligence ship, was attacked in the waters off the Sinai Peninsula. A CIA intelligence memorandum of June 13, 1967, compiled from the reports then available, states that unidentified jet aircraft made six strafing runs beginning at 3:05 p.m. local time, that three torpedo boats approached about twenty minutes later, and that one torpedo struck the starboard side in the spaces occupied by the SIGINT collectors. The memorandum records the hull number 206-T on one of the boats, and says that some fifty minutes later two Israeli helicopters arrived.[^3] The memorandum states that intercepted conversations between the helicopter pilots and the control tower at [[Hatzor Air Base|Hatzor]] "leave little doubt that the Israelis failed to identify" the ship as American before or during the attack. The control tower told helicopter 815 that "there is a warship there which we attacked. The men jumped into the water from it. You will try to rescue them." The memorandum records that the tower later identified the ship as Egyptian, that the weather was clear, that the hull number GTR 5 was prominently displayed, and that an American flag was flying. It gives the casualties as 10 killed, 90 wounded, and 22 missing.[^3]
+
+### NSA intercept report
+
+A report of the National Security Agency to the White House of June 22, 1967, based on Israeli plain-language radio traffic intercepted on June 8 between 1229Z and 1328Z, states that it deals solely with the aftermath of the attack and that there are no COMINT reflections of the actual attack itself. It records the control tower telling the helicopters at about 1235Z, "Pay attention: the ship is now identified as Egyptian, you can return home now," helicopter 815 reporting at 1312Z that it had sighted an American flag on the ship, and the tower asking the helicopter to make another pass to check "if this is really an American flag."[^4]
+
+### White House and NSC record, June 1967
+
+Helms's notes of the June 12 meeting of the [[National Security Council]] Special Committee record that the President requested a special study on the strafing and torpedoing of the ship, covering pilot conversations and "everything we can get" from the NSA. Rostow sent a preliminary version of the report to Johnson on June 13, calling it the "CIA's first cut at the problem" and noting: "They do not find evidence of U.S. identification before the attack."[^3] Notes of the NSC Special Committee meeting of June 9, 1967 record [[Clark Clifford]] saying: "My concern is that we're not tough enough. Handle as if Arabs or USSR had done it. Manner egregious. Inconceivable that it was accident. 3 strafing passes, 3 torpedo boats. Set forth facts. Punish Israelis responsible." A marginal notation by the note-taker, [[Harold H. Saunders]], next to Clifford's remarks reads: "President subscribed 100%." The notes record under the initials "DR": "Do what is normal. 1) Reparation. 2) Punish. 3) No repetition."[^5]
+
+### Navy Court of Inquiry
+
+A CIA memorandum of June 21, 1967, on the Israeli statement, states: "It is now known, however, that the IDF Headquarters had identified the Liberty, probably more than four hours before the attack."[^6] The United States Navy Court of Inquiry, convened by Admiral [[John S. McCain, Jr.]] and presided over by Rear Admiral [[Isaac C. Kidd, Jr.]], conducted classified hearings in London and aboard the ship in Malta from June 11 to 17. A memorandum from Rostow to Johnson of June 26 forwarding the proposed public summary states that it was the judgment, "not flatly stated in the Report," that the attack was an accident, quotes the report's statement that "It was not the responsibility of the Court to rule on the culpability of the attackers, and no evidence was heard from the attacking nation," and reports that [[Cyrus Vance]] told Rostow that the members of the court, on the evidence available to them, believed the attack resulted from a failure within the Israeli communications system and not from premeditation, but that in his view, on the evidence the government had, it should not so state.[^7] The New York Times reported in 1980 that the court had said the Liberty was in international waters, "properly marked as to identify and nationality," that the attack had been unprovoked, and that the court had insufficient information to make a judgment about the reasons for it.[^8] The Judge Advocate General's endorsement on the record states that the record discloses beyond any doubt that the Liberty was engaged in peaceful operations in international waters and that the attack was entirely unprovoked and unexpected; it also states that the Israeli government had admitted a tragic accident and agreed to make amends, and that 34 deaths and 171 injuries resulted.[^9]
+
+### Court of Inquiry counsel
+
+In a 2004 affidavit introduced into the [[Congressional Record]], Captain [[Ward Boston]], the senior legal counsel to the Court of Inquiry, stated: "Both Admiral Kidd and I believed with certainty that this attack, which killed 34 American sailors and injured 172 others, was a deliberate effort to sink an American ship and murder its entire crew." He stated that he knew "from personal conversations I had with Admiral Kidd that President Lyndon Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ordered him to conclude that the attack was a case of 'mistaken identity' despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary."[^10]
+
+### NSA oral histories
+
+The NSA's oral history interviews with personnel aboard the ship, conducted in 1980 and posted with the agency's USS Liberty release, contain divergent recollections. Terry McFarland, asked about the helicopter, answered "It was an Israeli helicopter," and said that he learned from others on the bridge, sometime after the helicopter left, that the attackers were Israeli.[^11] James O'Connor, asked whether the helicopter was well marked as Israeli, answered "Yes, I think it was." He also recounted a story, which he said he could not confirm, that "supposedly only a couple of us on the ship knew that there was an Israeli submarine out there."[^12] Richard Harvey, asked whether there was a feeling at the time that the attack might have been deliberate, answered "There was speculation but, I don't know that anybody had really any substance to base it on." The interviewer, Henry Millington, said in the same exchange that among the documentation collected was a report the Israelis turned over to the State Department in which, in his words, they "frankly admit that their reconnaissance forces did know, before the attack, that that was a U.S. ship," and that "the word never got down to the operating forces." Harvey replied that he had heard the claim, and that the speculation he had heard rested on the view that Israeli intelligence was too good not to know what the ship was.[^13]
+
+### Moorer commission
+
+The Independent Commission of Inquiry chaired by Admiral [[Thomas H. Moorer]], whose findings were introduced into the Congressional Record by [[John Conyers]], issued findings in October 2003. Its fourth finding is that "there is compelling evidence that Israel's attack was a deliberate attempt to destroy an American ship and kill her entire crew." Its sixth finding is that the White House "deliberately prevented the U.S. Navy from coming to the defense of the Liberty by recalling Sixth Fleet military rescue support while the ship was under attack." The commission's published biographies describe Moorer as chairman of the Liberty Alliance, an organization dedicated to obtaining an investigation of the attack.[^10]
+
+### Israeli inquiry and apologies
+
+On June 14, Commodore [[Shlomo Erell]], commander of the Israeli Navy, presented apologies to the American naval attaché and said the incident was a "great mistake."[^14] On June 17 an aide to the Israeli chief of staff, [[Yitzhak Rabin]], gave the American naval attaché the synopsis of the findings of the Israeli court of inquiry, read from a Hebrew document. The synopsis stated that "the attack on USS Liberty was not in malice; there was no criminal negligence and the attack was made by innocent mistake," attributed the attack to a chain of three mistakes, and stated that "the officers who knew of the identification of Liberty early the same morning did not connect Liberty with the unidentified ships said to be shelling El-Arish." It also stated, in the words of the inquiry officer, that "a grave additional mistake not less decisive than the three above mistakes made by IDF was made by the Liberty itself." The aide mentioned that the Israeli government had received a statement from the United States saying that the Liberty had been identified six hours before the attack rather than one hour as stated in an earlier American communication. The attaché's own evaluation, in the same telegram, called the Israeli standing order to attack any ship moving at more than 20 knots "incomprehensible" and described two of the Israeli justifications as mutually contradictory.[^15] A CIA memorandum of June 21 reported the preliminary findings of the Israeli court as "not in malice" and "innocent mistake."[^6]
+
+### Settlement, 1980
+
+On December 18, 1980, the United States and Israel announced the settlement of American claims for the damage to the ship. The [[New York Times]] reported that Israel would pay $6 million over three years, in addition to nearly $7 million already paid ($3,323,500 in 1968 for the families of those killed and $3,452,275 in 1969 for wounds sustained by 75 crew members), and that Israel had maintained the attack was an accident. The paper also reported that [[James M. Ennes Jr.|James M. Ennes]], a retired Navy officer wounded in the attack, had charged in his book *Assault on the Liberty* that the court of inquiry and public statements by the government amounted to a cover-up, and that messages ordering the Liberty out of the area were not received by the vessel in time.[^8]
+
 ### Footnotes
 
-[^1]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 12.
+[^1]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 12.
+[^2]: National Security Agency, "A Review of the Technical Research Ship Program, 1961-1969," released under MDR-85456, February 22, 2017, section on USN-855 (USS Liberty). https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/terrorism/AReviewoftheTechnicalResearchShipProgram-postMDR.pdf
+[^3]: Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Memorandum, "The Israeli Attack on the USS Liberty," June 13, 1967 (SC No. 01415/67), in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 284, with source note reporting Helms's notes of the June 12 NSC Special Committee meeting and Rostow's covering memorandum of June 13. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d284
+[^4]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 319, Telegram from the Director of the National Security Agency (Carter) to the White House, June 22, 1967, SIGINT Readiness Bravo "Crayon" Report Nr. 2149. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d319
+[^5]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 236, Notes of a Meeting of the Special Committee of the National Security Council, June 9, 1967, 6:30 p.m. (Saunders' handwritten notes). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d236
+[^6]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 317, Intelligence Memorandum, June 21, 1967 (SC 08384-67). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d317
+[^7]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 324, Memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson, June 26, 1967. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d324
+[^8]: Gwertzman, Bernard. "Israeli Payment to Close the Book On '67 Attack on U.S. Navy Vessel." New York Times, December 19, 1980. CIA Reading Room, CREST document CIA-RDP90-00965R000302640098-3, copy at https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302640098-3. The article spells the name Ennis.
+[^9]: Judge Advocate General of the Navy, Third Endorsement and Enclosure (1), Summary of Events, on the Record of Proceedings, Court of Inquiry into the armed attack on USS Liberty (AGTR-5), 1967, pp. 1-2 of the endorsement (Navy JAG file 131). Scanned copy of the record at https://libertyincident.com/USNcourt.html (a website maintained by A. Jay Cristol).
+[^10]: Congressional Record, Extensions of Remarks, Findings of the Independent Commission of Inquiry into the Israeli Attack on the USS Liberty and Affidavit of Captain Ward Boston, USN, JAG (Ret.), introduced by Representative John Conyers, Jr., dated October 7, 2004, in the issue of October 11, 2004 (Volume 150, Number 130, pp. E1886-E1889). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CREC-2004-10-11/html/CREC-2004-10-11-pt1-PgE1886-3.htm. Sole source for the finding texts and the affidavit text; the findings are the commission's and the affidavit is Boston's.
+[^11]: National Security Agency, Oral History Interview with Terry L. McFarland, June 23, 1980 (OH-1980-26). https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/18/2002804900/-1/-1/0/INTERVIEW_T_MCFARLAND.PDF. Copy of the NSA USS Liberty gallery, captured by the Wayback Machine, at https://web.archive.org/web/20210928195052/https://www.nsa.gov/Helpful-Links/NSA-FOIA/Declassification-Transparency-Initiatives/Historical-Releases/USS-Liberty/
+[^12]: National Security Agency, Oral History Interview NSA-OH-21-80 with CDR James G. O'Connor, May 22, 1980. https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/18/2002804901/-1/-1/0/INTERVIEW_J_OCONNER.PDF. Sole source for the submarine story, which O'Connor recounts as a story passed among the crew.
+[^13]: National Security Agency, Oral History Interview with Richard Harvey, July 16, 1980 (OH-1980-29). https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/18/2002804909/-1/-1/0/INTERVIEW_R_HARVEY.PDF. The Millington statement appears in the interviewer's question in the same transcript.
+[^14]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 289, Telegram from the Defense Attache Office, Tel Aviv, June 15, 1967, reporting Erell's June 14 presentation of apologies. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d289
+[^15]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 307, Telegram from the Defense Attache Office in Israel to the White House, June 18, 1967, "Israeli Court of Inquiry in USS Liberty incident." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d307

40 - EVENTS/MAJOR_CONFLICTS/Vietnam War.md

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ The Vietnam War followed the French defeat at [[Dienbienphu]] and the division o
 
 ### Behavioral Science
 
-The [[Rand Corporation]]'s Viet Cong Motivation and Morale Study, commissioned by [[Advanced Research Projects Agency|ARPA]] in the mid-1960s, produced about 2,371 interviews, more than 60,000 pages, conducted at some forty sites in South Vietnam, including detention centers; Rand's own history later confirmed that its analyst Leon Gouré had promoted the air war with findings the interviews did not support.[^6] The Army's [[4th Psychological Operations Group]] developed leaflet and loudspeaker equipment; in March 1969 alone 713 million leaflets were dropped over Vietnam, the main channel for the [[Chieu Hoi]] defection program.[^7] In Top Secret testimony to the Church Committee in October 1975, [[Sidney Gottlieb]] said that during the war the military had been "considering the use of [[LSD]] on a fairly large scale."[^8]
+The [[Rand Corporation]]'s Viet Cong Motivation and Morale Study, commissioned by [[DARPA|ARPA]] in the mid-1960s, produced about 2,371 interviews, more than 60,000 pages, conducted at some forty sites in South Vietnam, including detention centers; Rand's own history later confirmed that its analyst Leon Gouré had promoted the air war with findings the interviews did not support.[^6] The Army's [[4th Psychological Operations Group]] developed leaflet and loudspeaker equipment; in March 1969 alone 713 million leaflets were dropped over Vietnam, the main channel for the [[Chieu Hoi]] defection program.[^7] In Top Secret testimony to the Church Committee in October 1975, [[Sidney Gottlieb]] said that during the war the military had been "considering the use of [[LSD]] on a fairly large scale."[^8]
 
 ### Opposition
 

40 - EVENTS/MAJOR_CONFLICTS/Yom Kippur War.md

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ summary: "The 1973 war in which coordinated Egyptian and Syrian attacks produced
 start: 1973-10-06
 end: 1973-10-25
 location: ["Sinai Peninsula", "Golan Heights"]
-updated: 2026-10-07
+updated: 2026-10-08
 relations:
   - type: participant_in
     with: "[[Israel]]"
@@ -49,21 +49,21 @@ relations:
     start: 1973-10-24
     end: 1973-10-25
     role: "sender of the Brezhnev letter of October 24, 1973 that preceded the American DEFCON III alert"
-    fn: 14
+    fn: 25
   - type: participant_in
     with: "[[Henry A. Kissinger]]"
     reverse: true
     start: 1973-10-16
     end: 1973-10-25
     role: "Secretary of State; participant in the Washington Special Actions Group meetings"
-    fn: 25
+    fn: 27
   - type: participant_in
     with: "[[Richard Nixon]]"
     reverse: true
     start: 1973-10-06
     end: 1973-10-25
     role: "President; authorized the airlift on October 12, 1973"
-    fn: 15
+    fn: 16
   - type: investigated
     with: "[[Agranat Commission]]"
     reverse: true
@@ -73,90 +73,96 @@ relations:
 ---
 The Yom Kippur War, also called the October War, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the Ramadan War, began on Saturday, October 6, 1973, when [[Egypt]] attacked across the [[Suez Canal]] into the [[Sinai Peninsula]] and [[Syria]] attacked the [[Golan Heights]], both striking [[Israel]] on the Jewish holy day. [[Seymour Hersh]] wrote that the first days were "a stunning rout" for Israel, with 500 tanks and 49 aircraft (14 of them F-4 Phantoms) lost in the first three days, that Egyptian forces equipped with missiles and electronic defenses "blasted through the Bar-Lev defense line" along the canal, and that Syrian forces rolled through the Israeli defenses on the Golan and "moved to the edge of Galilee."[^1] The [[Agranat Commission]] recorded that the Egyptians crossed the canal despite the line of Israeli outposts, and that the Syrians attacked with 1,400 tanks against 177 Israeli tanks and advanced almost to the edge of the heights overlooking the [[Sea of Galilee]].[^2]
 
+### Israeli nuclear arsenal at the outbreak
+
+Hersh writes, citing Israeli officials, that [[Dimona]] was ordered into full-scale production early in 1968, turning out four or five warheads a year, and that there were more than twenty-five bombs in the arsenal by the Yom Kippur War.[^3] A Control Group paper of June 1967 had stated that the reactor at Dimona was capable of producing enough plutonium for about one weapon per year and that before the 1967 crisis the Israelis had "probably not made a decision to develop nuclear weapons, but probably had decided to keep that option open."[^4]
+
 ### The warning
 
-On October 5, 1973, [[Zvi Zamir]], the head of the [[Mossad]], sent a five-page Hebrew cable to the military secretary of Prime Minister [[Golda Meir]]. The Israel State Archives released it on September 17, 2018. Its first line read, "The Egyptian army and the Syrian army are poised to launch an attack on Israel on Saturday 6.10.73 at dusk." The cable gave the source's assessment as a "99 percent chance" that the attack would be launched on October 6, and suggested that "it may be possible to prevent the outbreak of war by publishing information about it on the radio and in newspapers."[^3] The source was [[Ashraf Marwan]], a son-in-law of [[Gamal Abdel Nasser]] and an aide to [[Anwar Sadat]].[^3][^2]
+On October 5, 1973, [[Zvi Zamir]], the head of the [[Mossad]], sent a five-page Hebrew cable to the military secretary of Prime Minister [[Golda Meir]]. The Israel State Archives released it on September 17, 2018. Its first line read, "The Egyptian army and the Syrian army are poised to launch an attack on Israel on Saturday 6.10.73 at dusk." The cable gave the source's assessment as a "99 percent chance" that the attack would be launched on October 6, and suggested that "it may be possible to prevent the outbreak of war by publishing information about it on the radio and in newspapers."[^5] The source was [[Ashraf Marwan]], a son-in-law of [[Gamal Abdel Nasser]] and an aide to [[Anwar Sadat]].[^2][^5]
 
-A telegram from London reached the Mossad on the night of October 4 and 5, 1973. [[Alfred Eini]], an aide to Zamir, testified to the Agranat Commission that he understood it "to be a warning that there would be a war," and that he telephoned Zamir that night.[^4] At the meeting of the Prime Minister's advisers that opened at 8:05 a.m. on October 6, the Chief of Staff, [[David Elazar]], said that he had read the telegram sent by Marwan to Zamir and that it was "an authentic message, though it is a very short notice for us." Defense Minister [[Moshe Dayan]] opposed a preemptive strike and proposed a smaller call-up of reserves than the 200,000 that Elazar asked for; Golda Meir decided for the larger mobilization.[^2]
+A telegram from London reached the Mossad on the night of October 4 and 5, 1973. [[Alfred Eini]], an aide to Zamir, testified to the Agranat Commission that he understood it "to be a warning that there would be a war," and that he telephoned Zamir that night.[^6] At the meeting of the Prime Minister's advisers that opened at 8:05 a.m. on October 6, the Chief of Staff, [[David Elazar]], said that he had read the telegram sent by Marwan to Zamir and that it was "an authentic message, though it is a very short notice for us." Defense Minister [[Moshe Dayan]] opposed a preemptive strike and proposed a smaller call-up of reserves than the 200,000 that Elazar asked for; Golda Meir decided for the larger mobilization.[^2]
 
 The Agranat Commission, which the Israeli government established on November 21, 1973, held 156 sessions and heard 90 witnesses. Its interim report, presented on April 1, 1974, dealt mainly with the circumstances that produced the surprise and examined the functionality of the prime minister, the defense minister and the heads of the military. A second report followed on July 10, 1974, and a final report of a more general character came after it.[^2]
 
-The [[Central Intelligence Agency]] conducted its own review. A preliminary post-mortem dated December 20, 1973, titled "The Performance of the Intelligence Community before the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973," concluded that "there was an intelligence failure in the weeks preceding the outbreak of war in the Middle East on 6 October."[^5] The same report stated that the information gathered by the collection elements "was sufficient to prompt such a warning" and was "not conclusive but was plentiful, ominous, and often accurate."[^5] Shortly before the war, the Director of Central Intelligence, [[William Colby]], had initiated a reorganization of the Agency's estimative process.[^5]
+The [[Central Intelligence Agency]] conducted its own review. A preliminary post-mortem dated December 20, 1973, titled "The Performance of the Intelligence Community before the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973," concluded that "there was an intelligence failure in the weeks preceding the outbreak of war in the Middle East on 6 October."[^7] The same report stated that the information gathered by the collection elements "was sufficient to prompt such a warning" and was "not conclusive but was plentiful, ominous, and often accurate."[^7] Shortly before the war, the Director of Central Intelligence, [[William Colby]], had initiated a reorganization of the Agency's estimative process.[^7]
 
 ### Opening days and the nuclear question
 
-In his 1991 book on the [[Samson Option]], Hersh wrote that Dayan had told the censored press at his daily briefing on Monday, October 8 that "the situation is desperate. Everything is lost. We must withdraw," and had said that "this is the end of the Third Temple."[^1] Hersh wrote that Dayan's pessimism led to an all-night meeting that day in Golda Meir's office in [[Tel Aviv]], attended by Dayan, Meir, Elazar, deputy prime minister [[Yigal Allon]], Meir's military aide [[Yisrael Leor]] and the minister without portfolio [[Israel Galili]]. Hersh wrote that the leadership resolved to rally its collapsing forces, to arm and target its nuclear arsenal in case of total collapse, and to inform [[Washington, D.C.|Washington]] of the step and demand an emergency airlift.[^6] He wrote that the launchers at [[Hirbat Zachariah]] would be made operational, along with eight specially marked F-4 aircraft on twenty-four-hour alert at [[Tel Nof]], and that the initial target list included the Egyptian and Syrian military headquarters near [[Cairo]] and [[Damascus]].[^6] Hersh wrote that no weapons were targeted on the [[Soviet Union]] but that "there was little doubt that the Soviets would quickly learn what was going on," because Israeli intelligence was intercepting encoded signals from presumed Soviet operatives inside the country that morning.[^7] He added that Elazar's published diary recorded the night of October 8 only as "Crucial meeting," that a source said some senior officials of the nuclear establishment, though not [[Shalheveth Freier]], accused the senior officials of panicking, and that a separate preliminary briefing by technical experts from [[Dimona]], led by Freier, described the weapons and targets available for immediate assembly.[^7]
+In his 1991 book on the [[Samson Option]], Hersh wrote that Dayan had told the censored press at his daily briefing on Monday, October 8 that "the situation is desperate. Everything is lost. We must withdraw," and had said that "this is the end of the Third Temple."[^1] Hersh wrote that Dayan's pessimism led to an all-night meeting that day in Golda Meir's office in [[Tel Aviv]], attended by Dayan, Meir, Elazar, deputy prime minister [[Yigal Allon]], Meir's military aide [[Yisrael Leor]] and the minister without portfolio [[Israel Galili]]. Hersh wrote that the leadership resolved to rally its collapsing forces, to arm and target its nuclear arsenal in case of total collapse, and to inform [[Washington, D.C.|Washington]] of the step and demand an emergency airlift.[^8] He wrote that the launchers at [[Hirbat Zachariah]] would be made operational, along with eight specially marked F-4 aircraft on twenty-four-hour alert at [[Tel Nof]], and that the initial target list included the Egyptian and Syrian military headquarters near [[Cairo]] and [[Damascus]].[^8] Hersh wrote that no weapons were targeted on the [[Soviet Union]] but that "there was little doubt that the Soviets would quickly learn what was going on," because Israeli intelligence was intercepting encoded signals from presumed Soviet operatives inside the country that morning.[^9] He added that Elazar's published diary recorded the night of October 8 only as "Crucial meeting," that a source said some senior officials of the nuclear establishment, though not [[Shalheveth Freier]], accused the senior officials of panicking, and that a separate preliminary briefing by technical experts from Dimona, led by Freier, described the weapons and targets available for immediate assembly.[^9]
 
-Hersh quoted [[Mohammed Heikal]], the editor of [[Al-Ahram]], as saying that the Soviet Union told the Egyptian leadership early in the war that the "Israelis had three warheads assembled and ready," through a Soviet intelligence officer who passed the message to the Egyptian chief of staff, [[Mohammed Abdel Ghany el-Gamasy]].[^7] Hersh wrote, citing former Israeli government officials, that arming the weapons had a second purpose, to force the [[United States]] into an immediate resupply of the Israeli military, and that "there was widespread rage inside the Israeli cabinet at the Nixon White House," aimed especially at [[Henry A. Kissinger]], "over what was correctly perceived in Israel as an American strategy of delaying the resupply" so that the Arabs would win some territory and open the way to land-for-peace bargaining. He quoted Kissinger telling Defense Secretary [[James R. Schlesinger]] that his goal was to "let Israel come out ahead, but bleed."[^7]
+Hersh quoted [[Mohammed Heikal]], the editor of [[Al-Ahram]], as saying that the Soviet Union told the Egyptian leadership early in the war that the "Israelis had three warheads assembled and ready," through a Soviet intelligence officer who passed the message to the Egyptian chief of staff, [[Mohammed Abdel Ghany el-Gamasy]].[^9] Hersh wrote, citing former Israeli government officials, that arming the weapons had a second purpose, to force the [[United States]] into an immediate resupply of the Israeli military, and that "there was widespread rage inside the Israeli cabinet at the Nixon White House," aimed especially at [[Henry A. Kissinger]], "over what was correctly perceived in Israel as an American strategy of delaying the resupply" so that the Arabs would win some territory and open the way to land-for-peace bargaining. He quoted Kissinger telling Defense Secretary [[James R. Schlesinger]] that his goal was to "let Israel come out ahead, but bleed."[^9]
 
-Hersh described a series of urgent telephone calls from the Israeli ambassador to Washington, [[Simcha Dinitz]], beginning at 1:45 a.m. on Tuesday, October 9, and a meeting at 8:20 a.m. in the White House Map Room, at which, in Kissinger's memoir, Dinitz asked to speak with him alone and said that Meir "was prepared to come to the United States personally for an hour to plead with President Nixon for urgent arms aid." Kissinger wrote that he rejected the proposal "out of hand" and that it "could reflect only either hysteria or blackmail," and that by the evening of October 9 Israel "had been assured that its war losses would be made up." Hersh wrote that "a more complete account of the Dinitz message would undoubtedly show that it was closer to blackmail." He wrote that, according to a former Israeli intelligence official, the Israeli signals intelligence unit [[Unit 8200]] intercepted on the morning of October 9 a Soviet warning to Washington about the Israeli nuclear arming.[^8]
+Hersh described a series of urgent telephone calls from the Israeli ambassador to Washington, [[Simcha Dinitz]], beginning at 1:45 a.m. on Tuesday, October 9, and a meeting at 8:20 a.m. in the White House Map Room, at which, in Kissinger's memoir, Dinitz asked to speak with him alone and said that Meir "was prepared to come to the United States personally for an hour to plead with President Nixon for urgent arms aid." Kissinger wrote that he rejected the proposal "out of hand" and that it "could reflect only either hysteria or blackmail," and that by the evening of October 9 Israel "had been assured that its war losses would be made up." Hersh wrote that "a more complete account of the Dinitz message would undoubtedly show that it was closer to blackmail." He wrote that, according to a former Israeli intelligence official, the Israeli signals intelligence unit [[Unit 8200]] intercepted on the morning of October 9 a Soviet warning to Washington about the Israeli nuclear arming.[^10]
 
-Hersh cited the recollection of [[Hermann F. Eilts]], the American ambassador to Egypt, that Kissinger spoke to him in November 1973 about Israeli panic on the fourth day of the war with "never a word about nuclear arming," and that in late 1976 Kissinger "threw in that there was concern that the Israelis might go nuclear." Schlesinger told Hersh that "Kissinger just turned around totally" on resupply and that "from where we sat, there was an assumption that Israel had a few nukes"; Colby told him, "We were afraid Israel might go for broke." Hersh wrote that Heikal reported that Anwar Sadat had relayed a remark by an "American," whom Hersh took to be Kissinger, that the airlift was decided to avoid a nuclear escalation, and that "sometime in this period" the American intelligence community got its first look, via the KH-11, at the completed missile launchers at Hirbat Zachariah.[^9]
+Hersh cited the recollection of [[Hermann F. Eilts]], the American ambassador to Egypt, that Kissinger spoke to him in November 1973 about Israeli panic on the fourth day of the war with "never a word about nuclear arming," and that in late 1976 Kissinger "threw in that there was concern that the Israelis might go nuclear." Schlesinger told Hersh that "Kissinger just turned around totally" on resupply and that "from where we sat, there was an assumption that Israel had a few nukes"; Colby told him, "We were afraid Israel might go for broke." Hersh wrote that Heikal reported that Anwar Sadat had relayed a remark by an "American," whom Hersh took to be Kissinger, that the airlift was decided to avoid a nuclear escalation, and that "sometime in this period" the American intelligence community got its first look, via the KH-11, at the completed missile launchers at Hirbat Zachariah.[^11]
 
 The Israel State Archives released protocols of Meir's consultations with her advisers in 2010. In the protocol of the session of October 9, 1973 at 7:30 a.m., Golda Meir raises a "crazy thought" of flying to Washington in secrecy for 24 hours to put the severity of the situation to Nixon directly, and asks that Dinitz bring the idea to Kissinger; Dayan answers, "It is. But it needs to be done." In the same session Elazar asks for permission to target inside Damascus.[^2]
 
-A 2013 [[CNA]] study by [[Elbridge Colby]], [[Avner Cohen]], William McCants, Bradley Morris and William Rosenau. It concluded that Israel "likely did take some steps associated with the readying of its nuclear weapons and/or nuclear weapons delivery forces" in the early stages of the war, that these steps were "defensive or precautionary in nature," and that the United States very likely observed the activity.[^10] The study judged that Dayan likely proposed a "demonstration" use of nuclear forces on or about October 7, that Meir and the other participants rebuffed the proposal, and that no action followed from it.[^10] The study assessed Hersh's account of a coordinated "blackmail" attempt as "without foundation" and found that the account has "evident inaccuracies."[^10] It located the "blackmail" that Kissinger described in his memoirs in a proposal by Dinitz that Meir visit Washington during the war.[^10]
+A 2013 [[CNA]] study by [[Elbridge Colby]], [[Avner Cohen]], William McCants, Bradley Morris and William Rosenau. It concluded that Israel "likely did take some steps associated with the readying of its nuclear weapons and/or nuclear weapons delivery forces" in the early stages of the war, that these steps were "defensive or precautionary in nature," and that the United States very likely observed the activity.[^12] The study judged that Dayan likely proposed a "demonstration" use of nuclear forces on or about October 7, that Meir and the other participants rebuffed the proposal, and that no action followed from it.[^12] The study assessed Hersh's account of a coordinated "blackmail" attempt as "without foundation" and found that the account has "evident inaccuracies."[^12] It located the "blackmail" that Kissinger described in his memoirs in a proposal by Dinitz that Meir visit Washington during the war.[^12]
 
-A 2002 [[United Press International]] report by [[Richard Sale]] repeated several of Hersh's claims and attributed them to unidentified "knowledgeable" American government sources. It added that the alert lasted three full days and that the Jericho missiles were deployed inside caves at air bases with "huge blast doors."[^11] [[Alistair Horne]] wrote in his Kissinger biography that Kissinger "always hotly denied, and several times to the author, that Israel had ever mentioned this possibility [the use, in extremis, of Israel's nuclear weapon]" to the United States.[^12]
+A 2002 [[United Press International]] report by [[Richard Sale]] repeated several of Hersh's claims and attributed them to unidentified "knowledgeable" American government sources. It added that the alert lasted three full days and that the Jericho missiles were deployed inside caves at air bases with "huge blast doors."[^13] [[Alistair Horne]] wrote in his Kissinger biography that Kissinger "always hotly denied, and several times to the author, that Israel had ever mentioned this possibility [the use, in extremis, of Israel's nuclear weapon]" to the United States.[^14]
 
-A [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] paper on Israeli security, "Long-Range Outlook for Israeli Security," was attached to an October 24 memorandum from Vice Admiral V.P. de Poix, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, to [[Thomas H. Moorer]]. One option it listed was "a public declaration of Israeli determination to employ nuclear weapons." The paper described an Israeli nuclear threat against "such targets as Arab forces, cities, ports, holy places, and the Aswan High Dam," and stated that the Arabs "might be willing to attack, despite the deterrent threat."[^13]
+A [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] paper on Israeli security, "Long-Range Outlook for Israeli Security," was attached to an October 24 memorandum from Vice Admiral V.P. de Poix, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, to [[Thomas H. Moorer]]. One option it listed was "a public declaration of Israeli determination to employ nuclear weapons." The paper described an Israeli nuclear threat against "such targets as Arab forces, cities, ports, holy places, and the Aswan High Dam," and stated that the Arabs "might be willing to attack, despite the deterrent threat."[^15]
 
 ### The airlift
 
-On October 12, 1973, President [[Richard Nixon]] authorized the emergency airlift known as [[Operation Nickel Grass]]. [[Military Airlift Command]] aircraft were ready to depart less than nine hours after the decision. The fleet consisted of 268 C-141s and 77 C-5As, and [[Paul K. Carlton]] knew that it could sustain a flow of three C-141s every two hours and four C-5s every four hours.[^15] With a single exception, the United States' allies denied landing and overflight rights, and [[Portugal]] allowed flights through [[Lajes Field]].[^15]
+On October 12, 1973, President [[Richard Nixon]] authorized the emergency airlift known as [[Operation Nickel Grass]]. [[Military Airlift Command]] aircraft were ready to depart less than nine hours after the decision. The fleet consisted of 268 C-141s and 77 C-5As, and [[Paul K. Carlton]] knew that it could sustain a flow of three C-141s every two hours and four C-5s every four hours.[^16] With a single exception, the United States' allies denied landing and overflight rights, and [[Portugal]] allowed flights through [[Lajes Field]].[^16]
 
-Military Airlift Command aircraft carried 22,325 tons over 32 days, between October 14 and November 14, 1973,, and the airlift slowed after the third cease-fire resolution was implemented on October 24.[^16] The Israeli national airline, [[El Al]], flew eight of its own airliners carrying 5,500 tons.[^15] The Washington Special Actions Group minutes of October 19 record that the airlift was being stepped up to "5 C5As and 18 C141s a day."[^17]
+Military Airlift Command aircraft carried 22,325 tons over 32 days, between October 14 and November 14, 1973,, and the airlift slowed after the third cease-fire resolution was implemented on October 24.[^17] The Israeli national airline, [[El Al]], flew eight of its own airliners carrying 5,500 tons.[^16] The Washington Special Actions Group minutes of October 19 record that the airlift was being stepped up to "5 C5As and 18 C141s a day."[^18]
 
 ### The oil embargo
 
-On October 17, 1973, the eleven members of the [[Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries]] announced an immediate cut of 5 percent in oil production, with monthly cuts of 5 percent to follow until Israel withdrew to the 1967 frontiers. On the same day the six Persian Gulf members of [[OPEC]] raised the price of oil by 70 percent, from $3.01 to $5.12 a barrel. The Kuwaiti minister of oil and finance told the American ambassador that the cumulative effect of the cuts was intended to produce a "complete embargo on oil to the United States."[^18]
+On October 17, 1973, the eleven members of the [[Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries]] announced an immediate cut of 5 percent in oil production, with monthly cuts of 5 percent to follow until Israel withdrew to the 1967 frontiers. On the same day the six Persian Gulf members of [[OPEC]] raised the price of oil by 70 percent, from $3.01 to $5.12 a barrel. The Kuwaiti minister of oil and finance told the American ambassador that the cumulative effect of the cuts was intended to produce a "complete embargo on oil to the United States."[^19]
 
-A CIA paper of October 19 judged that the effect on the United States "would be relatively small" and that the brunt of the cutback would fall on [[Europe]] and [[Japan]].[^18] On October 23, Prince [[Fahd]] of [[Saudi Arabia]] informed Kissinger that the kingdom would maintain a total embargo on oil exports to the United States until Israel withdrew to its pre-June 1967 borders. At the Secretary of State's staff meeting that day, Kissinger said, "We will break it."[^18] Kissinger later wrote that "the true impact of the embargo was psychological."[^18]
+A CIA paper of October 19 judged that the effect on the United States "would be relatively small" and that the brunt of the cutback would fall on [[Europe]] and [[Japan]].[^19] On October 23, Prince [[Fahd]] of [[Saudi Arabia]] informed Kissinger that the kingdom would maintain a total embargo on oil exports to the United States until Israel withdrew to its pre-June 1967 borders. At the Secretary of State's staff meeting that day, Kissinger said, "We will break it."[^19] Kissinger later wrote that "the true impact of the embargo was psychological."[^19]
 
-The financial side of the price rise appears in the State Department and CIA papers of the period. A telegram from the embassy at [[Jeddah]] of September 4, 1973, reported that Saudi petrodollars "continue to grow" and that more than 50 percent of current Saudi income was being re-positioned into European or other currencies.[^19] A CIA Office of Economic Research paper of March 5, 1974, stated that OPEC members were "considering many and implementing some schemes to recycle a portion of their burgeoning revenues to the Third World."[^20] A March 29, 1974 paper by an ad hoc group of the [[International Energy Review Group]] addressed "the LDC payments problems related to higher oil prices."[^21]
+The financial side of the price rise appears in the State Department and CIA papers of the period. A telegram from the embassy at [[Jeddah]] of September 4, 1973, reported that Saudi petrodollars "continue to grow" and that more than 50 percent of current Saudi income was being re-positioned into European or other currencies.[^20] A CIA Office of Economic Research paper of March 5, 1974, stated that OPEC members were "considering many and implementing some schemes to recycle a portion of their burgeoning revenues to the Third World."[^21] A March 29, 1974 paper by an ad hoc group of the [[International Energy Review Group]] addressed "the LDC payments problems related to higher oil prices."[^22]
 
-Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy" between Israel and the Arab states followed the fighting.[^22] On October 16, at a Washington Special Actions Group meeting, Kissinger said, "I expect that plane is carrying Kosygin to Cairo," a reference to [[Alexei N. Kosygin]], the Soviet premier.[^23]
+Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy" between Israel and the Arab states followed the fighting.[^23] On October 16, at a Washington Special Actions Group meeting, Kissinger said, "I expect that plane is carrying Kosygin to Cairo," a reference to [[Alexei N. Kosygin]], the Soviet premier.[^24]
 
 ### The October 24 alert
 
-On October 24, 1973, [[Leonid Brezhnev]] sent Nixon a letter threatening unilateral Soviet action in the Middle East. The letter prompted the American DEFCON III alert.[^14] Kissinger described it in his memoirs as "one of the most serious challenges to an American President by a Soviet leader."[^24]
+On October 24, 1973, [[Leonid Brezhnev]] sent Nixon a letter threatening unilateral Soviet action in the Middle East. The letter prompted the American DEFCON III alert.[^25] Kissinger described it in his memoirs as "one of the most serious challenges to an American President by a Soviet leader."[^26]
 
-The Washington Special Actions Group principals met in the night of October 24 and 25 and decided to set DEFCON III. Admiral Moorer's record of the meeting lists the actions taken: the carrier [[USS John F. Kennedy]] was moved from west of [[Gibraltar]] into the Mediterranean, the Roosevelt was moved from the vicinity of [[Sicily]], the [[82nd Airborne Division]] was alerted, and 75 B-52s were recalled from [[Guam]].[^25] Kissinger recalled that the group decided DEFCON III would not be noted quickly enough by Soviet decisionmakers, so at 12:20 a.m. the 82nd Airborne was alerted for possible movement and at 12:25 a.m. the carriers were ordered to the Mediterranean.[^26] The alert was leaked at about 3 a.m. on October 25.[^25] At 1:03 a.m. Kissinger told the British ambassador, [[Cromer]], "Well, don't say the Americans have gone crazy."[^25]
+The Washington Special Actions Group principals met in the night of October 24 and 25 and decided to set DEFCON III. Admiral Moorer's record of the meeting lists the actions taken: the carrier [[USS John F. Kennedy]] was moved from west of [[Gibraltar]] into the Mediterranean, the Roosevelt was moved from the vicinity of [[Sicily]], the [[82nd Airborne Division]] was alerted, and 75 B-52s were recalled from [[Guam]].[^27] Kissinger recalled that the group decided DEFCON III would not be noted quickly enough by Soviet decisionmakers, so at 12:20 a.m. the 82nd Airborne was alerted for possible movement and at 12:25 a.m. the carriers were ordered to the Mediterranean.[^28] The alert was leaked at about 3 a.m. on October 25.[^27] At 1:03 a.m. Kissinger told the British ambassador, [[Cromer]], "Well, don't say the Americans have gone crazy."[^27]
 
-The participants in the rump session were Kissinger, Schlesinger, Moorer, [[Alexander Haig]], [[Brent Scowcroft]] and Colby. Nixon remained upstairs in the White House, and Kissinger conferred with him by telephone before the decision.[^5] The CIA's 2013 history of the episode states that "many questioned, then and later, whether the decision for DEFCON III was based on legitimate alarms or whether it was an overreaction," and that "there has also been speculation that the decision may have been politically motivated" by the needs of a [[Watergate]]-beleaguered White House.[^5] It records the view of [[Ray Cline]] that Kissinger "knew what he wanted to do all along" and that the meeting was "a kind of shell game, a superficial exercise."[^5] Cline's October 26 memorandum to Kissinger, quoted in a footnote to the minutes, stated that "the technical intelligence evidence available in INR did not support such a Soviet intention."[^25]
+The participants in the rump session were Kissinger, Schlesinger, Moorer, [[Alexander Haig]], [[Brent Scowcroft]] and Colby. Nixon remained upstairs in the White House, and Kissinger conferred with him by telephone before the decision.[^7] The CIA's 2013 history of the episode states that "many questioned, then and later, whether the decision for DEFCON III was based on legitimate alarms or whether it was an overreaction," and that "there has also been speculation that the decision may have been politically motivated" by the needs of a [[Watergate]]-beleaguered White House.[^7] It records the view of [[Ray Cline]] that Kissinger "knew what he wanted to do all along" and that the meeting was "a kind of shell game, a superficial exercise."[^7] Cline's October 26 memorandum to Kissinger, quoted in a footnote to the minutes, stated that "the technical intelligence evidence available in INR did not support such a Soviet intention."[^27]
 
-A CIA document dated October 30, 1973, titled "Soviet Nuclear Weapons in Egypt?," reported Scud-associated equipment at two locations in Egypt and stated that the confirmation "adds seriousness to the evidence that Moscow introduced nuclear weapons into the Middle East."[^5] A December 20, 1973 CIA assessment, "The Impact of the 24 October US Alert on the Soviet Leadership," judged that Brezhnev and his colleagues "appear to have reacted with greater concern and annoyance to President Nixon's statements of 26 October than they did to the alert itself."[^5]
+A CIA document dated October 30, 1973, titled "Soviet Nuclear Weapons in Egypt?," reported Scud-associated equipment at two locations in Egypt and stated that the confirmation "adds seriousness to the evidence that Moscow introduced nuclear weapons into the Middle East."[^7] A December 20, 1973 CIA assessment, "The Impact of the 24 October US Alert on the Soviet Leadership," judged that Brezhnev and his colleagues "appear to have reacted with greater concern and annoyance to President Nixon's statements of 26 October than they did to the alert itself."[^7]
 
 ### Aftermath
 
-Marwan died in June 2007 after falling from the balcony of his apartment in [[London]]. A coroner's inquest was held to determine whether he died by suicide, accident or foul play.[^27] Coroner [[William Dolman]] handed down an open verdict on July 14, 2010, and said there was no evidence to support a verdict of either suicide or unlawful killing.[^27] Dolman described claims about the death as belonging to "the murky and secretive world of espionage."[^27] Marwan's widow, [[Mona Nasser]], told the inquest that her husband had never spoken of suicide but had expressed fears that he might be killed.[^27] Historians and intelligence agents have accused Marwan of being an Israeli spy who passed on vital information before the 1973 war, or of being a double agent loyal to Egypt.[^27]
+Marwan died in June 2007 after falling from the balcony of his apartment in [[London]]. A coroner's inquest was held to determine whether he died by suicide, accident or foul play.[^29] Coroner [[William Dolman]] handed down an open verdict on July 14, 2010, and said there was no evidence to support a verdict of either suicide or unlawful killing.[^29] Dolman described claims about the death as belonging to "the murky and secretive world of espionage."[^29] Marwan's widow, [[Mona Nasser]], told the inquest that her husband had never spoken of suicide but had expressed fears that he might be killed.[^29] Historians and intelligence agents have accused Marwan of being an Israeli spy who passed on vital information before the 1973 war, or of being a double agent loyal to Egypt.[^29]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
 [^1]: Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1991), pages 222 to 223 (military losses, Bar-Lev line, the Golan, "the end of the Third Temple," Dayan's October 8 briefing). Sole source for the figures so cited.
 [^2]: Agranat Commission, "1973 Agranat Commission: Yom Kippur War," translated by Roni Eshel (Center for Israel Education, December 2010), https://israeled.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/1973-Agranat-Comm-Report-1973-War.pdf. Summary of the Egyptian and Syrian fronts (1,400 Syrian tanks against 177 Israeli tanks); session and witness counts and the interim report of April 1, 1974; the protocol of the meeting of October 6, 1973 at 8:05 a.m. in which the Chief of Staff speaks of the Marwan telegram; the protocol of October 9, 1973 (7:30 a.m.) released by the Israel State Archives.
-[^3]: Judah Ari Gross, "'Odds of war lower than low': Papers highlight intel failures in Yom Kippur War," The Times of Israel, September 17, 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/odds-of-war-lower-than-low-papers-highlight-intel-failures-in-yom-kippur-war/, on the cable of Zvi Zamir dated October 5, 1973 released by the Israel State Archives.
-[^4]: Alfred Eini testimony to the Agranat Commission, as reported by ynetnews (Reuters), September 25, 2012, https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4285092,00.html
-[^5]: Central Intelligence Agency, Historical Collections Division, "President Nixon and the Role of Intelligence in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War" (2013), https://cia.gov/static/President-Nixon-and-the-Role-of-Intelligence-in-the-1973-Arab-Israeli-War.pdf. The December 20, 1973 post-mortem, the Cline and Colby passages, the CIA document of October 30, 1973 and the December 20, 1973 assessment appear in the booklet's text and collection list.
-[^6]: Hersh, The Samson Option, pages 224 to 226 (chapter 17, "Nuclear Blackmail": the meeting of October 8, attendees, the three decisions, Hirbat Zachariah, Tel Nof, target list). Sole source for the passages so cited.
-[^7]: Hersh, The Samson Option, pages 226 to 228 (Soviet interception, Elazar's diary, the objections, the Freier briefing, the Heikal account of the Soviet warning to Cairo, the Israeli cabinet's anger, Kissinger's "let Israel come out ahead, but bleed"). Sole source for the passages so cited.
-[^8]: Hersh, The Samson Option, pages 228 to 229 (the Dinitz calls and Map Room meeting, quoting Kissinger, Years of Upheaval; the account of a former Israeli intelligence official on Detachment 8200 and the October 9 Soviet warning). Sole source for the intelligence official's account.
-[^9]: Hersh, The Samson Option, pages 229 to 231 (Eilts, Schlesinger and Colby recollections; Heikal on Sadat and Kissinger; the KH-11 imagery of Hirbat Zachariah). Sole source for the passages so cited.
-[^10]: Elbridge Colby, Avner Cohen, William McCants, Bradley Morris and William Rosenau, "The Israeli 'Nuclear Alert' of 1973: Deterrence and Signaling in Crisis," CNA, DRM-2013-U-004480-Final (April 2013), https://www.cna.org/reports/2013/DRM-2013-U-004480-Final.pdf
-[^11]: Richard Sale, "Yom Kippur: Israel's 1973 Nuclear Alert," UPI, September 16, 2002, as cited in Colby et al., note 10. Sole source for the passages so cited.
-[^12]: Alistair Horne, biography of Henry Kissinger, as quoted in Colby et al., note 10. Sole source for the passage so cited.
-[^13]: Defense Intelligence Agency, "Long-Range Outlook for Israeli Security," enclosure to the October 24, 1973 memorandum from Vice Admiral V.P. de Poix to Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, Document 265, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25
-[^14]: National Security Archive, "The October War and U.S. Policy," Electronic Briefing Book No. 98 (2003), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/index.htm, including document 71, Brezhnev's letter of October 24, 1973.
-[^15]: "Nickel Grass," Air & Space Forces Magazine, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/1298nickel/
-[^16]: "Yom Kippur War: Nickel Grass," Jewish Virtual Library, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/nickelgrass.html
-[^17]: Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, October 19, 1973, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXV, Document 208, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25
-[^18]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXV, Document 200, editorial note, pages 586 to 587, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25
-[^19]: Embassy in Saudi Arabia, telegram 3796 to the Department of State, Jidda, September 4, 1973, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXXVI, Energy Crisis, 1969-1974, Document 200, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v36
-[^20]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Economic Research paper, March 5, 1974, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXXVI, Document 333, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v36
-[^21]: Ad Hoc Group, International Energy Review Group Working Group, "The LDC Payments Problems Related to Higher Oil Prices," March 29, 1974, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXXVI, Document 346, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v36
-[^22]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXV, Preface, identifying Volume XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974-1976, for the "shuttle diplomacy," https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25
-[^23]: Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, October 16, 1973, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXV, Document 191, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25
-[^24]: Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (1982), pages 583 to 584, as quoted in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXV, Document 268, note 3, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25
-[^25]: Memorandum for the Record, CJCS Memo M-88-73, NSC/JCS meeting of October 24 and 25, 1973, from the records of Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXV, Document 269, including notes 11 and 13, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25
-[^26]: Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (1982), pages 588 to 589, as quoted in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXV, Document 269, note 10, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25
-[^27]: "Inquest: Egyptian spy suspect's death unexplained," report of the British coroner's ruling of July 14, 2010, reprinted at The Herald (heraldnet.com), https://www.heraldnet.com/?p=177620, and ynetnews, https://www.ynetnews.com/article/3919938
+[^3]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 13, p. 179. Sole source for the passages so cited.
+[^4]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 305, Paper Submitted by the Control Group, undated (dated June 17, 1967 by the editors), with annex. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d305
+[^5]: Judah Ari Gross, "'Odds of war lower than low': Papers highlight intel failures in Yom Kippur War," The Times of Israel, September 17, 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/odds-of-war-lower-than-low-papers-highlight-intel-failures-in-yom-kippur-war/, on the cable of Zvi Zamir dated October 5, 1973 released by the Israel State Archives.
+[^6]: Alfred Eini testimony to the Agranat Commission, as reported by ynetnews (Reuters), September 25, 2012, https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4285092,00.html
+[^7]: Central Intelligence Agency, Historical Collections Division, "President Nixon and the Role of Intelligence in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War" (2013), https://cia.gov/static/President-Nixon-and-the-Role-of-Intelligence-in-the-1973-Arab-Israeli-War.pdf. The December 20, 1973 post-mortem, the Cline and Colby passages, the CIA document of October 30, 1973 and the December 20, 1973 assessment appear in the booklet's text and collection list.
+[^8]: Hersh, The Samson Option, pages 224 to 226 (chapter 17, "Nuclear Blackmail": the meeting of October 8, attendees, the three decisions, Hirbat Zachariah, Tel Nof, target list). Sole source for the passages so cited.
+[^9]: Hersh, The Samson Option, pages 226 to 228 (Soviet interception, Elazar's diary, the objections, the Freier briefing, the Heikal account of the Soviet warning to Cairo, the Israeli cabinet's anger, Kissinger's "let Israel come out ahead, but bleed"). Sole source for the passages so cited.
+[^10]: Hersh, The Samson Option, pages 228 to 229 (the Dinitz calls and Map Room meeting, quoting Kissinger, Years of Upheaval; the account of a former Israeli intelligence official on Detachment 8200 and the October 9 Soviet warning). Sole source for the intelligence official's account.
+[^11]: Hersh, The Samson Option, pages 229 to 231 (Eilts, Schlesinger and Colby recollections; Heikal on Sadat and Kissinger; the KH-11 imagery of Hirbat Zachariah). Sole source for the passages so cited.
+[^12]: Elbridge Colby, Avner Cohen, William McCants, Bradley Morris and William Rosenau, "The Israeli 'Nuclear Alert' of 1973: Deterrence and Signaling in Crisis," CNA, DRM-2013-U-004480-Final (April 2013), https://www.cna.org/reports/2013/DRM-2013-U-004480-Final.pdf
+[^13]: Richard Sale, "Yom Kippur: Israel's 1973 Nuclear Alert," UPI, September 16, 2002, as cited in Colby et al., note 10. Sole source for the passages so cited.
+[^14]: Alistair Horne, biography of Henry Kissinger, as quoted in Colby et al., note 10. Sole source for the passage so cited.
+[^15]: Defense Intelligence Agency, "Long-Range Outlook for Israeli Security," enclosure to the October 24, 1973 memorandum from Vice Admiral V.P. de Poix to Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, Document 265, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25
+[^16]: "Nickel Grass," Air & Space Forces Magazine, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/1298nickel/
+[^17]: "Yom Kippur War: Nickel Grass," Jewish Virtual Library, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/nickelgrass.html
+[^18]: Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, October 19, 1973, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXV, Document 208, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25
+[^19]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXV, Document 200, editorial note, pages 586 to 587, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25
+[^20]: Embassy in Saudi Arabia, telegram 3796 to the Department of State, Jidda, September 4, 1973, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXXVI, Energy Crisis, 1969-1974, Document 200, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v36
+[^21]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Economic Research paper, March 5, 1974, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXXVI, Document 333, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v36
+[^22]: Ad Hoc Group, International Energy Review Group Working Group, "The LDC Payments Problems Related to Higher Oil Prices," March 29, 1974, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXXVI, Document 346, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v36
+[^23]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXV, Preface, identifying Volume XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974-1976, for the "shuttle diplomacy," https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25
+[^24]: Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, October 16, 1973, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXV, Document 191, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25
+[^25]: National Security Archive, "The October War and U.S. Policy," Electronic Briefing Book No. 98 (2003), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/index.htm, including document 71, Brezhnev's letter of October 24, 1973.
+[^26]: Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (1982), pages 583 to 584, as quoted in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXV, Document 268, note 3, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25
+[^27]: Memorandum for the Record, CJCS Memo M-88-73, NSC/JCS meeting of October 24 and 25, 1973, from the records of Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXV, Document 269, including notes 11 and 13, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25
+[^28]: Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (1982), pages 588 to 589, as quoted in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXV, Document 269, note 10, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25
+[^29]: "Inquest: Egyptian spy suspect's death unexplained," report of the British coroner's ruling of July 14, 2010, reprinted at The Herald (heraldnet.com), https://www.heraldnet.com/?p=177620, and ynetnews, https://www.ynetnews.com/article/3919938

40 - EVENTS/MODERN_INCIDENTS/Waco Siege.md

@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ The FBI's tear gas planning is dated in the Special Counsel's report from early
 
 ### Consultation with Igor Smirnov
 
-In a series of closed meetings that began on March 17, 1993 in suburban northern Virginia, the Russian physician [[Igor Smirnov]] of the [[Moscow Medical Academy]] briefed FBI officials on a computerized acoustic "psycho-correction" device. *[[Defense Electronics]]*, citing an unnamed participant and a memorandum of the Richmond firm [[Psychotechnologies Corp.]], reported in July 1993 that the FBI, "which was looking for a viable option to deal with Koresh," asked after several meetings for a proposal on requirements and procedures for using the device at Waco; that officials "wanted the Russians to promise zero risk," which the Russians would not do; and that Smirnov had brought only "entry-level equipment." Representatives of the [[Central Intelligence Agency]], the [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] and the [[Advanced Research Projects Agency]] were also said to be present.[^3]
+In a series of closed meetings that began on March 17, 1993 in suburban northern Virginia, the Russian physician [[Igor Smirnov]] of the [[Moscow Medical Academy]] briefed FBI officials on a computerized acoustic "psycho-correction" device. *[[Defense Electronics]]*, citing an unnamed participant and a memorandum of the Richmond firm [[Psychotechnologies Corp.]], reported in July 1993 that the FBI, "which was looking for a viable option to deal with Koresh," asked after several meetings for a proposal on requirements and procedures for using the device at Waco; that officials "wanted the Russians to promise zero risk," which the Russians would not do; and that Smirnov had brought only "entry-level equipment." Representatives of the [[Central Intelligence Agency]], the [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] and the [[DARPA|Advanced Research Projects Agency]] were also said to be present.[^3]
 
 *[[Newsweek]]* reported in August 1994 that "Experts from the FBI Counter-Terrorism Center secretly met in Arlington, Va." with Smirnov, whose plan was "piping subliminal messages from sect members' families through the phone lines during negotiations," and that "the FBI backed out of Smirnov's Waco strategy."[^4] Smirnov told the [[Moscow Times]] in July 1994 that the FBI had explored using his methods, and the paper reported that a *[[Village Voice]]* article had quoted an FBI official to the same effect.[^5] The writer [[Sharon Weinberger]] recorded [[Chris Morris]]'s account that the FBI was put off when Smirnov answered a question about failure by saying that Koresh's followers might slit each other's throats.[^6]