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@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ summary: "Alexander Acosta is the former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District
born: 1969-01-16
location: "Miami, Florida (born)"
created: 2026-06-20
updated: 2026-09-25
updated: 2026-10-12
relations:
- type: head_of
with: "[[United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida]]"
@ -100,29 +100,29 @@ The victims' broader effort to overturn the agreement ultimately failed at the a
The review originated in a December 3, 2018 letter from Senator [[Ben Sasse]], chairman of a Senate Judiciary oversight subcommittee, citing the [[Miami Herald]] series; OPR opened its investigation on February 6, 2019. It recorded that a victims' attorney had raised allegations of improper influence in December 2010 and that OPR had declined to open an inquiry then in deference to the pending litigation. The Justice Department's [[Office of Professional Responsibility|Office of Professional Responsibility]] released a report on November 12, 2020, examining the conduct of Acosta and his subordinates in the Epstein matter. The report concluded that Acosta exercised "poor judgment" in resolving the federal investigation through a state plea agreement, but it did not find professional misconduct, stating that his decision to decline federal prosecution was within the scope of his authority and that there was no evidence the decision was based on corruption or other impermissible considerations.[^2][^7]
OPR located the "poor judgment" specifically in Acosta's failure to ensure that the state would notify the federally identified victims of Epstein's plea hearing, leaving victims uninformed about the proceeding that resolved an investigation about which the office had communicated with them for months. The report described the non-prosecution agreement as "a flawed mechanism for satisfying the federal interest" that had prompted the investigation, and it documented extensive concessions made to Epstein's lawyers. OPR found that Acosta's "application of federalism principles was too expansive, his view of the federal interest in prosecuting Epstein was too narrow, and his understanding of the state system was too imperfect to justify the decision to use the NPA," and that the three other supervisory subjects "left the USAO, were transitioning to other jobs, or were absent at critical junctures." It also concluded that the government's handling "gave victims and the public the misimpression that the government had colluded with Epstein's counsel to keep the NPA secret from the victims."[^7] Before the report was final, the chief of the Public Corruption Unit of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the [[Southern District of New York]] reviewed the draft and on August 21, 2020 asked for two wording changes, which OPR accepted: "at least one victim known to be a minor" became "at least one victim believed to be a minor," described as "more accurately reflect[ing] our position in the bail arguments regarding Epstein," and a statement that investigators "were aware" Epstein used hidden cameras in his New York residence became that they "had learned" it.[^23]
OPR located the "poor judgment" specifically in Acosta's failure to ensure that the state would notify the federally identified victims of Epstein's plea hearing, leaving victims uninformed about the proceeding that resolved an investigation about which the office had communicated with them for months. The report described the non-prosecution agreement as "a flawed mechanism for satisfying the federal interest" that had prompted the investigation, and it documented extensive concessions made to Epstein's lawyers. OPR found that Acosta's "application of federalism principles was too expansive, his view of the federal interest in prosecuting Epstein was too narrow, and his understanding of the state system was too imperfect to justify the decision to use the NPA," and that the three other supervisory subjects "left the USAO, were transitioning to other jobs, or were absent at critical junctures." It also concluded that the government's handling "gave victims and the public the misimpression that the government had colluded with Epstein's counsel to keep the NPA secret from the victims."[^7] The Executive Summary states that Acosta "made the pivotal decision to resolve the federal investigation of Epstein" through a state-based plea, and that he "participated in its drafting and approved it, with knowledge of its terms." It states that as United States attorney he had "plenary authority" to resolve the case as he deemed appropriate, and that he did not commit professional misconduct. It found that he exercised poor judgment both in choosing the non-prosecution agreement as the mechanism and in failing to make certain that the state would notify victims identified in the federal investigation of the state plea hearing.[^23] The summary records the agreement signed on September 24, 2007, the defense's request for review by the Criminal Division and the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the June 23, 2008 determination that the deputy attorney general would not intervene, and the state plea of June 30, 2008.[^24] Before the report was final, the chief of the Public Corruption Unit of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the [[Southern District of New York]] reviewed the draft and on August 21, 2020 asked for two wording changes, which OPR accepted: "at least one victim known to be a minor" became "at least one victim believed to be a minor," described as "more accurately reflect[ing] our position in the bail arguments regarding Epstein," and a statement that investigators "were aware" Epstein used hidden cameras in his New York residence became that they "had learned" it.[^25]
The report also recorded internal dissent. The line prosecutor Ann Marie Villafana had objected to the access granted to Epstein's defense counsel and to meeting with them, and was overruled by supervisors; a footnote recorded her belief that an email from her supervisor [[Matthew Menchel|Matthew Menchel]] was meant to "put [her] in [her] place," while Menchel described her as having a history of resisting supervisory authority. OPR declined to refer Acosta or other prosecutors for disciplinary action on professional-responsibility grounds, a conclusion that victims' advocates characterized as a whitewash.[^24]
The report also recorded internal dissent. The line prosecutor Ann Marie Villafana had objected to the access granted to Epstein's defense counsel and to meeting with them, and was overruled by supervisors; a footnote recorded her belief that an email from her supervisor [[Matthew Menchel|Matthew Menchel]] was meant to "put [her] in [her] place," while Menchel described her as having a history of resisting supervisory authority. OPR declined to refer Acosta or other prosecutors for disciplinary action on professional-responsibility grounds, a conclusion that victims' advocates characterized as a whitewash.[^26]
One of those supervisors was Matthew Menchel, chief of the office's Criminal Division, who left in August 2007, weeks before the agreement was signed, for the law firm [[Kobre & Kim]]. According to reporting on the full OPR report, Menchel had offered the 2007 plea terms to an Epstein lawyer he had formerly dated. Epstein estate records released by the [[House Oversight Committee]] in October 2025 show appointments, telephone calls, and dinners between Menchel and Epstein in 2011, 2013, and 2017. Menchel has said he had no business relationship with Epstein "at any point, not before, during or after my tenure," and has denied skiing with him, but did not deny meeting him after leaving the office.[^25]
One of those supervisors was Matthew Menchel, chief of the office's Criminal Division, who left in August 2007, weeks before the agreement was signed, for the law firm [[Kobre & Kim]]. According to reporting on the full OPR report, Menchel had offered the 2007 plea terms to an Epstein lawyer he had formerly dated. Epstein estate records released by the [[House Oversight Committee]] in October 2025 show appointments, telephone calls, and dinners between Menchel and Epstein in 2011, 2013, and 2017. Menchel has said he had no business relationship with Epstein "at any point, not before, during or after my tenure," and has denied skiing with him, but did not deny meeting him after leaving the office.[^27]
### Secretary of Labor and Resignation
President [[Donald Trump|Donald Trump]] nominated Acosta as Secretary of Labor, and he was confirmed by the Senate on April 17, 2017 and sworn in that month, having previously chaired the National Labor Relations Board and served as dean of Florida International University's law school. The Florida agreement drew scrutiny during his 2017 confirmation but did not derail it; OPR recorded that at his March 2017 hearing he was "questioned only briefly about the Epstein case."[^1][^7]
After the November 2018 Miami Herald investigation "Perversion of Justice" by [[Julie K. Brown|Julie K. Brown]] revived attention to the agreement, and after Epstein's July 2019 federal arrest in New York on new sex-trafficking charges, Acosta held a July 10, 2019, press conference defending his handling of the case, arguing that the state alternative had at least secured Epstein's registration as a sex offender and some jail time, and saying that the Palm Beach State Attorney's Office "was ready to allow Epstein to walk free with no jail time, nothing." Krischer answered the same day that Acosta's "recollection of the matter is completely wrong" and that "Mr. Acosta should not be allowed to rewrite history." He resigned on July 12, 2019, two days later, saying he did not want the controversy to distract from the administration's work and that it would be "selfish" to remain.[^1][^26][^27]
After the November 2018 Miami Herald investigation "Perversion of Justice" by [[Julie K. Brown|Julie K. Brown]] revived attention to the agreement, and after Epstein's July 2019 federal arrest in New York on new sex-trafficking charges, Acosta held a July 10, 2019, press conference defending his handling of the case, arguing that the state alternative had at least secured Epstein's registration as a sex offender and some jail time, and saying that the Palm Beach State Attorney's Office "was ready to allow Epstein to walk free with no jail time, nothing." Krischer answered the same day that Acosta's "recollection of the matter is completely wrong" and that "Mr. Acosta should not be allowed to rewrite history." He resigned on July 12, 2019, two days later, saying he did not want the controversy to distract from the administration's work and that it would be "selfish" to remain.[^1][^28][^29]
On September 19, 2025 Acosta sat for a voluntary transcribed interview with the [[House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform|House Oversight Committee]] as part of its renewed inquiry into the federal handling of the Epstein and Maxwell cases; the committee released the transcript on October 17, 2025, together with Epstein estate records. Chairman [[James Comer|James Comer]] said Acosta had cooperated, and the committee separately sought records and testimony from other former officials. Acosta told the committee that prosecutors had avoided trial partly because some underage victims did not want to testify and a conviction was not assured, and he said he did not recall reading Villafaña's recommendation of a 60-count indictment. Lawmakers questioned him about the records of Menchel's later contacts with Epstein and about a photograph said to show the two skiing, which was not produced.[^25][^28]
On September 19, 2025 Acosta sat for a voluntary transcribed interview with the [[House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform|House Oversight Committee]] as part of its renewed inquiry into the federal handling of the Epstein and Maxwell cases; the committee released the transcript on October 17, 2025, together with Epstein estate records. Chairman [[James Comer|James Comer]] said Acosta had cooperated, and the committee separately sought records and testimony from other former officials. Acosta told the committee that prosecutors had avoided trial partly because some underage victims did not want to testify and a conviction was not assured, and he said he did not recall reading Villafaña's recommendation of a 60-count indictment. Lawmakers questioned him about the records of Menchel's later contacts with Epstein and about a photograph said to show the two skiing, which was not produced.[^27][^30]
### Intelligence Claim
In a July 2019 article for [[The Daily Beast|The Daily Beast]], journalist [[Vicky Ward|Vicky Ward]] reported that, according to an anonymous former senior [[White House]] official, Acosta had explained the lenient Epstein deal during his Labor Secretary vetting by saying he had been told that Epstein "belonged to intelligence" and to "leave it alone" because the matter was above his pay grade. Ward's report attributed the account to a single unnamed source, and commentators noted the source could not be independently confirmed. Ward had reported on Epstein for years and had earlier written a 2003 profile of him for Vanity Fair.[^29][^30]
In a July 2019 article for [[The Daily Beast|The Daily Beast]], journalist [[Vicky Ward|Vicky Ward]] reported that, according to an anonymous former senior [[White House]] official, Acosta had explained the lenient Epstein deal during his Labor Secretary vetting by saying he had been told that Epstein "belonged to intelligence" and to "leave it alone" because the matter was above his pay grade. Ward's report attributed the account to a single unnamed source, and commentators noted the source could not be independently confirmed. Ward had reported on Epstein for years and had earlier written a 2003 profile of him for Vanity Fair.[^31][^32]
Acosta disputed the characterization. Asked about the reporting at his July 2019 press conference, he said he would "hesitate to take this reporting as fact." Under oath to Justice Department investigators he answered "no" when asked whether he had knowledge of Epstein being an intelligence asset, and the OPR review reported that none of the subjects it interviewed believed Epstein to have been an intelligence asset.[^31][^32]
Acosta disputed the characterization. Asked about the reporting at his July 2019 press conference, he said he would "hesitate to take this reporting as fact." Under oath to Justice Department investigators he answered "no" when asked whether he had knowledge of Epstein being an intelligence asset, and the OPR review reported that none of the subjects it interviewed believed Epstein to have been an intelligence asset.[^33][^34]
At his September 19, 2025 transcribed interview with the House Oversight Committee, Acosta again denied the intelligence account. Asked whether anyone had told him Epstein could not be prosecuted because he was an asset, he said "No one approached me and said that," and he stated that if there had been classified or secure information bearing on the case, established procedures would have been triggered that were never triggered. The intelligence claim remains an attributed, disputed assertion sourced to a single anonymous account rather than an established finding.[^28][^31]
At his September 19, 2025 transcribed interview with the House Oversight Committee, Acosta again denied the intelligence account. Asked whether anyone had told him Epstein could not be prosecuted because he was an asset, he said "No one approached me and said that," and he stated that if there had been classified or secure information bearing on the case, established procedures would have been triggered that were never triggered. The intelligence claim remains an attributed, disputed assertion sourced to a single anonymous account rather than an established finding.[^30][^33]
[[William Barr]], Attorney General at the time of Epstein's 2019 arrest and death, was asked about the account in an August 18, 2025 deposition before the same committee. Asked whether he was aware of Acosta saying he had been told Epstein "belongs to intelligence and to leave it alone," Barr answered: "No. Other than what's ever been reported in articles over the years." He said he had "no reason to believe he was working for the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] or any intelligence agency, and I'm dubious about claims like that," offered the supposition that Epstein might, "like many other businessmen," have talked to intelligence officers who debrief well-connected people, and said that "if he was an American asset, as opposed to some businessman who shares stuff with the government, I would've heard about it from the intelligence agency."[^33]
[[William Barr]], Attorney General at the time of Epstein's 2019 arrest and death, was asked about the account in an August 18, 2025 deposition before the same committee. Asked whether he was aware of Acosta saying he had been told Epstein "belongs to intelligence and to leave it alone," Barr answered: "No. Other than what's ever been reported in articles over the years." He said he had "no reason to believe he was working for the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] or any intelligence agency, and I'm dubious about claims like that," offered the supposition that Epstein might, "like many other businessmen," have talked to intelligence officers who debrief well-connected people, and said that "if he was an American asset, as opposed to some businessman who shares stuff with the government, I would've heard about it from the intelligence agency."[^35]
### Footnotes
@ -148,14 +148,16 @@ At his September 19, 2025 transcribed interview with the House Oversight Committ
[^20]: Opinion and Order, *Doe v. United States*, No. 9:08-cv-80736-KAM (S.D. Fla. Sept. 16, 2019), ECF No. 478 (Marra, J.). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-flsd-9_08-cv-80736/pdf/USCOURTS-flsd-9_08-cv-80736-2.pdf
[^21]: *In re Wild*, No. 19-13843, 994 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. Apr. 15, 2021) (en banc), majority opinion at 2-3, 13; Branch, J., dissenting; Hull, J., dissenting. https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201913843.enb.pdf
[^22]: Supreme Court of the United States, docket No. 21-351, order of February 22, 2022 denying certiorari. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-351.html
[^23]: U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Library, EFTA00077309, DataSet 9, email, Chief, Public Corruption Unit, U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, and the Office of Professional Responsibility, "RE: Draft OPR Report," August 21, 2020. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%209/EFTA00077309.pdf
[^24]: "US Attorney Alex Acosta showed 'poor judgment' when giving Jeffrey Epstein state-based plea deal in 2008: DOJ," *ABC News,* November 12, 2020. https://abcnews.com/US/us-attorney-alex-acosta-showed-poor-judgment-giving/story?id=74178029 ; the Villafaña footnote passage appears in the body of the full OPR report of November 2020, not in the executive summary cited at note 7.
[^25]: Debra Cassens Weiss, "Jeffrey Epstein had dinners with top criminal prosecutor in years following favorable deal, documents show," *ABA Journal,* October 20, 2025. https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/jeffrey-epstein-had-dinners-with-top-criminal-prosecutor-in-years-following-favorable-deal-documents-show
[^26]: "Trump's Labor Secretary Alex Acosta resigns after criticism over Epstein deal," *Euronews,* July 12, 2019. https://www.euronews.com/2019/07/12/trump-s-labor-secretary-alex-acosta-resigns-after-criticism-over-n1029226
[^27]: "Former state's attorney pushes back against Acosta account of Epstein case," *The Hill,* July 10, 2019. https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/452527-former-florida-state-attorney-pushes-back-against-acosta-account-of/
[^28]: "Alex Acosta, former US attorney who negotiated Epstein's plea deal, appears before House Oversight Committee," *ABC News,* October 2025 (September 19, 2025 closed-door transcribed interview; transcript released October 17, 2025). https://abcnews.com/Politics/alex-acosta-former-us-attorney-negotiated-epsteins-plea/story?id=125731737
[^29]: Vicky Ward, "Jeffrey Epstein's Sick Story Played Out for Years in Plain Sight," *The Daily Beast,* July 9, 2019. https://www.thedailybeast.com/jeffrey-epsteins-sick-story-played-out-for-years-in-plain-sight/
[^30]: "Did Jeffrey Epstein 'Belong to Intelligence'?," *Skeptic,* analyzing Vicky Ward's July 2019 Daily Beast report. https://www.skeptic.com/article/did-jeffrey-epstein-belong-to-intelligence/
[^31]: "Acosta once said Epstein 'belonged to intelligence,'" *Newsweek,* July 2019. https://www.newsweek.com/alex-acosta-epstein-sex-trafficking-department-labor-1448568
[^32]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, full report of November 2020 on the Southern District of Florida's resolution of the Epstein investigation (report body; the passage does not appear in the executive summary cited at note 7). https://www.justice.gov/opr/page/file/1336471/dl
[^33]: U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, deposition of William P. Barr, August 18, 2025, transcript released September 2025. https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Barr-Transcript.pdf
[^23]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, Executive Summary of the investigation into the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida's resolution of the 2006-2008 federal investigation of Jeffrey Epstein (November 2020), pp. 10-12. https://www.justice.gov/opr/page/file/1336471/dl
[^24]: Same Executive Summary, pp. 2-3.
[^25]: U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Library, EFTA00077309, DataSet 9, email, Chief, Public Corruption Unit, U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, and the Office of Professional Responsibility, "RE: Draft OPR Report," August 21, 2020. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%209/EFTA00077309.pdf
[^26]: "US Attorney Alex Acosta showed 'poor judgment' when giving Jeffrey Epstein state-based plea deal in 2008: DOJ," *ABC News,* November 12, 2020. https://abcnews.com/US/us-attorney-alex-acosta-showed-poor-judgment-giving/story?id=74178029 ; the Villafaña footnote passage appears in the body of the full OPR report of November 2020, not in the executive summary cited at note 7.
[^27]: Debra Cassens Weiss, "Jeffrey Epstein had dinners with top criminal prosecutor in years following favorable deal, documents show," *ABA Journal,* October 20, 2025. https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/jeffrey-epstein-had-dinners-with-top-criminal-prosecutor-in-years-following-favorable-deal-documents-show
[^28]: "Trump's Labor Secretary Alex Acosta resigns after criticism over Epstein deal," *Euronews,* July 12, 2019. https://www.euronews.com/2019/07/12/trump-s-labor-secretary-alex-acosta-resigns-after-criticism-over-n1029226
[^29]: "Former state's attorney pushes back against Acosta account of Epstein case," *The Hill,* July 10, 2019. https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/452527-former-florida-state-attorney-pushes-back-against-acosta-account-of/
[^30]: "Alex Acosta, former US attorney who negotiated Epstein's plea deal, appears before House Oversight Committee," *ABC News,* October 2025 (September 19, 2025 closed-door transcribed interview; transcript released October 17, 2025). https://abcnews.com/Politics/alex-acosta-former-us-attorney-negotiated-epsteins-plea/story?id=125731737
[^31]: Vicky Ward, "Jeffrey Epstein's Sick Story Played Out for Years in Plain Sight," *The Daily Beast,* July 9, 2019. https://www.thedailybeast.com/jeffrey-epsteins-sick-story-played-out-for-years-in-plain-sight/
[^32]: "Did Jeffrey Epstein 'Belong to Intelligence'?," *Skeptic,* analyzing Vicky Ward's July 2019 Daily Beast report. https://www.skeptic.com/article/did-jeffrey-epstein-belong-to-intelligence/
[^33]: "Acosta once said Epstein 'belonged to intelligence,'" *Newsweek,* July 2019. https://www.newsweek.com/alex-acosta-epstein-sex-trafficking-department-labor-1448568
[^34]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, full report of November 2020 on the Southern District of Florida's resolution of the Epstein investigation (report body; the passage does not appear in the executive summary cited at note 7). https://www.justice.gov/opr/page/file/1336471/dl
[^35]: U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, deposition of William P. Barr, August 18, 2025, transcript released September 2025. https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Barr-Transcript.pdf

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@ -8,21 +8,21 @@ tags:
summary: "Chilean arms maker whose company supplied cluster bombs to Iraq in the 1980s, indicted in Miami in 1993 over zirconium exports, and named by Ari Ben-Menashe as a broker of CIA-backed arms channels."
born: 1942-05-01
location: "Santa Cruz, Chile"
updated: 2026-10-08
updated: 2026-10-12
relations:
- type: owned
with: "[[Industrias Cardoen]]"
fn: 3
fn: 5
- type: owned
with: "[[Swissco Management Group]]"
role: "described by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence as a subsidiary of Cardoen Industries"
fn: 2
fn: 4
- type: prosecuted
with: "[[Department of Justice]]"
reverse: true
start: 1993-05
role: "twenty-one count indictment, Southern District of Florida, May 26, 1993"
fn: 3
fn: 5
---
[[Carlos Cardoen]] is a Chilean businessman and arms producer, owner of [[Industrias Cardoen|Cardoen Industries]]. He comes from an upper-class Chilean family of Italian descent. After attending university in the [[United States|U.S.]] and receiving a degree as a mining engineer, he returned to [[Santiago]], [[Chile]], after [[Augusto Pinochet|General Augusto Pinochet's]] 1973 coup d'état to work for the government-owned [[Chilean Mining Corporation]]. His job involved procuring explosives for mining, which became a lucrative business for him personally due to kickbacks.[^1]
@ -30,9 +30,9 @@ Cardoen later resigned and became a private contractor, securing a deal to suppl
After being rejected by Israel, Cardoen obtained a brokering license from the [[Armscor|ARMSCOR]] (South Africa's government weapons manufacturer) with the help of the Chilean ambassador to [[South Africa]]. He then secured loans from Chilean banks and began operating as an arms producer and broker.[^1]
By 1985, Cardoen was selling arms to [[Iraq]], with the help of ARMSCOR and support from individuals connected to the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]], such as [[Alan Sanders]] of [[ITICO]]. He received blueprints for cluster bombs from Sanders and, despite a [[United Nations]] arms embargo against Chile, produced these bombs with a covert U.S. license. Israel was interested in acquiring these bombs.[^1]
By 1985, Cardoen was selling arms to [[Iraq]], with the help of ARMSCOR and support from individuals connected to the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]], such as [[Alan Sanders]] of [[ITICO]]. He received blueprints for cluster bombs from Sanders and, according to [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], produced these bombs with a covert U.S. license despite a [[United Nations]] arms embargo against Chile.[^1] Security Council resolution 232 of December 16, 1966 imposed mandatory measures against Southern Rhodesia, including a prohibition on the sale or shipment of arms, and resolution 418 of November 4, 1977 imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.[^2][^3] Israel was interested in acquiring these bombs.[^1]
In 1985, [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] approached Alan Sanders to purchase cluster bombs for Israel, and was informed that Cardoen would sell to anyone who paid him. A few weeks later, Israel received cluster bombs from Santiago via diplomatic crate.[^1]
In 1985, Ari Ben-Menashe approached Alan Sanders to purchase cluster bombs for Israel, and was informed that Cardoen would sell to anyone who paid him. A few weeks later, Israel received cluster bombs from Santiago via diplomatic crate.[^1]
[[Robert Gates]], then CIA deputy director for intelligence, was approached by [[Nachum Admoni]] ([[Mossad]] director) regarding U.S. support for Cardoen. Admoni expressed Israeli concerns about the support for Iraq, especially through Chile and South Africa. By this time, Cardoen owned two chemical weapons plants in Santiago, a cluster bomb factory in cooperation with Chile's military, and a third chemical weapons plant in [[Paraguay]]. He was also building a chemical weapons plant outside [[Baghdad]].[^1]
@ -40,60 +40,62 @@ Cardoen's Santiago-produced chemical weapons and those from Paraguay used artill
In late 1986, Israel expressed concern about arms shipments to Iraq, with [[Yitzhak Shamir]] threatening to go to Congress. Robert Gates called a meeting in Santiago to calm the Israelis. Attendees included Cardoen, Gates, Senator [[John Tower]], [[Pieter Van Der Westhuizen|Gen. Pieter Van Der Westhuizen]] (South African Military Intelligence), and [[Rodolfo Stange|Gen. Rodolfo Stange]] (Chilean Carabineros). At this meeting, U.S. officials made it clear they intended to maintain the arms channel to Iraq to bring Iraq into their sphere of influence, assuring Israel it would not be harmed. Cardoen continued to supply chemical weapons and cluster bombs to Iraq despite Israeli concerns.[^1]
The [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]], in its October 24, 1991 report on the Gates nomination, recorded that Gates denied specific allegations made by Ben-Menashe at his confirmation hearing, and that investigations by the FBI and the CIA inspector general, which included analysis of Gates's calendar and travel records, provided no credible evidence to confirm them. The same report records that Cardoen denied meeting Gates in a letter of July 16, 1991 to the U.S. ambassador in Chile.[^2]
The [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]], in its October 24, 1991 report on the Gates nomination, recorded that Gates denied specific allegations made by Ben-Menashe at his confirmation hearing, and that investigations by the FBI and the CIA inspector general, which included analysis of Gates's calendar and travel records, provided no credible evidence to confirm them. The same report records that Cardoen denied meeting Gates in a letter of July 16, 1991 to the U.S. ambassador in Chile.[^4]
In September 1988, Ari Ben-Menashe was sent to Chile to confront Cardoen. Ben-Menashe offered Cardoen a deal: Israel would license him to produce [[Uzi]]s, [[Galil assault rifles]], artillery shells, and mortars, and exclusively sell these materials throughout South America, in exchange for stopping his chemical trade with Iraq. Cardoen was given two weeks to consider the offer. During this visit, Cardoen introduced Ben-Menashe to [[Mark Thatcher]], implying Thatcher was involved in his business.[^1]
Cardoen was furious about Ben-Menashe's visit to his plant in Paraguay and his attempts to stop the trade. He claimed to have the backing of the Americans and the Chilean government, and threatened Israel if they interfered. He also revealed that Gates's office provided technology directly from the CIA, and that Ihsan Barbouti was a key link in his operations. He mentioned [[Alan Bond]] and British investors as backers.[^1]
In February 1989, Cardoen's plant in Paraguay was not closed down, thanks to [[Andres Rodriguez|President Andres Rodriguez]], who continued to rule the country with U.S. blessing. On May 26, 1993, a federal grand jury in the Southern District of Florida in [[Miami]] returned a twenty-one count indictment against Cardoen, Industrias Cardoen Limitada (INCAR), Swissco Management Group, Inc., Franco Saffa, Jorge Burr, [[Edward A. Johnson]], Ronald W. Griffin and Teledyne Industries, Inc. d/b/a [[Teledyne Wah Chang Albany]].[^3] Ben-Menashe's account gives April 1992 and the U.S. Customs Service as the charging agency.[^1]
In February 1989, Cardoen's plant in Paraguay was not closed down, thanks to [[Andres Rodriguez|President Andres Rodriguez]], who continued to rule the country with U.S. blessing. On May 26, 1993, a federal grand jury in the Southern District of Florida in [[Miami]] returned a twenty-one count indictment against Cardoen, Industrias Cardoen Limitada (INCAR), Swissco Management Group, Inc., Franco Saffa, Jorge Burr, [[Edward A. Johnson]], Ronald W. Griffin and Teledyne Industries, Inc. d/b/a [[Teledyne Wah Chang Albany]].[^5] Ben-Menashe's account gives April 1992 and the U.S. Customs Service as the charging agency.[^1]
### Iquique and Baghdad
Cardoen's plant at [[Iquique]] turned out about a thousand cluster bombs a month with labor paid the equivalent of ninety dollars a month, and he priced them at about 7,000 dollars each, some 19,000 dollars below his European competitors. "I'll have to build [[Jimmy Carter]] a statue," he said. "If it hadn't been for the U.S. embargo we would never have invested in arms production here." His agent for Iraq, [[Nasser Beydoun]], who later sued him for 30 million dollars in commissions, carried his offer to Baghdad: "We can provide you with our cluster bombs at the lowest possible price." The first shipment, worth 21 million dollars, reached Iraq early in 1984, and Iraq came to supply about three quarters of his arms exports of 100 million dollars a year. Two American munitions plants were classified by American officials as scrap metal so that they could be exported to Chile. His Washington representative, Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Rickertson, said: "It should have been quite evident to them that this was U.S. equipment because the placards on the bomb-making presses identified them."[^4]
Cardoen's plant at [[Iquique]] turned out about a thousand cluster bombs a month with labor paid the equivalent of ninety dollars a month, and he priced them at about 7,000 dollars each, some 19,000 dollars below his European competitors. "I'll have to build [[Jimmy Carter]] a statue," he said. "If it hadn't been for the U.S. embargo we would never have invested in arms production here." His agent for Iraq, [[Nasser Beydoun]], who later sued him for 30 million dollars in commissions, carried his offer to Baghdad: "We can provide you with our cluster bombs at the lowest possible price." The first shipment, worth 21 million dollars, reached Iraq early in 1984, and Iraq came to supply about three quarters of his arms exports of 100 million dollars a year. Two American munitions plants were classified by American officials as scrap metal so that they could be exported to Chile. His Washington representative, Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Rickertson, said: "It should have been quite evident to them that this was U.S. equipment because the placards on the bomb-making presses identified them."[^6]
A former contractor for the CIA described Cardoen as "an all-purpose asset, designed to be one of those offshore stockpilers of military equipment who could be used by the CIA to ship arms to the Afghan rebels, to the boys in Angola, or anywhere the U.S. needed some help." [[Howard Teicher]] of the [[National Security Council]] staff said of Robert Gates: "He was tight with Casey and with the [[White House]]. He was one of those who helped get things done." An associate of Cardoen, Robert Johnson, said he saw Gates arrive at Cardoen's house near Miami in the summer of 1986: "He and Cardoen had a series of meetings in 1986 and 1987. We needed an offshore supplier, and the Chileans were very cooperative." The White House said in July 1991: "The whole story is unfounded. There never were any sales, overt or covert, to Iraq or Iran through a third country. Mr. Gates never met with Carlos Cardoen." A subcontractor of his bought 330,000 power supplies from [[International Signal and Control|ISC]] and sent them on to a proximity fuse factory near Baghdad. The British journalist [[Jonathan Moyle]], who was inquiring into Cardoen's helicopter project, was found dead in a Santiago hotel on March 31, 1990.[^4]
A former contractor for the CIA described Cardoen as "an all-purpose asset, designed to be one of those offshore stockpilers of military equipment who could be used by the CIA to ship arms to the Afghan rebels, to the boys in Angola, or anywhere the U.S. needed some help." [[Howard Teicher]] of the [[National Security Council]] staff said of Robert Gates: "He was tight with Casey and with the [[White House]]. He was one of those who helped get things done." An associate of Cardoen, Robert Johnson, said he saw Gates arrive at Cardoen's house near Miami in the summer of 1986: "He and Cardoen had a series of meetings in 1986 and 1987. We needed an offshore supplier, and the Chileans were very cooperative." The White House said in July 1991: "The whole story is unfounded. There never were any sales, overt or covert, to Iraq or Iran through a third country. Mr. Gates never met with Carlos Cardoen." A subcontractor of his bought 330,000 power supplies from [[International Signal and Control|ISC]] and sent them on to a proximity fuse factory near Baghdad. The British journalist [[Jonathan Moyle]], who was inquiring into Cardoen's helicopter project, was found dead in a Santiago hotel on March 31, 1990.[^6]
### Miami arrest, Swissco and the Senate report
[[Kenneth R. Timmerman]] wrote that on August 2, 1983, U.S. Customs officers arrested Cardoen in Miami over night-vision goggles bound for Chile and that the case ended in a plea bargain with a 100,000 dollar fine on his company; a declaration by Howard Teicher dates the arrest to 1983 in a Miami sting concerning night-vision goggles bound for Cuba and Libya.[^5][^6] Teicher's corrective declaration of October 3, 1996 states that, although he understood Cardoen had been arrested, "the other information in this paragraph is incorrect."[^7]
[[Kenneth R. Timmerman]] wrote that on August 2, 1983, U.S. Customs officers arrested Cardoen in Miami over night-vision goggles bound for Chile and that the case ended in a plea bargain with a 100,000 dollar fine on his company; a declaration by Howard Teicher dates the arrest to 1983 in a Miami sting concerning night-vision goggles bound for Cuba and Libya.[^7][^8] Teicher's corrective declaration of October 3, 1996 states that, although he understood Cardoen had been arrested, "the other information in this paragraph is incorrect."[^9]
The Senate report records that the CIA employed [[James D. Theberge]] on its Senior Review Panel from January 1986 to January 1988, and that during much of that period he was a consultant to [[Swissco Management Group]], "a subsidiary of Cardoen Industries of Chile." Theberge had been U.S. ambassador to Chile from 1982 to 1985. The report states that Theberge disclosed the Swissco work and its Cardoen parentage in the personal history statement he gave the CIA in December 1985, that [[William J. Casey]], John McMahon and James Taylor were involved in his recruitment, and that there was no evidence Gates took part. It states that "Between 1984 and 1988, Cardoen Industries was of significant intelligence interest to CIA, which believed Cardoen was the primary supplier of cluster bombs to the Iraqi government, and an important supplier of other categories of ordnance to Iraq and other Middle Eastern states."[^2] Swissco Management Group, Inc. is among the eight defendants in the 1993 indictment.[^3] The Commerce Department order of September 11, 1995 states that Swissco Management Group, Inc., of Miami Lakes, was convicted on August 7, 1995 of exporting zirconium from the United States to Chile in violation of the terms of a Commerce export license.[^8]
The Senate report records that the CIA employed [[James D. Theberge]] on its Senior Review Panel from January 1986 to January 1988, and that during much of that period he was a consultant to [[Swissco Management Group]], "a subsidiary of Cardoen Industries of Chile." Theberge had been U.S. ambassador to Chile from 1982 to 1985. The report states that Theberge disclosed the Swissco work and its Cardoen parentage in the personal history statement he gave the CIA in December 1985, that [[William J. Casey]], John McMahon and James Taylor were involved in his recruitment, and that there was no evidence Gates took part. It states that "Between 1984 and 1988, Cardoen Industries was of significant intelligence interest to CIA, which believed Cardoen was the primary supplier of cluster bombs to the Iraqi government, and an important supplier of other categories of ordnance to Iraq and other Middle Eastern states."[^4] Swissco Management Group, Inc. is among the eight defendants in the 1993 indictment.[^5] The Commerce Department order of September 11, 1995 states that Swissco Management Group, Inc., of Miami Lakes, was convicted on August 7, 1995 of exporting zirconium from the United States to Chile in violation of the terms of a Commerce export license.[^10]
### Miami property and the Graham fund-raiser
[[Justin Hibbard]] wrote in the *San Francisco Chronicle Magazine* in 2003 that Cardoen's Miami company Swissco invested Iraqi payments in Florida real estate; that the Commerce Department and the Customs Service announced a civil suit against Swissco in Miami on April 6, 1992, seeking to seize 30 million dollars in real estate; and that in August 1986 Cardoen helped organize a fund-raiser for U.S. Senator [[Bob Graham]] at the Miami home of the Swissco executive [[Anthony Mijares Jr.|Anthony Mijares]], which raised about 50,000 dollars.[^9]
[[Justin Hibbard]] wrote in the *San Francisco Chronicle Magazine* in 2003 that Cardoen's Miami company Swissco invested Iraqi payments in Florida real estate; that the Commerce Department and the Customs Service announced a civil suit against Swissco in Miami on April 6, 1992, seeking to seize 30 million dollars in real estate; and that in August 1986 Cardoen helped organize a fund-raiser for U.S. Senator [[Bob Graham]] at the Miami home of the Swissco executive [[Anthony Mijares Jr.|Anthony Mijares]], which raised about 50,000 dollars.[^11]
In September 2022 the Chilean investigative outlet [[CIPER Chile|CIPER]] reported that Cardoen's Miami investments grew into a real estate holding that it described, citing United States government estimates, as worth about 30 million dollars. CIPER reported that Graham and his wife sold Cardoen their house in [[Miami Lakes]] for 575,000 dollars, which is how Cardoen came to know Graham, then Florida's governor. CIPER also reported that the [[Federal Reserve Board|Federal Reserve]] seized Cardoen's checking accounts and real estate investments, including land, office complexes and subdivisions for a housing project, in Miami and Orlando, on suspicion of money laundering, and that the investigation was later dismissed after a settlement, with part of the assets returned to him.[^10]
In September 2022 the Chilean investigative outlet [[CIPER Chile|CIPER]] reported that Cardoen's Miami investments grew into a real estate holding that it described, citing United States government estimates, as worth about 30 million dollars. CIPER reported that Graham and his wife sold Cardoen their house in [[Miami Lakes]] for 575,000 dollars, which is how Cardoen came to know Graham, then Florida's governor. CIPER also reported that the [[Federal Reserve Board|Federal Reserve]] seized Cardoen's checking accounts and real estate investments, including land, office complexes and subdivisions for a housing project, in Miami and Orlando, on suspicion of money laundering, and that the investigation was later dismissed after a settlement, with part of the assets returned to him.[^12]
### Indictment, trial and extradition
The zirconium counts concern ordnance-grade zirconium sponge and compacts exported to Chile. The Eleventh Circuit wrote that Cardoen supplied the exporter with false end-use statements describing the zirconium as a booster material for industrial explosives, and that "The zirconium was used as an incendiary agent in cluster bombs that Cardoen was selling to Iraq for use in the Iran-Iraq war."[^11] The district court's order of 1994, reissued in 1995, noted Cardoen's "present fugitive status."[^3] On March 22, 1994 the court dismissed Counts II through VI against Teledyne on statute-of-limitations grounds.[^3]
The zirconium counts concern ordnance-grade zirconium sponge and compacts exported to Chile. The Eleventh Circuit wrote that Cardoen supplied the exporter with false end-use statements describing the zirconium as a booster material for industrial explosives, and that "The zirconium was used as an incendiary agent in cluster bombs that Cardoen was selling to Iraq for use in the Iran-Iraq war."[^13] The district court's order of 1994, reissued in 1995, noted Cardoen's "present fugitive status."[^5] On March 22, 1994 the court dismissed Counts II through VI against Teledyne on statute-of-limitations grounds.[^5]
Edward A. Johnson, a sales manager at Teledyne Wah Chang Albany, was convicted by a jury on four counts, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in 1998.[^11] A State Department notice records that Teledyne Industries pleaded guilty in the Southern District of Florida on January 26, 1995.[^12]
Edward A. Johnson, a sales manager at Teledyne Wah Chang Albany, was convicted by a jury on four counts, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in 1998.[^13] A State Department notice records that Teledyne Industries pleaded guilty in the Southern District of Florida on January 26, 1995.[^14]
A witness identified as "Linda C." of the CIA Directorate of Operations, who reviewed the agency file on Cardoen covering 1984 to 1993, testified at the classified-information hearing that Cardoen "was not an agent or source of intelligence for the United States government; on the contrary, Cardoen was a target; that is, an individual of intelligence interest to the government." The court adopted that conclusion for purposes of the hearing, and wrote that the Senate report "corroborates" it.[^3]
A witness identified as "Linda C." of the CIA Directorate of Operations, who reviewed the agency file on Cardoen covering 1984 to 1993, testified at the classified-information hearing that Cardoen "was not an agent or source of intelligence for the United States government; on the contrary, Cardoen was a target; that is, an individual of intelligence interest to the government." The court adopted that conclusion for purposes of the hearing, and wrote that the Senate report "corroborates" it.[^5]
On January 31, 1995, Teicher signed a declaration in the case stating that "the CIA authorized, approved and assisted Cardoen in the manufacture and sale of cluster bombs." [[Robert Parry]] reported that the government sealed it as a state secret while attacking Teicher's credibility, and that Teicher was blocked from testifying.[^6][^13]
On January 31, 1995, Teicher signed a declaration in the case stating that "the CIA authorized, approved and assisted Cardoen in the manufacture and sale of cluster bombs." [[Robert Parry]] reported that the government sealed it as a state secret while attacking Teicher's credibility, and that Teicher was blocked from testifying.[^8][^15]
The United States served a corrective declaration signed by Teicher on October 3, 1996, with a notice of filing served November 8, 1996. In it Teicher wrote that attorneys for Teledyne had prepared the January declaration and faxed it to him, that he had not reviewed his National Security Council files since 1987, and that his statements in paragraphs 15 through 18 were his best memory and belief and not "categorical statements of fact." He wrote that he is "not aware of any specific evidence that the United States government or any government official or agency took steps to help Cardoen obtain any U.S.-origin components for use in cluster bombs." The corrective declaration does not address paragraphs 1 through 14 of the January declaration; as to paragraph 17 he wrote that, although he understood Cardoen had been arrested, "the other information in this paragraph is incorrect."[^7]
The United States served a corrective declaration signed by Teicher on October 3, 1996, with a notice of filing served November 8, 1996. In it Teicher wrote that attorneys for Teledyne had prepared the January declaration and faxed it to him, that he had not reviewed his National Security Council files since 1987, and that his statements in paragraphs 15 through 18 were his best memory and belief and not "categorical statements of fact." He wrote that he is "not aware of any specific evidence that the United States government or any government official or agency took steps to help Cardoen obtain any U.S.-origin components for use in cluster bombs." The corrective declaration does not address paragraphs 1 through 14 of the January declaration; as to paragraph 17 he wrote that, although he understood Cardoen had been arrested, "the other information in this paragraph is incorrect."[^9]
The United States formally requested Cardoen's extradition in March 2019. The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists reports that the Chilean Supreme Court rejected the request in March 2020; Emol reports that the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court unanimously rejected it on August 24, 2020, confirming a first rejection in March 2020 by the instructing minister Carlos Aranguiz, on grounds of dual criminality and prescription.[^14][^15]
The United States formally requested Cardoen's extradition in March 2019. The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists reports that the Chilean Supreme Court rejected the request in March 2020; Emol reports that the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court unanimously rejected it on August 24, 2020, confirming a first rejection in March 2020 by the instructing minister Carlos Aranguiz, on grounds of dual criminality and prescription.[^16][^17]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
[^2]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence*, S. Exec. Rept. 102-19, 102d Cong., 1st sess. (October 24, 1991), section 5, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-10219.pdf (PDF pages 186 to 188).
[^3]: *United States v. Cardoen*, 898 F. Supp. 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (Highsmith, J.), No. 93-241-CR, reissued order on hearing under section 6 of the Classified Information Procedures Act (original order December 28, 1994), https://static.case.law/f-supp/898/cases/1563-01.json.
[^4]: Friedman, Alan. *Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq*. Bantam, 1993, pp. 46-54, 64.
[^5]: Kenneth R. Timmerman, *The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991), p. 169.
[^6]: Declaration of Howard Teicher, January 31, 1995, *United States v. Cardoen*, No. 93-241-CR-HIGHSMITH, as transcribed at http://spikethenews.blogspot.com/2016/01/the-teicher-affidavit.html.
[^7]: Declaration of Howard R. Teicher (corrective), *United States v. Carlos Cardoen et al.*, No. 93-241-CR-Highsmith (S.D. Fla.), dated October 3, 1996, with the United States' notice of filing served November 8, 1996, paragraphs 2 to 7, https://archive.org/details/utf-893cr-241-de-679.
[^8]: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, "Action Affecting Export Privileges; Swissco Management Group, Inc.; Order Denying Permission To Apply for or Use Export Licenses," dated September 11, 1995, 60 Federal Register 48964-48965 (September 21, 1995), FR Doc. 95-23363, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1995-09-21/pdf/95-23363.pdf.
[^9]: Justin Hibbard, "The Chilean Connection," *San Francisco Chronicle Magazine*, March 2, 2003, https://www.sfgate.com/magazine/article/THE-CHILEAN-CONNECTION-Carlos-Cardoen-arms-2667085.php.
[^10]: CIPER Chile, Alberto Arellano and Francisca Skoknic, "Los secretos de Carlos Cardoen en Panamá y la alerta por una de sus sociedades que fue vinculada a la venta de armas," September 14, 2022, https://www.ciperchile.cl/2022/09/14/los-secretos-de-carlos-cardoen-en-panama-y-la-alerta-por-una-de-sus-sociedades-que-fue-vinculada-a-la-venta-de-armas/.
[^11]: *United States v. Edward A. Johnson*, No. 95-5021 (11th Cir. Apr. 28, 1998), https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/19955021.OPN.pdf.
[^12]: Department of State, Public Notice 2206, 60 Fed. Reg. 30151 (June 7, 1995), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1995-06-07/pdf/95-13834.pdf.
[^13]: Robert Parry, "Iraqgate: Confession and Cover-up," *Extra!* (FAIR), 1995, as reposted at https://scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0212/S00074.htm.
[^14]: International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, "Most wanted Chilean arms dealer concealed ties to companies with help from Panama's offshore industry," September 2022, https://www.icij.org/inside-icij/2022/09/most-wanted-chilean-arms-dealer-concealed-ties-to-companies-with-help-from-panamas-offshore-industry/.
[^15]: "Suprema rechaza extradición Cardoen," Emol, August 24, 2020, https://www.emol.com/noticias/Nacional/2020/08/24/995884/Suprema-rechaza-extradicion-Cardoen.html.
[^2]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 232 (1966), December 16, 1966. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F232%20%281966%29&l=en&t=pdf
[^3]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 418 (1977), November 4, 1977. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F418%20%281977%29&l=en&t=pdf
[^4]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence*, S. Exec. Rept. 102-19, 102d Cong., 1st sess. (October 24, 1991), section 5, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-10219.pdf (PDF pages 186 to 188).
[^5]: *United States v. Cardoen*, 898 F. Supp. 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (Highsmith, J.), No. 93-241-CR, reissued order on hearing under section 6 of the Classified Information Procedures Act (original order December 28, 1994), https://static.case.law/f-supp/898/cases/1563-01.json.
[^6]: Friedman, Alan. *Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq*. Bantam, 1993, pp. 46-54, 64.
[^7]: Kenneth R. Timmerman, *The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991), p. 169.
[^8]: Declaration of Howard Teicher, January 31, 1995, *United States v. Cardoen*, No. 93-241-CR-HIGHSMITH, as transcribed at http://spikethenews.blogspot.com/2016/01/the-teicher-affidavit.html.
[^9]: Declaration of Howard R. Teicher (corrective), *United States v. Carlos Cardoen et al.*, No. 93-241-CR-Highsmith (S.D. Fla.), dated October 3, 1996, with the United States' notice of filing served November 8, 1996, paragraphs 2 to 7, https://archive.org/details/utf-893cr-241-de-679.
[^10]: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, "Action Affecting Export Privileges; Swissco Management Group, Inc.; Order Denying Permission To Apply for or Use Export Licenses," dated September 11, 1995, 60 Federal Register 48964-48965 (September 21, 1995), FR Doc. 95-23363, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1995-09-21/pdf/95-23363.pdf.
[^11]: Justin Hibbard, "The Chilean Connection," *San Francisco Chronicle Magazine*, March 2, 2003, https://www.sfgate.com/magazine/article/THE-CHILEAN-CONNECTION-Carlos-Cardoen-arms-2667085.php.
[^12]: CIPER Chile, Alberto Arellano and Francisca Skoknic, "Los secretos de Carlos Cardoen en Panamá y la alerta por una de sus sociedades que fue vinculada a la venta de armas," September 14, 2022, https://www.ciperchile.cl/2022/09/14/los-secretos-de-carlos-cardoen-en-panama-y-la-alerta-por-una-de-sus-sociedades-que-fue-vinculada-a-la-venta-de-armas/.
[^13]: *United States v. Edward A. Johnson*, No. 95-5021 (11th Cir. Apr. 28, 1998), https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/19955021.OPN.pdf.
[^14]: Department of State, Public Notice 2206, 60 Fed. Reg. 30151 (June 7, 1995), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1995-06-07/pdf/95-13834.pdf.
[^15]: Robert Parry, "Iraqgate: Confession and Cover-up," *Extra!* (FAIR), 1995, as reposted at https://scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0212/S00074.htm.
[^16]: International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, "Most wanted Chilean arms dealer concealed ties to companies with help from Panama's offshore industry," September 2022, https://www.icij.org/inside-icij/2022/09/most-wanted-chilean-arms-dealer-concealed-ties-to-companies-with-help-from-panamas-offshore-industry/.
[^17]: "Suprema rechaza extradición Cardoen," Emol, August 24, 2020, https://www.emol.com/noticias/Nacional/2020/08/24/995884/Suprema-rechaza-extradicion-Cardoen.html.

View file

@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ born: 1904-11-28
died: 1986-02-19
location: "Doddsville, Mississippi"
created: 2026-09-21
updated: 2026-09-21
updated: 2026-10-12
---
James Oliver Eastland (November 28, 1904 to February 19, 1986) was born at [[Doddsville, Mississippi]], "only months after his father had orchestrated the gruesome lynching of a Black woman and her lover, who was accused of murdering Woods's twenty-one-year-old brother, James, in whose memory the newborn was named." His grandfather had bought more than 2,000 acres of [[Sunflower County, Mississippi|Sunflower County]] "for speculative purposes," and his father, Woods Eastland, a personal injury lawyer, made it a plantation. He studied at the [[University of Mississippi]], [[Vanderbilt University|Vanderbilt]], and the [[University of Alabama]], was admitted to the bar in 1927, and sat in the state legislature as a supporter of Governor [[Theodore G. Bilbo]]. When Senator [[Pat Harrison]] died in 1941, Woods Eastland declined the appointment and suggested his son. "The boy'll do it," said Governor [[Paul B. Johnson Sr.|Paul Johnson]].[^1][^2]
@ -28,17 +28,17 @@ On the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry he "zealously guarded the interests
### The Committees
He left the Democratic ticket for the [[Dixiecrats]] in 1948. In 1953 he became chairman of the [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]], "a forum from which to hound suspected domestic subversives, especially those involved in civil rights activities and the labor movement," and in 1956 chairman of the [[United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary|Judiciary Committee]], which he made the "graveyard of civil rights legislation," blocking "more than one hundred civil rights measures." He told white audiences "that he once had special pockets sewn into his trousers so he could carry civil rights bills around with him to make sure no one called them up for consideration in his absence." Senator [[Herbert Lehman]] called him "a symbol of racism in America." The Episcopal Diocese of New York charged him with "subversion just as real and, because it comes from a U.S. Senator, far more dangerous than any perpetrated by the Communist Party." Senator [[Ted Kennedy]] praised the "scrupulously fair and even-handed manner in which he presided." [[Aaron Henry]] told him: "You have a master-servant philosophy with regard to blacks."[^1][^2]
He left the Democratic ticket for the [[Dixiecrats]] in 1948. He joined the [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]] in 1951, became its chairman in 1955 and served as chairman until the Senate abolished the subcommittee in 1977.[^3] The subcommittee has been described as "a forum from which to hound suspected domestic subversives, especially those involved in civil rights activities and the labor movement," and he was chairman of the [[United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary|Judiciary Committee]] from the Eighty-fourth Congress through the Ninety-fifth Congress,[^4] which he made the "graveyard of civil rights legislation," blocking "more than one hundred civil rights measures." He told white audiences "that he once had special pockets sewn into his trousers so he could carry civil rights bills around with him to make sure no one called them up for consideration in his absence." Senator [[Herbert Lehman]] called him "a symbol of racism in America." The Episcopal Diocese of New York charged him with "subversion just as real and, because it comes from a U.S. Senator, far more dangerous than any perpetrated by the Communist Party." Senator [[Ted Kennedy]] praised the "scrupulously fair and even-handed manner in which he presided." [[Aaron Henry]] told him: "You have a master-servant philosophy with regard to blacks."[^1][^2]
### Welch
On March 31, 1961, [[Robert Welch]] of the [[John Birch Society]] telegraphed Eastland asking the subcommittee to investigate the society. "None of our members will plead the Fifth Amendment." On July 3, 1962, Welch wrote that the society had spent "several thousand dollars" to send its members Eastland's speech "Is the Supreme Court Pro-Communist?" and closed "with admiration for both your patriotism and your courage."[^3]
On March 31, 1961, [[Robert Welch]] of the [[John Birch Society]] telegraphed Eastland asking the subcommittee to investigate the society. "None of our members will plead the Fifth Amendment." On July 3, 1962, Welch wrote that the society had spent "several thousand dollars" to send its members Eastland's speech "Is the Supreme Court Pro-Communist?" and closed "with admiration for both your patriotism and your courage."[^5]
[[Wickliffe Draper]]'s money for the campaign against the Civil Rights Act went through the [[Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission]] of Eastland's state.[^4]
[[Wickliffe Draper]]'s money for the campaign against the Civil Rights Act went through the [[Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission]] of Eastland's state.[^6]
### The Hunts
"[[Nelson Bunker Hunt|Nelson Bunker]] and his father met President Nixon at the celebrated barbecue at [[John Connally]]'s Floresville ranch in the autumn of 1972. Soon after, Nelson Bunker huddled with [[Richard Kleindienst]], then the new boss of the Justice Department, at the plantation of Mississippi Senator James Eastland." The account came from Hunt sources. The wiretapping indictments of the [[Hunt brothers]] followed regardless.[^5]
"[[Nelson Bunker Hunt|Nelson Bunker]] and his father met President Nixon at the celebrated barbecue at [[John Connally]]'s Floresville ranch in the autumn of 1972. Soon after, Nelson Bunker huddled with [[Richard Kleindienst]], then the new boss of the Justice Department, at the plantation of Mississippi Senator James Eastland." The account came from Hunt sources. The wiretapping indictments of the [[Hunt brothers]] followed regardless.[^7]
### The Succession
@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ Eastland became president pro tempore of the Senate in 1972 and "twice came with
[^1]: "James Oliver Eastland," *Mississippi Encyclopedia*. Center for Study of Southern Culture, University of Mississippi.
[^2]: Morgan, Chester M. "James O. Eastland," *Mississippi History Now,* Mississippi Department of Archives and History, April 2011.
[^3]: Welch, Robert. Telegram to James O. Eastland, March 31, 1961, and letter, July 3, 1962, in Federal Bureau of Investigation files on the John Birch Society, compiled by Ernie Lazar from Freedom of Information Act releases.
[^4]: Blackmon, Douglas A. "Silent Partner: How the South's Fight to Uphold Segregation Was Funded Up North," *The Wall Street Journal,* June 11, 1999, p. A1.
[^5]: Porterfield, Bill. "H.L. Hunt's Long Goodbye," *Texas Monthly,* March 1975.
[^3]: Senator James O. Eastland Collection, University of Mississippi, Modern Political Archives, File Series 4, Legislative, Subseries 10: Internal Security Subcommittee (finding aid). https://olemiss.edu/depts/general_library/archives/finding_docs/eastland/Eastland_File4_SS10.pdf
[^4]: "EASTLAND, James Oliver," Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, entry E000018. https://bioguide.congress.gov/search/bio/E000018
[^5]: Welch, Robert. Telegram to James O. Eastland, March 31, 1961, and letter, July 3, 1962, in Federal Bureau of Investigation files on the John Birch Society, compiled by Ernie Lazar from Freedom of Information Act releases.
[^6]: Blackmon, Douglas A. "Silent Partner: How the South's Fight to Uphold Segregation Was Funded Up North," *The Wall Street Journal,* June 11, 1999, p. A1.
[^7]: Porterfield, Bill. "H.L. Hunt's Long Goodbye," *Texas Monthly,* March 1975.

View file

@ -8,22 +8,30 @@ tags:
- Person
- Military
- Stargate
summary: "Brigadier General James L."
summary: "Brigadier General James L. Dozier was the U.S. Army deputy chief of staff at NATO's southern Europe command, kidnapped by the Red Brigades in Verona on December 17, 1981 and rescued January 28, 1982."
born: 1931-04-10
relations:
- type: employed_by
with: "[[U.S. Army]]"
role: "Brigadier General; deputy chief of staff, NATO southern Europe command"
start: 1981
end: 1982
fn: 2
location: "Arcadia, Florida"
updated: 2026-10-12
---
Brigadier General James L. Dozier was a senior [[U.S. Army]] official and deputy chief of staff in the [[NATO]] Southern Command. On December 17, 1981, he was kidnapped from his penthouse apartment in Verona, [[Italy]], by the [[Red Brigades]], a Marxist-Leninist paramilitary group[^1].
Brigadier General James L. Dozier was a senior [[U.S. Army]] official and deputy chief of staff in the [[NATO]] Southern Command. On December 17, 1981, he was kidnapped from his penthouse apartment in Verona, [[Italy]], by the [[Red Brigades]], a Marxist-Leninist paramilitary group[^1]. A press clipping of the kidnapping describes him as "the highest-ranking U.S. officer in NATO's southern Europe command."[^2]
Dozier, a graduate of [[West Point]] and a [[Vietnam]] veteran, was reading a letter when his doorbell rang. Two young men, posing as plumbers, gained entry to his apartment. Dozier was attacked, and he and his wife, Judy, were bound and gagged. Dozier was then forced into a steamer trunk and secreted away in the back of a blue Fiat van[^1].
His abduction triggered a massive international response. The [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]] offered a $2 million reward for information, and a Joint Special Operations Command team was dispatched to Italy. In Washington, the Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center of [[United States Army Intelligence and Security Command|INSCOM]], under Colonel Charles F. Scanlon, the command's deputy chief of staff for operations, asked the [[Defense Intelligence Agency|DIA]] on December 18, 1981 to help provide [[Grill Flame]] derived data to U.S. authorities in Europe concerning the search for Dozier, and the first Grill Flame session on the case was held that day.[^2][^3] Jacobsen wrote that [[Dale Graff]] and the Grill Flame remote viewers at [[Fort Meade]] were tasked with providing intelligence to locate him.[^1]
His abduction triggered a massive international response. The [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]] offered a $2 million reward for information, and a Joint Special Operations Command team was dispatched to Italy. In Washington, the Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center of [[United States Army Intelligence and Security Command|INSCOM]], under Colonel Charles F. Scanlon, the command's deputy chief of staff for operations, asked the [[Defense Intelligence Agency|DIA]] on December 18, 1981 to help provide [[Grill Flame]] derived data to U.S. authorities in Europe concerning the search for Dozier, and the first Grill Flame session on the case was held that day.[^3][^4] Jacobsen wrote that [[Dale Graff]] and the Grill Flame remote viewers at [[Fort Meade]] were tasked with providing intelligence to locate him.[^1]
Remote viewers, including [[Joe McMoneagle]], [[Hartleigh Trent]], and [[Ken Bell]], provided information that Dozier was still alive and in the same place. However, the information was often vague and disparate, making it difficult to pinpoint his exact location[^1].
Remote viewers, including [[Joe McMoneagle]], [[Hartleigh Trent]], and [[Ken Bell]], provided information that Dozier was still alive and in the same place. However, the information was often vague and disparate, making it difficult to pinpoint his exact location[^1]. A memorandum of March 23, 1982 from the Grill Flame project manager records a debriefing of Dozier on February 9, 1982, at which he was asked to review remote-viewing drawings made during the search and to comment on places and events of his captivity.[^5] A January 1982 Army message reported visions by several private individuals in Kent, Washington, concerning Dozier, describing a settlement called the "place of the shepherds" and a hallway behind metal bars.[^6]
Graff himself experienced vivid dreams and impressions, believing Dozier was held "upstairs in a room above a grocery store" in Padua. This information, combined with intelligence from a U.S. signals intelligence team, led Italian police to the exact street address where Dozier was being held[^1].
On Nightline in November 1995, Graff said of the Dozier case, "we had one viewer come up with the name of the city, Padua. We had another one come up with the name of the building he was in."[^4] INSCOM's 1983 briefing states that the drawing from the third session, on January 20, 1982, carried "NOTE THE NAME PADUA" and "WAS NOT FORWARDED TO ITALY," and that a drawing from the first session was used by a DIA analyst to brief the commander of the Southern European Task Force that the search should be concentrated in the Padua area two days before the rescue.[^3] A press report datelined Rome, February 2, 1982, stated that police confirmed a 22-year-old from Verona had revealed Dozier's place of captivity, an apartment above a grocery store in Padua.[^5]
On Nightline in November 1995, Graff said of the Dozier case, "we had one viewer come up with the name of the city, Padua. We had another one come up with the name of the building he was in."[^7] INSCOM's 1983 briefing states that the drawing from the third session, on January 20, 1982, carried "NOTE THE NAME PADUA" and "WAS NOT FORWARDED TO ITALY," and that a drawing from the first session was used by a DIA analyst to brief the commander of the Southern European Task Force that the search should be concentrated in the Padua area two days before the rescue.[^4] A press report datelined Rome, February 2, 1982, stated that police confirmed a 22-year-old from Verona had revealed Dozier's place of captivity, an apartment above a grocery store in Padua.[^8]
After 42 days in captivity, Dozier was rescued on January 28, 1982, by ten men from Italy's Central Operative Security Nucleus who stormed the apartment. He was found alive and was flown home to a hero's welcome, including an invitation to the [[White House]] from [[Ronald Reagan]][^1].
@ -32,7 +40,10 @@ Despite the remote viewers' involvement, Dozier later stated that he finally fig
### Footnotes
[^1]: Jacobsen, Annie. *Phenomena: The Secret History of the U.S. Government's Investigations into Extrasensory Perception and Psychokinesis*. Little, Brown and Company, 2017.
[^2]: Defense Intelligence Agency staff summary bearing the name of Jack Vorona, CIA-RDP96-00788R000700130004-8, cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R000700130004-8.pdf. The passage reads "was requested by COL C.F. Scanlon, the Deputy Chief of Staff: Operations, Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, INSCOM to assist in providing GRILL FLAME derived data to U.S. authorities in Europe concerning the search for BG Dozier." Other INSCOM documents in the collection (for example CIA-RDP96-00788R001100440042-7) identify COL Scanlon as DCSOPS, INSCOM, and two memoranda carry the signature block of Charles F. Scanlon (CIA-RDP96-00788R000100240002-4, CIA-RDP96-00788R000100250029-4).
[^3]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command briefing on the Dozier search, 1983, CIA-RDP96-00788R001700370002-3, cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R001700370002-3.pdf. The briefing reads "GENERAL DOZIER WAS KIDNAPPED THE EVENING OF 17 DECEMBER 1981. ON 18 DECEMBER, WE CONDUCTED OUR FIRST SESSION."
[^4]: "Psychic Spies: Cold War Whimsy or Secret Weapon?," ABC News Nightline, November 28, 1995, Radio TV Reports transcript for the CIA Public Affairs Staff, CIA-RDP99-01448R000402140001-7.
[^5]: Press report datelined Rome, February 2, 1982, on General Dozier's press conference (publication not identified on the clipping), CIA-RDP96-00788R000100270006-7, cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R000100270006-7.pdf.
[^2]: CIA-RDP96-00788R000100240026-8, press clipping on the Red Brigades kidnapping of Brigadier General James L. Dozier. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00788r000100240026-8
[^3]: Defense Intelligence Agency staff summary bearing the name of Jack Vorona, CIA-RDP96-00788R000700130004-8, cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R000700130004-8.pdf. The passage reads "was requested by COL C.F. Scanlon, the Deputy Chief of Staff: Operations, Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, INSCOM to assist in providing GRILL FLAME derived data to U.S. authorities in Europe concerning the search for BG Dozier." Other INSCOM documents in the collection (for example CIA-RDP96-00788R001100440042-7) identify COL Scanlon as DCSOPS, INSCOM, and two memoranda carry the signature block of Charles F. Scanlon (CIA-RDP96-00788R000100240002-4, CIA-RDP96-00788R000100250029-4).
[^4]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command briefing on the Dozier search, 1983, CIA-RDP96-00788R001700370002-3, cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R001700370002-3.pdf. The briefing reads "GENERAL DOZIER WAS KIDNAPPED THE EVENING OF 17 DECEMBER 1981. ON 18 DECEMBER, WE CONDUCTED OUR FIRST SESSION."
[^5]: CIA-RDP96-00788R000100250001-4, memorandum of March 23, 1982 from Robert J. Jachim, GRILL FLAME project manager, on the debriefing of BG Dozier at the Command SCIF, Fort Meade, on February 9, 1982. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00788r000100250001-4
[^6]: CIA-RDP96-00788R000100250011-3, Army Intelligence and Security Command message of January 25, 1982 reporting visions concerning BG Dozier, including "THE PLACE OF THE SHEPHERDS." https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00788r000100250011-3
[^7]: "Psychic Spies: Cold War Whimsy or Secret Weapon?," ABC News Nightline, November 28, 1995, Radio TV Reports transcript for the CIA Public Affairs Staff, CIA-RDP99-01448R000402140001-7.
[^8]: Press report datelined Rome, February 2, 1982, on General Dozier's press conference (publication not identified on the clipping), CIA-RDP96-00788R000100270006-7, cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R000100270006-7.pdf.

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@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ summary: "Steve Bannon is the Breitbart chairman, Cambridge Analytica vice presi
born: 1953-11-27
location: "Norfolk, Virginia (born)"
created: 2026-06-18
updated: 2026-09-25
updated: 2026-10-12
---
[[Steve Bannon|Steve Bannon]] (born November 27, 1953) is an American media executive and political strategist who served as executive chairman of [[Breitbart News|Breitbart News]] from 2012 (after founder [[Andrew Breitbart|Andrew Breitbart]]'s death) through 2016 and again 2017-2018, as vice president and secretary of [[Cambridge Analytica|Cambridge Analytica]] from June 2014 to August 2016, as chief executive of the [[Donald Trump|Trump]] 2016 presidential campaign from August 17, 2016, and as White House Chief Strategist and Senior Counselor to the President from January 20 to August 18, 2017. The [[Mercer family|Mercer family]] funded Breitbart, bankrolled Cambridge Analytica, and was instrumental in installing Bannon as Trump campaign CEO.[^1][^2][^3]
@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ Epstein sat for a videotaped interview with Bannon. A November 1, 2021 defense e
[^4]: For the Breitbart-Gamergate pipeline, see the Gamergate page.
[^5]: "The Mercers and Stephen Bannon: How a populist power base was funded and built." *Washington Post.* https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/mercer-bannon/ . For the June 2011 10 million dollar Breitbart investment, the Government Accountability Institute funding, and the *Clinton Cash* placement, see also "Steve Bannon used Robert Mercer's offshore millions to accuse Clinton of corruption." *ThinkProgress,* November 8, 2017.
[^6]: Mayer, Jane. "New Evidence Emerges of Steve Bannon and Cambridge Analytica's Role in Brexit." *The New Yorker.*
[^7]: "Christopher Wylie: Bannon wanted 'weapons' to fight a 'culture war' at Cambridge Analytica," testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee, May 16, 2018. *CBS News.* https://www.cbsnews.com/live-news/senate-cambridge-analytica-whistleblower-christopher-wylie-live-stream-updates-today-2018-05-16 ; and "How Steve Bannon used Cambridge Analytica to further his alt-right vision for America." *CNN,* March 30, 2018. https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/30/politics/bannon-cambridge-analytica
[^7]: Christopher Wylie, written statement, "In the Matter of Cambridge Analytica and Other Related Issues," Senate Committee on the Judiciary, May 16, 2018, paragraphs 8 and 9. https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/06/03/2026/05-16-18-wylie-testimony ; and "How Steve Bannon used Cambridge Analytica to further his alt-right vision for America." *CNN,* March 30, 2018. https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/30/politics/bannon-cambridge-analytica
[^8]: Green, Joshua. *Devil's Bargain: Steve Bannon, Donald Trump, and the Storming of the Presidency.* Penguin Press, 2017. For the Make America Number 1 / Keep the Promise I super PAC and the Mercer contribution, see "Make America Number 1." *Ballotpedia.* https://ballotpedia.org/Make_America_Number_1
[^9]: "Stephen Bannon removed from National Security Council." *Washington Post,* April 5, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/04/05/steven-bannon-no-longer-a-member-of-national-security-council/ ; Kuttner, Robert. "Steve Bannon, Unrepentant." *The American Prospect,* August 16, 2017. https://prospect.org/2017/08/16/steve-bannon-unrepentant/
[^10]: U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Library, EFTA01615267, DataSet 10, iMessage log between Jeffrey Epstein and Steve Bannon, August 23, 2018. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2010/EFTA01615267.pdf

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@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ relations:
role: "son"
fn: 6
created: 2025-08-05
updated: 2026-09-22
updated: 2026-10-12
---
William P. Barr worked at the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] from 1973 to 1977 while attending law school at night. "During my tenure at CIA, 1973 to '77, the investigations of the agency started, and I moved to the legislative counsel's office," he recalled; as assistant legislative counsel under Director [[George H.W. Bush]] in 1976 he worked against legislation of Representatives [[Michael Harrington]] and [[Bella Abzug]] that would have required notice to people whose mail the agency had opened under [[HTLINGUAL]]. He then clerked for Judge [[Malcolm Wilkey]] of the [[United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit|D.C. Circuit]], a former head of the Justice Department's Criminal Division, who telephoned Bush for a reference. After private practice and the Reagan transition he joined the [[White House]] domestic policy staff, where he worked with [[C. Boyden Gray]], counsel to Vice President Bush. In 1988 he helped screen vice-presidential candidates through [[Robert Kimmitt]].[^1]
@ -80,6 +80,10 @@ At the end of the administration Barr advised Bush to pardon [[Caspar Weinberger
Barr resigned from the board of [[Dominion Energy]] effective February 12, 2019, before his confirmation as attorney general.[^5] His department oversaw the federal prosecution of [[Jeffrey Epstein]] that year. His father, [[Donald Barr]], was headmaster of the [[Dalton School]] in New York during the period in which Epstein, a college dropout, was hired there to teach; accounts differ on whether Donald Barr personally hired him.[^6]
In a deposition before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on August 18, 2025, Barr was asked whether he had recused himself from the Justice Department's review of the Florida prosecution and plea agreement of Epstein. He answered, "No, I didn't recuse myself." He said that the Southern District of New York investigation was "the only thing that I was aware of going on when I was there," and that "I don't recall playing a role in the review of that." He said he had considered whether to recuse from the New York matter, and that the decision not to recuse was made on input from the department's ethics office, by his recollection. Asked about the 2019 Office of Professional Responsibility inquiry into the Florida plea deal, he said, "I wasn't hovering over that or involved in that."[^7]
Asked about his father's role as headmaster of the Dalton School, Barr said, "It's not pertinent at all." Asked about [[Kirkland & Ellis]] representing Epstein in the non-prosecution negotiations, and about his former employment with the firm, he said, "I actually don't think I would've had to recuse myself from that. But I just was never involved in that."[^8]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Miller Center, University of Virginia. "William P. Barr Oral History," interview of April 5, 2001, George H. W. Bush Oral History Project. https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/william-p-barr-oral-history
@ -88,3 +92,5 @@ Barr resigned from the board of [[Dominion Energy]] effective February 12, 2019,
[^4]: Lacey, Frederick B. "The Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Investigation: Report of the Independent Counsel," reproduced in House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, *Testimony of Former Employees of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro,* Serial No. 103-95, November 9, 1993; Gonzalez, Henry B. "Update on BNL Investigation," *Congressional Record,* House, January 21, 1993.
[^5]: Dominion Energy, Inc. Proxy statement, 2019, SEC Form DEF 14A, director table, note 4. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/715957/000119312519085276/d693331ddef14a.htm
[^6]: "The 'Epstein-Barr' Problem of New York City's Dalton School." *Law and Crime,* July 13, 2019, which states that Epstein was hired "by the school's headmaster Donald Barr in the mid 1970's". https://web.archive.org/web/2019/https://lawandcrime.com/high-profile/the-epstein-barr-problem-of-new-york-citys-dalton-school/
[^7]: Deposition of William P. Barr, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, August 18, 2025, pp. 47-48. https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Barr-Transcript.pdf
[^8]: Same transcript, pp. 51 and 92-93.

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@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ aliases:
- "William Casey"
category: "Intelligence & Government"
created: 2024-04-25
updated: 2026-10-08
updated: 2026-10-12
tags:
- KeyFigure
- Person
@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ relations:
role: "chairman"
start: 1971-04-14
end: 1973-02-02
fn: 16
fn: 18
---
William Joseph Casey was born March 13, 1913, in Elmhurst, Queens, New York. He attended [[St. John's University]] and Fordham Law School, becoming a corporate and tax attorney. During World War II he served in the [[Office of Strategic Services]] (OSS) under [[William J. Donovan|William "Wild Bill" Donovan]], rising to head the OSS's Secret Intelligence operations in Europe and coordinating the infiltration of agents into Nazi-controlled territory. After the war he became a wealthy lawyer and author of tax shelter guides. President [[Richard Nixon|Nixon]] appointed him Chairman of the [[Securities and Exchange Commission]] in 1971, a post he held through 1973. He managed [[Ronald Reagan]]'s 1980 presidential campaign. Reagan appointed him [[Director of Central Intelligence]] in January 1981, and he served as DCI until resigning due to illness in January 1987. He died May 6, 1987, at a hospital in Glen Cove, New York, having suffered a seizure in December 1986 and subsequently undergone brain surgery. He was subpoenaed to testify before the Senate [[Iran-Contra Affair|Iran-Contra]] investigating committee but died before he could appear.[^1]
@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ Reagan approved the intelligence finding for covert operations in [[Nicaragua]]
### The Secret 1982 Agreement
In early 1982, Casey and Attorney General [[William French Smith]] signed a formal Memorandum of Understanding that exempted CIA assets from drug crimes reporting. Crimes committed by people "acting for" an intelligence agency no longer needed to be reported to the [[Department of Justice]], and drug offenses were specifically removed from the list of crimes the CIA was required to report. For thirteen years, the CIA and Justice had what Inspector General Hitz called "a gentleman's agreement to look the other way." Robert Parry argued the timing proved premeditation: "That could only have been done for one purpose. They were anticipating what eventually happened. They knew drugs were going to be sold."[^5]
In early 1982, Casey and Attorney General [[William French Smith]] signed a formal Memorandum of Understanding that exempted CIA assets from drug crimes reporting. Crimes committed by people "acting for" an intelligence agency no longer needed to be reported to the [[Department of Justice]], and narcotics violations by non-employees were not on the list of crimes the CIA was required to report.[^6] Gary Webb, after quoting [[Fred Hitz|Hitz]]'s March 1998 testimony that the arrangement had been "hammered out" in 1982, wrote that for thirteen years "the CIA and Justice had a gentleman's agreement to look the other way."[^5] In an interview for the PBS series Frontline, Hitz said: "We didn't find any evidence of an understanding that official Washington was going to look the other way with respect to allegations of drug trafficking."[^7] Robert Parry argued the timing proved premeditation: "That could only have been done for one purpose. They were anticipating what eventually happened. They knew drugs were going to be sold."[^5]
### Protecting Drug Traffickers
@ -59,23 +59,23 @@ Casey decided not to raise allegations of [[Manuel Noriega|Noriega's]] cocaine t
### High Frontier correspondence
[[Daniel O. Graham]], the retired lieutenant general who directed the [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] from September 1974 to January 1, 1976, wrote to Casey about [[High Frontier]], the space defense group he had founded in 1981. On January 8, 1982 Casey wrote to Graham that the High Frontier prospectus was "very well done and deserving of close attention" and that he found "something of a disconnect" in its budget paragraphs, from a $35 billion figure to a higher $50 billion figure.[^6] Casey wrote to Graham on December 20, 1982 that he had enjoyed Graham's talk at the [[National Strategy Information Center]] breakfast and offered to arrange for Graham to exchange ideas with CIA officers knowledgeable about space and missile technology.[^7]
[[Daniel O. Graham]], the retired lieutenant general who directed the [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] from September 1974 to January 1, 1976, wrote to Casey about [[High Frontier]], the space defense group he had founded in 1981. On January 8, 1982 Casey wrote to Graham that the High Frontier prospectus was "very well done and deserving of close attention" and that he found "something of a disconnect" in its budget paragraphs, from a $35 billion figure to a higher $50 billion figure.[^8] Casey wrote to Graham on December 20, 1982 that he had enjoyed Graham's talk at the [[National Strategy Information Center]] breakfast and offered to arrange for Graham to exchange ideas with CIA officers knowledgeable about space and missile technology.[^9]
On July 23, 1986 Graham wrote to Casey enclosing a paper titled "Is the KGB Sabotaging SDI?", written after the loss of the shuttle Challenger, and urged Casey and [[Edwin Meese]] to "leave no stone unturned" in getting answers. A cover memorandum dated July 28, 1986, titled "Possible Soviet Sabotage of Our Space Program," carries Casey's instruction: "Please take the lead in drafting a response from me to General Graham."[^8] Casey replied on August 16, 1986, acknowledging Graham's letters of July 23 and 29, 1986, and rejected Graham's sabotage theory. He wrote that "we do not believe the U.S. space launch failures you cited were due to Soviet action," that the failures had been traced to "errors or procedural problems," and that "none of the investigations found any evidence of Soviet involvement."[^9] On December 8, 1986 Graham wrote to [[Robert Gates|Robert M. Gates]], then deputy director of the CIA, praising his assessment of Soviet strategic defense efforts, with a copy to Casey.[^10]
On July 23, 1986 Graham wrote to Casey enclosing a paper titled "Is the KGB Sabotaging SDI?", written after the loss of the shuttle Challenger, and urged Casey and [[Edwin Meese]] to "leave no stone unturned" in getting answers. A cover memorandum dated July 28, 1986, titled "Possible Soviet Sabotage of Our Space Program," carries Casey's instruction: "Please take the lead in drafting a response from me to General Graham."[^10] Casey replied on August 16, 1986, acknowledging Graham's letters of July 23 and 29, 1986, and rejected Graham's sabotage theory. He wrote that "we do not believe the U.S. space launch failures you cited were due to Soviet action," that the failures had been traced to "errors or procedural problems," and that "none of the investigations found any evidence of Soviet involvement."[^11] On December 8, 1986 Graham wrote to [[Robert Gates|Robert M. Gates]], then deputy director of the CIA, praising his assessment of Soviet strategic defense efforts, with a copy to Casey.[^12]
### National Intelligence Study Center
Casey is listed on the advisory board of the [[National Intelligence Study Center]] in Washington, alongside Graham and [[Paul Nitze]]. The board of directors of the center included [[Ray Cline]]. The center's invitation to an exhibit of intelligence books, dated November 3, 1983, carries these lists.[^11]
Casey is listed on the advisory board of the [[National Intelligence Study Center]] in Washington, alongside Graham and [[Paul Nitze]]. The board of directors of the center included [[Ray Cline]]. The center's invitation to an exhibit of intelligence books, dated November 3, 1983, carries these lists.[^13]
### Recruitment of James D. Theberge to the Senior Review Panel
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, in its October 24, 1991 report on the nomination of Gates, named Casey as one of three CIA officials involved in the recruitment and selection of [[James D. Theberge]] for the Senior Review Panel, with Deputy Director [[John McMahon]] and Executive Director [[James Taylor]].[^12] The report states that "the Committee's documentary evidence makes clear that Director Casey was the CIA official most instrumental in recruiting Mr. Theberge."[^12] The report records that Theberge disclosed his consulting work for a Cardoen subsidiary in the personal history statement he submitted to the CIA in December 1985, and that he was hired on a three-days-per-week basis.[^12] CIA visitor records held in the reading room list Theberge as meeting the director at headquarters in November 1984 and, as "Ambassador Theberge," calling on the director on September 23, 1985.[^13] A routing sheet of August 12, 1985 confirms a courtesy call on the director at 1100 hours on August 14, 1985, twelve days after Theberge left his post in Chile, stating that he "has completed his tour in Chile and has no particular items to discuss."[^14] In a memorandum of August 19, 1985 titled "Soviet Game Plan," Casey told the Vice Chairman of the [[National Intelligence Council]]: "You will get in touch with Theberge, talk about the project generally, see what he has to contribute and perhaps have him do some work on the Latin America phase of it."[^15]
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, in its October 24, 1991 report on the nomination of Gates, named Casey as one of three CIA officials involved in the recruitment and selection of [[James D. Theberge]] for the Senior Review Panel, with Deputy Director [[John McMahon]] and Executive Director [[James Taylor]].[^14] The report states that "the Committee's documentary evidence makes clear that Director Casey was the CIA official most instrumental in recruiting Mr. Theberge."[^14] The report records that Theberge disclosed his consulting work for a Cardoen subsidiary in the personal history statement he submitted to the CIA in December 1985, and that he was hired on a three-days-per-week basis.[^14] CIA visitor records held in the reading room list Theberge as meeting the director at headquarters in November 1984 and, as "Ambassador Theberge," calling on the director on September 23, 1985.[^15] A routing sheet of August 12, 1985 confirms a courtesy call on the director at 1100 hours on August 14, 1985, twelve days after Theberge left his post in Chile, stating that he "has completed his tour in Chile and has no particular items to discuss."[^16] In a memorandum of August 19, 1985 titled "Soviet Game Plan," Casey told the Vice Chairman of the [[National Intelligence Council]]: "You will get in touch with Theberge, talk about the project generally, see what he has to contribute and perhaps have him do some work on the Latin America phase of it."[^17]
### Securities and Exchange Commission, 1971 to 1973
Casey served as chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission from April 14, 1971 to February 2, 1973.[^16] During his chairmanship the commission was investigating the 1970 takeover of [[Investors Overseas Services]] by [[International Controls Corporation]]. The complaint filed in November 1972 described transfers of International Controls assets to entities controlled by [[Robert Vesco]].[^17]
Casey served as chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission from April 14, 1971 to February 2, 1973.[^18] During his chairmanship the commission was investigating the 1970 takeover of [[Investors Overseas Services]] by [[International Controls Corporation]]. The complaint filed in November 1972 described transfers of International Controls assets to entities controlled by [[Robert Vesco]].[^19]
The New Jersey Supreme Court's disciplinary opinion on [[Harry L. Sears]], a former majority leader of the New Jersey Senate, records that Sears conveyed Vesco's requests to [[John N. Mitchell]], then attorney general, in two letters and three meetings, and that Vesco hoped Mitchell could induce Casey "to monitor and limit the investigation." The opinion records that Mitchell telephoned Casey and arranged a meeting between Sears and the chairman. At that meeting Casey gave assurances that International Controls could respond to the investigation, and that he would personally review its claims of SEC harassment.[^18]
The New Jersey Supreme Court's disciplinary opinion on [[Harry L. Sears]], a former majority leader of the New Jersey Senate, records that Sears conveyed Vesco's requests to [[John N. Mitchell]], then attorney general, in two letters and three meetings, and that Vesco hoped Mitchell could induce Casey "to monitor and limit the investigation." The opinion records that Mitchell telephoned Casey and arranged a meeting between Sears and the chairman. At that meeting Casey gave assurances that International Controls could respond to the investigation, and that he would personally review its claims of SEC harassment.[^20]
### Footnotes
@ -83,17 +83,19 @@ The New Jersey Supreme Court's disciplinary opinion on [[Harry L. Sears]], a for
[^2]: Sick, Gary. *October Surprise: America's Hostages in Iran and the Election of Ronald Reagan*. Times Books, 1991.
[^3]: U.S. House of Representatives, October Surprise Task Force. *Joint Report of the Task Force to Investigate Certain Allegations Concerning the Holding of American Hostages by Iran in 1980*. 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, January 1993.
[^4]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991.
[^5]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998.
[^6]: Letter, William J. Casey to Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, January 8, 1982, CIA-RDP83M00914R001900220074-1. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp83m00914r001900220074-1
[^7]: Letter, William J. Casey to Graham, December 20, 1982, CIA-RDP88B00443R001203980021-9, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp88b00443r001203980021-9; the reading room also catalogues Graham's letter to Casey of December 9, 1982 under CIA-RDP83M00914R002400010001-8.
[^8]: Letter, Daniel O. Graham to William J. Casey, July 23, 1986, enclosing "Is the KGB Sabotaging SDI?", with the cover memorandum "Possible Soviet Sabotage of Our Space Program," July 28, 1986, CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6.
[^9]: Letter, William J. Casey to Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, August 16, 1986, CIA-RDP88B00443R002004470017-0.
[^10]: Letter, Daniel O. Graham to Robert M. Gates, December 8, 1986, CIA-RDP88G01116R000700840002-1, copy to William J. Casey.
[^11]: National Intelligence Study Center, invitation to the Russell J. Bowen collection exhibit, Georgetown University, November 3, 1983, CIA-RDP90-00806R000100430001-2.
[^12]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence*, S. Exec. Rept. 102-19, 102d Cong., 1st sess., October 24, 1991, section 5, PDF pages 186 to 188. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-10219.pdf
[^13]: Central Intelligence Agency, "American Ambassadors" visitor log, November 1984 (1045), CREST document CIA-RDP93-00415R000100040012-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp93-00415r000100040012-4; visitor record, September 23, 1985 (1645), CREST document CIA-RDP93-00415R000200230005-0, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp93-00415r000200230005-0.
[^14]: Central Intelligence Agency, "DCI 14 August 1985 Meeting with Mr. James D. Theberge, Former U.S. Ambassador to Chile," August 12, 1985, CREST document CIA-RDP87M00539R000801050023-0. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp87m00539r000801050023-0
[^15]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Soviet Game Plan," memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence to the Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council, August 19, 1985, signed William J. Casey, CREST document CIA-RDP97M00248R000500220030-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp97m00248r000500220030-9
[^16]: U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, "Historical Summary of Chairmen and Commissioners" (William Casey, Chairman, April 14, 1971 to February 2, 1973). https://www.sec.gov/about/sec-commissioners/sec-historical-summary-chairmen-commissioners
[^17]: U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, News Digest, November 28, 1972 (complaint of November 27, 1972 against Robert L. Vesco and 41 other defendants; transfers from International Controls Corp.; purchase in early 1971 of 6,000,000 shares of Investors Overseas Services). https://www.sec.gov/news/digest/1972/dig112872.pdf
[^18]: In re Sears, 71 N.J. 175 (1976) (Supreme Court of New Jersey, disciplinary opinion; the requests conveyed by Sears to Mitchell, and the meeting Mitchell arranged between Sears and Casey). https://static.case.law/nj/71/cases/0175-01.json
[^5]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue.
[^6]: CIA Office of Inspector General, *Report of Investigation: Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States* (96-0143-IG), Vol. II, *The Contra Story.* https://archive.org/details/nps56-111612-04
[^7]: PBS Frontline, *Drug Wars,* interview with Frederick P. Hitz, CIA Inspector General 1990 to 1998. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/special/hitz.html
[^8]: Letter, William J. Casey to Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, January 8, 1982, CIA-RDP83M00914R001900220074-1. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp83m00914r001900220074-1
[^9]: Letter, William J. Casey to Graham, December 20, 1982, CIA-RDP88B00443R001203980021-9, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp88b00443r001203980021-9; the reading room also catalogues Graham's letter to Casey of December 9, 1982 under CIA-RDP83M00914R002400010001-8.
[^10]: Letter, Daniel O. Graham to William J. Casey, July 23, 1986, enclosing "Is the KGB Sabotaging SDI?", with the cover memorandum "Possible Soviet Sabotage of Our Space Program," July 28, 1986, CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6.
[^11]: Letter, William J. Casey to Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, August 16, 1986, CIA-RDP88B00443R002004470017-0.
[^12]: Letter, Daniel O. Graham to Robert M. Gates, December 8, 1986, CIA-RDP88G01116R000700840002-1, copy to William J. Casey.
[^13]: National Intelligence Study Center, invitation to the Russell J. Bowen collection exhibit, Georgetown University, November 3, 1983, CIA-RDP90-00806R000100430001-2.
[^14]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence*, S. Exec. Rept. 102-19, 102d Cong., 1st sess., October 24, 1991, section 5, PDF pages 186 to 188. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-10219.pdf
[^15]: Central Intelligence Agency, "American Ambassadors" visitor log, November 1984 (1045), CREST document CIA-RDP93-00415R000100040012-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp93-00415r000100040012-4; visitor record, September 23, 1985 (1645), CREST document CIA-RDP93-00415R000200230005-0, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp93-00415r000200230005-0.
[^16]: Central Intelligence Agency, "DCI 14 August 1985 Meeting with Mr. James D. Theberge, Former U.S. Ambassador to Chile," August 12, 1985, CREST document CIA-RDP87M00539R000801050023-0. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp87m00539r000801050023-0
[^17]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Soviet Game Plan," memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence to the Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council, August 19, 1985, signed William J. Casey, CREST document CIA-RDP97M00248R000500220030-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp97m00248r000500220030-9
[^18]: U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, "Historical Summary of Chairmen and Commissioners" (William Casey, Chairman, April 14, 1971 to February 2, 1973). https://www.sec.gov/about/sec-commissioners/sec-historical-summary-chairmen-commissioners
[^19]: U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, News Digest, November 28, 1972 (complaint of November 27, 1972 against Robert L. Vesco and 41 other defendants; transfers from International Controls Corp.; purchase in early 1971 of 6,000,000 shares of Investors Overseas Services). https://www.sec.gov/news/digest/1972/dig112872.pdf
[^20]: In re Sears, 71 N.J. 175 (1976) (Supreme Court of New Jersey, disciplinary opinion; the requests conveyed by Sears to Mitchell, and the meeting Mitchell arranged between Sears and Casey). https://static.case.law/nj/71/cases/0175-01.json